special proceedings recent digested cases.2010 2011

8/12/2019 Special Proceedings Recent Digested Cases.2010 2011

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Special Proceedings Recent Digested Cases (2010-2011)

CONTENTS:

1. Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persona. Probate of the will in the foreign country where the alien deceased

resides condition sine qua non for Reprobate of the will in the

Philippines

IN RE: In the Matter of the Petition to approve the will of

Ruperta Palaganas with prayer for the appointment of Special

Administrator, Manuel Miguel Palaganas and Benjamin Palaganas vs.

Ernesto Palaganas, G.R. No. 169144, January 26, 2011

2. Guardianshipa. Guardianship of Minor

Cabales vs. Court of Appeal, G.R. No. 162421, August 31, 2007

b. Appointment of a Guardian: Court Authority RequiredPeople vs. Flores, G.R. No. 188315, August 25, 2010

c. Fiduciary Funds Shall Remain With CourtPosted January 31, 2011; By Anna Katrina M. Martinez (SC

Website)

3. Legal Guardian: When one of the spouse is incapacitatedSoleAdministration

Jose Uy vs. Court of Appeals, GR No. 109557, November 29,

2000

a. Guardian over Incompetent Person: Who is an incompetent personHernandez, et.al. vs. San Juan-Santos, G.R. Nos. 166470 and

169217, August 7, 2009

4. Escheata. Escheat Proceeding: Proper Party and Citizenship of the owner of the

property to be escheated.


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Balais-Mabanag vs. Registry of Deeds of Quezon City, G.R. No.

153142, March 29, 2010

5. Adoptiona. Validity of Adoption when the Surviving Spouse remarries

IN RE: Petition for Adoption OF Michael Jude P. Lim , G.R. Nos.

168992-93, May 21, 2009

b. Adoption under Article 33, New Civil Code and SC Cir. No.12: decreeof Adoption cannot be made solely by case study reports made by a

social welfare officer of the court

DSWD vs. Judge Antonio M. Belen, A.M. No. RTJ-96-1362 July

18, 1997

c. Penalty for a public officer for simulating birth certificate: Applicationof the Civil Service Rules

Anonymous vs. Emma Curamen, A.M. No. P-08-2549, June 18,

2010

6. Habeas Corpusa. Grant of Writ of Habeas Corpus ancillary to a Criminal Case: Dismissal

of the latter rendered moot and academic of the former

So vs. Hon. Esteban A. Tacla, Jr., G.R. No. 190108, 19 October

2010

b. Writ of Habeas Corpus: Not proper pending Special Civil Action forCertiorari before the Court of Appeals 7th Division.

In the matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of CEZARI

GONZALES and JULIUS MESA: ROBERTO RAFAEL PULIDO vs. Gen.

EFREN ABU, et al., G.R. No. 170924, July 4, 2007

c. A detention previously invalid becomes valid upon the application,issuance of the writ of Habeas Corpus denied. (Section 4 of Rule 102)

Ampatuan vs. Judge Virgilio V. Macaraig, G.R. No. 182497, 29

June 2010

7. Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data:a. Command Responsibility


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b. Amparo: Not applied to those instances other than right to life,liberty or security (i.e. personal property)

In the Matter of the Petition for the Writ of Amparo and the Writ

of Habeas Data in Favor of Melissa C. Roxas, G. R. No. 189155

September 7, 2010

8. Rule 103: Change of Name: Jurisdiction and Sufficiency of EvidenceRepublic vs. Roselie Eloisa Bringas Bolante a.k.a. MARIA ELOISA

BRINGAS BOLANTE, G.R. No. 160597, July 20, 2006

9. Rule 108a. Authority of the trial courts to make judicial corrections of entries

in the civil registry.

RE: FINAL REPORT ON THE JUDICIAL AUDIT CONDUCTED AT THE

RTC BRANCH 67, PANIQUI, TARLAC, A.M.No.06-7-414-RTC, October 19,

2007

b. When civil status affects the changes in the entry in civil registry,adversarial proceedings appliedJurisdictional and Notice are

essential

Republic vs. Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng-Magpayo (A.K.A.

JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON MARQUEZ-LIM COSETENG), G.R. No.

189476, February 2, 2011

c. Change of Status: Alien Spouse failed to comply on theJurisdictional Requirement

Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010

10.RULE 103, 108 and RA 9048: DistinguishedRepublic vs. Mercadera, G.R. No. 186027, December 8, 2010


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A. SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF DECEASED PERSONProbate of the will in the foreign country where the alien deceased resides

condition sine qua non for Reprobate of the will in the Philippines

IN RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF RUPERTA PALAGANAS WITH

PRAYER FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR, MANUEL MIGUEL PALAGANAS AND

BENJAMIN GREGORIO PALAGANAS VS. ERNESTO PALAGANAS

G.R. No. 169144, January 26, 2011

FACTS:

Ruperta C. Palaganas (Ruperta), a Filipino who became a naturalized United States (U.S.) citizen,

died single and childless. In the last will and testament she executed in California, she designated her

brother, Sergio C. Palaganas (Sergio), as the executor of her will for she had left properties in thePhilippines and in the U.S.

Respondent Ernesto C. Palaganas (Ernesto), another brother of Ruperta, filed with the a

petition for the probate of Rupertas will and for his appointment as special administrator of her estate.

However, petitioners Manuel Miguel Palaganas (Manuel) and Benjamin Gregorio Palaganas (Benjamin),

nephews of Ruperta, opposed the petition on the ground that Rupertas will should not be probated in

the Philippines but in the U.S. where she executed it

The RTC issued an order: (a) admitting to probate Rupertas last will; (b) appointing respondent

Ernesto as special administrator at the request of Sergio, the U.S.-based executor designated in the will;

and (c) issuing the Letters of Special Administration to Ernesto.

Manuel and Benjamin appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that an unprobated will

executed by an American citizen in the U.S. cannot be probated for the first time in the Philippines.

The CA affirmed order of the RTC, holding that the RTC properly allowed the probate of the will.

The CA pointed out that Section 2, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court does not require prior probate and

allowance of the will in the country of its execution, before it can be probated in the Philippines. The

present case is different from reprobate, which refers to a will already probated and allowed abroad.

Reprobate is governed by different rules or procedures.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be probated in the Philippines although it has

not been previously probated and allowed in the country where it was executed.

HELD:

Section 1, Rule 73 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that if the decedent is an

inhabitant of a foreign country, the RTC of the province where he has an estate may take cognizance of

the settlement of such estate. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 76 further state that the executor, devisee, or

legatee named in the will, or any other person interested in the estate, may, at any time after the death

of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the same be in

his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.

Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a will must show, so far as known to

the petitioner: (a) the jurisdictional facts; (b) the names, ages, and residences of the heirs, legatees, and

devisees of the testator or decedent; (c) the probable value and character of the property of the estate;


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(d) the name of the person for whom letters are prayed; and (e) if the will has not been delivered to the

court, the name of the person having custody of it. Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact of death of the

decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the province where the probate court is sitting, or if

he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the estate he left in such province. The rules do not require

proof that the foreign will has already been allowed and probated in the country of its execution.

In insisting that Rupertas will should have been first probated and allowed by the court of

California, petitioners Manuel and Benjamin obviously have in mind the procedure for the reprobate of

will before admitting it here. But, reprobate or re-authentication of a will already probated and allowed

in a foreign country is different from that probate where the will is presented for the first time before a

competent court. Reprobate is specifically governed by Rule 77 of the Rules of Court. Contrary to

petitioners stance, since this latter rule applies only to reprobate of a will, it cannot be made to apply to

the present case. In reprobate, the local court acknowledges as binding the findings of the foreign

probate court provided its jurisdiction over the matter can be established.

Besides, petitioners stand is fraught with impractically. If the instituted heirs do not have the

means to go abroad for the probate of the will, it is as good as depriving them outright of their

inheritance, since our law requires that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless the will

has been proved and allowed by the proper court.

B. GUARDIANSHIPGuardianship of Minor: AM. No. 03-02-05-SC

NELSON CABALES and RITO CABALES vs. COURT OF APPEALS, JESUS FELIANO and ANUNCIANO

FELIANO

G.R. No. 162421, August 31, 2007

Puno, C.J.

FACTS:

Sometime in 1964, Rurfino Cabales died leaving behind a parcel of land in Southern Leyte to his

wife, Saturnina and six children, namely, Bonifacio, Francisco, Alberto, Albino, Lenora, and Rito. On

1971, the brothers and co-owners Bonifacio, Alberto and Albino sold the property to Dr. Corrompido

with a right to repurchase within eight (8) years. On 1972, prior to the redemption of the property,

Alberto died leaving behind his wife and son, Nelson, herein petitioner.

Sometime later and within the redemption period, the said brothers and their mother, in lieu of

Alberto, tendered their payment to Dr. Corrompido. Subsequently, Saturnina, and her four children,

Bonifacio, Albino, Francisco and Leonora sold the said land to Spouses Feliano. It was provided in the

deed of sale that the shares of Nelson and Rito, being minor at the time of the sale, will be held in trust

by the vendee and will paid upon them reaching the age of 21.

In 1986, Rito received the sum of 1,143 pesos from the Spouses Feliano representing his share

from the proceeds of the sale of the property. It was only in 1988, that Nelson learned of the sale from

his uncle, Rito. He signified his intention to redeem the property in 1993 but it was only in 1995 that he

filed a complaint for redemption against the Spouses Feliano. The respondent Spouses averred that the

petitioners are estopped from denying the sale since: (1) Rito already received his share; and (2) Nelson,

failed to tender the total amount of the redemption price.


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The Regional Trial Court ruled in favour of Spouses Feliano on the ground that Nelson was no

longer entitled to the property since, his right was subrogated by Saturnina upon the death of his father,

Alberto. It also alleged that Rito had no more right to redeem since Saturnina, being his legal guardian at

the time of the sale was properly vested with the right to alienate the same.

The Court of Appeals modified the decision of the trial court stating that the sale made by

Saturnina in behalf of Rito and Nelson were unenforceable.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the sale made by a legal guardian (Saturnina) in behalf of the minors were binding upon

them.

HELD:

With regard to the share of Rito, the contract of sale was valid. Under Section 1, Rule 96 A

guardian shall have the care and custody of the person of his ward, and the management of his estate,

or the management of the estate only. x x x Indeed, the legal guardian only has the plenary power of

administration of the minors property. It does not include the power of alienation which needs judicial

authority. Thus, when Saturnina, as legal guardian of petitioner Rito, sold the latters pro indiviso share

in subject land, she did not have the legal authority to do so. Accordingly, the contract as to the share of

Rito was unenforceable. However, when he received the proceeds of the sale, he effectively ratified it.

This act of ratification rendered the sale valid and binding as to him.

With respect to petitioner Nelson, the contract of sale was void. He was a minor at the time of

the sale. Saturnina or any and all the other co-owners were not his legal guardians; rather it was his

mother who if duly authorized by the courts, could validly sell his share in the property. Consequently,petitioner Nelson retained ownership over their undivided share in the said property. However, Nelson

can no longer redeem the property since the thirty day redemption period has expired and thus he

remains as co-owner of the property with the Spouses Feliano.

Appointment of Guardian: Court authority required

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ISIDRO FLORES y LAGUA

G.R. No. 188315, August 25, 2010

FACTS:

AAA lived with her adoptive mother, BBB, since she was just a few months old. BBB is married to

appellant, who was working abroad for six years. Appellant came home in 1997 and lived with AAA and

BBB. BBB was working as a restaurant supervisor from 4pm to 2am for six days a week.

In February 1999 at around 9:30 pm, AAA then 11 yrs old, was sleeping inside the house when

she felt and saw appellant touch her thighs. The following day, at around the same time and while BBB

was at work, appellant again touched AAA from her legs up to her breast.

Two weeks after the incident, AAA was already asleep when she suddenly woke up and saw

appellant holding a knife, then appellant was able to penetrate her. Two days after, appellant again

raped her. AAA recounted that appellant raped her at least 3 times a week at the same time until

October 15, 2002, when she was 14 yrs. old.


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RTC rendered judgment finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of 181 counts of

rape.CA affirmed the finding that AAA was raped by appellant, but did so only on 2 counts and consider

the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship.

ISSUE:

Whether or not appellant should be consider as a guardian of the victim even without court

authority

Whether that the qualifying/aggravating circumstances of relationship is applicable.

HELD:

To justify the death penalty, the prosecution must specifically allege in the information and

prove during the trial the qualifying circumstances of minority of the victim and her relationship to the

offender.

Jurisprudence dictates that the guardian must be a person who has a legal relationship with his

ward. The theory that a guardian must be legally appointed was first enunciated in the early case of

People vs. Dela Cruz which held that the guardian referred to in the law is either a legal or judicial

guardian as understood in the rules on Civil Procedure.

The law requires a legal or judicial guardian since it is the consanguineous relation or the

solemnity of judicial appointment which impresses upon the guardian the lofty purpose of his office and

normally deters him from violating its objectives. The appellant cannot be considered as the guardian

falling within the ambit of the amendatory provision introduced by RA 7659.Since both logic and fact

conjointly demonstrate that he is actually only a custodian, that is, a mere caretaker of the children over

whom he exercises a limited degree of authority for a temporary period, we cannot impose death

penalty contemplated for a real guardian under RA 7659, since he does not fit into that category.

Be that as it may, this qualifying circumstance of being a guardian was not even mentioned in

the Information. What was clearly stated was that appellant was the adopting father of AAA, which

the prosecution nonetheless failed to establish.

For failure of the prosecution to prove the qualifying circumstance of relationship, appellant

could only be convicted for two counts of simple rape, and not qualified rape.

Fiduciary Funds Shall Remain With Court

Posted January 31 , 2011; By Anna Katrina M. Martinez

The deposit of the Judiciarys Fiduciary Funds, amounting to more than PhP4.8 billion, and all

subsequent collections of trust and other receipts with the Bureau of Treasury has no legal basis, and

the remittance of interests of the Fiduciary Funds to the national government is erroneous and must be

discontinued.

Thus said the Supreme Court as it ruled that Fiduciary Funds in custodialegis shall remain underthe custody and control of the courts, to be deposited and disposed of as the courts may direct in the

exercise of their judicial functions, while Fiduciary Funds deposited with the Court in its administrative

capacity, and not in custodialegis, shall be remitted to the National Treasury.

In its 2008 Annual Audit Report, the COA recommended that the Court deposit the amount of

P4,838,976,011.86 and all subsequent collections of trust and other receipts with the Bureau of


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Treasury in conformity with Executive Order 338 (EO 338), Sections 7 and 8 of the General Provisions of

the General Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (2008 GAA), and COA-DOF-DBM Joint Circular No. 1-

97.

EO 338 directs government offices and agencies to immediately transfer all public moneys

deposited with depository banks and other institutions to the Bureau of Treasury, regardless of income

source, while the 2008 GAA directs government agencies to book trust and other receipts which have

been received as guaranty for the fulfilment of an obligation with the National Treasury. Joint Circular

No. 1-97, on the other hand, requires that all National Government cash balances be deposited with the

National Treasury.

In an En Banc Resolution, the Supreme Court clarified whether the deposits in its Fiduciary

Funds and in those of the lower courts as well as the Philippine Mediation Center should be remitted to

the National Treasury, as suggested by COA.

The Court said while funds that properly accrue to the General Fund must be turned over to theBureau of Treasury, which is under the Executive branch, the custody and disposition of any fund of

whatever nature that is in custodia legis (custody of the law) is under the exclusive control of the courts

in the exercise of their judicial functions.

The control of funds in custodia legis is an exercise of judicial power, and under the

Constitution, *T+he judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be

established by law, said the Court. Neither the Executive nor Legislative branch can encroach on the

power of the courts to control custody or disposition of funds in custodia legis, adding that upon

termination of the case, or earlier as the courts may direct, the funds in custodia legis will be returned to

their rightful owners, subject to a service fee of 10% per annum of the interests earned, which shall

accrue to the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).

The High Court said that while Batas Pambansa Blg. 325 provides that, unless otherwise

provided, all collections from fees and charges of government agencies, including the Supreme Court,

shall accrue to the General Fund of the National Government, an exemption is provided under

Presidential Decree No. 1949 (PD 1949), which established the JDF for the benefit of the members and

personnel of the Judiciary to help ensure and guarantee the independence of the Judiciary.

PD 1949 provides that the Chief Justice shall administer and allocate the JDF and shall have the

sole exclusive power and duty to approve the authorized disbursement and expenditures of the Fund.

Thus, the JDF, although derived from legal fees and charges, does not accrue to the General Fund byexpress provision of PD 1949, said the Court.

The High Court added that Fiduciary Funds also do not accrue to the General Fund as these are

not collections from fees and charges but are funds that are deposited in court which are held in trust

for the parties and litigants.

The Court also ruled that its own practice of remitting the interests of the Fiduciary Funds to the

national government is erroneous and must be discontinued.

Following the right of accession conferred on the owner of the property under Article 440 of

the Civil Code, the interests on these fiduciary funds also belong to the parties who own the principalamount. Upon termination of the case, the interests should be returned to the parties together with the

principal. The interests should not accrue to the General Fund because it is tantamount to taking private

property for public use without just compensation, the Court held. It added that interests on deposits

of the JDF accrue to the JDF for the benefit of the members and personnel of the Judiciary.


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The Court, however, ruled that forfeited cash deposits made to guarantee undertakings in favor

of the government, and the interests thereon, are income of the government and shall be remitted to

the National Treasury and that unclaimed fiduciary funds of private parties, including interests, shall

remain with the courts until a law is passed authorizing the escheat or forfeiture of such unclaimed

funds in favor of the State.

Finally, the Supreme Court ruled that the amounts it previously remitted to the National

Treasury representing interest earned on the Fiduciary Fund and forfeited/confiscated bonds covering

the period from 2004 to 2007, under the staggered payments proposed by retired Chief Justice Reynato

S. Puno to the COA in 2009, shall be credited to whatever amounts the Court is required to remit to the

National Treasury. (Min. Res., AM No. 05-3-35-SC, Re: Audit Observation Memorandum; Min. Res., AM

No. 10-8-3-SC, Re: Fiduciary Fund Deposits Not Remitted to the Bureau of Treasury, January 18, 2011)

Legal Guardian: When one of the spouse is incapacitatedSole Administration

Jose Uy vs. Court of Appeals and Teodoro Jardeleza

GR No. 109557. November 29, 2000

Facts:

Dr. Jardeleza suffered a stroke which left him comatose and depriving him of his mental and

physical capability to act. Upon learning that the real property he owned is about to be sold, Teodoro

filed a petition for the issuance of the letter of guardianship of his father. In the petition, he prayed for

the issuance of the letters of guardianship in favor of his mother and petitioner, Gilda.

Days later, Gilda filed a petition for the declaration of incapacity of Dr. Jardeleza, administration

of conjugal properties, and authority of sell the same. In the said petition, she prayed for such reliefs

because of the increasing hospital bills due to the fact that Dr. Jardeleza is confined in an intensive care

unit (ICU).

Upon the finding of the petition to be in form, the RTC issued a notice for hearing, which

happened few days after. On the same date of the hearing, the RTC, upon hearing the witnesses

presented by Gilda, granted such petition. Teodoro filed an Opposition contending that he was unaware

that the case was already decided. He also filed a Motion for Reconsideration contending that the

proper remedy in the case is not the petition filed by his mother, but the petition for guardianship

proceedings. As such, the case cannot be heard under the rules of summary proceedings as

contemplated in Article 253 of the Family Code. He also noted that the provisions on summary

proceedings, found in Chapter 2 of the Family Code, comes under the heading on Separation in Fact

Between Husband and Wife which contemplates of a situation where both spouses are of disposing

mind. Thus, he argued that were one spouse is comatose without motor and mental faculties, the

said provisions cannot be made to apply.

Issue: Whether the provision of Article 124 of the Family Code applies in this case when one of the spose

is incapacitated to give his consent?

Held:

No. Article 124 of the Family Code provides as follows:

ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both

spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husbands decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the

court by the wife for a proper remedy which must be availed of within five years from the date of the

contract implementing such decision.


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In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration

of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers

do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or

the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or

encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on thepart of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon

the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either

or both offerors. (165a).

In regular manner, the rules on summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code govern the

proceedings under Article 124 of the Family Code. The situation contemplated is one where the spouse

is absent, or separated in fact or has abandoned the other or consent is withheld or cannot be obtained.

Such rules do not apply to cases where the non-consenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to

give consent. In this case, the trial court found that the subject spouse "is an incompetent" who was in

comatose or semi-comatose condition, a victim of stroke, cerebrovascular accident, without motor and

mental faculties, and with a diagnosis of brain stem infarct. In such case, the proper remedy is a judicial

guardianship proceedings under Rule 93 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court.

Even assuming that the rules of summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code may apply

to the wife's administration of the conjugal property, the law provides that the wife who assumes sole

powers of administration has the same powers and duties as a guardian under the Rules of Court.

Consequently, a spouse who desires to sell real property as such administrator of the conjugal

property must observe the procedure for the sale of the wards estate required of judicial guardians

under Rule 95, 1964 Revised Rules of Court, not the summary judicial proceedings under the Family

Code.

In the case at bar, the trial court did not comply with the procedure under the Revised Rules of

Court. Indeed, the trial court did not even observe the requirements of the summary judicial

proceedings under the Family Code. Thus, the trial court did not serve notice of the petition to the

incapacitated spouse; it did not require him to show cause why the petition should not be granted.

Guardianship over Incompetent Person: Who is an Incompetent Person?

CECILIO C. HERNANDEZ, MA. VICTORIA C. HERNANDEZ-SAGUN, TERESA C. HERNANDEZ-VILLA ABRILLEand NATIVIDADCRUZ-HERNANDEZ vs. JOVITA SAN JUAN-SANTOS

G.R. No. 166470 and G.R. No. 169217 August 7, 2009

FACTS:

Maria Lourdes San Juan Hernandez (or Lulu) was born on February 14, 1947 to the spouses Felix

Hernandez and Maria San Juan Hernandez. Unfortunately, the latter died due to complications during

childbirth. After Maria's death, Felix left Lulu in the care of her maternal uncle, Sotero C. San Juan. On

December 16, 1951, Felix married Natividad Cruz. The union produced three children, herein petitioners.

Meanwhile, as the only child of Maria and the sole testate heir of Sotero, Lulu inherited valuable real

properties from the San Juan family. In 1968, upon reaching the age of majority, Lulu was given fullcontrol of her estate. Nevertheless, because Lulu did not even finish her elementary education, Felix

continued to exercise actual administration of Lulus properties. Upon Felix's death in 1993, petitioners

took over the task of administering Lulu's properties.

During the period of their informal administration (from 1968 until 1993), Felix and petitioners

undertook various projects involving Lulus real properties. In 1974, Felix allegedly purchased one of


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Lulus properties for an undisclosed amount to develop the Marilou Subdivision. Thus, Lulu signed a

special power of attorney (SPA) believing that she was authorizing Ma. Victoria to appear in court on her

behalf when she was in fact unknowingly authorizing her half-sister to sell the said property to the

Manila Electric Company for P18,206,400. In September 1998, Lulu sought the assistance of her

maternal first cousin, respondent Jovita San Juan-Santos, after learning that petitioners had beendissipating her estate. She confided to Jovita that she was made to live in the basement of petitioners

home and was receiving a measly daily allowance of P400 for her food and medication.

Respondent was appalled as Lulu was severely overweight, unkempt and smelled of urine. She

later found out that Lulu was occupying a cramped room lit by a single fluorescent lamp without running

water. Due to Lulu's poor hygiene, respondent brought her to several physicians for medical

examination. Lulu was found to be afflicted with tuberculosis, rheumatism and diabetes from which she

was suffering several complications.

On October 2, 1998, respondent filed a petition for guardianship in the RTC of San Mateo, Rizal,

Branch 76. She alleged that Lulu was incapable of taking care of herself and managing her estate

because she was of weak mind. Subsequently, petitioners moved to intervene in the proceedings to

oppose the same. Cecilio, Teresa and Ma. Victoria, for their part, claimed that the issue of Lulus

competency had been settled in 1968 (upon her emancipation) when the court ordered her legal

guardian and maternal uncle, Ciriaco San Juan, to deliver the properties for her to manage. They

likewise asserted that Lulu was literate and, for that reason, aware of the consequences of executing an

SPA.

During the hearing, Lulu was presented and asked to testify on her genealogy and experiences

with the San Juan and Hernandez families. Lulu identified and described her parents, stepmother, half-

siblings and maternal relatives. Medical specialists testified to explain the results of Lulus examinationswhich revealed the alarming state of her health. Furthermore, they unanimously opined that in view of

Lulus intelligence level (which was below average) and fragile mental state, she would not be able to

care for herself and self-administer her medications.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Lulu is an incompetent and the appointment of a judicial guardian over her person and

property is necessary.

HELD:

YES. Under Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court, persons who, though of sound mind but by

reason of age, disease, weak mind or other similar causes are incapable of taking care of themselves and

their property without outside aid, are considered as incompetents who may properly be placed under

guardianship. The RTC and the CA both found that Lulu was incapable of taking care of herself and her

properties without outside aid due to her ailments and weak mind. Thus, since determining whether or

not Lulu is in fact an incompetent would require a reexamination of the evidence presented in the

courts a quo, it undoubtedly involves questions of fact. Petitioners are furthermore ordered to render to

respondent, Lulus legal guardian, an accurate and faithful accounting of all the properties and funds

they unlawfully appropriated for themselves from the estate of Maria Lourdes San Juan Hernandez,

within thirty (30) days from receipt of this decision. If warranted, the proper complaints should also befiled against them for any criminal liability in connection with the dissipation of Maria Lourdes San Juan

Hernandezs estate and her unlawful abduction from the custody of her legal guardian.


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C. ESCHEATEscheat Proceeding: Proper Party and Citizenship of the owner of the real

property to be escheated

CATALINA BALAIS-MABANAG v. THE REGISTRY OF DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY, CONCEPTION D. ALCARAZ

AND RAMONA ALCARAZ

G.R. No. 153142, March 29, 2010

Facts:

The Coronel brothers executed a document entitled Receipt of Down payment in favor of

Ramona Alcaraz upon the receiving P50,000.00 as a down payment for the sale of their inherited house

and lot in Quezon City. In the agreement with Ramona, they will execute a deed of absolute sale

immediately upon the transfer of the TCT to the name of the brothers Coronel because the same was

named to their father. On Feb.18, 1985, they sold the same property to petitioner herein for a highercontract price than that of Ramona. For this reason, Coronel rescinded the first agreement with Ramona

by depositing to her the down payment of P50, 000.00. Consequently, respondents filed a case for

specific performance and caused the annotation of lispendensover the property. On June 5, 1985, TCT

351382 was issued in the name of petitioner herein.

RTC ruled in favor of respondents herein ordering the cancellation of the TCT in the name of

petitioner. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the registration by the Registry ofDeeds of the DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE despite the lack of indication of citizenship of the buyer.

Ruling:

The High Court ruled that it should be pointed out that the petitioner was not the proper party

to challenge Ramonas qualification to acquire land. Only the Government through the Solicitor General

has the personality to file the case challenging the capacity of person to acquire or own land based on

non-citizenship. The limitation is based on the fact that the violation is committed against the State and

not against individual. And that in the event that the transferee is adjudged to be not a Filipino citizen,

the affected property reverts to the State, not to the previous owner or individual. It will not inure to the

benefit of the petitioner, instead the subject property will be escheated in favor of the State according

to BP Blg. 185.

D. ADOPTIONValidity of Adoption in case the surviving spouse remarries

IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHAEL JUDE P. LIM

G.R. Nos. 168992-93, May 21, 2009CARPIO, J.:

Facts

On 23 June 1974, Petitioner Monina P. Lim married Primo Lim. They were childless.

Subsequently, minor children, whose parents were unknown, were entrusted to them by a certain Lucia


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Ayuban. Being so eager to have a child of their own, Monina and Primo registered the children to make

it appear that they were the childrens parents. The children were named Michelle P. Lim and Michael

Jude P. Lim. The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were their own. They sent the

children to exclusive schools. They used the surname "Lim" in all their school records and documents.

Unfortunately, on 28 November 1998, Primo died. On 27 December 2000, petitioner married AngelOlario, an American citizen.

Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given under

Republic Act No. 8552 (RA 8552) to those individuals who simulated the birth of a child. Thus, on 24

April 2002, petitioner filed separate petitions for the adoption of Michelle and Michael, who was already

25 years old and already married and 18 years and seven months, before the trial court.

Michelle, together with her husband and Michael, gave their consent to the adoption as

evidenced by their Affidavits of Consent. Moninas husband Angel likewise executed an Affidavit of

Consent for the adoption of Michelle and Michael.

On 15 September 2004, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the petitions. On the

ground that since petitioner having remarried, should have filed the petition jointly with her new

husband. The trial court ruled that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory citing

Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552 and Article 185 of the Family Code.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision but the motion was denied. In

denying the motion, the trial court ruled that petitioner did not fall under any of the exceptions under

Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner Monina Lim, who has remarried, can singly adopt.

Held:

Joint Adoption by Husband and Wife

It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner had already

remarried. She filed the petitions by herself, without being joined by her husband Angel Olario. We have

no other recourse but to affirm the trial courts decision denying the petitions for adoption.Dura lex sed

lex. The law is explicit. Section 7, Article III of RA 8552 reads:

SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. - The following may adopt:

(a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil capacity and legal rights, of good moral

character, has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude, emotionally and

psychologically capable of caring for children, at least sixteen (16) years older than the adoptee, and

who is in a position to support and care for his/her children in keeping with the means of the family. The

requirement of sixteen (16) year difference between the age of the adopter and adoptee may be waived

when the adopter is the biological parent of the adoptee, or is the spouse of the adoptees parent;

(b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above stated for Filipino nationals: Provided, That

his/her country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines, that he/she has been livingin the Philippines for at least three (3) continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption

and maintains such residence until the adoption decree is entered, that he/she has been certified by

his/her diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate government agency that he/she has the legal

capacity to adopt in his/her country, and that his/her government allows the adoptee to enter his/her

country as his/her adopted son/daughter: Provided, further, That the requirements on residency and

certification of the aliens qualification to adopt in his/her country may be waived for the following:


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(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity

or affinity; or

(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/her Filipino spouse; or

(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his/her spouse a relative

within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino spouses; or

(c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the guardianship and clearance of

his/her financial accountabilities.

Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:

(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or

(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided, however, That the

other spouse has signified his/her consent thereto; or

(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.

In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of

the other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses.

The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision means that joint adoption by the

husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority

over the child which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a

legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony

between the spouses.

Petitioner, having remarried at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly

adopt. Since the petitions for adoption were filed only by petitioner herself, without joining her

husband, Angel Olario, the trial court was correct in denying the petitions for adoption on this ground.

Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in Section 7.

Effects of Adoption

Petitioner contention that joint parental authority is not anymore necessary since the children

have been emancipated having reached the age of majority is untenable.

It is true that when the child reaches the age of emancipation that is, when he attains the age

of majority or 18 years of age emancipation terminates parental authority over the person and

property of the child, who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life. However,

parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal adoption. Article V of RA 8552 enumerates

the effects of adoption, thus:

Joint adoption of the husband and wife may not be dispensed. Adoption has, thus, the following

effects:

(1) sever all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee, except when the biological

parent is the spouse of the adopter;

(2) deem the adoptee as a legitimate child of the adopter; and

(3) give adopter and adoptee reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent

and child, including but not limited to:


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(i) the right of the adopter to choose the name the child is to be known; and

(ii) the right of the adopter and adoptee to be legal and compulsory heirs of each other.

Therefore, even if emancipation terminates parental authority, the adoptee is still considered a

legitimate child of the adopter with all the rights of a legitimate child such as: (1) to bear the surname of

the father and the mother; (2) to receive support from their parents; and (3) to be entitled to the

legitime and other successional rights. Conversely, the adoptive parents shall, with respect to the

adopted child, enjoy all the benefits to which biological parents are entitled such as support and

successional rights.

Petitioner, in her Memorandum, insists that subsequent events would show that joint adoption

could no longer be possible because Angel Olario has filed a case for dissolution of his marriage to

petitioner in the Los Angeles Superior Court.

We disagree. The filing of a case for dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and Angel

Olario is of no moment. Until and unless there is a judicial decree for the dissolution of the marriage

between petitioner and Angel Olario, the marriage still subsists. That being the case, joint adoption by

the husband and the wife is required. We reiterate our ruling above that since, at the time the petitions

for adoption were filed, petitioner was married to Olario, joint adoption is mandatory.

Adoption under Article 33, New Civil Code and SC Cir. No.12: Decree of Adoption

cannot be made solely by case study reports made by a social welfare officer

of the courtDEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND DEVELOPMENT vs. JUDGE ANTONIO M. BELEN

A.M. No. RTJ-96-1362, July 18, 1997

FACTS:

Spouses Desiderio Soriano and Aurora Bernardo-Soriano, both of whom are naturalized

American citizens, filed a verified petition for adoption of their niece, the minor Zhedell Bernardo Ibea.

Respondent Judge Belen granted the petition after finding that petitioner spouses were highly qualified

to adopt the child as their own, basing his decree primarily on the "findings and recommendation of the

DSWD that the adopting parents on the one hand and the adoptee on the other hand have already

developed love and emotional attachment and parenting rules have been demonstrated to the minor."

On these considerations, respondent judge decided and proceeded to dispense with trial custody. He

asserted that the DSWD findings and recommendations are contained in the "Adoptive Home Study

Report" and "Child Study Report" prepared by the local office of the DSWD through respondent Elma P.

Vedaa.

However, when the minor Zhedell Bernardo Ibea sought to obtain the requisite travel clearance

from the DSWD in order to join her adoptive parents in the United States, the DSWD found that it did

not have any record in its files regarding the adoption and that there was never any order from

respondent judge for the DSWD to conduct a "Home and Child Study Report" in the case. Furthermore,

there was no directive from respondent judge for the social welfare officer of the lower court to

coordinate with the DSWD on the matter of the required reports for said minor's adoption.

ISSUE:

May a decree of adoption be granted on the basis of case study reports made by a social welfare

officer of the court?


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RULING:

No. Article 33 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code provides in no uncertain terms that:

No petition for adoption shall be granted unless the Department of Social Welfare, or the Social Work

and Counseling Division, in case of Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, has made a case study of the

child to be adopted, his natural parents as well as the prospective adopting parents, and has submitted

its report and recommendations on the matter to the court hearing such petition. The Department of

Social Welfare shall intervene on behalf of the child if it finds, after such case study, that the petition

should be denied.

Circular No. 12, as a complementary measure, was issued by this Court precisely to obviate the

mishandling of adoption cases by judges, particularly in respect to the aforementioned case study to be

conducted in accordance with Article 33 of Presidential Decree No. 603 by the DSWD itself and involving

the child to be adopted, its natural parents, and the adopting parents. It definitively directs Regional

Trial Courts hearing adoption cases:

(1) to NOTIFY the Ministry of Social Services and Development, thru its local agency, of the filing of

adoption cases or the pendency thereof with respect to those cases already filed;

(2) to strictly COMPLY with the requirement in Article 33 of the aforesaid decree . . .

xxx xxx xxx

The Staff Assistant V. (Social Worker) of the Regional Trial Courts, if any, shall coordinate with the

Ministry of Social Services and Development representatives in the preparation and submittal of such

case study. . . .

The error on the part of both respondent judge and social worker is thus all too evident.

Pursuant to Circular No. 12, the proper course that respondent judge should have taken was to notify

the DSWD at the outset about the commencement of Special Proceeding No. 5830 so that the

corresponding case study could have been accordingly conducted by said department which

undoubtedly has the necessary competence, more than that possessed by the court social welfare

officer, to make the proper recommendation. Moreover, respondent judge should never have merely

presumed that it was routinary for the social welfare officer to coordinate with the DSWD regarding the

adoption proceedings. It was his duty to exercise caution and to see to it that such coordination was

observed in the adoption proceedings, together with all the other requirements of the law.

By respondent's failure to do so, he may well have wittingly or unwittingly placed in jeopardy

the welfare and future of the child whose adoption was under consideration. Adoption, after all, is in a

large measure a legal device by which a better future may be accorded an unfortunate child like Zhedell

Bernardo Ibea in this case. Treading on equally sensitive legal terrain, the social welfare officer

concerned, respondent Elma P. Vedaa, arrogated unto herself a matter that pertained exclusively to

the DSWD, her task being to coordinate with the DSWD in the preparation and submission of the

relevant case study reports, and not to make the same and recommend by herself the facts on which

the court was to act.

ACCORDINGLY, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall bedealt with more severely by this Court, respondent Judge Antonio M. Belen of the Regional Trial Court,

Branch 38, of Lingayen, Pangasinan is hereby CENSURED for violating Article 33 of Presidential Decree

No. 603 and Circular No. 12 of this Court; and respondent Elma P. Vedaa, Social Welfare Officer II of the

Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, is REPRIMANDED for violating

Circular No. 12.


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Simulation of Birth: Penalty of a public officer who registers a child to the Civil

Registry not of the childs biological parents.

Sec. 21, Article VII of Domestic Adoption Act: Rules on Civil Service Applied

Anonymous vs. Emma Curamen

A.M. No. P-08-2549, June 18, 2010

Facts:

This is an administrative case against Emma Baldonado Curamen, Court Interpreter I in the

Municipal Trial Court of Rizal in Nueva Ecija, for dishonesty and falsification of a public document.

On 6 March 2007, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received an anonymous

complaint charging respondent with falsification of a public document and simulation of birth.

The complaint alleged that respondent registered the birth of a child supposedly named Rica

Mae Baldonado Curamen in the local civil registry of Rizal, Nueva Ecija. Complainant submitted the

childs purported birth certificate to show respondent misrepresented that she was the childs

biological mother and her husband, Ricardo Curamen, was the biological father. Complainant claimed

respondent was, in fact, the childs maternal grandmother. Complainant submitted the childs original

birth certificate to show that the childs real name was Rinea Mae Curamen Aquino and that her parents

were spouses Olga Mae Baldonado Curamen Aquino and Jun Aquino. According to complainant,

respondent included the child as additional dependent in her income tax declaration.

In his Report, Executive Judge Rodrigo S. Caspillo of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 24) of

Cabanatuan City verified that Rinea Mae Curamen Aquino and Rica Mae Baldonado Curamen were the

same child. Judge Caspillo confirmed that the child was, in fact, respondents granddaughter. Thechilds

real mother, Olga, was one of respondents children.

Judge Caspillo verified that on 31 March 2006, respondent executed an affidavit for delayed

registration of the alleged birth of her child. Respondent claimed that her supposed child, Rica Mae

Baldonado Curamen, was born on 30 November 2005. Respondents application was given due course

and the supposed birth of Rica Mae Baldonado Curamen was registered in the Civil Registry of Rizal,

Nueva Ecija under Registry No. 2006-507. This second birth certificate of the child indicated that the

childs parents were respondent and her husband.

Issue: Whether Curamen is liable for simulation of birth by falsification.

Held:

With respect to the alleged falsification of the childs birth certificate, we find respondent guilty

of dishonesty and falsification of a public document. A birth certificate, being a public document, serves

as prima facie evidence of filiation. The making of a false statement therein constitutes dishonesty and

falsification of a public document.

Respondent cannot escape liability by claiming that she did not have any intention to concealthe identity of the child nor cause the loss of any trace as to the childs true filiation to the childs

prejudice. When public documents are falsified, the intent to injure a third person need not be present

because the principal thing punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth

the document proclaims.


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However, the extreme penalty of dismissal is not automatically imposed, especially where

mitigating circumstances exist. Although under the schedule of penalties adopted by the Civil Service,

dishonesty and falsification of a public document are classified as grave offenses punishable by

dismissal, the fact that this is respondents first offense may be considered a mitigating circumstance in

her favor. The law requires that the mitigating circumstance must first be pleaded by the proper party.But in the interest of substantial justice, we may appreciate the mitigating circumstance in the

imposition of penalty, even if not raised by respondent.

We thus impose on respondent the penalty next lower in degree, which is suspension for six

months and one day without pay with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the

future shall be dealt with more severely.

E. WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS:Grant of Writ of Habeas Corpus ancillary to a Criminal Case: Dismissal of the

latter rendered moot and academic of the former

DAVID E. SOv.HON. ESTEBAN A. TACLA, JR.

G.R. No. 190108, 19 October 2010

NACHURA,J.:

FACTS:

Petitioner David E. So (So) filed the petition for the writs of habeas corpus and amparo on behalf

of his daughter, Ma. Elena So Guisande (Guisande), accused of Qualified Theft in the criminal casepending before Judge Tacla. Petitioner So alleged, among others, that Guisande was under a life-

threatening situation while confined at the NCMH, the government hospital ordered by the RTC

Mandaluyong City to ascertain the actual psychological state of Guisande, who was being charged with a

non-bailable offense.

The case arose from the following facts. Prior to the institution of the criminal proceedings,

Guisande was committed by So for psychiatric treatment and care at the Makati Medical Center (MMC).

Thus, the return of the warrant for the arrest of Guisande, issued by Judge Tacla which states that the

former was confined at MMC for Bipolar Mood Disorder and that she was "not ready for discharge".

Judge Tacla ordered Guisandes referral to the NCMH for an independent forensic assessment of

Guisandes mental health to determine if she would be able to stand arraignment and undergo trial for

Qualified Theft. Subsequently, Judge Tacla, upon motion of the NCMH, ordered that accused Guisandebe physically brought to the NCMH to have temporary legal custody of the accused, and thereafter,

Judge Tacla would issue the corresponding order of confinement of Guisande in a regular jail facility

upon the NCMHs determination that she was ready for trial.

Eventually, claiming "life-threatening" circumstances surrounding her confinement at the NCMH

which supposedly worsened her mental condition and violated her constitutional rights against solitary

detention and assistance of counsel, accused Guisande and her father filed a Motion for Relief from

Solitary Confinement and the present petition for the issuance of the writs of habeas corpus and

amparo.

The court granted the Motion for Relief. On the petition for habeas corpus and amparo, the

court resolved to issue a joint writ of habeas corpus and amparo and refer the petition to the Court of

Appeals for decision. Meanwhile, NCMH submitted its Evaluation Report according to which, Guisande is

competent to stand the rigors of court trial.

Hence, the petition for review on certiorari.

During the pendency of these consolidated cases, various events occurred which ultimately led

to the incident before this Court. Public respondent Judge ordered the dismissal of Criminal Case for

Qualified Theft against Guisande. In view of such dismissal, Judge Tacla contends that the cases for

issuance of the writs of habeas corpus and amparo and the petition for review on certiorari should be

dismissed for having been rendered moot and academic.


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ISSUE: WHETHER THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR HAVING BEEN

RENDERED MOOT AND ACADEMIC

HELD:

The petition should be dismissed. The petition for the writs of habeas corpus and amparo wasbased on the criminal case for Qualified Theft against petitioner Sos daughter, Guisande.

There is no affirmation of petitioner Sos claim that the confinement of accused Guisande at the

NCMH was illegal. Neither were the respective acts performed by respondents Judge Tacla and Dr.

Vicente in ascertaining the mental condition of accused Guisande to withstand trial declared unlawful.

On the contrary, the NCMH, a well-reputed government forensic facility, albeit not held in high regard

by petitioner Sos and accused Guisandes family, had assessed Guisande fit for trial.

The Rules on the Writs of Habeas Corpus and Amparo are clear; the act or omission or the

threatened act or omission complained of - confinement and custody for habeas corpus and violations

of, or threat to violate, a persons life, liberty, and security for amparo cases - should be illegal or

unlawful.

The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ, therefore, is that the individual seekingsuch relief is illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or place under some form of illegal restraint.

If an individuals liberty is restrained via some legal process, the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing.

Fundamentally, in order to justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of liberty must be

in the nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action.

While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of course or as a mere

perfunctory operation on the filing of the petition. Judicial discretion is called for in its issuance and it

must be clear to the judge to whom the petition is presented that, prima facie, the petitioner is entitled

to the writ. It is only if the court is satisfied that a person is being unlawfully restrained of his liberty will

the petition for habeas corpus be granted. If the respondents are not detaining or restraining the

applicant of the person in whose behalf the petition is filed, the petition should be dismissed.

In the cases at bar, the question before the CA was correctly limited to which hospital, the

NCMH or a medical facility of accuseds own choosing, accused Guisande should be referred for

treatment of a supposed mental condition. In addition, it was procedurally proper for the RTC to ask the

NCMH for a separate opinion on accuseds mental fitness to be arraigned and stand trial.

Certainly, with the dismissal of the non-bailable case against accused Guisande, she is no longer

under peril to be confined in a jail facility, much less at the NCMH. Effectively, accused Guisandes

person, and treatment of any medical and mental malady she may or may not have, can no longer be

subjected to the lawful processes of the RTC Mandaluyong City. In short, the cases have now been

rendered moot and academic which, in the often cited David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, is defined as "one

that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration

thereon would be of no practical use or value."

Writ of Habeas Corpus: Not proper pending Special Civil Action for Certiorari

before the Court of Appeals 7th Division.

In the matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of CEZARI GONZALES and JULIUS MESA:

ROBERTO RAFAEL PULIDO vs. Gen. EFREN ABU, as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the

Philippines and all persons acting in his stead and under his authority, and GEN. ERNESTO DE LEON, in

his capacity as the Flag Officer in Command of the Philippine Navy, and all persons acting in his stead

and under his authority, respondents.

G.R. No. 170924, July 4, 2007

Facts:

In line with their participation in the Oakwood Mutiny that led to Pres. Gloria Macapagal

Arroyos issuance of Proclamation No. 427 declaring the country to be under a "state of rebellion and

General Order No. 4 directing the AFP and the PNP to carry out all reasonable measures, giving due

regard to constitutional rights, to suppress and quell the "rebellion.", petitioners were taken into

custody by their Service Commander. Gonzales and Mesa were not charged before a court martial with


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violation of the Articles of War. They were, however, among the soldiers charged before Branch 61 of

the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, with the crime of Coup Detatas defined under Article 134-

A of the Revised Penal Code. They were consequently detained in Fort Bonifacio under the custody of

the Philippine Marines. A petition for bail was filed by the accused soldiers which the RTC subsequently

granted. Despite of the order and the service thereof, petitioners were not released. As a response, thePeople of the Philippines moved for partial reconsideration of the order granting bail. With the denial of

the Motion for Partial Reconsideration, the People filed with the Court of Appeals on 4 February 2005 a

special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with urgent prayer for Temporary

Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. Moreover, since Gonzales and Mesa

continued to be in detention, a Petition for Habeas Corpus was filed by petitioner Pulido on their behalf.

In response, Respondents prayed that the Petition for Habeas Corpus be dismissed primarily on two

grounds: (1) the continued detention of Gonzales and Mesa is justified because of the pendency of the

Petition for Certiorari questioning the order dated 8 July 2004 of the RTC granting bail to Gonzales and

Mesa before the 7th Division of the Court of Appeals and (2) petitioner is guilty of forum shopping

because of his failure to state in the petition that the order granting bail has been elevated to the Courtof Appeals and pending before its 7th Division. Thus, we have this case.

Issue: Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus was proper despite of the pending special civil

action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals 7th Division.

Held:

No. That the present petition has direct and intimate links with the certiorari case is beyond

doubt as they involve two sides of the same coin. The certiorari case filed by the People seeks to prevent

the release of Gonzales and Mesa by annulling the lower courts grant of bail. The present petition, on

the other hand, was filed in behalf of Gonzales and Mesa to secure their immediate release because theorder granting bail is already executory. In effect, the petitioner seeks to implement through a petition

for habeas corpus the provisional release from detention that the lower court has ordered. The question

this immediately raises is: can this be done through a petition for habeas corpus when the validity of the

grant of bail and the release under bail are live questions before another Division of this Court?

We believe and so hold that his cannot and should not be done as this is precisely the reason

why the rule against forum shopping has been put in place. The remedies sought being two sides of the

same coin (i.e., the release of Gonzales and Mesa), they cannot be secured through separately-filed

cases where issues of jurisdiction may arise and whose rulings may conflict with one another. To be

sure, we clearly heard the petitioner say that there can be no conflict because the effectiveness of ourruling in this petition will depend on the nature and tenor of the ruling in the certiorari case; there is no

basis for a release on habeas corpus if this same Court will rule in the certiorari case that the grant of

bail is improper. For this very same reason, we should not entertain the present petition as the matter

before us is already before another co-equal body whose ruling will be finally determinative of the issue

of Gonzales and Mesas release. The Decision of the Seventh Division of this Court, heretofore

footnoted, ordering the release on bail of Gonzales and Mesa drives home this point.

XXX XXX XXX

When the release of the persons in whose behalf the application for a Writ of Habeas

Corpus was filed is effected, the Petition for the issuance of the writ becomes moot and academic. With

the release of both Mesa and Gonzales, the Petition for Habeas Corpus has, indeed, been rendered

moot. Courts of justice constituted to pass upon substantial rights will not consider questions where no

actual interests are involved. Thus, the well-settled rule that courts will not determine a moot question.

Where the issues have become moot and academic, there ceases to be any justiciable controversy, thus


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rendering the resolution of the same of no practical value. This Court will therefore abstain from

expressing its opinion in a case where no legal relief is needed or called for.

Writ of Habeas Corpus: Section 4 of Rule 102

A detention previously invalid becomes valid upon the application, issuance of

the writ of Habeas Corpus denied.

NURHIDA JUHURI AMPATUAN vs. JUDGE VIRGILIO V. MACARAIG

G.R. No. 182497, 29 June 2010

PEREZ, J.:

FACTS:

Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the COMELEC Legal Department, was killed at the corner of M.

H. Del Pilar and Pedro Gil Streets, Ermita, Manila. Investigation conducted by the Manila Police District

Homicide Section yielded the identity of the male perpetrator as PO1 Ampatuan. Consequently, PO1

Ampatuan was commanded to the MPD District Director for proper disposition. Likewise, inquest

proceedings were conducted by the Manila Prosecutors Office.

On 18 April 2008, Police Senior Superintendent Guinto, rendered his Pre-Charge Evaluation

Report against PO1 Ampatuan, finding probable cause to charge PO1 Ampatuan with Grave Misconduct

(Murder) and recommending that said PO1 Ampatuan be subjected to summary hearing.

Meanwhile, on 21 April 2008,the City Prosecutor of Manila recommended that the case against

PO1 Ampatuan be set for further investigation and that the latter be released from custody unless he is

being held for other charges/legal grounds

Armed with the 21 April 2008 recommendation of the Manila Citys Prosecution Office,

petitioner, who is the wife of PO1 Ampatuan, filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpusbefore the RTC of Manila on 22 April 2008.

On 24 April 2008, RTC ordered the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus commanding therein

respondents to produce the body of PO1 Ampatuan and directing said respondents to show cause why

they are withholding or restraining the liberty of PO1 Ampatuan.

Seeking the reversal of RTC, the respondents averred that the filing of the administrative case

against PO1 Ampatuan is a process done by the PNP and this Court has no authority to order the release

of the subject police officer. The petitioner countered that the letter resignation of PO1 Ampatuan has

rendered the administrative case moot and academic. Respondent however stressed that the

resignation has not been acted by the appropriate police officials of the PNP, and that the administrative

case was filed while PO1 Ampatuan is still in the active status of the PNP. The RTC reversed and

dismissed the petition.

ISSUE: THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT

THE ARREST AND DETENTION OF PO1 BASSER B. AMPATUAN WAS MADE WITHOUT ANY WARRANT AND

THEREFORE, ILLEGAL.

HELD:

The objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or detention is valid or

lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued. What is to be inquired into is the legality of a person's detention

as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for the writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention

is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, such as the instances mentioned

in Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application

In this case, PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under Restrictive Custody. Republic Act No. 6975

(also known as the Department of Interior and Local Government Act of 1990), as amended by Republic

Act No. 8551 (also known as the Philippine National Police Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998),

clearly provides that members of the police force are subject to the administrative disciplinary

machinery of the PNP.

Given that PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under restrictive custody, such constitutes a valid

argument for his continued detention. This Court has held that a restrictive custody and monitoring of


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movements or whereabouts of police officers under investigation by their superiors is not a form of

illegal detention or restraint of liberty.

Restrictive custody is, at best, nominal restraint which is beyond the ambit of habeas

corpus. It is neither actual nor effective restraint that would call for the grant of the remedy prayed for.

It is a permissible precautionary measure to assure the PNP authorities that the police officers

concerned are always accounted for.In sum, petitioner is unable to discharge the burden of showing that she is entitled to the

issuance of the writ prayed for in behalf of her husband, PO1 Ampatuan. The petition fails to show on its

face that the latter is unlawfully deprived of his liberty guaranteed and enshrined in the Constitution.

F. WRIT OF AMPARO AND HABEAS DATAIn the Matter of the Petition for the Writ of Amparo and the Writ of Habeas Data in Favor of Melissa

C. Roxas

Melissa C. Roxas vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al.

G. R. No. 189155, September 7, 2010,

En Banc

Perez, J.

FACTS:

Roxas is an American citizen of Filipino descent. While in the United States, she is enrolled in an

exposure program to the Philippines with the group Bagong Alyansang Makabayan- United States of

America (BAYAN-USA) of which she is a member. During the course of her immersion, Roxas toured

various provinces and towns in Central Luzon and, in April of 2009, she volunteered to join members ofBAYAN-Tarlac in conducting an initial health survey in La Paz, Tarlac for a future medical mission.

After doing survey work on 19 May 2009, Roxas and her companions, Carabeo amd Jandoc,

decided to rest in the house of Mr. Paolo in Sitio Bagong Sikat, Barangay Kapanikian, La Paz, Tarlac. At

around 1:30 in the afternoon, however, Roxas, her companions and Mr. Paolo were startled by the loud

sounds of someone banging at the front door and a voice demanding that they open-up. Suddenly 15

heavily armed men forcibly opened the door, banged inside, tied and blindfolded Roxas and her

companions, Carabeo and Jandoc, then dragged them inside a van parked outside the house. The armed

men were all in civilian clothes and were wearing bonnets to conceal their faces.

After about an hour of travelling, the van stopped. Roxas, Carabeo and Jandoc were ordered to

alight. After she was informed that she was detained for being a member of the Communist Party of the

Philippines New Peoples Army (CPP-NPA), Roxas was separated from her companions and was

escorted to a room which she believed is a jail cell from the sound of the metal doors. From there she

could hear the sounds of gunfire, the noise of planes taking off and landing and some construction

bustle. Roxas inferred that she was taken to the military camp of Fort Magsaysay in Laur, Nueva Ecija.

On May 25, 2009, Roxas was finally released and returned to her uncles house in Quezon City.

Before being release, the abductors gave her a cellphone with a sim card, a slip of paper cantaining an

email address with password, a plastic bag containing biscuits and books, the handcuffs used on her, a

blouse and a pair of shoes. She was also sternly warned not to report the incident to the groupKarapatan or else something bad will happen to her and her family. Sometime after her release, Roxas

continued to receive calls from one of her abductors via the cellular phone given to her. Out of

apprehension that she was being monitored and also fearing for the safety of her family, Roxas threw

away the cellphone.

Roxas fied a petition for writ of amparo and writ of habeas data.


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The Court of Appeals granted her petition for writ of amparo and writ of habeas data. However,

the appellate court absolved the respondents from the petition. Her prayer for the return of her

personal belongings and for the inspection order and production order were denied. Roxas invokes he

doctrine of command responsibility to implicate the high-ranking civilian and military authorities.

ISSUES:

a. Whether or not the principle of command responsibility shall apply in writ of amparo?b. Whether or not the respondents are liable in her abduction and torture?c. Whether or not her prayer for the return of her personal belongings be granted?d. Whether or not her prayer for inspection order be granted?e. Whether or not the grant of writ of habeas data is proper?

RULING:

a. It must be stated at the outset that the use by the petitioner of the doctrine of commandresponsibility as the justification in impleading the public respondents in her amparo petition, is

legally inaccurate, if not incorrect. The doctrine of command responsibility is a rule of

substantive law that establishes liability and, by this account, cannot be a proper legal basis to

implead a party-respondent in an amparo petition. According to Fr. Bernas, "command

responsibility," in its simplest terms, means the "responsibility of commanders for crimes

committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their

control in international wars or domestic conflict." In this sense, command responsibility is

properly a form of criminal complicity. Since the application of command responsibility

presupposes an imputation of individual liability, it is more aptly invoked in a full-blown criminal

or administrative case rather than in a summary amparo proceeding. The obvious reason lies in

the nature of the writ itself: The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing

judicial relief consisting of the appropriate remedial measures and directives that may be

crafted by the court, in order to address specific violations or threats of violation of the

constitutional rights to life, liberty or security. While the principal objective of its proceedings is

the initial determination of whether an enforced disappearance, extralegal killing or threats

thereof had transpiredthe writ does not, by so doing, fix liability for such disappearance,

killing or threats, whether that may be criminal, civil or administrative under the applicable

substantive law. It must be clarified, however, that the inapplicability of the doctrine of

command responsibility in an amparo proceeding does not, by any measure, preclude

impleading military or police commanders on the ground that the complained acts in the

petition were committed with their direct or indirect acquiescence. In which case, commanders

may be impleadednot actually on the basis of command responsibilitybut rather on the

ground of their responsibility, or at least accountability.

b. The totality of the evidence presented by the petitioner does not inspire reasonable conclusionthat her abductors were military or police personnel and that she was detained at Fort

Magsaysay. First. In amparo proceedings, the weight that may be accorded to parallel

circumstances as evidence of military involvement depends largely on the availability or non-

availability of other pieces of evidence that has the potential of directly proving the identity and

affiliation of the perpetrators. Direct evidence of identity, when obtainable, must be preferred

over mere circumstantial evidence based on patterns and similarity, because the former

indubitably offers greater certainty as to the true identity and affiliation of the perpetrators. An

amparo court cannot simply leave to remote and hazy inference what it could otherwise clearly

and directly ascertain. In the case at bench, petitioner was, in fact, able to include in her Offer

of Exhibits, the cartographic sketches of several of her abductors whose faces she managed to

see. To the mind of the Court, these cartographic sketches have the undeniable potential of


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giving the greatest certainty as to the true identity and affiliation of petitioners abductors.

Unfortunately for the petitioner, this potential has not been realized in view of the fact that the

faces described in such sketches remain unidentified, much less have been shown to be that of

any military or police personnel. Bluntly stated, the abductors were not proven to be part of

either the military or the police chain of command. Second. The claim of the petitioner that shewas taken to Fort Magsaysay was not adequately established by her mere estimate of the time

it took to reach the place where she was detained and by the sounds that she heard while

thereat. Like the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court are not inclined to take the estimate and

observations of the petitioner as accurate on its facenot only because they were made mostly

while she was in blindfolds, but also in view of the fact that she was a mere sojourner in the

Philippines, whose familiarity with Fort Magsaysay and the travel time required to reach it is in

itself doubtful. With nothing else but obscure observations to support it, petitioners claim that

she was taken to Fort Magsaysay remains a mere speculation.

c. In an order directing the public respondents to return the personal belongings of the petitioneris already equivalent to a conclusive pronouncement of liability. The order itself is a substantial

relief that can only be granted once the liability of the public respondents has been fixed in a full

and exhaustive proceeding. As already discussed above, matters of liability are not determinable

in a mere summary amparo proceeding. But perhaps the more fundamental reason in denying

the prayer of the petitioner, lies with the fact that a persons right to be restituted of his

property is already subsumed under the general rubric of property rightswhich are no longer

protected by the writ of amparo. Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, which defines the scope and

extent of the writ, clearly excludes the protection of property rights.

d. The prayer of Roxas for the grant of the inspection order is equivalent to sanctioning a "fishingexpedition," which was never intended by the Amparo Rule in providing for the interim relief of

inspection order. An inspection order is an interim relief designed to give support or strengthen

the claim of a petitioner in an amparo petition, in order to aid the court before making a

decision. A basic requirement before an amparo court may grant an inspection order is that the

place to be inspected is reasonably determinable from the allegations of the party seeking the

order. While the Amparo Rule does not require that the place to be inspected be identified with

clarity and precision, it is, nevertheless, a minimum for the issuance of an inspection order that

the supporting allegations of a party be sufficient in itself, so as to make a prima facie case. This,

as was shown above, petitioner failed to do. Since the very estimates and observations of the

petitioner are not strong enough to make out a prima facie case that she was detained in Fort

Magsaysay, an inspection of the military camp cannot be ordered. An inspection order cannot

issue on the basis of allegations that are, in themselves, unreliable and doubtful.

e. The writ of habeas data was conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing the right to privacy,most especially the right to informational privacy of individuals. The writ operates to protect a

persons right to control information regarding himself, particularly in the instances where such

information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.

Needless to state, an indispensable requirement before the privilege of the writ may be

extended is the showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of

the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim. This, in the case at bench, the

petitioner failed to do. The main problem behind the ruling of the Court of Appeals is that there

is actually no evidence on record that shows that any of the public respondents had violated or

threatened the right to privacy of the petitioner. The act ascribed by the Court of Appeals to the

public respondents that would have violated or threatened the right to privacy of the petitioner,

i.e., keeping records of investigations and other reports about the petitioners ties with the CPP-

NPA, was not adequately provenconsidering that the origin of such records were virtually


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unexplained and its existence, clearly, only inferred by the appellate court from the video and

photograph released by Representatives Palparan and Alcover in their press conference. No

evidence on record even shows that any of the public respondents had access to such video or

photograph. In view of the above considerations, the directive by the Court of Appeals

enjoining the public respondents from "distributing or causing the distribution to the public anyrecords in whatever form, reports, documents or similar papers" relative to the petitioners

"alleged ties with the CPP-NPA," appears to be devoid of any legal basis. The public respondents

cannot be ordered to refrain from distributing something that, in the first place, it was not

proven to have.

G. Rule 103: Change of Name: Jurisdiction and Sufficiency of EvidenceROSELIE ELOISA BRINGAS BOLANTE a.k.a. MARIA ELOISA BRINGAS BOLANTE

G.R. No. 160597, July 20, 2006

FACTS:

A petition for change of name was commenced by respondent Roselie Eloisa Bringas Bolante

also known as Maria Eloisa Bringas Bolante on October 18, 2000.

In her petition before the RTC, respondent alleged, among other things, the following:

1. That she is a Filipino, of legal age, married, born to spouses Floriano B. Bolante and Paula B. Bringas

and a resident since birth of Bangued, Abra;

2. That per records in the Office of the Municipal Civil Registrar, Bangued, Abra, her registered name is

Roselie Eloisa Bringas Bolante which name, as far as she can remember, she did not use but instead the

name Maria Eloisa Bringas Bolante;

3. That the name Maria Eloisa appears in all her school as well as in her other public and private records;

and

4. That her married name is Maria Eloisa B. Bolante-Marbella.

Thus, to prevent confusion, Ms. Bolante prayed that her registered name be changed to conform to the

name she has always carried and used.

The trial court ordered respondent, as petitioner, to comply with the jurisdictional requirements

of notice and publication, and set the hearing on February 20, 2001.

At the scheduled February 20, 2001 initial hearing, the trial court issued an Order giving

respondent five (5) days within which to file a written formal offer of evidence to establish jurisdictional

facts and set the presentation of evidence proper on March 26, 2001.

On June 5, 2001, the branch clerk of court, acting upon the trial court's express March 26, 2001

directive for a resetting, issued a notice for a July 18, 2001 hearing. Following anot

special proceedings recent digested cases.2010 2011

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