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EGNOS and Galileo: towards an Integrated European

PNT Infrastructure Dr. ing. Marco LISI

European Space Agency Special Advisor of the European Commission

International Workshop on "GNSS technologies advances in a multiconstellation framework“

SOGEI, Roma, 26th Sptember 2014

Summary EGNOS and Galileo are the key elements of the European navigation “system of systems”, a strategic and critical infrastructure of the European Union; The Galileo global navigation satellite system, joint initiative by the European Union and the European Space Agency, is one of the most ambitious and technologically advanced service systems being developed in Europe, by European industries and with European resources; As any large and complex system, Galileo, besides suffering from some intrinsic limitations (e.g. too weak radio signals, not allowing for indoor, underground and underwater applications), is vulnerable and exposed to many threats, such as cyber-attacks, jamming and spoofing; The only way to guarantee to the world a reliable, continuous and resilient Positioning, Navigation and Timing (PNT) service comes from a full, seamless integration of GNSS and of non-GNSS infrastructures and platforms. 2

EGNOS and Galileo Objectives

EGNOS: the European SBAS

EGNOS Services

EGNOS: a GPS Augmentation System

EGNOS System Architecture

The SBAS Worldwide Infrastructure

GNSS Multi-Constellation Scenario

Galileo Services

Galileo System Architecture

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Galileo System Interfaces

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Galileo Implementation Plan

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Galileo FOC Constellation

Galileo FOC Spacecraft (OHB)

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Galileo Deployed Configuration

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Galileo Centers in Europe

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Galileo IOV – Ground Control Centres

© Axel Schultes Architekten

2 Complementary Control Centres:

• Ground Mission Segment (GMS) in Fucino has the responsibility

for the mission aspects ,

• Ground Control Segment (GCS) in Oberpfaffenhofen, to control and monitor the constellation.

Both centres will be completed

to become fully redundant.

GCC-I at Telespazio - Fucino

Galileo Stations for Early Services

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From Products to Systems to Services

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“Loyola de Palacio” GNSS Service Centre

Come and visit us at: www.gsc-europa.eu

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11 September 2001

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11 September 2014

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11 September 201?

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An Escalating Threath • In 2012 nearly 200 cyber-attacks against critical

infrastructure targets were reported to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security – an increase of more than 50% vs. the previous year;

• Growing evidence indicates that many of these attacks originated from military and/or government institutions in China, Iran and other countries.

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Critical Infrastructures • Critical infrastructures are “so vital (…) that the incapacity

or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety.” [U.S. Homeland Security Presidential Directive on Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection, December 17, 2003];

• Critical infrastructures are required to:

Assess their vulnerabilities to both physical and cyber attacks;

Plan to eliminate significant vulnerabilities; Develop systems to identify and prevent attempted

attacks; Alert, contain and rebuff attacks and then plan to

rebuild essential capabilities in the aftermath.

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Critical Infrastructures are Interdependent

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Simpler, Cheaper…

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GNSS Threats: Jamming

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Commercial GNSS (GPS) Jammers

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Susceptibility to Interference/Jamming

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GNSS Threats: Spoofing Spoofing is the possibility to generate, through relatively inexpensive and technologically simple equipment, fake replicas of GNSS signals. In this way, it is possible to provide to the attacked user or infrastructure inaccurate information about both location and time; The reality of this type of threat was glamorously proven in 2013 by a team of researchers from the University of Texas. They boarded a 65-meter, $80 million luxury yacht named “White Rose of the Drachs”, sailing from Monaco to the island of Rhodes in the Mediterranean.

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Galileo Security Doctrine

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Accreditation Core Activities Accreditation Authority

Security Accreditation Board (SAB) Galileo Security Accreditation Panel (GSAP)

Crypto Distribution Authority (CDA) System accreditation

System design review System audits

Verify that all Galileo security requirements are met

Site accreditation Audits and on-site inspections

Ensure that local security requirements are met Components

Review Security Targets Follow evaluation and certification process

PRS User Segment PRS receiver certification, evaluation and

accreditation PRS manufacturers accreditation

TECHNOLOGY IS NOT ENOUGH!

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GLONASS Suffers Temporary Systemwide Outage; Multi-GNSS Receiver Overcomes

Problem

GLONASS Gone . . . Then Back

Explanation for GLONASS outage?

GLONASS GNSS Constellation Suffered 11 Hours Outage

GLONASS navigation system suffers outage

GLONASS Loses Control Again

Altus Positioning Systems Pinpoints Cause for GLONASS Default

Glonass Plagued by Glitches for 2nd Time This Month

Is GNSS a Time Bomb?

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IT DOES NOT NEED TO BE!

GNSS System of Systems

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North Korea’s e-Loran System

GNSS-Based Sensor Fusion

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DARPA's “timing & inertial

measurement unit” (TIMU)

MICRO-TECHNOLOGY FOR POSITIONING, NAVIGATION AND TIMING

(MICRO-PNT)

Chip-Scale Atomic Clocks (CSAC)

Future PNT System of Systems Infrastructure

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Future PNT Infrastructure: the US DoT View

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ATM SoS GEOSS

The Global Systems of Systems Infrastructure

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Conclusion

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EGNOS and Galileo: eager to serve

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