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Social preferences, beliefs, and cooperation in games with positive and negative outcome valence Maik M.P. Theelen Robert Böhm RWTH Aachen University Ryan O. Murphy Kurt A. Ackermann ETH Zurich 16th International Conference on Social Dilemmas, 2015

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Page 1: Social preferences, beliefs, and cooperation in games with positive and negative outcome valence Maik M.P. Theelen Robert Böhm RWTH Aachen University Ryan

Social preferences, beliefs, and cooperation in games with positive and

negative outcome valence

Maik M.P. Theelen

Robert Böhm

RWTH Aachen University

Ryan O. Murphy

Kurt A. Ackermann

ETH Zurich

16th International Conference on Social Dilemmas, 2015

Page 2: Social preferences, beliefs, and cooperation in games with positive and negative outcome valence Maik M.P. Theelen Robert Böhm RWTH Aachen University Ryan

Background

Real-world social dilemmas often have negative outcomes.

Böhm & Theelen (submitted)Repeated PGG, positive vs. negative outcomesMore cooperation when there were negative outcomes

Murphy & Ackermann (submitted)

Social preferences, beliefs, and cooperation in games with positive and negative outcome valenceMaik Theelen | 16th International Conference on Social Dilemmas | 23.06.2015

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Social Preferences

Beliefs- About other’s cooperative

behavior- About other’s social

preferences

Cooperative Behavior

Page 3: Social preferences, beliefs, and cooperation in games with positive and negative outcome valence Maik M.P. Theelen Robert Böhm RWTH Aachen University Ryan

Research Questions

Does outcome valence lead to differences in cooperation, SVO and beliefs?

Do personality characteristics explain possible shifts in cooperation, SVO and beliefs between positive and negative outcome domains?

Honesty-Humility, HEXACO (Lee & Ashton, 2004; Ashton & Lee, 2009)

Loss-Aversion (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984)

Social preferences, beliefs, and cooperation in games with positive and negative outcome valenceMaik Theelen | 16th International Conference on Social Dilemmas | 23.06.2015

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Page 4: Social preferences, beliefs, and cooperation in games with positive and negative outcome valence Maik M.P. Theelen Robert Böhm RWTH Aachen University Ryan

Design & Experimental sequence

Social preferences, beliefs, and cooperation in games with positive and negative outcome valenceMaik Theelen | 16th International Conference on Social Dilemmas | 23.06.2015

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Positive Outcome Negative OutcomePersonality

Characteristics

SVO SVO Beliefs

Cooperation & Beliefs SVO SVO

BeliefsCooperation &

Beliefs • Honesty-Humility• Loss-Aversion

• 96 students (45 women, age = 22.94)

• Within-subject (counterbalanced)

• Cooperation, SVO and beliefs measures were incentivized

Page 5: Social preferences, beliefs, and cooperation in games with positive and negative outcome valence Maik M.P. Theelen Robert Böhm RWTH Aachen University Ryan

SVO measures

Slider Measure (Murphy, Ackermann & Handgraaf, 2011)

Social preferences, beliefs, and cooperation in games with positive and negative outcome valenceMaik Theelen | 16th International Conference on Social Dilemmas | 23.06.2015

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SVO Positive

Page 6: Social preferences, beliefs, and cooperation in games with positive and negative outcome valence Maik M.P. Theelen Robert Böhm RWTH Aachen University Ryan

SVO measures

Slider Measure (Murphy, Ackermann & Handgraaf, 2011)

Social preferences, beliefs, and cooperation in games with positive and negative outcome valenceMaik Theelen | 16th International Conference on Social Dilemmas | 23.06.2015

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SVO Positive

SVO Negative

Page 7: Social preferences, beliefs, and cooperation in games with positive and negative outcome valence Maik M.P. Theelen Robert Böhm RWTH Aachen University Ryan

One-Shot Public Good Game

Social preferences, beliefs, and cooperation in games with positive and negative outcome valenceMaik Theelen | 16th International Conference on Social Dilemmas | 23.06.2015

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 Positive Outcome Negative Outcome

Endowment per round 20 20

Public account 0 -240

MPCR 0.5 0.5

Payoff range in tokens 10 / 50 -50 / -10

Group Size 4

Exchange rate 100 tokens = 1,50 euro

Page 8: Social preferences, beliefs, and cooperation in games with positive and negative outcome valence Maik M.P. Theelen Robert Böhm RWTH Aachen University Ryan

Personality Characteristics

Honesty-Humility (HEXACO)Example:

» I wouldn’t pretend to like someone just to get that person to do favors for me.

» 5-point Likert scale

Loss AversionExample Item 1o Nothing happens (Status Quo)o 50% chance to win 100 Euro and 50% chance to lose 100 euro

Social preferences, beliefs, and cooperation in games with positive and negative outcome valenceMaik Theelen | 16th International Conference on Social Dilemmas | 23.06.2015

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Succeeding items increased by 20

Page 9: Social preferences, beliefs, and cooperation in games with positive and negative outcome valence Maik M.P. Theelen Robert Böhm RWTH Aachen University Ryan

Does outcome valence lead to differences in cooperation, SVO and beliefs?

Social preferences, beliefs, and cooperation in games with positive and negative outcome valenceMaik Theelen | 16th International Conference on Social Dilemmas | 23.06.2015

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Page 10: Social preferences, beliefs, and cooperation in games with positive and negative outcome valence Maik M.P. Theelen Robert Böhm RWTH Aachen University Ryan

Descriptives

Social preferences, beliefs, and cooperation in games with positive and negative outcome valenceMaik Theelen | 16th International Conference on Social Dilemmas | 23.06.2015

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Mean (SD)

Positive Outcome Negative Outcome

SVO 29.93 (12.55) 29.26 (12.34)

SVO Beliefs 29.93 (10.72) 27.6 (10.06)

Cooperation 7.09 (6.05) 7.66 (6.23)

Cooperation Beliefs 8.1 (4.6) 8.63 (4.67)

Page 11: Social preferences, beliefs, and cooperation in games with positive and negative outcome valence Maik M.P. Theelen Robert Böhm RWTH Aachen University Ryan

Cooperation beliefs pos – neg

Social preferences, beliefs, and cooperation in games with positive and negative outcome valenceMaik Theelen | 16th International Conference on Social Dilemmas | 23.06.2015

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Cooperation Beliefs Positive

Co

ope

ratio

n B

elie

fs N

eg

ativ

e

Page 12: Social preferences, beliefs, and cooperation in games with positive and negative outcome valence Maik M.P. Theelen Robert Böhm RWTH Aachen University Ryan

Do personality characteristics explain possible shifts in Cooperation, SVO and Beliefs between

positive and negative outcome domains?

Social preferences, beliefs, and cooperation in games with positive and negative outcome valenceMaik Theelen | 16th International Conference on Social Dilemmas | 23.06.2015

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Page 13: Social preferences, beliefs, and cooperation in games with positive and negative outcome valence Maik M.P. Theelen Robert Böhm RWTH Aachen University Ryan

Cooperation Belief diff – Cooperation diff

Social preferences, beliefs, and cooperation in games with positive and negative outcome valenceMaik Theelen | 16th International Conference on Social Dilemmas | 23.06.2015

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Difference score = negative outcome – positive outcome

Cooperation Belief Difference

Co

ope

ratio

n D

iffe

ren

ce

Page 14: Social preferences, beliefs, and cooperation in games with positive and negative outcome valence Maik M.P. Theelen Robert Böhm RWTH Aachen University Ryan

Indirect Effect Honesty-Humility

Social preferences, beliefs, and cooperation in games with positive and negative outcome valenceMaik Theelen | 16th International Conference on Social Dilemmas | 23.06.2015

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Honesty-Humility

Cooperation beliefs difference

Cooperation difference

Indirect effectb = 0.128, BCa 95% CI [0.038,0.244]k2 = 0.138, BCa 95% CI [0.039,0.270]

+ +

Page 15: Social preferences, beliefs, and cooperation in games with positive and negative outcome valence Maik M.P. Theelen Robert Böhm RWTH Aachen University Ryan

Indirect Effect Loss Aversion

Social preferences, beliefs, and cooperation in games with positive and negative outcome valenceMaik Theelen | 16th International Conference on Social Dilemmas | 23.06.2015

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Loss Aversion

Cooperation beliefs difference

Cooperation difference

Indirect effectb = 0.105, BCa 95% CI [-0.004, 0.267]k2 = 0.111, BCa 95% CI [0.009, 0.288]

+ +

Page 16: Social preferences, beliefs, and cooperation in games with positive and negative outcome valence Maik M.P. Theelen Robert Böhm RWTH Aachen University Ryan

Conclusion

Considerable amount of variance between positive and negative outcome measures

Shifts in cooperation beliefs explain shifts in cooperation.

Honesty-Humility and Loss-Aversion drives these differences in beliefs.

Social preferences, beliefs, and cooperation in games with positive and negative outcome valenceMaik Theelen | 16th International Conference on Social Dilemmas | 23.06.2015

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Page 17: Social preferences, beliefs, and cooperation in games with positive and negative outcome valence Maik M.P. Theelen Robert Böhm RWTH Aachen University Ryan

Social preferences, beliefs, and cooperation in games with positive and negative outcome valenceMaik Theelen | 16th International Conference on Social Dilemmas | 23.06.2015

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Maik Theelen

RWTH Aachen University

Aachen, Germany

[email protected]

Thank you for your attention!

Page 18: Social preferences, beliefs, and cooperation in games with positive and negative outcome valence Maik M.P. Theelen Robert Böhm RWTH Aachen University Ryan

Design

96 students (45 women, age = 22.94) Within-subject design 4 sessions (counterbalanced) Written instruction (envelopes) Slider measure and PGG incentivized Duration: 1:15 (including payment) Average earning: € 11.10

Social preferences, beliefs, and cooperation in games with positive and negative outcome valenceMaik Theelen | 16th International Conference on Social Dilemmas | 23.06.2015

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