spartans in darkness
TRANSCRIPT
Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 21 December 2007 pursuant to E.O. 12958, as amended MDR 52331
Cover Photo:
(U) Sentry atop a bunker complex at the Phu Bai station in 1972
Tep SE6RET::eeMINli'})(1
Volume 7
(U) Spartans in Darkness: American SIGINT and the Indochina War~ 1945-1975
Robert J. Hanyok
Tep sEeRETrVeeMINli\'X1
Iktill'l' till' battle [ofThormopyl.u-], Diuncces. the Spartan. was wumed that the
number 01" till' Persians \\as snch that when they loosed their bows. the arrows would
block IIll' sun. 'So much Iht' better'. «bscrvod Diancces. 'Iftho Persians hide the sun.
then we will fight in till' shade rather than sunlight',
Herodotus, 111(' Histories
This book is dedicated to those Allied cryptologists in Indochina, whose devotion to duty, under the worst of conditions, was borne with the courage, virtuosity, aplomb, and humor that only true professionals can display.
Tep SEeRETrVeeMINTHX1 Page iii
19P SESAElMS9MINlt/X1
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(U) Prelude: Indochina Before 1950 1
(V) The French Arrive :~
(U) Threats to the French: Nationalists and Ho Chi Minh 4 (U) Japanese E",..pansion 6 (C) V.S. Policy 8 (C) Resistance to Japanese Occupation 9 (D) The French Counter Ho 10 (V) The American View 12 (D) Bao Dai Returns 1~~
(D) Operation Lea 14 (C) The Beginning of the End for the French 14
(S//SI)
Chanter 1- 'MLe Grand Nombre Des Rues Sans Joie: I land the Franco-Vietnamese War, 1950-1954 17
(Sf/51) America's Postwar COMINT Predicament 17 (e) '111E.' Earlv COMI~T Effort a <tinst Viet :\linh Communications. 1945-1950 18 (SI/SI) The Asian Crucible:
'--_ Indochina War. 1950 21 oof*~~ l'nceltain Relations: COMINT Partn~rshi )s witl 26
.........•....... ~~ 1 ~(~S~fJ~/S~I~)nE~a\~'e~s~d~ro~p~p~in~g~.O~nlH~e~I~I:r------lt~h~E.'~B~a~tttll~e~07fnD~ie~n~B~ien Phu .. , 35
(U) The Battle Begins .......•........\................•........ > ••••••• ~H
(S/fSI) The ~SA Emergency Plan for Southeast Asia \ 42 (V) "We are blowing up everything, Adieu." -; \ t~
fSI/SI) Firs....t. Interlude: The Geneva Settlem-. ent.a.nd L IDrawdown, 1954-1955 . 49
(S//SI)
Chapter 2 - M"The Strugglefor Heaven's Mattdatr=:e,-=-:............, SIGINT and the Internal Crisisin~()uthVietnam~. . . ~962 5:~
(U) Ngo Dinh Diem: The Embattled President, ...........•.\.. \...•.............. 54 (D) Diem's War Against Internal Dissent ~ •..........'....•.•............... ;')8
EO 1. 4. (c)
EO 1. 4. (d)
Tell 5EeRETNeeMIN'FfJ)(1 Page v
Page
(V) "It is time for the struggle": Hanoi andtheSouthernlnsurrectfon 62 (SIISO SIGINT and the Attempted S()llpS Again;LBiem, 1960,:1962>../ 66 (U) The Formation of the Natifll)alLiberati~I1Front.December lCJ60/ 70
• (S / / S1 )~America Plans the Mainland SIGIN'['lluildUp,D96] <'" ,,/, •••••••••••••••• n - (S / / S 1 )~'~'he First Berh?~~ld in :\.sia:(Establishing the SIGIN'.:I'.Site /// "7m[ Th,ul.mdDl )6] ;4
(S//S1)
Chapter 3 - ~ "To Die in the South": SIGINT~the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and the Infiltration Problem,I/1t968/ H:~
(I,") An Embattled Kingdom: Group 959 and Hanoi's Role in the Struggle for Laosr-l1962 ; ; H7
(C) Military Group 559, the 'roristruetiollof the He) Chi Minh Trial. and the Southern Infiltrationrllr62 . r:' Y4
(e) GI'OUp 7:19 and MaritimeInfi~1963 101 (S//SI) The Rest of the Story, Part 1: SIGINT and Infiltration, 1963-1967 10:1 (U) '111e Rest of the Story. Part 2: The Vinh Window and the Breakthrough
on the Infiltration Problem. 1967-1968 110
Chapter 4 - (U) The Burden's First Fanfare: American SIGINT Arrives in the Republic ofVietnam, 1961-1964 119
(C) Defining the Struggle: The Counterinsurgency Plan. 1960-1961 120 (Sf/SI) The SIGINT Plan for Southeast Asia. 1961 122 (C) The Arrival or the :~rd RRlT in Saigon, 1961 12:1 (l,") The Beginnings of the ASA Airborne Radio Direction
Finding Mission, 1961-1963 129 (l:) Tactical SIGINT Support to ARVN Operations 134 (8,,/31) TIll' Marines, Air Force, and NSA Establish Their
Southeast Asia Mainland Missions l:P (S//SI) The Communists' Big Communications Change, April 1962 146 (L') Phu Bai: The First American-only Base 1.50 (f'I'SI) \ R . ' .. I'D 'I') '1)' . t " ftl 'F -h 1('6" -'):'/,:: :1.U e\OIl.1U (IC qMl 1IIE. 0 }C rell( . ".7 .::; •••••••••••••••••• b.~
(I") "Apres Moi. Le Deluge: SIGINTand the Fall of President Diem. 196:~ I;')!)
Second Interlude: (U) The Center Does NofHold: Post-Diem South Vietnam, 1964 ~., 171
EO 1.4. (c) EO 1.4. (d)
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Page
Chapter 5 - CU) Skunks, Bogies, Silent Hounds, and the Flying Fish: The Gulf of Tonkin Mystery, 2-4 August 1964 175
(U) The Desoto Missions 17R (LJ) Operations Plan :34A 1H1 (LJ) Round One: The 2 August Battle IH6 (V) Interlude: Maneuvers and Watchfulness. 3 August 194 (U) Round Two: "Everything in Doubt" - '11l(~ -+ August Action 195 (LJ) The Silent Dogs: What till' SIGI~T Really Did (and Did Not) Report :!.oo
(Sf/SI) Exhibit A: The First Attack Message 200 H1//ST) Exhibit B: The Lack of Vietnamese Command Control,
Communications. and Intelligence 204 (ti//SI) Exhibit C: The "After-Action" Report 207 (e) Exhibit D: A Matter of Certainty 211 (S//SI) Exhibit E: And Some More Silent Dogs 214
(SI/SI) Xlaintaining the Line: The NSA Summary Reports and the "Del Lang Chronology" 214
(Sf/SI) Gulf of Tonkin Redux: The 18 September "Attack" 219
Chapter 6 - (S/lSI) Xerxes' Arrows: SIGINT Support to the Air War, 1964-1972 2:l1
(C) Washington Plans the Air War. 1964-1965 2:~2
(C) North Vietnam's Air Defense System 2~l4
(Sf/Sl) In Search of a Target: TIll' Early Days of SIUINT Support to Air Operations, 1962-196.~ 2:~9
(S//SI) SIGI~Tand the Air War, 1965-1968 24;~
(S//E1l) Project Hammock 249 (e) Setting till' Trap: Operation Bolo, .Ianuary 1967 2~):!.
(C) The Battle .Ioined: Ail' Combat to the Bombing Halt, .Ianuary 1967-l\farrh 1968 2;,4
(Sf/SI) Iron HOI"Sl': Automating the SIGINT Support to the Air War :!.;'l8 (Sl/SI) Flying for Uncle Ho: Foreign Communist Pilots
During the Vietnam War. 1964-1972 :!.61 (C) "Take nothing on faith": SIGIKT and the Son Tay Raid.
21 November 1970 26:l (C) The Final Air Battles: Teaball and SIGINT Support
to the Linebacker Operations. May-October 1972 269
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- ----------------------------------------
EO 1.4. (c) EO 1.4. (d)
(U) Third Interlude: "\Vho'll Stop the Rain?" America Enters the Ground War, 1965-1967 ./ 2H;~
el~) Propping Up the Domino: American Cryptology Enters a Wider War :!Hi) (U) The Army Security Agency / 2Hi) eV) The Naval Security Group / 29:1- (l;) The Air Force Security Service ; 294
'-- ---"1 :1-96
(V) Centralization of SIGIl\'T: The Missing Ingredient 196
Chapter 7 - (U) A Springtime of Trumpets: SIGINT and the Tet Offensive ao I
(S//81) The Ground War and the Development of SIGINT Indicators, 1965-1967 :30-1-
(U) Hanoi and Washington Plan for Victory :~()9
(U) l: .S. Intelligence and the Start ofthe Winter/Spring Offensive :31;') (U) The Fulcrum of Our Vision: The Siege of Khe Sanh and
Its Effects on American Intelligence :~20
(to) Countdown to Tel: SIGINT Reporting During .Ianuarv 1968 :~26
(U) The l\'lyskry of the :30.lanuary "Premature" Attacks :~:~-1-
(L:) The Storm Breaks: Tet and the American Reaction :~:F
(I") After Tel: Cryptologic Postmortem :{40
(lJ) Trapped in the Looking Glass: The Post-Tot Reality Hits Washington :{-1-7
(U) Fourth Interlude: Grasping at the Straws ofVictory, 1968-1970 . :357
(S//~I) Hunting the Elusive COSV:\': A Case Study of the Limits of SIGI~T. 1970 :~h()
Chapter 8 - (B/lSI) In Our Own Image: NSA, Vietnamizatlon, and the Expansion of South Vietnamese SIGINT, 1969-1973 :~6<')
I I :~7() (~/I~n ~SA Looks for a New SIGI~T Partner in Southeast Asia~ I :37:~ (:5/1~l) American :\10\'(lS in: The Sabertooth Training Program
and Vietnamese Expansion. 1961-196:~ .......................•.......... :{76 (9/181) A Matter of Distant Trust: TIlt' Persistent Problem of Security
in the Vietnamese SIGI~TOrganization ......................•.......... :{HO
EO 1.4. (c)
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EO 1.4. (d)
(Sf/51) South Vietnamese SI(a~T during the American Exii.lnsion. t96!)-1969 :~H-+
(TS//m) Counterpoint: Vietnamese Communist Cpl\nxr.;; .... , :~H7
(S//SO OUl' Man in Saigon~ I~j()uth Vietnamese SWINT. EO 1.4. (c)
196:3-1969 :~94
(Sl/SI) TIll' Great Cryptologic "Bugout," 197o-t97:~ :N7 (S//SI) Last Chance to Make Good: South Vietnamese SIGIXT
and tilt' VnIP. 197()-1l)7:~ -+00 (Sf/m) Nowhere to Go But Down: The Danung Processing Center,
October 1972-Fl'bl'llary 1l)7:~ -1-04
Chapter 9 - (U) The Last Ramparts of Our Conceits: The DGTS, American SIGINT, and the Fall of South Vietnam, 1973-1975 -+1;")
(8//81) Going It Alone: The l)(3TS after the Paris Pl~aCE' Agreement to the Fall of Saigon. 197:3-197,=j 420
(I,') Endgame: The Collapse of South Vietnam's Defensive Strategy -+2H (U) Prelude to the Killing Fields: TIll' Fall of Phnom Penh 4:36 (C) "Nothing Left to Give Up": TIl(' Fall of Saigon. .-\pri11975 4:~H
(U) The Still, Small Voice: Aftermath and Conclusions. 1975 and Beyond -1-:') I
(C) Aftermath. 197:')-1979 4S1 [U) Conclusions -+.')9
(U) Glossary 469 (U) Sources 475 (U) Index -+H:~
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(U) Foreword
America's war in Vietnam conti nUL'S as a topic of highest interest among scholars and the goner al public alike - and as a topic of the highest con travers)'. As this introduction is being written in April 2001, several news stories related to the war and its aftermath are unfolding on newspaper front pages.
The Vietnam War has been the subject of countless memoirs, histories. and adventure tales, yet a critical aspect of the war has been lack ing in what has been written so far, Even mono graphs on the roll' of intelligence in the war do not treat the signals intelligence (SIUI~T) and information systems security (I~FOSEC) aspects of the war. or do so only in the most superficial ways.
Robert l lunyok's meticulously researched and richly detailed history of eryptology in the Vietnam War fills this mid. It provides a grand perspective of these most secret aspects of the war. and answers many of the questions histori ans ask about it.
Those who work SImNT tend to view it mechanistically. It is often believed to he "cut and dried," that it provides an unchallenged source of information - what the other sidl' is saying to itself. and therefore what must he l'OI'J'E'Cl.
However. the interpretation of Sit;L\'T and its political or policy implications often gl'lll'rate considerable discussion and controversy. This was certainly the case with SI(;I:\T in the Vietnam War. :VII'. Hanyok's study looks careful ly at these controversies - and itself has several areas likely to be controversial in the implicat ions and interpretation.
This is a stimulating study. highl~" rerom mended for all who are interested in LS. policy in the last half of the twcntieth centurv, the conduct of the war itself. and the 1'01(' of ('r~vtology spccif ically.
1 also recommend. for context on lhe times and background to t·.S. Slt;I~T and I:\FOSEC. that the reader also consult Dr. Thomas .Iohnson's four-volume Anicricun ('ryplllloyy durinq the Cold H "(/1'. N..J.5-/()Hl.J.
D:\\"ID .:\. II:\'I'CII 1)il'el'lor
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(U) Preface
historians left blanks in their writ ings: I nu-an
for things they didn't know,
But that tinu- Sl'('mS tn hc.' passing."
Canto XIII. Ezra Pound
(D) The Vietnam War. or more accurately. the Indochina War, perhaps was the momentous event of American history in the third quarter of the twentieth century. Besides the casualty count - 58,000 dead and another half million wounded - it devoured the resources of the United States, weakened its economy, turncd generations against one another. and hurt its international image. Opposition to the war coalesced with the strong currents of the 1960s' domestic social change - the nascent women's push for equality. the youth "rebellion," and the SUlW' in the civil rights movement - and charged them with even more fervor. And the failure of various adminis trations to reliably define the war's purpose. and truthfully report its course, ground down the rela tionship between citizen and government to a razor-thin bond.
(D) After the war. there were several concur rent efforts to arrive at some meaning about it. Attempts were made to define it as a crusade against communism: others called the war a fail ure in strategic policy or a tragedy born out of the arrogance of power. Some observers called atten tion to the war's effect in later American foreign policy - the "Vietnam syndrome.' a reluctance to get involved in long-term ventures. Finally. oth ers pointed to the deeper social costs of the war. how veterans and nonvetcruns tried to come to grips with their attitudes towards the war.
(C) Ironically. the American cryptologic com munity, especially the National Security Agency. appeared to remove itself from any examination of its role in the war. This distancing was meas-
urcd in the paucity of histories, studies. and arti ell'S about the war. How could such a war. which SllilNT had covered since 19S0, that. at its peak. involved as many as len thousand cryptologists from a number of allied nations. not 11l' worth a serious historical consideration? B~' ignoring its past. how much had the American SIGINT com munity impoverished its sense of historical conti nuity'? What stories and what truths wert' buried under the silence? What could American cryptol ogists learn about themselves and their perform aucc during the war'? And what lessons could \\"(' carry into the future?
• ( S / / S I ) _ EO 1. 4. (c)
~ '111C immediate ongms of SJlurlal1~ ill Darkness lay in a conversation I had someyears ago with a retired ~SA senior who had an exton sive personal knowledge of the war in lndorhina. In passing, I had mentioned my scheme for writ ing a complete. multivolume history of American SIGINT during the Indochina War. 11l'):!;inning with World Wat' I1J land finally coming to the American involvement. Rathel' abruptly. he strongly suggested that I get out a single volume on the war before "those who were there are gone," 111is approach. of course. was correct: inasmuch as the Vietnam-ern popu lation of the National Security Ag('llCy (and the associated cryptologic elements of the four armed services) was beginning to retire in ever-incrcas ing numbers. there was a need to produce a his tory to which they could contribute. as well as OI1t~
with which they could identify. Then' also was a growing interest in the war by the younger gener ation of Agency personnel within the cryptologic community - who had no direct experience and little memory of the war - as evidenced by their attendance in various classes and seminal'S on cryptologic history. That situation made final my decision to produce this overview volume.
fap SEeREli\'eaMINli'fK1 Page xiii
EO 1.4. (c) l8P SEGRE'FHS8MIN'Fh')E1
(C/ /go '1111' major historiographical problem was the dimension of the SIGl~T effort during the American phase of the war..Just the numbers alone suggested the size of the problem, At the height of the American involvement.upwards of 10,000 American and allied cryptologists were supporting the war in South Vietnam. mostly in sites throughout Southeast Asia . A smaller ~rollP
at Fort Meade worked the SIGI:\T from NK\ headqual'lers al Forl Gl'orgl' (;. :\·Il'ade. 1\1an'land.] -=oJ I ~ corresponding records availublc for my research. despite rumors of a massive dostmction of paper records from the early 19HOs (which may han' been partially true). were staggering: OWl'
l!)O.O()O pages in the Center for Cryptologir History's various colleclions. and about -lOO.UOO pages from the ~s.-\ Archives, Records Center. and other collections (on-line and hard copy). l luppy is the historian with such a bounty. but cursed is Ill' in deciding what exactly lo write about without getting mired in the bog ofso much available detail, that. due to the nature of intelli genre. often was conflicting,
(C;','!i1) I decided that the best way to avoid being buried under this material was to write an overview of American SIGINT d U1'i ng the Indochina \\'ar. However, it would be one with a difference: 1would concentrate on various topics and critical incidents ofthe war. making thorn the narrative framework for this eryptologic history. The topics and incidents I included were an cclcc til' collection, and required individual treatment. Hence. this history is not the usual lincar.chrono logical nurrutive. Rather, I approached each episode in a somewhat different manner. tailor ing thl' hislorical treatment to the issue at hal1(l. For example. the cha 1ters on the SI(;[:\T dlll'inu
thl' air war. and the Soulh Vietnamese SIGI:\T qrg'll1iza
lion pl'Obably l'ome closest to resl'ml)lirlg a ('Iassil' hislOl'ical narratiw,
EO 1. 4. (c)
(C/ /~~I) On the other hand. the Gulf of Tonkin incidents and the Tet Offensive will be treated almost likL' case studies. TIll' performance of till' SI(;[xr system will be looked ut eritically: it will be illustrated in both cases how critical informa tion was mishandled. misinterpreted. lost, or ignored. :\llhl' same time. the nature ofthe Sl(i INT material. especially its effect on decision makers in Saigon and Washington. required a detailed analysis of individual reports. This approach. at times. mav Sl'l'm to some readers like an excruciating turn al scriptural exegesis, Yd. the payoff is in the revelation of what was really contained in the reports,
(U) Nul all topics of interest could be covered in this history. This mls a decision based on St'\" eral factors, One was tho realization that other cryptologic organizations were producing histo ries oftheir participation in the war. OIl(' example is the Army's Intelligence and Securitv Command, which is working on a history of .-\S.-\ participation that emphasizes tactical 81(;1:\'1' units. Also. I did not wunt to repeat what previous histories haw covered. In this l'asl'. I knew thal three volumes had been written about communi cations security (COyISEC) during the war. Although much more can he written on this effort, it requires a volume of its own..-\ final rea son was that the impact of a topic fell out of tlu time frame of the war..-\ good example of this is the Prisoner of Wari:\lissing in Action (POW/:\]IA) controversy. No other subject aflect cd Americans as passionately as this one. Although there had lx-on interest in the fate of PO\\,s and :\'II:\~ during and shortly after tho war. the peak of public attention did not occur until the 19HOs and 19t)()s. This sad story. and till' Sll; 1:\'1' aspecl of it. dl'Sl'I"\"l'S ils own tl>lIing.
(C//~I) Spw'lw/s is soml'thinl=!, of a departlll'e from lhe pl'l'\"iOllS historil'~ of Sl <..i I\';'1' in tIll' Indol'hina War. For tIll' mosl parl. thosl' hi~to
ries. written bl'twl'l'n llll' laLP 1960s and thl' mrl~' 1970s. Wl'rl' dl'taill'd dl'sniptions of tl'l'hnil'al Sllil:\T ('olleclion and procl'ssing s~·sll'ms. and
Page xiv T611 SEeRETSeeMIN'ffi)E1
organizations. While intrinsically interesting to a narrow range of cryptologists with similar ~Pl'
cialties, the histories themselves left most ques tions about the results of SI<..;IXT UI1<lI1SWl'I'ed, who made use of the intelligence derived from it. and its effect on the course of the war, These hi~
tories often minimized 01' completely ignored some significant outside influences and determi nants, as well as previous cryptologic events and efforts, all of which affected SIGINT activities in Indochina. Some of these factors included the attitude of command authorities towards SI<..i 11\T; the technical and operational limitations of eryptologic techniques and technology: the natu ral "competition" 01' "friction" between intelli gence organizations and services: and. most importantly, the capabilities of Vietnamese com munist cryptography and communications. and its personnel. which were the real targets of American SIGINT.
(0//81) Surprisingly (or maybe unsurprising ly), the effort at writing histories of crvptology during the war ended at about the same lime that the last American troops left. Since till' fall of Saigon in 197:'5, precious little of that history had been written: A special issue of the now-defunct ='lSA Cryptolog magazine. one short. useful work on the Purple Dragon Operations Security pro gram, a handful of articles in various KS.-\ in house technical journals. and a three-hour Sl'S sion at the 1990 Cryptologic History Symposium. This scarcity is not l'asily explainable. However. one sad result was that much of the history of SIGI='lT during the…
Cover Photo:
(U) Sentry atop a bunker complex at the Phu Bai station in 1972
Tep SE6RET::eeMINli'})(1
Volume 7
(U) Spartans in Darkness: American SIGINT and the Indochina War~ 1945-1975
Robert J. Hanyok
Tep sEeRETrVeeMINli\'X1
Iktill'l' till' battle [ofThormopyl.u-], Diuncces. the Spartan. was wumed that the
number 01" till' Persians \\as snch that when they loosed their bows. the arrows would
block IIll' sun. 'So much Iht' better'. «bscrvod Diancces. 'Iftho Persians hide the sun.
then we will fight in till' shade rather than sunlight',
Herodotus, 111(' Histories
This book is dedicated to those Allied cryptologists in Indochina, whose devotion to duty, under the worst of conditions, was borne with the courage, virtuosity, aplomb, and humor that only true professionals can display.
Tep SEeRETrVeeMINTHX1 Page iii
19P SESAElMS9MINlt/X1
Tell 5EeRETNeeMINl,'J)(1
(U) Prelude: Indochina Before 1950 1
(V) The French Arrive :~
(U) Threats to the French: Nationalists and Ho Chi Minh 4 (U) Japanese E",..pansion 6 (C) V.S. Policy 8 (C) Resistance to Japanese Occupation 9 (D) The French Counter Ho 10 (V) The American View 12 (D) Bao Dai Returns 1~~
(D) Operation Lea 14 (C) The Beginning of the End for the French 14
(S//SI)
Chanter 1- 'MLe Grand Nombre Des Rues Sans Joie: I land the Franco-Vietnamese War, 1950-1954 17
(Sf/51) America's Postwar COMINT Predicament 17 (e) '111E.' Earlv COMI~T Effort a <tinst Viet :\linh Communications. 1945-1950 18 (SI/SI) The Asian Crucible:
'--_ Indochina War. 1950 21 oof*~~ l'nceltain Relations: COMINT Partn~rshi )s witl 26
.........•....... ~~ 1 ~(~S~fJ~/S~I~)nE~a\~'e~s~d~ro~p~p~in~g~.O~nlH~e~I~I:r------lt~h~E.'~B~a~tttll~e~07fnD~ie~n~B~ien Phu .. , 35
(U) The Battle Begins .......•........\................•........ > ••••••• ~H
(S/fSI) The ~SA Emergency Plan for Southeast Asia \ 42 (V) "We are blowing up everything, Adieu." -; \ t~
fSI/SI) Firs....t. Interlude: The Geneva Settlem-. ent.a.nd L IDrawdown, 1954-1955 . 49
(S//SI)
Chapter 2 - M"The Strugglefor Heaven's Mattdatr=:e,-=-:............, SIGINT and the Internal Crisisin~()uthVietnam~. . . ~962 5:~
(U) Ngo Dinh Diem: The Embattled President, ...........•.\.. \...•.............. 54 (D) Diem's War Against Internal Dissent ~ •..........'....•.•............... ;')8
EO 1. 4. (c)
EO 1. 4. (d)
Tell 5EeRETNeeMIN'FfJ)(1 Page v
Page
(V) "It is time for the struggle": Hanoi andtheSouthernlnsurrectfon 62 (SIISO SIGINT and the Attempted S()llpS Again;LBiem, 1960,:1962>../ 66 (U) The Formation of the Natifll)alLiberati~I1Front.December lCJ60/ 70
• (S / / S1 )~America Plans the Mainland SIGIN'['lluildUp,D96] <'" ,,/, •••••••••••••••• n - (S / / S 1 )~'~'he First Berh?~~ld in :\.sia:(Establishing the SIGIN'.:I'.Site /// "7m[ Th,ul.mdDl )6] ;4
(S//S1)
Chapter 3 - ~ "To Die in the South": SIGINT~the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and the Infiltration Problem,I/1t968/ H:~
(I,") An Embattled Kingdom: Group 959 and Hanoi's Role in the Struggle for Laosr-l1962 ; ; H7
(C) Military Group 559, the 'roristruetiollof the He) Chi Minh Trial. and the Southern Infiltrationrllr62 . r:' Y4
(e) GI'OUp 7:19 and MaritimeInfi~1963 101 (S//SI) The Rest of the Story, Part 1: SIGINT and Infiltration, 1963-1967 10:1 (U) '111e Rest of the Story. Part 2: The Vinh Window and the Breakthrough
on the Infiltration Problem. 1967-1968 110
Chapter 4 - (U) The Burden's First Fanfare: American SIGINT Arrives in the Republic ofVietnam, 1961-1964 119
(C) Defining the Struggle: The Counterinsurgency Plan. 1960-1961 120 (Sf/SI) The SIGINT Plan for Southeast Asia. 1961 122 (C) The Arrival or the :~rd RRlT in Saigon, 1961 12:1 (l,") The Beginnings of the ASA Airborne Radio Direction
Finding Mission, 1961-1963 129 (l:) Tactical SIGINT Support to ARVN Operations 134 (8,,/31) TIll' Marines, Air Force, and NSA Establish Their
Southeast Asia Mainland Missions l:P (S//SI) The Communists' Big Communications Change, April 1962 146 (L') Phu Bai: The First American-only Base 1.50 (f'I'SI) \ R . ' .. I'D 'I') '1)' . t " ftl 'F -h 1('6" -'):'/,:: :1.U e\OIl.1U (IC qMl 1IIE. 0 }C rell( . ".7 .::; •••••••••••••••••• b.~
(I") "Apres Moi. Le Deluge: SIGINTand the Fall of President Diem. 196:~ I;')!)
Second Interlude: (U) The Center Does NofHold: Post-Diem South Vietnam, 1964 ~., 171
EO 1.4. (c) EO 1.4. (d)
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Chapter 5 - CU) Skunks, Bogies, Silent Hounds, and the Flying Fish: The Gulf of Tonkin Mystery, 2-4 August 1964 175
(U) The Desoto Missions 17R (LJ) Operations Plan :34A 1H1 (LJ) Round One: The 2 August Battle IH6 (V) Interlude: Maneuvers and Watchfulness. 3 August 194 (U) Round Two: "Everything in Doubt" - '11l(~ -+ August Action 195 (LJ) The Silent Dogs: What till' SIGI~T Really Did (and Did Not) Report :!.oo
(Sf/SI) Exhibit A: The First Attack Message 200 H1//ST) Exhibit B: The Lack of Vietnamese Command Control,
Communications. and Intelligence 204 (ti//SI) Exhibit C: The "After-Action" Report 207 (e) Exhibit D: A Matter of Certainty 211 (S//SI) Exhibit E: And Some More Silent Dogs 214
(SI/SI) Xlaintaining the Line: The NSA Summary Reports and the "Del Lang Chronology" 214
(Sf/SI) Gulf of Tonkin Redux: The 18 September "Attack" 219
Chapter 6 - (S/lSI) Xerxes' Arrows: SIGINT Support to the Air War, 1964-1972 2:l1
(C) Washington Plans the Air War. 1964-1965 2:~2
(C) North Vietnam's Air Defense System 2~l4
(Sf/Sl) In Search of a Target: TIll' Early Days of SIUINT Support to Air Operations, 1962-196.~ 2:~9
(S//SI) SIGI~Tand the Air War, 1965-1968 24;~
(S//E1l) Project Hammock 249 (e) Setting till' Trap: Operation Bolo, .Ianuary 1967 2~):!.
(C) The Battle .Ioined: Ail' Combat to the Bombing Halt, .Ianuary 1967-l\farrh 1968 2;,4
(Sf/SI) Iron HOI"Sl': Automating the SIGINT Support to the Air War :!.;'l8 (Sl/SI) Flying for Uncle Ho: Foreign Communist Pilots
During the Vietnam War. 1964-1972 :!.61 (C) "Take nothing on faith": SIGIKT and the Son Tay Raid.
21 November 1970 26:l (C) The Final Air Battles: Teaball and SIGINT Support
to the Linebacker Operations. May-October 1972 269
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EO 1.4. (c) EO 1.4. (d)
(U) Third Interlude: "\Vho'll Stop the Rain?" America Enters the Ground War, 1965-1967 ./ 2H;~
el~) Propping Up the Domino: American Cryptology Enters a Wider War :!Hi) (U) The Army Security Agency / 2Hi) eV) The Naval Security Group / 29:1- (l;) The Air Force Security Service ; 294
'-- ---"1 :1-96
(V) Centralization of SIGIl\'T: The Missing Ingredient 196
Chapter 7 - (U) A Springtime of Trumpets: SIGINT and the Tet Offensive ao I
(S//81) The Ground War and the Development of SIGINT Indicators, 1965-1967 :30-1-
(U) Hanoi and Washington Plan for Victory :~()9
(U) l: .S. Intelligence and the Start ofthe Winter/Spring Offensive :31;') (U) The Fulcrum of Our Vision: The Siege of Khe Sanh and
Its Effects on American Intelligence :~20
(to) Countdown to Tel: SIGINT Reporting During .Ianuarv 1968 :~26
(U) The l\'lyskry of the :30.lanuary "Premature" Attacks :~:~-1-
(L:) The Storm Breaks: Tet and the American Reaction :~:F
(I") After Tel: Cryptologic Postmortem :{40
(lJ) Trapped in the Looking Glass: The Post-Tot Reality Hits Washington :{-1-7
(U) Fourth Interlude: Grasping at the Straws ofVictory, 1968-1970 . :357
(S//~I) Hunting the Elusive COSV:\': A Case Study of the Limits of SIGI~T. 1970 :~h()
Chapter 8 - (B/lSI) In Our Own Image: NSA, Vietnamizatlon, and the Expansion of South Vietnamese SIGINT, 1969-1973 :~6<')
I I :~7() (~/I~n ~SA Looks for a New SIGI~T Partner in Southeast Asia~ I :37:~ (:5/1~l) American :\10\'(lS in: The Sabertooth Training Program
and Vietnamese Expansion. 1961-196:~ .......................•.......... :{76 (9/181) A Matter of Distant Trust: TIlt' Persistent Problem of Security
in the Vietnamese SIGI~TOrganization ......................•.......... :{HO
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(Sf/51) South Vietnamese SI(a~T during the American Exii.lnsion. t96!)-1969 :~H-+
(TS//m) Counterpoint: Vietnamese Communist Cpl\nxr.;; .... , :~H7
(S//SO OUl' Man in Saigon~ I~j()uth Vietnamese SWINT. EO 1.4. (c)
196:3-1969 :~94
(Sl/SI) TIll' Great Cryptologic "Bugout," 197o-t97:~ :N7 (S//SI) Last Chance to Make Good: South Vietnamese SIGIXT
and tilt' VnIP. 197()-1l)7:~ -+00 (Sf/m) Nowhere to Go But Down: The Danung Processing Center,
October 1972-Fl'bl'llary 1l)7:~ -1-04
Chapter 9 - (U) The Last Ramparts of Our Conceits: The DGTS, American SIGINT, and the Fall of South Vietnam, 1973-1975 -+1;")
(8//81) Going It Alone: The l)(3TS after the Paris Pl~aCE' Agreement to the Fall of Saigon. 197:3-197,=j 420
(I,') Endgame: The Collapse of South Vietnam's Defensive Strategy -+2H (U) Prelude to the Killing Fields: TIll' Fall of Phnom Penh 4:36 (C) "Nothing Left to Give Up": TIl(' Fall of Saigon. .-\pri11975 4:~H
(U) The Still, Small Voice: Aftermath and Conclusions. 1975 and Beyond -1-:') I
(C) Aftermath. 197:')-1979 4S1 [U) Conclusions -+.')9
(U) Glossary 469 (U) Sources 475 (U) Index -+H:~
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(U) Foreword
America's war in Vietnam conti nUL'S as a topic of highest interest among scholars and the goner al public alike - and as a topic of the highest con travers)'. As this introduction is being written in April 2001, several news stories related to the war and its aftermath are unfolding on newspaper front pages.
The Vietnam War has been the subject of countless memoirs, histories. and adventure tales, yet a critical aspect of the war has been lack ing in what has been written so far, Even mono graphs on the roll' of intelligence in the war do not treat the signals intelligence (SIUI~T) and information systems security (I~FOSEC) aspects of the war. or do so only in the most superficial ways.
Robert l lunyok's meticulously researched and richly detailed history of eryptology in the Vietnam War fills this mid. It provides a grand perspective of these most secret aspects of the war. and answers many of the questions histori ans ask about it.
Those who work SImNT tend to view it mechanistically. It is often believed to he "cut and dried," that it provides an unchallenged source of information - what the other sidl' is saying to itself. and therefore what must he l'OI'J'E'Cl.
However. the interpretation of Sit;L\'T and its political or policy implications often gl'lll'rate considerable discussion and controversy. This was certainly the case with SI(;I:\T in the Vietnam War. :VII'. Hanyok's study looks careful ly at these controversies - and itself has several areas likely to be controversial in the implicat ions and interpretation.
This is a stimulating study. highl~" rerom mended for all who are interested in LS. policy in the last half of the twcntieth centurv, the conduct of the war itself. and the 1'01(' of ('r~vtology spccif ically.
1 also recommend. for context on lhe times and background to t·.S. Slt;I~T and I:\FOSEC. that the reader also consult Dr. Thomas .Iohnson's four-volume Anicricun ('ryplllloyy durinq the Cold H "(/1'. N..J.5-/()Hl.J.
D:\\"ID .:\. II:\'I'CII 1)il'el'lor
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(U) Preface
historians left blanks in their writ ings: I nu-an
for things they didn't know,
But that tinu- Sl'('mS tn hc.' passing."
Canto XIII. Ezra Pound
(D) The Vietnam War. or more accurately. the Indochina War, perhaps was the momentous event of American history in the third quarter of the twentieth century. Besides the casualty count - 58,000 dead and another half million wounded - it devoured the resources of the United States, weakened its economy, turncd generations against one another. and hurt its international image. Opposition to the war coalesced with the strong currents of the 1960s' domestic social change - the nascent women's push for equality. the youth "rebellion," and the SUlW' in the civil rights movement - and charged them with even more fervor. And the failure of various adminis trations to reliably define the war's purpose. and truthfully report its course, ground down the rela tionship between citizen and government to a razor-thin bond.
(D) After the war. there were several concur rent efforts to arrive at some meaning about it. Attempts were made to define it as a crusade against communism: others called the war a fail ure in strategic policy or a tragedy born out of the arrogance of power. Some observers called atten tion to the war's effect in later American foreign policy - the "Vietnam syndrome.' a reluctance to get involved in long-term ventures. Finally. oth ers pointed to the deeper social costs of the war. how veterans and nonvetcruns tried to come to grips with their attitudes towards the war.
(C) Ironically. the American cryptologic com munity, especially the National Security Agency. appeared to remove itself from any examination of its role in the war. This distancing was meas-
urcd in the paucity of histories, studies. and arti ell'S about the war. How could such a war. which SllilNT had covered since 19S0, that. at its peak. involved as many as len thousand cryptologists from a number of allied nations. not 11l' worth a serious historical consideration? B~' ignoring its past. how much had the American SIGINT com munity impoverished its sense of historical conti nuity'? What stories and what truths wert' buried under the silence? What could American cryptol ogists learn about themselves and their perform aucc during the war'? And what lessons could \\"(' carry into the future?
• ( S / / S I ) _ EO 1. 4. (c)
~ '111C immediate ongms of SJlurlal1~ ill Darkness lay in a conversation I had someyears ago with a retired ~SA senior who had an exton sive personal knowledge of the war in lndorhina. In passing, I had mentioned my scheme for writ ing a complete. multivolume history of American SIGINT during the Indochina War. 11l'):!;inning with World Wat' I1J land finally coming to the American involvement. Rathel' abruptly. he strongly suggested that I get out a single volume on the war before "those who were there are gone," 111is approach. of course. was correct: inasmuch as the Vietnam-ern popu lation of the National Security Ag('llCy (and the associated cryptologic elements of the four armed services) was beginning to retire in ever-incrcas ing numbers. there was a need to produce a his tory to which they could contribute. as well as OI1t~
with which they could identify. Then' also was a growing interest in the war by the younger gener ation of Agency personnel within the cryptologic community - who had no direct experience and little memory of the war - as evidenced by their attendance in various classes and seminal'S on cryptologic history. That situation made final my decision to produce this overview volume.
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(C/ /go '1111' major historiographical problem was the dimension of the SIGl~T effort during the American phase of the war..Just the numbers alone suggested the size of the problem, At the height of the American involvement.upwards of 10,000 American and allied cryptologists were supporting the war in South Vietnam. mostly in sites throughout Southeast Asia . A smaller ~rollP
at Fort Meade worked the SIGI:\T from NK\ headqual'lers al Forl Gl'orgl' (;. :\·Il'ade. 1\1an'land.] -=oJ I ~ corresponding records availublc for my research. despite rumors of a massive dostmction of paper records from the early 19HOs (which may han' been partially true). were staggering: OWl'
l!)O.O()O pages in the Center for Cryptologir History's various colleclions. and about -lOO.UOO pages from the ~s.-\ Archives, Records Center. and other collections (on-line and hard copy). l luppy is the historian with such a bounty. but cursed is Ill' in deciding what exactly lo write about without getting mired in the bog ofso much available detail, that. due to the nature of intelli genre. often was conflicting,
(C;','!i1) I decided that the best way to avoid being buried under this material was to write an overview of American SIGINT d U1'i ng the Indochina \\'ar. However, it would be one with a difference: 1would concentrate on various topics and critical incidents ofthe war. making thorn the narrative framework for this eryptologic history. The topics and incidents I included were an cclcc til' collection, and required individual treatment. Hence. this history is not the usual lincar.chrono logical nurrutive. Rather, I approached each episode in a somewhat different manner. tailor ing thl' hislorical treatment to the issue at hal1(l. For example. the cha 1ters on the SI(;[:\T dlll'inu
thl' air war. and the Soulh Vietnamese SIGI:\T qrg'll1iza
lion pl'Obably l'ome closest to resl'ml)lirlg a ('Iassil' hislOl'ical narratiw,
EO 1. 4. (c)
(C/ /~~I) On the other hand. the Gulf of Tonkin incidents and the Tet Offensive will be treated almost likL' case studies. TIll' performance of till' SI(;[xr system will be looked ut eritically: it will be illustrated in both cases how critical informa tion was mishandled. misinterpreted. lost, or ignored. :\llhl' same time. the nature ofthe Sl(i INT material. especially its effect on decision makers in Saigon and Washington. required a detailed analysis of individual reports. This approach. at times. mav Sl'l'm to some readers like an excruciating turn al scriptural exegesis, Yd. the payoff is in the revelation of what was really contained in the reports,
(U) Nul all topics of interest could be covered in this history. This mls a decision based on St'\" eral factors, One was tho realization that other cryptologic organizations were producing histo ries oftheir participation in the war. OIl(' example is the Army's Intelligence and Securitv Command, which is working on a history of .-\S.-\ participation that emphasizes tactical 81(;1:\'1' units. Also. I did not wunt to repeat what previous histories haw covered. In this l'asl'. I knew thal three volumes had been written about communi cations security (COyISEC) during the war. Although much more can he written on this effort, it requires a volume of its own..-\ final rea son was that the impact of a topic fell out of tlu time frame of the war..-\ good example of this is the Prisoner of Wari:\lissing in Action (POW/:\]IA) controversy. No other subject aflect cd Americans as passionately as this one. Although there had lx-on interest in the fate of PO\\,s and :\'II:\~ during and shortly after tho war. the peak of public attention did not occur until the 19HOs and 19t)()s. This sad story. and till' Sll; 1:\'1' aspecl of it. dl'Sl'I"\"l'S ils own tl>lIing.
(C//~I) Spw'lw/s is soml'thinl=!, of a departlll'e from lhe pl'l'\"iOllS historil'~ of Sl <..i I\';'1' in tIll' Indol'hina War. For tIll' mosl parl. thosl' hi~to
ries. written bl'twl'l'n llll' laLP 1960s and thl' mrl~' 1970s. Wl'rl' dl'taill'd dl'sniptions of tl'l'hnil'al Sllil:\T ('olleclion and procl'ssing s~·sll'ms. and
Page xiv T611 SEeRETSeeMIN'ffi)E1
organizations. While intrinsically interesting to a narrow range of cryptologists with similar ~Pl'
cialties, the histories themselves left most ques tions about the results of SI<..;IXT UI1<lI1SWl'I'ed, who made use of the intelligence derived from it. and its effect on the course of the war, These hi~
tories often minimized 01' completely ignored some significant outside influences and determi nants, as well as previous cryptologic events and efforts, all of which affected SIGINT activities in Indochina. Some of these factors included the attitude of command authorities towards SI<..i 11\T; the technical and operational limitations of eryptologic techniques and technology: the natu ral "competition" 01' "friction" between intelli gence organizations and services: and. most importantly, the capabilities of Vietnamese com munist cryptography and communications. and its personnel. which were the real targets of American SIGINT.
(0//81) Surprisingly (or maybe unsurprising ly), the effort at writing histories of crvptology during the war ended at about the same lime that the last American troops left. Since till' fall of Saigon in 197:'5, precious little of that history had been written: A special issue of the now-defunct ='lSA Cryptolog magazine. one short. useful work on the Purple Dragon Operations Security pro gram, a handful of articles in various KS.-\ in house technical journals. and a three-hour Sl'S sion at the 1990 Cryptologic History Symposium. This scarcity is not l'asily explainable. However. one sad result was that much of the history of SIGI='lT during the…