speciale - talking about energy - maria toft

Maria Toft & Svend Elberg Thomsen University of Copenhagen

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TALKING ABOUT ENERGY THE MAKING OF THE ENERGY UNION

By Maria Toft & Svend Elberg Thomsen

Master’s Dissertation

Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen

Academic Advisor: Prof. Ian Manners

Authors: Maria Toft & Svend Elberg Thomsen

Words: 47.454 (135 pages)

Date: 7 October 2015


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ABSTRACT

On the 21st of April 2014, the Financial Times brought an opinion piece on Eu-ropean Energy policy. The author was Donald Tusk, then Prime Minister of Po-land. From that day, the idea of an Energy Union entered the European policy agenda. In less than seven months, the project became a top priority for the newly installed European Commission led by Jean Claude Juncker. Due to its broad and ambiguous formulation, the Energy Union easily gained widespread support among member states, and it was agreed that the idea should be devel-oped further.

This dissertation examines the following question: Why is ‘the Energy Union’ on the European policy agenda? The dissertation applies an abductive strategy, go-ing between theory and empirics before finding an adequate answer to the re-search question. We start by applying the Multiple Streams Framework (MSF) in order to systematically explore the case of the Energy Union and to identify the most influential variables. Due to MSF’s lack of explanatory power, we look to the theories within neo-institutionalism for explanations of causal inferences. The empirical findings suggest that Discursive institutionalism is the best-suited theory when explaining the making of the Energy Union proposal. In addition, we add the Narrative Policy Framework in order to improve descriptive power of the overall theoretical framework. By doing so, we are able to describe how agents make use of strategic communicative action when marketing certain poli-cy ideas. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find that the Energy Union should not be ascribed to the 2014 Russian aggression in Ukraine, although this may have hastened the proposal of the Energy Union.

Instead, we find that the Energy Union is a holistic narrative marketed by main-ly the European Commission with the intentional goal to give a new impetus for the Europeanisation of national energy policies. The holistic narrative effectively combines the different aspects of energy policy. We argue that the new holistic energy narrative is primarily a result of substantial structural changes that have taken place over the past decades within European energy policy. These struc-tural changes within European energy mix, rules and ideology are a result of competing energy policy narratives that all influenced the need for further Euro-pean coordination. In order to overcome old barriers for further energy coopera-tion in the EU, dedicated policy marketers strategically utilised this structural momentum to promote the Energy Union proposal.


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Acknowledgements

First of all we wish to express our sincere thanks to Prof. Ian Manners, who guided this dissertation to safe harbor. Second our interviewees; without their contribution this dissertation would not have been possible.

We are also indebted to Anne, Andreas, Sophus, Leon, and especially Malte, who spent their precious time making sure that both form and content was un-derstandable and provided constructive pieces of advice.

Maria would like to thank Skrap, Admiralitetet and particularly Malte.

Svend would like to thank Cecilie, Cosmos and the LM crew.

A special thankyou from both of us goes to Johanne Holm for the beautiful drawing on the frontpage.

- Maria & Svend


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TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract 3 Abbreviations 7 1.0 Introduction 8

1.1 Energy on the European policy agenda 12 1.2 The Energy Union 14

2.0 Literature review 16 2.1 Concepts of energy 16 2.1.1$Energy$security$ 20$

2.2 Multiple Streams Framework 21 2.2.1$The$origins$of$MSF$ 22$2.2.2$MSF$conception$ 23$2.2.3$MSF$in$an$EU$context$ 23$

2.3 Drivers of change: Neo-Institutionalism 26

3.0 Multiple Streams Framework 30 3.1 MSF outlined 30 3.2 Assumptions 32 3.2.1$Time$constraints$ 32$3.2.2$Independent$streams$ 33$3.2.3$Ambiguity$ 33$

3.3 Agents and structures 35 3.4 MSF and the EU 37 3.4.1$Advantages$ 37$3.4.2$Changes$ 38$

3.5 Delimitations 40

4.0 Methodology and research design 41 4.1 Single case study method 42 4.2 The abductive strategy 48 4.3 Specification of the Problem and Research Objective 51 4.3.1$The$European$policy$agenda$ 53$4.3.2$The$Energy$Union$ 56$

4.4 Data requirements and the semi-structured interview 57 4.4.1$Reliability$and$validity$within$the$premises$of$the$interview$ 59$4.4.2$Theoretical$sampling$of$interviewees$ 61$4.4.3$The$snowball$sampling$technique$ 65$

4.5 Conceptualisation and measurement 68 4.6 Conducting interviews 73 4.6.1$Interviewing$the$elite$ 74$

4.7 Coding and interpretation of data 77


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5.0 Analysis 79 5.1 Choosing Discursive Institutionalism 81 5.1.1$Order$of$ideas$ 85$

5.2 Adding the narrative policy framework 92 5.3.2$A$structuralist$approach:$Merging$MSF$with$NPF$ 95$5.2.3$The$final$theoretical$framework$and$structure$of$the$analysis$ 97$

5.3 Narratives 99 5.3.1$The$geopolitical$narrative$ 100$5.3.2$The$market$narrative$ 114$5.3.3$The$climate$narrative$ 126$5.3.4$The$holistic$narrative$ 137$

5.4 Ideologies 146 5.4.1$The$realm$of$social$and$economic$transformation$ 148$5.4.2$Energy$as$an$issue$for$nationSstates$ 151$5.4.3$Europeanisation$of$energy$matters$ 152$

5.5 Policy marketers and framing 154 5.6 Final hypothesis and analytical process tracing 157

6.0 Discussion 162 6.1 Counterfactual discussion 162 6.2 Normative discussion - the Energy Union a symptom of integration crisis? 165

7. Conclusion 170 8.0 literature 174 Appendix 1 - 14 184 Appendix 15 185 Appendix 16 186 Appendix 17 193 Appendix 18 196


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ABBREVIATIONS ACER The Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators CO2 Carbon dioxide COP21 Conference of the Parties number 21 (in Paris in December 2015 DG Directorates-General DI Discursive Institutionalism DK Denmark ECB European Central Bank EESS European Energy and Security Strategy EMU Economic and Monetary Union EPP The European People’s Party EU European Union Grexit Greek Exit (from the Eurozone and/or EU) HI Historical Institutinoalism IEA International Energy Agency ITRE Committee on Industry, Research and Energy LNG Liquified Natural Gas MEP Member of European Parliament MSF Multiple Streams Framework NGO Non-Governmental Organisation NPF Narrative Policy Framework OAPEC Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Developmen PE Policy Entrepreneur PV Photovoltaic (solar power) RCI Rational Choice Institutionalism RES Renewable Energy Sources S&D Socialists & Democrats SI Sociological Institutionalism TSO Transmission Systems Operator U.K. United Kiingdom UNSDSN United Nations Sustainable Development Solutions Network US United States of America


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1.0 INTRODUCTION

“It is totally unacceptable that Russia is using gas as a political weapon. The time for a European Energy Union has clearly come.”1

- Maroš Šefčovič, Vice President of the European Commission,

October 2014

Energy has been a centrepiece policy area in the European community ever since

the early days of the Coal and Steel Community. This has become particularly

evident in the recent decade where the important gas supplies to EU member

states from Russia have been affected, where oil prices have first skyrocketed

and then plummeted, and where conventional energy sources have fuelled the

climate debate. Given the early start of energy cooperation in Europe and the

advanced level of cooperation in the European Union, it is in many ways a curi-

osity that energy is not a fully integral part of EU policy-making today. In the

Treaty of Lisbon, however, the European heads of state agreed in 2007 that the

EU should “aim, in a spirit of solidarity between Member States, to: (a) ensure

the functioning of the energy market; (b) ensure security of energy supply in the

Union; (c) promote energy efficiency and energy saving and the development of

new and renewable forms of energy; and (d) promote the interconnection of en-

ergy networks.” (European Union 2007: 135). In the years after, the EU adopted

a series of pro-integration decisions, most notably the energy and climate targets

for 2020 and the Third Internal Energy Market Package.

1 (EurActiv.com 2014)


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Today, energy policies in Europe remain highly nationalised, and changes have

mostly gone through the low politics route via experts and specialised officials in

the administration (Alexandrova & Timmermans 2015: 46). The Treaty of Lis-

bon also provides the legal ground for the member states to determine their own

energy mix. Therefore, energy is still mostly an issue for member states. Howev-

er, in April 2014, a comprehensive energy proposal appeared on to the Europe-

an policy agenda. The debate about this policy was triggered by an article in the

Financial Times by the then Polish Prime Minister (and current President of the

European Council) Donald Tusk (Tusk 2015). The fundamental claim of the

article was that EU member states had neglected the security aspects of energy, a

fact that needed to be rectified immediately. Tusk called for a new policy ap-

proach centred around a new European Energy Union, where the great potential

of indigenous energy sources (e.g. coal, shale gas) and nuclear energy should be

recognised.

As the new European Commission under Jean Claude Juncker took office on the

1st of November 2014, it made the Energy Union one of its five priority areas for

new legislation. A Vice President was appointed with the sole responsibility of

securing the necessary momentum, and on the 25th of February 2015, the

Commission revealed the first proposal for an Energy Union. The Commission

proposal had travelled a long way from Tusk’s initial article in the Financial

Times. It gave new impetus to further European integration within energy poli-

cy. Aligned with the statement (shown above) made by Vice President Šefčovič,

the main argument to build comprehensive energy cooperation was the recent

Russian intervention in Ukraine. However, if the Energy Union really is a result

of the crisis in Ukraine, why was a new approach to European energy policy not

already adopted after the first gas crisis in early 2006 - or after the Russo-

Georgian war in August 2008? The two events are somewhat similar to today’s

problematic relationship with Russia, yet the Energy Union represents a rather

fundamental re-thinking of energy policies. Yet, the broadly defined concept of

an Energy Union still remains rather ambiguous. This leads us to wonder about


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some of the fundamentals in public policy, which firstly relate to the timing of

the proposal - or as Kingdon puts it: how can we explain “an idea whose time

has come?” (Kingdon 2003: xvii).

Why was the Energy Union suddenly proposed in February 2015 - almost ten

years after Russia first shut off the gas valves? Secondly, we wonder what

shaped the Energy Union and how it differs from earlier energy policies. These

two questions lead us to ask the following research question:

Research question:

“Why is ‘the Energy Union’ on the European policy agenda?”

In order to examine why the Energy Union is on the agenda, we need to uncover

what it is. Thus, we approach the question one step at the time, by first uncover-

ing the explorative aspect of the Energy Union, (1) what is it? Through inter-

views, we collect data and various perceptions of the Energy Union. On this ba-

sis, we will then describe (2) how the Energy Union has entered the agenda. This

identification of variables, and the way they influence each other, will enable us

to uncover causal inferences and thus the final explanatory element in our re-

search: (3) why has an agenda change taken place? These sub-questions implicit-

ly structure our research in which the final research objective is to achieve an

explanatory theory that adequately answers the overall research question (An-

kersborg & Watt Boolsen 2007: 12).

In the present dissertation, we take the reader upon a journey of increased theo-

retical reflection. We start with an empirical puzzle and explore it using a theo-

retical framework. We follow the abductive research strategy moving back and

forth between theory and empirical evidence until we have a satisfying answer to


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our research question. Due to the complex nature of the case of the Energy Un-

ion, we gather data by conducting elite interviews with individual experts on the

subject. We use the interviews as a source of information about events, and to

reveal the perspectives and discursive practices of those who produced them.

This way we gain rich data - and through a within-case method of congruence

using an analytical general process tracing, we will be able to answer the overall

research question.

In order to approach the research question systematically, we use the Multiple

Streams Framework (MSF) as proposed by Kingdon (2003) and further devel-

oped by Zahariadis (2007a). However, while the MSF is a valuable tool to ex-

plore complex policy proposals, it has difficulties explaining the real drivers be-

hind them. Therefore, we make use of an abductive research strategy that seeks

to refine our theoretical reflections and create an adequate hypothesis about the

causes that led to the Energy Union. We therefore turn to theoretical hypotheses

on the one hand and empirical puzzles on the other.

The empirical findings from our interviews lead us in the direction of the neo-

institutional theory Discursive Institutionalism (DI) as developed by Vivien

Schmidt (2008, 2010, 2012). This theory is chosen as we consider it the most

suitable overall explanatory perspective, from which we are able to uncover

causal inferences. However, while DI provides a satisfying degree of explanatory

power, we find that the theory needs further adaptation in order to provide an

adequate framework to assess our data. Hence, we merge the Narrative Policy

Framework with DI in order to identify how agents make use of strategic com-

municative action. The new theoretical framework guides our analysis and un-

covers the dynamic relationship between the various narratives and their struc-

tural premises. This leads us to an overall hypothesis, which we discuss by mak-

ing use of a counterfactual reasoning using the incidents with Russia in 2006

and 2008. Finally, we discuss whether the Energy Union should be understood

as more than merely a symptom of a legitimacy crisis within the EU.


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1.1 ENERGY ON THE EUROPEAN POLICY AGENDA

In order to give our reader an overall understanding of the energy policy area,

and of the developments within European energy policies in particular, we take

a brief historical tour. The review reveals different stages within energy policy.

The energy policy-making has only been high on the European policy agenda

twice. This is sometimes known as ‘the high politics route’ where problems enter

the political agenda as matters of high urgency, and a necessity to respond to

issues in the social and political environment (Alexandrova & Timmermans

2015: 46). However, issues may also become a matter of concern in the social

environment before policy-makers address them. Historical and structural fac-

tors must be considered when examining plausible causal inferences relevant to

our research question.

The first time energy was high on the European agenda since the establishment

of the Coal and Steel Community was in 1979 during the second oil crisis,

where the issue surged to 32% of the subjects in the European Council conclu-

sions. Energy policy narrowly surpassed macroeconomics as the most discussed

topic at the European Council meetings. The surge happened only to disappear

almost completely within a few years. From 1981 to 2005, the subject averaged

around 1%, only to become the second most discussed subject in 2006 when

Russia took a firm grasp on the gas handle. The only subject to surpass energy

in the council conclusions was foreign policy as shown in figure 1.1. Figure 1.1

shows this development by categorising the subjects in the council conclusions.

Figure 1.1: European Council conclusions by subject


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Chart from Alexandrova (et al. 2014) with our modifications.

Table 1.1 shows the general understanding of the developments within the field

of energy policy. The first stage was the founding of the European Coal and

Steel Community in 1951, and the European Atomic Energy Community in

1957. The main objective of these institutions was to guarantee the supply of

energy among the member states. Over the years, the European Commission in

particular made several attempts to modify the treaty law by including a chapter

on energy. These attempts repeatedly failed due to the resistance by member

states that were reluctant to transfer further competencies in energy matters to

the EU. However, by 1987, member states agreed to include the Environmental

Policy Integration principle in the Single European Act (Biesenbender 2015: 23).

Finally, the third stage of energy cooperation started when the Treaty of Lisbon

provided a broad mandate for energy policy-making. This decision enabled poli-


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cy-makers to pursue a number of – oftentimes – conflicting energy-related policy

goals.

Table 1.1: Energy policy and treaty law in the European Union

First stage Second stage Third stage

Time frame Mid 1950s to late 1980s Late 1980s to mid-

2000s

Since mid-2000s

Legal frame-

work

● European Coal- and

Steel Community (1951)

● Atomic Energy Commu-

nity (1957)

● Single European

Act (1987)

● Treaty of Maas-

tricht (1992)

● Treaty of Lisbon

(2007)

Focus of the

EU energy

policy

● Energy security

● Common market

● Environmental

policy integration

(EPI) principle

● Energy as a pri-

ority matter

● Energy supply

● Energy efficiency

● Renewable ener-

gy

● Interconnection of

energy networks

Source: Biesenbender 2015: 24

However, the third stage was still characterised by non-holistic policy initiatives

which member states were reluctant to comply with. In the present dissertation,

we will demonstrate that the proposal of the Energy Union could symbolise a

new stage of European energy cooperation.

1.2 THE ENERGY UNION

On 25 February 2015, the European Commission revealed the first proposal for

a strategy for an Energy Union. The context for this proposal was that the EU

imported 53% of its energy from outside the EU, which made it the largest en-

ergy importer in the world. Six member states depended on a single external

supplier for their entire gas imports and therefore remained highly vulnerable to


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supply shocks. At the same time, the Commission emphasised that wholesale

electricity prices for European countries were 30% higher than in the US, which

has a negative impact on the overall competitiveness. However, the Commission

stressed that the EU still had a leading role within global investment in renewa-

ble energy (EU Commission 2015: 3).

The proposed Energy Union consists of five interrelated dimensions:

“1. Energy security, solidarity and trust;

2. A fully integrated European energy market;

3. Energy efficiency contributing to moderation of demand;

4. Decarbonising the economy, and

5. Research, Innovation and Competitiveness” (EU Commission 2015: 4)

Within the first dimension, (1) emphasis was put on solidarity between member

states to secure a reliable energy supply and an optimal use of energy. In this

way, the EU will be able to speak with ‘one voice’ in global affairs. Achieving

this goal requires new and expensive infrastructure. The Commission suggests

using “all available Community funding instruments” (EU Commission 2015:

5), in particular the proposed European Fund for Strategic Investments. (2) The

second dimension relates to the further development of European energy mar-

kets based on competition, and the free flow of energy with effective regulation

where necessary. (3 & 4) The energy should be used more effectively, and

should preferably be based on sustainable, low-carbon and climate-friendly

sources that will safeguard Europe in the long term. (5) Achieving the last di-

mension would improve innovation and the overall competitiveness of European

companies.


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2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW

In this section, we evaluate previous studies in the research literature that are

relevant to the case of the Energy Union. This is done in order to determine the

nature of our research and to clarify where our dissertation fits into the existing

body of knowledge. Furthermore, it will enable us to build upon previous theo-

ries and empirical findings on the subject.

Firstly, (2.1) we review the general approaches to energy in Political Science in

order to understand the area that we are studying. This is needed in order for us

to comprehend the object of our research question: what is energy all about and

why does it matter in our society? It is not our objective to explain the physical

aspects of various energy forms, but to present an understanding of the political

role energy plays, and to clarify the distinct characteristics of energy policy

compared to other public policy areas.

Secondly, (2.2) we will carry out a historical tour of the Multiple Streams

Framework from the garbage-can heritage to its conception in Kingdon’s semi-

nal book. We include the recent developments and adaptations to a European

context, as well as the suggestions for further research in the literature.

Thirdly, (2.3) we briefly look at the drivers of change, as it will become im-

portant at a later stage in our dissertation. We choose to look within the neo-

institutionalisms for causal chains that can explain why the Energy Union made

it onto the agenda.

2.1 CONCEPTS OF ENERGY

We have identified four main understandings of energy in the existing research

literature: ‘markets and institutions’, ‘regions and empires’, ‘environmental un-

derstanding’ and that of ‘distributional justice’. We briefly touch upon all story-


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lines and the different research agendas dealing with energy and elaborate on

how to utilise this knowledge. The understandings are outlined in table 2.1.

Table 2.1: Understandings of energy in International Relations

Understandings Markets and

institutions

Regions and

empires

Environment Distributional jus-

tice

Energy is a mat-

ter of

The economy

and supply and

demand. Interde-

pendence creates

peace and eco-

nomic growth.

Security of the

state. Environmental con-

cerns. Energy is a

means to mitigate

climate change.

Distributional jus-

tice. Inequalities

should be consid-

ered when imple-

menting energy

(and climate) poli-

cies.

Roots in Inter-

national Rela-

tions

Liberalism Realism Governance litera-

ture; Constructiv-

ism; and Poststruc-

turalism; Environ-

mental philosophy

International Politi-

cal Economy; and

World Systems

Theory

Representative

authors

Goldthau & Witte

(2009); Keohane

& Victor (2013);

Youngs (2009);

Haas (1968)

Gilpin (1981);

Mearsheimer

(1995); Morgen-

thau et al. (2006)

Hulme (2009);

Hajer (1995); Mol

et al. (2009); New-

ell & Bulkeley

(2010); Connely et

al. (2012)

Robert and Bradley

(2006); Krasner

(1985); Wallerstein

(1979)

The understandings outlined in table 1 form the basis for discussions about en-

ergy policy. The table shows that energy policy-making can be driven by com-

mercial interests, national energy security, mitigating climate change and distri-

butional justice. Within the recent decades, there have been a rise in studies fo-

cusing on environmental and climate policies based on distinct philosophical

assumptions (e.g. Connelly et al. 2012). Given that the largest component of

greenhouse gas emissions is the consumption of fossil fuels, energy is an im-


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portant component within this understanding. We believe that, in a European

context, the environmental understanding of energy is likely to be found due to

the substantial number of adopted climate policies within the last decade.

The understanding of energy being a matter of distributional justice has its roots

in World Systems Theory and (Realist) International Political Economy. This

approach especially revolves around the North-South divide and the unequal

climate change negotiations, i.e. the unequal negotiating capacity together with

the unjust cost of climate change (e.g. Robert et al. 2006). In this perspective,

the ability to implement climate-mitigating reforms should consider the differ-

ence between the countries’ economic and social stage of development. We find

that this understanding is mostly relevant to global climate negotiations.

However, the understandings of ‘markets and institution’ and ‘regions and em-

pires’ have historically drawn most attention, both scholarly and politically

(Youngs 2009). The fundamental conflict between the two main understandings

of energy is whether the economy is superior to political interests or not. Geopo-

litical views on energy were especially influential following the oil crisis in 1973

where OAPEC punished Western countries for their support for the State of Is-

rael. However, in the following decades, a stronger sense of market rule ap-

peared in the energy sector. Energy security in the geopolitical sense of the

1970s was now “a footnote[…] an empty phrase” (Youngs 2009: 7). The un-

derstanding of markets thus flourished especially from the mid-80s until mid-

00s. While the oil crisis had substantial implications for the political understand-

ing of energy, it also fuelled scholarly works, as seen in figure 2.1. where the

correlation between journal publications on energy and the oil price is remarka-

bly consistent.


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Figure 2.1: Correlation between journal publications on energy

and the oil price.

Source: Hughes & Lipscy (2013: 453).

Recent developments in the Middle East and the most recent crisis with Russia

have re-nurtured the storyline of regions and empires. Energy supply is once

again on the agenda as a political mean of exerting pressure. Political scientist

Robert Gilpin, who writes within the realist tradition of International Relations,

describes the mercantilist model and the object of economic means as ‘the at-

tempt of governments to manipulate economic arrangements in order to maxim-

ize their own interest’. (Gilpin 1975: 45). In this sense, the economic structures

become inferior in comparison to the political interest of the state. States should

not steer the energy policy based on the moods and whims of the market, but

rather based on self-interest. From this perspective, energy is securitized and the

challenge is first and foremost to secure the interests of the nation states.


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The two main storylines can also be found when within the constructivist ap-

proach to International Relations. This is the case, when discussing the EU as an

international actor – especially within the Common Foreign and Security Policy.

In this perspective, the member states are subject to the dynamics of normative

socialisation and discursive persuasion. Thus, in this view, national interest was

constructed within the EU to be able to adapt to the ‘shared problem solving’

instead of competing against each other (Youngs 2009: 17). In the realist view,

it remains unclear whether energy security imperatives would undermine coop-

eration within EU or push the member states into a deeper self-protecting coor-

dination.

2.1.1 ENERGY SECURITY

Energy security has a number of aspects: long-term energy security mainly deals

with timely investments to supply energy in line with economic developments

and environmental needs. On the other hand, short-term energy security focuses

on the ability of the energy system to react promptly to sudden changes in the

supply-demand balance.

Energy security intersects with a range of wider security concerns because of its

physical nature. Energy security is a prerequisite for obtaining economic securi-

ty, social security, international security, and finally, it is intertwined with envi-

ronmental security (Raphael & Stokes in Collins 2010: 379). An often-used def-

inition is the following:

“Energy security exists when there are energy sources large enough to meet the

needs of the political community (the energy demands), which include all mili-

tary, economic and social activity. Those sources must be able to deliver such

quantities in a reliable and stable manner, and for the foreseeable future.”

(Raphael & Stokes in Collins 2010: 379).

This definition is problematic, however, because it defines energy security mere-

ly as a function of energy needs. Energy security has more aspects. For instance,


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when the EU blames Russia of intervening in Ukraine and annexing Crimea, the

European dependency becomes a hot topic. However, there is little focus on the

energy import from Norway, although that country is also a crucial energy sup-

plier to the EU. One might then distinguish between negative and positive de-

pendency. The EU relation with Russia could be described as a ‘negative de-

pendency’, whereas the Norwegian example would be a ‘positive dependency’.

Hence, we prefer the International Energy Agency’s definition because it in-

cludes the subject of price:

“The uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price.” (IEA

2015).

2.2 MULTIPLE STREAMS FRAMEWORK

We use MSF to structure our data gathering, and we will therefore spend some

time assessing the field. Multiple Stream is sometimes called Multiple Streams

approach, occasionally the model, and other times framework. We will employ

the latter and use the abbreviation “MSF”.

In table 2.2, we have summarized the applications of MSF so far. Only full ap-

plications of MSF have found their way into the table, as sporadically uses of

MSF-tools do not substantially contribute to the field.

Table 2.2: Works where MSF has applied been applied fully.

Domain/System US EU Other

Theoretical Kingdon 2003,

Zahariadis 2007

Ackrill & Kay 2011

Ackrill et al. 2013

Olsen 2001

Energy Solati 2009

Karapin 2012

Nicole Herweg 2015a

THIS

DISSERTATION

Karapin 2012


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Other domain Zahariadis 2007

Hesting 2009

Ackrill & Kay 2011

Maricuţ 2011

Jeppesen et al. 2013

Note: Applications in italic are master theses.

The table shows that our thesis contributes to a developing field. Most of the

works are very recent, including the only other application in the EU energy

field.

2.2.1 THE ORIGINS OF MSF

The roots of Multiple Streams Framework can easily be traced back to Cohen,

March and Olsen’s 1972 “Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice.” (Ol-

sen 2001). The original text is a mathematical model of decision-making, or

what Cohen et al. calls “a simple simulation model” (Cohen et al. 1972: 3).

Scholars using MSF today seldom follow the mathematical approach, and nei-

ther do we in this dissertation.

The scope of MSF’s applications is organized anarchies in which decision-

makers have limited time and attention. The attention span may differ from per-

son to person, but in the context of a large number of policy areas, any decision-

maker is limited to focusing on a few subjects at a time.

Given MSF’s original application in organisations, Garbage Can-model is con-

cerned with individuals: “Problems are the concern of people (...) A solution is

somebody’s product” (Cohen et al. 1972: 3; our highlighting). These solutions

may be rational at the specific time at an individual level, but not at an organisa-

tional level. As we shall see later, this has implications for our framework as we

study organisations, institutions, corporations, and countries.

The Garbage Can-tradition kept developing and today it can be viewed almost

independently of MSF. Below - like in the rest of the thesis - we focus on the

specific MSF strand, rather than Garbage Can-theory.


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2.2.2 MSF CONCEPTION

The starting point for MSF is Kingdon’s book ‘Agendas, Alternatives and Public

Policies’, published in 1984. Although the book and its theory still employs the

terms used by Garbage Can Theory (Maricut 2011: 3), it is considered the actu-

al starting point for the Multiple Streams Framework. In the book, rather than

just listing concepts, Kingdon manages to put these into context and show how

to use them through his own application.

Kingdon carried out his test over four years (Kingdon 2003: 4). Through 247

continuous interviews with the same public officials, he was able to track differ-

ent agendas and their presence in lawmakers’ and public officials’ minds over

time. This enabled him to track where various policy initiatives/agendas started,

and how they spread or disappeared over time. Kingdon followed ‘agenda set-

ting’, but later, other researchers expanded MSF to the analysis of decision-

making as well.

A major advantage of MSF is its ‘holism’, which goes beyond cherry picking one

causal chain and analysing just one variable. Indeed, as Ackrill & Kay note:

“full understanding of EU sugar reform must integrate all reform pressures”

(Ackrill & Kay 2011: 86). Every aspect plays a part and everything can be in-

cluded.

2.2.3 MSF IN AN EU CONTEXT

The Multiple Streams Framework was originally developed to explain the Unit-

ed States’ health and transport policies. The lens shows how interactions be-

tween leading individuals and institutions in the US federal government can ex-

plain the conditions for successful policy-making. When applied to a European

context, the framework therefore needs to be adapted.

Many have suggested applying MSF in a European context, but only recently

has this suggestion been followed by action. Zahariadis finished his seminal arti-


24

cles with a list of “Recommendations for Further Research” (Zahariadis in Sa-

batier & Weible 2007: 46ff). One of Zahariadis’ first recommendations is to test

whether the approach works in other domains: “Can lenses developed in one

context be extended to provide credible explanations in the other?” (ibid.)

Ackrill et al. (2013) take up this recommendation by adapting the theoretical

framework to the EU.

MSF is in fact quite versatile which the recent applications have proven: with

only a few modifications the framework can also be used to analyse an EU con-

text. Mostly, this can be attributed to its ability to incorporate complex struc-

ture and very diverse actors - something it does better than most other ap-

proaches. Some adaptations are needed, and we will treat this further in 3.4.

(Ackrill & Kay 2011; Ackrill et al. 2013). In the following paragraph we will

give a tour of MSF’s applications to the EU. This will eventually lead to us to

argue that MSF thrives in a complex organisation with many different actors at

different levels.

Peters (1994) and Richardson (2001) were among the first to advocate the use

of MSF in a European context. Peters, (1994: 19ff) however only used a few

isolated concepts (policy entrepreneurs and ideas) without genuinely endorsing

further research. Richardson (2001) engaged more fully with Kingdon’s ideas,

but still did not carry out a full analysis. Maricut, writing in 2011, believed that

MSF was underdeveloped and underapplied in a European context (Maricut

2011: 6). This was probably true in 2011; however, since then the developments

and applications have picked up speed, as seen in table 2.2.

Ackrill & Kay (2011) set out with a puzzle similar to the one in this thesis: “[...]

the 2005 EU sugar policy reform, which occurred after several reforms to other

sectors under the CAP. The paper sets out, first, why sugar was not reformed

sooner” (Ackrill & Kay 2011: 86). They believe that MSF is underdeveloped in

a European context and set out to rectify that. They separated policy entrepre-

neurs from the process of policy entrepreneurship (Ackrill & Kay 2011: 86) be-


25

cause policy windows are kept open longer due to authority that resides in sev-

eral different institutions.

Applying MSF to analyse the European Union is now gaining momentum, espe-

cially since Ackrill et al. (2013) presented a more fully adapted approach to us-

ing MSF within the EU. However, many still do not apply the full framework

(e.g. Richardson in Richardson & Mazey 2015).

Surely, Kingdon (2003) and Ackrill et al. (2013) are the most relevant theoreti-

cal sources for our thesis, but application-wise, the most relevant is Herweg

(2015a). Herweg’s application is recent and applies MSF to the area of energy,

as do we in the present dissertation.

Nicole Herweg addresses the question of why it was only in the late 1980s that

the liberalisation of the energy markets entered the institutional agenda, and

why it was finally adopted a decade later. (Herweg 2015a: 87). Herweg con-

cludes that the rise of energy policy on the political agenda was a result of the

Commission’s success in framing energy matters as a competition issue. Today,

three energy packages seeking to develop the Internal Energy Market have been

passed. Herweg finds the lacking focus on a comprehensive energy policy puz-

zling and analyses the area through the case of the liberalisation of the natural

gas market. The making of the first directive in 1998 is studied in-depth to ex-

plain the breaking down of the ‘legitimacy barrier’ (Herweg 2015a: 88). The

claim is that the low politics route suddenly became a success in terms of claim-

ing authority at the EU-policy agenda. In this respect, we differ from Herweg as

our case is set in a context of external security shocks (2006, 2009 and 2015),

thus explaining the difference in agenda setting going through the high politics

route.

While MSF provides a useful framework for data gathering, it has no ‘inner log-

ic’ or causal chain that can explain change. For this, we look to neo-

institutionalist theories.


26

2.3 DRIVERS OF CHANGE: NEO-INSTITUTIONALISM

In order to explain how institutions and public policy are being created and

changed, we turn to the theories of neo-institutionalism where the ‘second gen-

eration’ neo-institutionalists are concerned with questions such as: ‘How does

institutional change come about?’, ‘Where does it originate?’, etc. (Fligstein &

McAdams 2012; Thornton et al. 2012). In comparison with the old institution-

alism, the perspectives have a renewed focus on how political outcomes are be-

ing influenced by institutions (Hall & Taylor 1996: 937). Neo-institutionalists

are more concerned with stable patterns of action and meaning orientation cre-

ated by social processes of isomorphism, rather than as a reflection of efficiency

considerations (Morgan et al. 2014: 934).

While the Multiple Streams Framework can work as a lens to structure the cha-

otic policy-making within the EU, the theories of neo-institutionalism can also

explain the latent logics and drivers of change (or stabilisation). The theoretical

perspectives can roughly be divided into four types of institutionalisms: Rational

choice, Sociological, Historical (Hall & Taylor 1996), and Discursive Institu-

tionalism, as Vivien Schmidt and others have recently argued (Schmidt 2008;

Schmidt 2010; Schmidt 2012). In the analysis of the conducted interviews, we

weigh the various theories against each other in order to identify the logic of

change with greatest explanatory power.

Rational choice institutionalism is essentially based on an actor-centred, inten-

tional and utilitarian ontology (Djikstra 2013: 8). Within an EU context, sover-

eign member states face the dilemma of whether they should perform desired

functions ‘in-house’ or ‘outsource’ them to the EU bureaucracies (Tallberg 2002:

25). This results in a cost-benefit analysis by the member states. By monitoring

and enforcing agreements, the Commission and the Courts of Justice can im-

prove domestic compliance. Rational choice institutionalism stresses that delega-

tion leads to a loss of agency on the side of the member states (Kiewet &

McCubbins 1991). The member states consider these sovereign costs when mak-


27

ing their initial delegation decisions. Uncertainty may result in non-delegation or

less delegation than is functionally optimal (Stone 2009; Miller 2005). Change

can happen when situation or policy environment is subject to external shock.

The focus of sociological institutionalists is a ‘logic of appropriateness’ that re-

sults in institutional development and human action (March & Olsen 1989;

DiMaggio & Powell 1991; Scott 1995). They prefer to study preference for-

mation of actors stemming from the context, rather than analysing their power-

struggles (Checkel 2005). Constructivist approaches suggest (in opposition to

RCI) that member states may delegate tasks for structure-related reasons, rather

than on the basis of calculation (e.g. March & Olsen 1984). In their delegation

decisions, member states create bureaucracies that they consider ‘appropriate’ or

legitimate. Through their experiences, member states internalise notions of what

is considered appropriate. Though constructivists focus on institutions as struc-

tural constraints, there is some focus on agency. EU officials and diplomats try

to reach mutually acceptable decisions as a result of deliberate problem-solving

(e.g. Joerges & Neyer 1997). In this process, the ability to put forward persua-

sive arguments on the basis of better information and expertise becomes crucial

(e.g. Hall 1997; Barnett & Finnemore 1999, 2004; Risse 2000)

Scholars within Historical institutionalism (HI) use concepts of path dependency

and commitment to explain how institutional formations emerge at the societal

level. . Unlike rational choice institutionalists, historical institutionalists place

emphasis on power and politics. HI emphasises not only the operation and de-

velopment of institutions, but also the path dependencies and unintended conse-

quences that result from such historical development (Hall & Taylor 1996).

More recent work in historical institutionalism (Streeck & Thelen 2005) have

focused on incremental institutional change where terms such as layering, drift,

and conversion are central. Change happens when rational actors are engaged in

“on-going skirmishing as actors try to achieve advantage by interpreting or redi-

recting institutions” (Streeck and Thelen 2005: 19).


28

The most recent contribution to neo-institutionalism is Discursive institutional-

ism. ‘Discursive’ as a concept refers to the notion that ideas plays a pivotal role

in explaining change (Schmidt 2008: 305). In Contrasting discursive text analy-

sis where ‘what is being said’ is the main object of analysis, the context of who,

what, when and where is also a central explanatory factor within discursive in-

stitutionalism (DI). The literature has pointed towards similar theoretical

frameworks, e.g. Ideational institutionalism (Hay 2001), Constructivist institu-

tionalism (Hay 2006) and Strategic institutionalism (Jabko 2006). The frame-

work being used and developed by Vivien Schmidt distinguishes itself on espe-

cially two accounts: Firstly, institutional changes are explained by endogenous

change within actors’ ideas and discourses (Schmidt 2008: 309). Secondly, insti-

tutions are not a priori a fact of the case or limited factors. Institutions are seen

as dynamic constructions with the possibility of change through ”a logic of

communication” (ibid.: 322). DI scholars therefore distance themselves from the

three older neo-institutionalisms where institutions primarily work as con-

straints, whether as rational incentives, historical paths, or cultural frames

(Schmidt 2010: 4).

The explanatory power of DI lies in its assumption that human ideas and dis-

course are explanatory variables in relation to institutional change. Therefore,

ideas can be institutions within DI (Bell 2012: 6). Schmidt denotes her approach

as moderately constructivist (Schmidt 2012: 708), and when it comes to change

of formal institutions, the so called ‘rules and regularities’, she is partly inspired

by historical institutionalism in explaining change through crises or incremental-

ism (Schmidt 2012: 707). She acknowledges that institutions can limit agents;

however, agents still have the possibility of criticising institutions by using the

foreground abilities (Schmidt 2008: 322) The foreground is the policy or pro-

gram ideas which are discussed on a regular basis; they are the arena for the dis-

cursive construction of institutions. The actors are able to relate critically to the

institutions. Background abilities are the ‘baggage’ of philosophical presump-

tions. They cannot be questioned and agents bring them everywhere - in this


29

sense, they relate to the Kuhnian or Lakatosian understandings of paradigm or

research agenda. The background is shaped by the institutions but cannot be

criticised by agents. Changes in background happen incrementally or suddenly

during crises, while the foreground is changing constantly in interaction with the

background. In this sense, Schmidt is open to actors as changing institutions.

The change within the individual agent happens as an endogenous process

through reframing and recasting of collective memories and narratives (Schmidt

2010: 5). This leads us to conclude that Schmidt sees institutions as creating and

created structures: “The institutions of discursive institutionalism [...] are simul-

taneously structures and constructs internal to agents whose ”background idea-

tional abilities” within a given ”meaning context” explain how institutions are

created and exist and whose ”foreground discursive abilities” following a ”logic

of communication” explain how institutions change or persist.” (Schmidt 2008:

303).


30

3.0 MULTIPLE STREAMS FRAMEWORK

After a short introduction and a brief historical overview of the MSF (2.0), we

now unfold the framework in greater detail and adapt it to the case of the Ener-

gy Union. We do this because MSF is structuring our data gathering and hence

much of our understanding of the Energy Union. We use it to obtain a necessary

overview, which MSF provides in a systematic manner. The framework provides

a wide and flexible lens, which is adequate in identifying the most influential

variables to our overall research question. In this section we clarify the sur-

roundings relevant to the case of the Energy Union and the delimitations of the

MSF.

First, we outline the framework in 3.1, and then we discuss the assumptions in

3.2 and what it means when MSF encompasses both agents and structure in 3.3.

In 3.4, we argue that MSF is the adequate lens for exploring EU agenda-setting

and policy-making, whereafter we assess the delimitations of this framework in

3.5.

3.1 MSF OUTLINED

Multiple Streams Framework consists of three streams: 1) policy, 2) politics, 3)

problems, and furthermore the elements: 4) policy entrepreneurs and 5) policy

windows. Each stream is “conceptualized as having a life and dynamics of its

own” (Zahariadis 2007: 1). The independent streams are both the greatest ad-

vantage and the biggest criticism of MSF. An advantage because it creates the

overview that is so needed in complicated policy processes, and criticism because

the different streams are difficult to separate in practice.

Problem stream contains problems that call for policy-makers’ attention. Prob-

lems are usually backed by data or an indicator of the particular problem. Prob-

lems jump on and off the agenda, often having a stronger effect the second time

that they emerge on the agenda. Agenda items perceived as ‘heavier’ push the


31

‘lighter’ items off the agenda as policy-makers’ attention is limited. We explore

this characteristic in depth by examining how agents perceive problems relevant

to the Energy Union.

Policy stream consists of ideas within a certain policy area, e.g. energy. Policies

are not connected to problems, but are rather independent ideas that will jump

onto any policy proposal regardless of whether it represents a solution to the

problem. If an idea refers to commonly agreed upon ideals (value acceptability)

it has a greater chance of succeeding. Also, the idea must be technical feasible.

For that reason, we ask our interviewees how they assess the chances of actual

implementation of the Energy Union.

Politics stream are, in this respect, the ‘surroundings’ to the Energy Union pro-

posal. Not only problems and ideas are affecting the viability of a proposal - the

general attitude is too. In the case of a proposal at the EU level, the general “EU-

mood” is important when proposing legislation. E.g. more powers to the EU

Commission, at the expense of member states, will have a tougher time when

public dissent vis à vis the EU is widespread. The balance of the European Par-

liament is also relevant to the surroundings. However, we do not expect it t be

crucial due to the Energy Union’s early stage in the decision-making process.

Policy windows are the rare moments when problems, policies and politics come

together. This is closely connected to policy entrepreneurs who advocate their

own ‘pet solutions’. The policy windows ‘open’ when policy-makers are aware

of a problem and willing to apply solutions (policies) and politics are not against

it. Hence, the window is where agency and structural momentum meet. In the

case of the Energy Union, we will look for these entrepreneurial events and ac-

tions.

Policy entrepreneurs can be anyone in or in the fringes of the political system.

They have one or more ideas that they advocate and connect their policy to any

problem in order to push it forward. The entrepreneurs frame their ideas in or-


32

der to convince important actors. Examining these framing activities are there-

fore crucial in order to identify relevant agency.

3.2 ASSUMPTIONS

The MSF rests on a couple of assumptions: 1) Time constraints, 2) Independent

streams and 3) Ambiguity. All of these concern what could be called ‘actor-

fails’. Actors are far from the omniscient, all-knowing, rational man that Ra-

tional Choice institutionalism presupposes. It even departs further from the

bounded rationality, as policy-makers can be fooled into connecting a policy to

a problem without there being a connection between the two. In this respect,

policy-makers’ attention shift from case to case without any particular order or

hierarchy, and is directed at one thing for such a short time that policy-windows

often close before entrepreneurs can act.

3.2.1 TIME CONSTRAINTS

The world does not stand still. While the hitherto largest number of refugees

and immigrants are knocking on the EU gates, Greece is close to defaulting, and

consumer lobbyists is frustrated about the TTIP agreement. Indeed, time is a

factor in policy-making - especially in the EU - and time constraints are a limit-

ing factor.

Policy-makers are busy people. They can engage in a limited number of cases

while representatives from all kinds of organisations try to divert their attention

to a large number of different issues. Only a few issues make it to the attention

of policy-makers. The ones that do are oftentimes based on the policy-makers’’

preconceived ideas about the case, the organisation delivering the message, etc.

Crucially, policy-makers “must accept outcomes that satisfice rather than opti-

mize” (Ackrill et al 2013: 872). Therefore, the understanding of focusing events

and problem perceptions become crucial in the MSF.


33

3.2.2 INDEPENDENT STREAMS

The causality from problem to solution does not exist in the MSF. Policies exist

at all times while problems appear unexpectedly, and politics has an individual

life as well. This controversial assumption is criticised as it turns the conven-

tional logic of problem solving upside down. This has to do with the actors who

are unable to know everything at all times. Entrepreneurs are seen as the reason

for the independent streams:

“Multiple streams argues that EU policies are the result of coupling by policy

entrepreneurs of three relatively independent streams—problems, politics, and

policies— during politically opportune moments. Each stream is conceptualized

as having a life and dynamics of its own.” (Zahariadis 2007: 6).

In analysing the streams, we recognize the critique of the rather artificially sepa-

rate streams as the streams indeed sometimes overlap. For analytical purposes,

however, we do believe that the separation has value, in the sense that it helps us

to identify important variables. Reminding ourselves that the purpose of theory

is not to create further confusion, but rather clarification, i.e. creating an over-

view and find causal inferences. After this step is executed, we construct an ade-

quate theoretical framework, which can lead us to answer how and why the En-

ergy Union entered the Agenda.

3.2.3 AMBIGUITY

The multiple streams framework is a lens that can be used to see and explain

how policies are made under conditions of ambiguity. The concept of ambiguity

is appropriate for both the EU policy process and the energy policy area. Feld-

man defines ambiguity as “a state of having many ways of thinking about the

same circumstances or phenomena” (Feldman 1989: 5 in Zahariadis 2007a).

Energy, as we have described earlier (2.1), is an ambiguous policy area that can

be viewed from different perspectives, i.e. energy as markets, geopolitics, distri-

butional justice, or as a means for a mitigating climate change. Ackrill et al.


34

(2013: 873) points out that the EU’s multi-level nature is an additional source to

ambiguity. Furthermore, the multitude of actors only creates an increased need

for a framework like MSF to provide an overview. Usually there is a distinction

between individual policy-makers and policy entrepreneurs due to the difference

in negotiating capacity. However, in the EU context, member states are obvious-

ly more resourceful than, for example, individual policy-makers in the US feder-

al government, and thus the distinction between policy-makers and policy entre-

preneurs can be rather opaque, a critique that has been raised before (Ackrill et

al. 2013: 881).

An important assumption about ambiguity is that actors are often unsure of

what they want to obtain. This is especially the case when time is scarce and

external events shape the agenda. Politicians often - due to time constraints -

make decisions before having formulated precise preferences (Zahariadis in Sa-

batier 2014: 67). In MSF, ambiguity and randomness are not anomalies that

need to be rectified. It is simply a normal EU policy-making process (Ackrill et

al. 2013: 872). In fact, when asking the Danish prime minister about the Energy

Union she felt a need to stress the character of the decision-making in the Euro-

pean Union:

“The great thing about Europe [...] is that whatever crisis we have to deal with,

we deal with it. [...] Even that we have to invent the path as we go along, we

invent a path and we find a way. That goes for the economic crisis, the financial

crisis, that’s the case with Ukraine where we have responded together, and that

will also be the case with the things we see in the Mediterranean sea. Conflict

upon conflict, crisis upon crisis. We deal with it“ (appendix 13: 2).

The ambiguity of the EU policy process is thus a premise for the decision-

making. Clearly, the Danish prime minister is proud that even under these diffi-

cult circumstances the EU is able to make decisions. Ambiguity hereby perme-

ates the process, and makes the process open to political manipulation biased in

favour of those who command information or those who control access to poli-


35

cy venues and communication platforms (Ackrill et al. 2013: 872). The ambigui-

ty of the policy process and the Energy Union proposal itself determines the

foundation for our choice of research strategy. In the methodology chapter, we

elaborate on our choice of following an abductive approach.

3.3 AGENTS AND STRUCTURES

The problem of agent vs. structure is probably as old as social science itself. In a

policy analysis-dissertation, we must address this issue as well. The Multiple

Streams Framework is a good point of departure for an overview of a compli-

cated process because “It draws insight from interactions between agency and

institutions”. (Ackrill et al. 2013: 871). It incorporates both agents and struc-

tural variables.

Our departing point is the quintessential puzzle in all of political science: How

does structure and agents influence each other. Most theories within social sci-

ences can be placed between the two outer positions that A) structure deter-

mines everything or that B) agents can roam independently of the structure.

Agents in particular play an important role in MSF: entrepreneurs can act seem-

ingly voluntarily - and in the MSF perspective indeed no action will happen

without them – due to their coupling of policies and problems. This is only the

‘popular’ (superficial) account of MSF, probably because it is easy to grasp the

concept of policy entrepreneurs. Where the research agenda stands today, an-

other area is more in need of scrutiny. Nowadays a larger emphasis is put on the

‘context’: “No entrepreneur alone will ever be enough to cause policy reform;

we always require an account of the context” (Ackrill et al. 2013: 879). The real

enabler is the context: “The expert and skilled advocacy of a policy idea, or

skilled brokering, in one context does not produce reform; but exactly the same

idea and brokering in a different context does produces reform” (Ackrill et al.

2013: 879).


36

Figure 3.1: Multiple Streams Framework’s position

Source: own depiction

MSF encompasses both the broader context (e.g. public mood) and the specific

situations (e.g. the activities of a policy entrepreneur). Even though the engineer-

ing of a policy window consists of microactions, agents act within a context that

is the basis for their actions: “No entrepreneur can cause policy reform alone;

we always require a set of background conditions for a PE [Policy Entrepreneur]

strategy to cause reform, fixed by a ceteris paribus clause” (Ackrill & Kay 2011:

76).

So, what does this going back and forth sum up? MSF takes a view that lies be-

tween structure and agent, but still lacks when trying to uncover causal infer-

ences. Hopefully we can contribute to this end: “The research agenda endures:

how to understand policy entrepreneurs’ situations in the broader context”

(Ackrill et al. 2013: 879). Thus, it is our goal to refine the theory by supple-

menting it with other useful perspectives.


37

3.4 MSF AND THE EU

As stated above in the literature review (2.2.3), the MSF application to the EU

has been desired for a long time, but it has only recently picked up speed. In this

section, we theorise the main changes that we make to the framework in order

to apply MSF to the EU. First, we argue that MSF is an obvious candidate to use

as a lens for the EU and the Energy Union; second, we highlight a few adjust-

ments to the model.

3.4.1 ADVANTAGES

As seen above, the MSF is particularly useful for exploring systems where the

actors’ participation is fluid and uncertainty rules. This is the case with the EU

where the number of actors is much larger than in the average national political

context.

Fluid participation: While MEP’s are elected for five years, many employees at

the national representations (e.g. COREPER and their subordinates) generally

stay for fewer years and then return to capitals. Ministers and their participation

in the various EU council meetings also change with elections and changes in

governments of member states. This institutional setup also complicates agenda-

setting profoundly. MSF is well equipped to catch this variety. As Ackrill et al.

notes:

“In 2001, Johan Olsen identified the EU as ‘an obvious candidate’ for study

using a garbage can approach (Olsen 2001: 196). He also stated that ‘it may

also be necessary to accept that significant political phenomena sometimes are

complex enough to make any simpler theory of them unsatisfactory’” (Ackrill et

al. 2013: 875).

In Olsen’s words, a theory focusing on only one causal chain is bound to fail,

why we find that a mere deductive approach would risk to narrow the scope of

possible important explanatory factors.


38

Actors and institutions: The EU institutions and member state leaders use hereof

also merits our choice of MSF. This was seen during Greece’s debt crisis where

European institutions like the ECB, the Commission, the Council and the Euro-

zone-countries were on high alert. However, the real decision-making power

seems to be present only when Merkel and Hollande are in the room. An odd

opt-out of the institutional set-up that according to flow-charts and hierarchies

should make the decisions. A similar scene was set when Merkel flew rendez-

vous between Moscow and Washington in an attempt to help resolve the Cri-

mea-crisis in 2014. The MSF as a lens has a broad outlook that ensures to in-

corporate all relevant actors, which is why the multitude of actors is not a prob-

lem.

External events: External events often play a part in major policy shifts. As

Ackrill et al. notes: “the wider the open window, the greater the possible change

– with unpredictable events opening the window wider” (Ackrill et al 2013:

876). External events are important to Energy policy, which MSF takes into ac-

count. Furthermore, lately it seems that EU policy-making has been driven most-

ly by external events: financial crisis, debt crisis, Ukraine-crisis and most recent-

ly the refugee-crisis. Using a lens that incorporates these crises seems appropri-

ate.

3.4.2 CHANGES

Pollitt (2008) believes that “the further one travels from […] the distinctive

characteristics and procedures of the American legislature – the more Kingdon’s

analysis may require adaptation.” (Pollitt 2008: 127). Ackrill & Kay call this

decontextualisation. We build on Ackrill & Kay and others when applying the

lens to the EU. We agree that decontextualisation is a valuable way of develop-

ing the framework to fit many different political systems; however, the frame-

work also needs to be adapted to fit the EU context.


39

Different authors point to different adaptations. In the following, we will focus

on what we believe are the most important adjustments.

The Public Mood: The public mood is inherent to the MSF; however, in the EU

“[t]he existence of an EU ‘public sphere’, a pre-condition for having a public

agenda, is questionable” (Herweg 2015a: 90). It could be argued that the refu-

gee-crisis has created just this. A pan-European agenda with every European

from Lisboa to Helsinki discussing the same events and reacting to the same pic-

tures. Within the energy agenda, however, this Europe-wide engagement is yet

to be seen. Therefore, we put less emphasis on the ‘public mood’ as a part of the

politics stream. This does not exclude the ‘private mood’, however. Lobbying

from private companies, their interest organisations, environmental NGO’s, etc.

is substantial, as this affects many companies and the climate at large.

Composition of governments: Composition of government is obviously an im-

portant factor in national systems. However, this changes at the EU level where

each national government only participate as a part of the Council. According to

Herweg (2015a: 90), we should abandon this traditional partisan way of think-

ing about governments and instead see the governments' influence as a kind of

national attitude. For that reason we also investigate the influence of important

member states.

Personal turnover: Personal turnover is part of the original MSF; however, as

Herweg points out, the focus should be increased and include “personal turno-

ver in positions with agenda-structuring power. This refers to the start of the

terms of office of the Commission President, of Commissioners […]” (Herweg

2015a: 90). We incorporate this by asking our interviewees about the new

Commission, especially Juncker and the Commissioners for Climate and Energy

Union.


40

3.5 DELIMITATIONS

We find that MSF has a good fit - even when applied to the EU. However, we

only apply it to one case, and one policy area, where the Commission does not

have a lot of power: “To clarify: in those sectors where the Union has exclusive

competence [...] ambiguity may no longer be the case, since the Commission

already has extensive powers over agenda-setting.” (Maricut 2011: 15). If ap-

plied to another area where the Commission is a much stronger actor, the MSF

may be a poorer fit. Only further studies can tell: “it can ultimately be argued

that the MS model can be very useful for explaining policy-making at EU level

in some areas, but fails short in explaining the factors characterising its policy

process more generally.” (Maricut 2011: 15). If the Energy Union ends up

changing the character of EU Energy Policy-making, perhaps MSF will not be an

appropriate approach to evaluate agenda-setting within EU energy policy in the

future.

MSF has another, and for this dissertation, greater delimitation. MSF provides a

framework for exploring a policy area or policy proposal, i.e. MSF explains the

what of our research question. However, the framework has no logic of change.

While it provides an overview of actors and their beliefs, it cannot explain why

actors believe what they do. For this reason, we need to supplement the MSF

with a theory containing alogic of change. For that reason, we turn to the neo-

institutionalist theories for explaining change using the rich data from our inter-

views.


41

4.0 METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN

In this chapter we first outline advantages of the single case study method, both

in terms of practical research and of the causal conclusions that can be drawn

from the method. Secondly, we develop a research strategy that seeks to refine

the immediate choice of using MSF as an easily accessible way of understanding

a complex policy proposal, it’s context, content and timing. However, this lens

has its own challenges, as it rather artificially separates policies, politics, and

problems, only to have entrepreneurs combine them once again in windows.

Thus, it’s clear that MSF cannot give an adequate answer to our research ques-

tion and we therefore follow an abductive strategy with the object of refining

theory and its explanatory power. Finally, we formulate data requirements, how

we obtain and assess them, and operationalise interview questions. When em-

barking on this journey, it is imperative to find an approach to the Energy Un-

ion that deals with the plurality of causes. In this chapter we therefore elaborate

on how we do research and how we gain knowledge, whilst being clear about

what principles to follow in our research in order to adequately answer the re-

search question. We therefore explain why we make use of certain methods in-

stead of others.

We are driven by a critical realism that straddles the ontological positions of

positivism/naturalism (as represented in both Popper and Hempel’s work) and

postmodernism/constructivism (as represented in Kuhn’s work) (Lopez & Potter

2005:7). However, we recognise that a social structure exists independent of our

own experience and activity: like Durkheim, we think to some extent that it pre-

exists us. We furthermore embrace Weber’s constructivist maxim, that man is an

animal suspended in webs of meaning that he himself has spun (Moses &

Knutsen: 13). Yet, we believe it is possible for human beings to critically observe

and achieve a conscious understanding of the foundations of society and culture

and act according to this realisation. Therefore, while we do not ‘create’ social

structures, we do transform them. Thus, we align ourselves with one of the most


42

important thinkers in the development of critical theory, Roy Bhaskar (2015).

Critical realism puts forward epistemological caution with respect to scientific

knowledge. Human beings produce knowledge and human beings can be mis-

taken. Science is not pure and can contain an ideologically distorted element in

both explanations and the methods used to conclude them. Hence, we find it

imperative to be transparent about our own background relevant to the research

and reflect upon how our pre-understanding affects the outcome of the research.

However, knowledge cannot be reduced to its sociological determinants of pro-

duction. Truth is relative, to be sure, but there is still both truth and error (as

well as lies) (Lopez & Potter 2015: 9). We are pragmatic in the sense that we

recognise that the world is complex but still expect to find social patterns that

agents act upon and perceive as being real. This starting point will lay the

ground for our epistemology. That is how we establish the accuracy and truth of

our conjectures, perceptions and findings.

4.1 SINGLE CASE STUDY METHOD

How do we create a research design that facilitates and optimises conceptual

validity? In the analysis, we wish to identify the causes that resulted in the mak-

ing of the Energy Union proposal. The case study method offers multiple ways

of strengthening theory testing and developing when conducting no-variance

research designs. Several works in comparative politics have e.g. used most-

likely, least-likely, etc. research designs to good effect2 (George & Bennett 2005:

33). Several pragmatic considerations have led us to choose the case study

method. First, our research object, the Energy Union and European energy poli-

cy, is most easily accessed by qualitative means. Secondly, single case studies

provide an excellent method for assessing causal relationships. Studying and

identifying variables and the causal relation between them are of crucial im-

2 Ronald Rogowski makes this point, citing works by Arend Lijphart, William Sheridan Allen, and Peter Alexis Gourevitch.


43

portance when wishing to find the drivers behind the Energy Union. Critical

ontologists endeavour to identify characteristics of ‘things’ and their tendencies

of interaction. ‘Things’ in a realist ontology may be powers, forces, mechanisms,

characteristics, or sets of relations (Lopez & Potter 2015: 11). The causal mech-

anisms within our research object are not yet realised, and hence the aim is to

identify the ‘things’ of the Energy Union.

Before moving on, we need to elaborate a bit on the case study and what this

implies for our analysis. George & Bennett defines a case study “as a class of

events. The term “class of events” refers here to a phenomenon of scientific in-

terest [...]. A case study is thus a well-defined aspect of a historical episode that

the investigator selects for analysis, rather than a historical event itself.” (George

& Bennett 2005: 17f) The recent discussion of the Energy Union on the EU

agenda, for example, is an instance of many different events: crisis management

in regards to energy security, working in the direction of more competitiveness,

a wish to mitigate climate change, etc. But why do we choose the case study

method and not the statistical approach? MSF is not fit for a statistical method

due to its non-linear and contextual character. Statistical methods require a

large sample size; therefore, models of complex interactions with many contex-

tual and intervening variables can become rather difficult to interpret (George &

Bennett 2005: 22). The method of controlled comparison, the study of two or

more instances of a well-specified phenomenon that resemble each other in every

respect but one, seems at first glance to be the most appealing approach. It ena-

bles the researcher to make use of experimental logic to draw causal inferences.

When securing analytically equivalent phenomena when comparing cases, it be-

comes possible to achieve high levels of conceptual validity or ‘to identify and

measure the indicators that best represent the theoretical concepts the researcher

intends to measure’ (George & Bennett 2005: 19). However, this perfect setup is

very difficult to achieve (George & Bennett 2005: 151). In the beginning of our

research, we did in fact aspire to design a longitudinal case study design that

compared three events where neighbour conflicts with Russia served as an ex-


44

ternal shock to the energy policy in Europe (2005/06, 2008 and 2014). These

conflicts serve to uncover why the Energy Union - being a comprehensive holis-

tic energy policy initiative - was not proposed until 2014. As initially stated, we

were puzzled that the Energy Union only recently entered the agenda, especially

due to the fact that there have been other focusing events or external shocks that

were similar to the Ukraine-crisis that we are currently dealing with. We are

therefore interested in the agenda setting going through the high politics route as

opposed to the low politics route, the latter characterised by experts and admin-

istrative specialist officials trying to push the agenda (Alexandrova & Timmer-

mans 2015: 46).

The first similar incident was the Russian-Ukrainian gas dispute in 2005 that

resulted in the Russian gas supplier Gazprom cutting off the energy supply in

January 2006, affecting European countries that were dependent on Russian gas

supplies. A few days later, the gas flow was restored and the situation settled.

However, this had a political effect on the EU member states’ perception of Rus-

sia as a trustworthy gas supplier. The second incident came when simmering

long-time tensions escalated between Georgia and its Russia-friendly breakaway

regions South Ossetia and Abkhazia in August 2008. Russia launched air at-

tacks throughout Georgia and Russian troops engaged on Georgian ground with

forces in South Ossetia. Alleged attempts were made to bomb the Georgian sec-

tions of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyan oil pipeline and the South Caucasus gas pipeline

that both provide fuel to EU member states. Again, this enhanced the distrust

between EU on one side and Russia on the other.

However, it quickly became evident in our research that it was difficult to com-

pare these events, due to many contextual differences. Furthermore, we realised

pragmatically that it was difficult to find individuals who still remember the in-

cidents, and what it meant to the European energy policy at that particular time.

A search through relevant news articles on the subject – in languages that we

comprehend – revealed little more. Last, but not least, we tend to believe that


45

the experimental paradigm promises more than it can deliver. The quasi-

experimental logic seems meticulous and militarily precise, yet findings often

seem to emerge in a prone-to-equivocation sort of way (in line with Pawson et

al. 1997). Instead, we optimised our research design within the single case of the

Energy Union while embracing the complexity of reality and our own embed-

dedness in it. To overcome some of the problems with equifinality that refers to

a plurality of causes to the same outcome (George & Bennett 2005: 157), we use

a within-case method of congruence together with an analytical general process

tracing. The latter method is used to further test the causal inferences made from

the congruence method. Finally, we discuss the hypothesis by making use of a

counterfactual reasoning (as a form of controlled comparison).

The essential characteristics of the congruence method are that we begin with a

theory and then attempt to assess its ability to explain the outcome: the Energy

Union on the European Agenda. However, as already mentioned, the Multiple

Streams Framework is not adequate in explaining the drivers behind the making

of the union. It can only gain a superficial description of what had happened

and not explain why it happened. So far, too much focus has been put on entre-

preneurs as individuals with their own personal life experiences (e.g. Corbett

2005 in Ackrill & Kay 2011). The ambitious goal of MSF is to illuminate the

ceteris paribus clause for the comparative analysis of policy processes (Ackrill et

al. 2013: 87). When mainly looking at the entrepreneurs, this goal will be

downplayed significantly. A ceteris paribus clause signifies an analytically fixed

moment. Ackrill et al. (2013: 880) suggest that more work should be done with-

in the literature of MSF in comparing windows of opportunity. This task has

not yet been fulfilled - or at least not in a satisfactory manner. “Theoretical

work on windows of opportunity where change or reforms do not eventuate is

limited; as is sustained empirical analysis which recreates through counterfactual

reasoning moments where reform possibility appears to exist but where no re-

forms are observed” (Ackrill et al. 2013: 880) Thus, it becomes evident that a

counterfactual discussion of the hypothesis should be an element in the disserta-


46

tion. The priority is therefore not to test MSF, but to refine it so a congruent

hypothesis can be further strengthened (or falsified) by the counterfactual ques-

tion: “Could there have been a comprehensive holistic energy initiative eg. ‘the

Energy Union’ on the European agenda in 2006 or 2008?” and “Why were no

holistic frameworks proposed at these moments?” Therefore, the goal is to come

up with an adequate hypothesis about the making of the Energy Union. Before

moving on to describing our strategy to reach this goal, we elaborate on what an

adequate explanation and congruent theory is.

Adequate explanation and congruent theory

First of all, the final explanation should have a level of concreteness with which

variance in the dependent variable can be measured. The dependent variable in

this dissertation is whether or not the Energy Union (being a holistic energy pol-

icy initiative) is put on the agenda. However, we believe that there are several

social factors (or ‘independent’ variables) that are interrelated and forms a dy-

namic relationship. Furthermore, we expect that the Energy Union itself is an

element with the purpose of influencing other social factors, which is often the

case with public policies. Our task is to uncover the various factors and their

intertwined relationship. We aim to end up with a theory that posits a relation

between variance in the independent variable and variance in the dependent var-

iable; it can be deductive or take the form of empirical generalisation. An im-

portant general standard for congruence tests is ‘congruity’, that is, similarities

in the relative strength and duration of hypothesised causes and observed effects

(George & Bennett 2005: 181). Therefore, we must take into account theoretical

reasons why the effect of hypothesised causes might be amplified or sped up -

e.g. due to a shift in the European Commission (agency could serve as a trigger).

This means that we will have a stronger focus on the dynamic between the dif-

ferent variables when identified adequately.

To deal with the possibility of spurious correlation, we will seek to provide a

plausible and a convincing argument that the created hypothesis fits our re-


47

search data well, and is not rivalled by competing theories, or at least is better

than conceivable alternative theories (ibid.: 184). The more evidence we can pre-

sent in line with our reconstruction of ’things’, the more convincing our hypoth-

esis will be. But, even though our theory complies with these standards, and

there is no convincing counter-evidence, it can be questionable to draw causal

inferences from congruence observation as not every correlation indicates a

causal relation. Correlation between presumed causes and effects may be due to

other, unobserved factors (George & Bennett 2005: 133). Hence, we need to be

sensitive to possible confounding influences to the making of the Energy Union.

Process tracing is a type of method that directly addresses the causal mecha-

nisms linking initial conditions with eventual outcomes (ibid.: 205ff; Collier

2011). However, it is of crucial importance that the variant of process tracing

being employed fits the nature of the causal process embedded in the phenome-

non being investigated (George & Bennett 2005: 213). The variant can take the

form of a detailed narrative (highly specific without explicit use of theory),

which is often the case when doing inductive descriptive research. It is, however,

common that the investigator starts out with a theoretical hypothesis and begins

to collect evidence to support it. The process tracing can then aim to foster an

analytical causal explanation couched in explicit narrative form. This is usually

as detailed as the narrative process tracing. However, because we use an abduc-

tive strategy, the final hypothesis about the causal relationship is created after

the data collection. Thus, the data necessary for a detailed analytical explana-

tion will, with great probability, be lacking. However, we take the stand that we

do not wish to narrow down the explanation to minute detailed events in order

to uncover the larger picture of change and the dynamic structure and agent. If

there is too much focus on several single events, this can blur the overall level of

explanation. Therefore, we will also consider in our general process tracing how

grand changes within historical, social and political structures may have influ-

enced the making of the Energy Union. Thus we aim to construct an explanation

couched at a higher level of generality and abstraction, using a more general


48

process tracing together with counterfactual reasoning to support our main

method of congruence (ibid.: 211).

Before specifying the problem and research objective in order to guide the re-

search further, we wish to give the reader an understanding of the research jour-

ney and the iterative process of reasoning. We aim to develop our theory using

an abductive strategy, which refers to an inferential process of producing new

hypotheses and theories, based on regularly assessments on our empirical find-

ings. This is crucial to understand how we collect and process data.

4.2 THE ABDUCTIVE STRATEGY

We follow an abductive approach to our case. The reason is firstly that at the

time of writing this dissertation, the Energy Union is a new phenomenon and

thus undescribed in literature. On the face of it, this would seem to call for an

inductive approach. However, we are more curious to know why the Energy

Union has come about than merely describing empirically how it has come

about, which we believe would be the result of a purely inductive approach.

Thus, we need to regularly test our theoretical expectations. Secondly, we em-

brace the fact that our theoretical slate is not clean. We do have some expecta-

tions about the Energy Union. This leads us to believe that it is possible to iden-

tify the concepts in MSF in our case. However, we know that this theoretical

approach cannot give an adequate answer to our question. Therefore, it would

be flawed and unambitious to reduce the level of complexity by narrowing it

down to one explanation in MSF at the expense of many different theoretical

explanations. The American philosopher Charles Pierce explains the differences

in strategies of reasoning:


49

“Abduction is the process of forming an explanatory hypothesis. It is the only

logical operation which introduces any new ideas; for induction does nothing

but determine a value, and deduction merely involves the necessary consequenc-

es of a pure hypothesis” (Peirce 1934: 171)

When choosing the abductive approach as our research strategy, we align our-

selves with the German sociologist Jo Reichertz who describes the very premise

of the sociology of knowledge. In this respect, we therefore embrace the fact that

we as researchers and human beings have a natural ‘feeling’ for knowledge. This

is not to say that it is the same type of feeling as disgust or shame, but it is just

as basic (Reichertz 2014: 26). Our natural curiosity about the Energy Union did

not start by being the only ‘feeling’ we had. Other ‘feelings’ were a latent frus-

tration and anxiety caused by the many possible answers to our research ques-

tion, together with the complex context of the Energy Union, its many variables

and levels of action. This is, however, a normal starting point for research

(Reichertz 2014: 30), and we thus embrace the feeling of frustration in order to

build a research strategy that acknowledges this starting point.

Our logic of reasoning will therefore not be built upon a stringent deductive or

inductive strategy of inquiry. Rather, we will follow an abductive reasoning that

refers to an inferential creative process of producing new hypotheses and theo-

ries based on surprising empirical findings. This is a way of embracing our criti-

cal realist position because the abductive mode of uncovering inference is, at

heart, a way to explore underlying levels of reality and identifying their mecha-

nisms and events. By using the lens of MSF, we explore the Energy Union and

then decide what hypothesis is worth pursuing. We therefore alternately turn to

theoretical hypotheses on the one hand, and empirical puzzles on the other. We

will regularly assess whether we have given an adequate explanation to our re-

search question. The abductive strategy within this thesis can be illustrated as

follows:


50

Figure 4.1: Abductive strategy within this dissertation

Note: adapted from Beach & Pedersen (2013: 20)

Fear not, dear reader: although figure 4.1 may look like the demented scrib-

blings of a traffic-flow planner, it illustrates merely that we wish to find an ade-

quate explanation of why the Energy Union is on the European agenda. We do

this by adding new theoretical perspectives on the empirical findings that in the

end will give an explanatory hypothesis. Our empirical findings govern the

choice of theory. Specifically, this means that we compare our interpretation of

interviews with pre-existing theory of policy change and on this basis, we seek

to explain the results (Andersen et al. 2010: 73). Figure 4.1 illustrates that we

choose to use Discursive Institutionalism (DI) as the most suitable overall ex-

planatory perspective when aiming to identify causal inference within our data.

However, while DI provides satisfying explanatory power, we find that the the-

ory needs further adaptation in order to provide a framework to assess our data.

Thus, we merge the Narrative Policy Framework (NPF) with DI in order to


51

identify how agents make use of strategic communicative action. Additionally,

the indexed codes from MSF are used to describe the structure within the narra-

tives. Finally, we end up with a theoretical framework that enables us to answer

the full research question.

However, while it is easy to come up with a good hypothesis, it is more difficult

to decide which hypothesis is worth pursuing. How should we choose one par-

ticular direction within an endless universe of possibilities? Peirce suggests using

a ‘truth instinct’ (Peirce 1934: 591). However, while we acknowledge that the

researcher has an instinct that is most often worth pursuing, this reasoning is

challenged by the fact that instinct is influenced by the researcher’s cultivated

position. The disposition to perceive the world and its ‘surprises’, including the

very reflection on one’s positions in this world, is predicated by the researcher’s

familiarity with broader theoretical fields. The abductive analysis therefore rests

primarily on the scope of the theoretical background we bring into the research.

Consequently, we will try to be open in terms of various theoretical explana-

tions and weigh them critically against each other. Furthermore, we will reflect

on what our theoretical background means to our analysis.

4.3 SPECIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM AND RESEARCH OBJECTIVE

After elaborating on our logic of reasoning and our inferential process of collect-

ing and understanding our data, we now turn to the very objective of our re-

search. This is imperative in order to guide our research and point out the prop-

er data requirements. We therefore need to specify our research question further,

hereby clarifying how we understand the different elements and concepts within

the research question. Thus, the taxonomy within the research objective should

become more obvious, and it will work as a structuring guide throughout our

research.


52

The renewed focus on energy policy in Europe did not come as a surprise. It was

obvious that the Energy Union somehow symbolised a common European re-

sponse to the eastern neighbours in the wake of the Ukraine-crisis. However, we

were still puzzled. It was clear that the Energy Union was more than the drafted

proposal the Commission presented on 25 February 2015. It was the first time

that energy policy was discussed in a comprehensive and holistic manner in the

EU. Furthermore, the Commission acted with a different enthusiasm than nor-

mally; big words, a changed communication strategy, and a vice president Mr.

Šefčovič was put in charge of the Energy Union, which in turn was to be show-

cased on ‘the energy tour’ in every member state. Why has so much political

effort and will been put into this specific policy initiative? What will it contrib-

ute and what is understood by it? Our curiosity was further strengthened by the

fact that the Russian-Ukrainian crisis was often used as an explanation as to

why the Energy Union was proposed in the first place. We knew, however, this

could not be the only reason, as the proposal came almost ten years after Russia

initially shut off the gas valves supplying Ukraine.

These surprises were mainly empirical but along the way, we have come upon

theoretical surprises as well. Nicole Herweg’s research suggests that a renewed

focus on energy as a competition issue rather than a security issue fuelled the

energy cooperation in Europe. Thus, a focus on security will not lead to pan-

European solutions (Herweg 2015a: 103). However, the Energy Union may be a

policy initiative that suggest otherwise. Furthermore, Herweg and others (e.g.

McLendon & Cohen-Vogel 2008: 31) suggest that “regarding the explanation

of agenda change, the MSF does not manage to explain it entirely” (Herweg

2015a: 104). Thus, we believe that this dissertation is relevant for both empiri-

cal surprises and theoretical surprises. We hope to transform our wonder into

explanation by answering the research question: Why is ‘the Energy Union’ on

the European policy agenda?


53

The question contains different elements that we need to elaborate on. The ele-

ments can roughly be divided into three: (1) ‘Why’ implies that there is an ex-

planatory and a causal relation between different factors. At the same time,

‘why’ seeks a higher level of abstraction than ‘what’, ‘who’, ‘where’, and ‘when’.

Thus, the sub-questions listed in the beginning implicitly structure our research,

i.e. What is the Energy Union; how has the Energy Union entered the agenda;

and lastly why has this agenda change taken place? (2) ‘The Energy Union’ is

more than the drafted proposal from the Commission presented on 25 February

2015. We need to define what we need to know about the Energy Union and

how this knowledge should be gained. (3) ‘The European policy agenda’ nar-

rows down the area of research. However, this term has its own distinct features

and puts up some natural and much needed limitations on our research. We

start by defining the latter element in our research question first: What is the

European policy agenda and what does it mean for our research objective?

4.3.1 THE EUROPEAN POLICY AGENDA

In this dissertation, we use Kingdon’s definition of agenda: ”the list of subjects

or problems to which governmental officials, and people outside of government

closely associated with those officials, are paying some serious attention at any

given time” (Kingdon 2003: 3). The MSF is both used for analysing agenda set-

ting and decision-making (Zahariadis 2007a). We argue that the agenda shaping

and decision making process in the EU is quite different from e.g. the US. MSF

was developed in a US context, but lately the framework has been applied in a

multitude of different political systems, including the EU (Ackrill et al. 2013:

871). Every political system has distinct characteristics that call for a bit of ad-

aptation, and this is especially true when it comes to a system such as the Euro-

pean Union, which, due to its supranational character, is even more distinct.

Fortunately, we are not the first to explore a policy process in the EU through

MSF. In this, we rely on the theoretical work of Ackrill et al. (2013) who have

adapted the framework to a European context, as well as the recent analysis by

Herweg (2015a).


54

Nicole Herweg argues that MSF’s single coupling process, encompassing both

agenda setting and decision-making, is too imprecise to describe the EU policy

process. This is due to the distinct features of the legislative process in the EU,

which is characterised by the many actors and policy entrepreneurs involved and

several steps in the process. Thus, the streams of policy, politics and problem

rarely remain the same over the whole period of investigation (Herweg 2015a:

91). Herweg therefore introduces an additional coupling process and thereby

makes a distinction between the agenda setting and the decision-making. The

European policy agenda therefore consists of both steps:

Figure 4.2: The agenda and decision-making process in the EU as

viewed by MSF.

Source: Herweg 2015a: 91

The first coupling process is rather similar to the framework used by Kingdon.

However, the policy window is labelled the ‘agenda window’. Herweg describes

the output of the first coupling process as the following: ‘The output of this

coupling process is a worked-out proposal that increases the number of alterna-

tives available in the policy stream and opens the “decision window”.’ (Herweg

2015a: 91). Thus the Commission’s draft proposal on the Energy Union on 25

February 2015 marked the first policy proposal in the decision making process.


55

At the time of writing, the Energy Union is being discussed among the Council

and the Commission, and is therefore in its second stage before actually being

decided upon. If we only focused on the first coupling process, it would bias our

research towards the Commission and their detailed process in making the first

draft proposal. This would narrow down the complexity and cut away im-

portant explanatory variables in our search to answer the research question.

Furthermore, we argue that the agenda setting and decision-making process is

more intertwined than Nicole Herweg suggests. In reality, there will be more

going back and forth, and a more thorough policy proposal will be a result of an

iterative process where different actors (member states, the Commission, inter-

ests groups, media etc.) have gone through a comprehensive negotiation. The

Energy Union therefore needs to be high on the agenda for a long time to

strengthen an actual decision and policy output. So, in our view, the distinction

that Herweg makes is a theoretical exercise that can highlight some of the dis-

tinct features of the policy process in the EU, but in reality, the two coupling

processes are closely related and feed into each other. This means that we also

have to take the current negotiations between member states and the Commis-

sion into consideration when looking at the European policy agenda as shown in

figure 4.3.

Figure 4.3: The focus of our dissertation: The European policy

agenda


56

This realisation delimits the research objective by focusing on all the steps that come before the actual legislative decision on the Energy Union, and thus the aim is not to give any hypothetical projections on the actual implementation of the Energy Union. However, future implementation aspects are also on the agenda, and thus discussions on governance are inevitably an important subject leading up to the actual decision-making.

4.3.2 THE ENERGY UNION

The definition of the European agenda enables us to say more about what we

need to know about the Energy Union. Due to the many actors involved in the

agenda setting, shaping and decision-making, it is not enough to look at the

draft proposal from the Commission presented on 25 February 2015. We know

that the different streams in public policy can be perceived and captured differ-

ently by the policy entrepreneurs engaged with the specific policy issue. Especial-

ly perceptions of problems have had influence on certain energy policies (Her-

weg 2015a: 92f). Therefore, it will not be possible to make an objective claim

stating: “the Energy Union is this” from only one document.

In order to gain knowledge about the Energy Union, we need to know how the

streams leading up to the proposal (both the agenda and decision window) are

being perceived by the actors involved. Written documents will be an obvious

source of data gathering. However, due to our realist starting point, our aim is

to gain truthful statements about the Energy Union. Political written documents

will represent a partial picture of the reality - however, as they are written, they

have been processed, often by several agents, all embedded in their own context

of meaning. Thus, layers of meaning and (potentially) political correctness are

added to disguise frankness of statements. The realists Hammersley & Atkinson

(2007) believe that the interview can be used as a source of information about

events, and also to reveal the perspectives and discursive practices of those who

produced them. However, accounts must still be examined as social phenomena

occurring in, and shaped by, particular contexts (Hammersley et al. 2007: 120).

Therefore, we chose interviews as our main method of data inquiry, because it


57

will provide us with rich data about the Energy Union. We consider the lan-

guage used by the respondents essential in gaining insight into their perceptions,

and we see it as a way of gaining direct access to the point of view of the inter-

viewees, both in terms of the attitudes they present, and the accounts of their

experiences. However, we do believe that the interviews may not necessarily

reveal real causes of action and thus also present a partial picture. But, without

collecting data where actors experience certain actions, it is not possible to gain

insight into the actual and empirical representations of action. The interview is

one such method. Other written documents will subsequently work as important

secondary sources of data as well.

4.4 DATA REQUIREMENTS AND THE SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW

The fact that we have chosen interview as our main data implies that we have

chosen to do so without a positivistic logic in favour of a more qualitative her-

meneutic logic (Kvale 1997: 69). Where the standardised survey interview re-

flects an epistemology that tends to be positivist, the freer conversation tends to

be more constructivist (Warren in Gubrium & Holstein 2001: 83). However,

from a critical realist perspective, it is possible to recognise the collaborative

qualities between the two extremities while maintaining validity in revealing

knowledge in the interview itself. In addition, this knowlegde goes beyond the

social world within which the interview event has occurred (Banfield 2004).

Pawson and Tilley (1997) adopt an explicitly critical realist approach to data

collection through theory-led interviewing. However, we believe that if the in-

terview seems to be more of a conversation than a survey, the interviewee would

be more likely to disclose an honest and truthful description of the Energy Un-

ion and its making. This point is also made by Gomm (2004: 230): “the argu-

ment is that only by developing an intimate, trusting and empathetic relation-

ship will respondents feel able to disclose the truth”. Thus, the epistemology of

the semi-structured interview reflects our critical realist ontology. We do not


58

seek to make comparisons of the interviews, but we wish to gain insight into the

variety of how the Energy Union is perceived by asking theoretically guided

questions. If we believe that the interviewee emphasises certain points, or if we

find particular statements interesting, we choose to have the freedom to follow a

new path of conversation. Therefore, the interview depends on our own ability

to make quick judgements along the guided conversation. To help us ask the

right questions and cover the various MSF streams and agents relevant to the

Energy Union, we have made a flexible interview guide. However, we

acknowledge that the interview is a framed conversation between two human

beings in which the intersubjective interpretation is imperative in order to con-

struct meaning and create more or less socially fixed factors. It is our job to

translate these meanings and original insights into a theoretical framework that

is credible and convincing in order to explain the drivers behind the Energy Un-

ion. This realisation has consequences for the assessment of the study's scientific

legitimacy, as the concepts within the pure positivism not in itself may recognise

a research interview as a valid form of data gathering: “The qualitative inter-

view, which is based on human interaction, must necessarily appear unscientific

within a philosophy of science that is based on the elimination of the human

factor in research.” (Kvale 1997: 71; our translation).

Critical realists also recognise the significance of meaning construction and

communication among human actors, both as a topic of investigation and as an

essential medium of research and theorising. In these respects, they share some

common ground with the interpretive approach to interviewing. However, as

stated earlier, social action takes place in the context of pre-existing social rela-

tions and structures, which have both constraining and facilitating implications

for such action. Pawson has summarised his view on the purpose of the inter-

view in a realist perspective as follows:

“The basic task of social inquiry is to explain interesting, puzzling, socially sig-

nificant outcome patterns [e.g. The Energy Union] between events or happenings


59

or social properties. Explanation takes the form of positing some underlying

mechanism which generates these outcomes and thus consists of propositions

about how the interplay between agency and structure has constituted these out-

comes [researching the ‘why’]. Explanatory closure requires that, [...] there is

also an examination of how the workings of such mechanisms is contingent and

conditional [thus historical counterfactual reasoning is needed]” (Pawson 1996:

301).

Thus, the semi-structured interview fits right into this dissertation's research

objective. In the following paragraph, we elaborate further on how we opera-

tionalised and conducted the interviews in a credible and valid manner.

4.4.1 RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY WITHIN THE PREMISES OF THE

INTERVIEW

In our processing of the interview data, we have chosen to code data in order to

gain a better overview and observe patterns within the statements. We find this

strategy optimal for two reasons. Firstly, we are mainly driven by an ontological

critical realism: We believe that some form of truth exists in our interviewees’

statements, and that it is possible to find patterns or socially constructed factors

that our interviewees perceive as more or less fixed (Harrits et al. 2010: 168).

Secondly, we acknowledge that even the most cognitively capable human being

has its limits when processing an amount of data that comprises more than one

hundred pages of transcribed material. However, because we use an abductive

strategy and do not have any clear hypotheses about causation, we use a flexible

interviewing technique that enables us to adjust the interview as we go along in

a way that illuminates our research question further. The theory-led interview

should confirm or falsify and, above all, refine the theory (Pawson 1996: 299).

Therefore, we need to retain some control over the course of the interview, since

the interview is not simply a conversation, but a part of our research agenda..

However, the task is first and foremost to ascertain information that is faithful

to the subject’s thoughts and actions.


60

Due to our critical realist view on opinion construction, we believe that we can

borrow many valuable insights about validity from the hermeneutic scholar

Steinar Kvale (1997) when transcribing. We believe that transcripts are always

constructions obtained through the translation from an oral to a written form of

communication, and therefore it will always be influenced by a series of assess-

ments and decisions (Kvale 1997: 163). Transcripts can never be duplicated 1:1

or represent the indigenous reality, but they are interpretative constructs and

work as useful tools for representing a pattern of reality (Kvale 1997: 163).

In line with Kvale, it is our opinion that validity and reliability must be assessed

on the research interviews’ own premises if we want to make use of the qualita-

tive methods in a respectful manner. An interview will never be repeated in ex-

actly the same way, as it is always created within a unique intersubjective pro-

cess: “It is never a question of "authenticity"; it is always a question of creating

an impression of authenticity, of recontextualization that is interesting ("nov-

el"), credible and respectful.” (Czarniawska 2000: 19). The positivist require-

ments of reiteration cannot be met due to the fact that an interview context will

always be unique, though we believe that there would be many similarities if

others were asked the same questions and it would be possible to extract discur-

sive patterns. An interview should, in theory, be reproducible. Therefore, we

have made our transcriptions and recordings openly available in order to be as

transparent as possible.

Furthermore, we work with related concepts of ‘reliability’ and ‘consistency’ as

criteria for scientific validity (Kvale 1997: 231). We always strive to be precise,

as we want to avoid the interview results appearing arbitrarily subjective (Kvale

1997: 231). However, a very strong emphasis on reliability in the strict positivist

sense could discourage creative innovation and diversity (ibid.). Therefore, we

have chosen to be as close to wording and textually precise as possible, since

precise observation creates the foundation for validity (Kvale 1997: 246). To

improve consistency, we have listened to the recordings and read the transcripts


61

together to reach consensus on the understanding. At the same time, we have

made choices that affect representation, since we have edited out uh-sounds and

the like, because copy-typing should make the statements appear more concise

without altering the essence. Thus, it becomes easier to assess whether we make

an appropriate interpretation of the substantive elements.

We wish, however, for the reader to feel that we are working with the substance

in a respectful manner, and therefore we have generally omitted to change the

syntax of the sentence structure. Only when we have used quotations in the ac-

tual thesis that originally stems from the Danish language, has it been necessary

to translate the quotations into English. This is of course unfortunate because it

adds an extra layer of interpretation. However, we have tried to recreate the

wording and meaning as close to the original quotation as possible. On the basis

of these circumstances, it is up to the reader to assess whether our project has

been successful. We have made our research material easily accessible, with re-

spect for our interviewees, so one can retrace our empirical path and determine

if we can actually measure the object that we wish to measure (Kvale 1997:

229).

4.4.2 THEORETICAL SAMPLING OF INTERVIEWEES

After overcoming the barrier question of whether or not the interview is valid,

we proceed to the question of how to sample the right interviewees. This can be

decided upon in several ways (survey sampling, theoretical sampling, snowball

sampling etc.), but for obvious reasons it has to fit the overall research objective.

Due to the character of our research subject and our wish to gain rich data, we

needed to talk with interviewees that have detailed knowledge about the Energy

Union, and also hold various views in order to further develop our theory on the

driving factors behind the Energy Union. In opposition to the survey sampling

that seeks to unbiasedly represent the population by making a random sample,

we seek to inform our theory. Therefore, our interviewees were selected with the

ideal that Glaser and Strauss (1968) call ‘theoretical sampling’, choosing those


62

whose testimony seems most likely to develop and test emerging analytic ideas.

However, in practice, who is interviewed is also decided upon as the research

progresses. The specific choices will be made according to our assessment of

how the theory might be developed further. This way our process shares similar-

ities with the fieldwork of ethnographers (Hammersley & Atkinson 2007: 107).

First and foremost, we work on the principle that our selection of interviewees

should maximise the level of information based on our theoretical assumptions

(Flyvbjerg 2006: 230).

Because of limited resources, we wished to speak with individuals who were

likely to represent larger groups of people. Therefore, we selected representatives

within the political, the diplomatic and the lobbyist sphere who could be defined

as being an elite representative within their field. We did this due to our realist

view that human beings are both constrained and facilitated by their social con-

text. Here we agree with Czarniawska’s concept of 'logic of representation'

when we assume that elite politicians, diplomats and lobbyists are representing

both themselves and a group of people. About the logic of representation Czar-

niawska states: ”It is used by everybody in positions that require official ac-

counting for organizational practices” (Czarniawska 2004: 53). We partly agree

with Bordieu’s concept of ‘officialisation’ when describing the mechanism of

elite perceptions:

“Officialization is the process whereby the group (or those who dominate it)

teaches itself and masks from itself its own truth, binds itself by a public profes-

sion which sanctions and imposes what it utters, tacitly defining the limits of the

thinkable and the unthinkable and so contributing to the maintenance of the

social order from which it derives its power” (Bourdieu 2008 [1990]: 108).

However, we do believe that under the right interview circumstances, the inter-

viewees will also be able to detach themselves from their social context and re-

flect upon the questions. It will be our task to draw the distinction between the

statements in the analysis.


63

The theoretical sampling is based upon the MSF literature and the assumption

that different perceptions exist, especially of the problem stream. We also follow

Kingdon in trying to assess entire “policy communities” (Kingdon, 2003: 5).

This means that within the agenda shaping and decision-making process policy,

communities and entrepreneurs try to influence the outcome. However, the term

has only vaguely been defined as “policy communities are composed of special-

ists in a given policy area […] scattered both through and outside of govern-

ment” (Kingdon 2003: 123). Herweg tries to define it more closely in her draft

paper, where she refines the Multiple Streams Framework (Herweg 2015b),

where she sees the policy community as a loose connection of civil servants, in-

terest groups, academics, researchers and consultants. Herweg also points to-

wards national attitudes as important factors in an EU context. Therefore, we

tried to select interviewees that represent a variety within two dimensions:

1. Occupation - They are politicians (from national governments and the EP),

civil servants (within the institutions of EU or national servants working with

the Energy Union) or lobbyists. 2. Nationality - Differences within European

energy policy and positions on EU cooperation are generally represented.

To gain as much variety within the above-mentioned dimensions, while having

limited resources, we therefore drafted a ‘wish list’ based on well-known differ-

ences among the member states. Interviewees came from the following countries:

1. Germany - Hegemon plays a vital role being a junction of energy infrastruc-ture in Europe.

2. Denmark - Norm entrepreneurs within ‘green’ climate policies (Ingebritsen 2002).

3. Poland - The former Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk proposed the Energy Union as one of the first entrepreneurs. Poland is often considered to be a lag-gard within climate policies (as later mentioned by our interviewees, e.g. appen-dix 9). Yet they were frontrunners in bringing the so-called ‘Gazprom clause’ in the third gas directive on the agenda (Brutschin 2015: 187).


64

4. Greece - The odd one out. Have a very tense relationship with the EU. In re-gards to energy, they are quite independent due to hydroelectricity. However, they have big difficulties with islands disconnected from the main grid.

5. Great Britain - Sceptical EU member state. Was successful in agenda setting during the 1980’s when liberalising the energy market (Ciambra and Solorio 2015: 147).

6. France - Have a distinct energy character in being the country most reliant on nuclear power in their electricity generation.

7. Romania - Newest member of the EU (along with Bulgaria and Croatia).

8. Spain - Far away from Russia and poorly connected to the energy grid in rest of Europe.

While having the theoretical guideline in mind, we identified individuals occupy-

ing jobs such as energy attachés in the national representations to the EU, civil

servants in the Danish ministry of energy and politicians in the EP working in

the Committee of ITRE (Industry, Research and Energy). We also wished to in-

terview high-level politicians representing countries. This, however, we knew

would be difficult, since it is a challenge to reach elite interviewees due to their

busy calendar; ”One must get access, and it can be quite difficult to secure busy

officials who are widely sought after […] and it is important to be politely per-

sistent” (Aberbach & Rockman 2002: 673). But, reality sometimes overwhelms

you, and by a mix of polite persistency and a stroke of luck, we managed to ask

questions to various elite politicians, e.g. the German chancellor Angela Merkel.

The selection was therefore guided by our theoretical wish list, but the actual

entrance to our interviewees was greatly influenced by a snowball sampling

technique - and in the case of the German Chancellor and the Danish Prime

Minister - pure luck. However, most of the politicians were asked only one

question in public forums (see table 4.1 on interviewees below). This situational

factor is important to consider when analysing their statements, because the an-

swers - in a realist sense - are difficult to consider as credible or truthful. How-


65

ever, we will consider the answers as strongly disguised and thus expressions of

their social or political context (i.e. their national position on the matter).

4.4.3 THE SNOWBALL SAMPLING TECHNIQUE

While some of our interviewees were reached through email and telephone (see

appendix 15 for email invitation), the snowball sampling technique helped us

initiate contact to others. The technique is primarily used for interview-based

research where its main value is as a method for dealing with difficulties in ob-

taining respondents where they are few in number, or where some degree of

trust is required to initiate contact. Under these circumstances, techniques of

’chain referral’ may imbue the researcher with characteristics associated with

being an insider. This can aid entry to settings that conventional approaches find

difficult to succeed in. Trust may be developed as acquaintances or peers, rather

than other more formal methods of identification (Atkinson & Flint 2001: 2)

make referrals. Many studies have used the approach to engage with the ’hard

to reach’ in terms of urban elites (Saunders 1979), where, for example, a reputa-

tional method has been used. Using this technique, there is a risk of creating a

bias towards a certain group of agents being in the same network. This was,

however, counterbalanced by the fact that we already knew beforehand what

kind of respondents we needed and thus specifically asked for them. The actual

process of initiating contact can be illustrated in the following chart.


66

Figure 4.4: Snowball sampling technique

Source: Own depiction of connections between interviewees

The above chart most of all illustrates the complexity of reaching interviewees

within this field. However, networking efforts showed to be an effective way of

initiating contact to the hard-to-reach persons. Thus, we ended up interviewing

the interviewees as shown below in table 4.1


67

Table 4.1: Interviewees

Single interview,

name Title Date and place

Vivien Life British Ambassador to DK 17th of July, Copen-

hagen

Mårten Westrup Policy Officer at the Commission, DG energy, Unit of Energy

Policy Coordination 8th of July, Brussels

Mikael Eriksson Ambassador for International Energy Affairs, Swedish Ministry of

Foreign Affairs 7th of July, by phone

Christos Syriopoulos Energy Attaché at Permanent Representation of Greece to the

EU 8th of July, Brussels

Antonin Ferri Counsellor within energy policy, Permanent Representation of

France to the EU 7th July, Brussels

Uwe Schroeder-

Selbach Permanent Representation of Germany, Regier-

ungsdirektor/Conseiller energy 8th of July, Brussels

Maciej Kolaczek First counsellor at Permanent Representation of Poland to the

EU, EU energy policy (including hard coal and lignite industry) 9th of July, Brussels

Anonymous Civil servant, Ministry of Climate, Energy and Supply 1st of July, Copenha-

gen

Bendt Bendtsen

MEP, Group of the European People's Party (Christian Demo-

crats), member of the Committee on Industry, Research and

Energy (ITRE) 14th of july, by phone

Anonymous Civil servant in the Commission working with the Energy Tour 10th of july, Brussels

Peder Søgaard-

Pedersen Chief counsellor, Energy policy, Danish Industry, Brussels office 9th of July, Brussels

Gregers Pedersen Civil servant, The Danish Energy Agency 25th of August, Co-

penhagen

Interview in fo-

rum, name Title Date and place

Angela Merkel German Chancellor 28th of April 2015,

Copenhagen

Helle Thorning

Schmidt (Now former) Danish Prime Minister 28th of April 2015,

Copenhagen

Connie Hedegaard Former European Commissioner of Climate and Energy 13th of June, Born-

holm, Denmark


68

Martin Lidegaard (Now former) Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs 6th of May 2015,

Copenhagen

Edgars Rinkevics Latvian Minister for Foreign Affairs 6th of May 2015,

Copenhagen

Peter Stenlund Secretary of State, Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 6th of May 2015,

Copenhagen

Mikael Eriksson Ambassador for International Energy Affairs, Swedish Ministry of

Foreign Affairs 6th of May 2015,

Copenhagen

Leiv Lunde Director of Strategy, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 6th of May 2015,

Copenhagen

Daila Kraulyte Ambassador at Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of

Lithuania 6th of May 2015,

Copenhagen

We believe that our aim to reach a variety of perspectives within the dimensions

of nationality and occupation has been fairly fulfilled. However, it would have

been desirable to engage with more lobbyists and preferably more people from

the European Parliament. We believe that interviewing more politicians would

not have benefited the research objective considerably. This is due to politicians’

familiarity with disguising the political struggle and the true drivers behind the

Energy Union (Following Hay 2007; Kock 2011). The interviews are fundamen-

tally theory-led using a lens of the Multiple Streams Framework. To improve

validity, this framework has to be further conceptualised.

4.5 CONCEPTUALISATION AND MEASUREMENT

Due to our theory-led interviewing, we need to translate the abstract concepts

within the MSF into tangible indicators, i.e. real life questions that our inter-

viewees are able to understand. We are thus putting some form of structure into

the open-ended interview. However, as earlier stated, the questions should only

work as a flexible guide and not as a stringent check mark scheme. Adcock and

Collier offer a good and valid methodology to move forward in operationalising

abstract terms and theories into tangible classifications and real life indicators


69

(Adcock & Collier 2001: 531). We have used this method to operationalise the

concepts within MSF in an honest and credible manner.

Figure 4.5: Conceptualisation and Measurement

Source: Freely adapted from Adcock & Collier (2001: 531)

Level%1.%Background%concept

e.g.$Problem$stream

Level%2.%Systematised%concepts

Problems are policy issues which are deemed to re-quire attention. Deviations from an ideal state. Consists

of: Focusing$events,$indicators,$feedback$and$problem$

load

Level%3.%Indicators%<%questions

E.g.

1. What events or developments have created the need for an Energy Union?

2. How have you seen the need for changes in

EU energy policy?

Level%4.%Scores%for%cases%

Results$of$interview$and$coding$of$data

Task:%Conceptualisation Formulating$systematised$concepts$through$reasonSing$about$Ideas$on$the$agenda$and$the$Multiple$Streams$Approach$in$light$of$the$main$task:$ExplainSing$the$Energy$Union$on$the$Agenda

Task:%Operationalisation Formulating$on$the$basis$of$the$systematised$conScepts,$some$questions$for$classifying$cases$and$interviews

Task:%classifying%cases Applying$these$indicators$to$classify$the$cases$and$data$being$analysed


70

Therefore, we have systematised the five main concepts within MSF. We have

drawn on especially Zahariadis (2007a), who has made a great effort to extract

the various meanings that were included in the main concepts, e.g. the policy

stream. Thus, we have derived our questions from a two-step task where the

following concepts provide the point of departure: the Policy stream, which con-

sists of ideas and proposals regarding a particular policy issue. The Problem

stream, which is the policy issues that are deemed to require attention and sym-

bolise deviations from an ideal state. The Politics stream, which refers to elec-

toral, partisan and pressure group factors. Entrepreneurs or Entrepreneurship,

which refer to the making or framing of one or more ideas. Finally, we use Win-

dows that are critical moments where choices are made. These moments are

floating and can be described as opportunities for advocates of proposals to

push their pet solutions, or to push attention to their special problems. Windows

thus defines the context within which policy is made.

In the perspective of Adcock and Collier, the measurement is valid when the

transcript or reply (level 4) responds to the question being asked (level 3) that in

turn is meaningful to interpret in terms of the systematised concept (level 2)

(Adcock & Collier 2001: 531). However, this is a very mechanical way of ap-

proaching human beings. Our interviewees can answer very differently, which is

what we would expect of especially elite representatives - maybe even naturally

answering other questions by elaborating further or telling related stories. Thus,

we do not see validity as mechanical; however, we do believe that the operation-

al exercise can serve as a valuable tool to interpret and cover the relevant factors

that may or may not have influence on the making of the Energy Union. In the

following, we have shown how we have operationalised the background concept

of the policy stream (see full operationalisation in appendix 16).


71

Table 4.2: Example of conceptualisation and operationalisation

in interviewguide.

Level 1: Background con-

cepts (Main code) - The

broad constellation of meanings

and understandings associated

with a given concept

Level 2: Systematized con-

cept (Sub codes and de-

scription) - A specific formula-

tion of a concept used by a giv-

en scholar or group of scholars;

commonly involves an explicit

definition

Level 3: Questions - Also

referred to as ‘measures’ and

‘operationalisations’ in qualita-

tive research, these are the op-

erational definitions employed in

classifying cases

Policy stream

Which consists of ideas and

proposals regarding a par-

ticular policy issue

Ideas - potential candidates

for the Energy Union

Every policy area always has

thousands of ideas floating

around at any given time.

However, very few are given

official attention.

These questions should pro-

vide us with an answer to

which other ideas that could

have made it into the Energy

Union.

“Whether an idea bubbles to

the top of the stream, i.e.,

becomes ripe for considera-

tion and adoption, depends

on two factors: value accept-

In your words what is the En-

ergy Union about?

What parts do you believe is

the most important of the En-

ergy Union?

The Energy Union broadly

consists of five elements.

[Mention the dimensions]

Are there other elements, that

didn’t make it into the Energy

Union that you think should or

could have?

What other [major] policies [at


72

ability and technical feasibil-

ity.

Technical feasibility refers to

ease of implementation. Does

the idea appear to be imple-

mentable with minimal prob-

lems? If so, the ideas chanc-

es of survival in the policy

stream greatly improve.”

(Zahariadis 2007b: 11)

the european level] have led

up to this Energy Union?

- Third energy package

- European Energy Se-

curity Strategy

- 2020-plan?

Value acceptability

Value acceptability refers to

the degree of agreement

among major participants in

the policy stream and does

not span the entire spectrum

of all EU policy-makers. An

idea that has the support of

many participants in the nar-

row policy stream stands a

greater chance of being

adopted than one that does

not (Zahariadis 2007b: 11)

Do you think that the Energy

Union has broad support? In

parliament, in the Commis-

sion, in the council, among

public?

Do you think that parts of the

Energy Union have been left

out, because they are unlikely

to gain broad support, e.g.

‘One Voice’?

Technical feasibility

Technical feasibility refers to

ease of implementation. Does

the idea appear to be imple-

mentable with minimal prob-

lems? If so, the ideas chanc-

es of survival in the policy

stream greatly improve.

(Zahariadis 2007b: 12)

Do you think that the Energy

Union will be easy to imple-

ment?


73

In order to be better suited for making a counterfactual reasoning after the theo-

ry has been further developed, we also ask the interviewees “Why didn’t we get

an Energy Union after the first energy crisis with Russia in 2006?” This ques-

tion is furthermore a relevant question when operationalising the concept of

windows. Additionally, we have developed questions that enable us to create a

general process tracing or timeline of events in order to strengthen causal infer-

ences.

4.6 CONDUCTING INTERVIEWS

There are many important considerations to bear in mind when conducting the

actual interviews. There are different forms to consider; from survey to life sto-

ries (Singleton & Straits 2001: 60; Atkinson 2001: 120). There are distinctive

kinds of respondents and particular ways of dealing with them (Odendahl &

Shaw 2001). In addition, there are important technical issues to consider.

Among these is the use of audio recording vs. taking notes. Notes are always

selective: it is not possible to capture everything. There is a trade-off between

breadth of focus and detail. What is recorded will depend on one’s general sense

of what is relevant to the foreshadowed research problems, as well as on back-

ground expectations (Hammersley & Atkinson 2007: 142). Audio recordings

can, however, dissuade frankness or increase nervousness to an unacceptable

level. Note taking in interviews can prove disruptive, when the interviewee be-

comes self-conscious about what is being written down. However, due to our

respondents’ familiarity with audio recording, public speeches and professional

presentations, we believed nervousness would not be a major problem. We be-

lieved that too much of our attention would be occupied by writing what was

being said, rather than by thinking about it. The advantages of the audio record-

ing are therefore obvious. The use of an audio recorder, however, requires a re-

flexive awareness on its consequences: Non-verbal behaviour is not captured in

audio recordings. However, the civil servants that we interviewed were not gen-


74

erally prone to body language. Only once did we experience that body language

gave us an impression of discomfort when asking a civil servant in the Commis-

sion whether or not the Commission should have more power to implement or

to make sure that member states complied with certain rules. The civil servant

paused for a long time and was clearly nervous, because this was a sensitive

matter. This particular interview was one of the two events where we were not

allowed to record. Nevertheless, combining interviewing with note taking is a

skill that we have learned through former practice, and we believe that the two

incidents of note taking were successfully conducted (appendix 7; appendix 11).

Another important technical decision is whether the interview should be con-

ducted in person or by telephone. Of course, it would be much more cost-

efficient to set up telephone interviews because most of our respondents work

abroad. However, we found it important to conduct the interviews in person

due to several advantages. Face-to-face interactions compel more small talk, po-

liteness routines, joking, and asides in which people can more fully express their

humanity (Shuy 2001: 541). A natural atmosphere furthermore leads to more

comfort and open expression. Thus, we only conducted two interviews by tele-

phone (appendix 4; appendix 9). One of the interviewees, a member of the Eu-

ropean Parliament, thus provided somewhat brief answers, which we believe

could have been elaborated further if there had been a face-to-face interaction

with visible signs to encourage our respondent to clarify further. However, we

believe that these few interviews do not bias our findings due to their familiarity

with telephone meetings. In the following, we elaborate on the distinct charac-

teristics of interviewing members of an elite, and how we take these considera-

tions into account when conducting the interviews.

4.6.1 INTERVIEWING THE ELITE

Since we interviewed elite respondents within their field, we needed to make

certain considerations regarding our way of approaching the interview itself. We

have therefore had some specific reflections about the interview type, and the

type of interview questions that work best in a (guided) conversation between


75

researcher and an interviewee from the elite. It is, first of all, important that the

researcher makes the most of the time allotted. Thus, we always sent the ques-

tionnaire in advance so that the interviewee felt comfortable and could be pre-

pared to speak directly on the issues of interest. This way we also experienced

that the interviewee independently supplied relevant materials to us at the meet-

ing (articles, data or other interesting contacts). Our goal was to have the inter-

viewee be as frank as possible. Therefore, we quickly found out that the inter-

viewee would feel more comfortable if only one and not two researchers were

present at the interview. We furthermore tried to fit into the cultural context,

and therefore brushed up our customs of courtesy, friendliness, and professional

demeanour (and even bought similar clothing that fit to the stereotypical EU-

employee). In addition, it helped considerably that the interviewees often had

similar educational background as ourselves, which was noted in the informal

talks before the actual interview. This, together with regularly discreet demon-

strations of our ability to understand the interviewee’s technical language and

knowledge, made the interviewee much more relaxed. Therefore, we also intro-

duced specific questions about particular policy directives or technical challenges

that only experts could know about. This created good conditions for the inter-

viewee to speak in his own voice (Zuckermann 1972: 170).

In terms of interview questions, we started by having fairly open question

“What is the Energy Union in your words?” (appendix 16). The open question

gives the interviewee the opportunity to talk broadly about his perceptions. We

benefitted from using the recommendations for the conducting of successful elite

interviews, where the issues that are being discussed are on the terms of the in-

terviewee’s. This differs from interviewing ordinary interviewees, who may find

it difficult to be asked very open questions (Aberbach & Rockman 2002: 674).

Individuals from an élite are familiar with thinking in causal relations so this

also influenced the rhythm of the interview due to occasionally very long argu-

ments and stories related to the initial question. Therefore, the elite interview is

a demanding type of interview because one needs to be very aware of what ques-


76

tion to ask next without compromising the natural rhythm of conversation

(where questions must relate to what has just been said). On the other hand, the

interviewee should not be allowed to steer the interview, due to our wish to en-

lighten our research question. Our interview design allowed flexibility in the

interview, though it is based on a predesigned interview guide. The idea is that

flexibility provides a good rhythm and atmosphere in the interview. Interviewees

from the élite are quick to observe standard patterns in the questions, which

may cause the interviewee to feel that the interview is a waste of time, or that

the interviewer is showing disrespect towards the interviewee's individual

thoughts (Zuckermann 1972: 167). The first interview we conducted was

somewhat mechanical. We evaluated our interviews between ourselves and prac-

ticed finding the natural rhythm, and thus our interview-style quickly improved.

This acknowledgement also relates to our own personal influence on the very

interview event. Because of our realist point of departure, we need to elaborate

further on how our personal presence influenced the interview.

The fact that we are Danes had a profound effect on the level of frankness we

experienced with our Danish interviewees vs. non-Danish interviewees. We be-

lieve that when Danes meet in an international environment they tend to be

more open compared to e.g. when two people of different nationalities meet in

the same international environment. Thus, we experienced some rather frank

descriptions of laggards within climate policy, and the Eastern countries were

often described as having a parochial attitude. This biased the research some-

what, because our Polish interviewee obviously did not feel comfortable using

strong words about the Dane sitting opposite him. We will take this fact into

consideration when analysing the transcripts.

Lastly, we find it important to mention that we found strength in being classi-

fied as ‘young students’. This actually helped us in engaging with some of our

interviewees where there are many gatekeeper functions to prevent this type of

engagement. Due to our status as ‘young students’, we did not pose a threat to


77

our interviewees. Maybe even well known professors would have had more dif-

ficulties approaching them due to the possibility of getting one's statements pub-

lished. Thus, we gained privileged access to the British Ambassador to Denmark,

largely because we were lucky to sit right beside her at the conference where the

German Chancellor visited the University of Copenhagen, but also because one

of us reminded her of her own daughter.

4.7 CODING AND INTERPRETATION OF DATA

Our engagement with data is characterised by an increasing theoretical under-

standing due to our abductive strategy. This approach, together with our critical

realist point of departure, has had a profound influence on our processing of

data. A key assumption of this dissertation is that the discourses of our inter-

viewees are embedded in their social contexts, but they can be observed at the

apparent level of social relations. The discourses are nevertheless as real as the

social structures to which they are materially related (Lopez & Potter 2005). We

believe that if treated the right way, our data can contribute to a transcendental

understanding of the causal relations and social processes that led to the Energy

Union (in line with Bhaskar 2015). After the transcription of the interviews, we

coded the data (for reflections on transcription see 4.4.1 Reliability and validity

within the premises of the interview).

We have coded the data in order to gain an overview and find analytical pat-

terns within the transcript. We have used an analytical technique that Hammers-

ley and Atkinson (2007) have used, called Analytic Induction together with a

classical theoretical coding that reflects our initial theory-led interviewing. Thus,

we have created codes rather inductively, assigning several non-exclusive index-

codes that refer to the various analytic topics brought up during the interview.

However, due to our theory-driven interview aligned with Pawson & Tilley

(1997), we are inevitably influenced by the concepts within MSF. Therefore,


78

while openly assigning codes according to the analytical subjects brought up in

the interview, we also use codes derived from background concepts within the

MSF (see final codes appendix 17). We believe this approach is appropriate be-

cause we acknowledge that the researcher is only human, with a limited capacity

to keep a systematised track of patterns within the many statements from the

interviewees. We began by processing the transcribed interviews individually,

using the advantage of being more than one researcher. Separately, we added

codes to statements aligned with our interpretation thereof. Subsequently, we

compared our individually coded interviews in order to improve validity of

measure: do we have the same understanding and interpretation of data? This

way we brought more hermeneutic consistency to our analysis of data, and thus

reached a meaning without internal contradictions (Gadamer 1975 [1960]). In

the comparison of codes, we made sure that we agreed on the various under-

standings and statements by reading them over and over again. In this, we lean

on the hermeneutic school that sees text interpretation as a never-ending pro-

cess. However, in reality, the process stops when achieving a meaning that

makes sense and is valid without internal contradictions (Kvale 1997: 58).

This is the first interpretational exercise in understanding the various statements

and sentences in the interviews. Once the indexing is completed, we try to an-

swer the first level within our research question, i.e., ‘what is the Energy Un-

ion?’ After this task has been fulfilled, we use the new theoretical insight and see

if we can answer the next question within our research question, which is “How

has the Energy Union entered the European Agenda?” This question often im-

plies descriptions of variables. To do this, we built on the Analytical Induction’s

second stage that focuses on the ‘deviant’ or contradictory indexed items

(Hammersley & Atkinson 2007). Here, the purpose is to embrace the contradic-

tory segments in order to guard against selective attention to data. We believe

this provided us with a more systematic and thus more credible approach to our

theory building. However, we do believe that we need to take our own pre-

understanding and social context into consideration when pursuing the critical


79

realist paradigm. That is the researcher’s need to reflect upon her own social

embeddedness and what this means to her research. Only this way we can de-

tach (although only partially) ourselves from the cultivated position.

Due to our Danish origins, we are inevitably influenced by a climate discourse

and the belief that climate and energy are linked together. We have studied cli-

mate policies, climate ethics and the like during our studies. However, we have

both been abroad and we are therefore aware that this discourse is not common-

ly found elsewhere. In the analysis, we therefore try to incorporate this aware-

ness.

5.0 ANALYSIS

After assessing the methodology of the present dissertation, we now turn to the

analysis. In this chapter our aim is to find an adequate answer to our research

question ‘Why is the Energy Union on the European policy agenda?’. Thus we

have reached the second step in our abductive journey, i.e. to understand what

the Energy Union and our interviewees’ perception hereof, shown in figure 5.1.

As outlined in paragraph 4.5 Conceptualisation and measurement, we utilised

the MSF in order to approach the Energy Union systematically. The MSF guided

our data collection. However, as mentioned above, MSF is only useful for ex-

ploring policy processes, using a rather bureaucratically defined logic. Applying

MSF as a starting point, we believe, is a strategy that openly embraces different

theoretical explanations to our research question. Thus, we compare our find-

ings to the theories within neo-institutionalism in order to decide which of the

neo-institutionalist theories have the greatest explanatory power.


80

Figure 5.1: Second step of the abductive research


We choose Discursive Institutionalism as the strongest theory. However, we find

it necessary to merge it with the Narrative Policy Framework in order to create

an adequate theoretical framework. Then we analyse the various narratives. We

do this to uncover the dynamics among them and their influence on the premises

from where they are being marketed. This analysis will lead us to a hypothesis

on what caused the Energy Union to enter the European policy agenda. In order

to support or falsify the hypothesis, we make an analytical general process trac-

ing to identify the most influential causal inferences. Finally, we test the theory

by analysing the interviewees’ counterfactual reasoning to the question of

‘Could there have been a comprehensive holistic energy initiative e.g. ‘the Ener-

gy Union’ on the European agenda in 2006 or 2008?’.

THEORETICAL GUIDED ANALYSIS

THEORETICAL LEVEL

EMPIRICAL LEVEL

Empirical observations of the case

1. The Energy Uni-on can be observed through a lens of multiple streams framework

2. Discursive in-stitutionalism is added as ex-planatory theore-tical perspective.

3. A Narrative Policy Framework is added to descri-be and explain differences.

ADEQUATE EXPLANATION

You are

here


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5.1 CHOOSING DISCURSIVE INSTITUTIONALISM

After transcribing the interviews we have reached a consensus on the meanings

within the text through coding and interpretation of the data. We are then able

to find patterns in our interviewees’ perception of the Energy Union. We choose

to look within the theories of neo-institutionalism for a way of analysing the

data, because they offer a way of explaining how institutions influence political

outcomes and thus enable us to explain change (and stability) within public pol-

icy-making.

When analysing data, it quickly becomes evident that the Energy Union is a new

way of framing existing energy cooperation in Europe. Some of our informants

express their views very clearly. The Swedish Ambassador for International En-

ergy Affairs, Mikael Eriksson states that the Energy Union is a useful framework

to implement already existing policies: “I think that the Energy Union is essen-

tially about putting an envelope or an umbrella for a whole group of policies,

which to a large extent have already been decided before, so it's a framework

really. And it's a useful framework” (appendix 4: 1).

The French energy attaché Antonin Ferri holds a similar view: “Although the

name is recent, many policy elements already existed in one form or another”

(appendix 10: 1). Our findings suggest that the Energy Union is a new way of

perceiving energy policy and this facilitates and legitimises possible policy out-

comes. Especially further European integration and stronger governance be-

comes easier to propose when framing energy policy holistically rather than

talking about energy policy as being separate policy areas. Policy officer Mårten

Westrup from DG Energy explains: “The main difference is that we now are

thinking about it in a comprehensive and holistic way in order to achieve a co-

hesive whole. Therefore it’s important not to do everything in a totally new way,

but on the other hand the Energy Union should neither just confirm former pol-

icies” (appendix 11: 3).


82

Some of our interviewees even emphasise that the Energy Union is a narrative

with the intentional goal of changing energy cooperation and lead the way to a

more integrated Europe, both in terms of physical infrastructure but also politi-

cally and within the legislative sphere. Chief counsellor within energy policy at

the Confederation of Danish Industries in Brussels, Peder Søgaard-Pedersen sees

two goals for the Energy Union: “The Energy Union is essentially about Euro-

peanisation of energy policy. You can say, or in other words, there are two di-

mensions. Firstly, there is a narrative about the Energy Union - you know, why

is it called the ‘Energy Union’ in the first place? [...] Then secondly, there is a

policy part - the technical machinery: Why don’t we improve cooperation across

borders?” (appendix 3: 1; our translation). Our anonymous source from the

Commission coordinating ‘the Energy Tour’ for Vice President Mr. Šefčovič also

uses the concept ‘narrative’ to explain what the Energy Union is: ”but you have

a whole sort of overarching structural narrative, whatever you want to call, that

to make this reality and that it will be beneficial for the citizens” (appendix 7:

5).

Thus our data suggest a pattern in the way our interviewees describe the Energy

Union; what it is about and how it differs from earlier energy policies. The un-

derlying assumption is therefore that agents are able to change institutions (in

this case energy policy), through communicative action or through intentional

reframing and recasting of collective narratives (Schmidt 2010: 5). This

acknowledgement leads in the direction of Discursive Institutionalism (DI) as

theoreticised by Schmidt (2008). Other theories within the neo-institutionalism

could have brought valuable insights as well, but given the massive - and diverse

- attention that agents give to framing this is an obvious choice in order to max-

imise the explanatory power. Before applying DI, we will argue that the discur-

sive institutionalist theoretical framework is better than other theories within

neo-institutionalism. We need to strengthen the congruence of our argument.


83

We reject the mind-set within Rational Choice Institutionalism as a strong ex-

planatory factor. This is mainly due to the theoretical assumption that member

states determine their interest through a cost-benefit analysis, i.e. asking ‘does it

makes sense from a materialist point of view to transfer power from the national

level to a European level?’ (Tallberg 2002: 25). In a situation of supply disrup-

tions it would arguably make sense to have a better coordination and more ef-

fective use of energy. Therefore the crisis between Russia and Ukraine could

serve as an external shock that would increase the possible gains of transferring

power from the member states to the EU. However, the logic is troubled in sev-

eral ways. Firstly, in terms of explaining why ‘The Energy Union’, being a holis-

tic policy framework, was not proposed during the Ukraine crisis in 2006 or

during the Russia-Georgia crisis in 2008. Secondly, the logic within rational in-

stitutionalism has difficulties in explaining the new narrative, which our inform-

ants emphasise. Thus in a strict Rational Choice perspective it is not possible to

identify (yet) any major specific changes within the current Energy Union pro-

posal - other than a new label, which is not important in a rationalist sense.

Member of the parliament and the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy

(ITRE) Bendt Bendtsen experiences the effort put into the Energy Union as fol-

lows: “There has been put so much political prestige behind this. So from my

perspective, this is probably the biggest European initiative since the Coal and

Steel Community” (appendix 9: 3; our translation). From a rationalist perspec-

tive, it is difficult to explain the amount of political will and prestige put into a

new label.

Other scholars before us have discussed whether Rational Choice factors or stra-

tegic framing efforts have been the driving forces behind change within the lib-

eralisation of the energy market (Ciambra and Solorio 2015; Brutschin 2015).

Many scholars agree that the political entrepreneurship of the Commission was

one of the key explanatory factors in the agenda-setting and policy-making

within the three energy packages (Brutschin 2013; Eberlein 2008; Eikeland

2011; Eising 2002; Pollak and Slominski 2011). Process tracing studies show


84

how the Commission has struggled with mainly the British policy entrepreneurs

using both discursive resources and visibility in order to shape the political nar-

rative on the internal energy market, which have resulted in further market lib-

eralisation and infrastructural integration (Ciambra et al. 2015: 161). In another

study Elina Brutschin tries to show that a pure shift in the economic interests

among member states is not a better explanation to why the third gas directive

was successfully put on the agenda compared to a reframing of the energy de-

bate as a foreign policy issue rather than a competition issue (Brutschin 2015:

192). Thus previous similar studies also suggest that discursive framing has a

strong explanatory compared to Rational Choice institutionalism within Euro-

pean energy policy.

Turning to the logic found within Sociological Institutionalism (SI) it runs into

the same brick wall as the Rational Choice perspective: it has difficulty explain-

ing change and instead it points towards continuity. SI concentrates on social

agents who act according to a ‘logic of appropriateness’ structured by political

institutions that consist of cultural rules and norms (Schmidt 2010: 2). Hence, it

becomes easy to explain why member states have been treating energy policy as

separate paradigms, determined by their perceptions of ‘appropriate’ behaviour

and roles within the European energy policy. The social structure of the Europe-

an policy arena thus determines the way different member states perceive energy

policy and act accordingly. They can be described as playing a role3 that is ra-

ther difficult to change (Wendt 1999). It cannot explain why our informants

emphasise an intentional communicative effort within the Energy Union project

in order to overcome a deadlock of roles or socially structured perceptions. Thus

the logic within Sociological Institutionalism cannot explain adequately why

3 Role theory is a branch within Foreign Policy Analysis theory. It started in the cold war but has evolved since and now has number of social roles international relations – such as a leader, mediator, initiator – and counter-roles – such as follower, aggres-sor etc - as the social structure of international relations evolved (Wendt 1999)


85

agents are able to critically engage with the institutions they are part of in order

to maintain or change them.

Similar challenges are seen within the Historical Institutionalism (HI) that has a

tendency to emphasise historical determinism leading to path dependency (Ma-

honey 2000; Pierson 2000). HI has difficulties explaining institutional change

endogenously, or by a shift in leading political entrepreneurs. More recent HI

scholars have succeeded in describing incremental change, through layering,

conversion, and drift (Thelen 2004; Streeck & Thelen 2005). Discursive Institu-

tionalism uses a similar account of crisis-driven and/or incremental changes in

rules and regularities, which has a strong influence on agents’ background abili-

ties (Schmidt 2012: 708). Where background abilities therefore are incremental-

ly changed, agents’ foreground abilities are constantly subject to change. The

main difference is that agents are enabled by communicative logic (foreground

abilities) to “think, speak, and act outside their institutions even as they are in-

side them, to deliberate about institutional rules even as they use them, and to

persuade one another to change those institutions or to maintain them”

(Schmidt 2008: 314).

Therefore the analysis is built upon a logic of communication and an acknowl-

edgement that change is possible through ideas and discursive interaction.

5.1.1 ORDER OF IDEAS

In order to adequately understand the dynamics of why institutional change oc-

curs, i.e. how ideas themselves promote institutional change, we need to go be-

yond incremental layering within the institutions. We apply the interactive side

of discourse, i.e. how ideas are generated among policy entrepreneurs and com-

municated within the EU policy agenda by political actors (civil servants, politi-

cians, lobbyists, etc.). We identify the dynamics within ideas and thus the dy-

namics between ‘foreground discursive abilities’ through which sentient agents

may change (or maintain) their institutions (Schmidt 2010: 4) and the agent’s


86

background abilities, which explain the internal processes by which institutions

are created and maintained.

Discursive Institutionalism (DI) provides an analytical approach to studying in-

stitutional change and thus provides an answer to why some ideas succeed and

others fail. This is done by grouping ideas into three broad categories according

to their level of generality. Schmidt believes that identifying the foreground idea-

tional abilities, i.e. the second and third level of ideas, will enable scholars to

explain change: “[...] sometimes good ideas fail and bad ideas succeed. How to

respond to all of these issues? For answers we need to go on to the second and

third levels of ideas, since scholars who focus on programmatic and philosophi-

cal ideas tend to offer more general theories about ideational success and change

over time.” (Schmidt 2008: 307). In order to use this theoretical framework ad-

equately, we need to adapt it to the case of the Energy Union. To operationalise

this idea, the Energy Union, Vivien Schmidt has suggested grouping ideas into

three levels: (1) The philosophical ideas or ideologies, which offer a deep-seated

(e.g. ontological and normative) underpinning for understanding the world and

the appropriate actions to be undertaken by individuals and groups; (2) Pro-

grammatic ideas or paradigms, which reflect the organising principles and pro-

vide problem definitions that allow diagnosis of the practical challenges of the

real world and therefore enable response strategies to emerge; and (3) specific

policy ideas or solutions proposed by policy-makers, that are tailored to differ-

ent substantive problems. (Schmidt et al. 2013: 85). The order of ideas is depict-

ed in figure 5.2. The different levels are not conclusively hierarchical but should

rather be viewed as dynamical.


87

Figure 5.2: Foreground, background and ideas

Note: The figure is freely interpreted from Schmidt's (2008: 306) grouping of ideas.

While the background should be understood as more deep-rooted than the foreground level,

the levels should also be viewed as dynamical.

Whereas both policy ideas and paradigms can be seen as part of the agent’s

foreground, since these tend to be discussed and debated on a regular basis, the

ideology generally rests in the background as an underlying assumption that is

rarely contested except in times of crisis (Schmidt 2008: 306).

The basic ideology determines for whom the Energy Union is an issue: the mem-

ber state(s) or the EU. According to Ferrera (2013) ideologies rest on rationality

and emotions, and they are rarely contested nor debated. The ideology is also

planted in the realm of political action including the question of who should

exercise power (Ferrera 2013: 86). We find this dimension very relevant to the

idea of the Energy Union. For the Commission-official, Mårten Westrup, the

question of Commission-power was a very sensitive issue:

Maria Toft: “Should the Commission have more power?” Mårten Westrup:

“[Long pause] It is difficult to answer because it’s a very sensitive question.

Member states should have a lot to say of course, but many things only work if

we work together. So this has to be done and Member states have to reflect on

Ideology

Foreground

Background

Paradigms

Policy


88

the cohesive whole. If it fails and turns out to be difficult to reach our goals, we

have to reflect on how to improve the governance” (appendix 11: 3).

The sensitivity of the matter guided us in the direction that this is really what is

at stake here. While bearing these new theoretical insights and anticipations in

mind when revisiting our data, we started to look at the ‘deviant’ or contradic-

tory indexed items (according to the method of Analytic Induction). We identi-

fied two contradictory perspectives on who should exercise power. Our Greek

interviewee Christos Syriopoulos was a good source in terms of rather frank

expressions and (seemingly) detached statements. This may be due to the fact

that Greece’s future position in the EU was very uncertain at that particular

moment (8th of july 2015, a few days before a major national referendum). Sev-

eral pundits believed that ‘Grexit’ was almost certain and thus the atmosphere at

the Greek Representation to the EU in Brussels was rather unusual. The Greek

interviewee often distanced himself from the official Greek position through dis-

creet rhetorically expressions talking very much from his own point of view as

well: “In my opinion the Energy Union is going towards a more European solu-

tion for the energy sector. This is what I feel like: I feel like we're going from

National policies to European policies [...]. This is the philosophy!” (appendix

8: 1).

The interviewee furthermore showed the ability to detach from his own social

and cultural context (aligned with the critical realist view) and reflected on the

basic philosophies of the Energy Union: “The national Member State need to

have enough flexibility to implement these policies because national policies are

more easily to be implemented and governed by [...] each member state. This is

our official view, but I can understand that if we need the holistic view, then we

need a strong commission to steer this holistic approach” (appendix 8: 3). Thus

the Energy Union can be seen as a policy idea that reflects a change within the

underlying philosophy of energy policy. Our interviewees see the Energy Union

as a shift from energy policy being a member state-issue towards an EU-issue.


89

Schmidt furthermore points to the realm of social and economic transformation

as important to ideologies. Concrete policy choices thus affect transformation

within ideologies (Ferrera 2013: 87). Some of our interviewees also pointed to-

wards physical and economic transformation within renewable energy as an in-

fluential factor to the Energy Union (especially appendix 3; appendix 10). In the

analysis we clarify how these variables may have influenced the need for an En-

ergy Union. However, we want go more in depth with our data and see if we

can find patterns that are more than ripples on the surface. For this, we need to

understand the dynamic between the agent’s foreground abilities and the shift

within ideology. Schmidt (2008: 306) defines the paradigms as frames of refer-

ence that enable policy actors to (re-)construct visions of the world. Paradigms

also work as ‘programmatic beliefs’ that provide sets of diagnostics and pre-

scriptions for action, because they define the issues to be considered; the goals to

be achieved; the norms, methods, and instruments to be applied. Bearing this

definition in mind, we now return to our data in order to identify these para-

digms. The same way as before, we look for the contradictory indexed items

within the policy stream labelled “ideas”.

Analysing our data, we find four distinct paradigms. The dividing lines between

them can be drawn by asking the question ‘through what concerns should ener-

gy policy be governed and what type of policy instruments ought to be ap-

plied?’. To this question we found four different answers: (1) Concerns about

geopolitics and energy security, (2) concerns about the market and competitive-

ness, (3) concerns about the climate, and lastly (4) every dimension is equally

important and a holistic approach is needed. Thus the order of ideas can be

adapted to the case of the Energy Union as depicted below in figure 5.3. The

order of ideas.


90

Figure 5.3: The order of ideas

Note: The figure is freely interpreted from Schmidt's (2008: 306) grouping of ideas. While the background should be understood as more deep-rooted than the foreground level,


Figure 5.3. exemplifies that at the basic level, ideologies rule. These are agents’

background abilities. They are solid and very difficult to change - perhaps ex-

cept in times of crisis. In the case of the Energy Union the fundamental ideology

is that energy policy is a national prerogative. This has been a truth for as long

as nation states have existed and is emphasised in the Lisbon treaty article

194(2) as well: “Such measures shall not affect a Member State's right to deter-

mine the conditions for exploiting its energy resources, its choice between differ-

ent energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply.” However in

these years - crises-years in more than one understanding - this could be subject

to change.

Ideo

logyP

ara-

Polic

y

Energy is an issue for

Market Holistic

Geopolitics Climate

Interconnectors, Etc.

‘One voice’,

Reverse flows

ACER,

Foreground

Background

Nation-states or the European Union


91

In terms of agents’ foreground abilities, the focus on paradigms has been criti-

cised for being too superficial in just stating paradigms’ shift by empirical analy-

sis. This focus fails to specify the process of ideational change, i.e. how old ideas

fail and new ideas appear. Furthermore the one-way focus on paradigms’ shift

cannot explain the timing of ideational change as well. Since the emphasis is on

abrupt change in ideas, evolutionary change is ruled out (Schmidt 2011: 1195).

We find similar challenges to the rather artificially separation between para-

digms and policy ideas. Rather, our interviewees independently pointed towards

the importance of different narratives and perceptions of the Energy Union,

when elaborating on what the Energy Union is and why it is on the agenda.

Therefore, we see the ideas as being expressed in full narratives, instead of a

separated communicative action (paradigms and policy solutions). The Swedish

Ambassador for International Energy Affairs believes that different perceptions

can be found:

“I think that the perception of the Energy Union also has a lot to do with where

you come from, what perspective you're looking at. I think for instance other

countries in Eastern Europe this is very much a matter of national sovereignty

and security and for that reason it is seen as something extremely important and

extremely political. I think for other countries, it's a very very useful framework

for policy implementation, but some countries are not coming into the issue

from a purely to security angle but rather from a market angle but that's not to

say that it's any less important we all agree that there are very clear security im-

plications of a functioning Energy Union” (appendix 4: 3).

Thus, instead of paradigms and policy solutions, we will define the agents’ fore-

ground ideational abilities as being expressed in ‘narratives’ due to agents’ at-

tempts of making sense of an energy policy arena filled with ambiguity. We thus

add the narrative policy framework (Roe 1994, Czarniawska 2000, and McBeth

et al. 2014) in order to understand how agents use the four narratives strategi-

cally to make sense of ambiguity and to achieve their goals. Furthermore, we


92

analyse how the narratives influence one another and how foreground and

background abilities interact through narratives.

5.2 ADDING THE NARRATIVE POLICY FRAMEWORK

In the analysis, we use the term ‘narratives’ to describe the stories that agents tell

in order to justify the need for an Energy Union - or the type of Energy Union

that fits into their beliefs. Schmidt (2008: 306) prefers the term ‘ideas’, however

she briefly equals ideas with narratives4. We believe on the other hand that the

term narrative is appropriate, because it involves a story, or more precisely

“narratives shapes understandings of events” (ibid.). While a discourse always

will be subject to change as power-relations change, the narrative is what verbal-

ises the alternatives. Narratives are therefore resilient and can survive discourses.

(La Ville & Mounoud 2007: 102f). Stories allow decision making to take place

not only in the face of complexity (i.e. when matters are highly interrelated and

interdependent) but also in the face of uncertainty and ambiguity (Herbert Si-

mon in Roe 1994: 9).

4 From Schmidt 2008:306 “Defining ideas, the substantive content of discourse, is no easy task because there are so many ideas about ideas (see Goodin & Tilly 2005, Pt. IV). Ideas have been seen as switches for interests, road maps, or focal points (Goldstein & Keohane 1993); as strategic constructions ( Jabko 2006) or strategic weapons in the battle for control (Blyth 2002); as narratives that shape understandings of events (e.g., Roe 1994) or as “frames of reference” ( Jobert 1989, Muller 1995); and as collective memories (Rothstein 2005) or na-tional traditions (Katzenstein 1996).”


93

Figure 5.4 Third step in the abductive research


In order to understand the dynamic interrelationship between agents’ back-

ground abilities and foreground abilities, we turn to organisational psychologist

Karl Weick who has a more in-depth description of communicative action, and

why it is needed. Narratives are a way to making sense in a world of perpetual

change - and work as a fixed point, where it is possible to gain a perspective and

a still picture of reality. Cognitive stability is formed through verbalisation that

enables agents to act strategically (Weick et al. 2005: 409). “To focus on sense-

making is to portray organising as the experience of being thrown into an on-

going, unknowable, unpredictable streaming of experience in search of answers

to the question, what’s the story?” (Weick et al. 2005: 410). Thus the relation-

ship between foreground and background abilities can be depicted as follows:


THEORETICAL LEVEL

EMPIRICAL LEVEL


1. The Energy Uni-on can be observed through a lens of multiple streams framework

2. Discursive in-stitutionalism is added as ex-planatory theore-tical perspective.



You are

here


94

Figure 5.5: Foreground abilities as being expressed through nar-

ratives

Note: The figure is freely interpreted from Schmidt's (2008: 306) grouping of ideas.

While the background should be understood as more deep-rooted than the foreground level,


Other scholars (Derrida 1981; Huisman 2005) stress that the individual re-

searcher’s interpretations of narratives should be the unit of analysis. We prefer

a more structural approach to the narrative methodology. Following our critical

realist ontology, we believe it is possible to find some form of pattern within our

interviewees’ statements. Emery Roe (1994) has in his work with narrative poli-

cy analysis used a structured approach to narratives, that contains “a beginning,

middle, and end (or premises and conclusions, if cast as an argument) and re-

volves around a sequence of events or positions in which something is said to

happen or from which something is said to follow” (Roe 1994: 37). However,

we believe that the concepts of focusingevents, policy ideas, politics streams, and

entrepreneurs are used by our interviewees to construct a narrative or full argu-

ment to why their idea is superior. We apply the narrative policy framework and

add structure stemming from the Multiple Streams Framework. The MSF is

Energy is an issue for:

Ideo

logy

Narra

tives

Holistic Climate

Geopolitics Market

Foreground

Background

Nation-states or The European Union


95

therefore adapted to a logic of communicative action as the main explanatory

factor of change within EU energy policy.

5.3.2 A STRUCTURALIST APPROACH: MERGING MSF WITH NPF

This adaptation is at the same time a critique of the rather artificially separated

streams within the MSF (see paragraph 3.2.2). Our use of narratives places us

within the field of structuralism as opposed to post-structuralism. While schol-

ars using a structuralist approach insist that an underlying structure of the nar-

rative exists, the poststructuralist scholars take the radical position that struc-

tures do not exist in reality, but are constructed. The latter group believes that

the researcher is reading the structure into the narrative, which in turn leads to a

shift in focus from the narrative itself towards the researcher and her effect on

the scientific outcome (Czarniawska 2000: 22). In the analysis we place our-

selves in the structuralist courtyard, also using the concepts from MSF to con-

struct meaningful narratives. The structural approach to the NPF assumes that

policy narratives consist of specific structural elements that distinguish them

from other communication modes. However, the NPF remains open to what

those elements are (Jones et al. 2015: 4). The structural elements often consist of

four basic elements: (1) Setting, (2) Characters, (3) Plot, and (4) Moral of the

story. While the NPF does identify these four basic narrative elements, it does

not claim to have an exclusive truth on this front. Rather, the NPF is open to

revising the elements based on theoretical or empirical reasoning. Therefore, it

has been described as an open-source framework that can use mainstream policy

theory and methods to empirically understand and explain the chaotic policy

world (McBeth et al. 2014: 251). We utilise the classical NPF structure, but

within each element we supplement with concepts from MSF:


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Table 5.1 Traditional understanding of NPF and our modifica-

tions

Understanding according to McBeth et al. (2014: 250)

Our understanding with our modifications to McBeth et al. (2014)

Setting Policy narratives always have something to

do with policy problems and are situated in

specific policy contexts. As such, the setting

of a policy narrative consists of policy con-

sequential phenomena such as legal and

constitutional parameters; geography, scien-

tific evidence, economic conditions, agreed-

on norms, and other features that most ac-

tors agree are part of the considerations one

must come to terms with when dealing in a

particular policy area. As in a stage setting

for a theatrical play, the props (i.e., laws,

evidence, geography, etc.) are often taken

for granted; at times, however, they also

become the focal point of the policy narra-

tive.

The setting is the context in which a policy

problem or issue resides. It consists of the

low-contestation ‘facts’ that are generally

agreed upon by actors within the narrative

in question. This implies the basic idea

about energy and how it should be gov-

erned. Former and current policy initiatives

together with the general public awareness

are also relevant within the setting.

Characters Policy narratives must have at least one

character. As in any good story, there may

be victims who are harmed, villains who do

the harm, and heroes who provide or prom-

ise relief from the harm and a solution to the

problem.

When looking through our data it became

evident that within the narratives anyone

and anything can be a villain, a hero or a

victim. We use the same understanding as

McBeth et al. (2014: 250). Within the narra-

tives of the Energy Union there are howev-

er less fluttering superman capes and more

‘alliances’ between member states and

‘opponents’ that take a different stand.

Here we especially look within our indexed

codes of policy entrepreneurs and lobby-

ists.

Plot Establishing relationships between charac-

ters and situating the characters within the

policy setting, the plot provides the arc of

The plot maps the drama, i.e. the relation-

ships that characters have with each other

as well as the relationship between charac-


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action and typically has a beginning, middle,

and end.

ters and the setting. It often contains causal

relations such as ‘this happened because

of that’ or ‘if we do/don’t do this, then this

will happen.’ Here concepts of focusing

events and problems are defining the plot.

Moral of

the Story

Policy narratives also promote a policy solu-

tion. In narrative terms, we refer to this solu-

tion as the moral of the story

The moral of the story is the takeaway of a

policy narrative and often refers to the poli-

cy solutions proposed within the plot. The-

se solutions can be repeated in several

narratives. In this case, the motivation for

suggesting the specific solution will differ.

The fusion between the narrative policy framework and MSF is not new.

McBeth (et al. 2013) utilises this specific combination. Mark McBeth (et al.

2013) instead defines the policy entrepreneur as a policy marketer who uses pol-

icy narratives to construct focusing events and define a policy reality. In the

analysis we try to see how this unfolds through a framing or a strategically cast-

ing of specific narratives. Thus, we have now reached one of the last steps in our

abductive journey. Through regularly visits within our data, we have refined our

theoretical insights by comparing our empirical findings with theoretical ap-

proaches. We now have a theoretical framework that enables us to identify the

various factors within the making of the Energy Union, i.e. the verbalisation of

agent’s foreground abilities through different narratives and their interaction

with the two identified ideologies.

5.2.3 THE FINAL THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND STRUCTURE OF THE

ANALYSIS

We therefore end up with a theoretical framework that combines concepts firstly

from (1) the multiple streams framework (MSF) that works as an explorative

lens and puts structure into the narratives. Hence, the MSF is used to answer the

first question of what the Energy Union is. Secondly we use (2) the narrative

policy framework (NPF) to strengthen the overall descriptive power, when de-


98

scribing how the agents’ foreground abilities are expressed and how they inter-

act with the underlying ideologies. Finally, we apply (3) discursive institutional-

ism (DI), from which we are able to explain the driving forces behind the Energy

Union and thus give an answer to the overall research question why is the Ener-

gy Union on the European agenda. The three perspectives are therefore supple-

menting each other in a way that enables us to illuminate the various taxonomic

levels within our overall research question. The final theoretical framework can

thus be depicted as follows:

Figure 5.6: Final theoretical framework

The structure of the analysis follows this theoretical framework. Thus, we start

by elaborating on how the different narratives are expressed. Secondly, we iden-

tify the underlying ideologies, and we see how the dynamic relationship between

the ideologies and narratives unfolds and how this has influenced the making of

the holistic narrative labelled the ‘Energy Union’. In the analysis we argue that

the new holistic narrative has been created through incremental change within

Narratives NPF

Narrative structure Setting Characters Plot Moral

Foreground abilities

Background abilities

Ideology

MSF

DI

2) Social and economic transformation 1) The executive power


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the ideologies towards more European integration within the field of energy pol-

icy.

5.3 NARRATIVES

The narratives are ‘full-scale’ in the sense that they deliver a total ‘world-view’,

i.e. they embody both the questions and the answers. The narratives are not ex-

clusive as one interviewee can and does use arguments from several narratives -

even though the narratives are oftentimes contradictory. However, our inter-

viewees weigh the different narratives according to their individual preferences

(or the preferences of the group that they represent). Thus we work with narra-

tives as a way of ‘ideal types’ (stemming from Weber 1904) that characterises

the most common elements of a given phenomena and additionally identifies the

dividing lines. The way we use narratives also have similarities with Mike Hul-

me’s (2009) identification of four climate ‘myths’. He uses myths not in the

popular sense of implying falsehood, but in a specific anthropological sense of

stories that ‘embody fundamental truths underlying our assumptions about eve-

ryday or scientific reality’ (Hulme 2009: 341). Thus the mystical, psychological,

sociological and pedagogical functions of myths are more important than their

‘scientific’ truth or falsehood. However, we do find that the narratives used by

our interviewees are based on real events and indicators. Without basing stories

on reality, it would be difficult to tell credible stories and thus to convince other

agents in a setting of constant negotiation.

We thus identify four ‘narratives’ when applying Narrative Policy Framework to

our data. The first two - Geopolitics and Markets - are theoretically and empiri-

cally grounded and well established (Youngs 2011). The third narrative, which

we identify, is the climate narrative. The climate narrative has similarities to the

market narrative, however we will argue that it must be a separate narrative, as

it has its own logic. Especially when COP21 and 2030-goals are mentioned by

our interviewees, neither the market nor the geopolitics narratives are sufficient

explanations to include the climate narrative. This is furthermore supported by


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Murray & Manners’ (forthcoming 2016: 16-18) ‘Green Europe’. Finally, we

find a new holistic narrative that draws on the former narratives but sees the

different areas of energy as intertwined rather than separate and hierarchical.

We now analyse each narrative, as told by our interviewees. For each narrative

we have interpreted the structure of the narrative, thus we first outline (1) Set-

ting, (2) the characters, (3) the plot, and (4) the moral of the story. We start by

analysing the well-grounded narratives, i.e. Geopolitics (5.3.1) and Markets

(5.3.2). Then we add Climate (5.3.3) and lastly we analyse the holistic narrative

(5.3.4).

5.3.1 THE GEOPOLITICAL NARRATIVE

When Donald Tusk (then Polish Prime Minister) launched the idea of an Energy

Union, it was with these words: “Regardless of how the stand-off over Ukraine

develops, one lesson is clear: excessive dependence on Russian energy makes

Europe weak.” (Tusk 2014). The geopolitical narrative is a natural starting

point, as the Ukraine-crisis and increasingly difficult relations to Russia is top of

mind for all our interviewees.

In the following we firstly describe the settings for this narrative. It is concen-

trated around energy as a weapon and the previous gas crises of 2006 and 2008.

Then we move on to the characters, the most prominent being Russian president

Vladimir Putin, German chancellor Angela Merkel, the Commission and Polish

Prime Ministers. In the plot we look at the Ukraine-crisis and the European En-

ergy Security Strategy to analyse the characters’ relations. The solution to the

plot is connected to the moral of the story.


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Table 5.2: Overview of geopolitical narrative

Setting Energy is geopolitics because states use it to advance their foreign policy

goals. Energy as a strategic weapon is easily comprehensible, for both profes-

sionals, policy-makers and the public, hence narrative engagement is high.

The previous gas crises are an important part of the setting and particularly

strong in Eastern Europe.

Characters The main villain is Russia’s President Putin and to a lesser extent climate ad-

vocates and Germany. Putin is primarily opposed to the Commission, and ar-

guably the EU as a whole. Victims are concentrated around Eastern Europe,

with Poland and the Baltic Countries as the most prominent and vulnerable

consumers of energy.

Plot Focusing on the Ukraine-crisis and the European Energy Security Strategy

(EESS), our analysis shows that our interviewees think of Putin as the one

villain, while most are hoping for a more extensive role for the Commission.

Most acknowledge that the Commission’s role is lacking, but that it could not

replace the political bargaining power of the nation states, although the narra-

tive calls for it. Victims in this narrative are quite proactive, e.g. exemplified by

Donald Tusk’s proposal of the Energy Union.

Moral Looking at the moral shows us that the geopolitical narrative focuses mainly

on solutions that favour the European ideology, like One Voice, mandatory

solidarity in sharing of energy. However exactly these proposals are also hav-

ing a hard time in the policy-making process.

5.3.1.1 Setting

Inherent in the geopolitical narrative is that energy is - if not legitimately, then at

least in practice - an important factor for making a nation succeed. Energy can

advance (or the opposite) a country’s position, because it is an important tool in

the geopolitical toolbox. In order to optimise the use of energy, the realist per-

spective suggests that states should not steer the energy policy based on the

moods and whims of the market, but rather based on what is in the best interest


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of the state. In this perspective energy is securitised and the challenge is first and

foremost to secure the interests of the nation states (Gilpin 1975: 45).

Narratives are proposing solutions to a particular problem. The setting describes

the problem. The major problem in the geopolitical narrative is Europe’s energy

dependence. NPF operates with ‘Primacy of affect’ at the micro-level (McBeth et

al. 2014: 231). Primacy of affect tells us that “emotions play a critical role in

focusing attention” (ibid.). People react with their feelings. Hence Europe’s en-

ergy dependence coupled with Russian perceived aggression directly affects peo-

ple’s narrative about energy: “[The Energy Union] is about Europe becoming

more self-sufficient, and less dependent on Putin’s gas and the Middle East’s oil”

(appendix 9: 1; our translation). Using a term from Manners & Murray (forth-

coming 2016: 11), this narrative has high ‘narrative engagement’, i.e. it is easily

comprehensible and thus easy to engage with the collective story, even without

any pre existing knowledge of the energy field. That Russia can and will shut off

the gas seems to be a well-established fact. This makes geopolitics a very strong

narrative: it constitutes the quintessential problem, as it could cause enormous

damage to an entire region of Europe. A profound problem that calls for major

solutions.

This narrative has also been advanced by experience or ‘material factors’, which

is relevant to the economic and social realm within agent's’ background abilities

(aligned with Ferrera 2013:86). When countries are at war, energy and energy

sources are some of the first resources to be blocked from exporting. During the

First World War, control of the oil fields was a major cause for the warfare in

the Middle East (Thorpe 2014). Energy resources were also a reason for the

Coal- and Steel Community, the forerunner of the European Union: “The soli-

darity in production thus established will make it plain that any war between

France and Germany becomes not merely unthinkable, but materially impossi-

ble.” (Schuman 1950). If in doubt, the Schuman Declaration underscores it: en-

ergy is a means of war and a tool for national governments. If not controlled by


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a supranational organisation, it leads to war. This setting is reproduced in our

interviews: “in a way it [the Energy Union] started from resources, that were the

reasons for war” (appendix 6: 1) says the Polish representative. Clearly energy is

seen as a major geopolitical factor that should primarily be governed through

concerns about geopolitics.

The gas-crises of 2006 and 2008 are the most important contemporary setting

for the geopolitical narrative: “[...] we’re also conscious of the impact of energy

supplies used on politics, in relations with Russia” (appendix 1: 1), says the Brit-

ish Ambassador to Denmark. Some interviewees mention the gas crises explicit-

ly, e.g. the Swedish Ambassador for International Energy Affairs: “And the issue

of gas supply security and the gas crisis in 2009 and the continued threats that

has been made over the past few years that at some point there will be a risk of

shutting down the pipelines” (appendix 4: 2)5.

The Ukraine-crisis represents a strong symbol of the setting. It is the main focus-

ing event that agents refer to as the trigger for the Energy Union. E.g. the Swe-

dish Ambassador for International Energy Affairs stresses how the EU success-

fully overcame an energy challenge from Russia (appendix 12: 2f). Energy as

geopolitics is closely linked to the neorealist school of International Relations.

The implicit understanding is that energy is a capability. Certainly, paths of en-

ergy diplomacy can be pursued, but according to our interviewees, the Russian

president is acting very much according to the logics of neorealist power-politics

principles: “and I think, to be very honest, that what Russia has been doing and

that the policies that President Putin is pursuing is in a way something that has

helped us to gather around a common energy policy” (appendix 4: 2). The geo-

political setting is thus well established.

5 The reason why the interviewees mention ‘2009’ and not the accurate year of 2008 is caused by the inaccurate question, where we mistakenly referred to the crises years of 2006 and 2009.


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The geopolitical narrative has been revived especially by Eastern European

member states. The Swedish representative exemplifies “I think for instance oth-

er countries in Eastern Europe this is very much a matter of national sovereignty

and security” (appendix 4: 3). The Polish representative supports this thinking:

“They [the Polish people] are fully aware of the risks that come from the Rus-

sian role in the Ukraine crisis and they understand that this is not only a matter

of security. But also the energy security” (appendix 6: 5). Later the Polish Ener-

gy Attaché goes on to imply that Scandinavians generally do not fully appreciate

the immediate threat from Russia, and that this is a problem. The geopolitical

narrative is also linked to a specific region and thereby their background abili-

ties.

The most prevalent philosophical assumption of the geopolitical narrative is first

and foremost that energy is of national importance: “[...] this is extremely sensi-

tive, because it is basically about, that in the countries, as a politician you are

responsible for supplying heat for the heater and gas for the gas oven” (appen-

dix 3: 3). However, there are also signs of a shift towards security understood in

a regional context rather than merely a national issue. This point becomes evi-

dent in the description of heroes within the geopolitical narrative in particular.

5.3.1.2 Characters

Heroes, villains and victims are essential to a narrative. Although using these

quite simplistic analogies, we believe that the terms are as real to the individual,

as they are useful. Therefore, the labels have a didactic purpose that clarifies the

meaning of the narrative. Specifically, we have looked at our data within 'entre-

preneurs'-code and separate them according to whether they are described posi-

tively.

The main character mentioned in this narrative is the Russian President, Vladi-

mir Putin.


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He is perceived as the anti-thesis to the ‘EU-leaders,’ whom at varying times and

to varying degrees include Chancellor Merkel and Juncker and to a lesser extent

Donald Tusk as head of the European Council. The victims are the Eastern Eu-

ropean countries, mainly as represented by the shifting Polish Prime Ministers,

the Baltic States and the vulnerable energy consumers in Europe in general.

As villain side-characters we also find that some see Merkel (in the case of the

Nord Stream gas pipeline) and the Climate advocates, when they are advocating

policies that increase Europe’s energy dependency.

Table 5.3: Characters within the geopolitical narrative

Primary Secondary

Villains President Putin, Russia Climate advocates, German Chan-

cellor Angela Merkel

(as a personification of Germany)

Heroes The European Commission EU

Victims Donald Tusk (as former Prime Min-

ister for Poland); Eastern Europe;

Baltic states; Ukraine.

Vulnerable consumers.

VILLAINS

Putin personifies all of the energy-difficulties for Eastern Europe. Where Gaz-

prom and other Russian energy companies may be the ones limiting energy ex-

port from Russia, Putin is personified by all interviewees - regardless of back-

ground or nationality - as the ‘bad guy’. A Danish MEP characterises: “[...] what

is happening at the moment is that we are seeing a Europe, becoming more and

more dependent on Putin, for gas to Europe” (appendix 9: 2; our translation).


106

We would expect this characterisation to have a firm foundation in Eastern Eu-

ropean interviewees. Seeing it represented so clearly by an interviewee from an

energy self-sufficient country indicates that this narrative is even evident beyond

the energy-dependent countries.

Climate advocates: Advocates of renewables often point to energy dependency

as a reason for more investment in wind turbines and solar power. Some of our

interviewees reverse the argument. Renewable energy is less reliable and it

crowds out the traditional energy sources, such as nuclear, coal and gas. The

interviewee from the Polish representation: “So for the Polish society, I think

that they are fully aware about the risks and costs that come from the climate

policy.[...] this has been as a - as you will know - a matter of national priority”

(appendix 6: 5). The climate policy is a risk, not to the Polish economy, but to

their security. Merkel’s position on Germany’s Energiewende (energy transition)

is also portraying her as a villain. Germany is gradually phasing out nuclear

plants (appendix 2: 7) and replacing them with renewable energy sources. Many

doubt whether the development of wind farms, solar energy etc. is moving fast

enough, hence in practice increasing Germany’s dependence on natural gas im-

ported from Russia: “The German ‘Energiewende’ was one that our chancellor

Angela Merkel took [...] Perhaps too quick and too harsh a turnaround in too

short a time, I don't have to comment on that” (appendix 2: 7) says the German

representative. In line with the representative from Confederation of Danish In-

dustries: “Germany is the focal point for this.[...] When you decide that [...] you

want to out phase nuclear energy - it was a very, very, very short timespan to

change the structure in the energy market. Where is the energy going to come

from? Well, the demand is not going to go away because you shut down the nu-

clear power plants” (appendix 3: 6; our translation). Depicting the climate-

friendly as endangering Europe’s geopolitical position is really underscoring the

primacy of the narrative. In essence these quotations are acknowledging the oth-

er narrative, but at the same time pointing out the that geopolitics should have

priority over the others.


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Merkel - as a personification of Germany: We expected that German chancellor

Merkel would be pointed to as a hero, due to her negotiations with Putin and

her position as the strongest leader in Europe. This holds true to some extent.

However, others see Germany’s actions and its rather pragmatic policy towards

Russia as playing into the hands of Putin. The Nord Stream pipeline was decid-

ed upon and built by Germany with Merkel at the helm. The pipeline is a geopo-

litical advantage for Russia, as Ukraine no longer can withhold Russia’s deliver-

ies to energy hungry Germany. In effect it could allow Putin to energy-starve

Eastern Europe. The German representative finds it necessary to defend Nord

Stream: “[...] that additional pipeline, especially supplying Germany, the Nord

Stream pipeline through the Baltic sea, brings in a huge quantity of gas, circum-

venting Ukraine, but with the option to reverse the flow - instead of Russia-

Ukraine-Slovakia and the rest of the EU - reversing the flow of Slovakia into

Ukraine, such as not to cut them off entirely and have a major humanitarian

crisis there” (appendix 2: 3). Germany stands out due to its regional hegemony

and thus Germany is inevitably subject to be either denounced as a villain or

glorified as a hero.

HEROES

The villain creates a pressure for a hero. However, none is apparent in the oppo-

sition. We identify two: the Commission and the EU as such. Both lack funda-

mental powers to take on the role as hero and hence has a lot of unfulfilled po-

tential in this regard; we label them ‘potential heroes’.

The Commission - a potential hero: The Commission has the potential as a hero

that can secure Europe as region against third party countries with malicious

intents. As the Swedish Ambassador for International Energy Affairs says: “[...]

we saw a letter coming in from President Putin sort of threatening that there

might be a gas crisis coming up. We all agreed, that we should not be replying

individually. But we asked the then president of the Commission, Barroso, if he

could actually write a reply from all of us. I think that was a very good example


108

of where the Commission can act as an energy diplomat” (appendix 12: 2f). As

the EU has several institutions and member states, the ‘hero-role’ is spread out.

Many interviewees would like the Commission to be a hero. The problem is that

it lacks institutional capacity. Hence the Commission is seen as an indirect hero:

“Here [governance, transparency, third country-negotiations] the Commission

should be strengthened so issues between states could be settled more easily and

comply with European goals” (appendix 10: 6) says a representative of the

French government. Coming from a French interviewee, shows that the percep-

tion of the Commission’s role is well rooted, even in Central Europe. In conclu-

sion, the Commission acts as a ‘would-be’ hero with a lot of potential as the

unifying figure.

The EU: We argue that the EU in itself is a potential hero. No European leader

or institution is likely to stand up against Putin alone. Cooperation is the only

way to solve the geopolitical problem: “No one listens to little Denmark, Bul-

garia, or Sweden alone, but together we would be much more strong” (appendix

11: 3). Hence the ability to be a hero lies in the community, especially in the

community’s solidarity. Sharing energy negates the consequences of a gas short-

age. Standing alone, the European leaders will be split and subject to Putin’s

‘divide and conquer’-tactic. When acting and reacting together they are more

resilient - and crucially they can make it through a winter with supply disrup-

tions of gas. As our anonymous source in the Commission says, talking about

the Energy Union and the public: “I think it's a good test case [...] for the citizen

as an individual in very concrete terms, to say to the citizens: "listen there will

be no disruption of Supply, because we are going to show that in case we have

diversified our supplies”[...]” (appendix 7: 6). The EU as a system has the poten-

tial to solve geopolitical part of the energy problem.

VICTIMS

Tusk and the Eastern member states: One could expect that Donald Tusk would

play the role as a hero, as he proposed the Energy Union. With the Polish inter-


109

viewee as the only exception, this is not the way he is portrayed, though. Pro-

posing the Energy Union is seen as a cry for help, which makes him fit into the

victim-category.

Tusk is the most visible representative for Poland and by proxy Eastern Europe

at large. When asked about security of supply, Poland, the Baltic countries and

Ukraine were mentioned the most. These regions are the real victims threatened

by Putin: “Germany focus on something completely different compared to Po-

land for example. The populations in central and south-eastern countries re-

member the gas crisis and know what it means not to have heat or energy” (ap-

pendix 11: 4), says Mårten Westrup, a DG Energy official.

The Baltic countries are seen as in a tough situation: “if you're a small [...] Baltic

country, and you got to stand up to Russia, you can feel stronger with the

Commission in the room, and even I think, [admitting] ‘we're weak enough to

do the job’, [the Commission is necessary]” (appendix 1: 1). This sentence from

the British Ambassador to Denmark (and former head of the Department of En-

ergy and Climate Change at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office) perfectly

sums up the villain, the victims and the hero. Villain Putin is, by proxy, pressur-

ing the victims in the Baltic states, and the potential hero is the Commission -

and hence the EU as a whole. The sentence has extra value as it comes from a

person representing a rather euro-sceptical country, which is not dependent on

Russian gas. A narrative this clear would be no surprise coming from an Eastern

European country, however, coming from a U.K.-representative only shows how

strong a foothold it has.

5.3.1.3 Plot

When analysing the plot, we want to assess the characters’ relations to each oth-

er and what the interviewees think about the focusing events. The latter is a

good indicator of the relationships between characters. If we stay in the ‘drama’-

metaphor, the plot is the acting itself or the drama that plays out between the


110

characters on the scene. Two focusing events show us the ‘state of play’ between

the main characters in the geopolitical narrative. One is of course the Ukraine-

crisis, and the second is the European Energy Security Strategy (EESS).

The Ukraine-crisis places Putin as the villain: “I think there's no doubt that the

threat that Russia might use energy supply for political means has focused

minds” (appendix 1: 2) says the British ambassador to Denmark. This statement

is representative for all interviewees. The narrative reactivated long-time fears

from 2006 and 2008 gas crises. The gas-crises are mentioned alongside Russian

intervention6 in Georgia (South Ossetia and Abkhazia). Our interviewees are all

squarely behind the interpretation that Russia is the villain, who is breaching

international law and sovereignty: “I was sitting around having conversations in

2008 after the invasion of Georgia, about what would Russia do next on all of

this and all of that is now raised in tension” (appendix 1: 5), says the British

ambassador to Denmark, who is also a former head of energy at the U.K. For-

eign and Commonwealth Office. Somehow both the public’s and the decision

makers’ perception of Russia and hence Putin was wrong. In a time of global

prosperity, the decision makers thought that Russia had entered into a new era,

with mutual cooperation on the agenda. This picture shattered with the events

in Georgia (and perhaps the on-going frozen conflict about Transnistria in Mol-

dova, but this issue is only mentioned briefly once). The story goes that this

made European leaders see Russian in a different way: “the crisis situation be-

tween Russia and Ukraine, 2006, 2009 created an additional problem, which

had not been envisaged before” (appendix 2: 3) as the German representative

puts it.

The strong villain character, i.e. Putin, reinforces the hero-role of the Commis-

sion and the EU in general. We take a look at how this role is performed by as-

6 We use the word intervention following our interviewees without taking a stance on the conflict.


111

sessing the EESS, which is an important part of the geopolitical narrative and

hence the perfect event for analysing the Commission and the EU.

EESS: The European Energy Security strategy tells us something about two he-

roes: the Commission and the EU as such. Its premises is that Putin is a villain,

and it shows a victimisation, that goes beyond the Eastern European countries.

Different measures were taken as a result of the gas-crises, but our interviewees

most frequently mention the European Energy Security Strategy (EESS): “From

the crisis in Ukraine and with Russia the ‘European Energy Security Strategy’

derived, and this really fueled the arguments for Donald Tusk around May

2014. He was in the game already” (appendix 11: 2) says a policy officer at DG

energy. The view is by no means unique and can be found elsewhere. The EESS

was a reaction to gas crises. But a collective European action, which shows us

that when there is geopolitical trouble, even the member states rely on European

measures. A strong indicator of the EU’s role as a hero.

The EESS depicts the Commission as a hero, e.g. because it carries out stress

tests of member states’ energy supply. The stress tests show how vulnerable each

country is. Even though stress tests are a Commission tool, they are at the same

time reinforcing member states as the central unit in energy planning, by looking

at each state independently.

The EESS also contains long-term strategies, e.g. the One Voice approach. As

the Commission itself states about the strategy: “Speaking with one voice in ex-

ternal energy policy, including having EU countries inform the European Com-

mission early-on with regards to planned agreements with non-EU countries

that may affect the EU's security of supply” (EESS 2014). Coordinating an as-

pect of a country’s foreign policy is a huge step for sovereign nations. Foreign

policy is what ‘makes’ a nation; hence even a small step in this area is potentially

huge. We find both tendencies towards nationalisation and Europeanisation.


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Having analysed the relationship between heroes and villains we turn to the vic-

tims. The interesting part is how our victims are viewed. The victim's’ relation-

ship with the heroes and the villain(s) is quite proactive, as they are themselves

proposing solutions, taking part in developing mechanisms, etc.: “[The Eastern

European countries] are quite keen on to support the energy community; the

neighbouring countries of Europe, including Moldova/Georgia for example”

(appendix 10: 3f). However this does not change that our interviewees see them

as victims.

5.3.1.4 Moral of the story

The plot, i.e. the relationship between characters, leads us to the moral of the

story. The moral is the ‘imperative’, or what the heroes ‘ought’ to do. The moral

asks ‘what should the heroes do in order to fight evil, succeed against the vil-

lain(s) and to save the victims?’ If the setting contains the problems, then the

moral of the story contains the solutions. We can learn a lot about the narrative

by analysing the various policy solutions to the narrative.

We have identified the following solutions to the geopolitical narrative in our

collected data. They are all rooted in and mentioned together with geopolitical

problems. Some solutions are uniform, while others differ slightly. The solutions

are as follows:

Interconnectors are a solution that is widely supported by our interviewees. An

interviewee from the Commission noted that Eastern European countries were

especially strong proponents of better interconnectors: “they have especially

been active within two topics: firstly, they have focused a lot on more intercon-

nectors and a better infrastructure in eastern Europe due to the interdependency

with Russia” (appendix 10: 3). Most interconnectors in Eastern Europe go

straight to and from Russia, which inhibits sharing between member states and

neighbours, which in turn creates a high dependency. Hence the narrative has an


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obvious solution: with the possibility to share energy, the countries will be less

vulnerable.

One Voice is the idea that the EU should speak in One Voice, i.e. collectively

negotiate energy contracts with third parties: ”Europe should develop a mecha-

nism for jointly negotiating energy contracts with Russia. [...] Finally, the Euro-

pean Commission would be required to take a role in all new negotiations”

(Tusk 2014). The suggestion however splits Europe in two and is furthermore a

very controversial issue in a number of member states. Thus the ‘One Voice’

approach has come to mean more transparency in bilateral negotiations: “We

have balanced our stand on that issue [One Voice], and it is difficult to imagine

at the moment the Commission representing Member states in bilateral negotia-

tions” (appendix 11: 3) says Mårten Westrup, a DG-energy official. The original

One Voice proposal, i.e. collectively negotiating contracts, is especially popular

in Eastern Europe though. The dividing line on the issue is well illustrated in the

debate between the Latvian minister for Foreign affairs and his Danish peer. The

Latvian minister of Foreign Affairs expresses: “So here I have to say that we

have supported [...] a stronger role for the Commission, but there are also mem-

ber states that are opposing to that. We have had this argument also with Mar-

tin [Danish FA minister, red.] some time ago. [Laughing].” Later the Danish

minister of Foreign Affairs replies: “And then there have been a suggestion that

the commission should have a more power in negotiating the contracts of gas

themselves. Here we have been more reluctant from the Danish side, because we

think that could risk making a new sort of kind of plan economy” (appendix 12:

2). Thus the original One Voice instrument is particularly linked to the groups

that engage with the geopolitical narrative.

Governance: The governance solution is proposed in order to push Transmission

System Operators (TSOs) to allow more foreign energy – within electricity and

gas – into their country. This is a rather technical approach, but will allow shar-

ing of energy.


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Solidarity: The solidarity mechanisms, where member states promise to share

their energy in case of a shortage are not a viable solution. Solidarity has come

to mean something more general, as one interviewee puts it: “whereas actual

Energy Union does not say, 'we will all send gas to the Czech Republic next

time the Russians cut it off', so it implies more than it is” (appendix 1: 6).

Storage: A solution that focuses on the national perspective, because each coun-

try must build up their own resources.

What does these solutions tell us about the underlying logic of the geopolitical

narrative? The solutions point to both more Europeanisation (e.g. One Voice,

Solidarity) and more nationalisation (e.g. Storage) at the same time. However,

the interesting point is that the radical solutions pointing to more Europeanisa-

tion suffer. Both the original ‘One Voice’-proposal and the mandatory solidarity

mechanisms will not become reality in this Energy Union. The ‘softer’ coordina-

tion solutions like interconnectors and improved European governance struc-

tures, do not meet as much opposition.

The solutions speak very much into the moral of the geopolitical narrative: a

belief that Europe itself can fix the problems by sharing energy. The narrative

tells us that we can ‘share’ our way out of geopolitical pressure, but member

states are not willing to take the full consequences of this. They only go halfway.

5.3.2 THE MARKET NARRATIVE

It has been argued that the liberalisation of energy policy ultimately have danced

at a British tempo. Hence, the goals, regulatory instruments and market-driven

vision are mainly uploaded from the United Kingdom to the EU (Ciambra and

Solorio 2015: 147). The following statement by the U.K. ambassador to Den-

mark emphasises the superior role of the market driven approach: “The [U.K.]

energy department, the energy and climate department have objectives about

basically keeping the lights on and reducing prices to consumers and reducing

carbon, but all of those, at the top can be delivered through the market based


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approach in Energy Union” (appendix 1: 1). The market approach will be good

to consumers, but can only be achieved through a European approach.

We start by analysing the setting, in which the market narrative lies. Then we

point out the characters and describe the most important ones. Later, we analyse

their relationship in the plot and then we sum up the underlying moral of the

story by looking at the solutions.

Table 5.4: Overview of market narrative

Setting Energy is understood as a tradable commodity bought by European consum-

ers and companies, and produced and sold by energy companies. Several

legislative events characterise the setting i.e. the three energy packages that

focus on the liberalisation energy and strengthened competitive environment.

However, implementation clearly lacks.

Characters The primary villains in this narrative are major energy companies, who have

market power (e.g. monopolies). They often act in concert with member states,

which want to protect a specific domestic energy company or sector. The

Commission is the biggest hero, as the guardian of the internal markets, while

the villains are consumers.

Plot The market is depicted as ‘work in progress’. It will naturally progress over the

coming years. However, due to backwards mentality and policies among

member states and major energy companies the Commission should - and

does - take action in order to protect consumers, who pay a price much too

high.

Moral The market is a ‘multi-tool’ that can solve virtually all problems, if not hindered

by regulation. It is imperative in this narrative to push for more markets, but it

presupposes better governance structures and improved infrastructure, such

as pipelines.


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5.3.2.1 Setting

Drawing on the common understandings in this narrative, energy should be seen

merely as another commodity. Energy is produced on the free market, where it

is also sold and bought. Market failures may exist due to monopolies, but gov-

ernment regulations can and should handle that. This narrative permeates many

of our interviewees’ quotations. Like the geopolitical narrative, the market nar-

rative is well grounded, too. It is one of two major paradigms referenced in

Youngs’ (2009: 7) book on energy and found as a general narrative of the EU

called ‘Economic Europe’ in Manners & Murray (forthcoming 2016).

In the narrative, the EU is built around an internal market. This is one of those-

low contestation facts, in which markets are better than non-markets. The best

route to energy security and inexpensive energy for consumers goes through

markets: “[...] the most economic way to do that is to do it as a part of a market

rather than trying to build up your own gas reserves” (appendix 1, ?) stresses

the British ambassador to Denmark. Securing markets would involve interna-

tional coordination and institutions based around good governance.

The setting of markets and energy has deep historical roots. The exploration and

extraction of energy sources has historically been linked to major companies and

the industrialisation of our societies. The Standard Oil Company is indispensa-

bly linked to the American industrial revolution like steam and steamboat is to

the European. The setting states that energy is of huge importance to our econ-

omies. E.g. crude oil is the most traded commodity, and it is traded in a well-

functioning market, that responds to changes in both production and demand.

Thus historically there has been a broad consensus that energy use and econom-

ic growth were intimately related (e.g. see Newell and Paterson 2010: 11ff). The

setting of the market narrative is that energy should be treated as a commodity

on a market. However, the narrative acknowledges that market failures exist.

“This service was government controlled, often even government owned, in mo-

nopolies, barely regulated monopolies and then we created markets out of that”


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(appendix 2: 10), says the German Regeriungsdirektor. Inherent in the narrative

is the acknowledgement that EU is still far from a perfect market in the energy

sector, and that getting there will take time and efforts.

5.3.2.2 Characters

A lot of characters from the geopolitical narrative reappear in the market narra-

tive. However, many of them are viewed in different ways, which tells us some-

thing about the incompatibility between the two narratives.

Table 5.5: Characters within the market narrative

Primary Secondary

Villains Energy companies, Member states

Heroes Commission ACER

Victims Consumers, energy-heavy industries Highly dependent member states

VILLAINS

Major energy companies are under heavy fire as villains in this narrative. They

are seen as major companies, in some instances even monopolies, that want to

keep the energy price high. Exemplified by the British Ambassador to Denmark:

“the biggest single thing is price and a belief that the energy company are some-

how raking in profits and not passing on” (appendix 1: 3). When asked about

lobbying efforts, the energy companies are often the first to be mentioned: “yes,

of course, there is no doubt that the big energy companies try to establish con-

tact with a lot of politicians in these areas” (appendix 9: 3; Our translation) says

a Danish MEP. The market narrative stressed the importance of discussing these

specific villains, because it legitimates certain changes within the market struc-

ture - we return to this below in the ‘moral of the story’. A frequent criticism of

the major energy companies are the connection between them and the political


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establishment: “traditionally this has been a field where there was a lot of politi-

cal influence, where you had state owned monopolies [...] you could set prices,

where else in the economy could you set prices? [...] Energy markets also are a

field in which these different philosophical, political philosophical approaches

can be felt more strongly, than when you look at trade policy or so on” (appen-

dix 2: 6). The German representative, who is a strong advocate of the market

narrative, sees the need for separating the market and state, and more specifical-

ly the states’ roles in major energy companies. This leads us to the second villain

in the market narrative, the member states themselves.

Member states: Other villains in this perspective are the member states them-

selves. In the narrative, this is a classic game theoretical point of view. The idea

is that European member states as a whole will be better off if they cooperate,

but each member state could gain more by ‘free-riding’ (aligned with ‘Tragedy

of the commons’ by Hardin 1968). Many member states have specific interests

in their domestic energy industry. E.g. France, who protects its state-owned nu-

clear industry by bundling transmission and production: “[...] the French have

been damn good at producing cheap, but when running [for foreign companies]

electricity and gas in their cables, it was extremely expensive [...] exporting elec-

tricity and other stuff, but not wanting other companies to enter their market”

(appendix 9: 3; Our translation) says a Danish MEP, and is supported by a

Greek representative: “I think that France is less - let's say - happy with more

liberalisation. Not like us but less happy than others”(appendix 8: 2). Several

member states are accused of actively working against liberalisation and market

incentives, which makes them a villain in the market narrative. The German rep-

resentative too believes that some member states are pushing their national in-

terest too far: “Some member states, take their right to veto or their right to set

certain parts of the agenda without a view to other member states or without a

view to the European level. Some member states feel that they have to exploit

this right to its absolute limit” (appendix 2: 6). In a very telling quotation, the

German representative highlights the lack of member state implementation:


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“Germany has opened its markets, you can choose a supplier, you can choose

among 3 to 4 thousand. If you are looking for a gas supplier, you can choose

from 500 to a 1000. There are member states out there where you have virtually

the old monopoly” (appendix 2: 3).

As we will see below, the best measure for combating these member state Nash-

equilibriums is increased Commission-powers. This is one of the most important

findings for the market narrative: Only considering national interests is not the

way forward. Some member states may be advancing market measures, but

when the point is to have a transnational market, you need everyone to comply.

Hence the natural stance to take is increased Commission-powers, that can force

member states to open up markets. Market proponents are hence moving from

an ideology based on the nation-state to an ideology based on European coordi-

nation.

HEROES

The Commission and the European Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Reg-

ulators (ACER): As noted above, the Commission is seen as a hero in this narra-

tive. In the EESS, which is really about energy security, the Commission (backed

by member states and the European Parliament) takes the following approach:

“a number of short-term measures can help the EU ensure secure supplies of

energy: the EU should follow a market-based approach to guarantee secure sup-

plies. Interventionist measures by governments should be avoided” (EESS 2014).

To some the Commission is more of a ‘potential hero’, as the Commission is

only halfway successful in pushing member states towards markets. In contrast

to the geopolitical narrative, the Commission’s role in the market narrative is

more technical: “Now there is a more technical approach to harmonisation that

will strengthen the Energy packages and the work with the unbundling of Ener-

gy. This implies a strengthening of ACER and more power to the European level

to make energy regulators in different Member states comply” (appendix 11: 1),

says Mårten Westrup, working in DG Energy. The Commission is depicted as a


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(potential) hero in two different ways. The first is introducing markets by im-

plementing legislation already agreed upon, e.g.: “to complete the internal mar-

ket, this turned out, it has not been fully implemented everywhere. The Com-

mission is struggling to push this agenda forward by opening [...] infringement

procedures against member states that has not complied fully” (appendix 2: 2).

The second is introducing more technical, or low-politics, adjustments, e.g. by

giving more power to the pan-European energy regulator (ACER) whose motto

is drawing on the market narrative: “Working towards a single energy market to

the benefit of all EU consumers!” (ACER 2015). Many interviewees with differ-

ent backgrounds mention ACER. A Polish representative says rather reluctantly:

“Of course the Commission also identified other areas when more European

dimension and more power to the ACER” (appendix 6: 4). ACER is, along with

network codes, an example of the common rules that are necessary at a practical

level in order to “effectively manage gas flows” (EU Commission 2015b). The

same goes for electricity. Many interviewees add the ACER/network codes story

to legitimise more power to the Commission.

However, more power to the Commission remains the most controversial ques-

tion in the Energy Union debate, but it also highlights the question of the strug-

gle between member states and the Commission. Many of our interviewees hesi-

tate to answer this question directly, but they do express the view that the only

way forward is with the Commission at the helm. They are affected by the re-

cent European Parliament elections, where Euro-sceptical parties increased their

number of seats. Hence many are reluctant to suggesting increased power to the

Commission: “if you have an Energy Union: Your goal is to work more and

more together.[...] That means that the Commission also have some power to

negotiate. But we are far from that in this stage” (appendix 13: 2), says the Dan-

ish Prime Minister, at the same time acknowledging Commission powers and

distancing herself from it.


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Whether a hero or not, the Commission is seen almost everywhere as an integral

part of implementing the energy market. Hence the market narrative simply

cannot exist without the Commission: “to complete the internal market, this

turned out it has not been fully implemented everywhere, the Commission is

struggling to push this agenda forward” (appendix 2: 2). An interviewee from

the Confederation of Danish Industries sees the Commission as absolutely neces-

sary, but focuses on the long road that still lies ahead: “The single market is the

strongest area of competencies that the Commission has. Removing barriers for

trade internally in Europe. [...] However we have done a poor job of establish-

ing a single market for energy and a digital single market. So this is where the

potential lies” (appendix 3: 5; our translation). Clearly this industry representa-

tive portrays the Commission as a hero because this is the only way to a more

market based-approach.

VICTIMS

Generally, two categories are ‘victimised’ in this narrative. The first is consumers

and the second is member states.

Consumers and energy-heavy industries: Consumers are seen as the victims of

energy companies’ greed: “are the energy companies making too much profit,

are there cartels going on about savings to the consumers, and if there's one sin-

gle overarching theme it's just cost of energy” (appendix 1: 3). This is combined

with the term ‘energy poverty’, where Europe’s poorest citizens cannot afford

the basic costs of heat, electricity etc. Some interviewees mention heavy indus-

tries, because they consume a lot of energy as victims as well, why the overall

competitiveness of the Europe is sometimes described as a victim too.

Member states: Some member states are also seen as victims. This only goes for

the highly dependent member states, as they risk ‘energy extortion’. It is interest-

ing that although these member states’ problems obviously fall under the geopo-

litical narrative, market arguments are also frequently used. In order to solve the


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geopolitical problems, market solutions are proposed as the most effective ones:

“our experience was that the markets could well take care of that and that it

was more a problem of an the incomplete liberalisation of markets in Poland

and other countries, that their negotiation-position was so weak” (appendix 2:

4). Poorly functioning markets increase the vulnerability of member states. Po-

land and the Baltic states are frequently described as victims in this narrative, as

is the rest of Eastern Europe. As a Danish MEP puts it: “it’s obvious that the

competition is not working, and that has to do with, that we don’t even have the

cables [interconnectors], that goes across everywhere, because then it would

work in different ways. There’s no doubt that the Balts pay more for the gas to

Gazprom than the Germans do” (appendix 9: 5; our translation).

5.3.2.3 Plot

An inherent part of plot is that the EU and the world is naturally progressing

towards more liberal markets and less regulation, simply because it is seen as

more efficient. It may not happen all at once, but progress - according to the

argument - is clear and unavoidable. Mårten Westrup, DG Energy official, ex-

plains: “Energy cooperation really started to grow much faster for the first time

20 years ago when the Internal Energy Market gradually strengthened. There

has – in my opinion – been much more progress in the last 20 years compared to

the 50 years before that” (appendix 11: 2). We analyse the plot through two

focusing events. For our respondents the financial crisis is the most important

external event and the series of energy packages the most important legislative

events.

Energy packages: The EU energy packages, sometimes referred to as ‘liberalisa-

tion packages’, are bundles of legislation. The narrative tells the story, that the

Commission is squarely behind this project and will do whatever it takes to push

the agenda forward. Each decade brings its own battles and every time the mar-

ket comes out on top, taking a small step forward for the market driven ap-

proach. At the moment, the Commission is struggling, hence, according to the


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narrative, more legislation is needed: “The Commission is struggling to push this

agenda forward by [...] opening infringement procedures against member states

that has not complied fully” (appendix 2: 2). The Energy Union is the needed

momentum. The Energy Union marks the provisional culmination of this line of

policy initiatives. All interviewees are aware that the energy packages have not

succeeded in introducing a fully liberalised market in the energy area. The

Commission has not had the necessary power to fulfil the market narrative’s

expectations of the third energy package, i.e. in particular taking action against

member states who have not yet implemented these measures. Many hope that

the Energy Union will provide the necessary momentum: “[...] now that you

mention the third liberalisation package, where they year upon year say ‘No,

now it must be implemented, No now it must be implemented,’ then this [the

Energy Union] may be a way of giving it momentum, right?” says the Danish

civil servant (appendix 5: 2; Our translation). Interviewees believe that the Ener-

gy Union will be an important push in a liberal market direction.

Market volatility: We expected the financial crisis to be evident in the market

narrative. However, our interviewees downplayed this part, because the perspec-

tives of most large-scale energy investments are much longer. This can be ex-

plained by one quotation from the German representative: “If you look at the

life cycles and pay-back periods in the sector you look at 20-25-40 year periods,

so investment signals are extremely important” (appendix 2: 2). Energy invest-

ments do not depend on the current price, because they pay off over the very

long run. Hence the financial crisis was not as important, as we had expected.

This is challenged by the British ambassador to Denmark, who says that the oil

price going up and down is a driver for sharing energy, and hence the Energy

Union: “I mean during the build-up to this there are prices being all over the

place, so it's hard to see that, to see how anyone makes a policy on that apart

from the big, the overarching image is around certainty. That you just cannot

predict what the oil price is going to do” (appendix 1: 2). Common for both the

German and British quotation is that the Energy Union will affect the markets in


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the long run, but that a financial crisis would not have a great impact. For pri-

vate companies, the key is long-term investment signals, e.g. that states will not

discriminate between technologies nor energy sources e.g. through support

mechanisms.


The moral of the market narrative is related to the solutions presented in the

narrative. And the solutions are different than the ones in the geopolitical narra-

tive, because the market driven approach is perceived as the solution itself. Alt-

hough the market narrative is ‘self-confident’, there are still some solutions,

which a real market presupposes.

Infrastructure: The market has this solution in common with the geopolitical

narrative above. Transferring energy is the basis of supply and demand. This is

sometimes referred to as the ‘hardware’ part. The goal is fully achieved when

Europe has one price of gas and electricity across every member state and every

region. This will necessitate large investments and secure a level playing field.

Governance: Not the overarching ‘One Voice’-governance that the geopolitical

narrative advocates, but technical ‘small scale’ governance, such as ACER, net-

work codes and more power for pan-European transmission operators are

stressed. Sometimes referred to as the ‘software’ part.

Further unbundling: This element was already part of the earlier energy packag-

es. However it has yet to be implemented in many member states. Unbundling

means that the producer of energy should not also be the owner of the down-

stream transmission infrastructure as this gives the producer a monopoly posi-

tion in the relation with the customer. Thus unbundling is a means to break

down vertical integration and create open access to the market (Bhattacharyya

2011: 679).


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Break-up monopolies: Major suppliers of energy mostly have considerable mar-

ket power that allows them to charge higher prices as no other supplier can

challenge them (i.e. they are not ‘price takers’). “[A]s long as the commission is

driving up against monopolies and is facilitating market reform, Norway is all

for a strong role for the commission in doing the difficult job that it is needed at

national levels to break up monopolies” (appendix 12: 2) says the Director of

Strategy at the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In practice this is often

coupled to governance and further unbundling strategies, however - according

the narrative - state ownership of energy companies should end.

Our conclusion points in the direction of ‘markets as a multi-tool for all solu-

tions’. The dominant story about how Liquefied Natural Gas can break up a

monopoly by diversifying supplies is the quintessential example of the market

narrative.

A common story in the market narrative is Russia ‘extorting’ small countries

who have no alternative sources of gas supply: “to some extend third countries

have been able to split the different countries in the EU – making one agreement

with one part, another agreement with another part – very big differences in

prices of gas in different countries [...]” (appendix 12: 2) says the Danish Minis-

ter for Foreign Affairs. Several interviewees emphasise this. Especially in the case

of the Baltic countries, who pay a considerably higher price than other coun-

tries. One particular case is quintessential to understanding the market narra-

tive. Lithuania built a floating LNG-terminal off the coast of the three Baltic

countries. LNG gas takes up less space and is therefore easier to transport.

Hence it is traded on the international market at a world market price. This

means that Lithuania (and Latvia and Estonia as they are connected) does not

solely rely on only Russian gas for its gas and electricity needs. When countries

in every part of the world can supply gas, the price on gas will gradually de-

crease to world market price (Fuks 2014). Even before the LNG-terminal was

taken into operation, Gazprom’s offered a 20% discount for the gas meaning


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that the substantial investment in the LNG-terminal is likely to be ‘earned back’

within a couple of years.

The inherent moral of this story and these solutions is that ‘everybody wins’ by

promoting a liberalised market. According to the narrative, a market driven ap-

proach is good for the climate, for the security of dependent member states, and

for personal economy of consumers.

5.3.3 THE CLIMATE NARRATIVE

The climate narrative is more recent than the ones on geopolitics and the mar-

ket. As the narratives are not exclusive (i.e. a person can draw on several narra-

tives) nor have clear limitations (i.e. solutions can be an answer to two or more

narratives), we will see some overlap. The geopolitical and market narratives are

well grounded in the literature. This is not the case with the climate narrative.

However, Manners and Murray (forthcoming 2016) identify a similar narrative

labelled ‘Green Europe’. As mentioned in paragraph 4.7 Coding and interpreta-

tion, we have a preunderstanding embedded in a Danish context with a strong

discourse that closely links energy and climate concerns. Furthermore it is entire-

ly plausible that a person speaking from the geopolitical narrative would mod-

erate his or her stance on the climate issue in order to accommodate our views.

We take these reflections into account when assessing the various quotations.

Thus we have to justify even stronger adding this narrative. Manners & Murray

find that the ‘Green Europe’ narrative is not as powerful when placed in compe-

tition with ‘economic Europe’ (similar to Market narrative) and ‘global Europe’

(shares some similarities to the geopolitical narrative). The climate narrative has

distinct features that contradict the consumerist ethic within the free market and

holds unique environmental concerns (Manner & Murray forthcoming 2016).

We find that the climate narrative is often expressed along with elements of the

market narrative. Therefore we are in particular examining those quotations

that do not agree in order to justify that climate narrative is a separate narrative.

Even with this additional precaution, it is quite obvious, when looking at our


127

data, that the climate narrative exists and is present in both proponent’s and

opponent’s minds.

Calling the less climate-friendly countries ‘laggards’ should not be interpreted as

the authors taking a stance on the climate question; it is merely how these coun-

tries are portrayed within the climate narrative.

Table 5.6: Overview of climate narrative

Setting Energy is ever changing, however at the moment we are seeing some of the

biggest changes. Fossil fuels hurt the climate (and the environment), but as

renewable energy sources are becoming more efficient, they will steadily gain

ground. The philosophy relies on the recognition of the finite nature of the

planet’s physical resources; and secondly, it draws attention to the ethical di-

mension of humanity’s relations with the non-human world.

Characters An ongoing struggle is happening between the ‘laggard member states’, who

fight renewable energy and the climate advocates. The laggards are joined by

(some) major energy companies who do not want to have their business case

ruined. Victims are conspicuously absent in this narrative.

Plot The relationship between heroes and villains in this narrative is more hostile

than in other narratives. Their agendas are directly opposed to each other, and

hardly any common ground can be found. The 2030-goals show that some

political will exists, but implementation will be difficult. The narrative is gaining

momentum heading towards COP21.

Moral The moral of the climate narrative is one of urgency. Something must be done

in order to combat climate changes. Both technical solutions (such as im-

proved infrastructure, better governance) and forcing the laggards to comply

are necessary steps.

5.3.3.1 Setting

The setting of the climate narrative is one of great upheaval. Rarely has there

been such a great focus on energy: “[...] they're happy that energy policy is back


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at this level of awareness. Because this is the one sector, where we have the big-

gest contribution to make in terms of climate change” (appendix 2: 8). Especial-

ly energy as a polluter (CO2-emissions) is in focus.

Urgency is a driver in the climate narrative and the COP21 in Paris (December

2015) presents a good opportunity to stress the EU’s role as a frontrunner of

policies that combat climate change. Keeping the momentum in climate policy is

further strengthened with the COP21 in Paris, which is described as the “last

chance” (SDSN 2015: 4) to reach a global climate agreement by UNSDSN7. The

philosophical setting of the climate narrative has distinct characteristics com-

pared to the two former narratives. Where the geopolitical and market narra-

tives are based on respectively realist and economic liberalist notions of problem

diagnoses, the climate narrative has its own distinctive focus. Connelly et al.

(2012) find that green politics rest on two fundamental insights: Firstly, the phi-

losophy relies on a recognition of the finite nature of the planet’s physical re-

sources; and secondly, it draws attention to the ethical dimension of humanity’s

relations with the non-human world (Connelly et al. 2012: 14). This is the pro-

grammatic belief that underpins the statement of especially the Danish civil

servant ”The Energy Union is a means to create and promote long term energy

and climate policies” (appendix 5: 1; our translation). However, not explicitly

saying that ‘we should save the planet’ there is a distinct difference in the way

the Danish civil servant describes the purpose of the Energy Union compared to

our other interviewees. She is thus stressing the long-term perspective as the

most important and always mentions ‘climate’ when speaking of ‘energy poli-

cies’. The major innovations within renewable energy sources are another im-

portant part of the setting. The price of electricity from renewable energy

sources has rapidly declined to a point where some sources have prospects of

becoming competitive. The climate narrative entails a battle of the state’s role

for two reasons. The first being that renewables still need state subsidies and the

7 Leadership Council of the Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN)


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second that CO2-emissions from fossil fuels are an externality that the state

needs to remedy.

5.3.3.2 Characters

Some of the characters from the other narratives also exist in this narrative,

however they have different properties.

Table 5.7: Characters within the climate narrative

Primary Secondary

Villains Laggard member states Major energy producing companies

Heroes Climate countries NGO’s, public and private investors.

Victims The planet (only mentioned once)

VILLAINS

Laggard member states: The EU member states fighting climate change-

mitigation efforts are most often described as villains: “member states [...] [that]

very strongly advocate that the EU should do more for nuclear, and there is

[countries] that want to expand their coal sector, even if it doesn't make sense at

all due to climate policies” (appendix 2: 6). The classical example of a laggard

EU member state is Poland, which seems to be our interviewees’ default posi-

tion: “you got Poland in particular, who was so coal dependent, that it's made it

tough for the EU to.. it's made it tougher than it would have been, for the the

EU to reach it's low carbon commitments” (appendix 1: 5) says the British am-

bassador to Denmark. When asked about the latest enlargements, most agree

that it has negatively affected ambitious climate goals. This is a clear indicator

of the number of interviewees that draw on the climate narrative.

The Energy Union is also seen as a choice between different energy sources: “I

think that there will be different opinions because there are countries, like Po-


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land, who are in favour of using coal and other countries who are in favour of

nuclear and other countries who are in favour of Renewables and setting this

new decision system will mean how we are going to promote Renewables or

traditional energy sources” (appendix 8: 3) says the Greek interviewee. The in-

terviews also reveal that almost all of our interviewees rely on the fact that “[...]

the countries’ energy mix, that is, how much renewable energy there should be

compared to fossil fuels, for example, well, that’s grounded in the treaty, that

it’s a national competence” (appendix 3: 4; our translation). Some point to the

national competency with barely concealed disappointment, others in order to

remind the interviewer, that the Energy Union should not give preferential

treatment to renewables. An interesting quotation is by the Polish interviewee:

“you might have doubts whether or not the approach will be technology neutral

to the use of nuclear, to the use of shale gas, to the use of coal, which also has

the potential for emission reduction” (appendix 6: 2). The interesting part is that

even coming from a coal-producing and consuming country, the interviewee also

uses the ‘climate argument’, although conventional wisdom has it that coal is

not good for the climate. For some reason he feels the need to cover his argu-

ment with the climate narrative. There may be some social desirability, consider-

ing that the interviewer is from a country with a better climate-profile, but it still

tells us something about the strength of the climate narrative, when even ‘the

villain’ draws on it.

Major energy producing companies: Besides the laggard member states, the ma-

jor energy companies are being presented as villains in the climate narrative. The

villains have a large overlap with the market narrative-villains, and are therefore

often lumped together, but with climate-arguments: “Obviously, when we’re

talking about energy efficiency,[...] where we easily can pick up 20% with ener-

gy savings, then they’re against it. They [energy companies] won’t say it public-

ly, but they are, because it gives 20% less bottomline in their business. [...] the

politicians must cut through and then say that [...] they have a hidden agenda,


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all the big energy companies, including state owned energy companies like Ener-

gie de France [Électricité de France]” says a Danish MEP.

HEROES

Climate countries: The climate laggard-countries are often contrasted with the

climate advocates: “So Poland for instance is a country with heavy industry.

And using CO2, and we have on the one hand those promoting Renewables like

Denmark, Like Germany” (appendix 8: 6). Often Poland is contrasted with

Denmark, but this tendency is probably overstated due to the interviewer com-

ing from Denmark. Germany is often pointed out as a leader due to the coun-

try's’ recent Energiewende and its central role in European politics. The contrast

between Poland and Denmark/Sweden/Germany is something that several differ-

ent interviewees point to: “Germany focus on something completely different

compared to Poland for example” Says the Swedish official from DG Energy

(appendix 11: 4).

NGO’s: Working together with - or against - climate countries are the NGO’s,

whom are often counted amongst the lobbyists by our interviewees: “I think you

have a very strong NGO community here sort of pushing Sweden into a very

strong stance on the green economy and sustainable energy systems” (appendix

4: 5). They are seen as heroes in the climate narrative. They are mostly men-

tioned when asked about outside interests (i.e. lobbyists) and not mentioned

spontaneously, which makes us suspect that they are not as influential charac-

ters. “[...] besides the institutions, it is clearly the NGO-side, with my specialty

on the environment- and climate area, that have played a role” (appendix 3: 2f;

our translation) says the lobbyist for the Confederation of Danish Industries in

Brussels. The NGO’s are almost always mentioned in the same sentence as the

industrial interests


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Private and public investors: Transitioning Europe’s entire energy supply calls

for huge investments, which can only be done with private and public investors.

The former EU-Commissioner for Climate Connie Hedegaard makes this con-

nection perfectly clear: “I think there are some investment streams of real signif-

icance that start to change [...] if investors start to invest differently, then there

are things happening in the world and then it has some pretty fast effects I

think” (appendix 14: 1; our translation). Again and again, our interviewees state

that the necessary investments rely on a long timespan: “What does the internal

market do? As markets do, it creates investment incentives, it creates a certain

degree of investment security. [...] If you look at the life cycles and pay-back

periods in the sector you look at 20-25-40 year periods, so investment signals

are extremely important” (appendix 2: 2). In this case the market and climate

narratives are very much in line. Public investment is a crucial element in the

climate narrative as well, when developing long-life infrastructure. In Greece,

and on disconnected Greek islands in particular, huge investments in infrastruc-

ture are necessary in order to make use of green energy sources: “You can have

a lot of Renewables here, because you have the sun, the wind, but you cannot

send electricity to the mainland then and then to the rest of Europe. So you can-

not have Investments here, so we need interconnections that is the one problem”

(appendix 8: 2) says a Greek representative.

VICTIMS

“[...]We have the choice between a stranded planet and stranded assets[...] when

even the Secretary General of OECD isn’t in doubt what one should choose

there, then things are starting to change” (appendix 14: 1; our translation) says

the former European Commissioner for Climate. This is very telling for the vic-

tims in the climate narrative. As ‘the planet’ will suffer, we will all suffer in some

respects. However, the victims are suspiciously absent in the climate narrative.

Everyone mentions climate, but the above quotation is as close as we get to a

‘victimisation’. We do not believe that this is due to a lack of victims, but to the

fact that (1) the victims are more dispersed and (2) the most tangible victims are


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physically far away and that (3) it is generally accepted that climate change will

lead to many victims. The missing verbalisation can also be a symptom of a fa-

tigue discourse that often calls to the parental responsibility ‘to save the chil-

dren’. Anyhow, we believe that these conditions lead our interviewees to not

mentioning the victims specifically.

5.3.3.3 Plot

The climate narrative plot depicts the proponents and opponents as heavily op-

posed to each other. In both market and geopolitics the proponents may have

sympathy for the opponent’s case, they just consider the wrong approach. This

is not the case within the climate narrative, where the relation between ‘climate

advocate’ and ‘laggard member states’ is more hostile.

We analyse the plot through two ‘focusing events’, which our interviewees deem

important in relation to the climate narrative. The first one are the 2030-goals

and the second is the upcoming COP21 event in Paris. These two focusing

events have one thing in common: the ability of the supranational level to de-

mand climate laggards into increasing energy efficiency and promoting more

renewable energy. The EU can furthermore help to create subsidising systems in

favour of the renewable energy power sector due to well-known market failures,

i.e. not accounting for externalities from CO2-emissions within the price of fos-

sil fuels. This, however, stands in great contrast to the ‘flexible’ and ‘energy neu-

tral’ preferences, which can be found within both the market and geopolitical

narrative.

2030-goals: One of these political pushes came in October 2014, just before the

Barroso Commission left office. The goals require the EU to collectively (thus,

not nationally) reduce its carbon emissions by at least 40% compared to 1990

levels. EU member states “also endorsed achieving at least 27% renewable ener-

gy in the EU's final energy consumption and a 27% or greater improvement in

energy efficiency by 2030” (EU Commission October 2014). The 2030 goals


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passed the European legislative system and are seen as a huge push to the cli-

mate narrative: “we can exploit the momentum from the 2030 agreement. Now

there is a strong feeling around energy cooperation and renewables especially.

And there exist a common awareness. But actual decisions are a lot more com-

plicated.” says Mårten Westrup, DG Energy official (appendix 11: 2). The

2030-goals are targets that must be implemented somehow, and many inter-

viewees see the Energy Union as a natural way to do this: “Whether they like it

or not, they’re stuck with the 2030-goals. That’s why some of us thought it was

pretty important to have them passed the 23rd of October before we stopped

being in session” (appendix 14: 3; our translation) says the former Climate

Commissioner. The German representative agrees: “high up on the agenda and

we have the October European Council conclusions with the target system for

2030 and for which the Energy Union also gives the framework” (appendix 2:

4). The 2030-goals are interlinked with the Energy Union and ensure that cli-

mate cannot be excluded from the Energy Union agenda. This is part of the plot,

which finally the climate advocates (especially the member states, but also

NGO’s, etc.) have something concrete to point to: “There are two major policies

that are possible to see in the Energy Union proposal. First of all, the 2030 cli-

mate framework from October 2014” (appendix 11: 1) says a DG Energy offi-

cial.

COP21: “Different arguments win momentum over time. So ahead of a COP15,

perhaps especially the climate argument for doing energy policy gained hearing”

(appendix 5: 6; our translation). While COP15 was mentioned only once by a

Danish interviewee, there was a broad consensus amongst all of our interviewee

that the COP21 (in Paris in December 2015) would be a major driver for cli-

mate in the Energy Union. The COP21 is an inherent part of the climate-plot,

because it engages the member states (both heroes and villains) and the EU as a

whole. When asked about the links between COP21 and the Energy Union, the

response is almost unanimous: “very much so very much so they're very clear

linkages between two processes” (appendix 4: 7) says a Swedish interviewee and


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on the subject of whether the Energy Union becomes more climate-friendly be-

cause of COP21: “I think it does. I think that countries like France for instance

and others do see the linkage between reduced CO2 emissions and the role in

energy. I think that the two processes actually are reinforcing.” (Ibid.). This

thinking is found in answers from almost all interviewees: “the COP21 in Paris

has a lot to say. The [COP21] demands Europe to be more ambitious on climate

matters” (appendix 10: 2) says a French interviewee.


The climate narrative wants to pass on the message that the climate laggards are

backwards and stuck in the past (mentioned explicitly in appendix 9: 2). The

moral of the climate narrative is rather difficult to find explicitly expressed in

our interviewees’ statements, perhaps because there are no apparent victims. The

climate narrative’s moral is inherent in the climate narrative itself, i.e. propo-

nents do not spend time arguing why climate change mitigation measures are

needed, and more time arguing what type of measures ought to be implemented.

Forcing laggard member states to become more climate-friendly is a solution

that points to more Europeanisation. The EU could speak with a much louder

voice after accepting ten new member states in 2004 (and another two in 2007).

However, according to the climate narrative, what is being said with this voice

could be much more climate-friendly. A few laggard member states are blocking

ambitious climate legislation. The laggards can do this in part because a member

state’s energy mix is a national competency.

Setting an example for others to follow ahead of COP21 is important for the

EU. The EU is perceived as a world leader within climate, which are both

acknowledged by our interviewees (e.g. appendix 14) and within the February

proposal “The challenge is to retain Europe's leading role in global investment

in renewable energy.” (EU Commission 2015a).


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Implementing 2030-goals: Through the Energy Union, the ambitious targets set

in the 2030-goals can be fulfilled. There seems to be scepticism about whether

member states actually know how tough it will be to fulfil the 2030 targets.

“Now there’s a lot of details about how to do this [implement the 2030-goals]

and so on. Yet, bottom line is: the goals are there. I believe that the Energy Un-

ion done right, can be a good way of doing it” (appendix 14: 3; our translation).

Energy efficiency is a solution to the climate narrative because less energy con-

sumption means less CO2-pollution. This solution is also found in the previous

narratives.

Interconnectors: Increasing the electricity network is necessary for transporting

the renewable electricity to consumers. This solution is also known as “hard-

ware”.

“Software”: Even when there is sufficient electricity grid, some national energy

regulators block the transmission in order to protect home market producers.

The climate advocates push for EU governance in this area as a prerequisite for

including intermittent energy sources in the European energy mix.

These solutions all point to the same ideology: energy policy is a European issue.

Nation states cannot solve the climate problem alone. And even worse: maybe

they will actively work against climate action as the British ambassador to

Denmark notes: “The Commission has an ambitious climate policy agenda. But

if member states couldn't agree in October on.. if they could only agree on Eu-

ropean binding targets, but not on member states binding targets, the Commis-

sion is all of a sudden, more or less it's like a train driving towards a concrete

wall, and the question is will the brakes work in time?” (appendix 2: 6). The

laggard member states are the big villains and the moral is that they should be

subject to EU regulation. In this regard the energy mix as a national competency

is a problem for the climate advocates. The moral is that everyone should im-


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plement measures to mitigate climate change, and those who do not, should be

forced by the supranational level.

5.3.4 THE HOLISTIC NARRATIVE

The three narratives above are prominent, grounded in theory and each contrib-

ute with an explanation of the Energy Union. Each narrative explains certain

dimensions of the proposal. As the French energy attaché points out: “Within

the five dimensions it is possible to find the three classical dimensions of any

energy policy. It should be 1) secure 2) sustainable 3) cost efficient” (appendix

10: 1). Several of our interviewees believe that the Energy Union is an umbrella

approach for all energy policies (the ‘umbrella’ term was mentioned specifically

by the German, British and Swedish representatives). In this analysis of the new

holistic narrative, we show how it has been pieced together by combining the

previous narratives in order to give European energy policy a new impetus.

Table 5.8: Overview of the holistic narrative

Setting The holistic narrative merges the three previous narratives and tries to over-

come old differences by convincing member states to take a more pragmatic

approach to energy policy-making. The basic philosophy is that the different

dimensions are mutually reinforcing rather than competing.

Characters The main characters are the Commission, Russia and Eastern European EU

member states. The holistic narrative also has important subordinate charac-

ters, i.e. the increased Euroscepticism. The victim characters play a minor part

due to the positive sentiment in the narrative.

Plot The official drama is between a united Europe on the one side and Russia on

the other side. This exercise shifts the focus from a struggle among member

states to a struggle between EU and its external relations. However another

drama awaits, which is the current and future negotiation on the implementa-

tion of Energy Union.

Moral The actual implementation of the Energy Union should secure an equal repre-

sentation of the three previous narratives.


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5.3.4.1 Setting

“First and foremost the Energy Union is a holistic and comprehensive approach

to European energy policies” (appendix 11: 1). This is mentioned by every single

interviewee - often as the first sentence, when asked to describe the Energy Un-

ion. What separates the Energy Union from previous initiatives within energy

policy is the holistic thinking. Hitherto energy has been perceived within either

the narrative of climate, markets or geopolitics. With the Energy Union in es-

sence, a new policy field emerges. This is rather surprising due to the distinct

differences between the three narratives, as they are in many ways contradictory.

Just to mention a few challenges in merging the dimensions: the climate narra-

tive’s underlying ethical dimension of humanity’s relations with the non-human

world directly contradicts the fundamental consumerist ethics of the market ap-

proach. Also, the geopolitical focus on security of the state undermines the func-

tions of ‘the invisible hand’ of the market. However, there seems to be a sincere

belief that a holistic approach is possible. The Swedish energy ambassador em-

phasises the importance of combining the dimensions: “The important thing is

to really have to holistic view and to really implement all five dimensions” (ap-

pendix 4: 1). Instead of competing, the dimensions are mutually reinforcing. The

Danish civil servant also holds this view: ”It binds the different sectors together,

in order to look at synergies and a holistic picture by looking at mutually de-

pendent dimensions. This is the overall picture” (appendix 5: 1; Our transla-

tion). The premise of the holistic narrative is that member states compromise

and pragmatically embrace all dimensions. Thus the narrative is very useful if it

succeeds in overcoming old barriers by convincing member states to take prag-

matic approach to energy policy-making. As pointed out earlier, the previous

narratives all lead towards further European integration, however based on dif-

ferent justifications and solutions. To overcome the differences, the European

Commission emphasises synergies and pragmatism instead of stalemate between

opposing dimensions. Mårten Westrup from the Commission underlines: “The

equality of the dimensions is important to emphasise, and the Commission has

been strong on that. Some member states have different focuses and priorities.


139

But all areas interact with each other and are working as prerequisites” (appen-

dix 11: 1).

The setting is furthermore characterised by a general feeling of excitement and

high expectations. When asking about the general mood amongst interest

groups and other private actors, all interviewees mention, similarly to the fol-

lowing statement, that the Energy Union: “has broad expectations, I think there

are a lot of expectations. [...] if you ask stakeholders and representatives, they

may give an impression that this Energy Union has one big chance, and that is

to put energy policy back on the agenda as a really, really, important top-level

item”, (appendix 2: 4) the German Regierungsdirektor states.

5.3.4.2 Characters

One of the advantages of the holistic narrative is that it can draw on the strong-

est characters from the other three narratives.

Table 5.9: Characters within the holistic narrative

Primary Secondary

Villains Russia Euroscepticism

Heroes The visionary Juncker Commission The faithful squire and Vice Presi-

dent Maros Šefčovič

Victims Eastern European EU member

states

VILLAINS

Russia: The holistic narrative draws on the strongest villain in all the narratives:

Russia as depicted in the geopolitical narrative. The geopolitical villain is strong

because it implies a fundamental securitisation of energy and - if framed correct-

ly - the insecurity threatens the very existence of Europe (aligned with the Co-


140

penhagen school of International Relations, e.g. Buzan et al. 1998). The stronger

the villain, the stronger the hero will appear. This is the fundamental logic when

trying to emphasise the role of EU as the problem solver.

Euroscepticism: We have not found any official statements referring to Euro-

scepticism as a challenge to the Energy Union. Still, Euroscepticism is perceived

as a villain, as the Danish MEP points out on the influence of Eurosceptic MEP’s

on a future Energy Union decision: “Well, I think that if anything should be de-

cided upon in the new parliament then there has to be found compromises be-

tween the EPP, the big Christian democratic group, and the Socialists. Because,

if the far right [...] on the one side and the communists on the other, if they

manage to drive a wedge between the S&D Group and the EPP Group, the is-

sue [the Energy Union] will fall” (appendix 9: 6; our translation).

Furthermore, the increased scepticism represents a danger to the EU as a whole,

according to this narrative. The Energy Union is a way of legitimising the EU by

demonstrating the benefits of cooperation (output legitimacy). Our anonymous

source from DG Energy says about the Energy Union: “It will not make Euro-

scepticism go away. That's a very big challenge. But I think it can contribute,

when people say, well this is not a bad idea” (appendix 7: 5). The Danish Indus-

try lobbyist working in Brussels explains his view on the root of the problem

“the European politicians - together with the national politicians for that matter

- have not managed to explain the value of the European community to its citi-

zens, which have resulted in this election, where the Eurosceptic people have

gained ground” (appendix 3: 4; our translation).

HEROES

The visionary Juncker Commission: The change of Commission ultimo 2014 is

seen as a crucial step in changing the visions for the EU. The Greek energy atta-

ché compares the Juncker Commission with the former Barroso Commission: “I

think that Juncker has greater Vision than Mr. Barroso, so it's not only the


141

economy behind it. The people, the persons behind” (appendix 8: 5). In general,

the new Juncker Commission is recognised as the main entrepreneur and creator

of the Energy Union, taking the concept initially proposed by the then Polish

Prime Minister Donald Tusk and reframing it. Juncker is praised for prioritising

the Energy Union, especially by appointing a Vice President for the Energy Un-

ion: “Jean Claude Juncker more or less took over the term and prioritised it on

his agenda or his legislative term and more or less redefined it with the help of

his new Commission-structure with his vice-president Šefčovič in charge of put-

ting together all the different strings of that policy” (appendix 2: 4) says the

German Regierungsdirektor. Besides the Commission, Maroš Šefčovič is often

mentioned as a kind of faithful squire, who is touring the member states to ad-

vocate the holistic narrative.

The faithful squire, Vice President Maros Šefčovič is mentioned in very positive

phrases by most of the interviewees: “[...] he is a very enthusiastic man, I’m sure

he’ll drive this agenda forward” (appendix 5: 4), says a Copenhagen-based Dan-

ish civil servant, who is seconded by a Polish representative: “So the communi-

cation, obviously, especially from Mr. Šefčovič is very good. I mean, he sees

what is the real problem right now and identifies that and tries to identify the

solutions” (appendix 6: 7). This view is also reflected by the ‘Energy Tour’,

where Šefčovič visits all EU member states to discuss the Energy Union. An

anonymous source, who coordinates the Energy Tour, describes the tour in ra-

ther heroic terms, because Šefčovič engages with the tough questions in public:

“it leads up to Vice President Šefčovič going to the member states, [...] where he

will be asked questions, sometimes perhaps tough questions, [..] I think it's a

way of bringing the Energy Union initiatives closer to the citizens” (appendix

7:3). Thus the holistic narrative also has the aim of creating strong engagement

with the European leadership and people along with tackling the villain.


142

VICTIMS

The Eastern European member states: The main victims also draw heavily on

the geopolitical narrative due to its strong narrative engagement. The Eastern

European member states are the main victims of the energy insecurity caused by

Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. However, the focus on the victims is less

prevalent compared to the previous narratives. This is interesting to note, be-

cause it shows that the holistic narrative emphasises the future, rather than fo-

cusing on barriers or victims.

The characters of the holistic narrative are hereby characterised. The following

plot outlines the drama within the setting and between the characters.

5.3.4.3 Plot

We identify two dramas. The first one relates to the identity of the Energy Un-

ion, which encourages a feeling of solidarity and unity across borders. We label

the drama ‘The Union vs. Russia’ because it tries to overcome a potential re-

nationalisation during times of crisis by reframing national identity into a more

regional - European identity. Only united ‘we’ can stand up to the Russian vil-

lains, seems to be the inherent logic of the plot. The second drama is the one of

the internal negotiations in the EU. This drama sees huge challenges in merging

the various dimensions because of member state opposition.

The ‘Union’ vs. Russia: The first drama is very similar to the geopolitical narra-

tive. The Ukraine-crisis is the focusing event, which gathers national leaders

around a regional solidarity in order to ‘stand together’ against Russia. The Brit-

ish ambassador to Denmark underlines: “I think there's no doubt that the threat

that Russia might use energy supply for political means has focused minds” (ap-

pendix 1: 2). The crisis demands a united political leadership to show what the

‘Union’ represents. Thus, the label ‘Energy Union’ is not coincidental. Mårten

Westrup from DG Energy is pleased with the term ‘Energy Union’ because it


143

illustrates the ambitions. He reads out loud the definition of the term ‘Union’ as

depicted in the Lisbon treaty:

“The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom,

democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the

rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the

Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance,

justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail” (appendix 11:

5).

The EU’s identity is strengthened when focus shifts from internal disagreements

to external enemies. To use the concept of ‘agonism’ from Chantal Mouffe: ‘we

desire an end to conflict, if we want people to be free we must always allow for

the possibility that conflict may appear and to provide an arena where differ-

ences can be confronted’ (Mouffe 2000: 98). The Energy Union is a ‘shortcut’ to

overcoming the differences internally in the EU. When pointing to an external

enemy, we are reminded of what unites, rather than what separates. In this re-

spect, external enemies create inner unity. The German representative also em-

phasises the problem-solver role of the Commission: “and at the same time po-

litically taking care by the trilateral talks - Russia-Ukraine-and the Commission,

largely with the winter package” (appendix 2: 3). The official drama does not

prevent the underlying plot to emerge. Thus, we found that many interviewees

mentioning that ‘the devil is in the detail’.

The devil is in the detail: the official plot cannot hide the potential drama that

awaits current and future negotiations between the actors within the EU. Several

interviewees expressed anxiety when speaking of implementation. The Danish

civil servant said about the overall idea of an Energy Union: “Well, it’s maybe

easier to agree, when you are on the very general level. However, the devil is in

the detail. So what will happen, when you go more in depth and say ‘what is the

Energy Union really about?’” (appendix 5: 2; our translation). The French ener-

gy attaché holds a similar view: “The Energy Union is broadly described – but


144

the devil is in the detail, and I will definitely have work to do in the coming

months and years. Different member states focus on different things” (appendix

10: 2). This plot recognises the differences within European energy policy. A

way to overcome the differences is to have each narrative represented equally.

When asked the question whether security or climate will be the strongest driver

for the Energy Union, The French energy attaché replied: “Of course there are

and will be divergent interests. The different member states emphasise different

elements. Therefore it would be easiest if everything were treated equally so that

everyone gets something out of it. Is that possible? We’ll see in the next few

years!” (appendix 10: 5). This approach can be compared to what Mike Hulme

calls a ‘silver buckshot solution’ when dealing with wicked problems, in which

no silver bullet solution can be found (Hulme 2009: 311). Yet, despite the dif-

ferences between the two dramas within the holistic narrative, they both call for

political leadership.


The various solutions that the holistic narrative is pointing to are often compat-

ible with the solutions that the previous narratives suggest. This feature, i.e.

finding common ground among the three narratives, characterises the overall

moral of the holistic narrative. Many of the specific proposals are yet to come.

However, our sources in DG Energy have pointed out the following solutions in

order to implement the Energy Union adequately (appendix 7; appendix 11).

Strengthening the European Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators

(ACER): This is one of the new elements in the Energy Union and it relates to

the Internal Energy Market in particular. This solution implies strengthening of

ACER and increased power to the European level, in order to make national

energy regulators in different member states comply. This particular solution is

in line with the previous narratives.


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More cooperation among Transmission System Operators (TSOs): Furthermore,

there should be more cooperation between TSOs across borders and regions.

Cooperation centres will be put up to facilitate market integration. A technical

approach will therefore strengthen governance and implementation of the Ener-

gy Union through daily management and facilitation.

Transparency on energy agreements with third party countries: The original

proposal of ‘One Voice’ was to transfer negotiating competences to the Europe-

an Commission. This proposal should be viewed in light of the geopolitical nar-

rative that hoped to overcome bilateral agreements that gives Russia leverage.

However, the ‘One Voice’ proposal has been downplayed in order to merge es-

pecially with the market narrative. The Swedish energy ambassador exemplifies:

“We really have to combine the One Voice approach with very stringent market

approach. So really I'm not sure - I would rather say: a lot of voices that say the

same thing, rather than one voice” (appendix 4: 2). More transparency should

secure that bilateral agreements comply with overall goals of the EU.

Reaching the objectives presented in the 2030 framework: The 2030 framework

did not include national targets, but ‘only’ collective goals. Therefore, the main

instruments to reach the climate objectives put forth in the 2030 framework are

yet to be decided upon. Many interviewees share the opinion that the Energy

Union is the proper context for taking these decisions. Our anonymous source in

DG Energy acknowledges that it will be very difficult to agree on targets for

each member state: “So we are still discussing internally how best to come about

this, because of course we need a very strong political process” (appendix 7: 1).

The mix of solutions put forth is crucial in order to make an actual decision on

the Energy Union. If the equality of dimensions is not represented, the Energy

Union is likely to bring about only minor pragmatic changes.

The Narrative Policy Framework has hereby helped us identify the various nar-

ratives within European energy policy. The clarification of the previous narra-


146

tives has enabled us to identify and to understand the composed nature of the

new holistic narrative - illustrated by the Energy Union proposal. The holistic

narrative merges the three previous narratives and tries to overcome old differ-

ences within European energy policy by convincing member states to solve the

combined problems within climate, energy security and market all at once. The

basis of the holistic narrative is that the different dimensions are mutually rein-

forcing rather than competing. Furthermore, the narrative analysis shows that

the drama is yet to unfold. However, to fully understand the dynamic between

the narratives and the context in which they are being marketed by agents, we

need to take a more thorough look at the underlying ideologies. This will enable

us to illuminate the explanatory element in the overall research question, i.e. the

causes that led to the Energy Union proposal.

5.4 IDEOLOGIES

We now turn to the underlying assumptions of the outlined narratives. We do

this in order to explain how the three older narratives have influenced the mak-

ing of the new holistic narrative. In general, we find that Schmidt’s and others’

(see e.g. Crespy & Schmidt 2014) applications of the third level of ideas - la-

belled ‘ideologies’ - is a bit messy. In Schmidt’s 2008 text, her understanding of

ideologies is equalled with “Public philosophies [...] Public sentiments [...] deep

core [...] worldviews or Weltanschauung [...] philosophical ideas” (Schmidt

2008: 306). In an analysis of the Franco-German agreement on reforming the

EMU and financing a rescue of debt countries, Crespy and Schmidt juggle with

various concepts of ‘ideas’. In this piece, paradigms, norms, values, and philoso-

phies are mixed together. At one point, they even refer to ideology as taking the

form of a grand narrative, as in the case of Sarkozy who appealed to ‘the grand

narrative of European integration’ in order to convince the French voters and

parliament to show solidarity with the rest of Europe (Crespy & Schmidt 2014:

1097). Yet, Schmidt does after all add some clarification to the ‘ideology’ as sit-


147

ting in the background, i.e. underlying assumptions that are rarely contested

except in times of crises. The clarification of the term ‘ideologies’ is greatly im-

proved in Schmidt and Thatcher's work on the resilient ideology of (neo-

)liberalism in Europe’s political economy (Schmidt et al. 2013). The ‘resilience’

or ‘rarely contested’ refer to ideas that seem to be the ‘preferred’ or assumed

ideational approach in public discussions. Ideology can thus be defined as the

overarching discourse that is legitimising certain actions (Schmidt et al. 2013:

17). This notion is somewhat similar to Manner and Murray’s perspective on

the narrative’s ability to shape norms and create legitimacy. Especially the meta-

narrative can act as a justification for specific political projects (Manners &

Murray forthcoming 2016). However, the notions of respectively ‘ideologies’

and ‘meta-narratives’ differ - particularly in terms of change. On the one hand,

Schmidt - though emphasising the dynamic relationship between agency and

structure - still tends to stress resilience as the ‘normal mode’ within ideologies.

In this perspective, change mostly stems from crises. On the other side, both

Andrews (1991) and Mayer (2008) emphasise the agency of the individual as a

main driver for change. Mayer points towards the need for EU leaders to change

the image (or meta-narrative) of the EU in the World through constructive en-

gagement, in order to regain the EU’s capacity to shape global policies (Mayer

2008: 23).

Though we find that the ideology of ‘energy being an issue for nation-states’ is a

resilient ideational approach, which have adapted to various narratives (the ones

of geopolitics, markets and even climate) since the very beginning of the Coal

and Steel Community. We also believe that change is possible through both in-

cremental and abrupt influence by a mixture of agency and structure. To clarify

our position on change within ideologies further, we lean on the elaboration

made by Freeden (1996) and the definition made by Ferrera (2013).8 According

8 The latter scholar has analysed the ideological changes within the discourse of welfare sta-tes in the EU.


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to them, ideologies ‘keep a foot in the realm of political thought and a foot in

the realm of political action’. Adaptation or change happens as a response to

changes in the two realms in which ‘their feet are planted’: “1) the realm of

philosophical debates and the practical realm of political action (including the

exercise of power), and (2) policy choice in response to social and economic

transformation” (Ferrera 2013: 86). We believe these two realms are important

to have in mind when analysing the change in discourse within energy policy in

the EU. We start by analysing the latter realm of social and economic transfor-

mation.

5.4.1 THE REALM OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION

Our findings suggest that the narratives of both the geopolitical, markets and

climate have influenced the legislative structure, the cooperation within the EU,

and the fundamental energy mix & energy infrastructure. Especially the in-

creased use of ‘fluctuating energy’ was mentioned on numerous occasions during

our interviews. Due to the unpredictable and fluctuating nature of wind and

solar power, electricity must be used at once and thus needs to be transported to

the consumer right away. This necessitates systems of comprehensive networks

and interconnectors in order that the intermittent energy can be properly trans-

ported: “The fact that the markets have been more coupled due to for example

intermittent energy and the freer flow of energy between member states has also

something to say, when talking about greater energy cooperation in Europe”

(appendix 10: 2), says the French interviewee. When climate advocates call for

more RES, they are in fact also calling for more interconnectors. But almost all

of our interviewees are pointing to wind and solar power as something that ne-

cessitates better functioning markets: “We've also been looking at low carbon

proposals, which down the track really only work if you've got the infrastruc-

ture to support them, the smart grids that support them. And that means inter-

connectivity across Europe [...] with all the stuff now with Denmark producing

more wind, than it can actually consume, produces a driver for interconnectivity

physically” (appendix 1: 2), says the British ambassador to Denmark. Intermit-


149

tent energy sources drive investments in infrastructure, which is a necessity for a

market to function. The German Chancellor agrees on this and directly connects

climate policies with markets: “But in the end: we will only be able to achieve

our climate goal by building up an efficient energy supply but also thinking in

terms of a single market, not shutting off against each other” (appendix 13: 1).

The lobbyist from Confederation of Danish Industries emphasises the Fukushi-

ma nuclear catastrophe in 2007 as a critical juncture that fuelled the investment

in renewable power plants and technologies - especially in Germany due to the

Energiewende. However, the 20-20-20 goals adopted in 2008 was also a driver

towards more intermittent energy (appendix 3). In fact, when looking at the in-

vestment in the EU power sector historically, these statements are supported (see

figure 5.7). The IEA amounted this investment to a cumulative 1.2 trillion dol-

lars9 from 2000 to 2012. Of this, about 70% of the cumulative expenditure was

for power plants, an annual investment that increased more than five-fold to

reach a peak of almost 145 billion USD in 2011. Renewable energy technologies

- mainly the intermittent sources of wind and solar PV - together accounted for

60 % of the overall investment in new power plants (IEA 2014:109).

Figure 5.7: European Union investment in power plants by type,

historical and in the New Policies Scenario

(Source IEA 2014: 109)

9 EUR 1.07 *10^12


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Thereby, it can arguably be stated that the climate narrative has resulted in sup-

port regimes for more intermittent energy. As a consequence, the structural

transformation within energy mix has clearly influenced the need for further

European cooperation.

Secondly, there are signs that the three ‘older’ narratives have resulted in various

legislative initiatives that all have pointed towards more European integration.

This follows the notion of Discursive Institutionalism, where incremental change

within rules and regularities have a profound effect on agent’s background abili-

ties (Schmidt 2012: 708). This is somewhat similar to the view of Historical In-

stitutionalism scholars, who believe that change is possible through layering,

conversion, and drift (Thelen 2004; Streeck and Thelen 2005). Mårten Westrup

from DG Energy summarises what several of our interviewees also mention:

“There are two major policies that are possible to see in the Energy Union pro-

posal. First of all, the 2030 climate framework from October 2014, and second-

ly, we had the European Energy Security Strategy (EESS) where there was a

broad angle to energy security. Energy Efficiency was for example accepted as

one of the most effective ways to be more secure and independent. [...] Other

policies like the Internal Energy Market have been more implemented” (appen-

dix 11: 1, our highlighting).

Summarising the changes within the realm of economic and social transfor-

mation, both physical infrastructure together with a layering of rules have

pointed towards the need for more European integration and governance within

energy policy. The transformation has been greatly influenced by the three older

narratives of geopolitics, markets and climate that have all resulted in various

policy solutions. Turning to the realm of philosophical debates and the practical

realm of political action including the exercise of power, we identify a struggle

between ‘energy as an issue for nation-states’ vs. ‘energy as an issue for the EU’.


151

5.4.2 ENERGY AS AN ISSUE FOR NATION-STATES

We find that especially the narratives of geopolitics, markets, and climate partly

try to reinforce the sovereignty of each member state by legitimising the ideology

of ‘energy as an issue for nation states’. This ideology is basically rooted in the

realist approach to energy sources, in which you see natural resources as a cru-

cial element in hard power capabilities of national governments (Morgenthau in

Sutch & Elias 2007: 49). Hence, Legro and Moravcsik expound on the ideology:

“Realists have long insisted that control over material resources in world politics

lies at the core of realism” (Legro & Moravcsik 1999: 18). We notice this phi-

losophy within several statements of our interviewees. E.g. the British ambassa-

dor to Denmark uses the market narrative to legitimise national flexibility in

order to achieve the most cost-efficient energy mix: “[...] Britain and Denmark

have differed on setting separate targets for efficiency and renewables. It's that

we want the freedom to able to have the most cost-effective mix, so it comes

back to my point about cost to consumers” (appendix 1: 4). Energy mix is the

prerogative of each member state, which is codified in the Lisbon-treaty art.

194(2). This point is repeated several times in the different interviews, some-

times with ill concealed regret - other times with a sigh of relief. No matter the

attitude, the ideology can be invoked by agents, who want to avoid energy goals

forced upon them by the EU, e.g. to protect domestic industries or secure the

cheapest sources of energy. It is possible to trace discreet rhetoric signs – within

our interviewees’ statements – that the ideology is slowly changing due to efforts

for further European integration. The German Regierungsdirektor adds: “The

Lisbon treaty leaves it to member states still to fully make their choice of tech-

nologies and energy sources, energy mix“ (appendix 2: 6; our highlighting), later

he continues: “The European level means in this sense, that the Commission can

come up with initiatives. If the Commission does not have the support of mem-

ber states - the majority of member states, it will go nowhere” (ibid.). The main

barrier for more cooperation is thus the sovereign choice of member states to

organise their own energy mix. The Danish MEP expresses both aversion and

relief when talking about the prerogative of nation-states: ”Let’s say it straight


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forward, they [Poland] just want to have the freedom to burn all their coal,

which results in different interests [...] However, you still have the right to de-

cide on your own energy mix without anyone pointing fingers at you e.g. when

we utilise a lot of renewable sources” (appendix 9: 4; our translation and high-

lighting). All of our interviewees mention the need to respect the choice of mem-

ber states so they have enough flexibility, and furthermore describe it as the de-

fault rule of energy policy.

Concerning the question of how our interviewees perceived the label ‘Union’,

there were different reactions. The interviewees from the countries where Euro-

scepticism is apparent (Greece, UK and Denmark) had their reservations con-

cerning this kind of symbolism. The Greek interviewee describes the attitude

very clearly: “Greece don't like the whole idea of a Union - what's this Union

about? We need flexibility, and I think that other member states also need to

have more flexibility. They don't like very much the whole idea of Union” (ap-

pendix 8: 7). Hence, the realist ideology of energy being an issue for nation

states is very resilient. However, we do find that this way of perceiving energy

policy is under pressure from the ideology perceiving energy as an issue for the

EU.

5.4.3 EUROPEANISATION OF ENERGY MATTERS

The former European Climate Commissioner describes the shift in ideology ra-

ther well: “Those old debates in Europe in which ‘the energy policy needs to be

Europeanised’. Well, that’s pretty much what the Energy Union is a visible proof

of. While energy policy 20 years ago was almost synonymous with national sov-

ereignty, there is today more an understanding of ‘no, we need to think about it

together” (appendix 14: 3f). In this respect, the Energy Union is a symbol of

Europeanisation of energy matters. Economic liberalism is a core element in the

ideology – or meta-narrative – of European integration. Particularly in the wake

of the Single Market Act in the mid 1980s there was a shift towards more eco-

nomic liberalism in almost every policy area. However, energy was in fact not


153

part of the original package proposed in the Cockfield Report on ‘Completing

the Internal Market’ (McGowan 2008: 94).

As shown, energy has been perceived as a means to increase the ‘hard power’ of

nation states. In response to the more geopolitical perspective and as a part of

the increased liberalisation of energy markets, the Commission argued that lib-

eralisation was not only compatible with supply security but would in fact rein-

force it (European Commission 1988). Our interviewees stress that the Commis-

sion has gained considerable powers to set the agenda and to push through initi-

atives in terms of the internal market, critical supply, efficiency, and renewables

(e.g. the German Chancellor Angela Merkel, appendix 13). Thus, within the

European integration ideology, transferring powers to the Commission is framed

as a necessary evil to achieve the higher goal of effective markets, effective nego-

tiation with third parties, and better compliance in terms of climate goals. The

British ambassador to Denmark downplays the Ukraine crisis in 2014 as a main

driver for the Energy Union. Instead, he stresses the fact that the need for a

comprehensive framework was there anyhow: ”It's given a little more of a Rus-

sian focus, but I think overall it's been a good wake-up call for Europe, because

a lot of these issues would have come to our head anyway with aging infrastruc-

ture and the need to meet the low carbon targets, so even if we hadn't enlarged

the East we would be having to address these questions” (appendix 1: 5). The

Ukraine crisis has only made the agenda more urgent than it would have been

otherwise. Other signs of a changed ideology are seen within the statement from

the Greek representative who points out that heads of state are aiming for more

European cooperation: “Part of the change is because of the people, but I think

that the main driver is that we have some decisions from heads of state and this

decision are going to be implemented slowly, and some people can make the

whole situation faster or less fast” (appendix 8: 6). This statement illustrates well

that also among national leaders, the attitude is changing towards European

cooperation within energy policy. The Greek statement also shows some of the

dynamic between agency and structure, where structural changes within the ide-


154

ology allow national leaders to give an impetus for more European Cooperation.

However, our findings also suggest that the agency of certain individuals influ-

ence the marketing of an Energy Union.

5.5 POLICY MARKETERS AND FRAMING

In this section, we take a more thorough look at the role that agency plays in the

making of the Energy Union. Aligned with McBeth (et al. 2013) we find that

agents, who are described as policy entrepreneurs in our interviewees’ state-

ments, also operate as a form of policy marketers who use policy narratives to

define policy realities and construct plausible meanings (aligned with organisa-

tional psychologist Karl Weick). When talking about plausible meanings, Weick

refers to ideas, which you internalise as your own in the long term. The premises

of a possible internalisation of ideas are firstly that the meaning should be con-

sistent with already familiar surroundings and experiences. Secondly, the selec-

tion must be able to reduce ambiguities, and finally, the idea should offer a po-

tentially exciting future (Weick 1979: 132). The latter point has similarities with

what Shanahan et al. (2013) see as a winning policy narrative. Hence, Shanahan

found the agents who marketed a successful narrative were less committed to

demonising their opponents (termed the ‘angel-shift’). This point is perhaps the

most characteristic feature of the holistic narrative, i.e. that it emphasises the

former narratives equally and finds that the various dimensions are mutually

reinforcing instead of competing. Our anonymous source in DG Energy clearly

believes that the Energy Union is a positive story that - in a tangible manner -

tells the public what EU can contribute with: “I think still a lot of people don't

even know - not only what is being done here in the Commission - but, what the

European parliament is for, what is it’s purpose, what is it really used for? [...]

are they really working for me? [...] From a very personal point of view, I think

that the Energy Union is something that sounds very concretely” (appendix 7:

5).


155

Gioia & Chittipiddi (1991) offer an additional dimension to the agents’ sense-

making process, which we find very relevant to public policy-making in the EU.

In this respect, agents are not merely passive receivers of various narratives, but

are making use of a strategic ‘sensegiving’ mechanism. Hence, sensegiving is

concerned with the process of attempting to influence sensemaking and meaning

construction of others towards a preferred redefinition of reality (Gioia & Chit-

tipiddi 1991: 442). All our interviewees described the Juncker Commission from

2014 as doing exactly this; strategically reframing the idea of the Energy Union.

Specifically Vice President Maroš Šefčovič and Climate and Energy Commis-

sioner Miguel Arias Cañete were mentioned as entrepreneurs that reframed the

Energy Union as put forward by the former Polish Prime Ministers Donald Tusk

and Jerzy Buzek (appendix 2: 4). The Swedish Ambassador for International

Energy Affairs also describes the usefulness of the Polish proposal: ”Then when

the idea came, I think that many people including the Commission saw it’s use-

fulness and realised that this is also a good opportunity to put a framework on”

(appendix 4: 3). This point follows the first premise of creating plausible mean-

ings, i.e. that it should be consistent with already familiar surroundings and ex-

periences. The usefulness refers to the ability of the narrative to create a new

impetus for further European integration and development of the Internal Ener-

gy Market. Mårten Westrup from DG Energy emphasises the familiarity as cru-

cial for gaining support: “The support is also caused by the fact that many of

the elements in the Energy Union are incorporated from previous decisions”

(appendix 11).

The Juncker Commission

Many interviewees also agreed that the Juncker Commission appears much

more visionary than the Barroso Commission. The lobbyist from Confederation

of Danish Industries working in Brussels explains why he thinks the Juncker

Commission appears to be particularly enthusiastic: “The Juncker Commission

came into being in the wake of an election for the European Parliament where

especially the EU sceptical parties did well in the election. Thus, the conclusion -


156

that was broadly accepted - he [Juncker] have himself labelled it as ‘last chance

Commission” (appendix 3: 4; our translation). Thus the pressure on EU as an

institution increases the demand of enthusiastic policy marketers. Although em-

phasising the agency of individuals, the Greek representative stresses, like other

interviewees, that the Energy Union or a similar proposal would have been sug-

gested sooner or later: “Yes, yes, but if it wasn't for him [Juncker], sooner or

later, a proposal like this would be on the table, but he played a part of this”

(appendix 8: 8). Other actors and specifically certain member states are also

mentioned by interviewees as important players within energy policy marketing.

Important member states

While the German Regierungsdirektor downplays the importance of changing

governments in member states and their influence on the overall policy-making

within the energy agenda, the Danish lobbyist Peder Søgaard-Pedersen gives

credit to the Germans for pushing the agenda on energy cooperation: ”The en-

ergy policy was kick-started during the German presidency in 2007 where you

agreed on a common energy policy based on the notorious energy triangle” (ap-

pendix 3: 5; our translation). The latter statement is supported by Robert Henry

Cox and Mariam Dekanozishvili, who demonstrate how Germany strove to

shape the EU's emerging policies on especially renewable energy. Firstly, due to

a desirability of renewable energy. Secondly, by establishing a European system

that resembled Germany’s own, German entrepreneurs in the renewable sector

would gain a competitive advantage in the broader European market (Cox &

Dekanozishvili 2015: 167). Also the UK has been attributed an important role

within the shaping of particularly the market-driven approach to energy policy

in the EU (Ciambra & Solorio 2015: 147).

Consequently, we argue that especially the Juncker Commission has utilised the

structural momentum of incremental change within the ideology of energy poli-

cy in order to reframe European energy policy into a holistic framework. The

first version of the Energy Union proposal proposed by Donald Tusk worked as


157

a gatekeeper that opened the door for the actual reframing. The purpose of the

Energy Union narrative is to create a new impetus for European integration.

Particularly Vice President Maroš Šefčovič and Climate and Energy Commis-

sioner Miguel Arias Cañete have appeared as policy marketers, who made use of

a strategic sensegiving mechanism in order to influence ‘the philosophical realm’

of ideology including the question on who exercise power. Particularly member

states have played an important role in creating the three narratives of respec-

tively geopolitics (Eastern European member states), markets (UK), and climate

(Germany). The narratives have all influenced the structure of ideology - both in

terms of the philosophical roots, but certainly also within the realm of economic

and social transformation.

5.6 FINAL HYPOTHESIS AND ANALYTICAL PROCESS TRACING

Finally, we are about to enter the last stage of our abductive journey. We have

used the theoretical framework that was put together, i.e. the explanatory dy-

namic within Discursive Institutionalism, the descriptive power of the Narrative

Policy Framework, and the explorative codes from the Multiple Streams

Framework. On this basis, we are now able to construct an adequate answer to

our research question.


158

Figure 5.8: Final step in the abductive research


The adequate answer to the question: ‘Why is the Energy Union on the Europe-

an agenda’ should be congruent, i.e. there should be similarities in the relative

strength and duration of hypothesised causes and observed effects (George &

Bennett 2005: 181). We use a general analytical process tracing in order to di-

rectly address the causal mechanisms linking initial conditions with the eventual

outcome, i.e. the Energy Union (Ibid: 205ff; Collier 2011). Therefore, we also

consider how grand changes within historical, social and political structures

have influenced the making of the Energy Union. By doing so, we achieve to

construct an explanation couched at a higher level of generality and abstraction

(George & Bennett 2005: 211). We could refine the theory of how a policy solu-

tion could successfully be proposed within public policy-making. However, it is

not within the research objective of this dissertation to construct general theoret-

ical conditions. First of all, such an aim would not add any new or valuable in-

sight to the already existing literature. Secondly, a general explanation to all

policy areas would be absurd, due to distinct differences between policy areas


THEORETICAL LEVEL

EMPIRICAL LEVEL


1. The Energy Union can be observed through a lens of multiple streams framework

2. Discursive institutionalism is added as ex-planatory theo-retical perspec-tive.



You are

here


159

and the contextual character of policy in general. For those reasons, we wish

‘merely’ to illuminate the causes that led to the Energy Union and preferably

also add some new insights to both the area of energy policy in the EU and to

the theoretical debates on discursive change. The hypothesis is not created in a

classical positivist sense of stringent ‘independent’ or ‘dependent’ variables due

to the dynamic relationship amongst the various social factors.

General process tracing

Through a general analytical process tracing, we have clarified the causes and

effects that shaped the Energy Union. The causal inferences are depicted in fig-

ure 5.9, which is couched on a theoretical and abstract level of explanation. The

causes and effects are thereby simplified and do not contain every minor influen-

tial event. Though we have created a more detailed list of influential policies and

events (see appendix 18) from where we have carefully selected the most crucial

elements. Therefore, the most influential dynamics are shown according to their

respective point in time. The primary policy marketers of the various narratives

are illustrated in order to show that agency indeed has a role in the making of

the Energy Union. However, the full list of actors is of course much more nu-

anced and diverse. Yet, we argue that the primary policy marketer has had a

profound influence on the overall energy policy in EU. While all narratives point

towards further European integration, the three previous narratives in particular

still show signs of being marketed on the premise of a national understanding of

energy. The greater context of the EU is left out of the overall hypothesis. We

address this particular issue in a wider discussion on how the narrative of the

Energy Union also has the purpose of legitimising EU in a context of increased

Euroscepticism.


160

Figure 5.9: Timeline, policy-marketeers and narratives.

Source: our depiction.


161

The general analytical process tracing leads us to construct the following hy-

pothesis.

Hypothesis

The Energy Union is first and foremost a holistic approach to European energy

policy. Additionally, the Energy Union is a political narrative that has been

marketed by the Juncker Commission as a response to an enhanced need for

coordination and cooperation among EU member states. This enhanced need is

a result of incremental changes within the European energy mix added a layer-

ing of rules within the policy areas of energy security, energy markets and cli-

mate. These structural changes are caused by mainly three narratives within en-

ergy policy, which have competed to win the attention of the European policy

agenda. The competition has been based on the philosophical premise or ideolo-

gy that ‘energy is primarily an issue for nation states’. However, over time the

competing narratives have themselves changed the ideology from which they are

being marketed. Thus the Juncker Commission has utilised the structural mo-

mentum to merge the three former energy narratives into one holistic approach

in order to give a new impetus on European integration and further legitimise

the new ideology of ‘energy being an issue for the European Union’. The

Ukraine-crisis in 2014 has merely worked as a trigger for the actual reframing of

the former narratives and thus hastened the making of the Energy Union.


162

6.0 DISCUSSION

In this chapter we discuss the outcome of our analysis, i.e. the hypothesis de-

scribed above, and thus the answer to ‘why the Energy Union is on the Europe-

an Policy Agenda?’ The discussion is divided into two parts: firstly, we justify

the causal claims made in our hypothesis by making use of counterfactual rea-

soning, as a form of controlled supposition. The basis for this part is our as-

sessment of our interviewees’ counterfactual reasoning. The second part follows

the normative implications and questions that have arisen from our research, i.e.

what is the legitimising purpose of the Energy Union narrative? We start by clar-

ifying the overall hypothesis by a counterfactual reasoning.

6.1 COUNTERFACTUAL DISCUSSION

“The common condition of too many variables and too few cases makes coun-

terfactual thought experiments a necessary means for strong justification of

causal claims” (George & Bennett 2005: 168). As shown in the analysis, there

are many intervening variables when explaining the Energy Union. To some, it

may seem controversial to downplay the influence of the Ukraine-crisis and in-

stead emphasise structural incremental change as the most influential factor for

the making of the Energy Union. For that reason, we employ counterfactual rea-

soning in order to justify the causal claims. To support (or falsify) our hypothe-

sis on the Energy Union we asked our interviewees the counterfactual question

’Could there have been a comprehensive holistic energy initiative e.g. ‘the Ener-

gy Union’ on the European agenda in 2006 or 2008?’ and/or “why was no holis-

tic framework proposed after the incidents in 2006 or 2008?”. Before analysing

the counterfactual reasoning made by our interviewees, we need to ascertain the

value of the main explanatory variables in the case of the Energy Union, and

then ask what prediction should follow from the theory. If the outcome of the

case is consistent with the theory’s prediction, the evidence supports that a caus-

al relationship exists.


163

The main conditions that explain the making of a holistic narrative within ener-

gy policy are as follows:

1. Layered rules and regulations should at the given time facilitate a holistic

approach to energy policy, where distinct policy dimensions are mutually

reinforcing instead of competing.

2. The overall energy mix should at the given time necessitate considerable

coordination within energy cooperation on a EU level.

If both of the above conditions have been met, then:

3. At the given time there should be an obvious and dedicated policy mar-

keter to utilise the structural momentum.

The argument presented by the Greek representative shares similarities with our

own analytical process tracing and hypothesis:

“Probably the time wasn't - we weren't ready to have a holistic view. Because if

you see all the energy policies of the energy union each time, the policy ad-

dressed the challenges of the time. [...] And right now [...] we have discussed a

lot the current problems and the new ideas and what should be done. So right

now it's easier to propose a holistic view than in 2000 or 2005. It's probably

also has to do with people” (appendix 8: 8; our highlighting).

Most of our interviewees refer to historical developments - similar to the above

statement - when explaining why we have not had a holistic approach to energy

before. We see a clear pattern within the understanding of EU policies, which is

characterised by inertia and incremental change. The phrase “we weren’t ready”

or similar phrases are repeated several times e.g. by the German Regier-

ungsdirektor, who argues: “maybe we weren't ready for that, maybe we had to


164

learn from those situations [...] the elements of the Energy Union were there

before. Maybe there was even a desire to frame this into one joint term” (ap-

pendix 2: 9; our highlighting). The Swedish Ambassador for International Ener-

gy Affairs has the exact same reasoning: ”well maybe the European countries

and member states were not ready for that. I don't know again it could be the

role of individuals that seized the opportunity” (appendix 4: 6; our highlight-

ing). For most of our interviewees, it is difficult to give a straightforward answer

to the counterfactual question. Even though our interviewees are élites within

their field, they are hesitatingly trying to grasp an adequate explanation. Most

of the interviewees mention that crucial structural changes were not in place -

similar to the above-mentioned explanatory conditions. The Polish energy atta-

ché describes the situation from 2006 and 2008 as another stage of integration:

“I think that we were in the different stage of energy integration. [...] So the

measures were introduced gradually. Just probably cannot introduce very ambi-

tious integration in a very short time” (appendix 6: 3; our highlighting). Mårten

Westrup from DG energy also describes the situation in 2006 and 2008 as being

less integrated compared to the present situation: ”Before ACER for example,

we had nothing. And these things take time. Now we want to do things in a

more comprehensive way and bring European Energy policy to the next level.

This has to be done by building on former policies” (appendix 11: 3; our high-

lighting). Later, Mårten Westrup explains that he sees no direct link between the

2006 gas crisis and the Energy Union proposal other than that big changes take

time in an institution consisting of 35000 bureaucrats and 28 member states

(appendix 11: 5).

Consequently, we argue that the counterfactual reasoning made by our inter-

viewees supports the causal claim of our hypothesis. The first condition on (1)

layered rules was not sufficient in facilitating a holistic approach to energy poli-

cy in 2006 and 2008, because energy policies were, to a large extent, built on

national policies, without any supranational coordination. Nor the second con-

dition on (2) energy mix was met back then, because the use of intermittent en-


165

ergy sources was not sufficiently widespread. Both conditions are necessary for a

holistic approach to energy policy, e.g. the Energy Union. Both of these are now

met, because the Energy Union can build on the non-holistic measures taken

back then (e.g. liberalisation packages and EESS). Unfortunately, based on the

interviewees’ statements, it is not possible to say anything about (3) agency (or

lack thereof) at the time of the two crises in 2006 and 2008. All of the above

criteria are met today, which is why a holistic approach can be introduced.

In order to support the hypothesis further, a more comprehensive comparative

study should be undertaken, where the three incidents of external energy shocks

caused by Russia should be compared in a more stringent manner. We suggest

this for future studies.

6.2 NORMATIVE DISCUSSION - THE ENERGY UNION A SYMPTOM

OF INTEGRATION CRISIS?

Severin Fischer and Oliver Geden from the German think tank ‘Stiftung Wissen-

schaft und Politik’ have stated that the Energy Union discourse should be inter-

preted primarily as a symptom of an EU integration crisis. “Der »Energieun-

ion«-Diskurs ist insofern eher als Symptom der EU-Integrationskrise zu deu-

ten”10 (Fischer & Geden 2015: 1). This claim is rooted in the fact that member

states openly resist the convergence pressure from the recently adopted 2030-

energy and climate targets. Essentially, there is a clash between the two oppos-

ing ideologies of national sovereignty and European coordination. Another ar-

gument in the article relates to the general legitimacy crisis of the EU as such,

and hence the increased scepticism towards further European integration among

European citizens. From this perspective, several crises have fuelled the Euro-

10 Which translates to: “The Energy Union-discourse is far more a symptom of an EU integra-tion crisis”


166

scepticism. The EU Commission in particular struggles to construct credible and

legitimate new narratives. Hence, the holistic energy narrative, which the Energy

Union embodies, is an attempt to further legitimise the metanarrative of Euro-

pean integration. This point supports the claim of Manners & Murray that

“[s]cholars - and EU itself - need to tell plural stories about European integra-

tion’’ (Manners & Murray forthcoming 2016: 5) in order to legitimise the EU as

a political system. The Energy Union can arguably be depicted as one of these

stories.

Our anonymous source in the Commission, working in DG Energy, explains

why large efforts have been put into communicating the Energy Union project.

He argues that the European Parliament and other actors have expressed an

overall sentiment of discontent due to the distance many feels about the lan-

guage coming from the EU and the fact

“that no one understands nothing - even us sometimes. I mean if we're working

for the citizens, basically, we have to explain what is it that you are doing for

the citizens, and I think that the energy Union - I'm not going to say there was-

n't - but I think there has been certainly an extra effort in order to say we're

doing this in working returns and this is good for you” (appendix 7: 3).

From this perspective, the Energy Union is a significant showcase, and an oppor-

tunity for the EU and the Commission in particular to tell the European citizens

what the EU is capable of. According to the British ambassador to Denmark,

Vivien Life, the narrative can even be used for convincing Eurosceptic voters of

the value of staying in the EU:

“I think it has the potential to be an important strand of the case that the gov-

ernment makes for why Britain should stay in Europe and we certainly talk

about energy and climate as an area where it makes sense for Europe to operate.

When businesses are making the positive case for Europe, they cite energy” (ap-

pendix 1: 3).


167

Thus, the point that the Energy Union is a means to secure the future of the EU

becomes rather evident when the British ambassador is describing it as a matter

of continued membership. Additionally, the lobbyist from the Confederations of

Danish Industries identifies two areas where the EU in particular can benefit

from the narrative potential:

“European politicians - nor national politicians for that matter - have not been

able to explain the value of the European Community to the citizens, [...] and

therefore the conclusion was that we must focus on the areas that have really

changed things.[...] And how do you do it? Well, you can do it by looking at

areas where there is major growth potential: the digital area and the energy ar-

ea” (appendix 3: 4; our translation)

In this respect, both the energy and digital area have the potential to increase

employment, to modernise the EU member states and thus to legitimise the

metanarrative of further European integration.

We experienced that the interviewees were rather optimistic when describing the

potential of minimising Euroscepticism by using the Energy Union as a show-

case. Here the anonymous source from DG energy says: “It will not make Euro-

scepticism go away. That's a very big challenge. But I think it can contribute,

when people say, well this is not a bad idea, it's good that you are taking the

time to explain it” (appendix 7: 5). Hence, in this perspective, narratives can be

used to legitimise certain norms and justify political projects. However, while

most of the interviewees see the legitimising potential in the Energy Union narra-

tive, they acknowledge that the Energy Union lacks a general public awareness.

Just to mention a few, the British ambassador to Denmark says “I don't think

that British public have any idea about it, really.” She is seconded by the Ger-

man representative: “people have a perception of energy policy and what hap-

pens there and what does energy policy do for them. People don't have a percep-

tion of Energy Union” (appendix 2: 9). We find a clear pattern that most of our

interviewees see public awareness as being rather fragmented in terms of general


168

knowledge about European energy policy. The Danish civil servant working in

Copenhagen believes that it will be difficult to point attention to energy due to

its complex and latent nature: “Energy is just different by nature. You have no

idea what's coming out of your outlet, whether it is produced by coal, nuclear or

wind” (appendix 5: 4; our translation). Thus, we find some discrepancy between

the seemingly lack of public awareness on the one side, and the general excite-

ment amongst our interviewees around the Energy Union on the other side.

However, some of our interviewees admit that they have difficulties in knowing

what the public believes: “You know, I've been in Brussels for three years, so I

don't know if I know anything about public awareness anymore.” says the

Polish energy attaché rather frankly.

What do these findings suggest? While many scholars have simply described

shifts within narratives, very few have offered insights into what policy narrative

strategies might yield success (McBeth et al. 2014: 242). This is a very relevant

question to the Energy Union; will it overcome the other narratives linked to

energy as predominantly a national prerogative? And will it succeed in legitimis-

ing further European integration? Due to the resilience of the ‘national sover-

eignty’-ideology, we do not expect large-scale changes - as the holistic narrative

might initially suggest. Yet, we argue that the holistic narrative will be able to

increase the near-term probability of further layering of rules and ‘soft’ govern-

ance measures within energy market regulation. Thus, the narrative will have

the same effect as the previous geopolitical, market and climate narrative, i.e.

incrementally change the economic and social realm of ideology. Therefore, we

argue that the holistic narrative will result in pragmatic steps towards more in-

tegrated electricity and gas markets. And the more integrated national electricity

and gas markets become, the more crucial EU governance of energy policy will

be. This leads us to argue that the Energy Union is not merely a symptom of EU

integration crisis. Firstly, there are signs that the holistic energy narrative has

not yet influenced the public opinion significantly - though we are not writing

off its potential in legitimising the metanarrative of European integration. To


169

fulfil this potential demands that also national policy-makers would market the

Energy Union narrative. Yet, the strongest argument against the claim that the

Energy Union is a symptom of EU integration crisis is that such a statement

would devalue the substantial structural change that has taken place over the

past decades within European energy policy.

Rather than understanding the holistic energy narrative as a mere symptom of

an EU integration crisis, the Energy Union should primarily be understood as a

consequence of pragmatic structural change of energy mix and ideology; a

change that dedicated policy marketers have utilised to create a new impetus for

European energy policy.


170

7. CONCLUSION

The point of departure for this dissertation was a fundamental curiosity of why

the ambiguous policy concept ‘the Energy Union’ entered the European policy

agenda. Given the early start of energy cooperation and the advanced level of

cooperation in the European Union today, we were puzzled that energy did not

appear to be an integral part of EU cooperation. Our wonder only became more

evident due to the main official argument that was used to legitimise the Energy

Union proposal. According to this argument the proposal was motivated by a

need to show unity as a response to the recent Russian intervention in Ukraine.

Therefore, we wondered if this was true, and why, in that case, a new approach

to European energy policy was not already adopted after the first gas crisis in

early 2006, or after the Russo-Georgian war in August 2008? Therefore, we

formulated the overall empirical research question: “Why is ‘the Energy Union’

on the European policy agenda?”

The structure of the investigation was guided by the taxonomy within the over-

all research question, so that we started by uncovering the explorative aspect of

the Energy Union, i.e. investigating what it is. Secondly, we described how the

Energy Union entered the agenda. These steps enabled us to uncover causal in-

ferences and thus the final explanatory element in our research, i.e. why did an

agenda change take place. After clarifying the research objective further, it be-

came clear that we needed to take the current negotiations between member

states and the Commission into consideration when looking at the European

policy agenda. We evaluated previous studies in order to determine the nature of

our research. In doing so, we realised that the case of the Energy Union was

characterised by multiple perceptions of energy, ambiguity within the policy

process, and - in general - a plurality of causes (George & Bennett 2005:157).

These acknowledgements lead us to undertake an abductive approach to our

research, which permitted us to, respectively, turn to theoretical hypotheses and

empirical puzzles.


171

In order to approach the research question systematically and identify influential

variables, we used the public policy theory Multiple Streams Framework (MSF)

as proposed by Kingdon (1984) and further developed by Zahariadis (2007a).

Consequently, we critically adapted the framework to the case of EU policy-

making and the Energy Union in particular. This step enabled us to use the

framework as a structuring lens when exploring the ambiguous concept of the

Energy Union as an idea. We found that the MSF was a valuable tool to explore

and identify variables. However, it was challenged when trying to uncover caus-

al inferences. For that reason, we sought to refine the theoretical framework

with other useful perspectives after finding additional empirical puzzles. Due to

the complex nature of the Energy Union, we decided to conduct interviews with

individual experts on the subject. In this, we pursued to select interviewees based

on whose testimonies seemed most likely to develop our theory (Glaser and

Strauss 1968). The theoretical sampling along with a snowball sampling tech-

nique led us to interview 21 persons, of whom twelve were interviewed for 30-

45 minutes, and nine (mainly high-level policy-makers) were asked only one

general question in public forums. The interviewees represented a broad variety

of occupations and nationalities. We used the interviews as a source of infor-

mation about events, and as a means to reveal a variety of perspectives.

To interpret data with respect for validity, we used an analytical technique

called Analytic Induction (aligned with Hammersley and Atkinson 2007), along

with a classical theoretical coding which reflected the theory-led interviewing.

The empirical findings suggested that the Energy Union is a narrative with the

intentional goal of changing energy cooperation and promote a more integrated

Europe. This finding led us in the direction of Discursive Institutionalism (DI),

which we found to have the greatest explanatory power for our case amongst

the theories within neo-institutionalism. Yet, we recognised that the theoretical

framework needed further adaptation in order to provide an adequate theory to

assess our data. The Narrative Policy Framework was merged with DI in order

to identify how agents make use of strategic communicative action.


172

The theoretical framework enabled us to identify four narratives within Europe-

an Energy policy. The oldest narrative we found was the geopolitical narrative,

in which energy is securitised and primarily a means to secure the interests of the

nation state. This particular narrative has recently been revived especially by the

Eastern European member states, albeit with a greater focus on Pan-European

cooperation. The second very prominent narrative has in particular been mar-

keted by the United Kingdom after the Single European Act. This is the market

narrative that promotes a market driven approach to energy, where energy mar-

kets should be liberalised. The third – and more recent – narrative is that of cli-

mate, which particularly Germany and the Scandinavian countries have pushed

for. According to this narrative, energy ought to be governed in a way that helps

mitigating climate change.

These narratives have fed into the new holistic narrative of the Energy Union.

The European Commission markets the new holistic narrative of the Energy Un-

ion, which is composed by the three previous narratives within European energy

policy. By doing this, the European Commission seeks to overcome longstanding

differences within European energy policy, and to convince member states to

collectively address the common challenges of energy security, the energy mar-

ket, and the climate all at once. The basis of the holistic narrative is that the dif-

ferent dimensions within the Energy Union are mutually reinforcing rather than

competing. By using a within-case method of congruence combined with an ana-

lytical general process tracing, we found causal inferences between the narratives

and the structural premises from which they were being marketed. This led us to

establish an overall hypothesis on the making of the Energy Union. We tested

this hypothesis by making use of a counterfactual reasoning, where we applied

the incidents with Russia in 2006 and 2008 in a suppositional discussion. This

exercise supported our hypothesis and further moderated the influence of the

Ukraine-crisis in 2014.


173

Finally, we discussed whether the Energy Union narrative was merely a symp-

tom of a EU integration crisis. These discussions led us to conclude that rather

than understanding the holistic energy narrative as merely a symptom of EU

integration crisis, the Energy Union should primarily be understood as Europe-

anisation of energy policy facilitated by pragmatic structural change within the

European energy mix, rules and ideology. These structural changes are caused

by mainly three different narratives within energy policy, which have competed

to win the attention of the European policy agenda. The competition has been

based on the philosophical premise or ideology that ‘energy is primarily an issue

for nation states’. However, over time the competing narratives have themselves

changed the ideology from which they are being marketed. Dedicated policy

marketers, i.e. the European Commission, have utilised this structural change to

create a new impetus for European energy policy. For that reason, the Energy

Union entered the European policy agenda.


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APPENDIX 1 - 14 These appendixes contain our transcribed interviews. Only available to supervisor and censor.


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APPENDIX 15 Email invitation to interviewees. First in Danish, then in english. ------ Kære X Vi skriver speciale på Institut for Statskundskab omkring Europæisk Energipolitik. Vores fokus er Energi Unionen - og hvorfor den er kommet på dagsordenen lige nu. Vi håber meget, at du har mulighed for et interview af op til 30 minutters varighed. Vi er klar over, at du har en travl kalender, og vi er selvfølgelig fleksible omkring tids-punktet. Vi er i Brussels i dagene d. 7. juli til 10. juli, hvor vi meget gerne vil interviewe dig. Alternativt når du alligevel er i Danmark på weekend. Vi møder dig gerne i Luft-havnen eller et andet sted, der passer ind i din kalender. Interviewet vil omhandle aktører (herunder både lande, enkeltpersoner, virksomhe-der, NGO’er), som spillede en rolle ift. at få Energi Unionen sat på dagsordenen. Samtidig undersøger vi hvilke eksterne begivenheder og strukturelle årsager, som kan have påvirket Energi Unionen hvorfor nogle af de samme tanker har været frem-me tidligere uden at blive vedtaget. Det er ikke nødvendigt med forberedelse til interviewet. Såfremt du ønsker kan hele eller dele af interviewet anonymiseres og du kan læse svarerne igennem før offentlig-gørelse. Hvis du vil høre mere om specialet, er du velkommen til at kontakte os på [email protected] eller +0045 30135515. Mvh. Maria Toft og Svend Elberg Thomsen -------- Dear X We are writing our master thesis about the Energy Union and would very much like to interview you. The interview would revolve around which actors (both MS, companies, NGO’s), that played a role in getting the Energy Union on the agenda. Also, we examine which external events could have affected the Energy Union and why some thoughts have been proposed previously but just now are making it onto the agenda. We can send questions beforehand if you like, but no preparation is needed. You will have the chance to look through your answers before publishing. We hope that you have time for an interview of no more than 30 minutes. The inter-view could take place between 6. july and 10. july in Brussels or perhaps some time in Copenhagen/Denmark if you are visiting for other reasons. Please let us know and we will be flexible on time. Best regards, Maria Toft and Svend Elberg Thomsen


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APPENDIX 16 Operationalisation and interviewguide.

Introductionary questi-ons

Getting to know the informant

For starters, could you briefly describe what is the Energy Union about? What is your position in relation to the Energy Union? Why do we need an Energy Union?

Level 1: Background con-cepts (Main code) - The broad constellation of meanings and under-standings associated with a given concept

Level 2: Systematized concept (Sub codes and description) - A specific formulation of a concept used by a given scholar or group of scholars; commonly involves an explicit definition

Level 3: Indicators - and questions - Also referred to as ‘me-asures’ and oprationalizations’’ in qualiti-ve research, these are the operational definitions employed in classifying cases

Policy stream Which consists of ideas and propo-sals regarding a particular policy issue

Ideas - potential candidates for the Energy Union Every policy area always have thousands of ideas floating around at any given time. Howe-ver, very few are given official at-tention. These questions should provide us with an answer to which other ideas that could have made it into the Energy Union. “Whether an idea bubbles to the top of the stream, i.e., becomes ripe for consideration and adopti-on, depends on two factors: value acceptability and technical feasi-bility. Technical feasibility refers to ease of implementation. Does the idea

In your words what is the Energy Union about?

What parts do you believe is the most important of the Energy Union?

The Energy Union broadly consists of five elements. 1. Energy security, [solidarity and trust;] 2. A fully integrated European energy market; 3. Energy efficiency [contribu-ting to moderation of de-mand;] 4. Decarbonising [the econo-my] 5. Research, [Innovation and Competitiveness]


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appear to be implementable with minimal problems? If so, the ideas chances of survival in the policy stream greatly improve.” (Zahariadis 2007a)

Are there other elements, that didn’t make it into the Energy Union, that you think should or could have? What do you think of the Energy Poverty discussions in relation to the Energy Union? How do you think it will affect the Energy Union?

What other [major] policies [at the european level] have led up to this Energy Union?

- Third energy package - European Energy Se-

curity Strategy - 2020-plan?

Value acceptability Do you think that the Energy Union has broad support? In parliament, in the Commissi-on, in the council, among pub-lic? Does other actors’ attitudes towards the Energy Union af-fect your willingness to enga-ge in the Energy Union?

- directly or indirectly? Do you think that parts of the Energy Union have been left out, because they are unlikely to gain broad support, e.g. ‘One Voice’?

Technical feasibility Technical feasibility refers to ease of implementation. Does the idea appear to be implementable with minimal problems? If so, the ideas chances of survival in the policy stream greatly improve. (Zahariadis 2007a)

Do you think that the Energy Union will be easy to imple-ment?

- How has the feasibility of the commission’s proposal influenced the reception of the Energy Union?

- Do you think that parts of the Energy Union have been left out, be-


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cause they are hard to implement?

Problem stream Problems are poli-cy issues which are deemed to re-quire attention. Deviations from an ideal state.

Focusing events events that draw policy-makers’ attention to the policy area

What events or developments have created the need for an Energy Union?

- In your perspective? - In others perspective?

Indicators “Indicators may be used to as-sess the existence, magnitude of a condition, and the scope of change” (Zahariadis 2007) This could be a study that shows that a policy area is in need of ac-tion or similar. The indicators are a symbol that something is amiss and hence a call to action for po-licy-makers.

How have you seen the need for changes in EU energy po-licy?

Can you point to any studies, number or its like, that call for change?

- How have these num-bers/studies changed in the last couple of years?

- Whom have produced these numbers?

Feedback “Feedback from previous pro-grams is important in that it helps highlight what works and what doesn’t. (...) Programmatic feed-back also provides information back into the system that cataly-zes changes not only in the direc-tion of policy but also in the struc-ture of the EU policy-making sy-stem itself (Richardson 2000). (...) In this case, one needs to diffe-rentiate between negative and positive feedback. Negative feed-back raises the possibility of cor-rective action (...) Positive feed-back, on the other hand, prompts a favorable rather than a correcti-ve response. The positive results of the program open the possibili-ty of policy moving further in the same direction (Pierson 2000). Put differently, positive feedback occurs when a change causes further changes to be amplified

Some people have stated that many of the elements propo-sed in the Energy Union have already been decided upon before - but not implemented successfully. Do you think this is true? And if yes, why?

The Commission’s competen-cies have risen in many are-as, however less so in energy policy. Do you think this is a driver for forming a “strong” Energy Union?


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(Jones and Baumgartner 2005).” (Zahariadis 2007a)

Problem load A policy-maker can comprehend a limited number of problems and solutions at any given time. The number of potential items will al-ways supercede the attention span of policy-makers (and me-dia, etc.) Hence some items are given priority over others. With this concept we wish to assess the Energy Union in relation to other policy areas.

Do you think that the Energy Union could have been suc-cessfully proposed during the financial crisis?

Do you think that the decision about the energy union will suffer if another major subject win the political agenda ie. refugees, TTIP, treaty amendments, Grexit or Brexit?

Politics stream Which refers to electoral, partisan and pressure group factors.

European mood refers to the public perception in the EU of european energy co-operation. The mood refers to the notion that a fairly large number of individuals in a given country tend to think along common lines and the mood swings from time to time.

Do you think that there exists a public awareness around european energy matters in general and more specifically the Energy Union negotiati-ons?

How does the public aware-ness or lack thereof affect you as a [policy-maker/public ser-vant/representative]?

Pressure-group / Interest groups / Private mood Formal and organised groups that have a significant interest in energy matters. These groups can support or oppose the Energy Union which in turn will indicate consensus or dissent in the broa-der political arena.

Are there any particular inte-rest groups or lobbyists that have been especially involved in the Energy Union?

- What specific subjects have they been intere-sted in?

- Whom have you been in contact with - if you are allowed to tell us?

National attitudes and balance in the council This refers to the balance and mix of member states’ problem per-ception regarding energy matters. Is energy a domestic affair or is it a pan-European affair? Additio-nally, there is a difference in per-ception of whether you empha-size security matters, competition matters or environmental issues.

Do you think that change in member states’ energy mix have had any influence on member states’ position to-wards more or less energy cooperation in EU? and how?

What is your [country or orga-nisation’s] position towards a Europe speaking with ‘One voice’ in energy matters?

- Do you think that the


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Commission should have more power to negotiate with third party countries?

Do you think that the latest enlargements with Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia have had any influence on energy cooperation in europe, and how?

Did it change much compared to the eastern enlargement from 2004?

The ideological balance of par-ties in Parliament

How much does the current mix of parties in the Parlia-ment influence the negotiati-ons on the Energy Union - in your opinion? How has the general percep-tion of the EU among Euro-pean citizens affected the possibility for proposing the Energy Union?

- E.g. Does the EU need to ‘show force’ (added value for regular citizens, tough on Rus-sia)

- E.g. Could the Energy Union have been scrapped due to popular resentment of EU in general?

Personal turnover “This refers to the start of the terms of office in positions with agenda structuring power of the Commission President, of Com-missioners in the Directorate-Generals involved, of the Council Presidency and of the Rapporteur of the responsible Committee: ITRE, Industry, Technology, Re-search and Energy” (Herweg 2015) [This is highly relevant in our ca-se, as the Energy Union was pro-posed right after a new Commis-

Do you think that change in the key position in the EU play a role when proposing a major new policy initiative?

- Which positions are key? Is it a coincidence that Energy Union was proposed right af-ter a new Commission took office?


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sion took office]

Entrepreneurs/ entrepreneurship

Actors Understood as organizations (and individuals) that are behind the push for certain policies. [We recognize the interplay bet-ween entrepreneurs and the poli-tics stream].

Which actors are important in relation to the Energy Union? - How have the policy com-munity been involved in the negotiations of the energy union. For example Internati-onal Federation of Industrial Energy Consumers or Euro-gas?

Individuals Certain individuals can act as ad-vocates for an idea - and thus carry out the actual agency. They take the form of power brokers, coalitions enablers, and manipu-lators of problematic preferences.

Are there any specific indivi-duals who have acted as the prime mover for an Energy Union?

Follow-up: Donald Tusk, what is his role in promoting the Energy Union?

Coupling by framing A way of manipulating or commu-nicating an idea or policy propo-sal in order to obtain your objecti-ve most efficiently.

What do you think about the current framing of the Energy Union?

- What role do you think the Commission play in framing and communicati-on of the Energy Union?

Some people have stated that the Energy Union is merely old initiatives formulated in a new way. Do you agree?

The commission has carried out a new communication strategy where all communi-cation has been centralized and more strictly controlled. Have you noticed this in any way in relation to the Energy Union?

Policy transfer or Symbols This can be a spillover of a policy idea from other policy areas or across national borders. In this case the ‘union’ idea is relevant (Banking union, fiscal union, etc).

We have many ‘Unions’ now in the EU. We have the Eco-nomic and Monetary Union, the Banking Union, Customs Union and so on. Do you think that the concept of a


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The ‘union’ is also working as a strong communicative symbol.

‘Union’ is a way to communi-cate in familiar terms? And does this framing have an ef-fect on the actual creation of an Energy Union?

Windows Critical moments where choices are made. These mo-ments are floating and can be descri-bed as opportuni-ties for advocates of proposals to push their pet solu-tions, or to push attention to their special problems. Windows thus de-fines the context within which policy is made.

Agenda Window and Decision Window Within the legislative process in the EU two coupling processes exists. The agenda window refers to the initial setting of the instituti-onal agenda and the output is thus the worked-out proposal of the Energy Union from the Com-mission (Feb. 2015). This opens the decision window and focuses on policy formulation and legiti-mation, and it captures the politi-cal struggle about the concrete design of the proposal.

What do you think of the ti-ming of the proposal of the Energy Union?

When did you first become aware of the policy propo-sal(s) known as the Energy Union?

Using the correct window If an idea should be successfully adopted it is important which win-dow the policy entrepreneur choose to open. The windows are linked to the changes in the poli-tics and problem stream. Thus the Energy Union can be linked as a security matter be-cause of the focusing event of Russia or it can be linked as mat-ter of competition because of the ‘event’ of increasing energy pri-ces or it can be linked as an en-vironmental issue because of cli-mate change (and the COP21 coming up).

The Commission have espe-cially emphasized security matters in their proposal. Will it be easier to agree on a cre-ation of an Energy Union due the emphasis on energy secu-rity compared to for example climate concerns or european competition?

Why didn’t we get an Energy Union after the first energy crisis with Russia in 2006?

Follow-up questions for elaboration, if there is time: How do you see the Energy Union in connection to other developments in the EU-system (Banking Union, potential Brexit, etc.) Energy Union in relation to COP21? How is the Energy Union affected by COP21?


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APPENDIX 17 Final codes

Code Definition (Code is applied if)

POLICY Policy stream. This code is applied if a policy is mentioned that could be brought into the Energy Union.

- IDEAS - IDEAS - TRINITY - IDEAS - SECURE - IDEAS - EFFI - IDEAS - SUSTEN - IDEAS - INTMARKET - IDEAS - R&D

IDEAS can be broadly defined and/or specific ideas can be emphasized eg. on the ‘holy trinity’ of energy and climate policy (the unity of secure, cheap, and sustainable energy). Emphasis can also be put on either the in-ternal market, efficiency, R&D, security of supply, or sustainable energy. In the analysis we will have an overview of the balance among the various ideas.

- TECHFEA Technical feasibility refers to ease of imple-mentation. Does the idea appear to be im-plementable with minimal problems? If so, the ideas chances of survival in the policy stream greatly improve.

- PREVINI Previous initiatives that have led up to the Energy Union

- ATTSPAN Attention span for politicians - how much can they overcome to deal with? This has to do with resource adequacy and therefore works as s selection criteria in the policy stream.

PROBLEM Problem stream. This code is applied if a pro-blem is mentioned, that the Energy Union could try to solve.

- FOCEVE Focusing events refer to external events that point to a specific problem.

- DATA Data is any reports, data, documents (Indica-tors) that could point to a problem.

- FEEDBACK Feedback is when current legislation provides useful or harmful outcomes that a policy-maker needs to react to.

- PROLOAD Problem load. How many things can policy-makers comprehend at one time?

POLITICS Politics stream. The politics stream consists of statements referring to the ‘surroundings’


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of a policy proposal.

- EUMOOD European Mood. Refers to the public percep-tion in the EU of european energy cooperati-on. The mood refers to the notion that a fairly large number of individuals in a given country tend to think along common lines and the mood swings from time to time

- PRIMOOD Private mood. Pressure-group / Interest groups / Private mood. Formal and organised groups that have a significant inte-rest in energy matters. These groups can support or oppose the Energy Union which in turn will indicate consensus or dissent in the broader political arena.

- NATATT National attitudes. How the public perception influenced a member state’s negotiations of the Energy Union

- EPBAL Balance of parties in European Parliament. The balance of parties in the European Parli-ament influences the parliaments attitude towards the Energy Union.

- TURNOV Personal turnover. Personal turnover affect the Energy Union proposal because 1) new decisionmakers may have new attitudes to-wards the Energy Union and 2) becuase tur-nover gives ‘a fresh start’ and allows for new priorities. This code also includes administrative/legislative turnover.

ENTREP Entrepreneurs. General statements involving entrepreneurs and their actions.

- TUSK. Donald Tusk, the former Polish primeminister, who (as a primeminister) proposed the Ener-gy Union. Now the president of the council.

- JUNCKER. Jean Claude Juncker took office as head of the Commission.

- SEFCOV Maroš Šefčovič was appointed vice president of the COM and Commissioner for the Energy Union.

- MERKEL Angela Merkel is the Chancellor of Germany. The code also represents Germany in a bro-ader sense.


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- COUNCIL The Council of the European Union

- COM Increased powers for the Commission

- FRAME Framing of Energy Union

WINDOW Possibilities for the combination of policy, politics and problems. Usually by an entre-preneur.

- NEWCOM The new COM presented a window of oppor-tunity for the Energy Union proposal.

- UKRAIN The Ukraine-crisis, where Russia, amongst other things, annexed Crimea.

- GAS1. The 2006 gas crisis, where Russia limited gas supplies to Ukraine and hence to Europe

- GAS2. The 2008 gas crisis, where Russia limited gas supplies to Ukraine and hence to Europe

- COP21 The UN conference of the parties, where the UN members will try to agree on binding tar-gets for climate reduction. Held 7-8 Decem-ber in Paris.

- ENLARG The enlargement of the EU in 2004 and 2007 affected

ENMIX How the energy mix of the countries affect their behavior and attitudes and policies. And how the change in energy mix may have changed this.

INERTIA Refers to the inertia of EU as an institution and the slow pace of reaction to certain events.

PUBAWA Public awareness refers to how much attenti-on policy proposal gets in a specific populati-on.


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APPENDIX 18 Timeline

Event Date

Coal- and Steel Union 1951

OIl crises 70’s

Single European Act 1986

First Liberalisation directives on electricity adopted (first energy package)

1996

Kyoto protocol 1997

Second liberalisation package 2003

EU enlargement with 10 new member states 2004 May 1

EU Energy Community with 8 neighboring countries.

2005

First Ukraine gas crisis starts (commonly known as 2006-gas crisis)

2005 March

Russia shuts off gas supplies through Europe 2006 January 1

Russian gas supply is restored on the basis of EU-brokered deal

2006 January 4

Energy Community (EU + South Eastern ne-ighbours)

2006 July 1

EU enlargement Bulgaria and Romania. 2007 January 1

Third energy package 2007

20-20-20 goals in 2020 objectives approved by the Council

2007 March 7

All Russian gas flows through Ukraine are halted for 13 days

2009 January 7

Russo-Georgian War 2008 August

Lisbon treaty enter into force 2009 December 1

Energiewende: German government publi-shes key document

2010 September


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Fukushima Nuclear disaster 2011 March 11

Energiewende: Legislation passed in Germa-ny

2011

Anti-Russian protests in Kyiev, Maidan square. At least 88 dead.

2014 February 20

Pro-Russian gunmen seize control over key buildings in Crimea capital

2014 February 27-28

Tusk launches Energy Union idea in Financial Times article

2014 April 21

EP elections 2014 May 22 - 25

Council urges Commission to propose Energy Union

2014 June 26-27

Juncker presents new Commissioners including Vice-president for Energy Union, Šefčovič

2014 September 10

Council agrees to 2030 climate and energy goals

2014 October 23-24

Juncker Commission takes office 2014 November 1

Tusk takes office as President of European Council

2014 December 1

Commission proposes Energy Union package 2015 February 25

Council Conclusion on Energy Union (taking into account the Commissions proposal)

2015 March 19

Question for Chancellor Merkel and Prime Minister Thorning-Schmidt

2015 April 28

Question at Baltic Energy Dialogue Forum 2015 May 6

Question for former Commissioner Connie Hedegaard

2015 June 13

Interviews in Brussels 2015 August 7 - 9

speciale - talking about energy - maria toft

Documents