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In the Beginning Notes on the Social Construction

of

Historical Discontinuity

Eviatar Zerubavel

Rutgers Univesiv

Beginnings are both theoretically and experientially anchored in a distinctively

discontinuous conception of time. This paper examines the conventional nature

of

beginnings, calls attention to the politics of establishing official beginnings of historical

narratives, and claims that the way groups (from families to nations) construct their

historical beginnings ought to be at the heart of any study of the development of

collective identity.

One of the most striking features of the way we experience time is the

essentially discontinuous nature we attribute to it

E.

Zerubavel 1991,

pp. 9-10, 30-31). Despite the fact that time flows uninterruptedly, we quite

normally carve in our minds out of historical continuums supposedly discrete

periods (adolescence, the Middle Ages) and events (conversations, revolutions).

Yet nowhere is our ability to segment time more clearly evident than in the

way we construct beginnings. The very notion of a beginning, inevitably

associated with some prior void, is the most distinctive manifestation of our

vision of insular chunks of history floating in the ocean of time.

Temporal partitions usually represent other, more elusive mental parti-

tions, and therefore serve to divide more than just time. We thus use the

boundaries of holidays, for example, to help us concretize the mental passage

between the sacred and the profane domains and those of the workday to

separate the states of being

on

and off duty and thus give substance to the

mental contrast between the private and public domains

E.

Zerubavel 1981,

pp. 101-166). In a similar fashion, we often use beginnings to help us articulate

in our minds distinct social identities. After all, social interaction presupposes

a standard orientation in time

E.

Zerubavel 1982), and membership in a

group inevitably entails a common perception of when it was “born.” That is

why groups have “origin myths” as well as standard chronological dating

frameworks, The foundation of Rome in 753 B.C. (for the ancient Romans),

the birth of Christ (for Christians), the flight of Mohammed from Mecca to

Medina in

A.D.

622

(for Muslims)-those and other similar pivots of conven-

tional “eras”(see also

E.

Zerubavel 1987, pp. 352-353) are standard points

of

Sociological Inquiry

Vol

63

No.4 November

1993

“1993 by the University of Texas Press, P.O. ox 7819 Austin, T X 78713


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58 EVIATAR ZERUBAVEL

departure from which groups begin their official histories, implicitly separating

those from what they regard as prehistory. Many married couples likewise

use their weddings to mark their official birth.

Recent studies of collective memory (Schwartz 1990;

Y

Zerubavel 1994)

reveal the remarkably dynamic nature of the past. As our present social

situation changes, so does our perception of our common past. Examining

the way groups construct their beginnings is therefore indispensable to any

study of the development of collective identity.

Furthermore, there is a critical political dimension to the way we construct

our collective beginnings. One of the most important contributions of Alex

Haley's oots to the development of a proud African-American identity, for

example, was the fact that it challenged the traditional beginning of African-

American history only with the beginning of slavery, when Africans first

became relevant to Americans of European descent, moving it back to when

they still lived in Africa and had no contact whatsoever with them. The debate

over the actual beginning

of

America's involvement in Vietnam is likewise

politically explosive, as different versions inevitably implicate different

administrations.

Consider also the political implications of almost any decision as to where

to begin a particular historical narrative. Does the story of the Gulf War, for

example, begin only on August

2,

1990, the day Iraq invaded Kuwait (which

is the standard American version) or much earlier, when both were still parts

of a single political entity (which is the standard Iraqi version)? Similarly, does

life actually begin at conception (which is the version typically adopted by

the pro-life movement)

or

only at some later point during pregnancy (which

is the version promoted by the pro-choice movement)? By the same token,

does the history of Palestine begin only sometime after the Arab conquest

(which is the version often implied

by Arabs) or some two and a half millennia

earlier, when the Jewish patriarchs were first promised that land by their God

(which is the standard Israeli version)? Beginnings are clearly at the very

heart of heated political battles over rights and legitimacy.

The fact that beginnings are

so

often contested, of course, ought to make

us more aware of their purely conventional nature. After all, history is a single

uninterrupted continuum. Like most acts of drawing lines (E. Zerubavel

1991, pp.

70-80 ,

any segmentation of time is therefore necessarily artificial,

a product of social convention alone.

The discontinuous conception

of

time, which the notion of beginnings

inevitably presupposes, implies a general view of history as made up of

discrete chunks separated from one another by actual stretches of void. Any

transition, therefore, is necessarily abrupt. Change is never gradual.

Yet such a view of history is but a mere social construction. After all,


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THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF HISTORICAL DISCONTINUITY

459

in reality, things rarely change overnight, whether the change

is

one from

adolescence to adulthood, spring to summer, or night to day. Overlapping

as well

as

ambiguous intermediate periods are therefore quite common

E.

Zerubavel 1991, p.

72).

And yet, if we are to fully understand how individuals and groups perceive

themselves, we must know where they think their “story” begins. The study

of perceived origins, therefore, is an absolute must for anyone interested in

identity, whether it be national, ethnic, or personal. It

is

at the heart of a truly

interpretive sociology.

REFERENCES

Schwartz, Barry. 1990. ‘The Reconstruction of Abraham Lincoln.” Pp. 81-107 in Collective

Zerubavel, Eviatar. 1981.Hiddm Rhythm: Scheduks and Calmdars in Social Lifc. Chicago: University

-

1982. ‘The Standardization of Time: A Sociohistorical Perspective.”Amcriian Journal

-.

1987. ‘The Language

of

Time: Toward a Semiotics of Temporality.”

Sociological

Rmmbering edited by David Middleton and Derek Edwards. London: Sage.

of

Chicago Press.

. f S o c i o l o ~8~1-23.

QUrterb 28:343-356.

1991.

The Fine Line: Making Distinctions in Evnyday Lift.

New York: Free Press.

Zerubavel, Yael. 1991. The Politics of Interpretation: Tel Hai in Israeli Collective Memory.”

1994. Recovered Roots: Collective Memory and the Making o Israeli National Tradition.

AJS

Review 16:133-159.

Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

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