social protection project - world bank€¦ · report no.: 20085 implementation completion reiport...

Document ofThe World Bank

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Report No.: 20085

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REIPORT

REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA

SOCIAL PROTECTION PROJECT(Loan 39570-AR)

April 7,2000

Country Management Unit for Argentina, Chile and UruguayHuman Development Sector Management UnitLatin America and the Caribbean Regional Office

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in theperformance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosedwithout World Bank authorization.

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTCurrent Unit = Argentine Peso

US $1.00 = 1 peso

FISCAL YEARJanuary 1- December 31

GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

APRENDER Apprenticeship Program for the UnemployedANSES Administracion Nacional de Seguridad Social/National Administration of Social

SecurityASOMA Program Apoyo Solidario a los Mayores/ Nutrition Program for the ElderlyCAS Country Assistance StrategyCHAGAS Programa de Control de Enfermedades de Chagasl Program for the Control of

Infectious DiseasesDEP Direcci6n de Evaluacion Presupuestarial Directorate of Budgetary EvaluationDNPGS Direcci6n Nacional de Programaci6n de Gasto Social! Directorate of Public Social

ExpendituresFOPAR Fondo Participativo de Inversi6n Social! Participatory Social Investment FundFORESTAR Program for Creation of Employment through

Reforestation ProjectsGDP Gross Domestic ProductGNP Gross National ProductGOA Government of ArgentinaIBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and DevelopmentIDB Inter-American Development BankINDEC Instituto Nacional de Estadisticay Censos/National Institute of Statistics and CensusMCE Ministerio de Cultura y Educacion/ Ministry of Culture and EducationMIS Management Information SystemMOE Ministerio de Economial Ministry of EconomyMOH Ministerio de Salud/Ministry of HealthMTSS Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social! Ministry of Labor and Social SecurityNBI/ UBN Necesidades Basicas Insatisfechasl Unsatisfied Basic NeedsNGO Non-governmental OrganizationNUBs Nzcleo de Beneficiarios! Nucleus of BeneficiariesPAI Programa Ampliado de Inmunizacionl Immunization ProgramPEP Programa de Empleo Privado/Private Employment ProgramPIU Project Implementation UnitPRENO Programa de Entrenamiento Ocupacional! Occupational Training ProgramPROAS Programa de Asistencia Solidarial Social Assistance ProgramPRODESO Programa Participativo de Dessarrollo Social/ Participatory Social Development

ProgramPRONAPAS Programa Nacional de Pasantias/National Internship ProgramPROSSE Mexico Program of Essential Social ServicesPSA Programa Social Agropecuariol Social Program for AgriculturePSE Plan Social Educativol Social Educational ProgramSDS Secretaria de Desarrollo Social! Social Development SecretariatSIEMPRO Sistema de Informaci6n, Monitoreo, y Evaluaci6n de Programas Socialesl Social

Information, Monitoring, and Evaluation of Targeted Social ProgramsTRABAJAR Argentina Public Works ProgramUCAF Unidad de Coordinaci6n Administrativo Financiera del Programa Participativo de

Desarrollo Social/Financial and Administrative Unit of PRODESOUEC Unidad Ejecutora Central! SIEMPRO's Central Unit

Vice President David de Ferranti

Country Unit Director Myma AlexanderCountry Sector Leader Alexandre AbrantesTask Manager Polly Jones

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Table of Contents

PREFACE .................................................. HI

EVALUATION SUMMARY .................................................. IV

PART I: PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT

PROJECT BACKGROUND .............................................................................................................................PROJECT OBJECTIVES AND DESCRIPTION ............................................................. 1.IMPLEMENTATION RECORD .............................................................. 3ACHIEVEMENT OF ORIGINAL OBJECTIVES ............................................................. 5MAJOR FACTORS AFFECTING THE PROJECT .............................................................. 6PROJECT SUSTAINABILITY ............................................................. 7BANK PERFORMANCE .............................................................. 8BORROWER PERFORMANCE .............................................................. 8ASSESSMENT OF OUTCOME .............................................................. 9LESSONS LEARNED .............................................................. 9CURRENT AND FUTURE OPERATIONS ............................................................. 10

PART II: STATISTICAL ANNEX

TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF ASSESSMENTS ............................................................. 12TABLE 2: RELATED BANK LOANS ............................................. . .............. 15TABLE 3: IBRD PROJECT TIMETABLE ............................................................. 16TABLE 4: LOAN DISBURSEMENTS (ESTIMATED AND ACTUAL) ............................................................. 16TABLE 5A: KEY INDICATORS FOR PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION- PART A .......................... ......................... 1 7TABLE 5B: KEY INDICATORS FOR PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION- PART B ...................................... .............. 18

TABLE 5C: KEY INDICATORS FOR PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION- PART C ....................................... ............. 19

TABLE 6: STUDIES INCLUDED IN THE PROJECT ............................................................. 20TABLE 7A: PROJECT COSTS ............................................................. 21TABLE 7B: PROJECT FINANCING ............................................................. 22TABLE 8: STATUS OF LEGAL COVENANTS ............................................................. 23TABLE 9: BANK RESOURCES- STAFF INPUTS ............................................................. 24TABLE 10: BANK RESOURCES- MISSION INPUTS ............................................................. 25TABLE I 1: FEDERAL SPENDING ON TARGETED SOCIAL PROGRAMS .......................................................... 26TABLE 12: FOPAR- SUB-PROJECTS FUNDED BY TYPE ............................................................. 27

APPENDIX: BORROWER CONTRIBUTION TO THE ICR

PARTS B AND C: SECRETARIAT FOR SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT ......................................................... 28

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance oftheir official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

ii

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPCIRT

ARGENTINA

SOCIAL PROTECTION PROJECT(LOAN 39570-AR)

PREFACE

This is the Implementation Completion Report (ICR) for the Social Protection Project in Argentina, forwhich Loan 39570-AR in the amount of US$152.0 million was approved by the Board on November 21, 1995.The Legal Agreement was signed on December 5, 1995, and the Loan became effective on December 14, 1995.Part A of the Loan closed on September 30, 1999. Parts B and C closed on October 31, 1998, and December 31,1998, respectively. The original closing date of the Loan was June 30, 1998. The final recovery of the specialaccount took place in November, 1999 and a cancellation of US$27,249.000 is being processed.

The preparation of this ICR was coordinated by Polly Jones. Kimberly Nead prepared the sectionsrelating to Part A of the Project and Jorge Barrientos prepared the sections relating to Parts B and C. TheBorrower prepared its own evaluation of Project execution for Parts B and C. A report of the main implementingagency, the Social Development Secretariat, is included in the Appendix. The report is a summary of a longerdocument which is available in the Project files.

This ICR is based on the findings of the final supervision/Project compJletion mission which took place inNovember 1998 for Part A and in February 1999 for Parts B and C; the Loan Agreement; supervision reports;interviews with Bank, Project and Government staff; the mid-term review; correspondence between the Bank andthe Borrower; and other Project documents. The ICR was reviewed by Myrna Alexander and Hideki Mori.

iii

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT

ARGENTINA


EVALUATION SUMMARY

Introduction

i. In late 1994 events outside of Argentina threatened to put a halt to the period of relative prosperityushered in by the Convertibility Plan. The Social Protection Project was part of the $1.3 billion provided by theBank in emergency assistance.

Project Objectives and Description

ii. The Project had three objectives: (a) to protect critical social programs, in 1995 and 1996; (b) to helpprovide income support to Argentines adversely affected by the economic measures taken in response to the fiscalcrisis, particularly through job loss; and (c) to improve the focus and management of social programs bypromoting transparency and efficiency, participation of civil society and better targeting of social services to thepoor.

iii. The Project consisted of three components: (A) Protection of Priority Social and Income SupportPrograms; (B) a pilot Participatory Social Investment Fund (FOPAR) and (C) ].mprovement of SocialInformation, Monitoring and Evaluation, of Social Programs (SIEMPRO). Component A accounted for the bulkof loan funds ($116 million). Funds in this component were used to: (a) finance a share of the 1995 and 1996federal budgets for selected social programs; (b) protect the 1995 and 1996 budgets for a larger set of socialprograms by requiring that the total expenditures for these programs amounted to no less than US$300 million inthose years; (c) finance a review of public social spending; and (d) finance teclnical assistance and equipment forthe Ministry of Labor. The social programs directly financed by the loan were Plan Social Educativo, and theemployment programs of Aprender, PROAS/PRENO (replaced in 1996 by Trabajar), and Forestar. Theprograms whose budgets were also protected, but not directly financed by the loan, were: the Program for IrivateEmployment; ASOMA (a nutrition program for the elderly); the vaccination program; control of endemicdiseases (Chagas); and the Programa Social Agropecuario.

iv. The objectives of the Participatory Social Investment Fund (FOPAR) were to test a new mechanism for:(a) channeling financial resources to targeted community-based sub-projects; (b) strengthening socialorganizations; and (c) carrying out small-scale investments to address social needs. These objectives were to beachieved by placing special emphasis on targeting poor communities and vulnerable groups and usingparticipatory approaches to develop the capacity of such groups to identify suitable projects, mobilize resourcesand implement selected projects. Loan funds were used to finance community-based sub-projects (US$20.2million), and to establish institutional arrangements (US$5.8 million).

v. The objective of the technical assistance for the Improvement of Social Information, Monitoring andEvaluation of Social Programs (SIEMPRO) was to develop and disseminate methodologies and systems forimproving the targeting, evaluation and monitoring of national and provincial social programs and to contribute tothe analysis and formulation of social policies. The SIEMPRO component (US$10 million in loan funds) hadfour sub-components: (a) enhancement of the availability of social information to improve the targeting, design,

iv

monitoring and evaluation of social programs; (b) establishment of a system of monitoring and evaluation oftargeted social programs; (c) dissemination and transfer of methodologies and systems to national and provincialagencies; and (d) institutional strengthening and management of the program.

Implementation Experience and Results

vi. For Part A, total expenditures on the protected social programs reached $307 million in 1995 and $359million in 1996, meeting the conditions set. There were only modest delays in the disbursements related tobudget support. The Ministry of Economy completed a high-quality review of public social spending and thetechnical assistance to the Ministry of Labor was carried out, albeit it with substantial delays, in the case ofequipment purchases.

vii. The achievements of Part B (FOPAR) were considerable. The fund provided a higher than expectedamount of financing for sub-projects since Project management was able to reallocate funds from institutionaldevelopment. FOPAR reached 215,000 beneficiaries in six provinces, representing about 45% of the populationwith unsatisfied basic needs (UBN) in those provinces. Targeting was highly effective: about 80% ofbeneficiaries reached by the program met the poverty criteria. A beneficiary assessment found that almost allbeneficiaries (96%) acknowledged that sub-projects had effectively addressed their needs or solved a pressingproblem, and that the support of FOPAR had been crucial for implementing the sub-projects.

viii. The achievements of Part C (SIEMPRO) were identified through an assessment of key stakeholders. Thestakeholders found the contributions of SIEMPRO were highly valuable through: (a) the creation of a system forgenerating and widely disseminating information about poverty and social indicators; (b) carrying out a socialdevelopment survey; (c) fostering the culture of evaluation and transparency which contributed to improvedtargeting, management and outcomes of social programs; (d) large scale training on the management andevaluation of social programs, particularly at the provincial level; and (e) contributing to strengthening thecapability for designing and implementing social sector policies and programs.

Key Lessons Learned

ix. A key lesson learned is that when there are potential overlaps in mandates and responsibilities (betweenthe Ministry of Economy and SIEMPRO and between SIEMPRO and the line ministries, for example) theyshould be addressed up front and cooperation and coordination should be encouraged through the implementationarrangements. In relation to Part B (FOPAR), there are five main lessons. One, a cautious and conservativeapproach during the initial phase pays off. Two, investing in the management information system pays off.Three, formulation of a core-beneficiary group increases the chances of participation. Four, because of theexistence of "spill-over" benefits it is necessary to redefine the benefits of social investment funds. Five, projectcompetition can generate important benefits. In the case of Part C (SIEMPRO), the main lesson is that adecentralized approach yielded higher benefits.

Sustainability and Future Operations

x. Part A. The Government increased overall spending on the protected social programs in 1998. Since theGovernment continues to improve monitoring, analysis and evaluation of social programs and expenditures, itseems likely that the institutional strengthening will be sustained after the Project ends; so far, the trend has beenfor the principles and skills learned to be extended to other programs, agencies and levels of Government. TheBank's follow-up operations (Social Protection II and III) provided additional support for Trabajar, one of theemployment programs included in the protected social programs in 1996. In a Special Structural AdjustmentLoan (Ln. 44050-AR) approved November 10, 1999, to help the Argentines deal with another episode of turmoilin the financial markets, all of the social programs protected under the first Social Protection Project were

v

included on the list of protected programs for the subsequent operation, all but one showing higher levels ofexpenditures.

xi. Parts B and C. FOPAR has given special emphasis to the sustainabilLity of its infrastructure projects andperiodic ex-post evaluations have indicated good results. The sustainability of SIEMPRO's interventions relyheavily on the training provided to staff from federal and provincial agencies for adopting and establishingmethodologies and practices for designing and evaluating social programs. A follow up operation (Fourth SocialProtection Project, Ln. 43980-AR) approved October 15, 1998, supports the continuation and expansion of bothcomponents.

vi

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORTP

ARGENTINA


PART I: PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSAIENT

I. Project Background

1 . In 1991, the Govemment of Argentina adopted a bold set of economic reforms. Collectively known as theConvertibility Plan, these policies were successful in turning the Argentine economy around and reducing poverty. In thefour years following the Plan's introduction, GDP growth, formerly stagnant, averaged 7.7 percent; low inflation replacedhyperinflation; and the incidence of poverty declined.

2. In late 1994 events outside of Argentina threatened to put a halt to this period of relative prosperity. A severecurrency crisis in Mexico shook confidence in Latin American financial markets, slowing capital inflows to Argentina toa trickle. Economic activity decelerated and tax revenues contracted. Unemployment, which had grown somewhat aseconomic restructuring took place, surged, reaching 18.9 percent in May 1995.

3. The Government responded quickly to reestablish a fiscal surplus by raising taxes and revising the originallyapproved budget for 1995 downward by 3.6 percent. The Government protected social spending more than otherexpenditures under these budget cuts. The Government also assembled a package of emergency financial assistancetotaling US$11 billion. The Social Protection Loan was part of the World Bank's $1.3 billion emergency assistancepackage, which also included operations to reform banking and health insurance. The IDB's assistance included a $450million social sector adjustment loan. The IDB and the Bank worked together closely to ensure that the two loanscomplemented one another in operational design and conditions.

II. Project Objectives and Description

Original Objectives

4. The World Bank and the Government were concemed that poor financial conditions might require furtherreductions in public spending, including social sector programs. Argentina's social saFety net might weaken just asunemployment and poverty increased the number of households requiring assistance. The limited effectiveness andefficiency of some social programs -of concern prior to the economic crisis-became more worrisome in the wake ofthe anticipated greater social needs and more limited public funds.

5. In line with these concerns, the Argentina Social Protection Project had three objectives: (a) to protect criticalsocial programs for the poor and vulnerable in 1995 and 1996; (b) to help provide income support to Argentines adverselyaffected by the economic measures taken in response to the fiscal crisis, particularly through job loss; and (c) to improvethe focus and management of social programs by promoting transparency and efficiency, participation of civil society andbetter targeting of social services to the poor.

Assessment of Original Objectives

6. The Project objectives addressed some of Argentina's most pressing needs ancl were consistent with the WorldBank Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) discussed by the Board on May 4, 1995. The Project directly addressed the

1

second CAS objective - to reduce poverty and to develop human resources. The Project's focus on providing immediatebudget support addressed the government's financial constraints and helped ensure program continuity.

7. The Project objectives were also consistent with, and complementary to, those of the IDB Social SectorAdjustment Loan. The IDB operation's key condition required that, in 1995, federal spending meet or exceed 85% ofplanned spending (US$1,039 million) for a group of 23 social programs. The main condition of the World Bank Projectrequired a minimum spending level ($300 million/year) for a subset of these programs.

Original Project Design and Organization

8. The Project consisted of three components: (a) Protection of Priority Social and Income Support Programs; (b) apilot Participatory Social Investrnent Fund (FOPAR); and (c) Improvement of Social Information, Monitoring andEvaluation of Social Programs (SIEMPRO). The Ministry of Economy was the Bank's Government counterpart for PartA. The Social Development Secretariat was the Government counterpart for Parts B and C.

Part A - Protection of Priority Social and Income Support Programs

9. Part A financed a two-year time-slice of the existing budgets for a set of targeted social programs. The use of aninvestment loan to provide a fast injection of cash during a financial crisis (rather than opting for an adjustmentoperation), while unusual was not unprecedented. A similar Project (Ln. 3912-ME-Program of Essential Social Services)had been approved by the Bank for Mexico. The Argentina Project took the lessons of this previous Project into account,with particular emphasis on the importance of identifying up-front social programs for which the Government usedprocurement and financial accounting practices acceptable to the Bank.

10. The bulk of the loan ($116 million) was allocated to Component A. Loan funds were used to: (a) finance a shareof the 1995 and 1996 federal budgets for selected programs in the areas of employment and education; (b) protect the1995 and 1996 budgets for a larger set of social programs by requiring that the expenditures for the programs amountedto no less than $300 million in those years; (c) finance a review of public social spending; and (d) provide technicalassistance and equipment for the Ministry of Labor. The social programs which received direct budgetary support in1995 and 1996 under the loan included the Plan Social Educativo administered by the Ministry of Education (MEC), andseveral employment and training programs administered by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security (MTSS), Aprender,PROAS/PRENO (replaced in 1996 by Trabajar), and Forestar. The additional programs whose budgets were protectedincluded the Program for Private Employment, ASOMA (a nutrition program for the elderly), a vaccination program, aprogram for the control of infectious diseases (Chagas) and the Social Program for Agriculture/Programa SocialAgropecuario.

Part B - FOPAR

11. The objectives of FOPAR were to test a new mechanism for (a) channeling financial resources to targetedcommunity-based sub-projects; (b) strengthening social organizations; and (c) carrying out small-scale investments toaddress social needs. These objectives were to be achieved by placing special emphasis on targeting poor communitiesand vulnerable groups and using participatory approaches to develop the capacity of such groups to identify suitableprojects, mobilize resources and implement selected projects. Under the FOPAR component, financing was provided forsub-projects ($20.2 million) as well as for the establishment of institutional arrangements to operate the pilot project($5.8 million), including technical assistance for promotion and dissemination of FOPAR's program, working withcommunities to identify sub-projects, and to carry out the ex-ante appraisal, supervision and ex-post evaluation of sub-projects.

2

Part C - SIEMPRO

12. The primary objective of the component was to influence a change in the focus and management of socialprograms by promoting transparency, participation of civil society and targeting of seivices to the poor. It wasspecifically aimed at developing and disseminating methodologies and systems for improving the targeting, evaluationand monitoring of national and provincial social programs and to contribute to the analysis and formulation of socialpolicies. The loan financing of $10 million covered four sub-components: (a) enhancement of the availability of socialinformation to improve the targeting, design, monitoring and evaluation of social programs; (b) establishment of a systemof monitoring and evaluation of targeted social programs; (c) dissemination and transfer of methodologies and systems tonational and provincial agencies; and (d) institutional strengthening and management of the program.

III. Implementation Record

Part A

13. Choosing an investment loan to transfer funds quickly presented challenges. Negotiations between the WorldBank and the Govemment broke down in July 1995 mainly because of difficulties reconciling the need for quickdisbursement and the World Bank's disbursement and procurement procedures. The (lovemment and the Bank resolvedthese problems and successfully concluded negotiations in October 1995. In order to iacilitate disbursements and toavoid potential delays, the number of social programs whose budgets were directly financed by the Project was reduced.

14. The Project unit in the Ministry of Economy (MOE) provided the Bank with the documentation needed toapprove loan disbursements. The MOE had to rely on the effectiveness and cooperation of the MEC and MTSS, sincetheir program expenditures were the ones eligible for reimbursement under the loan. The two Ministries had no obviousincentive to expend the effort required to meet the World Bank's documentation needs because the loan supported theirexisting budgets. Nevertheless, both Ministries cooperated well with the MOE. Several questions and issues regardingthe documentation needed to support disbursement requests were sorted out relatively quickly during Projectimplementation. The Social Protection Loan disbursed more rapidly and smoothly than the similar operation in Mexico(PROSSE), but some modest delays were experienced in presenting documentation for 1996. A component whichexperienced more serious delays was the technical assistance to the MTSS, mainly the financing for the purchase ofequipment.

Part B - FOPAR

15. FOPAR provided financing for 806 sub-projects totaling US$29.5million--including financing from the loan,counterpart resources and contribution of beneficiaries--an amount higher than anticipated because the program was ableto transfer resources from institutional development to sub-projects. A summary of the sub-projects by category is shownin Table 12 in the Statistical Annex. About one fifth of the total number of sub-projects were for capacity building ofcommunity organizations through technical assistance and training of community leaders. This was in addition to thecapacity building provided for identifying and prioritizing needs, and project formulation and implementation. The rest ofthe projects were mainly economic and social infrastructure.

16. Geographic Coverage and Targeting. FOPAR reached 215,000 beneficiaries in six provinces representingabout 45% of the population with unsatisfied basic needs ("UBNT') in those provinces. This is a remarkable achievementin terms of coverage of beneficiaries. Although the original target was to reach 10 provinces during the pilot phase,shortly after start up FOPAR's management decided, with the Bank's concurrence, to focus the efforts on six provincesand leave the remaining four for a second phase. One of the factors influencing this decision was that the time and effortrequired to establish participatory schemes took much longer than anticipated. However, these efforts were more thancompensated by the coverage reached.

3

17. Targeting was highly effective: about 80% of beneficiaries reached by the program met the poverty criteria. Thisoutcome exceeded the eligibility criteria adopted at appraisal for selecting poor communities, which was to be part of adistrict with at least 40% of the population with UBN. A beneficiary assessment conducted concluded that 75% of thebeneficiaries reached by FOPAR were part of the population with UBN. AdditiQnally, another 5% of beneficiaries whichdid not meet the UBN criteria, were classified as poor based on their family income. Considering that FOPAR' sintervention takes place at the community level rather than the individual level, these figures indicate that the leakage ofProject benefits was minimal. About 54% of beneficiaries were women. The successful targeting resulted from acombination of mechanisms. First, the geographical areas with the highest incidence of poverty were identified. Second,ad hoc local councils created by the program assisted in the micro-selection of specific places within the selected areas.Third, the thoroughness of the ex-ante evaluation for each sub-project ensured the poverty status of potentialbeneficiaries.

18. The beneficiary assessment mentioned earlier also found that almost all beneficiaries (96%) acknowledged thatsub-projects had effectively addressed their needs or solved a pressing problem, and that the support of FOPAR had beencrucial for implementing the sub-projects. Based on ex-post evaluations, FOPAR also had a positive impact in generatingemployment, mostly among beneficiaries, during the implementation phase. A total of 5,800 beneficiaries were employedfor an average length of about 80 working days. This implied that, for these sub-projects, in addition to the benefitsgenerated by the sub-project, about 20% of their total costs were transferred to the communities in the form of income.FOPAR developed methodologies for assessing the environmental impact of sub-projects, which were applied in the ex-ante evaluation. In all cases, the environmental impact was minor and relatively easy to control through design changesand simple control procedures.

19. While not stated as a specific objective, it had been foreseen at appraisal that FOPAR would test an approach tosupport microenterprises, thus contributing to private sector development. Two revolving funds were established, after asuccessful international bidding process, with financial intermediaries that provided loans on normal commercial terms.By the end of the pilot phase, the test was well underway with nearly 1,000 beneficiaries having received loans from theintermediaries.

Part C - SIEMPRO

20. A wide range of activities was carried out under this component. A strong focus was placed on generating andmaking available, in a user-friendly way, information on social conditions, as well as social programs, and numerouspublications (both electronic and printed) were completed during the Project. The Social Survey - an integratedhousehold survey with an emphasis on the use of social services - was designed and carried out in cooperation withINDEC, the National Statistical Institute. The survey broke new ground in Argentina in several aspects, including thedepth of coverage of social services, and it improved the underpinnings for the analysis of poverty and social policy.Another strategic focus of SIEMPRO was improving the use of evaluations in social programs. Evaluations of severalsocial programs were completed under the Project (Programa Social Agropecuario, ASOMA, Trabajar, FOPAR).Although it had been envisaged that SIEMPRO would carry out evaluations for all of the protected programs under PartA, for some programs this was not accomplished (Plan Social Educativa, for example) because of resistance from the lineministries. The leverage of the Bank was limited in forcing compliance since none of the protected programs receivedmoney directly from the Project. Also, budget support ended in 1996, while most of the evaluations were carried outafterwards. In retrospect, it would have been advisable to reach agreement with the Ministries in charge of theseprograms on an evaluation managed by SIEMPRO during Project preparation. Nevertheless, the activities of SIEMPROincreased the exposure and appreciation of social program managers to the importance of evaluation. SIEMPRO alsocarried out a program of dissemination of social information and methodologies to staff at both the federal and provinciallevels. Provincial executing units were established in 10 provinces and large-scale training programs were organized in avariety of topics including social information, evaluation, and social program management.

4

21. An independent assessment of SIEMPRO's first two years of operation was carried out using semi-structuredinterviews of representatives of stakeholder organizations including national and provincial sector ministries andagencies, NGOs and other external institutions. In general, stakeholders found that contributions were highly valuablethrough: (a) the creation of a system for generating, processing and disseminating information about poverty, inequalityand social vulnerability, and social indicators for a wide range of users; (b) carrying out a social survey; (c) fostering theculture of evaluation and transparency of social programs which contributed to improved targeting, management andoutcomes of social programs; (d) large scale training on management and evaluation of social programs, particularly atthe provincial level; and (e) strengthening the capability for designing and implementing social sector policies andprograms. At the same time, it should be noted that SIEMPRO faced some institutional problems during Projectimplementation. Its mandate to analyze poverty and social programs was shared by other public agencies, particularly bythe Ministry of Economy and the Chief Cabinet Office, provoking institutional rivalries. It can be argued that the designof the Social Protection Project itself contributed to this overlapping of responsibilities btecause it supported work onsocial programs in both the Ministry of Economy and SIEMPRO. More effort should have been made to address theseissues of overlapping responsibilities during Project preparation.

22. Mid-term Review. The Project provided for a mid-term review for Components B and C. In July 1997, a Bankmission undertook a wide review of both SIEMPRO and FOPAR. As performance was generally satisfactory, the Bankdid not recommend any major redirections. In the case of FOPAR, the main recommendations were to reduce processingtime within the Secretaria de Desarrollo Social to approve sub-project proposals and the related first payment and toanalyze the administrative costs of the program, which though high, were considered acceptable given the pilot nature ofFOPAR. In the case of SIEMPRO, discussions focused on the program for analysis and dissemination of the results ofthe Encuesta Social and better dissemination of the results of the evaluations that SIEMPRO had carried out to date.

23. The Bank agreed to three extensions of the closing date for Part A (from June 1998 to December 31, 1998, thento May 31, 1999, and then to September 30, 1999) in order to permit the MTSS to purchase equipment, mainlycomputers. For Components B and C, initial disbursements were somewhat slower than expected, which caused theclosing date to be extended to October 31, 1998 and to December 31, 1998, respectively.

IV. Achievement of Original Objectives

Part A

24. Project activities were successful in meeting their original objectives. As Table 11 shows, federal spending onprotected programs exceeded the target of US$300 million in 1995 and 1996. Spending on the programs directly financedby the loan also was substantially higher than anticipated. Table 5a shows key monitoring indicators for this componentover the period 1994-1997. In nearly all cases the indicators show that services in these programs were not onlymaintained, but increased above 1994 levels.

25. Institutional development activities within the MTSS made an important contribution to the Ministry's ability toconduct policy and program analysis and improve employment and training programns. Technical assistance supportedreview and analyses of unemployment insurance, labor market reforms, and employment and training programs.Concrete results included a series of program evaluations and the redesign of those programs based on the findings.Equally important, the analysis funded by the Project helped the MTSS to develop a more global view on employmentprograms and labor policies, and allowed MTSS to work more effectively with the multilateral development banks andother donors, and to take a more proactive role.

26. Support for a broad review of social spending and related analyses under the direction of staff in the Ministry ofEconomy also achieved significant results. The Directorate of Budget Evaluation in the Ministry of Economy improvedits monitoring of social sector spending and began feeding this information into the budget process. Technical assistanceunder Part A supported the completion of program evaluations for the Maternal-Child Program. The Directorate of

5

Public Social Expenditures (DNPGS) implemented a high-quality analysis of social expenditures which resulted inconcrete policy and program changes, including the integration of some small, overlapping social programs.

Part B (FOPAR)

27. The Project design was appropriate for achieving the objectives of the component. One of the strongest elementsof project design was the adoption from the outset of participatory approaches for working with beneficiaries. FOPARestablished highly effective mechanisms for working with poor beneficiaries in carrying out a diagnosis of their situation,identifying needs and establishing priorities leading to the formulation of sub-projects. This approach was crucial forcreating an atmosphere of collaboration with beneficiaries, which led to a high degree of ownership through a deepinvolvement in the formulation and implementation of sub-projects. Another key aspect of project design was themethodology for developing in beneficiaries the ability to manage Project implementation and its subsequent operationwhenever warranted.

28. FOPAR achieved a substantial institutional development during the pilot phase. Its most important achievementswere the development and implementation of approaches and methodologies for carrying out an effective targeting ofresources to beneficiaries, complemented by a rigorous ex-ante evaluation and a close supervision of sub-projectsimplemented by beneficiaries. These efforts were supported by the establishment of a highly effective managementinformation system that enabled the availability of information to control productivity and outcomes on processes (projectcycle control, promotion, ex-ante evaluations, supervision, etc.), manage financial resources and generate a data base ofbeneficiaries.

Part C (SIEMPRO)

29. The design of this technical assistance component was adequate for addressing the issues that motivated theestablishment of SIEMPRO. In three years the program enabled the availability of a more extensive social informationbase, contributing to the government's efforts to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of social spending, and to thestimulation of the demand for information on the social sector in general. It also provided methodologies and trained staffin key areas such as program evaluation and targeting.

30. The most salient feature of SIEMPRO's institutional development was the establishment of small agencies in theprovinces. These were key for implementing highly effective technical assistance and training programs forstrengthening the ability of provincial agencies to carry out assessments of social issues, to reevaluate ongoing programsand to design new interventions. SIEMPRO's provincial agencies also enabled the provision of continuous support tolocal agencies, establishing practices and processes for handling social sector issues in a sustainable manner. Thisscheme had a high impact since most social programs in Argentina are implemented at the provincial level.

V. Major Factors Affecting the Project

Factors not subject to Government control

31. Part A. The economic and financial crisis Argentina faced created a sense of urgency regarding loan processingand implementation. The ministries involved in implementing this component cooperated very well, and some staffattributed this to the crisis.

32. Parts B and C. The federal nature of the government structure in Argentina affected the start up of bothcomponents. In early 1996, provincial governments had recently taken office and it took longer than expected to finalizeagreements needed for initiating activities. In the case of FOPAR, it was only by the end of 1996 that agreements hadbeen finalized with six provincial governors. For similar reasons SIEMPRO had managed to set up only three out of fiveprovincial agencies by that time.

6

33. Another factor that affected implementation of sub-projects supported by FOPAR was the extreme weatherconditions that prevailed in the Northern provinces. In particular, during 1998 unusual floods affected four of the sixprovinces under the program, causing the reassessment of sub-projects under implementation and delays in reaching theircompletion.

Factors subject to Government control

34. Part A. The Government's strong response to the crisis limited the depth and the length of the budget crunch.Tax revenues recovered earlier than expected which made it easier for the Government to comply with the main loancondition to protect spending on the selected social programs.

35. Parts B and C. Some delays in the yearly approval and availability of budgets affected disbursements for bothcomponents.

Factors subject to Implementing agency control

36. Part A. The Ministries of Economy and Labor made effective use of the techni~cal assistance provided under theloan. The level of competence and commitment of the implementing agency's staff allowed for the successfulimplementation of the challenging project design.

37. Parts B and C. During Project execution, empowerment for signing legal documents on behalf of theGovernment was only at the level of the Secretary for Social Development, and in the last year also with the DeputySecretary. In the case of FOPAR, this was a source of some delays for signing agreements with beneficiaries and forclosing down sub-projects.

VI. Project Sustainability

38. Part A. Once the fiscal situation improved, the Government raised its level of budgetary support to the targetedprograms in 1997-1998. The Government has continued to undertake a variety of activities to improve the monitoring,analysis and evaluation of social programs and expenditures. It seems likely that these institutional changes will besustained after the Project ends; so far, the trend has been for the principles and skills learned to be extended to otherprograms, agencies and levels of Government. In mid-1998, turmoil in the international financial markets again had anadverse impact on the Argentine economy. In order to provide financial assistance to help Argentina weather this crisis,the Board approved on November 10, 1999, a Special Structural Adjustment Loan (Ln. 44050-AR) in the amount of $2.5billion and a Special Repurchase Facility Support Loan (Ln. 44060-AR) in the amount of US$505.05 million. Similar tothe Social Protection Project, the conditions included a commitment by the Government to maintain spending on 24 socialprograms. All the programs that were protected under the first Social Protection Project are included in the list for theSpecial Structural Adjustment Loan and all but one (ASOMA), are programmed to be funded at higher levels than was thecase in 1995-96.

39. Parts B and C. The sustainability of FOPAR and SIEMPRO are supported by the Social Protection IV Project(Ln. 43980-AR), which was approved by the Board on October 15, 1998. In addition, FOPAR has given specialemphasis to the sustainability of infrastructure projects. Ex-post evaluations conducted systematically concluded that80% of infrastructure projects have a high or medium chance of becoming sustainable. In order to ensure sustainability ofsub-projects, where relevant, FOPAR also had as a pre-requisite the firm commitment of municipalities or public serviceagencies to maintain and operate works to be constructed. Their continued involvement was followed up during sub-project implementation and particularly at the time of completion. This was complemented by special training programsfor beneficiaries and technical assistance during start up of the operating phase.

7

40. The sustainability of SIEMPRO's interventions relied heavily on the training provided to staff from federal andprovincial agencies for adopting and establishing methodologies and practices for designing and evaluating socialprograms. In addition, this is complemented with technical assistance and follow up provided by the provincial agencies.The demand for social sector information stimulated by SIEMPRO is likely to increase.

VII. Bank Performance

41. Part A. The performance of the Bank is rated as satisfactory. The Bank team processed the loan in a timelyfashion. During loan implementation, when it became apparent that there might be a problem disbursing againstexpenditures under the Plan Social Educativo, the Bank agreed to accept modified documentation. The Bank's level oftechnical assistance during supervision, especially linked with the public spending review, was of high caliber andeffective.

42. Parts B and C. Bank performance in Project preparation was highly satisfactory. During preparation activitiesthe Bank contributed its experience with similar projects in other countries and, where relevant, incorporated consultantswith the required expertise to advise on project design. Bank performance in Project appraisal was also highlysatisfactory, considering that appraisal of FOPAR and SIEMPRO was brought forward by a few months, to June 1995, inorder to consolidate these components under the Social Protection Project. Adequate judgments were made with respectto the government commitment and both agencies' implementation capacity. For FOPAR, some 20 key performanceindicators (see Table Sb) were originally defined for monitoring and evaluating of sub-project activities and processes.The indicators were useful for both FOPAR management and Bank supervision. In the case of SIEMPRO, monitoringwas carried out using a detailed program of activities (the SIEMPRO Matrix), which was updated during supervision.

43. Supervision was satisfactory. Both agencies acknowledged that although there was some lack of continuity instaff and consultants participating in Bank missions, their contribution improved instruments and methodologies whichlead to better management of both components.

VIII. Borrower Performance

44. Part A. Borrower performance was satisfactory throughout all phases of the Project. The only exception was thesubstantial delays in the case of the computer procurement by MTSS. As already noted, the caliber of the staff involvedin the Project was high. The strong level of commitment contributed to the successful achievement of the Project'sdevelopment objectives.

45. Parts B and C. Performance in Project preparation was highly satisfactory. The quality of technical, social,financial, and institutional analyses carried out by the Argentine teams was of the highest standards. The managementteams put together by the Secretariat of Social Development were extremely competent and showed an unequivocalcommitment to both components.

46. Overall, implementation performance was satisfactory. Implementation complied with the loan agreement as wellas with agreements reached during supervision missions. The Financial and Administration Unit (UCAF) provided strongsupport of high professional standards to both components in matters related to financial, personnel, legal issues and MIS.Project implementation progress was reported regularly in well prepared, comprehensive reports. The high quality andcontinuity of the management team, and staff in general, was an essential factor for the successful implementation of bothcomponents.

47. Sub-projects supported by FOPAR were implemented efficiently. The pilot nature of this component, to beimplemented in less than three years, and the extensive use of participatory approaches had led to relatively higheroverheads than other social funds in the LAC region. At appraisal it had been assumed that overheads would amount toabout 28% of the total cost of the pilot program, including initial investments to set up FOPAR. However, this figure

8

included most of the cost associated with capacity building activities related to the initial work done with communitiesand to the technical assistance provided during appraisal and implementation. When cost definitions are set in line withthese definitions, actual overheads represent about 16 percent of total costs. In addition, toward the end of the Project,FOPAR was able to reallocate about $1.7 million in loan funds from institutional development to sub-project financing,further lowering overhead costs.

48. Procurement arrangements for the FOPAR component were considerably simplified given the small-scale anddispersed nature of sub-projects. All procurement was carried out by representatives of beneficiaries responsible forimplementing sub-projects under procedures stipulated in the grant agreement. Th is proved highly effective in loweringunit costs.

IX. Assessment of Outcome

49. Part A. The outcome was satisfactory, and development objectives were achieved. While the design of theProject presented some challenges, Project implementation went smoothly, thanks to the commitment and competence onthe part of both Bank and Government staff. As noted previously, the budgets of key targeted social programs wereprotected; the capacity of the government to implement effective, well-targeted social programs and policies wasdemonstrably enhanced; and the chances of these achievements being sustained beyond Project completion are good. Asa summary of the discussion in preceding paragraphs, the overall outcome for the 'SIEMPRO component was satisfactory.By and large it achieved all major objectives with no shortcomings. However, it completed fewer evaluations than hadbeen expected and the field work for the Encuesta Social took place nearly a year behind schedule. As a result, when theSIEMPRO component closed in December 1998, very few of the results of the sunrey had been published. As of the endof 1999, the data for the survey had been made available and some analysis had been disseminated widely. Also,institutional conflicts during Project implementation are likely to have lessened the impact that the activities of SIEMPROhad in some areas.

50. Parts B and C. Based on the assessments discussed above of all aspects related to Project design,implementation, and management, the overall outcome of the FOPAR component was highly satisfactory. It achieved orexceeded all major objectives and its participatory approach can be considered as best practice for social funds.

X. Lessons Learned

51. Institutional relationships are important to consider up front in Project preparation and design. When there arepotential overlaps in mandates and responsibilities (between the Ministry of Economy and SIEMPRO, and betweenSIEMPRO and the line ministries, for example) an attempt should be made to address them up front and to encouragecooperation and coordination through the design of the implementation arrangements.

52. Part B (FOPAR). A cautious and conservative approach during the initial phase is important. During its earlydays, FOPAR concentrated on internal institution building, and maintained a cautious attitude concerning sub-projectappraisal and approval. The number of sub-projects approved during the first year was only 55, but by the end of thesecond year, FOPAR had accelerated the pace of implementation by 15 times, and approved 751 new sub-projects.Through its rigid appraisal process, it also established a reputation for adhering to its operational principles, in particularcommunity participation and transparency (for example, more than 50 percent of the reasons for disapproval wereinadequate participatory measures). This reputation has been effective in buffering the potential for political interference,and has helped ensure that resources are allocated to areas of greater need or beneficiary-determined priorities.

53. Investing in the Management Information System pays off. One of the benefits of concentrating on internalinstitution building during the initial year materialized as a highly effective management information system (MIS), whichis often considered to be one of the best MIS in a LAC social investment fund. The system was one of the key factorsthat enabled the above-mentioned rapid efficiency gain. The technological foundations of the system are modest, but it is

9

unique in its design and implementation process. A private consulting firm carried out a thorough business-processengineering analysis, working closely with FOPAR staff of all levels, and designed detailed data structure andinformation flow models. During system development, MIS staff and users worked side-by-side to help identify andovercome inefficiencies and weaknesses in operational procedures and organizational structure. This is a textbookexample of good (but often neglected) MIS development applicable for nearly any agency managing a Bank project.

54. Formulation of core-beneficiary groups increases the chance of participation. FOPAR used an approach similarto other funds: organizing beneficiaries into core groups (in Argentina, they are called NUBs - Nzucleo de Beneficiarios),which served as the focal point for sub-project preparation and implementation. This was an effective tool for facilitatingparticipation by communities and beneficiaries. Although about 60 percent of NUB members had no prior experience inparticipating in systematic organizational activities, the experience led to lower unit costs, curbed potential corruption insub-project implementation, and fostered flexibility and creativity. Record keeping, procurement and financialmanagement by the beneficiaries was exceptionally good. Two critical factors to its success were: (a) training ofsupervisors to provide on-going technical assistance to beneficiary groups on administering sub-project execution; and (b)incentives for monitoring by the community.

55. Existence of "spill-over" benefits of social investment funds. Through field visits during Bank supervisionmissions and the ex-post evaluation, it became clear that FOPAR had generated significant "spill-over" benefits,including the building of empowerment skills (leaming to organize and speak out, belief that the poor can improve theirconditions, confidence in dealing with government officials, banks and other institutions), institutional skills(identification of needs, planning and budgeting, handling of contracts, financial administration) and the transfer of skillsand experience to other community groups. Such benefits are compelling when witnessed on the ground, but difficult tocapture in statistics, although they may well have a significant and lasting effect on a community or group's ability toaddress poverty conditions beyond the actual benefits from the infrastructure or services contained in a sub-project.

56. Experience of Project Competition. Drawing on the experience of FOSIS, (Social Investment Fund) in Chile,FOPAR, unlike other social funds, uses project competitions (concursos de proyectos). In accordance with the targetingcriteria of FOPAR, eligible disadvantaged neighborhoods and poor districts were selected, and approximately threemonths were needed for communities to identify their needs, form beneficiary groups and formulate sub-projects. Acompetition of sub-projects was then advertised with clearly defined rules and evaluating procedures. This approachadded considerable transparency to the actual allocation of resources to specific communities.

57. Part C - SIEMPRO. A decentralized approach yielded high benefits. Through the course of implementation, itbecame evident that one of the most valuable contributions of the program was its technical assistance to the provinces.This proved to be not only a highly cost effective approach, but it was also critical for reinforcing the government policyof decentralizing to the provinces the execution of social programs. In addition, at the provincial level, SIEMPRO wasnot affected by the institutional rivalries which on occasion hindered its efforts at the federal level.

XI. Current and Future Operations

58. Part A. The Bank's follow-up operations in 1997 and 1998 (the Second and Third Social Protection Projects)focused on providing additional support for the Trabajar program, one of the employment programs included in theprotected social programs in 1996. The Social Protection II Project (Ln. 4195-AR) was approved by the Board on June20, 1997 for $200 million and the Social Protection III Project (Ln. 4366-AR) was approved by the Board on June 30,1998 for $284 million. Under Social Protection II and III, improvements in the Trabajar public employment programwere supported in order to increase the scale of activities, improve targeting to poor areas and raise the quality andrelevance of sub-projects financed. An impact evaluation carried out under the Project demonstrated the highly effectivetargeting of the program to the poor. The Special Structural Adjustment Loan (Ln. 44050-AR) and the SpecialRepurchase Facility Support (Ln. 44060-AR) approved by the board on November 10, 1999, were described above.

10

59. Parts B and C. The Fourth Social Protection Project (Ln. 43980-AR) approved by the Board on October 15,1999, for an amount of $90.75 million supports the continuation and expansion of both FOPAR and SIEMPRO.

11


ARGENTINA

SOCL41 PROTECTION PROJECT(LOAN 39570-AR)

PART II. STATISTICAL ANNEX

Table 1: Summary of AssessmentsPart A- Protection of Social Programs

A. Achievement of Objectives Substantial Partial Negligible Not Applicable

Macro PoliciesSector PoliciesFinancial Objectives V/Institutional Development X

Physical ObjectivesPoverty ReductionGender Issues VOther Social ObjectivesEnvironmental ObjectivesPublic Sector Managment v

Private Sector DevelopmentOther (specify)

B. Project Sustainability Likely Unlikely UncertainV

HighlyC. Bank Performnance Satisfactoy Satisfactory Deficient

IdentificationPreparation Assistance /AppraisalSupervision .

HighlyD. Borrower Performance Satisfactory Satisfactory Deficient

PreparationImplementationCovenant ComplianceOperation (if applicable)

Highly Un- HighlyE. Assessment of Outcome Satisfactory Satisfactory Satisfactory unsatisfactory

12

Table 1: Summary of AssessmentsPart B- FOPAR


Macroecnomic Policies .Sector PoliciesFinancial ObjectivesInstitutional DevelopmentPhysical ObjectivesPoverty ReductionGender ConcernsOther Social ObjectivesEnvironmental Objectives l

Public Sector ManagementPrivate Sector Management 1

B. Project Sustainability Likely Unlikely Uncertain

HighlyC. Bank Performance Satisfactory Satisfactory Deficient

IdentificationPreparation AssistanceAppraisal /Supervision l

D. Borrower Performance Satisfactory Satisfactory Deficient

Preparation IImplementation V/Covenant Compliance V

Highly Un- HighlyE. Assessment of Outcome Satisfactory Satisfactory Satisfactory Unsatisfactory

13

Table : Summary of AssessmentsPart C- SIEMPRO


Macroeconomic Policies 9

Sector Policies 9

Financial Objectives 9

Institutional Development /Physical Objectives /Poverty Reduction 9

Gender ConcernsOther Social Objectives /Enviromnental ObjectivesPublic Sector Management 9, 9

Private Sector Management

B. Project Su stainability L Unlike Uncertain

HighlyC. Bank Performance Satisfactory Satisfactory Deficient

Identification 9

Preparation Assistance 9

Appraisal 9/

Supervision 9

HighlyD. Borrower Performance Satisfactory Satisfactory Deficient

Preparation 9

Implementation 9

Covenant Compliance 9

Highly Un- HiyE. Assessment of Outcome Satisfactory Satisfactory Satisfactory Unsatisfactory

14

Table 2: Related Bank Loans

Loan/Credit Title Purpose Yr of Approval StatusLoan 3643-AR Improve child & maternal 1993 '[n operation

Maternal & Child health statusHealth & Nutrition

Second Maternal & Improve child & maternal 1997 In operationChild Health & health status

NutritionLoan 4164-AR

Social Protection II Provide temporary jobs 1997 ClosedLoan 4195-AR through construction of

small infrastructureprojects

Social Protection III Provide temporary jobs 1998 In operationLoan 4366-AR through construction of

small infrastructureprojects

Fourth Social Continue and expand 1998 In operationProtection Project FOPAR and SIEMPRO

Loan 4398-AR

Special Structural Protect social 1998 In operationAdjustment Loan expenditures and promoteLoan 4405-AR improvements in social

programs _

1 5

Table 3: Project Timetable

Steps in Project Cycle Date Planned I Date Actual

Identification (Executive Project Summary) 4/17/95 4/17/95

Preparation 4/24/95 4/24/95

Appraisal 6/12/95 6/12/95

Negotiations 7/95 7/95 and 10/03/95

Letter of Development (Social )Policy 10/95 10/10/95

Board Presentation 8/30/95 11/21/95

Signing 9/30/95 12/05/95

Effectiveness 10/30/95 12/14/95

Midterm review (if applicable) 3/31/97 7/07/97

Project Completion 12/30/97 6/30/99

Loan Closing 6/30/98 9/30/99

Table 4: Loan Disbursements: Cumulative Estimated and Actual(US $millions)

FY96 FY97 FY98Appraisal Estimate 80.6 137.5 152Actual 85.5 128.0 152Actual as % of Estimate 106 93 100Date of Final Disbursement November, 1999

16

Table 5A: Critical Social Programs and Income SupportKey Monitoring Indicators

1994 1995 1995 1996 1997Target Actual

Nutrition (ASOMA proaram)No. of elderly served by the program 167,324 102,913 137,860

Education (Plan Social Educativo)No. of books and educational materials purchased 1,500,000 220,000 2,290,000 2,500,000 3,900,000

No. of schools constructed/rehabilitated 1,000 500 637 1,000 911

No. of teachers trained 50,000 65,000 70,000 n.a.

Health (Immunization and Chagas Control programs)Programa de ImmunizacionesNo. of vaccinations administered 3,261,400 3,211,756 3,390,703

Programa de Control de ChagasNo. of homes treated 137,861 217,000 132,859 109,731 97,718

No. of homes inspected/monitored 311,000 384,000 337,162 342,245 476,904

Employment 121,500 123,874 227,199 n.a.

No. of Employment Program beneficiaries 59,500 79,714 154,243 n.a.

No. of Employment Training Program beneficiaries 62,000 44,160 72,956 n.a.

Rural Poverty (Plan Social Agropecuario)No. of new subprojects 783 774 1,231

No. of beneficiaries 5,124 8,078 9,678

No. of beneficiaries who received training 22,000 13,665 6,538 9,947

17

Table 5B: Key Monitoring Indicators/ FOPAR

______________________________ ____(AL 31/V2/1996) (AL 31/12/997) (AL 31/12/1998)

INDICADOR UNIDAD Meta Valor Diferencia Meta Valor Diferencia Meta Valor Diferencia

PROMOCIONBarrios que presentan proyectos Cant. 84 84 0 125 125

Barrios con Promocion Cant. 93 93 0 142 142

Barrios que presentan Proycotos / Barrios con Promoci6n .90 90 90 88.0 -2.0 90 88.0 -2.0

Localidades que presentaron Proyectos Cant. 20 20 0 53 53

Localidades con Promoci6n Cant. 20 20 0 53 53

Localidades que presentaron Proyectos / Localidades con promoci6n % 100 100 0 90 100 10 90 100.0 10.0

Apoyo a la constituci6n de organizaciones comussitarias Cant.org.Com. 1,100 1,440 340 1,100 1,440 340

Capacitaciones para el fortalecimiento institucional Cant.M6d.4 hs. 77 77 54 -23 77 54 -23

Capacitaciones para la formulaci6n de proyectos CantM6d.4 hs. 6,500 5,847 -653 6,600 5,847 -753

EVALUACION

Proyectos elegibles / Presentados 90 96 6 90 91.9 1.9 90 87 4 -2.6

Proyetos aprobadosfevaluados 70 71 1 70 87.8 17.8 70 87.7 17.7

Tiempo entre presentaci6n e informe tecnico final Dias 90 110 20 90 107 17 90 106 16

CONTRATACION

Tiempo entre informe tecnico final y el ler. desembolso Dias 30 35 5 30 66 36 30 66 36

Monto contratado acumulado $ (en miles) 1,600 1,380.6 -291.4 19,900 30,716.8 10,816.8 26,000 30,821,53 4,857.7

Monto contratado acumulado/Monto previsto acumulado % 100 86 -14 100 154.4 54.4 100 118.7 18.7

Cantidad de proyectos contratados Cant. 62 55 -7 610 806 196 760 806 46

Monto promedio de proyectos contratados $/proy 25,800 25,099 -701 32,700 38,110.20 5,410.2 34,200 38,285.0 4,085.0

SEGUIMIENTO V CONTROL

Proycctos en ejecuci6n al final del periodo Cant 62 47 -15 336 571 235 0 30 3

Proyectos terininados acusnulados Cant 0 0 0 266 70 -196 734 776 42

Monto desembolsado acumulado $ (en miles) 500.0 547.6 47.6 14,300 15,650.2 1,350.2 26,000.0 26,984.8 959.0

Nivel de gasto de proyectos 70 69 -1 100.0 98.0 -2.0

Avance fisico de la ejecuci6n 90 73.0 -17 100.0 98.0 -2.0

Avance financiero 90 76.0 -14 100.0 100.0 0.0

Promedio de dias de retraso en proyectos retrasados Dias 0 0 0 15 56 41 15.0 40.0 25.0

Promedio de dias de adelanto en proyectos adelantados Dias 20 0

Monto observado/monto rendido _ 5 0.2 -4.8 5.0 0.3 4.7

Monto observado $ (en miles) 17.6 56.6

GENERAL

CLDS instaladas (acumulado) Cant. 62 44 -18 62.0 44 -18

CPP instaladas (acumnulado) Cant6 6 0 10 6 -4 6. 6

Contribuci6n de beneficiariosmonto contratado7 10 3 7 114.3 7.0 11.3 4.3

Contribuci6n de beneficiarios/monto contratado en proycctos cerrados % 7 12.2 5.2 6.0 10.5 4.5

18

Table 5C: Key Monitoring Indicators/ SIEMPRO

ANO 1996 ANO 1997 ANO 1998 ACUMULADO 1995-1998

CONCEPTO META EJECUTADO DESVIO META EJECUTADO DESVIO META EJECUTADO DESVIO META EJECUTADO DESVIO

Encuesta de Desarrollo Social 1 0 -1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0Preparaci6n del SIEMPRO2 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0Talleres de Gesti6n 0 0 0 6 6 ( 9 9 0 15 15 0Estudio de vulnerabilidad y exclusi6n social 0 0 0 2 5 3 0 0 0 2 5 3Estudio sobre mortalidad infantil 1 1 0 3 3 0 0 0 0 4 4 0Construcci6n de mapas sobre vulnerabilidad I I 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 3 3 0Estudios cualitativos de pobreza 3 1 -2 3 4 1 0 1 1 6 6 0Publicaci6n de indicadores sociales I 0 -1 2 5 3 0 1 1 3 6 3Evaluaciones y Monitoreo 4 2 -2 13 15 2 2 4 2 19 21 2TORsparalaevaluaci6ndeprogramas 0 0 0 0 15 15 2 2 0 2 17 15Linea de Base I 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0Guia de Programas Sociales 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 3 3 0Manual de formulaci6n de programas 1 I 0 3 3 0 0 0 0 4 4 0Unidades ejecutoras provinciales 5 3 -2 5 7 2 0 0 0 10 10 0Talleres de capacitaci6n 10 25 15 42 44 2 10 12 2 62 81 19Base de Datos de Programas Sociales 0 0 0 4 23 19 26 33 7 30 56 26Planes de Diseminaci6n Tecnica 0 0 0 0 6 6 0 2 2 0 8 8Sistema Integrado de Monitoreo 0 0 0 3 3 0 4 6 2 7 9 2Cursos 0 0 0 9 9 0 8 8 0 17 17 0Publicaci6n de cartografla digital 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 0 2 4 2Estudios de coyuntura social 6 0 -6 0 61 6 6 6 0 12 12 0

19

Table 6: Studies Included in the Project

Study Purpose Status Impact

PART A To improve the longer-run efficiency of Completed I . Research results fed into the national budget formulation process.

Broad review of public social spending in Argentina public spending for social programs 2. Improved monitoring of social sector spending has been mainstreamed at the

at the national level-federal spending) federal level.

I . Review/analysis of social spending

A. Benefit incidence analysis

Provincial-level studies of public social spending: To improve the longer-run efficiency of Completed Ministry of Economy better informed on institutional issues from the provincial point

1. Santa Fe province public spending for social programs of view

2. Salta province

Evaluation of Matemal-Child Health Program To improve the effectiveness of public Completed Findings disseminated

1. national level spending on the Matemal-Child Health

2. Chaco province Program

3. Jujuy province l

Broad review of Argentine employment/training I . To increase the efficiency (including Completed I . A number of MTSS programs have been evaluated and improved/redesigned

programs and policies: the poverty targeting) of the based on findings (PROAS/PRENO, TRABAJAR, labor intermediation

I . Study of unemployment insurance program. unemployment insurance, services).

2. Labor market reforms study employment and training programs 2. Enhanced Ministry of Labor's ability to articulate a comprehensive strategy,administered by the Ministry of including with Donors

3. Studies on various employment programs Labor.

4. Analysis of training programs. 2. To help inform national leveldiscussions on employment and laborpolicy.

Provincial level study on the distributional impact of To enhance the province's ability to use its Completed Findings publicly diseminated.public spending on education (Mendoza Province)- resources effectively to achieve growthwith additional funding from UNICEF and Ministry with equityof Economy.

PART B To assure quality of sub-projects Completed Improvement in project cycle.

Ex-post evaluation of sub-projects

Beneficiary assessment To evaluate program Completed Improvement in project cycle.

Evaluation of FOPAR To evaluate program Completed Improvement in project cycle.

PART C To evaluate program Completed Improvement to program.

Evaluation ofASOMA

Evaluation of Program Agropecuario To evaluate program Completed Improvement to program.

Evaluation of Trabajar To evaluate program Completed Improvement to program.

20

Table 7A: Project Costs

Item Appraisal Estimate (US$M) Actual/Latest Estimate (US$M)

A. Priority Social and Income Support Programs 366.8 563.5

A. (i) Social Programs 361.5 558.2

A. (ii) Institutional Development 5.3 5.3

B. Pilot Participatory Social Investment Fund (FOPAR) 35.8 36.9

B. (i) Community-Based Subprojects 25.8 29.5

B. (ii) Institutional Devlopment 10.0 7.4

C. Improvement of Social Information, Targeting and Monitoring 13.2 13.2of Social Programs (SIEMPRO)

C. (i) Social Information and Targeting 4.7 5.3

C. (ii) Monitoring and Evaluation of Targeted Social Programs 3.0 2.2

C. (iii) Dissemination and Transfer of Methodologies 3.7 2.8

C. (iv) Institutional Strengthening 1.8 2.9

TOTAL BASE COSTS 415.8

Physical Contingencies 0.4

Price Contingencies 1.7TOTAL PROJECT COSTS 417.9 613.6

21

Table 7B: Project Financing

Source Appraisal Estimate (US$M) Actual (US$M)IBRD/IDA 152.0 152.0

Government of Argentina * 265.9 461.6

TOTAL 417.9 613.6

* Includes Beneficiary Contribution for FOPAR sub-projects

22

Table 8: Status of Legal Covenants

Section Covenant Present Original Revised Description oftype status fulfillment fulfillment Covenant

date date

3.02 (b) 3 C Continual Grants for Subprojects made in accordance withi procedures and terms and conditions set forth inFOPAR Operational Manual

3.04(a) 5/9 C MarchlSept Maintain policies and procedures adequate to enable monitoring on an ongoing basis, in accordanceannually with indicators satisfactory to the Bank, of the canying out of the Project and the achievement of

objectives, and shall by March 31 and September 30 of each year of execution provide the Bank withsemi-annual progress reports on the execution of each program included in Part A and on the executionof Parts B and C, in a format acceptable to the Bank and including the indicators referred to above

3.04 ((b) 5/9 CD 3/31/97 5/3097 Prepare, under terms of reference satisfactory to the Bank, and furmish to the Bank, not later than March31, 1997, a report integrating the results of the monitoring and evaluation activities performed pursuantto Paragraph (a) of this Section, on the progress achieved in the carying out of Parts B and C of theProject and setting out the measures recommended to ensure the efficient carrying out of these Parts ofthe Project and the achievement of the objectives during the period following such date;

3.04 9c 5/9 CD 4130/97 7/31/97 Review with the Bank, by April 30, 1997, or such later date as the Bank shall request, the report referredto in paragraph (b) of this Section and, thereafter, take all measures required to ensure the efficientcompletion of Parts B and C of the Project and the achievement of the objectives, based on theconclusions and recommendations of the report and the Bank's views.

3.04 (d) 9 C 12/15/97 Not later than December 15, 1995, the Borrowe:r shall fumish to the Bank a set of indicators,satisfactory to the Bank, to be used in the monibring of the execution of each of the ProtectedPrograms.

3.05 3/11 C 2/28/96 The Borrower shall ensure that its expenditures in 1995 under the Protected Programs shall amount, inthe aggregate, to no less than $300,000,000 equivalent, and shall inform the Bank in writing byFebruary 28, 1996 of the level and composition of 1995 expenditures for the Protected Programs.

3.06 3/5/11 C 12/15/95 The Borrower shall: (a) not later than December 15, 1995, forward to the Bank a report on the physicaland financial performance of the Protected Programs for the first semester of this year; (b) not later thanDecember 15, 995, provide the Bank with a proposal, acceptable to the Bank, for the size andcomposition of the Selected Emlployment Programs to be financed by the loan under Part A of theproject during 1996; and (c) allocate budgetary funds for the Protected Programs to be carried out in1996 in amounts at least equal to $300,000,000.

3.07 5/11 CD 12/15/95 and 12/15/95 and The Borrower, through DNPGS, shall carry out a public social expenditure review on the basis of terms6/30/96 and 7/31/96 and of reference provided to the Bank not later than December 15, 1995 for its review and coment, forward12/31/96 4/30/97 to the Bank for its review a copy of draft report; on federal social expenditures not later than May 31,

1996, and on provincial social expenditures not later than December 31, 1996.

3.08 4 C Continual The Borrower shall make available, as and when needed, no less than $13,000,000 equivalent, in theaggregate, as counterpart funds for the execution of Parts B and C of the Project prior to the Closingdate.

4.01 2 CD Continual Maintain adequate financial records.

4.01 (a) I CD Continual Submit audit reports of the financial, project records and of the Special Account.

Covenant types:

I. = Accounts/audits 8. = Indigenous people2. = Financial performance/revenue generation from 9. = Monitoring, review, and reporting

beneficiaries 10. = Project implementation not covered by categories 1-93. = Flow and utilization of project funds 11. = Sectoral or cross-sectoral budgetary or other resource4. = Counterpart fuinding allocation5. = Management aspects of the project or executing 12. = Sectoral or cross-sectoral policy/

agency regulatory/institutional action6. = Environmental covenants 13. = Other7. = Involuntary resettlement

Present Status:

C = covenant complied withCD = complied with after delayCP = complied with partiallyNC = not complied with

23

Table 9: Bank Resources: Staff Inputs

Stage of Weeks US$Project Cycle

Preparation to Appraisal 95 325,554

Appraisal- Board 31.5 107,136

Negotiations through Board Approval 6.2 18,517

Supervision 79 342,103

Completion 8.1 4,751

TOTAL 219.8 798,061

24

Table 10: Bank Resources: Missions

Performance R2ling

Number Specialized Implemen- D)evelop-Stage of Month/ of Days in Staff Skills tation ment Types of

Project Cycle Year Persons Field Represented Status Cbjectives Problems

Through Appraisal

Appraisal throughBoard Approval

Supervision 1 11/95 5 50 E, SS, E, LE, P S _

Supervision 2 7/96 6 60 E, E, E, SS, SS, S SOP

Supervision 3 7/97 5 49 E, E, SS, E, OP S HS

Supervision 4 11/97 3 20 E, E, LE S HS

Supervision 5 2/98 2 29 E, OP

Completion

Part A 11/98 1 5 E

Parts B and C 2/99 1 5 OP

E = EconomistOP = Operation OffficerP = ProcurementSS = Social ScientistLE = Labor Economist

25

Table 11: Federal Spending on Targeted Social Programs Protected under the Project(in millions of Argentine pesos)

Program 1994 1995 1996 1997Apoyo Solidario a los Mayores (ASOMA) $5.5 $24.7 $31.3 $36.2Plan Social Educativo $129.8 $92.0 $149.9 $129.5Normatizacion, Suministros y Supervision $10.9 $8.9 $8.6 $13.7de VacunacionesControl de Enfermedades Transmisibles por $17.2 $13.7 $6.0 $12.5Vectores (Chagas)Plan Social Agropecuario $6.9 $4.2 $10.7 $9.4Generacion de Empleo $138.0 $163.7 $152.6 $288.5Total Spending On Protected Programs $308.3 $307.3 $359.1 $489.9(in current pesos)Spending on Targeted Programs Relative to 100.0 99.7 116.5 158.91994, in nominal terms (1994=100)

Total Spending On Protected Programs $308.3 $294.0 $338.6 $464.2(in 1994 Pesos)Spending on Targeted Programs Relative to 100.0 95.4 109.8 150.61994, in real terms (1994=100)

Deflator for 1995 = 4.5Deflator for 1996 = 1.5Deflator for 1997 = -.5

26

Table 12: FOPAR Sub-projects Funded by Type

I Ejecuci6n al 31/2/98

Tipo Descripcion Cantidad MontoContrat Desembolsos BIRF SDS AporteBenef

CANM Establecimientos asistenciales nivel 1 bajo ri 42 1,567,805 1,535,062 1,058,311 359,717 117,034

CDC Centros de desarrollo comunitario 268 12,301,856 11,950,563 8,191,651 2,804,742 954,170

FALC Formaci6n de agentes y lideres comunitarios 96 905,414 852,195 592,658 161,600 97,937

FAMI Famiempresas 2 1,406,082 742,896 510,227

FIEL Fortalecim. de la integraci6n escuela - comun. 41 1,771,891 1,747,115 1,187,307 414,741 145,068

FOB Fortalecimiento de organizaciones de base 18 129,802 131,842 91,535 24,185 16,122

FOBANE Fortalec. organiz. de base c/activ.natur.econ. 32 587,330 603,666 389,773 101,498 112,395

PDC Promoci6n del desarrollo comunitario 27 186,277 181,503 124,659 38,495 18,349

PENC Proyectos de energia no convencionales 1 24,017 24,017 16,812 4,805 2,400

POC Pequenias obras comunitarias 108 4,305,455 4,258,982 2,894,026 846,164 518,792

PSA Pequefios sistemas de agua potable 29 1,301,642 1,293,260 895,796 284,951 112,513

SBL Saneamiento basico (letrinas y fosas septicas) 142 6,333,964 6,190,797 4,257,497 1,499,939 433,362

TOTALES 806 30,821,535 29,511,898 20,210,251 6,773,506 2,528,141

27


ARGENTINA


APPENDIX: BORROWER CONTRIBUTION TO THE ICR

PART B: SECRETARIAT FOR SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

INFORME DE CIERRECONVENIO DE PRESTAMO 3957 AR BIRF - COMPONENTES B Y C

PROGRAMA PARTICIPATIVO DE DESARROLLO SOCIAL

I- Creaci6n del Programa Participativo de Desarrollo Social: Surgimiento y Objetivos.

El Programa Participativo de Desarrollo Social (PRODESO), se cre6 por la Secretaria de Desarrollo Social de laPresidencia de la Naci6n (SDS) mediante la Resoluci6n 1826/94, es una unidad ejecutora compuesta por doscomponentes basicos y una unidad de apoyo: el Fondo Participativo de Inversi6n Social (FOPAR), el Sistema deInformaci6n, Monitoreo y Evaluaci6n de Programas Sociales (SIEMPRO), y la Unidad de Coordinaci6n AdministrativoFinanciera que brinda apoyo a ambos.

La creaci6n del Componente SIEMPRO esta estrechamente vinculada con el diagn6stico que dio origen a la SDS.En el se sefialaba la debilidad de la capacidad institucional del Estado para la elaboraci6n de diagnosticos sobre lascondiciones de vida de la poblaci6n en situaci6n de pobreza y vulnerabilidad social y, para la generaci6n de metodologiasde planificaci6n y evaluaci6n de las intervenciones publicas realizadas con ese fin.

Como consecuencia de ello, muchas de esas intervenciones expresadas en programas sociales reflejabanproblemas o bien la ausencia de focalizaci6n de las acciones, la fragmentaci6n y superposici6n geografica, la carencia deindicadores de desempefio e impacto, de sistemas intemos y externos de evaluaci6n, la insuficiencia de recursos humanosformados.

En ese contexto se cre6 el componente SIEMPRO, como un programa de apoyo de la SDS, con la misi6n basicade auxiliar al fortalecimiento de la gesti6n de los programas sociales y el apoyo tecnico a la toma de decisiones en elcampo social.

Por su parte el componente FOPAR respondi6 a la necesidad de poner a prueba un nuevo modelo de gesti6nsocial basado en el protagonismo de los beneficiarios en la presentaci6n de demandas comunitarias y en la administraci6nde los recursos para su soluci6n. En este sentido, para el disefno de la Etapa Piloto del FOPAR se definieronprocedimientos tendientes a garantizar la aplicaci6n de mecanismos transparentes para asignar localmente recursos a lossectores sociales mas afectados por la pobreza en base a una demanda estructurada en pequenos proyectos.

El disefio institucional consider6 explicitamente mecanismos para favorecer la aplicaci6n de una estrategia defocalizacion territorial, la recepci6n de demandas de la poblaci6n- objetivo y los instrumentos para brindar respuestas alas mismas y la aplicaci6n de un modelo de gesti6n apoyado en distintas formas de participaci6n provincial y comunitariay en una progresiva autogesti6n de los proyectos por parte de los beneficiarios directos del Programa.

28

II- Fondo Participativo de Inversi6n social (FOPAR)(Componente B)

Objetivos

El objetivo fundamental de] Fondo Participativo de Inversi6n Social (FOPAR) es el de desarrollar capacidadeslocales de gesti6n a traves de experiencias participativas y concretas en formulaci6n, gesti6n y ejecuci6n de proyectosdestinados a mejorar condiciones socioecon6micas de grupos y comunidades en situaci6n de pobreza.

Los objetivos para la etapa piloto del FOPAR consistieron en poner a prueba nuevos mecanismos para:* canalizar recursos financieros para subproyectos destinados a comunidades focalizadas;* fortalecer organizaciones sociales;* Ilevar a cabo inversiones de pequefia escala dirigidas a satisfacer necesidades basicas.

Logros y Resultados Alcanzados

* Alcance territorial: El Fondo ha logrado constituirse en un mecanismo transparente de financiamiento de proyectosen las provincias de Salta, Jujuy, Corrientes, Misiones, Chaco y Santiago del Estero. En el caso de la Provincia deTucumAn se trabaj6 durante la Etapa Piloto con el componente piloto de apoyo a las micro/famiempresas.

* Comisiones Locales de Desarrollo Social CLDS: En estas provincias se han constituido Comisiones Locales deDesarrollo Social (CLDS) que cumplen funciones de apoyo a la promoci6n y ejecuci6n de los proyectos .

C Cobertura y desempefno general:a) Durante el periodo 96-98, la participacion activa de los beneficiarios con el aipoyo tecnico del Programa ha

logrado la ejecuci6n de 806 proyectos comunitarios por un monto de $30.82 L.000 beneficiando directamente a214.289 personas. De esta manera se alcanza una cobertura del 45% de la poblaci6n NBI que habita en las zonasfocalizadas (la demanda potencial se estim6 en 475.000 personas). De los 214.289 beneficiarios directos,aproximadamente 16.000 personas, ademas de beneficiarse con el uso de la obra o de la capacitaci6n, hanparticipado activamente en la gesti6n y ejecuci6n de los proyectos a traves de su participaci6n en los nicleos debeneficiarios (NUB), recibiendo capacitaci6n y asistencia ticnica que les han permitido desarrollar capacidadesde identificaci6n de necesidades autogestion y administraci6n de recursos. Esta metodologia de fuerteparticipaci6n en todo el ciclo de proyectos y especialmente en la administraci6n de los recursos del proyecto, hademostrado que favorece la apropiaci6n de los beneficiarios como base de lae sostenibilidad de los mismos.

b) Dado el enfoque participativo que impulsa el programa, el ciclo de proyecto extendido que el mismo conlleva, laentrada gradual a las provincias y el periodo de dos anios del prestamo, se Dpt6 por atender 6 provincias y dejarcuatro para una segunda fase.

c) La respuesta de la poblaci6n a la propuesta del Fondo se evidencia en que en un total de 125 barrios de lasciudades capitales (el 88% de los barrios convocados a concurso) y 53 municipios del interior (el 100% de laslocalidades promocionadas) se contrataron proyectos.

d) El programa ingres6 gradualmente en las provincias, firmando convenios con los diferentes gobemadores yconvocando a los Consejos Participativos Provinciales. Al 30/09/96 se habfian contratado proyectos por un montode $166.000, al 31/12/96 este valor era de $1.380.000, al 30/06/97 trep6 a $9.802.000 y al 31/12/97 ascendi6 a $30.821.000.

e) Debe destacarse que en esta fase de operaciones se apoy6 la constituci6n de 1440 organizaciones comunitarias yse impartieron 5847 m6dulos de capacitaci6n para la formulaci6n de proyectos.

f) Dada la cantidad y calidad de los proyectos presentados al FOPAR se constituy6 un Banco de Proyectos (252)pendientes de financiamiento que se estan sometiendo a revisi6n para su contratacion y ejecuci6n en el transcursode 1999.

29

* Cartera de proyectos: Se presentaron y ejecutaron subproyectos de todos las categorias existentes en el menu deproyectos.

* Participaci6n organizaciones de la sociedad civil: El Fondo ha logrado la participaci6n de numerosasorganizaciones tecnicas e instituciones de la sociedad civil en el apoyo a los beneficiarios en las distintas etapas delciclo de subproyectos.

* Empleo: La mayoria de los proyectos realizados ejecutados durante la Etapa Piloto contemplaron la construcci6n deobra fisica, requiriendo una demanda significativa de trabajo.

Impacto del Programa

Hacia el uiltimo trimestre de 1997 comenz6 una evaluaci6n expost realizada por consultores externos al FOPAR aproyectos finalizados con el objeto de establecer los resultados obtenidos en la ejecuci6n de proyectos en relaci6n alcumplimiento de los objetivas propuestos.

* Focalizaci6n: La evaluacion expost que se desarroll6 a una muestra de proyectos ejecutados por el FOPAR encuatro provincias del pais, muestra que un 80% de los beneficiarios directos constituyen poblaci6n en situaci6n depobreza extrema.

* Percepci6n de los beneficiarios: En base a la encuesta a beneficiarios realizada por el equipo extemo de evaluaci6nexpost, se obtuvieron los siguientes resultados:a) El 96% de los beneficiarios manifestaron que sus proyectos efectivamente satisficieron sus necesidades o

solucionaron los problemas identificados.b) El 97% de beneficiarios expresaron que el apoyo de Fopar fue indispensable para la implementaci6n de sus

proyectos.c) Los mecanismos de participaci6n disefiados por FOPAR, entre estos, la administraci6n de recursos por los NUB

crearon las condiciones para que los beneficiarios contribuyan activamente en las etapas del proyecto.d) Existe un amplio consenso sobre el correcto manejo de los recursos econ6micos proporcionados por FOPAR por

parte de los responsables de los NUB.e) Los beneficiarios de los proyectos evaluados expresan una opini6n favorable sobre su experiencia de

participaci6n en los proyectos FOPAR.f) Se reconoce que un aspecto relevante de los proyectos es que proporcionaron trabajo a los hombres beneficiarios

NUB que tienen niveles mas altos de pobreza (el 82% de los trabajadores remunerados calific6 como NBI).g) Los beneficiarios destacaron el apoyo de los tecnicos del Programa para la formulaci6n y ejecuci6n de los

proyectos.h) Para la mayoria de los beneficiarios su participaci6n en los nuicleos de beneficiarios (NUB) constituye su primera

experiencia organizativa.

* Costos y aportes locales: Se ha podido constatar durante la etapa piloto del Fondo que los beneficiarios realizanmayores aportes locales durante la ejecuci6n de los proyectos llegando a un valor de 20.1% del costo total delproyecto seguin el informe de evaluaci6n expost. Ademas, el costo unitaria de construcci6n por metro cuadrado esmenor que en programas similares.

* Calidad de la infraestructura: La calidad final de las obras fue aceptable para el programa y las dimensiones de lasobras fueron adecuadas a la poblaci6n beneficiaria.

30

* Sostenibilidad: De las distintas consideraciones sociales, tecnicas y econ6micas itomadas en cuenta por la evaluaci6nex post se concluye que el 80% de los proyectos de infraestructura del FOPAR se encuentran en un nivel entre medioy alto de posibilidad de ser sostenibles.

* Efectos ambientales: Los proyectos comunitarios del FOPAR han sido de pequena magnitud y los impactosambientales fueron previsibles y controlados desde los proyectos.

Continuidad Institucional

Dado el exito observado por el Programa durante la etapa piloto y los resultados favorables de la evaluaci6nextema, el Gobiemo Argentino ha gestionado y aprobado una segunda fase de cuatro affos de duraci6n. La segunda etapaconstituye una continuidad con respecto a la Etapa Piloto, no obstante se han instrumentado algunas modificaciones.

Principales Factores que Afectaron la Ejecuci6n del Proyecto

Fuera del control del gobierno: Las regiones del norte donde trabaj6 el Fondo se caracterizan pos sus condicionesclimaticas adversas o inestables. A su vez, se observaron insuficientes recursos de apoyo tecnico a la formulaci6n yejecuci6n de proyectos, a nivel provincial y local.

En ireas de gobierno ajenas a la Secretaria de Desarrollo Social: A nivel Nacional: demoras en la aprobaci6n de laejecuci6n presupuestaria y restricciones y cambios presupuestarios. A nivel de las provincias: en el caso del FOPAR, elsistema de gobiemo federal vigente en la Repuiblica Argentina implica numerosas instancias de negociaci6n de acuerdoscon las autoridades nacionales, provinciales y municipales que incidieron en los ritmos de ejecuci6n. A nivel municipal:Existieron dificultades originadas tanto en la tendencia de los municipios a querer manejar los recursos como en lademora o falta de cumplimiento en compromisos de apoyo a los proyectos.

En relaci6n con la Secretaria de Desarrollo Social y el FOPAR: Es de destacar como factor condicionante inicial delPrograma, la falta de credibilidad generalizada de los pobladores y de los funcionarios de municipios pobres frente a losprogramas sociales en general. Por otra parte cabe destacar la existencia de significativas demoras en la tramitaci6n defirmas de convenio, cancelaci6n y cierre de proyectos, a nivel de la SDS.

Rol del Banco

La relaci6n del Programa con las misiones del Banco transcurrieron en un clima inmejorable de cooperaci6n eintercambio.

Lecciones

* Inserci6n institucionalTeniendo en cuenta actualmente con una imagen publica muy difundida en las provincias del Norte y considerando quepr6ximamente habrA de expandir su cobertura territorial se ha previsto reforzar los esquemas de inserci6n institucional delPrograma en cadajurisdicci6n provincial.

* Acompanamiento activoEl desarrollo exitoso de la experiencia FOPAR ha dependido en medida importante de la inserci6n del Programa enterreno antes y durante el ciclo de proyectos: promoci6n, evaluaci6n y seguimiento, bajo diferentes formas dediagn6stico, capacitaci6n, apoyo a procesos organizativos, asistencia tecnica y asistencia juridica. Esta modalidad de

31

trabajo esta siendo perfeccionada con vistas a la siguiente fase del Programa, tomando la experiencia acumulada comofuente para la reformulaci6n metodol6gica y de instrumentos.

* Estrategia de Articulaci6n y acuerdos institucionales con otros programas u organismos sectorialesLa experiencia ha demostrado la importancia de una estrategia integral de articulaci6n con otros programas u organismos,con el fin de maximizar el impacto de sus propias acciones. A tal efecto el FOPAR considera necesario profundizarestrategias de articulaci6n.

* Menu de Subproyectos ComunitariosSe consider6 conveniente amnpliar el menui para el segundo prestamo.

* Transferencia Metodol6gicaSe ha disefiado una nueva linea de accion que tiene como objetivo transferir las metodologias e instrumentosdesarrollados por el FOPAR, permitiendo potenciar recursos existentes.

* Monto Miximo de los proyectosSe acordo un incremento de este monto maximo. A su vez, a raiz de la capacidad demostrada por los beneficiarios paraadministrar sumas de dinero se ampli6 el monto de los mismos cuando se trate de proyectos de baja complejidad tecnica,que no requieran equipamiento sofisticado ni experiencia tecnica especifica.

I1- Sistema de Informaci6n, Monitoreo, y Evaluaci6n de Programas Sociales (SIEMPRO)- (Componente C)

1. Objetivos

El SIEMPRO, cuyo objetivo general es el de "dotar a la Secretaria de Desarrollo Social de los recursos necesariospara la operaci6n de un sistema de informaci6n social, monitoreo, evaluaci6n y capacitaci6n en gerenciamiento social",precisa los objetivos especificos que orientaron su estructura y ejecuci6n:

* Mejorar el gerenciamiento de los programas sociales.- Generar una base de datos util para los responsables del disenio y ejecucion de politicas y programas sociales, sobre

condiciones de vida de la poblaci6n y oferta de programas sociales.* Producir informaci6n social para el disefio y la focalizaci6n social y territorial de los programas sociales.* Promover la incorporacion e institucionalizaci6n de un sistema de gesti6n integral de programas sociales por

resultados.* Brindar asistencia tecnica y capacitaci6n a los organismos del area social en los niveles nacionales y provinciales.* Difundir en la opini6n publica nacional informaci6n sobre condiciones de vida de la poblaci6n, las politicas sociales y

el rol del estado.* Realizar un monitoreo estrategico y evaluaciones de proceso, resultados e impacto de los programas sociales.* Generar un ambito de analisis y monitoreo de la situacion social y de disenio de estrategias de intervencion

1. 1. Concepciones Estrategicas del SIEMPRO:

1.1.1. La Funci6n EvaluadoraPara el logro de sus prop6sitos, el SIEMPRO naci6 con determinadas concepciones estrategicas que orientaron su

estructura funcional y desarrollo. 'Jn criterio central es, generar un dispositivo de informaciones y evaluaciones cuyafinalidad sea contribuir al ejercicio de las politicas sociales y no la disminuci6n o supresi6n de gastos sociales comotradicionalmente fue entendida, en periodos de ajuste, la funcion evaluadora. A partir de esta formulaci6n, el SIEMPROprecis6 las siguientes concepciones acerca de las evaluaciones:

32

* La evaluaci6n es inherente a los procesos de modernizaci6n del Estado porque articula la gesti6n pubblica con susresultados, genera procesos de fortalecimiento institucional y permite transparentar las acciones del Estado paraposibilitar el control social.

* Reconocer la centralidad, la autonomia y la especificidad de la evaluaci6n social a partir de la complejidad,multicausalidad y heterogeneidad de lo social, por contraste con las habituales evaluaciones de inversiones fisicas concriterios estrictamente econ6micos.

* Introducir tina dimensi6n novedosa en la funci6n de evaluaci6n como las evaluaciones prospectivas: es decir,capaces de dar cuenta de los efectos sociales de la politicas econ6micas y de otras inversiones puiblicas y privadas.

* Necesidad de no divorciar los sistemas de informaci6n social de los procesos de evaluaci6n de los programassociales.

* La dinamica integradora de ambos aspectos (informaci6n y evaluaci6n), es la que habra de permitir dimensionarbrechas sociales, fijar metas, asumir compromisos institucionales de caracter puiblico y verificar su cumplimientodesde el estado y desde la sociedad, haciendo de la funci6n evaluadora un instrurnento democratizador de lainformaci6n al servicio de la ciudadania.

1.1.2. Descentralizaci6n del SIEMPRO a las provincias

El SIEMPRO, adopt6 una estrategia de transferencia, capacitaci6n y comunicaci6n flexible, que combinabaofertas preestablecidas aplicables a todo el pais y mecanismos que permit6 detectar requerimientos peculiares de lasjurisdicciones e instituciones, junto a modalidades ocasionales e intensivas y mecanismos permanentes.

Las acciones de transferencia tecnica tuvieron por objeto incorporar las provincias al SIEMPRO, fortaleciendolos organismos encargados de su implementaci6n. Para ello se crearon las Unidades Ejecutoras Provinciales (UEPs). Lasmismas recibieron asistencia tecnica, capacitaci6n, equipamiento y seguimiento.

1.1.3. Ambitos de anilisis y discusi6n

Generar un ambito de analisis y discusi6n te6rico-conceptual y metodol6gico acerca del rol del Estado frente a losproblemas sociales que permitiera el disefio de nuevas estrategias de intervenci6n.

1. 1.4. Formaci6n de equipos tecnicos

Fonnar equipos de excelencia en temas de pobreza, vulnerabilidad social, gerencia social, evaluaci6n ymonitoreo, atendiendo a la situaci6n desventajosa de las areas sociales frente a las capacidades de las areas econ6micas.

2. Disefio del Proyecto- Organizaci6n Funcional del SIEMPRO

Acorde con sus objetivos y concepciones estrategicas, se estructur6 funcionalmente el SIEMPRO. A nivelnacional se cre6 una Unidad Ejecutora Central conformada por un grupo de Gerencias responsables de desarrollar susdistintas funciones. Este mismo disefio de organizaci6n funcional se replic6 en los niveles subnacionales, en lasprovincias, en las que se instalaron las asi llamadas Unidades Ejecutoras Provinciales del SIEMPRO. 1

'A la fecha existen 10 de estas, en las provincias de Salta, Chaco, Misiones, Rio Negro, Neuquen, La Pampa, San Luis,Mendoza, La Rioja, San Juan y Santa Fe. Pr6ximamante se espera ampliar la experiencia al resto de las provincias delpais.

33

a) Gerencia de Informaci6n Social.De esta depende la funci6n de generaci6n y difusi6n de la informaci6n social, destinada a todos los niveles institucionalesde la propia Secretaria de Desarrollo Social, al Gabinete Social, a las areas sociales de los gobiemos provinciales, aorganismos no gubernamentales y organizaciones sociales de la comunidad. Asimismo, es la responsable de proveerasistencia tecnica a estas mismas instancias para que puedan mejorar sus propias formas de generaci6n y uso deinformaci6n social propia.

b) Gerencia de Monitoreo y Evaluaci6n de Programas Sociales.Tiene el prop6sito de contribuir a una gesti6n integral de los programas sociales sobre la base de un proceso deplanificaci6n, ejecuci6n y evaluaci6n de las acciones destinadas a mejorar las condiciones de vida de grupos de lapoblaci6n. Para ello, se desarrollan metodologias y herramientas de evaluaci6n, provisi6n de asistencia tecnica yfinanciamiento para la formulaci6n y evaluaci6n de programas.

c) Gerencia de Capacitaci6n y TransferenciaResponsable de instalar las capacidades de gerenciamiento social en las instituciones gubernamentales y nogubemamentales que desarrollan acciones en el campo social, sobre la base de la formaci6n de sus recursos humanos.

Este esfuerzo se centraliza especialmente en los niveles provinciales y locales, a traves de las Unidades EjecutorasProvinciales del SIEMPRO.

d) Unidad de Anilisis de Politicas SocialesEsta unidad tiene la responsabilidad de generar ambitos de debate con distintos actores y el sector academico y realizarestudios e investigaciones sistematicas sobre los fen6menos de la pobreza, la vulnerabilidad y exclusi6n social, a traves delos cuales se pueda apoyar la mejor toma de decisiones, asi como la conducci6n de las politicas sociales destinadas a lapoblaci6n en situacion de pobreza y vulnerabilidad social. Es esta Unidad la responsable de realizar, por lo mismo, lafunci6n evaluadora prospectiva.

3. Lecciones y Riesgos

3.1. Durante la ejecuci6n del SIEMPRO 1, se hizo evidente que una de las contribuciones mas valiosas del programaes su asistencia tecnica a las provincias. En ese sentido, el SIEMPRO 2 continuara fortaleciendo esta linea. Por otro lado,en algunos casos, el SIEMPRO I experiment6 dificultades en la obtenci6n de la cooperaci6n y el acceso a la informaci6nnecesaria para llevar a cabo la evaluaci6n de programas fuera de la SDS. Consecuentemente, durante el primer afio, elSIEMPRO 2 se concentrara en la evaluaci6n de programas dentro de la SDS. La evaluaci6n de programas fuera de laSDS sera a demanda. SIEMPRO 2 tambien se beneficiara de la expertise del Banco en el anAlisis de la pobreza y lasencuestas sociales. El Banco tambien serA instrumental en la transferencia de lecciones y experiencias de otros clientesasi como de paises de la OCDE.

3.2. En segundo lugar, el impacto que SIEMPRO estA teniendo en los programas nacionales es considerable, tomandoen cuenta que una buena parte estos se encuentran en la propia SDS y que aqui la acogida de las actividades del Programay la respuesta gerencial a las mismas es inmediata. Por otra parte, el SIEMPRO logr6 llegar, a veces con mucha fuerza alos equipos provinciales de los programas nacionales de la SDS y de otros sectores.

3.3. El SIEMPRO fue consultado permanentemente frente a la necesidad de definir estrategias de intervenci6n, siendointerlocutor de ambos bancos e incluso del FMI, durante sus misiones en el pais.

3.4. Las evaluaciones realizadas por el SIEMPRO, permitieron mejorar la operatoria de los programas evaluados,aumentar la eficiencia y eficacia de sus prestaciones. Sin Animo de realizar una lista exhaustiva de las mejoras concretasintroducidas por los programas, a modo de ejemplo se puede mencionar la evaluaci6n del PSA, que permiti6 reformular la

34

operatoria completa de la asistencia tecnica a los pequefios productores rurales, se retipifico la asistencia tecnica,estableciendo el costo por tipo y duraci6n de la misma, generandose una mayor eficiencia en la asignaci6n de recursospara este tipo de prestaciones. En el Programa ASOMA, la evaluaci6n permiti6 refo:rmular la estructura de recursoshumanos del programa, mejor6 la focalizaci6n y aument6 la cobertura del mismo, se reestructuraron los mecanismos detransferencia a las provincias y redujeron el peso de los gastos operativos de administraci6n; se redujo tambien el preciomedio de adquisici6n del bols6n de comida, manteniendo la calidad y contenido cal6rico de la prestaci6n, etc.

3.5. Lo que hace distinguible la experiencia del SIEMPRO respecto de las otras iniciativas desarrolladas en losrestantes paises, es que todas estas funciones de informaci6n social, monitoreo y evaluaci6n de politicas, programas einstituciones, capacitaci6n y difusion o transferencia tecnica a servidores publicos, sen parte de un sistemainstitucionalmente integrado, lo que permite su utilizaci6n de manera sistemica, en tanto que en otras realidadesnacionales, tales funciones estan desagregadas en distintas instituciones puiblicas o en distintos segmentos de una mismainstituci6n, sin alimentarse mutuamente.

3.6. Las agencias del SIEMPRO han sido decisivas en el fortalecimiento y mejoramiento de la gesti6n de las Areassociales y programas a traves de la capacitaci6n, la asistencia tecnica y la transferencia de instrumentos y metodologiaspara la instalaci6n de sistemas de informaci6n, evaluaci6n y monitoreo provinciales. Las agencias provinciales desataronprocesos de jerarquizacion de las areas sociales, planificaci6n estratdgica, desarrollo de infraestructura tecnol6gica,mecanismos de seguimiento y evaluaci6n intemos, transparencia y difusion de la informaci6n.

3.7. La naturaleza de la conformaci6n del equipo de trabajo del SIEMPRO ha sido un factor decisivo en la capacidadde producci6n de conocimientos y en su operativizaci6n: con un staff multidisciplinario y plural, el programa ha disefiadoy puesto en funcionamiento una experiencia inedita en el pais, tanto a nivel de las estructuras de la SDS, como en losniveles subnacionales.

4. Conclusiones

La instalaci6n de agencias provinciales se destaca como un instrumento de una gran capacidad de penetracion enlos niveles operativos de los programas. Ha sido una buena forma de mantener servicios constantes a las provincias yesta permitiendo, quizA mas que ninguna otra estrategia del Programa, la institucionalizaci6n de los objetivos delSIEMPRO en las provincias, que es donde se ejecutan realmente la mayoria de los programas.

El impacto del anAlisis social y de politicas es sin ninguna duda el principal aporte del SIEMPRO a lamodernizaci6n de las politicas sociales, en la medida que representa una linea de act ividad que resume o sintetiza losavances logrados por el Programa en sus distintas areas de trabajo. Desde ese punto de vista, los multiples documentos deanalisis, de informes y de propuestas elaboradas por el SIEMPRO han permitido justificar o disefiar nuevasintervenciones para atender problemas sociales especificos.

Los factores que estan relacionados con los exitos del Programa son sobre todo los que se refieren a: a) latransparencia y universalidad con la que se proporcionan los servicios, b) el nivel tecnico de los equipos del Programa yc) el respeto en el trato con las provincias y con otros sectores.

La existencia del SIEMPRO a nivel central significa que el pais ha estado avanzando en el fortalecimiento de lasareas sociales con un criterio homogeneo y consistente, al permitir que tanto las jurisdicciones provinciales como el nivelnacional tuvieran un mismo tipo de capacitaci6n asi como de unificaci6n de leguaje y contenido en la planificaci6n,evaluaci6n y monitoreo de las politicas y programas sociales. En tal sentido, la legilimidad tecnica de los instrumentos ymetodologias desarrollados por el SIEMPRO ha implicado que todos los programas sociales que actualmente estan enproceso de formulaci6n o de inicio de ejecuci6n con financiamiento BID, se ha establecido que el calculo de la demandapotencial, la focalizaci6n, la evaluaci6n y monitoreo sera realizado por el SIEMPRO.

35

Las tareas, cursos y talleres de capacitaci6n sobre gerencia social, planificaci6n de programas, monitoreo yevaluaci6n, realizados por el SIEMPRO tanto a nivel nacional como en las provincias permiti6 que, una cifra superior a10.000 personas accedieran a instrumentos, herramientas y desarrollos conceptuales. Ello ha creado condiciones parahacer comun a nivel nacional y provincial criterios y conceptos, generar habilidades gerenciales, instalar la "cultura" de laevaluaci6n como practica de gesti6n permanente, se han establecido las bases para la coordinaci6n institucional horizontal(entre programas nacionales entre si y entre programas provinciales entre si) y vertical (entre programas nacionales yprovinciales).

4.1. El SIEMPRO como Instrumento de Cambio

La instalaci6n del SIEMPRO y su operaci6n en estos primeros anios de su existencia se asocia, por una parte, amodificaciones en la institucionalidad social publica, y por otra parte, genera innovaciones en el funcionamiento del areasocial del pais. Es decir, el SIEMPRO, mas alla de los desafios pendientes que tiene y de las eventuales rectificacionesque pueden mejorar sus resultados, ha sido un importante instrumento de cambios en el ambito de las politicas sociales.

IV- Unidad de Coordinaci6n Administrativa Financiera

1. Objetivos y funciones

Los objetivos de la Unidad de Coordinaci6n Administrativo- Financiera (UCAF) durante la Etapa Piloto fueronbrindar servicios juridicos, de sistemas, presupuestarios, de control de gesti6n y administrativo- financieros en general alos componentes B (FOPAR) y C (SIEMPRO) del Proyecto de Proteccion Social LOAN 3957- AR.

1. Logros y Resultados Alcanzados

Los resultados alcanzados en la Etapa Piloto pueden dividirse en dos areas: a) Sistema de Informaci6n, y b)Administraci6n de los Recursos y Control de Gesti6n

2.a.- Sistema de Informaci6n

En la Etapa Piloto del Prestamo se disefi6, desarroll6 e implement6 el Sistema de Informaci6n del Prodeso con losobjetivos de:

* Sistematizar el conjunto de procesos que resulten de la actividad del Prodeso* Proporcionar informaci6n analitica referida a los proyectos en sus diferentes etapas de desarrollo y en cada uno de los

territorios donde se centre la acci6n, a los desembolsos y reembolsos resultantes de ese accionar.* Generar informaci6n gerencial con mayor o menor grado de detalle para asistir en la gesti6n directiva del Programa.* Asistir en tareas operativas

El contar con un Sistema de informacion que integra las funciones administrativas con las especificas de proyectos, locual permite una gran seguridad en la integralidad de los datos y evita la duplicaci6n de tareas y dispersi6n de esfuerzos,es un logro importante de esta etapa.

2.2.- Administraci6n de los Recursos y Control de Gesti6n

En esta Etapa se logr6 diseniar y desarrollar la sistematizacion peri6dica de los Estados Contables y Financierosdel PRODESO, como asi tambien se ha implementado los mecanismos necesarios para satisfacer los requerimientos dedesembolso de fondos a los subproyectos en cada una de la provincias, objetivo del FOPAR.

36

Esto se verific6 en la evaluaci6n expost realizada por el equipo de consultores externos al FOPAR, donde seadvirti6 la transparencia y gesti6n administrativa de los recursos transferidos por el F'OPAR a los beneficiarios de lossubproyectos.

A su vez, se implementaron procedimientos acordes a la normativa del BIRF y de la Secretaria de DesarrolloSocial tendientes a cumplir con las solicitudes de desembolsos y las rendiciones de cuenta de fondos de contrapartidalocal, respectivamente.

Es necesario destacar que, debido a la integralidad del sistema de informacion detallada anteriormente, se hamantenido la necesaria separaci6n de funciones entre las actividades administrativas en cuanto al manejo de los recursosy los procesos de control internos de la Unidad.

3. Lecciones Aprendidas

* Generar informes especificos de Informaci6n de Gesti6n que faciliten la toma de decisiones, incorporando la nuevametodologia de gesti6n impulsada por el Banco con la iniciativa LACI y atendiendo la necesidad de planificaci6n ypresupuestacion de las actividades del Programa.

* Incrementar el uso del sistema de proyectos en las Unidades Provinciales permnitiendo el acceso a la informaci6n enlinea haciendo uso de las posibilidades que brinda la tecnologia Internet. Esto posibilitara, ademas, descentralizar lastareas de procesamiento de la informaci6n.

- Incorporar controles cruzados adicionales que permitan minimizar las posibilidades de errores y brindar a los usuarioselementos adicionales para permitir efectuar controles en fonna semi-automatica2.

37

MAP SECTION

IBRD 29348

200- 60, so,20

-20. ? BOLIVIA 20'-

P ARAGUAY7-... \ coa ejur i u B R A Z I L

-- SALTA - NFormosai

) ,5o -(C 3Tuluman jCHACO--5 f "I, - TUCUMAN Resistencia - Posadas '\' -

SANTIAGO 7L- ssK X ,.g <3SantiaLgo del 1stro_ _ Crrientes JI- ~~~~~ DEL sterJ >, I, . Calamarca dl C/, '' '*~ LAESTERO /

La RiolaO --.< , I C..II ' -s RIOJA- SA N TA9_. -

-30° U AJUAN FE , } ; 30°-JUAN C6rdoba !Santa /

@DSan JunFe ,/Prn' _ \ >~,CORRDOBAW NTEg\

Mendoza\ San RIOS .URSUuis &N. URUGUAY(

LU\ISAN I ®Bv euenos Aires

fMENDOZA' rIBUENOS

Santa Rosa0(- \ : LA AIRES

PAM PAkNEUGIUENj (

) Neuqu&|

RIO

-40 ( @ NEGRO Viedma3

- . - - ARGENTINA

®o Rowson

- > C H U B U T e PROVINCE CAPITALS

NATIONAL CAPITAL

- - - - PROVINCE BOUNDARIES

. .- --- INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES

j SANTA

- -f CRUZ

-50. oGleo 50'-0 100 200 300 400 500 600 KILOMETERSL I IF I I

_ 9-t _ - 2 > ~ / 0 100 200 300 400 Mites

I . . . ' . ' .i ' .ztis mop wns pFros-ted by the Map Design Unit of The Word ank,-= t-; --.--Ush ua ia- -rhe bounwadries, alobrs, denmiatia'ons end anyother information shownITERRA an this map do not imply, on the part of The Wadd Bank Group, any

DEL FUEGO judgment an thc legalsitatvs af cm), territaiy, or any endorsement o'raccepftnce of ,vch boaindaries.

70' 60° : 1

APRIL 1 998

social protection project - world bank€¦ · report no.: 20085 implementation completion reiport...

Documents