social movement rhetoric anti abortion.pdf

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Social Movement Rhetoric and the Social

Psychology of Collective Action: A Case Study of

Anti-Abortion Mobilization

Nick Hopkins

1,3

and Steve Reicher

2

This paper seeks to contribute toward an integrated approach to social

movement mobil ization. It does so through considering how a social

psychological account of the determination of collective behavior (self-

categorization theory) may be applied to the mobilization rhetoric of social

movements. More specifically it argues that as people may define themselves

and act in terms of social categories, we may usefully conceive of social

movement rhetoric as being organized so as to construct social category

definitions which allow the activists preferred course of action to be taken on

by others as their own. Our theoretical argument is illustrated through the

detailed analysis of category construction in contemporary U.K. anti-abortion

argumentation.

KEY WORDS: social moveme nts; self-categorization theory; social identities;

rhetoric; abortion; fetus.

INTRODUCTION

If one considers the question of how people are mobilize d to pursue

particular political projects one is drawn to two literatures. The first con-

cerns social movements. The second, the social psychology of influence.

However, the dominant themes within these literatures are rather contra-

dictory.

On the one hand, the social movement literature demands a social

psychological analysis of collective behavior and the role of rhetoric in

changing people s conceptions of themselves, social issues, and their rela-

Human Relations, Vol. 50, No. 3, 1997

261

00187267/97/0300 0261$12.50/1 1997 The Tavistock Institute

1Departme nt of Psychology, University of Dundee, Dundee, Scotland.2St. Andrews University, Scotland.3Requests for reprints should be addresseed to Nick Hopkins, Department of Psychology,

University of Dundee, Dundee, Scotland.


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tionship with such issues. Thus, there has been a growing awareness that

it is not enough to study the objective conditions that give rise to grievances

or their psychological manifestations (e.g., feelings of relative depriva-

tion) without addressing the processes whereby issues come to be

framed or named as social problems (Schneider, 1985; Best, 1987;

Snow, Rochford, Worden, & Benford, 1986; Elder & Cobb, 1983) or

moral issues (Lee & Ungar, 1989). Further, there has been a recognition

of the relationship between such framings and the psychology of self-

definition: among other things, such framings organize experience, motivate

action, provide vocabularie s of motive , create group members (Wil-

liams, 1995; Snow et al., 1986). Indeed there is a general recognition that

the transformation of people s understanding of who they are and the situ-

ation that they are in is a key moment in mobilization and that activistsmay be expected to construct what is at stake so as narrow or broaden the

conflict and speak to public constituencies in ways that are supportive

of their project (Elder & Cobb, 1983).

Yet, when one turns to the social psychological literature on collective

behavior and mass social influence, one finds a body of work striking for

its neglect of the way in which issues are named and framed. Indeed, far

from concerning itself with the content of political argument and the way

in which this constructs peoples understandings of themselves and their re-

lations with particular courses of action, we have a social psychology which

typically neglects the content of argumentation (Billig, 1987) and seeks to

explain mass social influence in terms of the effects of a source s attractive-

ness and status (Mills & Aronson, 1965; Eagly & Chaiken, 1975; Hovland

& Weiss, 1951) , the role of emotion (Leventhal, 1970) , distraction from mes-

sage content (Osterhouse & Brock, 1970), message structure (Hovland,

Lumsdaine , & Sheffie ld, 1949; Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953) etc. The gen-

eral tenor of social psychologys approach is well capture d in Pratkanis andAronsons (1992) Age of Propaganda which emphasizes the limited capacity

of human beings cognitive resources and the ways in which these may be

exploited in order to circumvent thoughtful deliberation.

Thus, where students of social movements highlight the need for a so-

cial psychology capable of addressing the ways in which peoples under-

standings of themselves and their relationship with the world may be

transformed through the ideas contained in political rhetoric, we have a so-

cial psychology which seems to imply that the content of such rhetoric is of

little theoretical interest. Our purpose in this paper is to contribute toward

the social psychological analysis needed for an integrated analysis of social

movement communication. More specifically, we take a recently developed

theory of collective behavior that has its roots in experimental social psy-

chology and consider how it may be applied outside the laboratory to make

262 Hopkins an d Reicher


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sense of several features of mobilization rhetoric. Below, we describe this

model, discuss how it may be extended, and illustrate its utility through ap-

plying it to a specific example of social movement communication.

THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR

Self-Categorization Theory or SCT (Turner, 1991; Turner, Oakes,

Haslam, & McGarty, 1994; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell,

1987) argues that people are able to define themselves at different levels

of abstraction. Thus, people may define themselves in terms of their indi-

viduality (and contrast themselves from other individuals) . Or they may

define themselves in terms of particular social categories (e.g., as Scottish

vs. English). At a still higher level of abstraction, they may define them-

selves as members of the human race and differentiate themselves from

nonhumans. As a corollary, the theory holds that the way in which one

defines one self is not fixed but variable and that ones sense of psycho-

logical distance from others will change according to the level of

abstraction at which the self is defined. According to the theory, it is this

ability to define the self in terms of social categories that makes collective

behavior possible . Put simply, the adoption of a particular self-categoriza-tion results in one seeing oneself as equivalent to, and interchangeable with,

other exemplars of the category, with the corollary that one forms a cog-

nitive representation of the attributes associated with this category which

is then used to guide ones own behavior.

The argument that collective behavior is mediated by identification

with social categorie s carries several implications. First, conformity to the

categorys norms is dependent upon identification with the category

(Abrams & Hogg, 1990; Reicher, 1984a). Second, the direction of behavior(i.e ., what is done) is controlle d and determined by the categorys con-

tents (the norms and values held to define the category) (Hogg & Turner,

1987; Reicher, 1984b). As a corollary, collective behavior possesses a co-

herence with messages which advocate actions that are incongruent with

the category definition being rejected (Reicher, 1987). Third, as members

conform to the ir unde rstanding of what represents their cate gory in contrast

to others, the theory implies that a persons ability to define a categorys

contents will be determined by their relationship to the category as a whole.

More specifically, as members view themselves as interchangeable exem-

plars of a category (rather than as unique individuals) , the views of those

defined as common category members will be perceived as more self-rele-

vant (and so be more influential) than those defined as out-group members

(Abrams, Wetherell, Cochrane, Hogg, & Turner, 1990; Wetherell, 1987).

Psych ology of Collective Action 263


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Applying this logic to the issue of mass social influence and political

mobilization has the following implication. If what is done is determined

by the categorys contents and who is involve d in this activity is determined

by the breadth of the categorys boundarie s, political mobilization may be

viewed as depending upon people adopting a self-categorization, the con-

tents of which support the actions that activists wish to promote.

ARGUMENTS ABOUT SOCIAL CATEGORIES

As individuals may define themselves in a multitude of differe nt ways,

it is obvious that an adequate account of mass social influe nce and mobi-

lization must address the issue of how particular categories come to be

used rather than others. Turner et al. (1994) seek to address this questionthrough the concepts of accessibility and fit. Accessibility refers to

the individual s readine ss to use a particular category according to their

goals, motives and past experiences. Fit refers to the match between a

category and the nature of the situation and takes two forms. The first, or

comparative fit, refers to the relationship between categories and the dis-

tribution of the stimuli that are to be categorized. Thus, stimuli are more

likely to be categorized as an entity to the degree that the average differ-

ences between them are less than the average differences between themand the other stimuli that comprise the frame of reference. The second,

or normative fit, implies that if a particular categorization is to be ac-

cepted as appropriate , there must be a congruency between the categorys

social meaning and the nature of the stimuli. Thus, according to the the ory,

gender categories are more likely to be used to represent a discussion be-

tween men and women if all the males said one thing and all the females

another (comparative fit), and if the content of these different positions

were consonant with gender stereotypes (normative fit).While recognizing the me rits of this formulation and its experimental

support (Oakes, Turner, & Haslam, 1991), it is open to readings which

imply that the relevance of social categories may be mechanically read

off the social context by an isolated individual e ngage d in an internal cog-

nitive act of computation (Reicher, 1993; Reicher & Hopkins, 1996a, b).

At first sight, this might be taken as signaling the limitation of SCTs utility

in a domain in which the contested nature of social reality is a key theme.

Indeed, if the analysis of social movements shows anything it is that the

issue of how people make sense of themselves and their situation is com-

plex. As Elder and Cobb put it, the issue of who has what at stake is never

simply a matter of the facts of the situation but of what facts are con-

sidered relevant and of the meanings people assign to them (Elder &

Cobb, 1983, p. 129) . In a similar vein, Reicher (1993) observes that in order



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to make sense of something like the Gulf war, one must identify the nature

of the conflict and the identities of those involved, and that this inevitably

requires argument about who is to be viewed as part of the social context

and how their actions are to be construed. Thus, when deciding on how

to make sense of the conflict we could be faced with arguments about

whether to include U.S. activitie s in Vietnam, Grenada, and Nicaragua in

the picture or not, and if so, how to represent these activitie s. Similarly,

when considering the Arab states position in the war, our judgments are

continge nt on argume ntation about which pieces of information should be

taken as best representing their position (e.g., we may argue over whether

to pay attention to state presidents or spiritual leaders pronouncements,

the number and size of the pro- and anti-war demonstrations, etc.). In other

words, whether the conflict is defined as involving two adjace nt dictator-ships, a dictator and the rest of the world, the West against the Islamic

world, and so on, is crucially dependent upon argumentation about which

pieces of information are relevant and how they are to be characterized

(c.f. Elder & Cobb, 1983).

These observations about the essentially contestable nature of social

reality are not intended to dispute the core theoretical thrust of SCT.

Rather, they are to make the point that if categories are to be viewed as

intimately related to context, then our ability to argue about the nature ofthat context entails an ability to argue over the re levance , inclusive ness,

and content of social categories. Thus, while accepting SCTs analysis of

collective behavior as action in accordance with the norms, values, and

knowledge associated with categories, we wish to emphasize that the na-

ture of these categories is a site of argument and is constructed in and

through language (Reicher & Hopkins, 1996a, b). Indeed, we would ob-

serve that it is precisely because of the consequences of social category

definitions for the scope and direction of collective action that argumentsabout such issues are felt important and therefore exist.

THE PLACE OF CATEGORY ARGUMENTS IN POLITICAL

MOBILIZATION

If both the scope and the content of collective action is determined

by category definitions then we could expect this to have implications for

mobilization rhetoric. First, we could expect activist speakers to define the

category boundarie s so as to include as many of the audience as possible .

Second, if the speakers views are to be perceived as relevant for others,

we may expect the category boundarie s to be constructed so that the

speaker and audience are defined in terms of a common categorization

and opposition activists represented as standing outside this category.



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Third, as attitudes and behaviors are adopted according to their perceived

congruence with the relevant self-definition, we could expect the relation-

ship between the speakers proposed attitude s/behaviors and the category

used to define the audience to be constructed so as to be congruent (and

those of the opposition as incongrue nt). While the term argument con-

veys the notion that category definitions are constructed and disseminated

through language , it is also important to recognize that this occurs in a

context where there are alternative category constructions in circulation

(Billig, 1987). Thus, at the same time as exploring the ways in which a

particular definition is constructed, it is also important to consider how

these opposition alternatives are represented and the ways in which the

preferred construction undermines them.

In order to demonstrate the utility of this formulation, we now con-sider the debate about abortion and the role of category arguments in

defining the debate s protagonists and the nature of their positions.

ARGUING ABOUT ABORTION

The relevance of the Protagorian maxims that there are two sides to

every issue and humans are the measure of all things is graphically il-

lustrated if one considers the status of the human fetus. This entity maybe conside red to be both similar to and differe nt from childre n or adult

persons and its categorization is therefore inevitably dependent upon the

argumentative construction of particular attributes as relevant for our judg-

ment. Further, as the weighing of these arguments about the existence,

rele vance , and value of these dimensions is inextricably linke d with a com-

munitys beliefs and values, the categorization of the fetus is inevitably a

social choice (Condit, 1990) in which as Knutson puts it people are defined

by people (Knutson, 1967, p. 7). The socially chosen nature of the dimen-sions according to which the fetus may be categorized is well illustrated in

social anthropologic al (Williamson, 1978; Minturn, 1989; Morgan, 1989)

and ethnographic (Kovit, 1978) studies.

However, the controversy around abortion is not restricted to the

status of the fetus: people also argue over the meaning of abortion, the

nature of the abortion debate s protagonists, and their relationship with

wider publics. Indeed, in keeping with our general position, there is evi-

dence that activists in the debate seek to name or frame the issue so as

to broaden the constituency to which their position appeals (Mall, 1981).

By way of example, consider the symbolic significance of the names used

by campaign groups opposed to the U.S. Equal Rights Amendment and

abortion: names such as Women Concerned for America and FLAG

(Family, Life, America, God) framed these as threats to the American



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structed a broade r more inclusive category which include d himse lf, his audi-

ence, and others (e.g., enviornmentalists, activists concerned about animal

welfare, etc.) and defined it in contradistinction from another broad cate-

gory of people (whose values lead them to tolerate the exploitation of

nature for personal gain). Thus, although not himself able to claim mem-

bership of the medical profession, the speaker and audience were, at this

higher order of abstraction, defined as common category members and our

analysis e xplore d the ways in which this construction of an in-group rela-

tionship allowed him to represent himself and his anti-abortion views as

not only relevant for this audience but as arising from their identity.

While we cannot know whether audience members accepted these

category constructions, we feel that our analysis provides prima facie evi-

dence for the importance of category argumentation in polit icalmobilization. However, the general applicability of our framework may be

questioned for it could be argued that the prominence of category-related

argume ntation in this speech was due to the distinctive nature of the audi-

ence (members of a professional occupational category at their workplace)

and that our framework would be of less use in making sense of the content

of speeches addressing more heterogeneous audiences. In order to examine

the wider applicability of our analysis of the place of category argumenta-

tion in organizing collective action, this paper analyzes a speech given tojust such an audie nce. Be fore proce eding, we conside r several aspects of

anti-abortion rhetoric designed for mass public consumption.

ANTI-ABORTION ARGUMENTATION AND GENERAL AUDIENCES

The historical dependence of the anti-abortion position on religious

argumentation has meant that anti-abortion communication with general

public audiences has often been difficult (Hopkins & Reicher, 1992). Whilemeaningful within the relevant (e.g., religious) communitie s, this discourse

has had little widespread resonance and has isolated anti-abortionists from

large sections of an increasingly secular society. An important response to

the mismatch between this rhetoric and wider public audiences has been

the attempt to establish the fully human status of the fetus through other

means. Of particular interest has been the use of photographic imagery

(Condit, 1990; Petchesky, 1987; Mall, 1981; Daniels, 1993). Three features

of this material stand out. First, these images are highly selected and cut

so as to maximize the perceived similarity between fetus and neonate. For

example, one particularly powerful image is of the feet of a 10-week-old

fetus held between an adults fingers. Although a 10-week-old fetus looks

very different from a newborn, their fetal feet are visually similar. When

photographe d in such a way that the adults fingers holding the fetus quite



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literally obscure the visual differences between it and the newborn, we are

led to see the feet as standing in for the whole and hence perceive a small

human being (Condit, 1990, p. 88). Second, these pictures are read

through a lens of cultural meanings. For example, Condit argues that in

Western societies, the code for what is visually human is very broad and

that in a culture where even the bright look in a dogs eye can be inter-

preted as personality (Condit, 1990, p. 85) it was not surprising that fetal

pictures could be read as human beings and the richly embedded cultural

meanings of human being ascribed to them (Condit, 1990, p. 211). Third,

although highly selected and cut so as to be read through these cultural

lenses, the appare nt objectivity of photographic materials (the ir appe arance

of being a mechanical analogue of reality and a message without a

code

; Barthes, 1982, cited in Petchesky, 1987, p. 269) obscures the argu-mentative nature of these images. Indeed, their association with medical

science has allowed an inevitably highly constructed image of the fetus to

be represented as a fact thereby laying the basis for the generalization

of an anti-abortion position to a much wider audie nce than that within

reach of more traditional argumentation.

Given the central role of visual imagery in anti-abortion materials de-

signed for general audiences (e.g., leaflets, posters, adverts), it was little

surprise to find that it played a prominent role in the speech delivered tothe general audience that we analyze here. Of course, the fact that it was

so prominent makes the speech particularly interesting. While there has

been some attention to the content and organization of such photography

(see Condit, 1990; Petchesky, 1987) there has been little exploration of the

ways in which our readings of such images are directed by verbal argumen-

tation. However, Condit observes that this analysis is particularly important:

on their own visual images are rather inexplicit and a picture is potentially

a thousand different words (Condit, 1990, p. 81, original emphasis). Thus,the analysis of this speech provides an opportunity to consider the argu-

mentation surrounding such imagery and indeed this imagerys place in

category definition.

THE SPEECH

The speech, involving a slide presentation, was given by a senior maleofficial from the U.K. Society for the Protection of the Unborn Child

(SPUC) to students at a public meeting organize d by a student anti-abor-

tion society.4

Transcribed, it runs to 15 and a half pages of single-spaced


4The speech was given in a lecture theatre at Dundee University, Scotland, in 1993. Of course

it is possible to conceive of a student audience as differing from an ideal general audience


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text. After some introductory comments referring to a contemporary legal

judgment conce rning euthanasia, the spe aker turne d to abortion and the

slide presentation began. A total of ten slides were shown. First, five slides

depicted the fetus at various stages of development. In sequence they were:

a fetus at 6 and half weeks (shown inside an amniotic sac hanging between

the fingers of a doctor); a 10-week-old fetuss feet (the rest of the body

was masked by an adults fingers); fetuses at 11 or 12 weeks; 16 weeks; 23

weeks. Second, four slides of dismembered aborted fetuses were presented

as he described common abortion procedures. Finally, and as a conclusion,

a slide of an intact 10-week-old fetus was presented.

ANALYSIS

The Issue: Abortion as Killing

The general framing of the issue at hand (offered in his introduction)

drew a parallel between abortion and the war in Northern Ireland. Indeed,

he noted that recently there had been:

1. The three thousandth death, the three thousan dth victim of the trou-

bles in Northern Ireland, which coincidentally began in 1967, the year the

Abortion Act was passed, the three thousandth victim s life was claimed on,

you know, all sides of the tragic circumstances surrounding Northern Ireland.

Every single week in hospitals, in Britain, three thousand five hundred unborn

children are killed. Now, what one has to make up ones mind about on this

issue, is, is the unborn child a fellow human or not? To my mind, that is the

crunch issue and everything else, if you like is dependent upon that answer.

If the answer you arrive at, lets say after this evening, is no, the unborn child

is not a fellow human being, then thats fine, let

s forget about it. But if the

answer is yes, the unborn child is a fellow human being, then how do we

face up to the fact that three thousan d five hundred are killed?

One hour late r, the presentation conclude d with the final slide and

these words:

2. Here we have an embryo, a fetus of 10 weeks growing in the womb

and the womb has become the most dangerous place on earth to be: one baby

is killed for every four babies that are born .


and imagine argumentative constructions which are specifically designed to appeal to students

in terms of values associated with age or education (e.g., academic rationality). However,

we believe that a student audience may be seen as exemplifying many of the features of a

more general public audience: while a speaker faced with a medical audience working in a

hospital has an audience for whom a specific occupational identity is particularly meaningful

and which presents itself as a fairly obvious focus for attention, a general student audience

offers no such distinctive identity to work with.


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Overall, these paralle ls imply a direct comparability betwee n the fetus

and the adult person and between abortion and killing. Before turning to

how this definition of the heart of the debate was developed through his

construction of the fetus let us consider his construction of the debates

protagonists and their relationship with the audie nce.

The Protagon ists an d Their Style of Argumentation

A major problem facing U.K. anti-abortion propagandists is the wide-

spread public support for access to legal abortions (Francombe, 1989)

which means that they are particularly vulnerable to arguments which de-

fine them and their ideas as unrepresentative and marginal to public

opinion. At the start of the speech, the speakers construction of SPUCtook steps to counter such a construction:

3. We have tradition ally over the past 25 years gathered most of our

support from young people which is why we are a growing society. We have

six and a half thousand new members last year and given that we are, as

well as being an educational organisation, an organisation dedicated to pro-

moting research, dedicated to promoting knowledge on the unborn child, we

are also a non-party political organisation and I think for any group to be

developing that fast, if it was any political party that had six and a half thou-sand new paid up members in the course of the year, I think they would be

pretty happy.

This construes his own position as one which has a growing base. Fur-

ther, it is represented as based upon research with his own mode of

communication involving education and the dissemination of knowledge.

This theme was also manifested in his use of research scientists findings

to back up his claims as well as in his invitation for the audie nce to conduct

its own research:4. So, incidentally, I don t expect you to swallow what I say, I dont

expect you to just believe what I say hook, line and sinker. But I do expect

people to check on what I say and I also expect people to check on what the

pro-abortion lobby says on these issues, go back an d check. I thin k its terribly

important when so many claim s on so many issues are constantly made, we

should always go back and check.

With his own style of argumentation defined as educational and open

to rational appraisal, he defined the opposition s as devious. For example ,

he argued that the media collaborate d with the pro-abortion lobby and

silenced debate with this being illustrate d by a story of how a radio phone -

in presenter switched off a SPUC member mid-sentence and proceeded

in the rest of the program me to refer to her as that clown who was talking

out of her backside . This contrast between the protagonists style of ar-



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gumentation implied that pro-abortion sentiments only circulate because

proper debate is silenced with the corollary that public support for abortion

is based on misinformation. This theme was developed through the con-

struction of a series of commonalitie s betwee n anti-abortionists and public

opinion. One step was to emphasize the receptiveness of the public to

SPUC argumentation:

5. I am sure that many if not all of you here this evening will be en-

couraged to know that education, persistence and giving people access to the

truth, giving people access to facts from objective sources, does actually work.

People are fundamentally open to the truth and you know, the one thing we

have to guard against, and I think it goes wider, than, in in than, just on the

defence of the sanctity of hum an life. What we have to guard again st are those

in our community who seek to stop a particular point of view being expressedby various intimidatory measures.

Overall, this defines anti-abortionist argumentation as having a natural

resonance with public opinion and construes pro-abortion activists as being

a small and deviant group who fail to properly represent both the contents

of wider opinion and the appropriate style of argume nt. The implication

that people would adopt an anti-abortion position if only free and open

debate were allowed is made quite explicit when he argued that 99.99%

of students

would be anti-abortion ifgiven the facts.

A second step in building a consonance between anti-abortionist ar-

gumentation and the wider constitue ncy of public opinion involve d the

representation of the content of anti-abortion argumentation as common-

sense. For example when discussing the argument that without legal

abortion there would be dangerous back street abortions he argued that:

6. Theres an awful lot of good pro-life people who find this a difficult

argument. When I say, good pro-life people, I mean people who are naturally

pro-life, bu t just dont, you know, they have been convinced by the constantmedia repetition of this argument. And again, we have to do two things, theres

the common-sense of the mum and dad, who have seen their baby on the

ultra sound machine at the hospital; there is the common sense way of looking

at this argument. And there is also the hard evidence.

This constructs a body of people who, though apparently supporting

the availability of legal abortions, are in essence naturally pro-life and

against abortion. Further, his invocation of common-sense in his discus-

sion of how to communicate with such people implies a fundame ntal

congruency between what people naturally think or feel and the anti-abor-

tion message . This militate s against constructions of anti-abortionists as

outside mainstre am opinion and indeed implie s that they are simply ar-

ticulating what people already know but may have lost sight of because of

the constant media repetition . A particularly interesting feature of this



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construction concerns the way in which this pro-life common-sense is

constructed through reference to the vie ws and experiences of quite specific

people (i.e., the mum and dad, who have seen their baby on the ultra sound

machine at the hospital). The selection of these people to stand in for the

whole (i.e., public opinion) is important because such people stand in a

particular relationship to the fetus. Such people have willingly accepted the

pregnancy, developed a sense of responsibility for it, and, through their

actual and anticipate d reorganization of the ir lives, welcomed the fe tus as

a separate entity into their lives (Lumley, 1980; Stainton, 1985). As such,

social and relational factors are so important in the ascription of fetal per-

sonhood (Minturn, 1989; Morgan, 1989), and the willingly pregnant likely

to see the fetus in qualitative ly diffe rent ways from the unwillingly pregnant

(Maquire, 1989), the construction of such figures as representatives of eve-ryday common-sense is important for the audie nce is encourage d to see

what such willing parents may see: a baby person. Further, generalizing a

construction of the fe tus which is actually continge nt upon particular social

relations to all is important because it has the effect of representing a highly

constructed perception of the fetus as natural and inevitable . Indeed, the

definition of such a construction of the fetus as common-sense implie s that

it is not his construction (and hence one that is constructed and interested)

but a neutral description of what

everyone

knows. Again this not onlynaturalize s a particular construction of the fetus (see below) but give s sub-

stance to his claim that there are broad congruencies between himself and

the common-sense of the community. Indeed, these two issues are intri-

cately related: the anti-abortion position is represented as based upon the

common-sense knowledge that every ordinary person has.

Having outlined his representation of the protagonists in terms of their

style of argume ntation and his representation of the commonalitie s between

himself and his audie nce in terms of the form and content of their argu-mentation, we can now more properly turn to his construction of the fetus.

The Fetus

Constructing the Fetus as a Human Person

7. Now, you were you and I was me at the moment of conception. When

sperm and ovum un ite in fertilisation , the complete genetic information is pre-

sent, that spells out the characteristics, that you are goin g to have ginger hair,

6 foot tall, be good at maths or music, maybe a great athlete, maybe you will

develop some sort of heart condition . All these characteristics are there in the

single cell with which we all began .



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Here there is a se lection of a serie s of dime nsions of similarity/diffe r-

ence (and a definition of their significance ) which creates a powerful sense

of continuity in personal identity. Further, it is one which is of personal

significance for every living adult; each of us is invite d to see a range of

attributes of enormous significance for our current sense of personhood as

being similarly present in the fertilized ovum. This sense of continuity is

developed in his commentary upon the first slide (which features a vaguely

discernible embryo in its amniotic sac which was removed as it was an ec-

topic pregnancy):

8. This slide demonstrates how viable the embryo is, what a tremendous

determination to live the embryo has, because even though its in the wrong

place, its not being very clever, its not showing much foresight, which is a

very human characteristic, the embryo carries on growing in the tube becauseit has the right nutrients surrounding it: thus test-tube babies, which grow first

of all in the petrie-dish .

Viability, often used to differentiate between stages of fetal devel-

opment (and hence legitimate abortion at particular developmental stages),

is construed to dissolve such distinctions and advance instead a sense of

continuity. Further, the embryo is ascribed an agency (a tremendous de-

termination to live) which, through its construction as error-prone, appears

distinctive ly

human.

In his commentary upon the second slide (showingtwo fetal feet and introduced as one of the most upsetting pictures we show,

because these two perfectly formed feet were attached to a perfectly formed

tiny body) he again ascribes the fetus an agency:

9. Mothers to be and fathers to be, routinely see these days, their chil-

dren developing in the womb, moving around in the womb as early as 7

weeks when spontaneous movements begin and one lawyer member of ours

said he saw his unborn child doing the breast-stroke in the womb. And we

move with much more agility and co-ordination and ease and grace of move-ment in the womb where we are surrounded by amniotic fluid, where you

know, in those early weeks in the womb we have tremendous space in which

the tiny human can move around, its only a couple of inches long, but every-

thing is there and the baby leaps around like a ballet dancer, like an acrobat .

(Excluded material) It can also make complex facial expressions and even

smile.

The naming of movements (as swimming, smiling, etc.) construes

them as controlled or purposeful, and further, because it ascribes them a

social significance allows us to perceive a sense of continuity between our-

selves as we are now and as we were then. This is developed when he

argues that we moved with more ease and grace in the womb thereby

implying that the only difference between these stages of our personal ex-

istence is that we have lost something. Once again it is noteworthy that



15/26

our perspective on the fetus is constructed through the eyes and experi-

ences of quite specific people; willing parents watching the ultrasound

video-screen. Again, this invites us to view the fetus through the eyes of

particular social actors and so not only encourage s us to ascribe the fetus

the status ascribed by those positione d in this relationship (Maquire, 1989)

but grounds this highly constructed image in the direct experience of eve-

ryday others.

Elsewhere, these same constructions were grounde d in the direct ex-

perience and hard evidence (c.f. extract 6) of scientists. For example he

cited one leading geneticist as observing that those involved in the first

test-tube baby:

10. . . . knew with absolu te certainty, that the being that was created

in a petrie-dish would develop into nothing other than a mature human if itjust developed in the normal way and didn t die on route, that they could be

absolutely certain it wasnt a mole, it was a member of the human family and

I say, they put it very simply themselves: She looked beautiful in the test tube,

she looks beautiful now.

Her beauty in the petrie dish and her beauty as a newborn, create

a powerful sense of continuity such that our cultural response to the latter

is applie d to the former. Of particular interest is the way in which the

ascription of attributes associated with personhood is made easier through

the argument that they could be absolutely certain it wasnt a mole, it was

a member of the human family. Simply put, the ambiguity concerning what

being a member of the human family entails, means that our agreement

with the statement that this being is human (and not a mole) may encour-

age us to ascribe to it all of those things that we associate with human

beings.

Others Constructions of the Fetus

At the same time alternative constructions of the fetus were charac-

terised so as to render them untenable . One strategy was to present a series

of different criteria for categorization (you ll get some who say human life

begins then, youll get others who say, no, it begins when the baby starts moving,

you ll get others wholl say no, it begins when the babys heart starts beating)

and conclude on the basis of this range of constructions that:

11. So, we see there is a complete inconsistency in the argument, as

there must be if you claim as any other starting point that which can be shown

to be the case from a scientific point of view that human individual develop-

ment begins from conception. Any other point is completely arbitrary.



16/26

Charges of inconsiste ncy are frequently observed in argume ntation

(Billig, 1987) and are of special interest here for they turn attention to the

opposition s argumentation while detracting attention from aspects of his

own. Indeed, his ridiculing of others argumentation surrounding the selec-

tion of features as a basis for categorizing the fetus is interesting because

it seemingly denies the possibility of social categorization at all and thereby

obscures the fact that his own categorization is similarly based upon the

active singling out and construction of dime nsions of similarity and conti-

nuity. This tactic of advancing a categorization as natural or given

through appare ntly denying the possibility of categorization was also to be

found in his description of how a pro-abortionist (Professor We ndy Savage )

had responded to an anti-abortionist in a TV debate. During the pro-

gramme the latter held up a plastic model of a fetus declaring12. Look this is what we are talking about. This is a baby of 18 weeks.

and Professor Wendy Savage shouted across the room, the studio: Thats not

a baby, its a fetus. Now, all of us have different technical names as we go

through lifes journey. We begin as embryos, we go on to be fetuses, when we

are born the doctors call us neonates, we become infants, toddlers, children,

adolescen ts, adults, geriatrics an d so on. I have yet to hear of a proud new

father looking over the cot of his new born baby and saying: What a lovely

neonate Ive got.

(some audience laughter) If he did, I think it would say

more about him and his state of mind than it would about the humanity of

his baby. Well, its quite proper for the doctor to call it a neonate, its quite

proper for the doctor to call the unborn child a fetus, bu t you start usin g nam es

like that deliberately and you could question what is Professor Wendy Savage

trying to do? She is trying to foist a particular attitude towards the unborn

child and towards the unborn childs rights on to the viewers on that particular

occasion and you know, using names to distance people from the human re-

ality of the unborn child, this is a common ploy in all great campaigns forand against human rights, in particular instances.

This construes the opposition s use of the category fetus as a specific

instance of their general deviousne ss. Thus, while both pro- and anti-abor-

tionists seek to advance particular constructions of the fetus, his

construction of the opposition s motives detracts from the argumentative

substance behind it, and through the contrast that it implies, renders his

own as disinterested. That his preferred construction should be seen as a

nonconte stable description of reality is developed by his dismissal of the

rele vance of the distinctions implied by such categorizations as neonate

or adolescent. Defining them as merely technical has the effect of de-

tracting attention from the way in which our categorizations are bound up

with complex public deliberation about the meaning of adulthood and the

degree to which the rights of adulthood can be claimed by others (Aries,



17/26


18/26

possibly at the same hospital at possibly the sam e day in Britain , a baby pos-

sibly the same age would have been taken and put into an incinerator lawfully,

or put into a kidney dish and left to die, the only difference would be that

this is a so called wanted baby and the other is a so called unwanted baby.

So, people are given human rights according depending on their degree of want-

edness.

The choice of a slide of a wanted fetus again invites the audience to

see the fetus through the eyes of people who have welcomed the preg-

nancy and are like ly to ascribe the fe tus a distinctive social status. Indeed,

the act of naming is a practice associated with social birth (Minturn,

1989; Morgan, 1989) and powerfully conveys her welcome into a social

community. Again the important point here is that a sense of personhood

that is contingent on a particular social relationship (and which affectsour reading of the visual image before us) is universalized so that all fe-

tuses are seen as Kellys rather than as pieces of tissue or blobs of

jelly and as a corollary, the pro-abortion construction ridicule d as wholly

inadequate.

So far, we have described the speakers construction of the protago-

nists relationship with ordinary people and explored the way in which

a particular construction of the fetus was made to seem obvious. Let us

now look at the construction of women.

Women and Pro-abortionists

As anti-abortionists speak in a context in which they are vulnerable

to constructions which define them as reactionary and anti-women, we

could expect the speaker to define the relationship between women andabortion so as to break the opposition s construction of abortion as ex-

pressing womens political interests. Indeed, in a speech directed to a

general audience which seeks to univerzalise a particular construction of

the fe tus and the act of abortion through presenting it as being grounde d

in everyone s common-sense knowledge of reality, it is vitally important

that the spe ake r anticipate alternative constructions which could splinte r

such a general category and identify categories of people that have a

pro-abortion position based on political analyse s of wome ns place in so-

ciety.

Below we consider how women were represented in relation to the

fetus, the act of abortion and the debate s protagonists, and how the con-

struction of these relations functioned to separate women from those

calling for abortion.



19/26

The Significant Absence of Women as Persons

At the same time as the fetus was established as a separate social actor,

the womans presence was obscured. Thus, as a corollary of representing

the fetus as a free-floating autonomous being, the woman was rendered in-

visible (e.g., in extract 9 she was reduced to a backdropa tremendous

space). In similar vein, the woman was represented as an environment.

For example, in his discussion of test-tube babies he argued that:

15. If the test tube were to say, this baby is my property, nobody would

believe the test tube. And when the pro-abortion lobby argues the baby is part

of the mothers body, it is exactly, we can make exactly the sam e poin t, we

have a living human growing in the mothers womb dependent upon the mother

for life, bu t depen den ce does not mean you are part of the body of which youare dependent.

Construing an equivalence between the test tube and women invites

us to view the woman as akin to a non-animate containe r. This not only

supports a clear sense of the separate identity of container and containe d,

but also encourage s us to see the woman as simply a passive environme nt

which like the test-tube is not dramatically affected by the contained. The

construction of woman as containe r was further developed through the fol-

lowing representation of dependency:16. All of us were dependent on some body when we were born, we were

not part of the people upon whom we were dependent. My baby granddaughter

was born prematurely at thirty weeks, was dependen t upon the incubator in

the first several weeks of her life. She did not stop being part of her mothers

body when she was born prematurely at thirty weeks and start to be part of

an incubator. We recognised her as Hannah who required a particular envi-

ronment in which to live and we all require a particular environm ent in which

to live.

Again, the analogy between the woman and the incubator is powerful

because it defines the woman as an inanimate container that is unchanged

by the presence of the fetus. With no sense of the woman s personhood

and no sense of the reciprocal relationship between woman and fetus, we

have little sense of how the womans personhood is affected by the changes

of pregnancy and hence no sense of the woman as a person able to ar-

ticulate claims about her body.

Women as Onlookers

That women may articulate demands for abortion was also countered

by a construction of the debate s protagonists which defined women as on-



20/26

lookers while others advocate d abortion on the grounds of cost-cutting. This

construction of the logic behind abortion occurred while the image of the

23-week-old Kelly lingered on screen (5th slide, extract 14). Having con-

trasted the care extended to Kelly with the abortion of similarly aged

others, he argued that most of the children who are killed after 24 weeks

are handicappe d and that the Departme nt of Health and some doctors

prom ote the killing of the disabled for explicitly financial reasons. Thus,

while his earlier construction of women as environme nts meant that there

was an absence of women as persons, the disability example allows him to

represent women as particular sorts of persons: those that desperately want

their babies and who are forced into abortion in a moment of panic be-

cause of the pressures imposed upon them by others.

Women as Victims

In addition to the above , the speaker also constructe d womens health

as a direct victim of abortion:

17. Now, post-abortion syndrome is a disorder wh ich is in exactly within

the same sort of pattern as other post traumatic stress disorders which is some-

thing first recognised in war veterans, whereby if you like, behaviour patternsin these veterans might culminate in some dramatic incident or other and mas-

sive evidence was built up to show that all sorts of behaviou r patterns really

related back to som e unresolved trauma that they had experienced while fight-

ing in Vietnam and unfortunately because, you know, there is a tremendously

growin g body of eviden ce, you ll see it in popular womens magazines, youll

see it in serious medical journals, showing that women need to go through a

natural grievin g process following miscarriage; theyre mourning their lost child.

They dont talk after all, they say, I lost my baby, they do not talk abouthaving aborted a fetus which is perhaps a more accurate technical way of

putting it. They say theyve lost their baby. And there is the same sort of rec-

ognition about abortion .

The experience of a woman who is willingly pregnant and desperately

wants a child (and here has a miscarriage) is once again made to stand in

for all womens experiences. While before this meant that a construction

of the fetus continge nt upon a particular relationship was generalize d and

naturalize d, a similar effect is obtaine d here for women. In other words,

the experiences of a woman who has defined herself and her fetus in terms

of a mother

child relationship is made to stand in for the whole. As a

consequence we see allpregnant women as viewing their fetuses as unborn

children and as experiencing the same sense of loss after abortion as that

suffered by a woman after miscarriage. Note too how the meaningle ssness



21/26

of the categorization fetus is conveyed and how this again advances his

own as directly arising from womens experience. Further, this construction

of womens experience has consequences for others attempts to represent

abortion as an important element of womens political interests. Thus, in-

stead of being an expression of womens interests, abortion is represented

as inevitably harmful with the implication being that it is the anti-abortion-

ists that best represent womens interests. This is forcefully conveyed when

the speaker refers to the pro-abortion campaigners slogan a womans

right to choose and their opposition to anti-abortion education: their

opposition shows that they can never properly represent women because:

18. They want a woman s right to choose but they don t want a woman s

right to know what shes choosing.

DISCUSSION

Inevitably, the application of our theoretical analysis to specific in-

stances of communication entails a process of active interpretation.

However, we hope to have provided the reader with enough material to

be able to judge the argument that it is useful to pay close attention to

how the content of political rhetoric constructs social categories and cate-

gory contents. More specifically we hope to have demonstrated that thisdiscourse defines both anti-abortionists and audience as common-category

members, and represents the anti-abortion construction of the fetus as

firmly grounded in, and indeed as arising from, the common-sense knowl-

edge and everyday experience s of a category of people whose boundarie s

are so widely set as to include all ordinary/everyday people.

Furthe r, we hope to have provide d a fine -graine d analysis of the

rhetoric used to define the contents of this category. Thus, our analysis

highlights the way in which the experiences of particular people (e.g.,ordinary mums and dads, women grieving over miscarried babies, etc.)

were used to stand in for and define the whole. More specifically, it ex-

plores the way in which these others experiences imply that the speakers

preferred representation of the fetus (i.e., as a fully human person) is

neither his, nor argumentatively constructed, but a given, known by all

within the community (and alternative constructions of the fetus con-

strued as thoroughly marginal) . Further, we hope to have contribute d to

an understanding of the ways in which our reading of visual imagery is

directed by verbal argumentation. Seeing the screen fetuses through

the eyes of willing parents allows the sense of fetal personhood contin-

gent upon that particular social relationship (Maquire, 1989) to be gen-

eralized to all. The real grief associated with miscarriage and the real

excitement of prospective parents before an ultrasound scanner, brings



22/26

these screen images to life in a way which counters opposition argu-

ments that anti-abortionists are preoccupied with abstract metaphysical

and religious debate rather than everyday reality. Indeed, according to

this construction, if anyone ignore s reality it is the pro-abortionists who

cannot see what everyone else can seethat the fetus is a human person

and that abortion is killing.

We would also emphasize that the power and significance of these

constructions can only be properly recognized if they are conte xtualize d in

relation to the pro-abortion alte rnative s that have some currency. Take for

example, the construction of women. As the identification of political in-

terests (and hence the demands for political rights) is contingent upon

the adoption of particular collective identities (c.f. Brodie et al., 1992) much

pro-abortion activity has been associated with the construction and dissemi-nation of politicized analyse s of womanhood. For the se re asons, this

speakers construction of women has a special significance : where pro-abor-

tion activists have sought to represent women in terms of a distinctive

category with distinctive political demands, they are here either reconsti-

tuted as the prototypical representatives of an everyday knowledge which

holds that a fetus is a person or as victims of abortion.

CONCLUSION

As explaine d in the introduction, one reason for analyzing this par-

ticular speech was to consider the degree to which our emphasis upon the

prominence of category argument could apply to speeches given to hetero-

geneous public audiences as well as audiences that may be defined in terms

of quite specific (e.g., occupational) categories. Comparing this speech with

that given to medical staff (Hopkins & Reicher, 1992; Reicher & Hopkins,

1996a) illustrate s major differences in the content of argumentation. Thespeaker addressing the medical audience argued that there was a funda-

mental schism in the public s values and proceeded to construct an

anti-abortion definition of what it meant to be a professional medical prac-

titioner through locating it on one side of this value divide and in

opposition to the other. Thus, a striking feature of that speech was the

explicit construction of contrasting social categories defined in terms of

their values.

When we consider the present speech we find such explicit category-

related argumentation to be markedly absent. However, our analysis

suggests that on closer inspe ction there is much to be gaine d from analyzing

both speeches in terms of their arguments about social category definitions.

More specifically, our analysis implies that the key difference between these

speeches is the level of abstraction at which the categories used to represent



23/26

the audiences are defined. In the speech directed to the medical audience

the category was more specific/less inclusive and defined through contrasts

with other categories. In the speech analyze d here, the category was more

general and so inclusive as to be almost universal. Further, and as a cor-

ollary, the category contents were defined in such a way that the

anti-abortion construction of the fetus was construed as arising from or-

dinary peoples experiences and common-sense knowledge. Thus, although

the two speeches differ in the nature of the categories used and the manner

in which their contents were defined, there is an important sense in which

both speeches can be analyzed for the work that they do in representing

the anti-abortion position as arising from their audie nces social identities.

Of course, the detailed analysis of this anti-abortion speech should not

be taken as indicating that it is exceptional in any respect: we could expectto find those seeking to mobilize support for abortion to devote consider-

able attention to constructing and disseminating social category definitions

which make mass pro-abortion action possible . Indeed, in an analysis of

the mobilization rhetoric in another domain (Reicher & Hopkins, 1996b)

we describe how speakers with very different projects (those attempting to

mobilize support for a strike and those attempting to mobilize opposition

to it) used similar forms of argume ntation. More specifically our analysis

showed that although differing in the content of their argumentation, bothconstructed category boundarie s and category contents which represente d

their own position as embodying the mass of public opinion and their op-

pone nts as isolate d and periphe ral figure s. However, our decision to

analyze this speech was made on theoretical grounds. While we could have

complemented our earlier analysis of anti-abortion argumentation by ana-

lyzing pro-abortion mobilization rhetoric, we believe that there is a

theoretical case for exploring category-related argumentation in different

contexts. In particular, we hope to have demonstrated that even in contextswhere one may not expect category argumentation (e.g., where the audi-

ence cannot be defined in terms of a distinctive group me mbership and

contrasted from others) it is he lpful to analyze the content of rhetoric for

the work that it does in constructing social category definitions.

Of course, to have demonstrated the existence of category-argumen-

tation in social movement communication is not to say anything about the

degree to which speakers are consciously aware of their activity. Nor is it

to say anything about the reception given to particular constructions. Thus,

the next stage of our research program is to consider the degree to which

audiences accept particular category constructions as the basis for their ac-

tion. In this sense, our emphasis upon the importance of category

construction in political mobilization must remain provisional. However, in

the light of the very considerable evidence that social categories have im-



24/26

portant consequences for cognition and action, we hope to have persuaded

the reader that this approach has some promise.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The authors wish to thank Jannat Saleem and Suzanne Zeedyk for

their very helpful comments upon an earlier draft of this paper.

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WILLIAMSON, L. Infanticide: An anthropological analysis. In M. Kohl (Ed.), Infanticide and

the Value of Life. New York: Prometheus Books, 1978.

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTESNICK HOPKINS is a Lecturer in Social Psychology at Dundee University and has research

interests in issues concerning social identity, social influence, social conflict, and political

mobilization.

STEVE REICHER is a lecturer in Social Psychology at St. Andrews University and has

research interests in social conflict, social influence, mass/crowd behavior, racism, and the

social construction of collective identities.


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