social preferences, beliefs, and cooperation in games with positive and negative outcome valence...
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Social preferences, beliefs, and cooperation in games with positive and
negative outcome valence
Maik M.P. Theelen
Robert Böhm
RWTH Aachen University
Ryan O. Murphy
Kurt A. Ackermann
ETH Zurich
16th International Conference on Social Dilemmas, 2015
Background
Real-world social dilemmas often have negative outcomes.
Böhm & Theelen (submitted)Repeated PGG, positive vs. negative outcomesMore cooperation when there were negative outcomes
Murphy & Ackermann (submitted)
Social preferences, beliefs, and cooperation in games with positive and negative outcome valenceMaik Theelen | 16th International Conference on Social Dilemmas | 23.06.2015
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Social Preferences
Beliefs- About other’s cooperative
behavior- About other’s social
preferences
Cooperative Behavior
Research Questions
Does outcome valence lead to differences in cooperation, SVO and beliefs?
Do personality characteristics explain possible shifts in cooperation, SVO and beliefs between positive and negative outcome domains?
Honesty-Humility, HEXACO (Lee & Ashton, 2004; Ashton & Lee, 2009)
Loss-Aversion (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984)
Social preferences, beliefs, and cooperation in games with positive and negative outcome valenceMaik Theelen | 16th International Conference on Social Dilemmas | 23.06.2015
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Design & Experimental sequence
Social preferences, beliefs, and cooperation in games with positive and negative outcome valenceMaik Theelen | 16th International Conference on Social Dilemmas | 23.06.2015
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Positive Outcome Negative OutcomePersonality
Characteristics
SVO SVO Beliefs
Cooperation & Beliefs SVO SVO
BeliefsCooperation &
Beliefs • Honesty-Humility• Loss-Aversion
• 96 students (45 women, age = 22.94)
• Within-subject (counterbalanced)
• Cooperation, SVO and beliefs measures were incentivized
SVO measures
Slider Measure (Murphy, Ackermann & Handgraaf, 2011)
Social preferences, beliefs, and cooperation in games with positive and negative outcome valenceMaik Theelen | 16th International Conference on Social Dilemmas | 23.06.2015
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SVO Positive
SVO measures
Slider Measure (Murphy, Ackermann & Handgraaf, 2011)
Social preferences, beliefs, and cooperation in games with positive and negative outcome valenceMaik Theelen | 16th International Conference on Social Dilemmas | 23.06.2015
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SVO Positive
SVO Negative
One-Shot Public Good Game
Social preferences, beliefs, and cooperation in games with positive and negative outcome valenceMaik Theelen | 16th International Conference on Social Dilemmas | 23.06.2015
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Positive Outcome Negative Outcome
Endowment per round 20 20
Public account 0 -240
MPCR 0.5 0.5
Payoff range in tokens 10 / 50 -50 / -10
Group Size 4
Exchange rate 100 tokens = 1,50 euro
Personality Characteristics
Honesty-Humility (HEXACO)Example:
» I wouldn’t pretend to like someone just to get that person to do favors for me.
» 5-point Likert scale
Loss AversionExample Item 1o Nothing happens (Status Quo)o 50% chance to win 100 Euro and 50% chance to lose 100 euro
Social preferences, beliefs, and cooperation in games with positive and negative outcome valenceMaik Theelen | 16th International Conference on Social Dilemmas | 23.06.2015
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Succeeding items increased by 20
Does outcome valence lead to differences in cooperation, SVO and beliefs?
Social preferences, beliefs, and cooperation in games with positive and negative outcome valenceMaik Theelen | 16th International Conference on Social Dilemmas | 23.06.2015
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Descriptives
Social preferences, beliefs, and cooperation in games with positive and negative outcome valenceMaik Theelen | 16th International Conference on Social Dilemmas | 23.06.2015
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Mean (SD)
Positive Outcome Negative Outcome
SVO 29.93 (12.55) 29.26 (12.34)
SVO Beliefs 29.93 (10.72) 27.6 (10.06)
Cooperation 7.09 (6.05) 7.66 (6.23)
Cooperation Beliefs 8.1 (4.6) 8.63 (4.67)
Cooperation beliefs pos – neg
Social preferences, beliefs, and cooperation in games with positive and negative outcome valenceMaik Theelen | 16th International Conference on Social Dilemmas | 23.06.2015
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Cooperation Beliefs Positive
Co
ope
ratio
n B
elie
fs N
eg
ativ
e
Do personality characteristics explain possible shifts in Cooperation, SVO and Beliefs between
positive and negative outcome domains?
Social preferences, beliefs, and cooperation in games with positive and negative outcome valenceMaik Theelen | 16th International Conference on Social Dilemmas | 23.06.2015
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Cooperation Belief diff – Cooperation diff
Social preferences, beliefs, and cooperation in games with positive and negative outcome valenceMaik Theelen | 16th International Conference on Social Dilemmas | 23.06.2015
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Difference score = negative outcome – positive outcome
Cooperation Belief Difference
Co
ope
ratio
n D
iffe
ren
ce
Indirect Effect Honesty-Humility
Social preferences, beliefs, and cooperation in games with positive and negative outcome valenceMaik Theelen | 16th International Conference on Social Dilemmas | 23.06.2015
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Honesty-Humility
Cooperation beliefs difference
Cooperation difference
Indirect effectb = 0.128, BCa 95% CI [0.038,0.244]k2 = 0.138, BCa 95% CI [0.039,0.270]
+ +
Indirect Effect Loss Aversion
Social preferences, beliefs, and cooperation in games with positive and negative outcome valenceMaik Theelen | 16th International Conference on Social Dilemmas | 23.06.2015
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Loss Aversion
Cooperation beliefs difference
Cooperation difference
Indirect effectb = 0.105, BCa 95% CI [-0.004, 0.267]k2 = 0.111, BCa 95% CI [0.009, 0.288]
+ +
Conclusion
Considerable amount of variance between positive and negative outcome measures
Shifts in cooperation beliefs explain shifts in cooperation.
Honesty-Humility and Loss-Aversion drives these differences in beliefs.
Social preferences, beliefs, and cooperation in games with positive and negative outcome valenceMaik Theelen | 16th International Conference on Social Dilemmas | 23.06.2015
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Social preferences, beliefs, and cooperation in games with positive and negative outcome valenceMaik Theelen | 16th International Conference on Social Dilemmas | 23.06.2015
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Maik Theelen
RWTH Aachen University
Aachen, Germany
Thank you for your attention!
Design
96 students (45 women, age = 22.94) Within-subject design 4 sessions (counterbalanced) Written instruction (envelopes) Slider measure and PGG incentivized Duration: 1:15 (including payment) Average earning: € 11.10
Social preferences, beliefs, and cooperation in games with positive and negative outcome valenceMaik Theelen | 16th International Conference on Social Dilemmas | 23.06.2015
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