SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

Also by Carl G. Jacobsen

THE UNCERTAIN COURSE: New Weapons, Strategies and Mindsets THE SOVIET DEFENCE ENIGMA: Estimating Costs and Burden THE NUCLEAR ERA: Its History; Its Implications SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS SINCE MAO: The Chairman's Legacy SOVIET STRATEGIC INITIATIVES: Challenge and Response SOVIET STRATEGY -SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY STRATEGIC POWER: USA/USSR

Soviet Foreign Policy

New Dynamics, New Themes

Edited by Carl G. Jacobsen Director-designate, Carleton University Institute of Soviet and East European Studies' and Head, East-West Projects Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security Ollawa

M MACMILLAN

in association with the Palgrave Macmillan

©Carl G. Jacobsen 1989 Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1989 978-0-333-51847-2

All rights reserved. No reproduction. copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced. copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright Act 1956 (as amended). or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency. 33-4 Alfred Place. London WCIE 7DP. Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages.

First published 1989

Published by THE MACMILLAN PRESS LTD Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG212XS and London Companies and representatives throughout the world

Typeset by Vine & Gorfin Ltd, Exmouth. Devon

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Soviet foreign policy : new dynamics, new themes. l. Soviet Union. Foreign relations. Policies of government I. Jacobsen, Carl G. (Carl Gustave)./944- II. Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security 327.47 ISBN 978-1-349-11343-9 ISBN 978-1-349-11341-5 ( eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-11341-5

Contents Notes on the Contributors

Acknowledgements

List of Abbreviations

Introduction

PART I DOMESTIC POLICY DETERMINANTS: NEW REALITIES; NEW PERSPECTIVES

1 The Domestic Politics of Foreign Policy

VII

ix

X

XII

Jerry F. Hough 3 2 Gorbachev's 'New Thinking' about East-West Relations:

Causes and Consequences Paul Marantz 18

3 Domestic and Economic Aspects of Gorbachev's Foreign Policy David R. Jones 32

PART II NEW ARMSCONTROLINITIATIVES

4 The Scissors Phenomenon: The Incongruity of East-West Nuclear Doctrines Carl G. Jacobsen 53

5 Gorbachev's Arms-Control Offensive: Unilateral. Bilateral and Multilateral Initiatives Roy Allison 59

PARTIII NEWECONOMICINITIATIVES

6 Gorbachev's Foreign Economic Policy Carl H. McMillan 89

7 The Soviet Union and GATT: Gesture, Metaphor or Serious Trade Policy? William Diebold 104

PART IV NEW REGIONAL DYNAMICS

8 The Impact of Gorbachev's Agenda on Soviet Relations with Other Socialist States Jacques Levesque

v

131

VI Contents

9 Sino-Soviet Relations: New Perspectives Carl G. Jacobsen

10 Soviet Policy towards the Iran-Iraq War Mohiaddin Mesbahi

11 Arctic Security: The Murmansk Initiative Ronald G. Purver

Postscript to Chapter 9

Index

148

163

182

205

207

Notes on the Contributors Carl G. Jacobsen is Director-designate of Carleton University's Institute of Soviet and East European Studies and Head of East-West projects at the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security. He received his PhD from Glasgow University in 1971, has taught at Columbia, Harvard and Miami's Graduate School of International Affairs, and served as Senior Research Officer with the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. His latest books are The Uncertain Course: New Weapons, Strategies and Mindsets and The Soviet Defence Enigma: Estimating Costs and Burden.

Roy Allison is Lecturer in Soviet Defence Policy and International Security at the University of Birmingham's Centre for Russian and East European Studies. He received his PhD from St Antony's College, Oxford. His most recent book is Superpower Competition and Crisis Prevention in the Third World.

William Diebold holds degrees from Swathmore, Yale and the London School of Economics. He worked at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York from 1939 to 1983, and has written extensively on a wide range of international economic issues, including East- West trade. His latest book is Bilateralism, Multilateralism and Canada in US Trade Policy.

Jerry F. Hough is Director of the Center on East-West Trade, Investment and Communication at Duke University and a Fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington, DC. He is the author of numerous works on Soviet politics, including Russia and the West: the Politics of Gorbachev's Reform.

David R. Jones is Director of Dalhousie University's Russian Micro-Project, and former Research Associate of the Harvard Russian Research Center. A prolific author, he is also editor of the Military­Naval Encyclopedia of Russia and the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Armed Forces Review Annual volumes.

Jacques Levesque teaches at the University of Quebec at Montreal. He received his doctorate from FNSP in Paris, and has been Research

vii

viii Notes on the Contributors

Fellow at Columbia and Harvard Universities and Visiting Professor at Berkeley. His books include L'URSS et sa Politique Internationale de Lenine a Gorbatchev.

Paul Marantz teaches at the University of British Columbia. He received his PhD from Harvard. He has written numerous articles and book chapters on Soviet foreign policy, co-edited Superpower Involve­ment in the Middle East, and is the author of From Lenin to Gorbachev.

Carl H. McMillan is former Director of Carleton University's Institute of Soviet and East European Studies, and founder and Director of the University's East- West Project, which monitors East-West economic relations. His latest book is Multinationals from the Second World: Growth of Foreign Investment by Soviet and East European Enterprises.

Mohiaddin Mesbahi teaches at Florida International University. His PhD from Miami's Graduate School of International Affairs (super-vised externally by Alexandre Bennigsen) was granted the accolade 'with distinction'. He is an international consultant on Soviet policy towards the Middle East, focusing most recently on Soviet policy towards Iran and Iraq.

Ronald G. Purver is Research Associate at the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security. He attended the University of British Columbia and Stanford, and served previously as Research Director of the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament. He has written on arms control and defence policy. His latest monograph is Arctic Arms Control: Constraints and Opportunities.

Acknowledgements Funding from the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security made this book possible; it is gratefully acknowledged.

Doina Cioiu, Administrative Assistant to CliPS's Research Division, provided invaluable editing assistance and helped to type most of the chapters. Peter Gizewski, a CliPS Fellow, made a major contribution to the early proof-reading and editing process. Jiri Valek compiled the index. The book owes much to their unflinching dedication and professionalism.

The book also owes much to my wife, Trudy, and my children, whose tolerance and cheer during never-easy manuscript birth pangs astound and sustain me.

Thank you all! Ottawa CARL G. JACOBSEN

IX

List of Abbreviations ABM AFV APC ASW BMD e~I

CCSBMDE

CMEA (Comecon) CP CSBM CSCE

CTB ECE ECOSOC

FBIS GATT GNP IASC ICC IISS

IMEMO

INF ITO MAD m.f.n. MTN NEP NWFZ OTC PLA PRC

anti-ballistic missiles armoured fighting vehicles armoured personnel carrier(s) anti-submarine warfare Ballistic Missile Defence command, control, communications and intelligence Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe Council for Mutual Economic Assistance contracting parties (i.e. signatories to contract) confidence and security-building measures Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures in Europe comprehensive nuclear test ban Economic Commission for Europe Economic and Social Council of the United Nations Foreign Business and Information Service General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs Gross National Product International Arctic Science Committee Inuit Circumpolar Conference Institute of International Strategic Studies (London) Institute for World Economy and International Affairs (Moscow) intermediate-range nuclear forces International Trade Organization mutual assured destruction most favoured nation Multi-lateral Trade Negotiations New Economic Policy nuclear-weapon-free zone Organization for Trade Cooperation People's Liberation Army People's Republic of China

X

RDF SALT SDI SLCM SLOC SNF SSBN START TVD UN UNCTAD UNIT A

List of Abbreviations

Rapid Deployment Force Strategic Arms Limitation Talks/Treaty Strategic Defence Initiative sea-launched cruise missile sea lines of communication short-range nuclear forces strategic submarine ballistic nuclear strategic arms reduction talks Theatre of Strategic Military Operations United Nations

XI

UN Conference on Trade and Development National Union for Total Liberation of Angola

Introduction The debates leading up to, through and beyond the Party Conference of June 1988, and that culminated in the sweeping personnel changes of the suddenly convened Central Committee meeting in October 1988, symbolize the end of the 'first' Gorbachev era's attempt to consolidate power and to wrench the ship of state away from its previous course of doom. In the domestic arena, prime focus for Gorbachev and most Western commentators, revolutionary rhetoric and policy - establishing rights of free enterprise and appeal against Party and KGB high-handedness, multiple-candidate elections and the restoration of maligned reputations both to the right and the left-still flounders against the shoals of obduracy, by bureaucrats and apparatchiks fearful of the loss of privilege and power. In the foreign-policy arena, however, new themes and directions have produced results.

A 'Kremlinological' survey of personnel changes is indicative. Foreign Minister Gromyko, whose focus on relations with and against the USA was nurtured through forty years and more, was moved up to the symbolic but not unimportant portfolio of President of the Republic. Anatoli Dobrynin , his long-time Ambassador to the USA, was brought back, to head the Central Committee's Department of International Relations. Their early prominence clearly reflected the fact that Gorbachev needed improved relations and lessened tensions with the USA as a precondition for the diversion of defence resources that his domestic ambitions demand. The conclusion of the INF agreement that removed Pershing lis and SS-20s from Europe and US-Soviet agreement to pursue the goal of a 50 per-cent reduction of strategic missile warheads signalled achievement of this goal - truly a dramatic change in the international environment. The retirement of both Gromyko and Dobrynin in October 1988 might thus be ascribed to the combination of success and advanced age. Yet the fact that no younger-generation American specialist was promoted to remotely similar prominence compels a review of other appointments.

The most prominent of these was the bringing home of Alexandr Yakovlev from his 'exile' as Ambassador to Canada. His primary task was probably to counter the Russian nationalist appeal of Y egor Ligachev, the Party's 'Second' Secretary, who became a rallying point for opposition to Gorbachev. Yakovlev's internationalism and his

xii

Introduction xiii

disparaging of Russian chauvinism were in fact what had caused his exile. But his foreign policy experience and inclination may also have been relevant, the more so in view of the fact that Ligachev's removal from the crucial ideology fiefdom in October 1988 coincided with Yakovlev's appointment to a Kissingerian-like position as orchestrator of foreign policy and national security affairs. Yakovlev's speeches (and his 1984 book On the Edge of the Abyss) were interpreted by some Western observers as evidence of anti-Americanism. Yet this appears too simplistic. A Canadian observation that his years in Ottawa had turned him into a Canadian nationalist is also simplistic, but more accurate. Although acutely conscious of the need for manageable relations with the American giant, Yakovlev appears sensitive and sympathetic to the aspirations and opportunities of other agendas, other arenas.

Gorbachev's chosen Minister of Foreign Affairs, Eduard Shevard-nadze, had been Party chief in Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia. He is still often described, misleadingly, as a man of no previous foreign-policy experience. And he did indeed have little experience in dealing with Americans or other Westerners. But Latin American delegations to Moscow had for years routinely gone to visit Tbilisi, to talk to Shevardnadze. The gradual improvement of Soviet economic and other ties with Latin America is not coincidental; his visits to Latin-American countries occasioned a number of reunions.

Vadim Medvedev, a reform economist from Leningrad who had worked with Yakovlev during the mid-1970s, was made head of relations with socialist states. Czechoslovak Prague Spring supporters who thought '18 years' summarized the difference between Gorbachev and Dubcek and expected immediate sweeping change in Eastern Europe now disparage him. In Eastern Europe Moscow has broken with the Brezhnev doctrine, in favour of public stress on the autonomy and responsibility of national regimes: Moscow has accepted the notion of independent trade unions and non-Party organizations in Hungary and Poland; it has also accepted censorship of Gorbachev's speeches in Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic, and the ousting of Party reformers and presumptive Gorbachev allies in Prague. But if policy towards Eastern Europe has been marked by caution and a remarkable degree of non-interference (at least in the political arena), this cannot be said of policy towards other members or ex-members of 'the Socialist community'. Under Medvedev's steward-ship the improvement in relations with China accelerated. These have in effect now been 'normalized', with rapidly growing trade and

xiv Introduction

cultural ties, more Chinese students in the USSR than in the USA, and 'summits' (see Chapter 9). Medvedev, who succeeded Ligachev in October 1988, should not be judged by Eastern Europe- where he was cautious rather than obstreperous- but by his earlier record, and by the course and fact of Sino-Soviet rapprochement.

October 1988 also saw the promotion of Vallentin Fallin, chief of Moscow's English news agency Novosti and former Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany, to succeed Dobrynin as head of the International Department. Fallin's empathic relationship with and extraordinary access to German government (and non-government) elites is as remarkable as Yakovlev's with Canada's; Fallin is Moscow's 'German nationalist'! None of his three deputies is an 'Americanist'. One, N. Brutens, is a Third World specialist.

A quick review of military affairs is also illustrative. The primary objective of defusing tensions with the USA led to some of the more dramatic early departures from past Soviet policy - from a lengthy unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing to an about-face embrace of on-site inspection and such intrusive verification procedures that NATO strategists and industrialists were forced to squirm, and backtrack. But other themes may be equally if not more important. Doctrinal promulgations now spoke of defensive defence and suf-ficiency, disparaging blind quest for superiority or mechanistic parity. On the ground calls for nuclear- and offensive-weaponry-free zones addressed European concerns; the down-grading of Division readiness categories and consequent lowering of personnel numbers in the Far East addressed Chinese concerns. In the Navy significant procurement slowdowns accompanied a shift in Naval advocacy, from the 1970s theme of protecting state interests abroad, anywhere and everywhere, to the more circumscribed Iate-1980s theme of meeting central strategic tasks, and defending Eurasian shores.

December 1988 saw the announcement of a 500 000 cut in Soviet Armed Forces personnel numbers (including a disproportionate number of officers) and also cuts in armour, bridge-building and other offensive force components facing NATO and the Chinese border. In January 1989 Foreign Minister Shevardnadze announced that Moscow would begin to dismantle its stockpile of chemical-biological weapons.

Soviet foreign policy concerns have clearly shifted, from a near-exclusive focus on relations with the USA, to a broader and more differentiated agenda. Relations with China have been dramatically improved. Interest in better relations with Japan is manifest (former Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone met Gorbachev twice in 1988,

Introduction XV

during 'private' visits to Moscow), though prospects remain uncertain, and rapidly improving Soviet ties with South Korea and other Asian 'tigers' suggest the development of an alternative high-tech access option. The groundwork for improved relations with Western Europe and the European Common Market is in place - and the dramatic opening of West European credit lines to Moscow in the midst of the 1988 US presidential campaign suggests that this may be the prime focus of Gorbachev's 'second stage' foreign-policy campaign. Economic and other ties with Latin America, conservative Arab and South Asian states, and to a lesser extent even Israel, have improved. Support for self-proclaimed Marxist states, from Nicaragua to Angola and Ethiopia, and to self-professed 'revolutionary' movements and organizations, from Polisario to the PLO, has become cautious and restrained.

Pragmatic calculation and cost-benefit analysis has clearly displaced dogma and blind belief. In foreign policy as in domestic policy Gorbachev appears to have embraced Deng Xiaoping's theorem that it matters not whether a cat is black or white; what matters is whether it can catch mice!

The chapters that follow look at the new themes and directions that characterized Soviet foreign policy during the 'first' Gorbachev era. Other complementary themes suggested by this introduction remain nascent, in that they have not yet been fully developed; their assessment at this stage would be premature. But the early focus holds lessons for them too. The record of the early years suggests the emergence of a markedly different Soviet world view, and of a distinctly different appraisal of Moscow's place within that world. Ottawa

CARL G. JACOBSEN