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Special WarfareThe Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School

PB 80–96–2 May 1996 Vol. 9, No. 2

From the CommandantSpecial Warfare

As the new commander of the JFK Spe-cial Warfare Center and School, I look for-ward to the opportunity of commandingthe soldiers and the civilians who developthe doctrine and the training for our Spe-cial Forces, Civil Affairs and PsychologicalOperations forces. We face a challengingtask in developing a special-operationsforce for the future.

As we work together to develop thatforce, we should remember that despitechanges in the strategies and in the toolswe use to wage wars, the soldier willalways be of paramount importance in win-ning them.

In this issue of Special Warfare, severalarticles emphasize the importance of thehuman element of warfare. LieutenantColonel William Jacobs describes howArdant du Picq’s 19th-century theories ofthe human aspect of war apply to thedilemma faced by Chief Warrant OfficerMichael Durant, and how these theoriescan help us to train for operations on themodern battlefield and to deal with thetimeless factors of fear and loneliness.

Major Sam Young’s history of SF selec-tion and assessment shows that our cur-rent SF selection techniques stem fromthose developed by the OSS during WorldWar II. In assessing and selecting individ-uals for unconventional assignments, westill adhere to the basic principles used bythe OSS. Colonel Thomas Carlin and Dr.Mike Sanders explain how SOF assess-ment-and selection-techniques might beapplied Armywide as a means of selectingsoldiers for the various components ofForce XXI.

In his assessment of conflict situationsthat the United States is likely to face inthe 21st century, Brian Sullivan predictsthat special-operations forces will be ourmost valuable resource in dealing withthose challenges. Major General WilliamGarrison and Colonel Hayward Florer also

discuss the use of SOF in our current andfuture security environments and proposea structure for a new special-operationsbrigade to deal with the nontraditionalmissions that we will surely encounter.

SOF’s usefulness in a variety of opera-tions comes in large part from the qualitiesof SOF soldiers — their interpersonalskills, their flexibility, their adaptability,and their capacity for independent action.These qualities have served us well in thepast, and they will be essential to our suc-cess and survival on the confusing and iso-lated battlefields of the future.

Major General William P. Tangney

Features2 Special Operations and LIC in the 21st Century:

The Joint Strategic Perspectiveby Brian R. Sullivan

8 A View from the Field: Army Special Operations Forces in the Current and Future Security Environmentsby Major General William F. Garrison, U.S. Army (ret.),and Colonel Hayward S. Florer Jr.

16 Soldier of the Future: Assessment and Selection of Force XXIby Colonel Thomas M. Carlin and Dr. Mike Sanders

22 A Short History of SF Assessment and Selectionby Major Sam Young

28 The Role Technology Can’t Fillby Sergeant First Class Michael W. Devotie

30 How to Succeed in Foreign Internal Defenseby Colonel J.S. Ranger Roach, U.S. Army (ret.)

36 The Human Element of Battle: The Theories of Ardant du Picqby Lieutenant Colonel William M. Jacobs

Departments41 Enlisted Career Notes42 Officer Career Notes44 Foreign SOF46 Update48 Book Reviews

PB 80–96–2 ContentsMay 1996 Special Warfare Vol. 9, No. 2

Commander & CommandantMajor General William P. Tangney

EditorJerry D. Steelman

Associate EditorSylvia McCarley

Graphics & DesignBruce S. Barfield

Automation ClerkDebra Thomas

Special Warfare is an authorized, official quarterly of theUnited States Army John F. Kennedy Special WarfareCenter and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Its missionis to promote the professional development of special-operations forces by providing a forum for the examinationof established doctrine and new ideas.

Views expressed herein are those of the authors and donot necessarily reflect official Army position. Thispublication does not supersede any information presentedin other official Army publications.

Articles, photos, artwork and letters are invited andshould be addressed to Editor, Special Warfare,USAJFKSWCS, Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000. Telephone:DSN 239-5703, commercial (910) 432-5703, fax -3147.Special Warfare reserves the right to edit all material.

Published works may be reprinted, except wherecopyrighted, provided credit is given to Special Warfareand the authors.

Official distribution is limited to active and reservespecial-operations units. Individuals desiring privatesubscriptions should forward their requests to:Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government PrintingOffice, Washington, D.C. 20402.

V E R I T A S

STREBIL

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By Order of the Secretary of the Army:Dennis J. ReimerGeneral, United States ArmyChief of Staff

Official:

Joel B. Hudson Administrative Assistant to theSecretary of the Army

01516

Headquarters, Department of the Army

While it has become somethingof a cliché that the United Stateswill not become involved in a majorconventional war within the next15 years, there are good reasons tobelieve it. The powerful impressioncreated by U.S. military might dur-ing the Gulf War, the high level ofAmerican defense spending rela-tive to that of other states, the pre-eminence of the U.S. in a widerange of military technologies, andthe frequently demonstrated com-petence of the U.S. armed forcesseem likely to deter an attack onAmerican interests by regular

armed forces in the foreseeablefuture.

But that cliché can create a dan-gerous sense of complacency, for itis precisely because of our powerfulimage that unconventional andirregular military challenges toU.S. interests are quite likely tooccur. Its position as a global leadermakes the U.S. an obstacle to thosewho wish to upset the internation-al or the regional status quo. Whensuch antagonists seek to removethe American barrier by violentmeans, the only practical methodsavailable to them are insurgency,terrorism or assassination.

Furthermore, it seems likelythat in the coming years our gov-ernment will place U.S. armedforces in harm’s way. The recentinterventions in northern Iraq,Rwanda, Somalia, Haiti and Bos-nia have demonstrated that violentanarchy or widespread sufferingand bloodshed can trigger Ameri-can military intervention. Evi-dence suggests that worseningdemographic and economic condi-tions may increase the chaos in thepoorer sections of the world. As aconsequence, threats to U.S. inter-ests or the pressure generated byAmerican public opinion may leadto our armed involvement in a

number of low-intensity conflicts.Finally, international organized

crime is posing a serious danger tothe security of the U.S. and to thestability of the international order.Despite the growing severity ofillegal activities, the responsibilityfor combating them remains pri-marily with law-enforcement agen-cies. In a small number ofinstances, however, effectiveresponse may require the interven-tion of the U.S. military. For exam-ple, some small, impoverishedstates may be overtaken by crimi-nal gangs and become modern ver-sions of the buccaneer states of the17th-century Caribbean or thepirate states of 19th-century NorthAfrica. Destroying outlaw regimesmay require armed invasion, withheavy reliance on our special-oper-ations forces.

The increasing disparitybetween the living standards ofeconomically developed regionsand those of economically underde-veloped regions often provokeswarnings of future North-Southconflict. In fact, the relative wealthof Australia and New Zealand, thegrowing prosperity of Chile andArgentina, and the possibility thatSouth Africa and parts of South-east Asia may develop into econom-

2 Special Warfare

Special Operations and LIC in the 21st Century:The Joint Strategic Perspective

by Brian R. Sullivan

This article is an expanded andrevised version of a paper presentedby the author at the AmericanDefense Preparedness Associationconference held in Washington, D.C.,in December 1995. It examines possi-ble roles that SOF could fill in deal-ing with the problems the U.S. mayencounter in the 21st century. In thenext issue of Special Warfare, a sec-ond article by Dr. Sullivan will exam-ine future revolutions in militaryaffairs. The views expressed in thisarticle are those of the author and donot necessarily reflect the policies ofthe National Defense University, theDepartment of Defense or the UnitedStates government. — Editor.

ic successes suggest a differentgeographic reality. Global miseryand disorder are deepening not somuch in the southern parts of theglobe but rather in a broad region-al strip centered on the equator.Already, a number of failing stateshave appeared in that wide portionof the planet.

There is reasonable hope thatsome countries in that belt – Mexi-co, Peru, Morocco, Ghana, Angola,and even India and Bangladesh –may escape their present lowstandard of living. But other coun-tries in what was once called theThird World almost certainly willsuffer a horrid fate in comingyears, sinking into a condition ofdegradation almost too awful toimagine.

Our grandchildren and great-grandchildren may live in a farhappier world, thanks to the antic-ipated mid-21st-century easing ofdemographic pressures and to thecontinued advances of technology.But the next several decades arelikely to witness human misery ona scale unprecedented in history.Famine, pestilence and death,three of the Four Horsemen of theApocalypse, probably will ravagehundreds of millions — perhapsbillions — of human beings. Andthe fourth horseman is war.

Food and water shortages mayprompt desperate invasions by peo-ple seeking escape from hungerand thirst. Deadly plagues mayprompt mass flight across evenwell-guarded borders. Crime mayappeal to many as the only relieffrom poverty, leading entire soci-eties away from the rule of the lawto the law of the jungle. Cities inthe impoverished world maybecome the scene of huge riotsdirected by demagogues whose aimis to topple governments. Religiousfanatics may turn against theadherents of other religions, claim-ing divine sanction as an excuse for

plunder, rape and murder. Weak-ened by economic decline, manycentral governments may beunable to control long-festeringethnic and regional hatreds, withlarge-scale slaughter as a result.Massive illegal immigration intothe developed world could take onsimilar aspects of the tribal inva-sions that toppled the Roman andChinese empires. A desire eitherfor vengeance or for extortion couldgenerate widespread terrorism bythe poor against the rich.

These catastrophes may notoccur, but even if they do, they maynot threaten the prosperous por-tions of the human race. Technolo-gy and wealth may allow the Westto build a wall against the suffer-ing that exists outside its borders.But will none of these dreadful pos-sibilities trouble the U.S. or itsallies? The term “global interde-pendence” is more than a buzz-word. The American economy’sgrowing reliance on exports, ourneed to import raw materials, therapid spread of infectious diseasein an age of jet travel, the instantaccess to worldwide communica-tions, the unitary nature of theworld ecological system, and thedemonstrated vulnerability of the

U.S. to terrorist attack are reasonswhy Americans cannot ignore thetroubles that will afflict the poormajority of mankind.

New challengesIn dealing with those troubles,

the U.S. will find that the mostefficient and cost-effective optionis the use of its special-operationsforces. Special-operations person-nel possess the required languageskills and the knowledge of for-eign cultures and geography to

function effectively among non-Western peoples. U.S. interventionin chaotic or failed states probablywill involve a combination of mili-tary and nonmilitary activities.Such a range of difficult and deli-cate activities represents the forteof special-operations forces. Thosewho take part in such operationswill require certain personal qual-ities: daring, imagination, initia-tive, hardiness, inventiveness,persistence and flexibility. Theseare traits for which members ofthe special-operations forces are chosen and which their train-ing further enhances. SOF indi-vidual and small-unit skills incombat, medicine, communica-

May 1996 3

Our grandchildren and great-grandchildren maylive in a far happier world, thanks to the anticipatedmid-21st-century easing of demographic pressuresand to the continued advances of technology. Butthe next several decades are likely to witnesshuman misery on a scale unprecedented in history.Famine, pestilence and death, three of the FourHorsemen of the Apocalypse, probably will ravagehundreds of millions — perhaps billions — ofhuman beings. And the fourth horseman is war.

tions, teaching, mechanics, fieldengineering, demolitions, naviga-tion and survival are vital in com-plex circumstances.

Despite their present readiness,special-operations forces stillrequire enhancement and restruc-turing to deal more effectively withlikely future challenges. In prepa-ration for operations at the leastviolent end of the spectrum, we willneed to increase the number of ourCivil Affairs units. While it appearsunlikely that the U.S. will inter-vene in every crisis throughout theworld for the purpose of restoring acollapsed government, it seemsequally unlikely that Washingtonwould tolerate widespread disorderin Latin America, Africa or Asia.

Certain sea-lanes, maritimechoke points and canals wouldhave to be kept free from piracy,sunken ships, mines and terrorism.When anarchic states spill chaosacross their borders, we might bestprotect our allies by returningthose anarchic states to the rule oflaw. In the wake of conventionalmilitary action in these failedstates, Civil Affairs forces would berequired to reimpose order on thedisrupted societies, if only for oper-ational reasons. The demands ofrestoring government and essen-tial services on a wide scale wouldbe far beyond our present CAcapacity.

EpidemicsThe immediate future may pre-

sent other daunting challenges toCivil Affairs units. Because of com-plicated social and cultural rea-sons, AIDS already infects a highproportion of the military and civil-ian officials of Zaire, Uganda,Kenya, Zambia and other centralAfrican countries. In some or all ofthese countries, government estab-lishments may collapse in the next10-15 years. If this pattern is

repeated in other areas whereAIDS is spreading at an alarmingrate, then civil rule may also erodeor break down in parts of NorthAfrica, the Middle East, India andSoutheast Asia. It is estimated thatAIDS will ultimately claim at leastone million victims in the U.S. Onecan only imagine the number ofvictims it will claim in far lessmedically advanced societies.Moreover, a number of scientistsworry that AIDS may be only a pre-cursor to other, more deadlyplagues.

Epidemics might totally destabi-lize certain portions of the EasternHemisphere. The U. S. would prob-ably be unwilling to tolerate a totallack of government in a regionwhere the interests of the majorpowers converge – a region thatincludes both the Suez Canal andthe chief source of the world’spetroleum. Nor is it likely that theU.S. would stand by while govern-ments collapsed in countries imme-diately to the south of China, to theeast of India and to the north ofIndonesia. American interestswould not be served if India,China, Indonesia and Vietnamwere allowed to collide in an effortby each to impose its rule on theruins of the Bangladeshi, Burmese,Thai, Cambodian or Laotian states.The U.S. might therefore interveneto prevent war and to provide orderin these heavily populated areas.

The area of the globe likely tosuffer the greatest deprivation overthe next few decades – NorthAfrica, the Middle East, CentralAsia, and parts of Southern Asia –is also the center of the Muslimworld. True, some countries with asubstantial or a majority Islamicpopulation — for example, Moroc-co, Turkey, Lebanon, India,Bangladesh, Malaysia, the Philip-pines and Indonesia — may enjoy asubstantial rise in their livingstandards. But the majority of the

world’s Muslims may be especiallyhard-hit by economic misery.

Muslim resentmentAlready, for psychologically and

historically understandable rea-sons, the imbalance of wealth hascreated severe Muslim resentmenttoward Christians and the West. Asa result, some Muslims haveturned to violent religious fanati-cism. It is possible that many morewill join them as social and eco-nomic conditions further deterio-rate in parts of the Islamic world.

Consequently, any future Ameri-can military intervention in coun-tries with large Muslim popula-tions is certain to fuel negativesentiments. Civil Affairs andPSYOP units would face a specialchallenge in these areas. AlthoughAmericans are uncomfortable mix-ing religion and politics in the con-duct of foreign and security affairs,PSYOP units must be prepared toameliorate anti-Western religiousattitudes in certain Islamic coun-tries if U.S. forces have to deploy tothose areas.

Cultural dominationThe U.S. victory in the Cold War

has not been followed by an effortto control the world in a political ormilitary sense. But consider thetremendous impact of Americanculture and entertainment on therest of mankind over the pastdecade alone. Anyone who hasrecently traveled in Latin America,Africa or Asia has witnessed thegrowing availability in those areasof televisions, satellite dishes,radios, tape players and compact-disc players, personal computersand videocassette recorders. Theseentertainment and informationsources are dominated to an extra-ordinary degree by the transmis-sion of American popular culture.That domination seems certain to

4 Special Warfare

become even more widespread asthe entertainment industriesassume an increasingly importantrole in the American economy.

Unfortunately, the images ofAmerican society projected by ourpopular culture are often more rep-resentative of our nightmares andfantasies than of our realities. Thisis not always clear, however, topoorly educated foreign audiences,and they often form a distortedopinion of Americans.

Even when American reality isportrayed accurately, to know us isnot necessarily to love us. Suchconcepts as multi-party democracy,religious freedom, individual free-dom to choose a marriage partner,freedom of artistic expression, andthe right of adults to disobey theirparents are genuine American val-ues, protected by our laws andcherished in our culture. But insocieties functioning according tocontrary beliefs and customs, thepositive portrayal of these valuescan provoke violently negativereactions.

To many living in traditionalsocieties, Americans appear to betrying to dominate humanity withour notions about sex, religion, pol-itics, child-rearing and other inti-mate or personal matters. PSYOPand CA units will have to worktogether to convince large numbersof misinformed or highly suspi-cious people that a temporary U.S.military intervention is not anattempt to impose U.S. values onthem.

The educated among our oppo-nents may present us with addi-tional problems. Members of for-eign elites typically have muchmore knowledge about the U.S.than most Americans have aboutforeign countries. The English lan-guage is understood by increasing-ly larger numbers of people.Because of international broad-casting and widespread travel by

foreigners in the U.S., detailedknowledge of American society, cul-ture and politics is being spread toevery part of the globe. Our gradu-ate schools are educating largenumbers of foreign students. As wealready know, some Middle East-erners and Latin Americans whohave graduated from Americanuniversities are inevitably joiningthe ranks of our enemies. Unlessthe U.S. armed forces are preparedto operate under great intelligencedisadvantages, our military per-

sonnel must know far more aboutforeign societies than they do now.

Nor will it be sufficient to beknowledgeable only about certainparts of the world, as it was duringthe Cold War. Given the changes inthe international system over thepast five years, it is impossible torule out American military inter-vention anywhere. It is equallyimpossible to know where suchoperations are most likely to occur.Consequently, the need for univer-sal knowledge of the world and ofits peoples presents a particularproblem for special-operationsforces. To a large extent, theresponsibility of providing univer-sal knowledge rests with the Amer-ican educational system. Butshould the system fail to inculcatesuch knowledge among youngAmericans before they volunteerfor military service, the armedforces will have to educate theirown personnel.

The American military must also

stress counterintelligence andsecurity measures far more than ithas done in the past. The U.S.Marines paid a high price inLebanon for their lack of emphasison these concerns. Recent newsfrom Bosnia suggests that the ene-mies of the U. S. continue to envi-sion terrorist attacks as a primeweapon against our armed forces.Although our military’s technicalintelligence is superb, our humanintelligence is often poor. U.S.forces, in general, and SOF, in par-

ticular, must address intelligenceand security deficiencies to ensuresuccessful operations in the poorerregions of the world.

Urban warfareSince their inception, Special

Forces have operated mainly inrural areas. But the populations inimpoverished areas of the worldare becoming increasingly urban-ized. A few cities already containpopulations in the tens of millions.In the next decade, the centralregions of the world will containdozens of cities populated by multi-millions of inhabitants. MexicoCity, Cairo and Calcutta havealready established a pattern ofenormous urban squalor. In comingdecades, this pattern will berepeated in scores of other citiesaround the globe. Consequently, itseems almost certain that SpecialForces will be involved in urbanwarfare. Recent operations in

May 1996 5

Unfortunately, the images of American society pro-jected by our popular culture are often more repre-sentative of our nightmares and fantasies than ofour realities. This is not always clear, however, topoorly educated foreign audiences, and they oftenform a distorted opinion of Americans.

Panama and Mogadishu provide aforetaste of such combat.

New burdensUrban warfare will impose new

burdens on U.S. Special Forces. Forexample, making maps of hugeslum cities will not be an easytask. But in order to perform effec-tively, our SF soldiers must haveaccurate maps and other crucialinformation. This need creates amajor responsibility for U.S. intel-ligence agencies, since reliable

maps of such areas, with theirtwisting alleys and slapdash build-ings, are unlikely to be availablefrom conventional sources. Satel-lite imagery and computer-gener-ated maps will have to be createdand carefully studied if SpecialForces are to perform successfuloperations in sprawling slums.

The trend in 20th-century war-fare has been toward ever-increas-ing civilian losses. Moreover, U.S.Special Forces command the ever-more-awesome ability to inflictheavy casualties. Given thenature of their operations, SpecialForces may be forced to engageconventional enemy troops manytimes their number. To ensure thesurvival of their units, SpecialForces must be able to call in sup-porting firepower, especially from

artillery and aircraft.But we may have to rethink

our traditional tactics and devisealternate methods. Future urbanwarfare in flimsily constructed,densely populated slums couldmean that U.S. Special Forceswould inflict enormous numbersof civilian deaths. For obviousethical and political reasons,such bloodshed would be unac-ceptable, except in the case ofdire circumstances. SpecialForces cannot engage in the cal-

lous use of firepower as the Rus-sians have done in Grozny and inChechnya. The harm done wouldnot only lose the support of theAmerican people, it would alsoprovoke international outrage.Although it may be unfair, thefact remains that Americanforces are held to a much higherstandard of conduct than mostforeign militaries are.

On the other hand, attempts todevelop truly non-lethal weaponsfor the U.S. military may be some-what unrealistic. Certainly wewould prefer to conduct crowd con-trol or border-security operationswith a minimum of violence. Butthe idea of a bloodless war is a dan-gerous fantasy: It is precisely thedestruction inflicted on the foe thatforces him to seek peace.

Nevertheless, Special Forces

should develop methods of mini-mizing fatalities in certain urban-warfare situations. U.S. forcesmust also be prepared to treatpotentially huge numbers of bothenemy and civilian casualties. Bynecessity, our opponents will beforced to develop a plan to offsetthe high quality of U.S. SpecialForces. To achieve this, they mayincrease the number of theirforces or use civilian populationsas shields. There will be timeswhen U.S. forces will have nochoice but to shoot to kill, anaction that is certain to result inlarge numbers of wounded anddead. In turn, Special Forces med-ical personnel may be called uponto provide assistance to survivors,who could number in the tens ofthousands.

Urban operations will also bringabout widespread destruction,along with the need for CivilAffairs units to provide shelter andfood for many displaced persons.

Many situations involving futurespecial operations will also pertainto low-intensity conflict conductedby conventional U.S. forces. But theuse of the qualifier “low” should notlead to false expectations: Low-intensity conflict in the urban envi-ronment will still produce heavyenemy and civilian losses and agreat deal of destruction.

In thinking back to the urbanoperations in Algiers and Oranduring the Algerian War and tothe operations in Hue, Saigon andCholon during the Vietnam War,we may derive a general idea ofwhat to expect in the future. Thehuman scale, however, will be farlarger. The population of Algeriahas nearly tripled in the past 35years; the population of Vietnamhas more than doubled in the past25. Throughout the rest of theunderdeveloped world, the popula-tion has also greatly increased. Itcontinues to grow at an alarming

6 Special Warfare

Future urban warfare in flimsily constructed, dense-ly populated slums could mean that U.S. SpecialForces would inflict enormous numbers of civiliandeaths. For obvious ethical and political reasons,such bloodshed would be unacceptable, except inthe case of dire circumstances. … The harm donewould not only lose the support of the Americanpeople, it would also provoke international outrage.

rate and is overwhelmingly con-centrated in urban areas.

Question of strategyU.S. special-operations units

intervening in the poorer areas ofthe world may encounter a popu-lation scale and a density ofcrowding that is difficult for mostAmericans to imagine. Somaliaand Bosnia are relatively emptycompared to other areas wherethe U.S. government might con-sider intervention. Future opera-tions may be more like mega-Rwandas or mega-Haitis. U.S.leaders should carefully considerthe ends and the means beforeembarking on so-called low-intensity conflict in such regions.Even a very low level of violenceon an individual scale, when mul-tiplied by tens of millions, couldresult in a conflict of high inten-sity in terms of the effort and theresources necessary for U.S.forces to wage it.

This last point raises the finaland essential question of strategy:

matching available means to thechosen ends. The U.S. has passedthrough the isolationist and con-tainment phases of its national his-tory. We are now on the edge of anew period. But we have neitherreached a national bipartisan con-sensus on a new national securitypolicy nor have we developed astrategy for achieving it. Only aftersuch a fundamental national deci-sion has been reached will it bepossible to evaluate wisely wherethe U.S. should commit its forces.On that decision much depends,including the future of U.S. special-operations forces.

Brian R. Sullivanis a senior researchprofessor at theInstitute for Nation-al Strategic Studies,National DefenseUniversity. Heserved as a Marine officer in Viet-nam, where he was awarded theSilver Star and the Purple Heart.

After receiving a Ph.D. fromColumbia University, he taughtmilitary history at Yale University,and strategy at the Naval War Col-lege. During the Gulf crisis andWar, he was an adviser to theAssistant Secretary of Defense forSpecial Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict. At INSS, Dr.Sullivan analyses and writes doc-uments on issues pertaining toU.S. defense strategy. He is also theauthor of numerous articles aboutmilitary history and nationalsecurity.

May 1996 7

Much has been said and written aboutthe current security environment, andmany speakers and writers agree that theprimary event shaping the world today isthe end of the Cold War. What has not beenso thoroughly analyzed are the two dra-matically different effects produced by thatevent, and the ways in which those effectsare relevant to special-operations forces.

The first effect brought on by the end ofthe Cold War has been the increase in tur-

moil: Deep ethnic, national and religiousrivalries and hatreds have been unlockedthroughout the old Soviet Union and itssphere of influence. This era has also gen-erated an enormous increase in crime andcriminal cartels. In some places, our worldlooks like the world of the 1920s. In fact,the post-Cold War problems are similar tothose that occurred after World War I. Theconsequences of this unleashed turmoil areplaying out in unforeseen ways. Predicting

8 Special Warfare

Copyright 1996 byWilliam F. Garrisonand Hayward S.Florer Jr. Used withpermission. Thisarticle is taken fromMG Garrison’s pre-sentation at theDecember 1995 con-ference of the Amer-ican Defense Pre-paredness Associa-tion. Continuingthe discussion ofSOF’s role in futureconflicts, it proposesa new force struc-ture for dealingwith nontraditionalmissions — Editor.

Special Forces, Psychological Operations, and Civil Affairs

A View from the Field: Army Special Operations Forces in the Current and Future Security Environments

by Major General William F. Garrison, U.S. Army (ret.) and Colonel Hayward S. Florer Jr.

and anticipating today’s security require-ments remains an enormous challenge toour national leadership.

The second effect of the end of the ColdWar has been a resurgence in democracyand globalization. In sharp contrast to thedivisive power unleashed by the first effect,we are now witnessing a trend that is mov-ing politics toward more self-determination,and economics toward freer markets.

The old, centrally planned, closedeconomies of the Soviet Union and its Marx-ist surrogates are opening rapidly to bothcapitalism and the international market-place. Even though the authoritarian lead-ers of China, Vietnam and other Asiannations continue to resist democracy, theyhave initiated some forms of capitalism. Ashistory shows, these nations will learn thatcapitalism’s premium on individual initia-tive undercuts the authoritarian rulers’ gripon power and increases the demands fordemocratic reforms. Elsewhere, the ideas ofdemocracy have taken root, especially inLatin America and in parts of EasternEurope. Francis Fukyama, an analyst withthe RAND Corporation, predicts a dramaticdecrease in conflict as new democracieslearn to settle disputes peacefully.1

In response to the trend toward global-ization, powerful non-national actors,whether they are drug cartels or interna-tional business conglomerates, havearrived on the operational security scene.These actors, with their self-interests andnarrow constituencies, have no nationalmandates for action. Third World nationsthat have weak institutions must strugglewith them to maintain their sovereigntyand their responsibility to their citizens. Insome nations, these actors supplant theinstitutions in an effort to acquire moneyand to increase their power. Our NationalSecurity Strategy commits the UnitedStates to strengthening and supporting thedemocratic institutions in their attempt tolimit the power of non-national actors.2

As a result of the two broad trends thathave emerged from the end of the Cold War,our nation’s military forces are facing newchallenges. In preparing to meet these, weare reminded of General Omar Bradley’sstatement, “Our compelling need ... (is) notfor air power, sea power, or land power —but for American military power commen-surate with our tasks in the world.”3 Spe-cial Forces, Civil Affairs and PsychologicalOperations are part of a joint team that is

May 1996 9

Provide Ground Truth

Excel at Intercultural Communications

Have Earned Influence with Leadersin Emerging Areas of National Interest

Have History of Bringing Militaryand Civic Leaders Together

SF, CA, and PSYOP Deal with Today’s World

designed to be deeply integrated into Gen-eral Bradley’s idea of American militarypower.

The security environment of today is ill-defined and unpredictable. Nevertheless,SF, CA and PSYOP forces can provideground truth in this amorphous environ-ment because of their current worldwidedeployments to carry out the engagement-and-enlargement mandate from the cur-rent National Security Strategy.4 In fact,SOF may be the only U.S. forces who havebeen on the ground and know the leadersin dangerous areas in which only five yearsago we would never have predicted wewould have an interest.

Today’s SF, CA and PSYOP are alsostructured and trained to meet the chal-lenges of enlarging and strengtheningdemocratization. SOF have access to mili-tary leaders and can often influence themwith American values regarding humanrights and democracy. In some countries,CA forces have brought military and civicleaders together for the first time, thusincreasing the leaders’ trust in new demo-cratic institutions. The 361st Civil AffairsBrigade conducts a series of seminars inLatin American countries such as

Venezuela, Paraguay and Belize. There,American officers use their skills to bringtogether local military officers and localcivilian officials to discuss issues such asdisaster preparedness and environmentalprotection. The program works because theCA officers gain the trust of all the partici-pants and help them to focus on local needsand concerns.

Another element of today’s operationalenvironment is the integration of technolo-gy at all levels. SF, CA and PSYOP forcesstay connected with the Army and withother services in this high-tech arena asthe Army prepares to fight and win inmajor regional contingencies anywhere inthe world. SOF’s leadership in technologyis exemplified by our MH-60K and MH-47E helicopters, our tactical use of satel-lite-communications radios, and our devel-opment of highly secure high-frequencyradios. All the developments in informa-tion operations, command-and-control war-fare, battlefield awareness, and an order-of-magnitude improvement in the accuracyof smart weapons, as described in JCSVision 2010, include ARSOF participation.5

Over the next 10 years, these develop-ments will help make the joint-force com-

10 Special Warfare

Special ForcesCivil AffairsPsychological Operations

PersuasionLanguagesCross-cultural Communication

Train and Practice

For All Regions of the Globe

The Culturally and Geographically Oriented Force

mander, or JFC, decisively successful. Thecomplementary technological improve-ments and the total integration of ARSOFdoctrine into joint and Army doctrine willensure that SF, CA and PSYOP forcesremain on the joint team today and in thefuture.

Because of their core capabilities andvalues, SF, CA and PSYOP forces are calledon by the geographical commanders inchief, or CINCs, to execute missions in ill-defined and high-risk environments. Theentire force is culturally and geographical-ly oriented and sensitized. Language profi-ciency is only part of the power of thiscapability. SF, CA and PSYOP forces trainand practice the arts of persuasion, negoti-ation and cross-cultural communication forall regions of the globe. Special Forces addthe cutting edge of tough combat skills andsurvivability. Although SF can executecommando-style operations, their real skillis in teaching, advising, assisting andassessing other nations’ forces. They adaptparticularly well to the needs of coalition-support operations. As stated by GeneralNorman Schwarzkopf, during DesertShield/Desert Storm they provided theglue that held the coalition together.6 More

recently, they have been critical to the coor-dination and synchronization of operationswith our NATO and European partners inBalkan operations.

PSYOP forces develop and deliver appro-priate themes and products that aredesigned to influence all levels of foreignaudiences. CA forces bring the skills of civiladministration and civil-military coordina-tion to the joint force. The PSYOP and CAcapabilities give the joint-force commandersgreat flexibility and multiple options inaccomplishing their military objectives. Haitirepresents a classic example: SF, CA andPSYOP teams deployed to the countryside,allowing the general-purpose forces to focuson the center of gravity in Port-au-Prince.

So far, we have discussed today’s opera-tional environment. Now we will focus onthe future and what it means for SF, CAand PSYOP. The trends described earlierwill continue to bring a more unpredictableworld. We will see an era of fewer nation-state wars. But on the other hand, we willsee more violence, along with simmeringconflicts that flare up and then cool downonce the antagonists have exhausted theirresources. These will be unwinnable warswhose end state and military objective may

May 1996 11

Perform Commando Operations

each, T Advise, Assist Foreign Nations

Conduct Coalition Support Operations

Conduct Reconnaissanceand Assessments

Special Forces Capabilities

be difficult to ascertain.Poorly trained but fully politicized para-

military groups will continue to commitgenocide and ethnic cleansing; narcotraf-fickers will place our future generations atrisk; criminal cartels will undermine oureconomic and personal security; and ter-rorists will attempt to destroy our institu-tions. Any of these elements may useweapons of mass destruction as a tool forextortion, profit or actual destruction.

Dealing with an enemy who thumbs hisnose at a military force that can fly, shootand sail with unmatched speed and accu-racy will require us to answer the ques-tion, “How do we use a high-tech forceagainst a low-tech enemy?” To begin, wemust provide a 21st-century soldier – onewho is comfortable with technology, is cul-turally aware, is a good informationprocessor, is capable of adapting, is tena-cious under stress, is intelligent, is dis-cerning, is a good thinker, and is able todemonstrate sound judgment. This modelsoldier and his leaders must be capable ofdealing simultaneously with all levels ofwar, networked by technology. In short,the Cold War norms of hierarchical andsequential decisions and operations are

gone. Tactical decisions will have largerpolitical implications than in the past. Anexample of this was seen in Somalia,where a tactical decision had long-lastingnegative political implications, eventhough it resulted in a successful combatoperation.

Army Major Ralph Peters has writtentwo important articles in Parameters with-in the last year that aptly and dramatical-ly describe a potential future. He describesa “new warrior class” that does not followwhat he calls the highly stylized and ritu-alized customs and forms of warfare thatthe Euro-American soldier follows.

The U.S. military must still be pre-pared to meet and to fight organized mil-itaries, but it may often have to deal withwarriors from this new class as well. Todefeat them, the U.S. needs a two-pronged approach: an active campaign towin the support of the populace, coupledwith an overwhelming and violent attackagainst the warriors and their leaders.As Peters says, “You cannot teach them alesson ... you either win or lose. This kindof warfare is a zero-sum game. And ittakes guts to play.”7 Or as AdmiralOwens has said, “Identify [the] crown

12 Special Warfare

PSYOP PersonnelDevelop and Deliver Products to

Influence All Levels

CA PersonnelGive Joint Forces Civil Administration

and Civil-Military Coordination Capability

Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs Capabilities

jewels of [your] adversary and destroythem.”8 Dr. P.J. Berenson, scientificadviser to the commander of the ArmyTraining and Doctrine Command, writesabout the difficulty of deterrence againstthese future actors in the security envi-ronment. He states that selective, violentaction by Special Forces, to destroy whatan adversary most highly values, may benecessary.9

SF, CA and PSYOP will play an impor-tant role as high-tech combatants on ahighly lethal joint team. This team willbe able to hit the new warrior classwhere it lives. Yet, just as they are doingtoday, SF, CA and PSYOP teams will bethe primary element executing a low-tech campaign to gain the support of thepopulation in the old-fashioned, people-to-people method that President John F.Kennedy envisioned in 1961.10 Simulta-neous operation in the high-tech, highlysynchronized environment of joint opera-tions and in low-tech operations withindigenous armies and populations willbe the trademark of SF, CA and PSYOPin the future.

U.S. interagency cooperation and inte-gration must become the norm in the

future, just as joint operations havebecome the norm today. The mix ofhumanitarian, peacekeeping, peace-enforcement and nation-building objec-tives requires all the elements of power ofthe U.S. And while the complicated objec-tives will not be clearly military, theirconsequences will be highly political.Therefore, the intense interest of theNational Command Authority willrequire tight interagency cooperation.

Again, SF, CA and PSYOP forces canoperate easily in this kind of environ-ment, particularly where selective andpolitically sensitive military operationssupport specific U.S. policy goals.Whether the mission is a sensitive effortto counter the proliferation of weapons ofmass destruction, or a long-term effort topromote democracy and human rights,the initial elements on the ground areusually SF, CA and PSYOP.

New thinking about organizations mayprovide a solution to help us accomplishsuch a mission. In the past, we have usedtraditional structures such as an armoreddivision to handle high-intensity-combatcommand and control. In today’s environ-ment, we need a headquarters and a

May 1996 13

Operational

Diplomatic

Strategic

Tactical

Diplomatic Strategic

Operational Tactical

Hierarchical andSequential

Internetted andSimultaneous

The Cold WarNow and Tomorrow

Future Operations

structure that are prepared to deal withnon-traditional missions on a full-timebasis.

Proposed ‘exceptional force’An “exceptional force” is any element of

the combined-arms team or service thatdominates a given operation and plays thedecisive role. A task-organized Army spe-cial-operations brigade could be such anexceptional force for the future. It wouldconsist of SF, CA and PSYOP, as well aselements of infantry, aviation, combat sup-port and combat service support to fit aparticular mission. An operation should bebuilt around the dominant element, andthe exceptional-force headquarters shouldserve as the headquarters for the operationwhich it dominates, using joint and coali-tion operations to complement and rein-force it.

In combining the capabilities of SF, CA andPSYOP with the capabilities of these otherelements, we produce the nucleus of adynamic team that provides the theaterCINC with a tool that can be used to lead,support or advise the joint and interagencyteam efforts.

The dynamic team provides commandand control so that the JFC does not have toform ad hoc organizations. The team alsoprovides its own minimum security for forceprotection, with the innate ability to deter-mine when more help is needed. It providesa sophisticated headquarters for continuedassessments of a country or a region amidthe confusion of the future operational envi-ronment described earlier. It is an ideal ele-ment from which to base joint and inter-agency operations of the future.

It is conceivable that an SF, CA andPSYOP team could be advising and assist-ing a foreign nation in peacetime when acontingency requirement would compel it toperform special reconnaissance or directaction or to facilitate other joint-forceactions. Once the joint contingency opera-tions were over, the original team wouldrevert back to its engagement mission. TheArmy special-operations task force will easethe transition through these phases of theoperation for the joint force commander. Itshould be the exceptional force in futurepeacetime operations when political factors,interagency cooperation, intercultural com-munication, and human-intelligence collec-tion are dominant elements of an operation.

14 Special Warfare

Task Organized

CA PSYOP MP

CS CSS

ARSOF

Joint ForcesCommand

SF

Army SOF Exceptional Force

We have seen how the SF, CA andPSYOP team fits in today’s operationalenvironment as a critical member of thejoint team and as executor of the U.S.national security policy. We have alsoexplained ways in which the unpredictablefuture environment will need SF, CA andPSYOP to play an important role in theincreasingly frequent interagency opera-tions, while they remain a part of joint andcoalition operations. We are but one ele-ment of General Bradley’s American mili-tary power that is “commensurate with ourtasks in the world.”

In closing, we should remember that themain thing is to keep the main thing themain thing. The main thing is stated bestby General Dennis Reimer, our Army Chiefof Staff:

The idea of war in the information agewill conjure up images of bloodless con-flict, more like a computer game than thebloody wars we’ve known in the past.Nothing could be further from the truth.Warfare may change – its impact onnations, armies and soldiers will not. Thefates of nations and armies will still bedecided by war, perhaps more rapidly thanin the past. Losers may still spend genera-tions recovering from the consequences ofdefeat. Soldiers will always be the key tovictory. Technology and the ability to han-dle it may be increasingly important, butsoldiers will always win or lose wars. Thebattlefield will always be a dangerous,frightening and lonely place. Only soldiersof character and courage, well-trained,ably led, and properly equipped will sur-vive there and win – tomorrow, as theyhave in the past.11

Major General William F.Garrison retired from theArmy in May 1996 as com-mander of the JFK SpecialWarfare Center and School.In previous assignments, heserved as commander of theJoint Special Operations Command, asdeputy commanding general of the U.S.Army Special Operations Command, andas deputy commander of the U.S. Army

Intelligence Security Agency of the U.S.Army Intelligence and Security Command.

Colonel Hayward S. FlorerJr. is director of the Direc-torate of Training and Doc-trine, JFK Special WarfareCenter and School. A formerInfantry officer and Africaforeign area officer, he hasheld Special Forces assignments from theA-detachment to the battalion level. Hecommanded the 1st Battalion, 10th SpecialForces Group, during Operations DesertShield/Storm and Provide Comfort.Colonel Florer is a graduate of the U.S. Mil-itary Academy at West Point and the ArmyCommand and General Staff College. He isalso a War College graduate from theAdvanced Operational Studies fellowshipat the School of Advanced Military Studiesat Fort Leavenworth, Kan., and holds amaster’s degree in history from the Univer-sity of Kansas.

Notes:1 Francis Fukuyama, Have We Reached the End of

History? (Santa Monica, Calif.: The Rand Corporation,1989); and The End of History and the Last Man (NewYork: The Free Press, 1992).

2 A National Security Strategy of Engagement andEnlargement, The White House, February 1995, pp. 1-5.

3 General Omar Bradley, quote used by Joint Chiefsof Staff, J5, to guide the attitude of the Joint Staff.

4 A National Security Strategy, pp. 7-24.5 Discussion paper attached to Warfighting Vision

2010: A Framework for Change, 11 September 1995(Joint Warfighting Center, Doctrine Division, FortMonroe, Va.).

6 Norman Friedman, Desert Victory (Annapolis,Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1991), p. 224.

7 Major Ralph Peters, “The New Warrior Class,”Parameters, Vol. 24, No. 2, Summer 1994, pp. 16-26.

8 As stated by Dr. Paul J. Berenson, Thoughts onDeterrence, 6 October 1995, quoted with permission ofthe Office of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff, 29 November 1995.

9 Berenson, Thoughts on Deterrence.10 James J. Schneider, “Ambushing the Future,”

Special Warfare, Vol. 8, No. 2, April 1995, pp. 2-10.11 General Dennis Reimer's speech prepared for the

Fletcher School of Law symposium, “War In the Infor-mation Age,” 16 November 1995, Cambridge, Mass.

May 1996 15

As the Army prepares to meet the chal-lenges of the 21st century, changes in doc-trine, in tactics and in U.S. demographicswill require us to tailor the manning proc-ess that the Army uses to fill the force.

The manning process and the indicatorsthe Army uses to identify who should filleach slot in the force — the job-soldiermatch — are critical to the future of ForceXXI.

According to Army Training and Doc-trine Command Pamphlet 525-5, AirLandOperations, “Quality soldiers, trained andled by competent and caring leaders, willremain a key to success on future battle-fields. Soldiers in the 21st century will befaced with a wide variety of challenges inpreparing for and executing missions infull-dimensional operations. … Increasedflexibility and adaptability will be requiredat all levels, along with increased responsi-bility at much lower ranks.”

For the past 20 years, the Army hasorchestrated a quiet revolution in one of itsmanning processes — the assessment andselection of personnel for special-opera-tions forces, or SOF. SOF assessment andselection, which has been an evolutionaryprocess, has produced revolutionaryresults. The lessons learned could have asimilar revolutionary impact on the waythe Army mans Force XXI.

The SOF community has always placed anemphasis on people. One of its primary goalshas been to develop a cost-effective process

16 Special Warfare

Soldier of the Future: Assessment and Selection of Force XXI

by Colonel Thomas M. Carlin and Dr. Mike Sanders

This article is an outgrowth of a briefingconducted in 1994 for the Army’s leadership.The briefing, initiated by General WayneDowning, Lieutenant General J.T. Scott andMajor General William Garrison, proposeda process by which the Army might manForce XXI. The authors wish to acknowledgethe contributions of Colonel Greg Pulley inthe development of the original briefingand, thus, in the development of this article.The authors also emphasize that the SOFleadership in general is interested in hear-ing soldiers’ ideas on ways to enhance orimprove current SOF assessment-and-selec-tion programs. Readers are encouraged touse Special Warfare as a forum for theexpression of those ideas. — Editor.

Photo by Kirk Wyckoff

for manning the force and for placing theright soldier in the right job. Through mis-sion analysis, SOF have determined thattheir soldiers will be more successful if theyhave the following attributes:• Organizational skills.• Trainability.• Situational awareness.• Ability to make complex discriminations

and decisions.• Personal adaptability.• Resistance to stress.• Dependability, determination and

stability.• Physical endurance and specialized

military skills.SOF must select soldiers who can

remain “mentally alive” while experiencingdeep fatigue and personal discomfort. SOFsoldiers must also be capable of performingtheir duties while on solo missions in sen-sitive environments. Ultimately, each SOFsoldier must demonstrate the stability,dependability and adaptability required tooperate independently in fluid and chal-lenging situations.

The SOF community developed its initialassessment-and-selection program in 1976for one of its classified units. In developingthe program, SOF reviewed and incorpo-rated elements from similar programs,including those of the World War II Officeof Strategic Services, or OSS; the CentralIntelligence Agency; and the British 22ndSpecial Air Service, or SAS. The OSS’sselection process often failed to match aperson to the job he or she would performin the field. A later review indicated thatthis ineffective job match was the primaryreason for failure in the OSS operationalenvironment.1 Likewise, the SAS haddeveloped an assessment-and-selectionprocess because a large number of its menhad been proven unsuitable for their jobs.That mismatch resulted in a substantialwaste of resources.2

In 1987, the JFK Special Warfare Centerand School began developing a selectionprogram to use in screening candidates forSpecial Forces training. The first SFassessment and selection began in June1988.

SOF assessment-and-selection programs

May 1996 17

General Model for Assessment and Selection

CONTINUE SEQUENTIAL SCREENING USING MORE MISSION-ORIENTED SITUA-TIONAL AND PERFORMANCE TESTS UN-TIL ALL ATTRIBUTES ARE EVALUATED

ATTRIBUTES REQUIRED FOR MISSION

T O O L S T O A S S E S S A T T R I B U T E S

TEST, EVALUATE AND SCREEN OUT CANDIDATES, USING EXISTING TESTS AND MEASURES

TRAIN REMAINING SOLDIERS ON KEY MISSION SKILLS

APPRENTICE

FRONT-END ANALYSIS OF MISSION REQUIREMENTS

have continued to evolve and to expand.Today they are also used to screen candi-dates for the Rangers and for the 160thSpecial Operations Aviation Regiment.

Assessment and selection is a sequentialprocess designed to screen out, as early aspossible, soldiers who do not possess theattributes required for mission success.The overall process (shown on page 17)begins with a review of current and futuremission requirements. The next step is toidentify the attributes soldiers must haveto perform their missions successfully.Trainers then develop or adapt screeningtools that can determine whether the sol-diers possess the critical attributes. Oncethe tools have been validated, they areused in the assessment programs. Includedin the screening tools are the GeneralTechnical Composite, or GT, of the ArmedServices Vocational Aptitude Battery, orASVAB; physical-fitness tests; and spatial-relations tests.

The figure below shows the sequentialSOF assessment-and-selection process.While the numbers vary slightly amongthe assessment-and-selection programs of

the various SOF units, the statistics arerepresentative of all those programs. Theoverall assessment-and-selection processtypically begins with an initial screeningbased on a soldier’s GT test score from theASVAB. Only 35 percent of all soldiersachieve the required score of 110. The sec-ond screening is based on the soldier’s PTtest score — only 59 percent of those whotake this test meet the requirements. Sol-diers who pass the first two screenings,satisfy a background check and meet spe-cific psychological requirements are eligi-ble to attend a structured assessment-and-selection program, where they undergoadditional psychological and performancescreening.

There is a great deal of truth in theadage, “The best predictor of future per-formance is past performance.” However,individuals mature with experience, so thebest predictor of one’s future performanceis his recent performance on similar tasks.The screening process enables the Army toselect those soldiers who are likely to meetperformance standards. Assessment con-tinues into the training phase, where sol-

18 Special Warfare

S C R E E N I N G A S S E S S M E N T & SELECTION TRAINING

OPERATIONAL A S S I G N M E N T & CONTINUED A S S E S S M E N T

PSYCHOLOGICAL PERFORMANCE & SITUATIONAL TESTS

MISSION TASKS

ASVAB GT-110 UNITPT TEST

35% MEET REQUIREMENTS




99.5% MEET REQUIREMENTS

Sequential SOF Assessment and Selection Process

diers undergo situational testing.Soldiers selected during the assessment-

and-selection process have a high probabil-ity of success during operational trainingand assignment. SOF have achieved 95percent success in training and more than99 percent success during operationalassignments. Research proves that theoverall monetary savings resulting fromthe selection-and-assessment process havefar outweighed the initial investment.

Some of the key lessons learned duringthe 20 years of SOF assessment and selec-tion are as follows:• The assessment-and-selection process

enables the Army to select the right sol-dier for a specific job.

• The assessment-and-selection process iscost-effective and enhances individualand unit effectiveness.

• Candidates should be screened early.• Screening should continue through job-

related situational and performancetests.

• Performance evaluation during theassessment-and-selection processshould relate to the critical attributesidentified in the mission analysis.

• Objective performance standards shouldbe established for assessment, selectionand initial training.In applying SOF assessment-and-selec-

tion methods to other career-managementfields, the Army could identify tests andmeasures that are predictive of the desiredmission performance. These could be usedat military entrance and processing sta-tions, or MEPS, and incorporated into basicmilitary training, or BMT. For instance, theASVAB could be augmented with addition-al tests and measures to assess the sol-dier’s ability to perform a specific require-ment, such as learning a second language.

Programs should be developed to maxi-mize the use of the Army’s training cen-ters and schools as primary sites for per-forming screening and assessment. Earlytesting could identify those candidateswho do not possess specific aptitudes andskills, and it could also identify thosewhose skills and interests match profilesof particular jobs within a career-manage-ment field. In the field of aircraft mainte-

nance, for example, spatial-relations testscould help identify soldiers who have thepotential to read and use complex wiringdiagrams and schematics of mechanicallinkages. These tests could also identifysoldiers with particular skills and inter-ests in a specific series of aircraft such asattack helicopters. (Assigning mainte-nance personnel into different missiontracks, after having considered theirskills, abilities and interests, is consistentwith the Army Aviation Center’s pastapproach to the assignment of aviators.)

The technological advances in informa-tion-age computing could make it easier todevelop a means of testing a soldier at eachstage of his or her career. Individual soldierperformance in realistic simulations, exer-cises and operational assignments could beobjectively recorded into databases. Theinformation could be retrieved as needed,and considered in assignment decisions.

The figure on page 20 depicts a hypothet-ical example in which institutional trainingand assessment data, along with evalua-tions from operational assignments (effi-ciency reports), could be used to support theselection of new commanders. The keyattributes required for success in the newcommand position might be those listed tothe left of the figure. Scores for various offi-cers’ performance on tasks related to thekey attributes would be recorded. For exam-ple, Officer A has the scores 9, 3, 8 and 5;Officer B has the scores 7, 2, 5 and 2. Theprediction model would combine each offi-cer’s scores, placing emphasis on the vari-ables that represent the predictors of suc-cess for that particular job. As a result, theselection board would have an objectiveanalysis — a rank-ordering of candidates —to support its selection decisions.

It is important that the selection processaddress only the needs identified by themission analysis. A thorough missionanalysis and the validation process adhereto the principle that “perfect” is the enemyof “good enough.” The screen that the can-didates must pass through should be onlyas fine as the mission analysis dictates.

It is also critical to note that the boardphase of the assessment-and-selectionprocess is indispensable. While the assess-

May 1996 19

ment process is strongly dependent uponempirical data, assessment is an art, not ascience. Paper-and-pencil drills, by them-selves, cannot substitute for the judgmentof leaders who are trained and experiencedin the operational environment.3

One final point to consider is that assess-ment and selection is a dynamic processthat requires continual validation. TheSOF community maintains the closest pos-sible relationship with the Army ResearchInstitute, or ARI, in order to gain assist-ance for the continual validation of SOF’svarious assessment-and-selection process-es. In the past 12 years, ARI has conductedseveral research projects that supportthese processes. On SOF’s behalf, ARI hassurveyed various populations and providedinsight into such issues as SOF retention,officer assessment and selection, minorityrecruiting, and periodic reassessment ofthe force.

Despite the emphasis on technology andinformation warfare for Force XXI, wemust not neglect the importance of thehuman component. The Army must maxi-mize the potential of its human resources

by using methods that have proven to beeffective in measuring aptitude and poten-tial, in determining compatibility, and inplacing each soldier into the job that iscompatible with the individual’s abilities.Soldier assessment and job selection, ifcontinued throughout the soldier’s lifecycle of professional development, shouldresult in increased retention and missioneffectiveness. In order to leverage ourhuman resources, we must select the rightpersonnel for the force and make everyeffort to retain them.

A study of SOF’s successful assessment-and-selection processes has led to the fol-lowing conclusions:• A front-end analysis to determine mis-

sion requirements and the required sol-dier attributes should be the first step inassessment and selection.

• Processes of assessment and selectionshould be tailored to address the criticalelements necessary for mission success.

• Force XXI soldier assessment shouldbuild on successful approaches thathave evolved over the years.

• Force XXI assessment-and-selection

20 Special Warfare

■ BOARD REVIEW OF DATA

■ SELECTION DE-CISION MADE

Assessment Model for Commanders (O-6 and below)

A B

9 7

3 2

8 5

5 2

■ ABILITY TO PROCESS AND INTEGRATE A LARGE AMOUNT OF INFORMATION

■ ABILITY TO MAKE ORDER OUT

OF AMBIGUOUS SITUATIONS ■ ADAPTABLE ■ EFFECTIVE IN WORK-

ING WITH SENIOR AND SUBORDINATE OFFICERS AND NCOs

KEY ATTRIBUTES FOR SUCCESS IDENTIFIED

SCORES*

* SCORES BASED ON INSTITUTIONAL TRAINING & ASSESSMENT, OPERATIONAL ASSIGNMENT (OERs)

SCORES ENTERED

INTO A PREDICTION

MODEL

CANDIDATES RANK-

ORDERED

programs should use information-agecomputer technology to produce a betterjob-soldier match.

• The application of appropriate assess-ment-and-selection procedures reducesattrition, increases job satisfaction andenhances mission performance.Greater use of assessment-and-selection

techniques should be strongly consideredfor Force XXI. To support future demands,training centers should evolve into train-ing-and-assessment centers. The wise useof assessment-and-selection techniqueswill improve the job-soldier match,increase retention throughout the soldier’slife cycle, increase job satisfaction andenhance mission performance. The chal-lenges associated with the changes wehave proposed are considerable, but theyare consistent with other changes antici-pated as the Army continually evolvestoward a force for the 21st century.

Colonel Thomas M. Carlinis commander of the 5th Spe-cial Forces Group. He enteredthe Army in December 1973.Since December 1975, hisspecial-operations assign-ments have included com-mand of special-operations elements at thecaptain, major and lieutenant-colonel lev-els. He has served as a deputy commandingofficer and on a joint special-operationsstaff. He holds master’s degrees in interna-tional relations and in security manage-ment. From January 1989 until June 1991,Carlin commanded an assessment-and-training detachment that was, in part,responsible for the administration of one ofSOF’s assessment-and-selection processes.

Dr. Mike Sanders has served as chief ofthe Fort Bragg office of the Army ResearchInstitute since July 1994. He and other ARIpsychologists provide research support tothe SOF community on topics that addressthe life cycle of the soldier, includingrecruiting, assessment and selection, train-ing and retention. He began service in theArmy at Fort Rucker, Ala., as an active-dutyaviation psychologist at the Army Aeromed-

ical Research Laboratory. At the Fort Ruck-er ARI Field Unit, his research continuedon aviator selection, screening, training,performance assessment, and retention. Dr.Sanders also served as the ARI field unitchief at Fort Gordon, Ga., where his unitperformed research on training technologyenhancements for Signal soldiers. He holdsa master’s and a doctorate in experimentalpsychology, with an emphasis on humanfactors.

Notes:1 Office of Strategic Services Assessment Staff,

Assessment of Men, Selection of Personnel for theOffice of Strategic Services (New York: Rinehart &Company, Inc., 1948), pp. 14, 18-20 and 459.

2 From personal correspondence between ColonelThomas M. Carlin and Lieutenant Colonel John M.Woodhouse, RA (ret.), commanding officer of the 22SAS from 1962 to 1965. Woodhouse served in Malayawith the Malayan Scouts (SAS), the post-World War IIpredecessor of the 22 SAS. Then a major, he was per-sonally responsible for establishing the SAS’s assess-ment, selection and training process in 1952 at thedirection of the commander of the newly created 22SAS.

3 OSS Assessment Staff, p. 459.

May 1996 21

Throughout U.S. history, soldiers havevolunteered for duty that was different andmore dangerous than conventional assign-ments. This was true for those who servedwith Robert Rogers’ Rangers during theFrench and Indian War; with Francis Mar-ion, “The Swamp Fox,” during the Revolu-tionary War; and with Colonel John Mosby,the Confederate cavalry leader, during theAmerican Civil War. Each of these unitsused tactics and techniques that were con-sidered unconventional, and each unitrequired soldiers who could adapt tounique demands.

There was no formal selection process forthese units. The heat of battle weeded outthose who were physically, mentally ormorally unsuited. If a soldier did not havethe special skills and abilities that the unitrequired, or if he did not have the aptitudeto learn quickly, he was soon either trans-ferred, wounded or killed.

The lack of selection procedures was notrestricted to special-mission units. InGeorge Washington’s day, the only prereq-uisite for joining the Army was that thecandidate be a male U.S. citizen.1 The pro-viso of citizenship was intended more tomotivate citizens into doing their dutythan to screen possible candidates.

It was not until 1917 that selection pro-cedures were used for U.S. soldiers. OnMarch 28 of that year, President WoodrowWilson formally approved the use of a draftto man the Army.2 The Army began screen-

ing inductees, 21-30 years old, using twoprocedures: a physical examination and anewly developed intelligence-quotient test.These procedures revealed widespreadilliteracy and physical disabilities amongthe ranks of the inductees.3

Until the early 1940s, selection for spe-cial-mission units remained basically thesame as in Robert Rogers’ time: Soldiers“migrated” to those units and wereassessed while on the job. With the comingof World War II, the newly created Office ofStrategic Services made great progress inthe selection of personnel for unconven-tional units.

OSSThe OSS’s mission included infiltrating

personnel into Axis-occupied territories,organizing guerrilla armies, and conductingsabotage and subversion missions. Seekingthe best-qualified personnel for thesedemanding missions, the U.S. War Depart-ment tasked psychiatrists and psychologiststo screen and select candidates for positionsthroughout the OSS organization.

The assessment team modeled its proc-ess on the work of Fred Taylor, an earlymanagement theorist who conducted stud-ies on efficiency, task construction andworker productivity. Taylor’s studies sug-gested that in order to achieve the bestresults on a specific task, managers shouldobserve the “best” worker’s method of

22 Special Warfare

A Short History of SF Assessment and Selection

by Major Sam Young

accomplishing the task, and have all otherworkers imitate that method.4

The assessment team researched twoapproaches to assessment: organismic andelementalistic. The organismic approachassesses an individual’s performance on anassigned task or in a difficult situation.5For example, an individual is given an axand a set of climbing spurs and is instruct-ed to retrieve an object from a tree. Theway the individual accomplishes the taskreveals much about his personality andbehavior.

While the organismic approach requiresassessors to develop situations that willallow them to evaluate behavior, the ele-mentalistic approach, which was in itsinfancy during the early 1940s, identifiespersonality traits through written tests. Forexample, a series of questions can revealbehavioral or personality traits about anindividual when he answers in a particularfashion or pattern.

Believing that a combination approachwould better capture a candidate’s capabil-ities and predict his performance, the

assessment team incorporated the organis-mic and elementalistic approaches into theprocess.

Once the proper approach had beendetermined, the team had to identify thedesired end state of the candidates — thefoundation of any assessment or selectionprocess. To obtain information about thefull range of tasks that soldiers mightencounter, the team approached OSS staffmembers who were developing deploymentplans. Unfortunately, because of theuniqueness and the newness of the OSSorganization, no institutional knowledgeexisted.6 The team knew only that the com-mon-task missions included conductingsabotage, organizing resistance groups,and developing propaganda campaigns.Beyond that, no one could assist the teamin identifying personality traits consistentwith mission success.

Once the traits had been defined, theteam also had to develop the most effectivemethod of assessing those traits in candi-dates. An assessment program should havea certain degree of flexibility so that it will

May 1996 23

Members of the OSS Jed-burghs climb an obstacleduring training.

Courtesy National Archives

not overlook skills that could be put to usein other areas of the organization. Inassessing personnel for combat and haz-ardous situations, the OSS assessmentteam also considered those who might bequalified for administrative positions andintelligence-gathering and processing posi-tions. There was also flexibility in the OSShiring process: While the assessment teamprovided an assessment and a recommen-dation based on a candidate’s qualifica-tions, the OSS board was the final author-ity. In rare cases, the board selected anindividual who had been rated “not recom-mended” or “unsuited.”7

Special ForcesAt the close of World War II, the OSS was

disbanded. However, with the beginning ofthe Cold War era and with the growingthreat of communism, members of the U.S.War Department’s Psychological WarfareDepartment saw the urgent need for aunique force capable of conducting uncon-ventional-warfare missions similar tothose which had been conducted by theOSS. In 1952, to develop that unique force,the Army established the PsychologicalWarfare Center and activated the 10thSpecial Forces Group – both organizationswere based at Fort Bragg, N.C.

The 10th Group’s selection process wasdifferent from the one which had been usedby the OSS. To volunteer for Special Forces,soldiers had to satisfy the following criteria:• Meet the physical qualifications for

parachute duty.• Score a minimum of 200 on the physical-

fitness test.• Not be over age 36, with exceptions

granted.• Have completed 10 weeks of basic

training.• Be airborne-qualified or volunteer for

airborne training.8Once accepted into the 10th Group, sol-

diers were evaluated, often during field-training exercises,9 on their job perform-ance. Limited SF training courses were con-ducted at the PSYWAR Center,10 but theauthority to award SF qualification wasrestricted to the group commander. Thus for

a period of time, Special Forces assessmentand selection was very much organismic.

In 1954 the PSYWAR Center contractedresearchers from George Washington Uni-versity to determine specific personalityfactors or traits that would be most likelyto ensure a soldier’s success in SpecialForces. To accomplish this task, theresearchers used innovative techniques.11

For example, they asked 10th SF Groupsoldiers to place their colleagues into one ofthree categories – superior, inferior or in-between – regarding their probable successin combat. Combining the data collectedfrom these evaluations, researchers placedsoldiers into one of the three categories.They then distributed questionnaires andadministered psychological tests to select-ed soldiers in the superior and inferior cat-egories in order to identify the personalitytraits, attitudes and personal histories pre-dictive of success in Special Forces.

The elementalistic approach to assess-ment began to re-emerge in 1961, when thebasis for Special Forces selection and train-ing changed. Admission into SpecialForces, which by this time consisted of the10th, 7th and 1st SF groups, became moredifficult. In addition to implementing a res-ident training course,12 the Army SpecialWarfare School began administering theSpecial Forces Selection Battery to screenout volunteers who were not likely to suc-ceed in SF training.

The selection battery consisted of fourtests: the Special Forces Suitability Inven-tory — to measure personality aspects suit-able for Special Forces activity; the CriticalDecisions Test — to measure a soldier’srisk- or chance-taking tendencies; the Loca-tions Test — to measure a soldier’s abilityto perceive terrain features by reading amap; and the Infantry Aptitude Area — tomeasure soldiers’ potential for developinginfantry skills. On Aug. 21, 1961, theDepartment of the Army also revised theregulation governing Special Forcesentrance criteria, adding the following pre-requisites to the ones established in the1952 regulation:• Have an interim secret security

clearance.• Be able to swim.

24 Special Warfare

• Pass the Special Forces Selection Battery.13

Just over a year later, on Aug. 29, 1962,the Department of the Army again revisedthe Special Forces entrance criteria,adding the following:• Achieve a score of 100 or higher on the

Infantry Aptitude Area.• Achieve a score of 380 or higher on the

Special Forces Selection Battery regard-less of score on the Critical DecisionsTest or,

• Achieve a score of 370-379 on the Spe-cial Forces Selection Battery, and score50 or higher on the Critical DecisionsTest.Despite the changes in selection criteria

and training, the authority to award SFqualification remained exclusively with SFgroup commanders until the early 1970s.14

Afterward, SF commanders and the U.S.Army Institute for Military Assistanceshared qualification authority. Thisarrangement continued until 1977, whencompletion of the Special Forces Qualifica-tion Course became, with limited excep-

tions, the sole avenue to SF qualification.Although the training and qualification

courses have varied, they have typicallyconsisted of three or four phases devoted toSF common skills, SF MOS training, andfield training exercises. Until 1988, sol-diers were also observed and assessed dur-ing the first phase in an effort to determinetheir suitability for Special Forces. Theywere subjected to harsh conditions, such asstress, sleep deprivation, time constraintsand physical exertion, which weredesigned to test their motivation and com-mitment to complete the training.

SFASIn the mid-1980s, the Special Warfare

Center and School, in an attempt to savetraining time and resources, began design-ing a program in which soldiers could beassessed before they attended the SF Qual-ification Course. In 1987, project officersfrom SWCS began working with the ArmyResearch Institute to define desirable per-sonality traits and effective methods of

May 1996 25


The OSS selected candi-dates based on their abilityto overcome difficult situa-tions. Here, members of theJedburghs climb a towerduring their training.

assessing human behavior. In June 1988,SWCS conducted the first Special ForcesAssessment and Selection, or SFAS.

The selection process that had beendeveloped for the OSS became one of thefoundations of SFAS.15 Assessors in SFASstill observe candidates for positive andnegative displays associated with thebehavioral traits that have been deter-mined best for the organization. A boardthen selects soldiers who have demonstrat-ed the desired behavior.

During SFAS, soldiers are tested duringtimes of stress. For example, soldiers suf-fering from sleep deprivation may berequired to march long distances while car-rying 45-pound field packs. The concept ofSFAS evaluation and assessment is basedon the “whole man” theory.16 Evaluatorsassess a soldier’s physical and psychologi-cal abilities to accomplish a task. Soldiersare not coerced into completing arduoustasks — in fact, they are given every oppor-tunity to quit. They must have the will andthe desire to perform each assigned task,and they must complete the program

through their own desire and motivation.As they experience periods of limited sleepand increasing stress, soldiers are evaluat-ed on cognitive reasoning, teamwork andleadership through events modeled onthose used by the OSS.17

The OSS used extensive psychologicaland situational testing to determine thepersonality and behavioral traits of candi-dates. SFAS, however, does not use psycho-logical testing to determine a soldier’s suit-ability to begin or to remain in the pro-gram.18 It is used to determine any incli-nations toward extreme deviations fromthe norm. These findings are then reportedto the selection board. Soldiers may alsodemonstrate abnormal behavioral patternswhile undergoing physical and psychologi-cal stress during SFAS.19 If so, course eval-uators also submit that information to theselection board.

More than 50 years ago, the authors of theOSS program stated, “It is easy to predictprecisely the outcome of the meeting of oneknown chemical with another known chemi-cal in an immaculate test tube. But where is

26 Special Warfare


OSS soldiers, such asthese Jedburghs attendinga demolitions class,received extensive psycho-logical testing to determinetheir behavioral traits.

the chemist who can predict what will hap-pen to a known chemical if it meets anunknown chemical in an unknown vessel?”20

Since that time, assessment and selection ofcandidates for Special Forces, using the OSSprogram as a basis, has advanced to asophisticated process using mission-orientedtasks and psychological testing. Yet despitethese advances, evaluators still grapple withthe challenge that OSS researchers faced inthe early 1940s: anticipating and predictinghuman performance.

Major (P) Sam Young isthe deputy inspector generalfor inspections, U. S. ArmySpecial Operations Com-mand. His previous SpecialForces assignments includecommander of Company F,1st Special Warfare Training Group, JFKSpecial Warfare Center and School; com-mander of Company B, 3rd Battalion, 7thSpecial Forces Group; chief of the Infiltra-tion and Studies Branches, Directorate ofCombat Developments, USAJFKSWCS;and detachment commander in the 10thSpecial Forces Group. He has held variousstaff and leadership assignments in the25th and 101st Infantry Divisions. Heholds a master’s degree in administrationfrom Central Michigan University.

Notes:1 John W. Chambers, To Raise an Army (New York:

The Free Press, 1987), pp. 21-230.2 Chambers.3 Chambers.4 Author’s notes from a lecture by Dr. Robert Green-

wood during a management history course at CentralMichigan University, 1993.

5 Office of Strategic Services Assessment Staff,Assessment of Men (New York: Rinehart and Co., Inc.,1948).

6 OSS Assessment Staff.7 OSS Assessment Staff.8 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Special

Regulation 600-160-10, April, 1952.9 Telephone interview with Fred Funk (Fort Bragg,

N.C.: U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special WarfareCenter and School, 28 January 1994).

10 The institution responsible for training SpecialForces and other elements of SOF has a history of itsown. Over the years, it has been named the Psycho-logical Warfare Center (1952), the U.S. Army Special

Warfare School (1956), the U.S. Army John F.Kennedy Center for Special Warfare (1964), the U.S.Army Institute for Military Assistance (1969), and theU.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center(1983). It took on its current name, the U.S. ArmyJohn F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and Schoolin 1986.

11 Herbert Abelson, Factors Related to the Effective-ness of Special Forces Personnel (Washington, D.C.:George Washington University, August 1954), pp. 18-24.

12 Rudolph Berkhouse, Research on Selection andSpecial Forces Manpower Problems – Status Report(Behavioral Evaluation Research Laboratory, ArmyProject OJ95-60-001, Study 63-2).

13 Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1963.14 From the records of the Command Historian, U.S.

Army Special Operations Command.15 Beer, Spector, Lawrence, Mills, Walton, Human

Resource Management: A General Manager’s Perspec-tive (New York: The Free Press, 1985), p. 339.

16 Personal interview with John Galland, formercommander of the Special Forces Assessment andSelection Course, 1993.

17 Galland interview.18 Telephone interview with Dr. Morgan Banks,

staff psychologist for the 1st Special Warfare TrainingGroup, December 1993.

19 Banks interview.20 OSS Assessment Staff.

May 1996 27

Recent articles in Special Warfare and inother publications suggest that technologywill provide solutions to problems encoun-tered by United States military forcesengaged in difficult missions such as coun-terinsurgency, peacekeeping or peaceenforcement. Some military experts haveeven predicted that Special Forces missionsmay eventually be performed by computersand precision weapons systems. There hasalso been a suggestion that because of tech-nological advances, SF could become a relicof the past, replaced by the “new warriors” —presumably, computer wizards.

While we are being inundated with pre-dictions about what technology can do tosolve our problems, we might consider ournot-so-distant history as a lesson in whattechnology can’t do.

During the Vietnam conflict, U.S. forceswere successful in pitched battles withNorth Vietnamese army and Viet Congunits. However, our forces became weary ofthe frustrations, uncertainties and hazardsof combating the VC’s unconventional-war-fare tactics. Although our Special Forceshad effective countering techniques, ourconventional forces did not have the specialtraining or equipment to use them.

The military’s response was characteristi-cally American: Believing that miraculousinventions would help expedite a decisive vic-tory for the U.S., the Army developed its owntechnology to help eliminate the ambiguitiesand frustrations it was experiencing in Viet-

nam. As the conflict progressed, the flow ofnewly designed gadgets turned into a flood.

For those within the defense establish-ment, faith in technology became the newreligion: American technology could solveany problem, anytime, anywhere. High-ranking officials in Washington placed theirfaith in gadgets, and numbers replaced real-ity. Our leaders overlooked or ignored thefundamental truths about fighting astrange war in a far-off place, where rulesdid not apply and state-of-the-art warmachines were ineffective.

Some of the newly developed gadgets weretiny, such as the micro-gravel mines. Therewere also huge undertakings, including themassive spraying of both herbicides and defo-liants on thousands of acres of jungle. Somedevices, such as infrared warning transmit-ters and “starlight scopes,” worked well. Oth-ers, such as “people sniffers,” which weredesigned to detect humans by the ammoniain their perspiration, were abject failures.

One device that might have helped ourforces was never developed: a truth detectorcapable of quickly and accurately identify-ing a person as friend or foe. Distinguishingfriend from foe is a problem encountered inall environments, but during ambiguousoperations, such as counterinsurgency andoperations other than war, the problem isamplified.

Insurgent forces have learned to use thecover of the local populace to hide theiractivities. They conceal their loyalties; they

28 Special Warfare

The Role Technology Can’t Fill

by Sergeant First Class Michael W. Devotie

organize, train and plan; and at the mostadvantageous time for their cause, theystrike. In some countries, participation byU.S. or coalition forces is desired by somefactions and opposed by others. Factionsmay seek to use peacekeeping forces as abuffer or as a screen for their activities. Stillothers may simply wish to be rid of all for-eigners, and they plan actions designed toweaken U.S. resolve and support. When con-ducting these actions, the irregular forceattacks our weakest points.

Although we have information-gatheringplatforms that can detect a small vehiclemoving in darkness hundreds of miles away,can we determine whether the vehicle’soccupants are hostile? Satellites can photo-graph a group of people standing in the cen-ter of a village, but can we determinewhether there are insurgents among thegroup? Can remote, high-tech devices locatekey threat individuals in a given country?Can machines and technology establish rap-port and build trust with the local populace?

Even with our advanced technology, it isunlikely that we will ever be able to invent adevice that can read and analyze a humanmind or determine a person’s intentions.Perhaps the most effective way of determin-ing a person’s loyalty or his whereabouts isto seek out members of the local populaceand ask them. Since only they know the trueorientations of their countrymen, they arethe best sources of information.

Military planners and foreign-policystrategists seem to agree that in the fore-seeable future, U.S. forces will most likely beused in small, ambiguous brush-fire wars.The value and the utility of SF in these con-fusing environments have already beendemonstrated. Decision-makers who are notwell acquainted with special operationsshould understand that the ability to per-form precision-strike operations is but onecapability of SF – and one that is perhapsover-emphasized. Other SF capabilities,derived from our core mission of unconven-tional warfare, allow SF to operate and suc-ceed in ambiguous situations. Languageabilities and interpersonal-communicationsskills, combined with cultural awarenessand area orientation, enable SF to gatherinformation from sources and through

methods inaccessible to high-tech devices.Large operations such as Desert Storm

demonstrate the stupidity of engaging in aset-piece battle with a technologically superi-or force. Our enemies, no doubt, will studyDesert Storm and choose a more indirectroute. We face great danger in assuming thatfuture enemies will have mission capabilitiesequal to ours and that they will use the samefighting techniques that we use. They mightinstead trump our strong suit and strike usin a manner for which we are unprepared,just as the Viet Cong did nearly 30 years ago.Should this occur, the need for SF willbecome more urgent rather than diminish.

SF may be at a ideological crossroads.Should we become computer gurus, teach-ing foreign personnel the techniques of wag-ing war through cyberspace, or should wecontinue to teach basic and advanced mili-tary skills? The multiskilled operators in SFare too valuable a resource to lose by nar-rowing the mission focus of SF. Certainly weshould evaluate and adopt any new technol-ogy that enhances our mission capabilities,but we need not become members of the“software of the month club.”

If we blindly chase computer technology,we risk becoming an organization that is nomore effective at conducting unconventionalwarfare than IBM is. Regardless of howbadly the “new warriors” would like to wagebloodless computer conflicts, wars are stillwon by seizing and holding ground, andforce will continue to be the ultimate solu-tion in most conflicts.

Sergeant First Class Mi-chael W. Devotie is one of threeenlisted doctrine writersassigned to the Special ForcesDoctrine Division, Directorateof Training and Doctrine,USAJFKSWCS. During hismilitary career he has served in the 101stAirborne Division, the 2nd Infantry Divi-sion, the 24th Infantry Division, the 278thArmored Cavalry Regiment, the TennesseeNational Guard, the 82nd Airborne Divi-sion, and the 1st, 7th and 3rd Special Forcesgroups.

May 1996 29

There seems to be a consensusamong the senior leadership ofArmy special-operations forcesthat foreign internal defense, orFID, will continue to be the prima-ry mission of Special Forces.

The FID mission is clearly inkeeping with the operations of SF’sforerunners — the World War IIJedburgh teams who supported theFrench Resistance in its fightagainst the Nazi occupation force.The unconventional-warfare tradi-tion established by the Jedburghscontinues in Special Forces today,and our UW skills are extremelywell-suited to the FID environ-ment. Given more information onhow to succeed in FID, our soldierscan become even more effective.

Experience has taught us thatFID and conventional military mis-sions have different operationalenvironments:• Conventional military missions

focus on destroying enemy units;FID focuses on building friendlymilitary institutions.

• Conventional military opera-tions are normally conducted inweeks or months; FID may per-sist for decades.

• Conventional military missionsemphasize high-technologyweapons and overwhelming

force. FID missions provide sup-port to Third World nations thatcan neither afford high technolo-gy nor maintain an overwhelm-ing force.

• United States military leadersare trained to focus on the syn-chronization of overwhelmingmilitary force. Third World mili-tary leaders do not control over-whelming force; they have todevelop mission-analysis strate-gies that will enable them togain a tactical advantage.

• U.S. leaders focus solely on themilitary element of nationalpower, but our Third World coun-terparts must play legitimateroles in the other three elementsof national power: economic, polit-ical and informational.

• Our military doctrine stresses theimportance of synchronization,but Third World military leadersmust approach their mission ofinternal defense and develop-ment from a perspective thatemphasizes agility and initiative.We have also learned that FID

presents some distinct challenges:• In our attempts to help Third

World armies improve theiragility and initiative, one of ourgreatest challenges has beenconvincing host-country officials

to accept our ideas and recom-mendations. We representchange, and change is almostalways resisted. Therefore, wemust be prepared to seize anyopportunity that a receptivehost-nation commander pre-sents. Host-country units havetheir own standards, and weshould be sensitive to how muchand how quickly they are willingto change.

• Conventional military operationsfocus on operational-securitymeasures. But in FID, part of thefight for the support of the popu-lation takes place in the openpress. Anti-government forces,notably the narcos in South Amer-ica, use the press to spread disin-formation that undermines theirgovernment and any cooperationit has with the U.S. government.Simply put, this is an example ofinformation warfare. Real-time,worldwide news reporting deeplyinfluences the public. If we treatthe news media as the enemy, weforfeit an important opportunityto counter disinformation.

• The paradigm for conventionalmilitary operations is “move,shoot, and communicate.” Whilewe should teach our counter-parts to apply that paradigm, we

30 Special Warfare

How to Succeed in Foreign Internal Defense

by Colonel J.S. Ranger Roach, U.S. Army (ret.)

should also expand our perspec-tive. In FID we are a catalyst forchange; therefore, we mustmaintain a presence in order toeffectively influence our coun-terparts. We must be patient andunderstand that our counter-parts will not change as quicklyas we would like, and we mustbe persistent and continue work-ing the important issues in amanner that does not offend ourcounterparts. We must teach“move, shoot and communicate,”but we must live “presence,patience and persistence.”

• In a FID mission, the criticalimplied task is that we help ahost-country force to adapt tonecessary change and to evolveinto a more effective organiza-tion. Institutional change takesplace over a period of time;therefore, we must realize thatshort-term deployments are butone step in a long journey.

CustomersIn the U.S., the organizations

involved in the planning of a FIDmission include Department ofDefense, Joint Chiefs of Staff,Department of the Army, Depart-ment of State, International Nar-cotics Matters, Agency for Interna-tional Development, U.S. SpecialOperations Command, U.S. ArmySpecial Operations Command, U.S.Army Special Forces Command,and the applicable Special Forcesgroup and battalion headquarters.Each has important responsibili-ties in resourcing, training, certify-ing, coordinating and deployingteams for FID missions.

A theater-command headquar-ters is responsible for all militaryoperations conducted in theater.One level down is the theater spe-cial-operations command, responsi-ble for all operations conducted intheater by special-operations forces.

The theater-command headquar-ters and the theater special-opera-tions command are the operationalchain of command for SOF. But inFID, their primary responsibility isto determine the needs of the coun-tries and to prioritize our effortsbetween these countries. Becausethose headquarters are not in aposition to directly supervise theexecution of training programs,they rely on the Military Group, orMILGROUP, which is part of theU.S. Embassy country team.

The embassy country team is

responsible for all U.S. activity with-in its respective country. Each coun-try team has developed a strategyfor influencing the host-country’sgovernment. A FID mission must fitinto a particular country team’sstrategy, but this rarely creates aproblem, since FID missions nor-mally begin in the MILGROUP. TheMILGROUP commander is animportant member of the embassycountry team and serves as the pri-mary military adviser to the ambas-sador. He also serves as the person-al representative of the regionalcommander in chief, or CINC, andensures that the CINC’s concernsare addressed in the country team’sstrategy.

ProductWhen discussing the FID mission,

we often focus on the training pre-

sented to the host country, but thetraining is only the end product of acomplex process. Prior to deployingon a FID mission, soldiers receivetheir deployment orders through theformal tasking channel. But oncethey are in country, soldiers oftenreceive additional taskings from theMILGROUP and the host country’smilitary. Soldiers then tailor a pro-gram of instruction that will satisfythe MILGROUP, the host-country’smilitary, and the requirements setforth in their deployment orders.

The reality of a FID mission is

that it requires not only skilledinstructors but also skilled systemsanalysts, curriculum developers andnegotiators, all of whom must havethe ability to ensure that the train-ing program is acceptable to themyriad personalities and organiza-tions involved. Many aspects of aFID mission evolve according to theneeds of the organization involved;therefore, patience is a virtue inworking through the planning andexecution phases. Soldiers who losetheir patience and composure alsolose their effectiveness.

Interpersonal skillsIn a FID mission, SF soldiers

typically work with personnel ineach level of the host-country force,from the brigade commander to thecommon soldiers. Host-countrysenior officers may have as much

May 1996 31

In FID we are a catalyst for change; therefore, wemust maintain a presence in order to effectivelyinfluence our counterparts. We must be patient andunderstand that our counterparts will not changeas quickly as we would like, and we must be per-sistent and continue working the important issuesin a manner that does not offend our counterparts.

civilian and military education asthe U.S. senior officers. We shouldnot approach any host-countryforces with the attitude that we aregoing to “train” them. This kind ofattitude is classic “ugly American,”and it is not realistic.

Normally, we can develop rap-port in four phases:• Training preparation. We should

plan a training program that isappropriate for the host coun-try’s requirements. During thesite survey, ask the local com-mander to define his priorities.Allowing the host-country com-mander to participate in thedevelopment of the training pro-gram validates his ownershipand ensures his support for thetraining-execution phase.

• Training execution. Although weare responsible for executing thetraining program, we must beflexible enough to modify it inaccordance with the guidanceprovided by the host-countrycommander. The program mayalso have to be changed if thehost-country forces are not pre-pared for the level of trainingplanned. This is always a sensi-tive issue – and one that is mag-nified by national pride. No onewants to be reminded that heneeds more work on the basics;however, if soldiers haven’t mas-tered the basics, focusing onmore advanced topics wouldwaste our time and theirs.

• Garrison management. This isperhaps the most important ofthe four phases. We should dowhatever we can to help thelocal commander solve his“housekeeping” problems. In thepast, 7th SF Group soldiers havevoluntarily repaired plumbing,performed maintenance on vehi-cles, and reorganized armsrooms and dispensaries.Although volunteer assistancecannot eclipse the training pro-

gram we have contracted withthe host-country commander, weshould offer our services when-ever we have the opportunity.

• Organizational consulting. Thisis the ultimate phase. We may beinvited to perform this role if wehave completed the first threephases in a manner that demon-strates our support for the localcommander. We are most effec-tive in this phase when workingindirectly. Once our host-countrycounterparts have recommend-ed a course of action, we shouldreinforce their ideas rather thanseeking a solution of our own.

In dealing with host-country sol-diers, we should adjust our pace totheirs. The rifles they carry mayrepresent the highest level of tech-nology that they have ever experi-enced. A task that U.S. Armyrecruits can learn in one day maywell take two or three days forThird World soldiers to master.Although the host-country soldiersmay be dedicated, strong, intelli-gent and brave, the majority ofthem may also be functionally illit-erate. These soldiers have a greatdesire to do well in training, butbecause of their lack of classroomexperience, their knowledge base islimited and their learning skillsare impaired. We must explain and

demonstrate supervised practicalexercises and then allow the sol-diers to practice them. We shouldalso request feedback from the sol-diers. Because of their strongdesire to please us, host-countrysoldiers will rarely admit any diffi-culty in understanding materialcovered in a formal presentation.Require them to demonstrate theirproficiency, and drill them repeat-edly. Continue this process untilthey can successfully execute thetasks and can critique one anoth-er’s performance. Performance-ori-ented training, rather than class-room instruction, is crucial.

PresenceNo matter which level of the

host-country organization you’redealing with, your presence, bothon-duty and off-duty, is key to long-term success. A Salvadoran colonelonce made an unsolicited but inter-esting comment on the differencehe saw between U.S. Special Forcessoldiers and U.S. conventional sol-diers: “When any other Army offi-cer or NCO arrived to work a proj-ect with my Salvadoran brigade,they would have a short meetingwith the brigade commander andperhaps the brigade executive offi-cer, but then it was lunch time, andthey would leave to go eat a ham-burger at a local restaurant. Theywould return to visit once a weekfor updates on the project.

“On the other hand, when Spe-cial Forces soldiers arrived, theynot only talked to the brigade com-mander and executive officer, butalso to all the members of thebrigade staff. When it was lunchtime, they stayed and ate tortillas,rice and beans with us. After lunch,they went down and talked to thebattalion commanders, companycommanders and anyone else whowas in the area. The Special Forcessoldiers spent the time and came to

32 Special Warfare

Although the host-country soldiers may bededicated, strong, intel-ligent and brave, …because of their lack ofclassroom experience,their knowledge base islimited and their learn-ing skills are impaired.

understand our organizations andour problems as well as we did.”

These observations perfectlymatch the author’s experience: Tounderstand the people with whomyou are working, to be accepted bythem, and to be effective, you mustinvest your time. Informal contactsare extremely important in winningthe confidence of your counterparts.

Regarding personal comfort, wemust be willing to live in the sameprimitive conditions that the host-country soldiers endure. We arethere to help the leader solve his problems, not to create addi-tional ones for him by demandingsupport that he doesn’t have andcan’t provide. If we demonstraterespect and competence and com-municate a desire to help theleader solve his problems, we willbe accepted and, perhaps, so willour recommendations.

Humor is an important sociallubricant, and it is all the moreimportant when we are working inThird World countries. We representthe most powerful military in theworld, and our simple presence issometimes overwhelming for ourhosts. Humor, especially the ability

to laugh at ourselves, makes us moreapproachable and more effective.Humor can be misinterpreted, how-ever, and we should exercise greatcare in making sure that we commu-nicate only the meaning intended.

StandardsOur Army focuses on the highest

of standards. We strive to provideinformation to individuals andunits that will improve their per-formance. In our attempts toimprove, we often overlook the 85percent of our effort that went welland focus on the 15 percent thatdidn’t. Although this emphasis isnecessary if we are to improve, weoften forget how effective andsophisticated we have become, untilwe visit a Third World country andsee their performance problems.

For instance, we may worryabout the percentage of our sol-diers who achieve an expert riflequalification, whereas host-coun-try soldiers might never have hadthe ammunition with which tozero their weapons. If we are work-ing on a small-unit training pro-gram in the Third World, we might

have only 40 rounds of rifle ammu-nition per soldier for a week oftraining. Yet we are expected tozero the soldiers’ weapons; qualifythe soldiers on a range which wehave had to construct; and trainthe soldiers in individual tacticalmovement, buddy-team move-ment, fire-team movement, andsquad fire and movement. Obvi-ously we will not be able to trainthese soldiers to the same stan-dards as a Ranger regiment riflecompany, but we can improve theiroperational capability.

Given the obvious differencesbetween our military and thehost-country’s military, it wouldbe easy to look down on ThirdWorld militaries as not being inour league. Frankly, they aren’t. Ifwe were to engage in direct com-bat with them, the U.S. Army nodoubt would win decisively. Butthey don’t need the ability to fightin our league – we’re not theirenemies. They should, however, beable to confront their own coun-try’s problems and threats.

It is difficult not to admire theseThird World militaries and theiraccomplishments, considering

May 1996 33

Performance-oriented training, rather than class-room instruction, is critical in FID missions.

Photo by Douglas Wisnioski

their limited resources and sensi-tive missions. We’re there to helpthem identify problems and to bea catalyst for change; however, weshould never miss a chance toexercise positive reinforcement.On a daily basis, seek out a projectthey have done well or haveimproved upon, and enthusiasti-cally reinforce their success.

EquipmentIn FID our goal is to help host-

country forces seek solutions totheir problems. Throughout theprocess, however, we shouldencourage them to use their ownequipment and resources. If weprovide all the materiel for a FIDmission, at least two distractionstake away from the mission itself:

First, a certain amount of timemust be allocated for properlymanaging the equipment, if only tosecure it and to perform routinemaintenance on it. In turn, our sol-diers have less time to focus onhost-country forces.

Second, although Third Worldarmies are fascinated by our “hi-tech” equipment, they can rarely

afford to purchase it. Goal dis-placement becomes common, withmany of the host-country forcesadopting the idea that, “If only wehad that radio, that rifle, or thatfirst-aid kit, we could solve all ofour problems.” As a general rule,the less equipment there is, themore effective the training pro-gram will be. Of course, we do pro-vide essential equipment, and wemight also bring along some “high-speed, low-drag” equipment toenhance our chances of openingotherwise closed doors.

ValuesEach FID mission contributes to

the professionalism of the host coun-try. The technical tasks of the train-ing are important, but the valuesthat we represent and attempt toreinforce are an even more impor-tant part of the professionalizationprocess. The following are some ofour most fundamental values:• Military subordination to politi-

cal authority. It is important tosupport elected government offi-cials and to understand that thelegitimacy of the government

comes from the people of thecountry.

• Maintaining support of the civil-ian populace. Legitimacy of thenational government and of thehost-country military is crucialto long-term stability. Civic-action programs and psychologi-cal programs are importantforce multipliers in gaining andmaintaining the support of thepeople of the country.

• Defense of human rights.Respect for human rights is ofpragmatic importance to themilitary in maintaining the sup-port of the people.

• Accountability. It is important toestablish and maintain internaldiscipline and order within thearmed forces. The military insti-tution must guard against indi-vidual misconduct if it is tomaintain faith and confidenceamong the people. If there ismisconduct, the perpetratormust be actively pursued, inves-tigated and appropriately pun-ished. We must convince ourcounterparts that individualmisconduct is not a reflection onthe honor of their institution,

34 Special Warfare

Photo by Douglas Wisnioski

Civic-actions programs, such as construction, areimportant for gaining and maintaining the supportof the host-country population.

but the institution’s failure topolice itself is.

• Interagency teamwork. Thehost-country’s military mustwork with the other branches ofgovernment and accept the factthat in internal defense anddevelopment, political and eco-nomic factors are often moreimportant than military fac-tors. This is critical in a ThirdWorld country, since its militaryorganization often is not onlythe shield of democracy, butalso the backbone of democracy.In the U.S., the military fulfillsthe shield-of-democracy role,but other elements, both fromthe government and from theprivate sector, form the back-bone. In Third World countries,the military institution is oftenthe only branch of governmentthat functions from the nation-al level down to the local level.The host-government officialsoften have good ideas to maketheir branch of governmentwork, but they do not have thenecessary resources to imple-ment their ideas. As a result,the host-country military isoften drawn into the vacuumand can play important positiveroles in the internal develop-ment of the country.

• Selfless service. The welfare ofthe country comes before thewelfare of the military servicesor of the officer corps.We do not teach these values as

separate blocks of instruction –they must be integrated into everyformal class and woven into theinformal conversations we havewith our counterparts. We advo-cate these values because theyreflect the ideals of our society, butwe must help our brother soldiersrecognize the pragmatic reason foradopting them: These values,which all democracies share, pro-mote internal stability and eco-

nomic growth.Over the past few years, there has

been much discussion about theterm “democratization.” The authorfirst heard General George Joulwanuse the term at the 1993 Low Inten-sity Conflict Conference sponsoredby the Association of the UnitedStates Army. General Joulwan’scomment was, “Special Forces wasthe most important factor in thedemocratization of Latin America.”Many of our officials now use theword “democratization” to describealmost any kind of positive influ-ence our government exerts inunderdeveloped countries. But thefocus of democratization should benot on a scholar’s knowledge of ourConstitution or Declaration of Inde-pendence, but rather on the concernfor the practice of social equality atthe lowest level.

During World War II, the forerun-ners of Special Forces, the Jedburghteams, conducted unconventionalwarfare to help the French Resistanceliberate France from the oppression ofa hostile occupation force. ModernSpecial Forces are conducting FIDmissions to help friendly countriesachieve stability; in the process, theyalso help liberate the people from theignorance, poverty and lawlessnessthat are sapping their national vitali-ty. Over the past decade, SpecialForces have achieved significant suc-cesses in FID operations. Andalthough FID is truly a politicallysensitive, dangerous and fluid envi-ronment, it is one in which SF can bean effective catalyst for change.

J.S. Ranger Roachretired from theArmy in 1995 afterhaving commandedthe 7th SpecialForces Group. His 29years of active serviceincluded 10 years of overseas duty,with tours in Vietnam, Germany, El

Salvador, Korea and Colombia.Roach recently returned from Ser-bia after having served there fortwo months as an internationalobserver. He lives with his family innorthern Virginia.

May 1996 35

Napoleon stated, “In war the moral ele-ment is to all others as three is to one.”1

The American way of war asserts theimportance of moral forces and how theycan be used as both multipliers and debili-tators of combat power. Integral to our con-cepts about the nature and the purpose ofwar is an appreciation of the human ele-ment and its effects on the conduct and theoutcome of war.

Colonel Charles Ardant du Picq’s BattleStudies: Ancient and Modern Battle is arevolutionary study of the human elementon an ever more dispersed and lethal bat-tlefield, with particular regard to thenature of fear and cohesion. Du Picqasserts, “While all other circumstanceschange with time, the human elementremains the same, capable of just so muchendurance, sacrifice, effort, and no more.”2

He differentiates between “war” and “bat-tle.” While war is accepted by statesmenand soldiers alike as Clausewitz’s “exten-sion of policy,” du Picq views battle as a dis-tinctly unique dynamic more akin to a“contest of arms and will between tired andterrified men.”3 He opines that the concernof the soldier is not policy or strategy, butthe study of battle at the lowest level.

The employment of soldiers as an imple-ment of policy remains key to concentratedand overwhelming combat power. On themodern battlefield, the solitary soldier,although inserted into battle at the tacticallevel, may have significant operational and

strategic implications. Consider, for exam-ple, Chief Warrant Officer Michael Durant.the special-operations aviator who wascaptured in Somalia. By virtue of hismedia-portrayed plight, Durant became atragic figure whose fate was anxiouslyawaited by millions at home and abroad.He was no longer just another soldier, buta combatant whose capture and negotiatedfate had become a major policy issue.

Durant’s experience shows how thehuman element, described by one writer asa “summation of elan, esprit de corps,courage and unit cohesion,”4 can be tran-scended into a combat multiplier. Durant’ssituation invites attention to the study ofthe human element in war and to the the-ories of du Picq.

SoldierArdant du Picq was born in 1821 in

Perigueux, France. After graduating fromthe French military academy at Saint-Cyr,du Picq fought in the Crimean War. He wastaken prisoner by the Russians followingthe siege at Sevastopol. After his release atthe end of the war, du Picq served in cam-paigns in Syria and in North Africa as aninfantry officer at battalion and regimentlevels. He won promotion to colonel andwas ultimately awarded command of the10th Infantry of the Line Regiment. DuPicq succumbed to mortal wounds in the1870 Franco-Prussian War. Even as he lay

36 Special Warfare

The Human Element of Battle: The Theories of Ardant du Picq

by Lieutenant Colonel William M. Jacobs

dying, du Picq expressed concerns aboutthe morale and the welfare of his regiment.In 1903, 32 years after his death, du Picq’swritings were published in France. In 1921they were translated into English and pub-lished as Battle Studies: Ancient and Mod-ern Battle.

For his writings, du Picq relied on threemajor sources of martial knowledge: per-sonal experience; historical research ofthe Greeks, Romans and Gauls; and sur-veys that he fielded to fellow officers toobtain accounts of their battle experi-ences. The careful, scientific approach duPicq used in conducting the surveysallowed him to collect precise details andto avoid speculation that his work wasbased on conjecture.

TheoristThe Industrial Revolution provided

technological advances that not onlydrastically changed warfare but also pro-duced an arena characterized by disper-sion and the requirement for autonomousaction. Du Picq makes the observationthat technologically sophisticatedweapons turn the modern battlefield intoan increasingly expansive and more lone-ly place for the soldier. His view is sharedby modern-day military theorist JamesSchneider, who posits that because of theexpanded and more lonely battlefield,

cohesion is more apt to break down, lead-ing to unit disintegration.5

Although du Picq acknowledges the riseof technology, he also states, “The art ofwar is subject to many modifications byindustrial and scientific progress. Howev-er, there is truly one constant, and that isthe heart of man.”6 He remarks, “It is themind that wins battles, that will alwayswin them, that always has won themthroughout the world’s history. The spiritu-ality, the moral quality of war has notchanged.”7

Du Picq argues that preserving even amodicum of courage within a force gains anexponential advantage for the force com-mander and that simultaneously instillingfear into the hearts of the enemy producesinversely proportional deleterious effectson the enemy force.

American doctrine acknowledges thatfear is a debilitating factor and that it pre-sents a constant challenge to all who facebattle. From a deep understanding of hisown experiences, du Picq arrived at thepremise that the element of fear is a fun-damental battle consideration.8 He arguesthat every soldier experiences fear, andthat overwhelming fear is the contiguousand pervasive thread common to all com-bat. Controlling both fear and the powerfulinstinct for self-preservation requires adeep psychological understanding of thecombatants.

May 1996 37

From his studies of ancientand modern warfare, duPicq concluded that theRomans most clearlyappreciated the debilitatingeffects of fear in battle.

Du Picq concludes that although warevolves from the relatively simple to themore complicated and technicallyadvanced, the “ration” of human courage isa finite quality. Men in battle, with theirlimited capacity to endure, cannot main-tain the frenetic pace required in modernwarfare, thus reducing the combat powerof the individual soldier. Du Picq positsthat fear produces acute and chroniceffects – effects that draw from a finitereservoir of moral strength. When thatreservoir is ultimately depleted, fear pro-duces results disastrous to the overallfighting force.

In du Picq’s view, a soldier is more thana manipulable pawn; he is a human, con-strained by the frailties of flesh and blood.Du Picq was the first theorist to postulatethat there is a direct relationship betweenthe number and the degree of battle-stresscasualties and the increased lethalitywrought by high-technology firepower. Henotes that “absolute bravery is not naturalin man,”9 and that strong men are rareexceptions.10 In battles of higher intensityand of longer duration, men who experi-enced in seconds what formerly requiredhours or days to absorb succumbed as “bat-

tle-stress casualties.” Du Picq’s ideas serveas a precursor to the related studies ofS.L.A. Marshall and John Keegan thatillustrate how one’s morale can be quicklyovertaxed by fierce combat.

Du Picq cites many examples of battles,ancient and modern, that attest to theimplications of moral issues in warfare. Heobserves that the Romans, in particular,were the most honest in dealing with fearon the battlefield because they most clear-ly appreciated its debilitating effects. Dis-cipline emerged as the key concept inexploiting moral issues and in overcominghuman frailty under duress. The modernbattlefield, replete with highly lethalweapons systems capable of killing soldiersat great distances, exacerbates “theinstinct of self-preservation, so powerfulthat he [the soldier] did not feel disgracedin obeying it.”11 Du Picq cites high morale,leadership and cohesion as means of con-trolling both fear and the instinct of self-preservation. More important, highmorale, leadership and cohesion enhancethe combat power of a unit.

One excerpt from Battle Studies best dis-tills Ardant du Picq’s thesis: “Battle is thefinal objective of armies, and man is the

38 Special Warfare

Photo by Janel Schroeder

Chief Warrant OfficerMichael Durant arrives inGermany following hisrelease from Somali captors.

fundamental instrument in battle. Nothingcan wisely be prescribed in an army — itspersonnel, organization, discipline, andtactics, things that are connected like thefingers of a hand — without exact knowl-edge of the fundamental instrument, man,and his state of mind, his morale, at theinstant of combat.”

At a time when Jomini’s principles ofwarfare dominated French militarythought, du Picq challenged Jomini’s mostelementary calculus. And when the bayo-net was still the national weapon ofFrance, du Picq identified the timelessprinciple that man is the fundamentalinstrument of war.

Durant case studyChief Warrant Officer Michael J. Durant

found himself in a situation requiringgreat courage, stamina and discipline.Durant’s tragic experience on Oct. 3, 1993,during the Battle of the Black Sea inMogadishu, encompassed precisely theenvironment of lethality, loneliness andfear that du Picq had described in his the-ories more than 100 years earlier.

Durant suffered a fractured spine and abroken femur in the crash of his helicopter.Following a fierce firefight, he was cap-tured by Somalis, subjected to a series ofbeatings by a mob of civilians, carriedthrough the streets, chained, shot throughthe arm, and interrogated for 24 hours. Tothe questions and the demands levied byhis captors, Durant responded withanswers that allowed him to continue toresist, yet he steadfastly refused to revealany information that could endanger hiscomrades or degrade their trust and confi-dence in him.

Michael Durant not only survived, heacquitted himself well in the face ofimpending disaster. Mustering his courageand maintaining his decorum as an Amer-ican fighting man in the internationalspotlight, Durant overcame what du Picqcalls the “pervasive power and overwhelm-ing effect of fear on the battlefield.”12

Durant embodies du Picq’s concept of theindividual soldier, the starting point for theanalysis of all things military. Durant also

epitomizes the soldier whose discipline,high morale and cohesion enable him toovercome abject fear.

Strong motivators provided the incentiveDurant needed to survive – thoughts of hiswife and small son, thoughts of the comradeswhom he had inserted into the battlefield,thoughts of his aircrew — all dead — andthoughts of the two Special Forces soldiers,Master Sergeant Gary Gordon and SergeantFirst Class Randy Shugart, who had foughtso valiantly and died to save his life.

Durant, who at the time of his capturewas a member of a highly specialized unit,benefited from the camaraderie and thecohesion that come from mutual trust andconfidence. Cohesion is not synonymouswith esprit; it is more than the good feel-ings that a soldier and his leader havetoward each other. Cohesion is a prerequi-site to a soldier’s fighting spirit. It impartsa strong loyalty and dedication to supportcomrades in danger; it partially compen-sates for the effects of fear; and it serves asan antidote to the effects of dispersion.

Cohesion is also the product of sharedtough training. Today, Durant extols thevirtues of combat training he received asan aviator in the 160th Special OperationsAviation Regiment, particularly the Army’sSurvival, Evasion, Resistance and EscapeCourse. Throughout his ordeal, Durantperformed exactly as he had been trainedto do.

Michael Durant’s experience provides uswith a valuable learning opportunity. Notonly did he prevail, he emerged as a cham-pion who overcame a seemingly inextrica-ble predicament. Durant’s display ofcourage and dignity under austere condi-tions will serve as an inspiration to others.Durant’s experience also serves as areminder that the moral quality of war hasnot changed and that du Picq’s theoriesconcerning the human element in warremain as appropriate as if he had pennedthem yesterday.

Du Picq and future battlesIn War in the Modern World, Professor

Theodore Ropp refers to du Picq as “anobscure French colonel.”13 Far from obscure,

May 1996 39

du Picq is a relevant theorist whose workdeserves a place of honor beside that of oth-ers — Clausewitz, de Saxe, Jomini, Liddell-Hart and Sun Tzu — who are cited as primesources for the development of Americanmilitary doctrine.

Avoiding mathematical principles thatfailed to consider human dynamics, du Picqstudied the human spirit in war. He recog-nized that battle casualties often resultmerely from the lack of small-unit leader-ship, morale and cohesion, and that whenthese factors are present, they work in con-cert to produce moral supremacy.

The need for extraordinary courage inthe face of danger is truly the aspect thatmakes the military profession unique. TheAmerican fighting man continues to riskdanger at the tactical, operational andstrategic levels. Our goal of behavioraldevelopment for combat is to help soldiersovercome fear and to control the naturalinstinct to preserve life and limb. In pur-suit of that goal, we must understand warat the human level.

The farsighted theories of Ardant du Picqprovide a view of warfare with a specialemphasis on the human element. Againstthe currently prevailing technological sen-timent, Battle Studies remains a poignanttreatise on military morale — one that ourpolitical and military leaders should con-sider as they ponder the nature, the pur-pose, and the conduct of war. From beyondthe horizon, du Picq implores our militaryleaders and policy-makers to ask them-selves: “Among those who would contem-plate war, how many would risk their ownlives?”14 While war may be politics by othermeans, the human dynamics of combat aremore than an extension of policy.

Lieutenant Colonel Wil-liam M. Jacobs is assigned tothe Joint Special OperationsCommand, Fort Bragg, N.C.His previous assignmentsinclude deputy commandingofficer for the 160th SpecialOperations Aviation Regiment, Fort Camp-bell, Ky.; director of plans, policy and strat-egy/J5 and executive officer to the com-

manding general, Task ForceBlack/Raleigh in Haiti; and Regiment S3for the 160 SOAR. His overseas assign-ments include tours in Berlin, Graffenwho-er and Garlstedt, Germany; Honduras; andEl Salvador. Jacobs is a recent graduate ofthe National War College, National DefenseUniversity, where he received a master’sdegree in national security policy and strat-egy. He also has earned master’s degreesfrom Boston University and from the Com-mand and General Staff College, Fort Leav-enworth, Kan.

Notes:1 Frank H. Simonds, Preface to Battle Studies:

Ancient and Modern Battle, by Charles Ardant du Picq(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1921), p. vii.

2 Charles Ardant du Picq, Battle Studies: Ancientand Modern Battle (New York: The Macmillan Com-pany, 1921), p. vii.

3 Mitchell M. Zais, “Ardant du Picq: Unsung Giantof Military Theory,” Army, April 1985, p. 58.

4 Zais, p. 56.5 James J. Schneider, “The Theory of Operational

Art,” (Fort Leavenworth, Kan.: Command and Gener-al Staff College, March 1988).

6 Du Picq, p. 135.7 Zais, p. 58.8 Zais, p. 57.9 Zais, p. 59.10 Zais, p. 59.11 Du Picq, p. 72.12 Zais, p. 58.13 Zais, p. 57.14 Du Picq, p. 118.

40 Special Warfare

May 1996 41

Enlisted Career NotesSpecial Warfare

The results of the 1996 master sergeant promotion board results havebeen released, and once again promotions for special-operations soldiershave exceeded the Army average. The overall Army select rate was 8.2 per-cent; CMF 18 achieved 12.1 percent and CMF 37 achieved 26.7 percent.Future SOF promotions to master sergeant should continue in theseranges, but eventually they will be more in line with the Army average.The MOS breakdown is as follows:

Primary Zone Secondary Zone TotalElig. Sel. Elig. Sel. Elig. Sel. %

18B 156 26 57 2 213 28 13.118C 96 20 114 4 210 24 11.418D 154 29 62 1 216 30 13.918E 79 3 147 4 226 7 3.118F 345 58 45 5 390 63 16.2

37F 3 2 12 2 15 4 26.7

Staff members of the Special Forces Enlisted Branch, Enlisted PersonnelDirectorate, U.S. Total Army Personnel Command, are as follows:

MAJ Adrian Erckenbrack SF Enlisted Branch chiefMSG R.B. Gardner Senior career adviserSFC Todd Young CMF 18 career adviser;

reclassificationsSFC Stewart Marin CMF 37F career adviserMrs. Faye Matheny 1st, 5th and 10th SF groups;

ROTC and JRTC assignmentsMs. Franca Lockard 3rd and 7th SF groups;

JFKSWCS; USASOC; USASFC;SATMO; 96th CA Battalion

Ms. Dyna Amey SFQC student manager

Assignment-related questions should be directed to the assignment manager;career-development questions should be directed to the senior career adviser.Students enrolled in the SF Qualification Course who have questions aboutassignments should contact their student PAC. Questions regarding NCOESshould first be directed to the SF group schools NCO. The SF branch phonenumber is DSN 221-5395 or commercial (703) 325-5395, fax -0524. Addresscorrespondence to Commander, U.S. Total Army Personnel Command; Attn:TAPC-EPK-S; 2461 Eisenhower Ave.; Alexandria, VA 22331-0454.

E8 promotions for SOFexceed Army average

PERSCOM points of contact

42 Special Warfare

Officer Career NotesSpecial Warfare

In addition to the Command and General Staff Officers Course, orCGSOC, there are five sources of advanced education for SF field-gradeofficers:

• CGSOC SF Advanced Studies Program. This program is mandatory forSF students who are attending the resident CGSOC. It is the only SF-spe-cific field-grade institutional training for SF officers. The CGSOC admin-isters the program in coordination with the JFK Special Warfare Centerand School; instructors are chosen from all areas of the joint SOF com-munity. SF CGSOC. The program, which trains officers to perform SpecialForces group and joint duties as SF majors, culminates with an exerciseintegrating Army SOF into a JTF campaign plan. JFKSWCS is develop-ing a parallel course for non-resident SF CGSOC students and for SF stu-dents who attend sister-service command-and-staff colleges. The non-res-ident CGSOC will consist of a distant-learning phase and a residentphase.

• Naval Post Graduate School SO/LIC Program. This is a voluntaryadvanced-degree program for senior SOF captains and junior majors. Foreach course, PERSCOM selects 10 SOF officers (six 18A54 officers, two18A39 officers, one Ranger Regiment officer, and one SOF aviation offi-cer), all of whose records must reflect above-average performance. Theacademic program lasts 18 months, followed by a three-year utilizationassignment. Utilization positions are joint billets in theater special-oper-ations commands. Interested officers should send a completed DA Form1618R to Commander; U.S. Total Army Personnel Command; TAPC-OPE-SF; 200 Stovall Street; Alexandria, VA 22332-0414. For more information,contact Captain Roger Carstens at the SF Officer Branch.

• Advanced Military Studies Program. This is a highly competitiveadvanced-degree program for selected resident CGSOC students. Theprogram is conducted at the Fort Leavenworth School of Advanced Mil-itary Studies, or SAMS. All SF CGSOC attendees may volunteer andcompete for this professional-development opportunity, and the SpecialWarfare Center and School strongly encourages them to do so. TheAMSP has three phases: Phase one is the resident CGSOC. Phase two isan additional year of study at SAMS. (Resident Army students who areattending either the Marine Corps or the Air Force command-and-staffcollege may complete phases one and two at their respective institu-tion.) Phase three comprises the utilization and branch-qualificationassignments. Utilization assignments are with a corps or division staff.The corps commander may approve the officer’s branch-qualificationassignment before the officer performs the conventional-unit utilizationassignment. Following the utilization period, PERSCOM will assign theofficer to a functional-area or branch assignment at the highest levelpossible. For more information, contact Major Ray Helton at the SF Offi-cer Branch.

Advanced education for SF field-grade officers

May 1996 43

• Olmstead Scholarship. This highly competitive program, administeredby the civilian Olmstead Foundation, accepts four captains, Armywide,per year to attend foreign universities. The foundation considers thecountry preference of each applicant. Participants gain language profi-ciency and learn about a foreign culture. Programs of study are diverse,including such fields as political science, regional studies and even music.Studies last two years, and there is no requirement for a utilizationassignment. If course credits fall short of U.S. college and universityrequirements, some students may not be awarded a master’s degree. How-ever, the Army will subsequently afford those students an opportunity tocomplete master’s-degree requirements fully funded. To apply, contactCaptain Roger Carstens.

• Harvard/DCSOPS Fellowship. This highly competitive one-year pro-gram, administered by PERSCOM, accepts only two captains, Armywide,per year. Participants attend Harvard University’s Kennedy School ofGovernment and earn a master’s in public administration. A two-year uti-lization assignment in DA DCSOPS follows. To apply, contact CaptainRoger Carstens.

All these programs complement the officer’s professional developmentachieved during SF operational assignments, and they are viewed favor-ably by promotion boards and by command-selection boards. Interestedofficers should plan to attend one of the voluntary programs as seniorcaptains or as junior majors. Contact Major Ray Helton or Captain RogerCarstens at the SF Officer Branch, phone DSN 221-3175/3178 or com-mercial (703) 325-3175/3178.

In a permanent change to AR 135-215, the Army Deputy Chief of Staff forPersonnel approved the reimplementation of voluntary indefinite status-selection boards for warrant officers. As of Jan. 1, 1996, warrant officersare no longer automatically granted VI status upon promotion to CW2.Warrant officers appointed prior to Jan. 1, 1994, will not be affected by thenew policy. The first DA centralized VI board will convene during FY98 toconsider warrant officers who were appointed after Jan. 1, 1994, and haveobligated volunteer dates of Jan. 1, 1998, to Sept. 30, 1998. Those who arerated most qualified will be selected to fill the force at the CW2 grade. War-rant officers selected for VI status may continue to serve past their initialsix years of active duty, in accordance with AR 600-8-24, or they may revertback to their previously held enlisted rank. For more information, contactCW3 Wayne Searcy, 180A manager in the SWCS Proponency Office, phoneDSN 239-2415/8423 or commercial (910) 432-3175/3178.

VI status no longer automatic with promotion

to CW2

44 Special Warfare

Foreign SOFSpecial Warfare

The Bosnian Muslim army unit known as the “Black Swans” is consideredone of the most motivated and professional indigenous units in the Bos-nian force structure. More accurately described as commandos than asspecial-operations forces, the Black Swans, currently 800 men, performmissions ranging from spearheading tactical infantry attacks to providingsecurity support for senior political officials. Soldiers are often equippedwith French- or American-made assault rifles and rocket launchers. Ini-tially comprised of refugees and formed near the central Bosnian town ofKonjic under the operational control of the Bosnian 4th Corps, the unitquickly developed a reputation for aggressive action. It soon becamedirectly subordinate to the Bosnian Supreme Command and transferredits headquarters to Kakanj. From this location, the unit began performingcombat missions in all sectors along the confrontation lines existing priorto the Dayton Accords. Recruits for the Black Swans must be Muslim, mustbe under 21, must have prior military experience and must have beenwounded at least twice in battle. They must also agree to abide by specif-ic Islamic strictures. The commander of the Black Swans claims thatIslamic fundamentalism does not necessarily provide inspiration to all ofhis troops; but he insists that obligatory prayers, religious education, andattendance at Friday mosque services aid in solidifying unit identity.

By all accounts, Russia has inherited from the USSR the largest chemi-cal weapons arsenal in the world — about 40,000 metric tons of chemi-cal agents, resident in bombs, missile warheads, artillery shells, othermunitions, and canisters. According to the Russians, 32,300 mt of theseinclude paralyzing nerve gases, such as sarin, soman, and VX, while theremainder comprise older agents, such as lewisite and yperite. The sizeof the chemical-weapons stocks continues to be challenged by internalRussian critics, with some charging that 100,000 mt of chemical agentsare being maintained in Russia. Whatever the full size, the stocks, underthe purview of the Russian Federation Radiological, Chemical, and Bio-logical Defense Troops, are reportedly poorly accounted for, improperlymaintained, and inadequately secured. Against this backdrop, in October1995, the Russian Federal Security Service charged former LieutenantGeneral of Chemical Troops Anatoliy Kuntsevich with both the deliveryof about 800 kg of chemicals in 1993 to Middle East buyers and the sub-sequent attempted smuggling of an additional 5.5 tons in 1994. Thechemicals reportedly could be used for civil applications or for the cre-ation of chemical weapons. It is worth recalling that Kuntsevich wasawarded the Lenin Prize in 1991 (along with his fellow team members),for the development of Soviet binary nerve agents. It was revealed retro-spectively that in April 1994, Boris Yeltsin removed Kuntsevich from apresidential advisory post on chemical and biological issues for “grossviolation of his duties,” but Kuntsevich remained affiliated with the Rus-sian Academy of Sciences. Distinguishing truth from mere assertion in

Bosnian ‘Black Swans’aggressive commando unit

Russian general chargedwith weapons diversion

May 1996 45

the shadowy world of Russian “weapons of mass destruction” is alwaysdifficult, but the dissension and the disarray in the military chemicalstructure suggest that the diversion of the materials or the technologiesassociated with chemical weapons is a continuing danger.

Russia’s premier counterterrorist group, “Alpha,” is under the control of theRussian Federal Security Service, a successor organization to the KGB, afterchanges in subordination and status following Alpha’s ambiguous role in thefailed August 1991 Soviet coup. Reportedly, Alpha comprises a main group of250 personnel as well as smaller detachments in Yekaterinburg, Krasnodarand Khabarovsk. The unit’s morale and its capabilities may be declining,however. Alpha’s mid-June 1995 attempt to storm the Budennovsk hospitaland free hundreds of hostages seized by Chechen guerrillas ended unsuc-cessfully. Chechen rebels were later granted safe passage home. Meanwhile,a strong Alpha veterans association has been formed, which claims that it“can exert a real influence on Alpha activities.” Other former Alpha membersalso have joined or created private security firms and entered other privateventures based on their Alpha affiliations and experience.

Russian counterterroristgroup hanging on

Peruvian subversivesnow on Internet

Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr. and Lieutenant Colonel John E. Sray of the Foreign Military Studies Office, U.S. Army DCSOPS, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. All information is unclassified.

The Peruvian subversive organization Sendero Luminoso, or Shining Path,has been severely reduced in strength, cohesiveness and effectiveness overthe last few years. Its leader, Abimael Guzman, was captured in Septem-ber 1992 by the Peruvian National Police’s National CounterterrorismDirectorate, or DINCOTE; DINCOTE chief General Carlos Dominguezcontinues to dismantle the Sendero leadership and structure; and Senderohas suffered defeats in the field by the Peruvian armed forces. Neverthe-less, remaining Sendero elements continue their efforts to reorganize, andthey have carried out periodic terrorist acts in urban and rural areas as areminder that they have not completely vanished. Another reminder,aimed primarily at foreign audiences, is found on a Worldwide Web sitedesignated, “The People’s War in Peru: Information About the PeruvianCommunist Party” (http://www.blythe.org/peru-pcp/). The site is repletewith portraits of Marx, Lenin, Mao and Abimael Guzman. It includes Guz-man speeches, Sendero documents and position papers, and 29 “frequent-ly asked questions.”Although the site purports to represent the PeruvianCommunist Party, or PCP, it is unclear whether information posted on thesite reflects the positions of the Sendero/PCP leadership or those of foreignsympathizers who have for years been active in Europe and in the U.S. Thesite does note, in accordance with current orthodoxy, that the PCP contin-ues to make preparations to “seize power nationwide in a final insurrec-tion against the old State.”

Shelton takes command of USSOCOM

Army General Henry H. Sheltontook command of the U.S. SpecialOperations Command Feb. 29,1996, in a ceremony held at MacDillAFB, Fla.

Shelton was previously the com-manding general of the XVIII Air-borne Corps and Fort Bragg, N.C. Hehas also served as commander of the82nd Airborne Division at FortBragg and as assistant division com-mander of the 101st Airborne Divi-sion at Fort Campbell, Ky. Earlier inhis career, Shelton served as com-mander of Detachment A-104, 5thSpecial Forces Group, in Vietnam.During Operation Uphold Democra-cy in Haiti, Shelton served as com-mander of the joint task force.

Shelton replaced General WayneA. Downing, who retired from theArmy following the transfer of com-mand. Downing had been command-er of USSOCOM since May 1993.

USASOC soldiers receiveSoldier’s Medal

Five soldiers from the U.S. ArmySpecial Operations Command havereceived the Soldier’s Medal fortheir heroic efforts in three separateincidents that occurred duringOperation Uphold Democracy inHaiti.

Staff Sergeant Bart R. Bryant,Headquarters and HeadquartersCo., 3rd SF Group; Sergeant JamesE. Hall, C Co., 1st Bn., 3rd SFGroup; Sergeant First Class JosephE. Register Jr., B Co., 2nd Bn., 3rdSF Group; Specialist Daryl Thomas,B Co., 528th Support Battalion; andSergeant First Class Bruce A. Ward,

A Co., 1st Bn., 3rd SF Group,received the medals in a ceremonyheld on Fort Bragg Feb. 8.

The Soldier’s Medal is the highestmedal awarded during peacetime.

Following Hurricane Gordon inNovember 1994,Ward and a group ofsoldiers and Haitians performed life-saving efforts to save a family of sixfrom drowning. Using a fire hose as asafety line, Ward and the teampulled five children and an elderlywoman from a cinder-block housethat was moments from being sweptaway by torrential floodwaters.

Bryant, Hall and Thomas saved adrowning man on Dec. 19, 1994, atJeremie, Haiti. Hall and Thomasdived into murky water and swam150 feet to reach the man. Eachmade several dives attempting torecover the man. On Hall’s thirdattempt, he grabbed the man’s shirt

and brought him to the surface.Thomas then noticed that a smallboy who had dived in to help themwas also in trouble and rescuedhim. Bryant, who saw the difficultyeach soldier was having, dived in toassist them. All five swimmersreturned to shore safely.

On Oct. 11, 1994, Register wit-nessed a mob of 300 angry Haitiansbeating a man in Port-au-Prince.Register made his way through themob to shield the man and adminis-ter first aid. He was alone untilother soldiers arrived to load the vic-tim into Register’s vehicle. En routeto the Port-au-Prince General Hos-pital, Register was stopped byanother mob, which began to beatthe man through windows of thevehicle. Register shielded the manuntil he could get the vehicle movingagain. According to Major George P.Clements, battalion executive offi-cer, 2nd Bn., 3rd SF Group, “WithoutRegister’s actions, the mob wouldhave continued to beat the manuntil he was dead.” — Sergeant FirstClass Mike Brantley, USASOC PAO

Special Operations MedicalTraining Battalion activated

The JFK Special Warfare Centerand School activated the SpecialOperations Medical Training Bat-talion (Provisional) Nov. 1, 1995, inpreparation for the opening of theSpecial Operations Medical Train-ing Center, scheduled to take placein July.

“The Special Operations MedicalTraining Battalion will be responsi-ble for training all Special Forcesmedical sergeants, and for the Spe-cial Operations Medical Course,

46 Special Warfare

UpdateSpecial Warfare

DoD photo

General Wayne Downing (left) transfers theUSSOCOM flag. General Henry Shelton stands atfar right.

designed to train all medics in theArmy Special Operations Com-mand, Navy Special Warfare Com-mand and the Air Force SpecialOperations Command,” said ColonelLance E. Booth III, commander ofSWCS’s 1st Special Warfare Train-ing Group.

According to Lieutenant ColonelJohn R. Chambers, commander ofthe Special Operations MedicalTraining Battalion, the $18 millionSpecial Operations Medical Train-ing Center will feature automatedcomputer training aids, closed-cir-cuit television access throughoutthe facility, and operating roomsand laboratories. “The improvedcurriculum and facilities will farexceed the scope of training the Spe-cial Forces medics were receiving atFort Sam Houston, Texas,” he said.

SWCS dedicates free-fallsimulator

The JFK Special Warfare Centerand School dedicated its militaryfree-fall training facility to the lateSergeant Major Santos A. Matos onApril 29.

Born in Vista Allegre, Panama, onNov. 22, 1942, Matos joined the Armyin 1965. He served 26 years and com-pleted Airborne, Ranger, Pathfinder,Special Forces, Jumpmaster and Mil-itary Free-Fall schools. Matos died ina free-fall parachuting accident inNovember 1993.

The $5 million military free-fallfacility, which opened in 1992, con-tains a vertical wind tunnel thatoffers a safe training environmentfor military free-fall students.

Prerequisites change for CDQC, MFFPC

In response to the decrease inSF dive and free-fall teams to oneteam per battalion, the JFK Spe-cial Warfare Center and Schoolhas changed the prerequisites forthe Special Forces Combat DiverQualification Course and the Mili-tary Free-Fall Parachutist Course.

Special Forces soldiers are nolonger required to be en route or onorders to an SF dive detachment orSF free-fall detachment in order toattend either of the courses. Prereq-uisites for all other MOSs remainthe same for both courses. For moreinformation, contact CaptainStephen R. Lasse, S3 Operations,2nd Battalion, 1st Special WarfareTraining Group, at DSN 239-4387/5473 or commercial (910) 432-4387/5473.

PERSCOM establishesWorldwide Web site

The U.S. Total Army PersonnelCommand, or PERSCOM, hasestablished PERSCOM Online, ahomepage on the Worldwide Web, toprovide information about Armypersonnel issues and programs.

PERSCOM Online is linked tothe Army homepage “Army Link”;it can also be found under the uni-form resource locator http://www-PERSCOM.army.mil. For moreinformation about PERSCOMOnline, contact the PERSCOMPublic Affairs Office by phone at(703) 325-8857, DSN 221-8857, ore-mail at [email protected].

SWCS updates CA courseThe JFK Special Warfare Center

and School has made changes to theCivil Affairs Course in support ofthe expanded role of Civil Affairs innontraditional operations.

The four-week course trains active-and reserve-component officers forduty in Civil Affairs positions.

Civil Affairs Course 1-96, whichbegan in January 1996, incorporat-ed 18 hours of formal negotiationstraining, according to Major GeraldThomas, operations officer, 3rd Bat-talion, 1st Special Warfare TrainingGroup. Four hours of the new blockwere formal instruction; studentsspent the remaining 14 hours inindividual and team negotiationssupervised by the instructor.

The scenario in Class 1-96involved business negotiations. InClass 3-96, the negotiations blockwill involve a peacekeeping scenarioincluding nongovernmental organi-zations, military commanders andlocal civilian officials, Thomas said.

The CAC also incorporates brief-ings from Civil Affairs personnelreturning from operational deploy-ments. The intent is to continuallyupdate the course to ensure that itis realistic, doctrinally based andengages the interest and participa-tion of the students, Thomas said.For additional information, contactMajor Gerald Thomas at DSN 239-6504/3427 or commercial (910) 432-6504/3427.

SWCS, Army SF Command get new commanders

Major General William P.Tangney took command of the JFKSpecial Warfare Center and SchoolMay 29.

Tangney had been commander ofthe Army Special Forces Commandsince May 1, 1995. His other assign-ments include deputy commandinggeneral and chief of staff, Army Spe-cial Operations Command; com-manding general, Special Opera-tions Command, U.S. Central Com-mand; and commander, 10th SpecialForces Group.

Tangney replaced Major GeneralWilliam F. Garrison, who retiredfrom the Army. Garrison had com-manded SWCS since August 1994.

Brigadier General Kenneth R.Bowra took command of the ArmySpecial Forces Command May 21.

Bowra was previously deputycommanding general and chief ofstaff with the Army Special Opera-tions Command. His other assign-ments include commanding gener-al, Special Operations Command,U.S. Southern Command; and com-mander, 5th Special Forces Group.

May 1996 47

Managing Contemporary Con-flict: Pillars of Success. Edited byMax G. Manwaring and William J.Olson. Boulder, Colo.: WestviewPress, Inc., 1996. ISBN: 0-8133-8969-0. 269 pages. $49.95 (cloth).

Today’s military professionals,especially those in the special-opera-tions community, must have anunderstanding of two areas: the con-cepts, constraints, direction andtechnology progression of Force XXI;and the political views and trendsthat can lead to the deployment ofmilitary forces to execute the foreignpolicies of our government.

Foreign policy is a dynamicinstrument. With growing national-security requirements, smaller mili-tary forces and shrinking budgets,our foreign-policy makers require amore systematic process for identify-ing the goals and the steps neces-sary for success. Managing Contem-porary Conflict provides sound ideasfor the ingredients of a strong for-eign policy: identifiable and support-able ends, sufficient means and aclear purpose.

Managing Contemporary Conflictis structured in terms of three pil-lars — a sound theory of engage-ment, development and use ofappropriate instruments of nationalpower, and an appropriate manage-ment structure to implement thetheory of engagement and to coordi-nate the instruments of power. Thebook’s contributors cover the spec-trum of current regional securitystudies of the diplomatic, militaryand intellectual arenas. Profession-als such as retired Army GeneralWayne A. Downing, AmbassadorDavid Passage, Dr. Graham H. Tur-

biville Jr., Dr. Roy Godson, retiredAir Force Colonel Dennis F. Caffreyand Dr. William J. Olson contributedto make this book an intellectualguide through today’s internationalthreat climate.

Managing Contemporary Conflictprovides examples of recent and cur-rent conflicts to support its theories.One theory discusses the legitimacytheory of engagement for the post-Cold War period. Another theory dis-cusses a 10-step analytical processin end-state planning, which ismuch like a doctrine for success indetermining what the end-stategoals should be in any situation orconflict. Dr. John Fishel writes onthe challenge of achieving unity ofeffort in interagency operations andin coalition warfare. His workincludes a look at joint issues, civil-military issues and the challenges ofusing ad hoc coalitions as tools formanaging conflict.

Managing Contemporary Conflict

offers a strong base for understand-ing contemporary military prob-lems. It might best be used as a text-book by the military professionalwho seeks to understand how andwhy foreign policy will be importantto conflict other than war.

MAJ Robert C. ShawUSACGSCFort Leavenworth, Kan.

You’re No Good to Me Dead:Behind Japanese Lines in thePhilippines. By Bob Stahl.Annapolis, Md.: Naval InstitutePress, 1995. ISBN: 1-55750-793-7.232 pages. $26.95.

Like many of his contemporaryWorld War II draftees, Robert E.Stahl was not enamored with theUnited States Army, but he wasdetermined to do his part in the war.In 1943, after a series of trainingprograms that can be most kindlydescribed as haphazard, he wasassigned as a cryptographer, techni-cian 3rd class (roughly the equiva-lent of today’s staff sergeant) withthe Allied Intelligence Bureau, orAIB, in Australia. The AIB was aninter-allied organization. It per-formed for the Southwest PacificArea, or SWPA, many of the func-tions that in other theaters wereperformed by the Office of StrategicServices, or OSS. General DouglasMacArthur, who was distrustful ofnon-subordinate organizations,would not permit the OSS to operatein the SWPA.

Impressed by guerrilla radio traf-fic and by an officer who had escapedfrom the Philippines and waspreparing to return there, Stahl vol-

48 Special Warfare

Book ReviewsSpecial Warfare

unteered to accompany him. Stahlwas accepted and with almost noadditional training, he deployed with11 other soldiers via submarine.You’re No Good to Me Dead recountsStahl’s growth as he survives andoperates in the rear areas of a pow-erful and determined enemy.

The infiltrating teams were toldto avoid combat: their mission wasto report intelligence. The book’stitle is, in fact, a quote from GeneralMacArthur’s farewell injunction tothe teams. Although the introduc-tion of the book states that the storyis not a guerrilla-warfare account,the growth of the guerrilla move-ment around Stahl’s location, Stahl’suse of the movement, his depend-ence upon it and, later, his assist-ance to it make it difficult to identi-fy any real differences betweenStahl’s actions and those of the Jed-burghs in Europe. The length of theoperational period is an importantdistinction: Stahl’s deployment wasfor 15 months. Most Jedburghdeployments lasted two months orless.

This book’s introduction, writtenby Dr. Clayton Laurie of the U. S.Army Center for Military History,contains a rare bonus: an explana-tion of the evolution and relation-

ships of the Southwest Pacificarea’s special-operations controlorganizations.

You’re No Good to Me Dead is notonly very readable, it has potentiallessons in the aspects of guerrillawarfare, strategic reconnaissanceand psychological operations. TheNaval Institute Press is to be com-mended for adding this book to itsSpecial Warfare Series.

COL Scot CrerarU.S. Army (ret.)Vienna, Va.

PSYWAR: Psychological Warfarein Korea 1950-1953. By Stephen E.Pease. Harrisburg, Pa.: StackpoleBooks, 1992. ISBN: 0-8117-2592-8.194 pages. $12.95 (paper).

Stephen Pease’s meticulousresearch of a virtually undocument-ed area of the Korean conflict isindicative of his research abilitiesand erudition. Pease researched offi-cial Army, Air Force and Navyrecords to provide a broad-brushlook at PSYWAR efforts during theKorean conflict. Extensive inter-views with Korean War PSYWARoperators of all services add colorand an “I was there” attribution tohis book. It works well — PSYWARis highly readable.

Pease transitions smoothly frombackground on the history of PSYOPand its strategic context in the Kore-an conflict, to more singular andextensive chapters on leaflets, prop-aganda, and Chinese and NorthKorean PSYWAR efforts. The book’sbibliographic references and appen-dices provide a treasure-trove of suc-cessful and unsuccessful PSYOPtactics, techniques and procedures.

Pease’s chapter on leaflets isextensive and contains many pho-tographs illustrating the types ofleaflets produced. Most significantin this chapter are the ideologicaland moral questions raised by theuse of certain types of leaflets. Peasehighlights this problem with numer-

ous examples, including “OperationMoolah,” in which a $50,000 rewardwas offered for the defection of aNorth Korean, Chinese or Russianpilot with his MiG-15 or -17 aircraft.As Pease points out, PresidentDwight Eisenhower was opposed tothis particular project — he felt thatdefection should occur for ideologicalreasons rather than for monetaryones. The subsequent defection of aNorth Korean pilot was hailed asthe greatest PSYWAR operation ofthe Korean War, because it defini-tively supported U.S. claims that theSoviets were supplying the NorthKoreans with hardware, trainingand technical assistance.

Ultimately, Pease’s effort is a goodone. He details numerous psycholog-ical operations, methods and tech-niques (some of which are still inuse), and he provides illumination ofa rather unknown aspect of the “For-gotten War.”

CPT David KnappUSAJFKSWCSFort Bragg, N.C.

May 1996 49

Special Warfare

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