REPUBLIC VS CA, MADRONA

G.R. NO. 163604 6 MAY 2005

CARPIO-MORALES, J.:

In In the Matter of Declaration of Presumptive Death of Absentee Spouse Clemente P.

Jomoc, Apolinaria Malinao Jomoc, petitioner, the Ormoc City, Regional Trial Court, Branch 35,

by Order of September 29, 1999,[1]

granted the petition on the basis of the Commissioners

Report[2]

and accordingly declared the absentee spouse, who had left his petitioner-wife nine

years earlier, presumptively dead.

In granting the petition, the trial judge, Judge Fortunito L. Madrona, cited Article 41, par. 2

of the Family Code. Said article provides that for the purpose of contracting a valid subsequent

marriage during the subsistence of a previous marriage where the prior spouse had been absent

for four consecutive years, the spouse present must institute summary proceedings for the

declaration of presumptive death of the absentee spouse, without prejudice to the effect of the

reappearance of the absent spouse.

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, sought to appeal the trial courts

order by filing a Notice of Appeal.[3]

By Order of November 22, 1999s,[4]

the trial court, noting that no record of appeal was filed

and served as required by and pursuant to Sec. 2(a), Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil

Procedure, the present case being a special proceeding, disapproved the Notice of Appeal.

The Republics Motion for Reconsideration of the trial courts order of disapproval having

been denied by Order of January 13, 2000,[5]

it filed a Petition for Certiorari[6]

before the Court

of Appeals, it contending that the declaration of presumptive death of a person under Article 41

of the Family Code is not a special proceeding or a case of multiple or separate appeals requiring

a record on appeal.

By Decision of May 5, 2004,[7]

the Court of Appeals denied the Republics petition on

procedural and substantive grounds in this wise:

At the outset, it must be stressed that the petition is not sufficient in form. It failed to attach to its

petition a certified true copy of the assailed Order dated January 13, 2000 [denying its Motion

for Reconsideration of the November 22, 1999 Order disapproving its Notice of Appeal].

Moreover, the petition questioned the [trial courts] Order dated August 15, 1999, which declared

Clemente Jomoc presumptively dead, likewise for having been issued with grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, yet, not even a copy could be found in the records.

On this score alone, the petition should have been dismissed outright in accordance with Sec. 3,

Rule 46 of the Rules of Court.

However, despite the procedural lapses, the Court resolves to delve deeper into the substantive

issue of the validity/nullity of the assailed order.

The principal issue in this case is whether a petition for declaration of the presumptive

death of a person is in the nature of a special proceeding. If it is, the period to appeal is 30

days and the party appealing must, in addition to a notice of appeal, file with the trial court a

record on appeal to perfect its appeal. Otherwise, if the petition is an ordinary action, the period

to appeal is 15 days from notice or decision or final order appealed from and the appeal is

perfected by filing a notice of appeal (Section 3, Rule 41, Rules of Court).

As defined in Section 3(a), Rule 1 of the Rules of Court, a civil action is one by which a party

sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention of redress of a wrong

while a special proceeding under Section 3(c) of the same rule is defined as a remedy by which a

party seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact (Heirs of Yaptinchay, et al. v. Del

Rosario, et al., G.R. No. 124320, March 2, 1999).

Considering the aforementioned distinction, this Court finds that the instant petition is in the

nature of a special proceeding and not an ordinary action. The petition merely seeks for a

declaration by the trial court of the presumptive death of absentee spouse Clemente Jomoc. It

does not seek the enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong.

Neither does it involve a demand of right or a cause of action that can be enforced against any

person.

On the basis of the foregoing discussion, the subject Order dated January 13, 2000 denying

OSGs Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated November 22, 1999 disapproving its

Notice of Appeal was correctly issued. The instant petition, being in the nature of a special

proceeding, OSG should have filed, in addition to its Notice of Appeal, a record on

appeal in accordance with Section 19 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines to Implement BP Blg.

129 and Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court . . . (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The Republic (petitioner) insists that the declaration of presumptive death under Article 41

of the Family Code is not a special proceeding involving multiple or separate appeals where a

record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.

Petitioner cites Rule 109 of the Revised Rules of Court which enumerates the cases wherein

multiple appeals are allowed and a record on appeal is required for an appeal to be perfected. The

petition for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse not being included in the

enumeration, petitioner contends that a mere notice of appeal suffices.

By Resolution of December 15, 2004,[8]

this Court, noting that copy of the September 27,

2004 Resolution[9]

requiring respondent to file her comment on the petition was returned

unserved with postmasters notation Party refused, Resolved to consider that copy deemed served

upon her.

The pertinent provisions on the General Provisions on Special Proceedings, Part II of the

Revised Rules of Court entitled SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS, read:

RULE 72

SUBJECT MATTER AND APPLICABILITY

OF GENERAL RULES

Section 1. Subject matter of special proceedings. Rules of special proceedings are provided for in

the following:

(a) Settlement of estate of deceased persons;

(b) Escheat;

(c) Guardianship and custody of children;

(d) Trustees;

(e) Adoption;

(f) Rescission and revocation of adoption;

(g) Hospitalization of insane persons;

(h) Habeas corpus;

(i) Change of name;

(j) Voluntary dissolution of corporations;

(k) Judicial approval of voluntary recognition of minor natural children;

(l) Constitution of family home;

(m) Declaration of absence and death;

(n) Cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry.

Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of civil actions. In the absence of special provisions, the rules

provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special proceedings.

(Underscoring supplied)

The pertinent provision of the Civil Code on presumption of death provides:

Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still

lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.

x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Upon the other hand, Article 41 of the Family Code, upon which the trial court anchored its

grant of the petition for the declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse, provides:

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall

be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouses had

been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the

absent spouses was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under

the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only

two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose pf contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the

spouses present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the

declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of a

reappearance of the absent spouse. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Rule 41, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, on Modes of Appeal, invoked by the trial

court in disapproving petitioners Notice of Appeal, provides:

Sec. 2. Modes of appeal. -

(a) Ordinary appeal. - The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial

Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the

court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon

the adverse party. No record on appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and

other cases of multiple or separate appeals where the law or these Rules so require. In such

cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.

By the trial courts citation of Article 41 of the Family Code, it is gathered that the petition of

Apolinaria Jomoc to have her absent spouse declared presumptively dead had for its purpose her

desire to contract a valid subsequent marriage. Ergo, the petition for that purpose is a summary

proceeding, following above-quoted Art. 41, paragraph 2 of the Family Code.

Since Title XI of the Family Code, entitled SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDING IN

THE FAMILY LAW, contains the following provision, inter alia:

Art. 238. Unless modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in

all cases provided for in this Codes requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be

decided in an expeditious manner without regard to technical rules. (Emphasis and

underscoring supplied)

there is no doubt that the petition of Apolinaria Jomoc required, and is, therefore, a summary

proceeding under the Family Code, not a special proceeding under the Revised Rules of Court

appeal for which calls for the filing of a Record on Appeal. It being a summary ordinary

proceeding, the filing of a Notice of Appeal from the trial courts order sufficed.

That the Family Code provision on repeal, Art. 254, provides as follows:

Art. 254. Titles III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, XI and XV of Book I of Republic Act No. 386,

otherwise known as the Civil Code of the Philippines, as amended, and Articles 17, 18, 19, 27,

28, 29, 30, 31, 39, 40, 41 and 42 of Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as the Child

and Youth Welfare Code, as amended, and all laws, decrees, executive orders,

proclamations rules and regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent therewith are

hereby repealed, seals the case in petitioners favor.

Finally, on the alleged procedural flaw in petitioners petition before the appellate court.

Petitioners failure to attach to his petition before the appellate court a copy of the trial

courts order denying its motion for reconsideration of the disapproval of its Notice of Appeal is

not necessarily fatal, for the rules of procedure are not to be applied in a technical sense. Given

the issue raised before it by petitioner, what the appellate court should have done was to direct

petitioner to comply with the rule.

As for petitioners failure to submit copy of the trial courts order granting the petition for

declaration of presumptive death, contrary to the appellate courts observation that petitioner was

also assailing it, petitioners 8-page petition[10]

filed in said court does not so reflect, it merely

having assailed the order disapproving the Notice of Appeal.

WHEREFORE, the assailed May 5, 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby

REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let the case be REMANDED to it for appropriate action in light

of the foregoing discussion.

SO ORDERED.

SHEKER VS SHEKER

G.R. NO. 157912 13 DECEMBER 2007

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking the reversal of the Order[1]

of

the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 6 (RTC) dated January 15, 2003 and its Omnibus

Order dated April 9, 2003.

KEY NOTES:

I. AS FAR AS PRACTICABLE: This means that in the absence of special provisions,

rules in ordinary actions may be applied in special proceedings as much as possible

and where doing so would not pose an obstacle to said proceedings.

RULE 72 SEC 1 NOT MERELY SUPPLETORY

II. The filing of a money claim against the decedent’s estate in the probate court is

mandatory.

This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by

informing the executor or administrator of the claims against it, The plain and

obvious design of the rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and

the early delivery of the property to the distributees, legatees, or heirs. The law

strictly requires the prompt presentation and disposition of the claims against the

decedent's estate in order to settle the affairs of the estate as soon as possible, pay off

its debts and distribute the residue. The ruling spirit of the probate law is the speedy

settlement of estates of deceased persons for the benefit of creditors and those entitled

to residue by way of inheritance or legacy after the debts and expenses of

administration have been paid

RULE 1 SEC 6: LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION OF RULES FOR SPEEDY JUST

INEXPENSIVE DISPOSITION OF CASES

SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE

FACTS: Petition for allowance of the decedent Alice Sheker's holographic will was filed to the

RTC, thereafter RTC admitted to probate the holographic will of Alice O. Sheker and thereafter

issued an order for all the creditors to file their respective claims against the estate.

Alan Sheker, petitioner filed a contingent claim for agent's commission due him in the event of

the sale of certain parcels of land belonging to the estate, and reimbursement for expenses

incurred and/or to be incurred by petitioner in the course of negotiating the sale of said realties.

The executrix of the Estate of Alice O. Sheker (respondent Victoria Medina) moved for the

dismissal of said money claim against the estate on the grounds that (1) the requisite docket fee,

as prescribed in Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, had not been paid; (2) petitioner

failed to attach a certification against non-forum shopping; and (3) petitioner failed to attach a

written explanation why the money claim was not filed and served personally.

RTC issued the assailed Order dismissing without prejudice the money claim based on ALL of

respondent’s grounds.

ISSUE/HELD:

I. Whether or not the rules in ordinary actions are applicable to special proceedings only in

a suppletory manner?

NO. Section 2, Rule 72, Part II of the same Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of Civil Actions. - In the absence of special provisions, the rules

provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special proceedings.

The word ―practicable‖ is defined as: possible to practice or perform; capable of being put into

practice, done or accomplished. This means that in the absence of special provisions, rules in

ordinary actions may be applied in special proceedings as much as possible and where doing so

would not pose an obstacle to said proceedings and not merely suppletory.

II. Whether or not attachment of non-forum shopping required for creditor's claim in

probate proceeding?

NO. Although the requirement of Non-forum shopping is applicable if not in conflict or obstacle

to spec. proc., like in probate proceeding. However it only applies to complaint or other initiatory

pleading... the whole probate proceeding was initiated upon the filing of the petition for

allowance of the decedent's will, hence the petition by creditors for their claim against the estate

is merely a motion for creditor's claim (Rule 86, sec 1 and 5).

A money claim is only an incidental matter in the main action for the settlement of the decedent's

estate; more so if the claim is contingent since the claimant cannot even institute a separate

action for a mere contingent claim. Hence, herein petitioner's contingent money claim, not being

an initiatory pleading, does not require a certification against non-forum shopping.

III. Whether or not non-payment of docket/filing fees of creditor's claim in probate

proceeding ground for dismissal?

NO. because the creditor's claim is not initiatory. It is not a ground for dismissal , because such

filing fees constitute a lien on the judgment pursuant to Section 2, Rule 141 of the Rules of

Court, or the trial court may order the payment of such filing fees within a reasonable time. After

all, the trial court had already assumed jurisdiction over the action for settlement of the estate.

IV. Whether or not written explanation of non-personal service of papers a ground for

dismissal?

In the present case, NO. situational.

Petitioner holds office in Salcedo Village, Makati City, while counsel for respondent and the

RTC which rendered the assailed orders are both in Iligan City. The lower court should have

taken judicial notice of the great distance between said cities and realized that it is indeed not

practicable to serve and file the money claim personally. Thus, following Medina v. Court of

Appeals, the failure of petitioner to submit a written explanation why service has not been done

personally, may be considered as superfluous and the RTC should have exercised its discretion

under Section 11, Rule 13, not to dismiss the money claim of petitioner, in the interest of

substantial justice and purpose of probate proceeding for speedy settlement of estate of deceased.

FALLO: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of

Iligan City, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch

6, is hereby DIRECTED to give due course and take appropriate action on petitioner's money

claim in accordance with Rule 82 of the Rules of Court.

REYES VS ENRIQUEZ

G.R. No. 12956 10 APRIL 2008

PUNO, C.J.:

This case is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of

Court from the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated September 29, 2003 in CA G.R. CV

No. 68147, entitled Peter B. Enriquez, et al. v. Faustino Reyes, et al., reversing the decision of

the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch XI dated June 29, 2000, which dismissed

the complaint filed by the respondents herein.[1]

The subject matter of the present case is a parcel of land known as Lot No. 1851 Flr-133

with an aggregate area of 2,017 square meters located in Talisay, Cebu.[2]

According to petitioners Faustino Reyes, Esperidion Reyes, Julieta C. Rivera, and

Eutiquio Dico, Jr., they are the lawful heirs of Dionisia Reyes who co-owned the subject parcel

of land with Anacleto Cabrera as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-3551

(T-8070). On April 17, 1996, petitioners executed an Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale of the

Estate of Dionisia Reyes (the Extra Judicial Settlement) involving a portion of the subject parcel

of land. On March 21, 1997, the petitioners and the known heirs of Anacleto Cabrera executed a

Segregation of Real Estate and Confirmation of Sale (the Segregation and Confirmation) over

the same property. By virtue of the aforestated documents, TCT No. RT-35551 (T-8070) was

cancelled and new TCTs were issued: (1) TCT No. T-98576 in the name of Anacleto Cabrera

covering Lot 1851-A; (2) TCT No. T-98577 covering Lot 1851-B in the name of petitioner

Eutiquio Dico, Jr.; (3) TCT No. T-98578 covering Lot 1851-C in the name of petitioner Faustino

Reyes; (4) TCT No. T-98579 covering Lot 1851-D in the name of petitioner Esperidion Reyes;

(5) TCT No. T-98580 covering Lot 1851-E in the name of petitioner Julieta G. Rivera; (6) TCT

No. T-98581 covering Lot 1851-F in the name of Felipe Dico; and (7) TCT No. T-98582

covering Lot 1851-G in the name of Archimedes C. Villaluz.[3]

Respondents Peter B. Enriquez (Peter) for himself and on behalf of his minor daughter

Deborah Ann C. Enriquez (Deborah Ann), also known as Dina Abdullah Enriquez Alsagoff, on

the other hand, alleges that their predecessor-in-interest Anacleto Cabrera and his wife Patricia

Seguera Cabrera (collectively the Spouses Cabrera) owned pro-indiviso share in the subject

parcel of land or 1051 sq. m. They further allege that Spouses Cabrera were survived by two

daughters Graciana, who died single and without issue, and Etta, the wife of respondent Peter

and mother of respondent Deborah Ann who succeeded their parents rights and took possession

ofthe 1051 sq. m. of the subject parcel of land. During her lifetime, Graciana sold her share over

the land to Etta. Thus, making the latter the sole owner of the one-half share of the subject parcel

of land. Subsequently, Etta died and the property passed on to petitioners Peter and Deborah Ann

by virtue of an Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate. On June 19, 1999, petitioners Peter and

Deborah Ann sold 200 sq. m. out of the 1051 sq. m. for P200,000.00 to Spouses Dionisio and

Catalina Fernandez (Spouses Fernandez), also their co-respondents in the case at bar. After the

sale, Spouses Fernandez took possession of the said area in the subject parcel of land.[4]

When Spouses Fernandez, tried to register their share in the subject land, they discovered

that certain documents prevent them from doing so: (1) Affidavit by Anacleto Cabrera dated

March 16, 1957 stating that his share in Lot No. 1851, the subject property, is approximately 369

sq. m.; (2) Affidavit by Dionisia Reyes dated July 13, 1929 stating that Anacleto only owned of

Lot No. 1851, while 302.55 sq. m. belongs to Dionisia and the rest of the property is co-owned

by Nicolasa Bacalso, Juan Reyes, Florentino Reyes and Maximiano Dico; (3) Extra-Judicial

Settlement with Sale of the Estate of Dionisia Reyes dated April 17, 1996; (4) certificates of title

in the name of the herein petitioners; and (5) Deed of Segregation of Real Estate and

Confirmation of Sale dated March 21, 1997 executed by the alleged heirs of Dionisia Reyes and

Anacleto Cabrera. Alleging that the foregoing documents are fraudulent and fictitious, the

respondents filed a complaint for annulment or nullification of the aforementioned documents

and for damages. [5]

They likewise prayed for the repartition and resubdivision of the subject

property.[6]

The RTC, upon motion of the herein petitioners, dismissed the case on the ground that

the respondents-plaintiffs were actually seeking first and foremost to be declared heirs of

Anacleto Cabrera since they can not demand the partition of the real property without first being

declared as legal heirs and such may not be done in an ordinary civil action, as in this case, but

through a special proceeding specifically instituted for the purpose.[7]

On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTC and directed the trial court to

proceed with the hearing of the case.[8]

The Motion for Reconsideration filed by the herein

petitioners was similarly denied.[9]

Hence this petition.

The primary issue in this case is whether or not the respondents have to institute a special

proceeding to determine their status as heirs of Anacleto Cabrera before they can file an ordinary

civil action to nullify the affidavits of Anacleto Cabrera and Dionisia Reyes, the Extra-Judicial

Settlement with the Sale of Estate of Dionisia Reyes, and the Deed of Segregation of Real Estate

and Confirmation of Sale executed by the heirs of Dionisia Reyes and the heirs of Anacleto

Cabrera, as well as to cancel the new transfer certificates of title issued by virtue of the above-

questioned documents.

We answer in the affirmative.

An ordinary civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or

protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.[10]

A special proceeding, on the

other hand, is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact.[11]

The Rules of Court provide that only a real party in interest is allowed to prosecute and

defend an action in court.[12]

A real party in interest is the one who stands to be benefited or

injured by the judgment in the suit or the one entitled to the avails thereof.[13]

Such interest, to be

considered a real interest, must be one which is present and substantial, as distinguished from a

mere expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate or consequential interest.[14]

A plaintiff is a

real party in interest when he is the one who has a legal right to enforce or protect, while a

defendant is a real party in interest when he is the one who has a correlative legal obligation to

redress a wrong done to the plaintiff by reason of the defendants act or omission which had

violated the legal right of the former.[15]

The purpose of the rule is to protect persons against

undue and unnecessary litigation.[16]

It likewise ensures that the court will have the benefit of

having before it the real adverse parties in the consideration of a case.[17]

Thus, a plaintiffs right

to institute an ordinary civil action should be based on his own right to the relief sought.

In cases wherein alleged heirs of a decedent in whose name a property was registered sue

to recover the said property through the institution of an ordinary civil action, such as a

complaint for reconveyance and partition,[18]

or nullification of transfer certificate of titles and

other deeds or documents related thereto,[19]

this Court has consistently ruled that a declaration of

heirship is improper in an ordinary civil action since the matter is within the exclusive

competence of the court in a special proceeding. [20]

In the recent case of Portugal v. Portugal-

Beltran,[21]

the Court had the occasion to clarify its ruling on the issue at hand, to wit:

The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which the adverse

parties are putative heirs to the estate of a decedent or parties to the special

proceedings for its settlement is that if the special proceedings are pending, or if

there are no special proceedings filed but there is, under the circumstances of

the case, a need to file one, then the determination of, among other issues,

heirship should be raised and settled in said special proceedings. Where

special proceedings had been instituted but had been finally closed and

terminated, however, or if a putative heir has lost the right to have himself

declared in the special proceedings as co-heir and he can no longer ask for its re-

opening, then an ordinary civil action can be filed for his declaration as heir in

order to bring about the annulment of the partition or distribution or adjudication

of a property or properties belonging to the estate of the deceased.[22]

In the instant case, while the complaint was denominated as an action for the Declaration

of Non-Existency[sic], Nullity of Deeds, and Cancellation of Certificates of Title, etc., a review

of the allegations therein reveals that the right being asserted by the respondents are their right as

heirs of Anacleto Cabrera who they claim co-owned one-half of the subject property and not

merely one-fourth as stated in the documents the respondents sought to annul. As correctly

pointed out by the trial court, the ruling in the case of Heirs of Guido Yaptinchay v. Hon. Roy

del Rosario[23]

is applicable in the case at bar. In the said case, the petitioners therein, claiming

to be the legal heirs of the late Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay filed for annulment of the transfer

certificates of title issued in the name of Golden Bay Realty Corporation on the ground that the

subject properties rightfully belong to the petitioners predecessor and by virtue of succession

have passed on to them. In affirming the trial court therein, this Court ruled:

...(T)he plaintiffs who claimed to be the legal heirs of the said Guido and

Isabel Yaptinchay have not shown any proof or even a semblance of it except the

allegations that they are the legal heirs of the aforementioned Yaptinchays that

they have been declared the legal heirs of the deceased couple. Now, the

determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased couple must be made in

the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for

reconveyance of property. This must take precedence over the action for

reconveyance.[24]

In the same manner, the respondents herein, except for their allegations, have yet to

substantiate their claim as the legal heirs of Anacleto Cabrera who are, thus, entitled to the

subject property. Neither is there anything in the records of this case which would show that a

special proceeding to have themselves declared as heirs of Anacleto Cabrera had been

instituted. As such, the trial court correctly dismissed the case for there is a lack of cause of

action when a case is instituted by parties who are not real parties in interest. While a declaration

of heirship was not prayed for in the complaint, it is clear from the allegations therein that the

right the respondents sought to protect or enforce is that of an heir of one of the registered co-

owners of the property prior to the issuance of the new transfer certificates of title that they seek

to cancel. Thus, there is a need to establish their status as such heirs in the proper forum.

Furthermore, in Portugal,[25]

the Court held that it would be superfluous to still subject

the estate to administration proceedings since a determination of the parties' status as heirs could

be achieved in the ordinary civil case filed because it appeared from the records of the case that

the only property left by the decedent was the subject matter of the case and that the parties have

already presented evidence to establish their right as heirs of the decedent. In the present case,

however, nothing in the records of this case shows that the only property left by the deceased

Anacleto Cabrera is the subject lot, and neither had respondents Peter and Deborah Ann

presented any evidence to establish their rights as heirs, considering especially that it appears

that there are other heirs of Anacleto Cabrera who are not parties in this case that had signed one

of the questioned documents. Hence, under the circumstances in this case, this Court finds that a

determination of the rights of respondents Peter and Deborah Ann as heirs of Anacleto Cabrera

in a special proceeding is necessary.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of

Appeals is hereby REVERSED and the decision of the Regional Trial Court datedJune 29,

2000 DISMISSING the complaint is REINSTATED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

CHING ET.AL VS RODRIGUEZ

GR 192828 28 NOVEMBER 2011

REYES, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1]

under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court

assailing the December 14, 2009 Decision[2]

and July 8, 2010 Resolution[3]

of the Court of

Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 99856. The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads:

FACTS: The respondents filed a Complaint against the petitioners and Stroghold Insurance

Company, Global Business Bank, Inc. (formerly PhilBank), Elena Tiu Del Pilar, Asia Atlantic

Resources Ventures, Inc., Registers of Deeds of Manila and Malabon, and all persons claiming

rights or titles from Ramon Ching (Ramon).

The Complaint was captioned as one for "Disinheritance, Declaration of Nullity of Agreement

and Waiver, Affidavit of Extra-Judicial Settlement, Deed of Absolute Sale, Transfer Certificates

of Title with Prayer for [the] Issuance of [a] Temporary Restraining Order and [a] Writ of

Preliminary Injunction." In the complaint, the respondents alleged that (1) they are the heirs of

Antonio Ching and that Ramon misrepresented himself as Antonios son when he was, in fact,

adopted and his birth certificated merely simulated; (2) Antonio was killed with Ramon as the

prime suspect and prior to the conclusion of the investigations, Ramon made an inventory of the

formers estate and illegally transferred to his name the titles to Antonios properties; (3) Ramon

sweet-talked respondent Mercedes into surrendering to him a Certificate of Time Deposit of

P4,000,000.00 in the name of Antonio and the TCTs of two condo units registered under Ramons

name; (4) Ramon illegally transferred to his own name through a forged document 40,000 shares

in Po Wing Corporation; (5) Ramon executed an Affidavit of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate

adjudicating solely to himself Antonio's entire estate to the prejudice of the respondents; and (6)

Ramon sold Antonio's two parcels of land in Navotas to co-defendant Asia Atlantic Business

Ventures, Inc. Another parcel of land, which was part of Antonio's estate, was sold by Ramon to

co-defendant Elena Tiu Del Pilar at an unreasonably low price.

The respondents thus prayed for the (1) issuance of a TRO to restrain Ramon or his

representatives from disposing or selling any property that belongs to the estate of Antonio; (2)

that Ramon be declared as disqualified from inheriting from Antonio Ching; and (3) declaring

null the unauthorized transfers made by Ramon.

The RTC denied the petitioners Motion to Dismiss and subsequent Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC should have granted the Motion to Dismiss with regard to the

issues which could only be resolved in a special proceeding and not in an ordinary civil action

HELD: No reversible errors were committed by the RTC and the CA when they both ruled that

the denial of the petitioners' second motion to dismiss was proper.

An action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil action, whereas

matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property

made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly

requires the application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.

Under Article 916 of the NCC, disinheritance can be effected only through a will wherein the

legal cause therefor shall be specified. This Court agrees with the RTC and the CA that while the

respondents in their Complaint and Amended Complaint sought the disinheritance of Ramon, no

will or any instrument supposedly effecting the disposition of Antonio's estate was ever

mentioned. Hence, despite the prayer for Ramon's disinheritance, the case filed does not partake

of the nature of a special proceeding and does not call for the probate court's exercise of its

limited jurisdiction.

Even without the necessity of being declared as heirs of Antonio, the respondents have the

standing to seek for the nullification of the instruments in the light of their claims that there was

no consideration for their execution, and that Ramon exercised undue influence and committed

fraud against them. Consequently, the respondents then claimed that the Affidavit of Extra-

Judicial Settlement of Antonios estate executed by Ramon, and the TCTs issued upon the

authority of the said affidavit, are null and void as well. Ramon's averment that a resolution of

the issues raised shall first require a declaration of the respondents' status as heirs is a mere

defense which is not determinative of which court shall properly exercise jurisdiction.

In sum, this Court agrees with the CA that the nullification of the documents subject of the civil

case could be achieved in an ordinary civil action, which in this specific case was instituted to

protect the respondents from the supposedly fraudulent acts of Ramon. In the event that the RTC

will find grounds to grant the reliefs prayed for by the respondents, the only consequence will be

the reversion of the properties subject of the dispute to the estate of Antonio. The civil case was

not instituted to conclusively resolve the issues relating to the administration, liquidation and

distribution of Antonio's estate, hence, not the proper subject of a special proceeding for the

settlement of the estate of a deceased person under Rules 73-91 of the Rules of Court.

The respondents' resort to an ordinary civil action before the RTC may not be strategically

sound, because a settlement proceeding should thereafter still follow, if their intent is to recover

from Ramon the properties alleged to have been illegally transferred in his name. Be that as it

may, the RTC, in the exercise of its general jurisdiction, cannot be restrained from taking

cognizance of respondents' Complaint and Amended Complaint as the issues raised and the

prayers indicated therein are matters which need not be threshed out in a special proceeding

MENDOZA VS TEH et.al

G.R. No. 122646 March 14, 1997

FRANCISCO, J.:

On October 28, 1994, petitioner "for herself and as administratrix of the intestate estate" of her

deceased husband Norberto Mendoza filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Batangas a

complaint for "reconveyance of title (involving parcels of lot in Batangas) and damages with

petition for preliminary injunction" docketed as Civil Case No. R94-009. 1

Paragraphs 2 and 3 of

said complaint states:

2. That Adelia C. Mendoza likewise represents her co-plaintiff, the Intestate

Estate of the late Norberto B. Mendoza in her capacity as the surviving wife of the

deceased Norberto B. Mendoza who died on December 29, 1993;

3. That Adelia C. Mendoza should be appointed by this Honorable Court as the

judicial administratrix of her co-plaintiff for purposes of this case; 2

Private respondents filed on January 21, 1995 3

their "answer with motion to dismiss" 4

alleging

among others that the complaint states no cause of action and that petitioner's demand had

already been paid. 5

On February 17, 1995, private respondents filed another pleading entitled

"motion to dismiss" invoking, this time, lack of jurisdiction, lack of cause of action, estoppel,

laches and prescription. In support of their argument of lack of jurisdiction, private respondents

contend that a special proceedings case for appointment of administratrix of an estate cannot be

incorporated in the ordinary action for reconveyance. In her opposition to the motions, petitioner

asserts among others, that the allegation seeking appointment as administratrix is only an

incidental matter which is not even prayed for in the complaint. Replying to the opposition,

private respondents argued that since petitioner's husband resided in Quezon City at the time of

his death, the appointment of the estate administratrix should be filed in the RTC of that place in

accordance with Section 1 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court. Accordingly, it is their argument that

the RTC of Batangas has no jurisdiction over the case.

In a Resolution dated June 14, 1995, the RTC of Batangas thru respondent Judge Teh "dismissed

without prejudice" the complaint for lack of jurisdiction "on the ground that the rules governing

an ordinary civil action and a special proceeding are different." Accordingly, the lower court

found it unnecessary to discuss the other grounds raised in the motion to dismiss. 6

Upon denial

of petitioner's motion for reconsideration, he filed this petition under Rule 45 on pure questions

of law. The Court thereafter gave due course to the petition.

The issue is whether or not in an action for reconveyance, an allegation seeking appointment as

administratrix of an estate, would oust the RTC of its jurisdiction over the whole case?

We rule in the negative. First, Section 19 of B.P. 129 as amended by RA 7691 provides:

Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive

original jurisdiction:

(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of

pecuniary estimation;

(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or

any interest therein, where the assessed value of property involved exceeds

Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00). . .

(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestat . . . .

Likewise, Section 33 of the same law provides that:

Metropolitan Trial Court shall exercise:

(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate

proceedings, testate and intestate . . . (emphasis ours).

The above law is clear. An action for reconveyance, which involves title to property

worth millions of pesos, such as the lots subject of this case, is cognizable by the RTC.

Likewise falling within its jurisdiction are actions "incapable of pecuniary estimation,"

such as the appointment of an administratrix for an estate. Even the Rules on venue of

estate proceedings (Section 1 of Rule 73 7

) impliedly recognizes the jurisdiction of the

RTC over petitions for granting of letters of administration. On the other hand, probate

proceedings for the settlement of estate are within the ambit of either the RTC or MTC

depending on the net worth of the estate. By arguing that the allegation seeking such

appointment as administratrix ousted the RTC of its jurisdiction, both public and private

respondents confuse jurisdiction with venue. Section 2 of Rule 4 as revised by Circular

13-95 8

provides that actions involving title to property shall be tried in the province

where the property is located, in this case, — Batangas. The mere fact that petitioner's

deceased husband resides in Quezon City at the time of his death affects only the venue

but not the jurisdiction of the Court. 9

Second, the cases cited 10

by private respondents are not at point as they involve settlement of

estate where the probate court was asked to resolve questions of ownership of certain

properties.In the present suit, no settlement of estate is involved, but merely an allegation

seeking appointment as estate administratrix which does not necessarily involve settlement of

estate that would have invited the exercise of the limited jurisdiction of a probate court. The

above allegation is not even a jurisdictional fact which must be stated in an action for

reconveyance. The Court therefore, should have at least, proceeded with the reconveyance suit

rather than dismiss the entire case.

Third, jurisprudential rulings that a probate court cannot generally decide questions of ownership

or title to property 11

is not applicable in this case, because: there is no settlement of estate

involved and the RTC of Batangas was not acting as a probate court. It should be clarified that

whether a particular matter should be resolved by the RTC in the exercise of its general

jurisdiction or its limited probate jurisdiction, is not a jurisdictional issue but a mere question of

procedure. 12

Moreover, the instant action for reconveyance does not even invoke the limited

jurisdiction of a probate court.13

Considering that the RTC has jurisdiction, whether it be on the

reconveyance suit or as to the appointment of an administratrix, it was improper for respondent

judge to dismiss the whole complaint for alleged lack of jurisdiction.

Finally, judges should not dismiss with precipitate haste, complaints or petitions filed before

them, just so they can comply with their administrative duty to dispose cases within 90 days at

the expense of their judicial responsibility.

WHEREFORE, the Resolutions dated June 14, 1995 and November 14, 1995 of the RTC of

Batangas are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The trial court is ordered to immediately proceed

with the disposition of the case in accordance with this Decision. SO ORDERED.

REPUBLIC VS VILLARAMA

G.R. No. 117733. September 5, 1997

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

This is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to reverse the

2 November 1994 Order [1]

of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig City (hereafter,

probate court), in Special Proceedings No. 10279 entitled In the Matter of the Probate of the Will

of Ferdinand E. Marcos/Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration. The assailed order

lifted the temporary restraining order issued on 25 October 1994, and denied petitioner's (1)

petition for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and (2) motion to cite Mr. Robert

Swift, Atty. Rodrigo Domingo, and other persons in contempt of court.

Petitioner Republic of the Philippines is the petitioner in Special Proceedings No.

10279. The petition, filed on 16 October 1992, alleged that during his exile the late President

Ferdinand E. Marcos executed his last will and testament [2]

in Hawaii, United States of America,

with his wife Imelda Trinidad R. Marcos and son Ferdinand R. Marcos II as executors. Petitioner

justified its action in filing the petition by claiming neglect on the part of the testators heirs to

initiate testate proceedings and the need to protect the interest of the Philippine government in

assessing and collecting the taxes due the estate.It moved that Mrs. Marcos and Ferdinand II be

declared incompetent as executors and prayed that letters of administration be issued in favor of

petitioners nominee.

Mrs. Imelda Marcos and Ferdinand Marcos II filed an Opposition/ Comment on the

petition. [3]

On 7 June 1993, petitioner sent a notice [4]

of Commencement of Probate Proceedings in

Philippine Court to the United States (U.S.) District Court of Hawaii, where a class

action [5]

docketed as MDL No. 840 was previously filed against former President Marcos.[6]

The

action sought damages against the latter for human rights violations he allegedly committed

during his authoritarian rule.

After establishing the jurisdictional facts and concluding its presentation of evidence in the

probate court, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for Appointment of Special

Administrator/s [7]

citing the following grounds in support thereof:

(1) The probate court has failed to appoint an administrator of the estate since the filing of the

petition.

(2) The US District Court of Hawaii awarded in favor of the claimants the amount of US$1.2

Billion as exemplary damages against the estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos.

(3) In its order of 19 November 1991 the said court granted a preliminary injunction against the

estate to prevent any transfer, encumbrance, conversion, or disposition of the funds and assets of

the estate.

(4) On the premise that no probate proceeding was pending anywhere, said Court modified on 16

November 1992 its preliminary injunction to include certain Swiss Banks.

(5) In July 1994, the plaintiffs in MDL No. 840 filed with the Hawaii District Court a motion to

further modify the preliminary injunction to identify the Republic of the Philippines as agent,

representative, aide, and abettor of the defendant Estate, notice of which was received by the

Office of the Solicitor General on 25 July 1994.

(6) There was a need to preserve the estate, considering that it was the subject of protracted

litigation both here and abroad. Petitioner nominated Commissioner of Internal Revenue

Liwayway Vinzons-Chato as administrator of the estate.

Ferdinand R. Marcos II opposed the motion claiming that the Commissioner of Internal

Revenue was not a suitable person to act as administrator of the estate.

In its Order [8]

of 9 September 1994, the probate court, per public respondent Judge

Villarama, granted the motion and appointed Commissioner Liwayway Vinzons-Chato as

Special Administrator of the estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos. Citing Section 1 of Rule 73 of the

Rules of Court, the order also declared that upon the filing of the petition for probate of the will,

the probate court acquired jurisdiction over the estate to the exclusion of all other courts; and that

the U.S. District Court of Hawaii cannot assert its jurisdiction over the assets of the estate and

exclude the jurisdiction already vested in [the probate court]. He directed that a copy of the order

be furnished the U.S. District Court of Hawaii through the Department of Foreign Affairs.

On 24 October 1994, petitioner filed in the probate court a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ

of Preliminary Injunction with Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order. [9]

It

alleged that in the class action the U.S. District Court of Hawaii issued sometime in October

1994 a Reference Order [10]

appointing special masters for the purpose of obtaining depositions

in the Philippines on the following matters: (1) whether the victims identified in the claim forms

suffered torture, summary execution, or disappearance; and (2) the extent of damages

sustained. The Reference Order prescribed the procedure, including the availment of local court

reporters and interpreters as might be required. Petitioner asserted that the Reference Order

impinged on the exclusive jurisdiction of the probate court and disregarded the claim of the

Philippine government against the Marcos estate. It also contended that the claim against the

estate should be filed before the probate court and that the Philippine government should be

accorded first preference in the priority list of the estates creditors.

On 25 October 1994, respondent Judge Villarama issued a temporary restraining

order [11]

against the special masters and persons acting in their stead, and set for hearing the

petition for the preliminary injunction. The sheriffs return [12]

indicated that service of the order

was attempted upon the resident manager of New World Hotel, Makati City, where Mr. Swift

and the other special masters were billeted. However, the sheriff was referred to the guest

services manager, who refused to accept a copy of the order.

Before the hearing on the preliminary injunction could take place, petitioner filed an

urgent ex-parte motion [13]

to cite herein private respondents, Mr. Robert Swift, Atty. Rodrigo

Domingo, and other concerned persons in contempt of court based on media reports that they

vowed to continue the taking of depositions notwithstanding the issuance of a temporary

restraining order. Petitioner also questioned the legal practice in the Philippines of Mr. Swift, an

American counsel who had no special work permit and license to practice.

On 28 October 1994, respondent Judge Villarama issued an order [14]

directing private

respondents to comment on petitioner's motion and to show cause why they should not be cited

for contempt. The sheriffs return [15]

confirmed that the order was served upon Mr. Swift through

the senior guest services officer of the New World Hotel, Makati City, and personally upon Atty.

Domingo at his office.

In the meantime, the Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism,

Inc., (MABINI) filed in SP Proc. No. 10279 a petition for leave to intervene asamicus

curiae and pro se ex abundanti cautela. [16]

It noted the hostile, if not indifferent, attitude the

Philippine government continued to display towards its citizens whose human rights were

violated; and just when the victims had been vindicated by the ruling of the U.S. Court District

of Hawaii, it was the Philippine government which would serve as an obstruction to their

attainment of justice by suppressing their freedom to express the ordeal they had

suffered. MABINI underscored that the taking of the depositions was a compassionate remedy

granted to the Filipino victims, who were spared the burden of testifying in a foreign court.

Likewise, the Samahan ng Mga Ex-Detainees Laban sa Detensyon at Para sa Amnestiya

(SELDA), a human rights non-government organization, filed its special appearance with motion

to dissolve the temporary restraining order and to deny writ of preliminary injunction. [17]

In his Opposition [18]

Atty. Domingo asserted that the real motive of petitioner was to

prevent the human rights victims from recovering what was due them and that it forgot or

conveniently chose not to remember that in February 1987, it asked the U.S. Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit to allow the human rights suits against Marcos to proceed to trial. He also

contended that the motion for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction was grossly

insufficient both in form and substance, since it was not verified and was deficient and baseless.;

and that petitioners reliance on Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court is misplaced. The words

exclusive jurisdiction found therein should be limited to proceedings concerning the probate of

the will and settlement of the estate of the decedent and should not include other litigation for or

against the estate. He argued that MDL No. 840 is an action for recovery of damages arising out

of the late President's tortuous violation of international law. The action is totally unrelated to the

probate proceedings. He reasoned that the probate court is of limited jurisdiction and that it can

only exercise jurisdiction over the property of the estate in the Philippines. Moreover, the probate

court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the special masters, since they were never properly

summoned.

Anent petitioners motion to cite them in contempt of court, Atty. Domingo alleged that said

motion, which was litigious in nature, was a useless scrap of paper for lack of the three-day

notice for hearing. Besides, the temporary restraining order could not be directed to him because

he was neither a special master nor a representative thereof. He was a lawyer for the human

rights claimants.

In his pleading [19]

Mr. Swift joined Atty. Domingo in the latters opposition and further

alleged that the petition for preliminary injunction became moot and academic, as the special

masters voluntarily left the country on 26 October 1994, without having been served a copy of

the temporary restraining order. He also raised the settled principle of comity, which required the

probate court to avoid interference in the conduct of judicial proceedings in a foreign country;

warned that petitioner was courting danger in encouraging the probate court to collaterally attack

the jurisdiction of the U.S. District Court of Hawaii in violation of said principle; and claimed

that the temporary restraining order could not be directed to him, since he was neither a special

master nor a representative thereof but a counsel of the human rights victims.

On 2 November 1994, public respondent Judge Villarama issued the assailed Order[20]

lifting

the 25 October 1995 Temporary Restraining Order and denying the motion for the issuance of a

writ of preliminary injunction on the ground that petitioner has failed to show by convincing

proof the existence of a clear and positive right which should be protected. The said order also

denied, on equity considerations, the motion to cite private respondents in contempt of court.

Petitioner no longer sought a reconsideration of the Order for the following reasons: (a) such

motion would serve no useful purpose because it would raise the same points stated in the

rejected motions; (b) the error committed by respondent Judge was grave and patent as to make

the questioned order void; (c) the relief sought in this petition is extremely urgent because the

Special Masters or the persons acting in their stead were taking the depositions in furtherance

and in implementation of the foreign courts directive; and (d) the issue raised is purely a question

of law. [21]

Instead, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari alleging that the trial court

committed grave abuse of discretion in failing to consider that the issuance and implementation

of the reference order of the Hawaii court violated the sovereignty of the Philippines and

impinged on the exclusive jurisdiction of the probate court.

In support thereof, petitioner invokes Section 1 of Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, which

provides in part as follows:

SEC. 1. Where estate of deceased person settled. xxx The court first taking cognizance of the

settlement of the estate of the decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other

courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the

decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in

an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the

record.

It raises a contradiction in public respondent Judge Villaramas actuation in that in his Order

of 9 September 1994 he declared that the U.S. District Court of Hawaii could not assert its

jurisdiction over the assets of the estate and exclude the jurisdiction vested in the probate

court. Said respondent was aware that the purpose of the reference order was to determine the

amount of compensatory damages to be charged against the estate; however, he chose to ignore

that it is the probate court which exercises exclusive jurisdiction over the estate. He cannot,

therefore, claim that petitioner failed to prove a clear and positive right which should be

protected.

Anent the issue of contempt, petitioner argues that the following documentary evidence

presented before the probate court proved that Messrs. Swift and Domingo and other concerned

persons defied the probate court's temporary restraining order: (1) Special Master Order No. 4

issued by the Supervising Special Master, which confirmed notice of the probate court's

temporary restraining order; and (2) letters [22]

of Mr. Swift to Mr. James Linn, American counsel

of Mrs. Marcos (a) indicating that the plaintiffs in MDL No. 840 would proceed with the taking

of the depositions on 27 October 1994 at the office of Atty. Domingo and the New World Hotel,

(b) giving notice that he would take the depositions of some class members on 28 October 1994,

and (c) notifying the continuation of his taking of the depositions on 29 October 1994. These

notwithstanding, respondent Judge denied petitioner's motion to cite Messrs. Swift and Domingo

and other concerned persons in contempt of court due to equity considerations. The denial was

tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

In his comment filed on his behalf and as counsel for the other private respondents, Atty.

Domingo argues that the petition is moot and academic and without merit. The act primarily

sought to be restrained, which was the taking of the depositions, was accomplished as of 27

November 1994; and the transcripts had been submitted to the U.S. District Court of Hawaii.

Furthermore, the probate court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate matters which had no reference

or bearing to the probate, such as MDL No. 840. Besides, there was no law which prohibited the

taking of depositions in the Philippines for evidentiary use in a pending case abroad. The estate

of Ferdinand E. Marcos even financed the taking of the depositions. Lastly, Atty. Domingo

reiterated that he could not be cited for contempt for not having been served a copy of the

temporary restraining order.

Mrs. Marcos subsequently filed a motion for leave to intervene and to admit its petition in

intervention, citing that petitioner failed to defend the interest of the estate of her late husband.

She claims that the proceeding undertaken by the special masters by virtue of the reference order

was a continuation of the trial of MDL No. 840, considering that (1) a reference is the trial and

determination of questions arising in litigation by a person appointed for that purpose by the

court wherein the case is pending; [23]

(2) a special master is an officer of the appointing court;

and (3) the applicable law pertaining to a reference and a master is Section 53 of the U.S. Rules

of Civil Procedure for the District Courts. Public respondent Judge then erred in considering the

proceeding as one for deposition as a mode of discovery. Accordingly, in denying the petition for

injunction he abdicated the jurisdiction of the probate court in favor of the U.S. District Court of

Hawaii; he even made a turn-about since earlier, in his 9 September 1994 Order, he ruled that the

Hawaii Court could not assert jurisdiction over the Marcos assets.

In a Comment submitted on 5 September 1995 in compliance with our resolution, petitioner

offered no objection to the intervention of Mrs. Marcos.

On 4 December 1995, we required the parties to submit their respective memoranda on why

this petition should not be dismissed for having become moot and academic considering that the

taking of the depositions by the special masters appointed pursuant to the Reference Order issued

by the District Court of Hawaii had been completed on 27 November 1994.

Petitioner filed its Memorandum urging us to decide this case on the merits even if the act to

be enjoined had already been consummated in view of the transcendental importance of the

issues involved: sovereignty of the Philippines and the exclusive jurisdiction of the probate court

of the Philippines. There is a compelling need to seek an incisive ruling from the highest tribunal

of the land to uphold the exclusive jurisdiction of the probate court and to protect this nations

sovereignty from foreign transgressions and preserve the same as supreme and inviolable. To

buttress its plea, it cites Salonga v. Cruz Pano [24]

where we resolved the case on its merits even

if the issue raised had become moot and academic.

Private respondents in their memorandum, reiterate that the petition for the issuance of a

writ of preliminary injunction lacked the verification required under Section 4, Rule 58 of the

Rules of Court. They likewise submit that aside from the undisputed fact that the act sought to be

enjoined had already been completed, the judgment in MDL No. 840 became final on 27 January

1995 and that the estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos was adjudged to pay close to US$2 billion in

damages.

We dismiss the petition not only on the ground of mootness which, generally, would justify

dismissal. [25]

We dismiss it also for lack of merit.

It is settled that where the ground invoked in a special civil action for certiorari under Rule

65 of the Rules of Court is abuse of discretion --as in this case -- the abuse must be grave as

where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal

hostility; or, it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a

virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. [26]

This

remedy then is extraordinary, and its use is restricted to truly extraordinary cases. [27]

The pleadings of the parties in this case and the record of SP. Proc. No. 10279 fail to show

that respondent Judge Villarama had, as charged by petitioner, committed grave abuse of

discretion in denying the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction against the special masters.

In the first place, the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction was not verified.Section 4

of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court is very explicit in its requirement that a preliminary injunction

may be granted only when the complaint is verified. Absence of verification makes an

application or petition for preliminary injunction patently insufficient both in form and

substance. [28]

In the second place, even if we disregard the requirement of verification or consider the

adverse parties in estoppel from raising the issue when they allowed the petitioner to present

evidence on the petition, we find that respondent Judge Villarama committed no error in holding

that petitioner failed to prove that it had a clear and positive right to be protected.

Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court enumerates the grounds for the issuance of a

preliminary injunction:

(a) That the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief

consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the acts complained of, or in the

performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;

(b) That the commission or continuance of some act complained of during the litigation or the

non-performance thereof would probably work injustice to the plaintiff; or

(c) That the defendant is doing, threatens, or is about to do, or is procuring or suffering to be

done, some act probably in violation of the plaintiff's rights respecting the subject of the action,

and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.

Under this rule, a clear and positive right especially calling for judicial protection must be

shown. Injunction is not a remedy to protect or enforce contingent, abstract, or future rights; it

will not issue to protect a right not in esse and which may never arise, or to restrain an act which

does not give rise to a cause of action. There must exist an actual right. [29]

We fail to comprehend what clear and positive right petitioner has which may be violated by

the issuance and implementation of the Reference Order by the District Court of

Hawaii. Petitioner seeks to establish such a right by claiming that since the probate court was the

first to take cognizance of the settlement of the Marcos estate then pursuant to Section 1 of Rule

73 of the Rules of Court, it exercises jurisdiction thereon to the exclusion of all other courts; and

that, accordingly, the District Court of Hawaii cannot assert jurisdiction over the assets of said

estate. The argument is like a loose cannon ball way off its target.

For one, petitioner is unable to distinguish between the exclusive right on jurisdiction of the

probate court and the right contemplated by the law on injunction. For another, Section 1 of Rule

73 refers to courts in the Philippines and simply means that once a special proceeding for the

settlement of the estate of a decedent is filed in one of such courts, that court has exclusive

jurisdiction over said estate and no other special proceedings involving the same subject matter

may be filed before any other court. Since foreign courts are not contemplated in Section 1, in no

way then can it be validly maintained that the District Court of Hawaii has encroached upon, or

impinged on, the jurisdiction of the probate court by the issuance of the Reference Order. The

Reference Order cannot be construed as concerning or affecting the Marcos estate within the

exclusive jurisdiction of the probate court. The duties of the special masters as defined in the

Reference Order were to prepare written findings for submission to the jury regarding (a)

whether the victims identified in the claim forms suffered torture, summary execution or

disappearance, and (b) the extent of the damages sustained. No extravagant imagination can lead

us to a conclusion that such duties do not involve any issue cognizable by the probate court.

Neither is there merit to the claim that the issuance and implementation of the Reference

Order violated the sovereignty of the Philippines.

It is noteworthy that petitioner was aware of the pendency of MDL No. 840 of the District

Court of Hawaii. In fact, it did not oppose the action; on the contrary, it urged the U.S. Court of

Appeals for the Ninth District to allow the trial of the human rights litigation against the former

strongman. Petitioner even exhorted the human rights victims to pursue the justice which has

eluded them for many years. In its Amicus Curiae Brief [30]

filed before the U.S. District Court of

Hawaii, petitioner declared:

The government of the Republic of the Philippines support of their claims. Because the

international law principles are clear and agreed upon by all nations, this judicial action does not

have the capacity of disrupting foreign relations between the concerned countries. The

Government of the Republic of the Philippines can state without hesitation or reservation that its

foreign relations with the United States will not be adversely affected if these human rights

claims against Ferdinand Marcos are heard in U.S. courts; and, in fact, relations may well be

improved if Filipino citizens see that justice is available in U.S. courts. The Philippine

Government has previously expressed its deep concern to the U.S. Government about the need

for a just solution to the present suits against ex-President Marcos. See Opinion No. 34, s. 1986,

Ministry of Justice, Republic of the Philippines, dated April 23, 1986, attached hereto as Exhibit

A. The Philippine Government now respectfully requests this Honorable Court to allow the

present suits to proceed to trial.

As regards the denial of the motion to cite Messrs. Swift and Domingo in contempt of court,

we rule that the same was not tainted with grave abuse of discretion. It must be recalled that they

were not served a copy of the temporary restraining order which they allegedly defied.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the Order of 2 November 1992 of

the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig City, is AFFIRMED in toto. SO ORDERED.

MALOLES II VS PHILIPPS

G.R. No. 129505. January 31, 2000

These are petitions for review on certiorari of the decisions of the Thirteenth and the Special Eighth

Divisions of the Court of Appeals which ruled that petitioner has no right to intervene in the settlement of

the estate of Dr. Arturo de Santos. The cases were consolidated considering that they involve the same

parties and some of the issues raised are the same.

FACTS: In 1995, Dr. Arturo De Los Santos filed a petition for probate of his will. He declared

that he has no compulsory heirs and that he is naming as sole devisee and legatee the Arturo de

Santos Foundation, Inc. (ASF). The named executrix is Pacita De Los Reyes Phillips. The

petition was filed in RTC Makati Branch 61. Judge Fernando Gorospe of said court determined

that Arturo is of sound mind and was not acting in duress when he signed his last will and

testament and so Branch 61 allowed the last will and testament on February 16, 1996.

Ten days from the allowance, Arturo died. Thereafter, Pacita, as executrix, filed a motion for the

issuance of letters of testamentary with Branch 61. She however withdrew the motion but later

on refilled it with RTC Makati Branch 65.

Meanwhile, a certain Octavio Maloles II filed a motion for intervention with Branch 61 claiming

that as a next of kin (him being the full blooded nephew of Arturo) he should be appointed as the

administrator of the estate and that he is an heir.

Judge Abad Santos of Branch 65 issued an order transferring the motion filed by Pacita to

Branch 61. Judge Santos ratiocinated that since the probate proceeding started in Branch 61, then

it should be the same court which should hear Pacita’s motion. Branch 61 however refused to

consolidate and referred the case back to Branch 65. Branch 65 subsequently consolidated the

case per refusal of Branch 61. Eventually, Branch 65 allowed the motion for intervention filed by

Octavio.

ISSUE: Whether or not Octavio Maloles II has the right to intervene in the probate proceeding.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court first clarified that the probate of will filed in Branch 61 has

already terminated upon the allowance of the will. Hence when Pacita filed a motion with

Branch 65, the same is already a separate proceeding and not a continuance of the now

concluded probate in Branch 61. There is therefore no reason for Branch 65 to refer back the

case to Branch 61 as it initially did. Further even if the probate was terminated, under Rule 73 of

the Rules of Court concerning the venue of settlement of estates, it is provided that when a case

is filed in one branch, jurisdiction over the case does not attach to the branch or judge alone, to

the exclusion of the other branches.

Anent the issue of Octavio being an heir, such contention has no merit. He is not an heir. Arturo

died testate. Next of kins may only inherit if a person dies intestate. In this case, Arturo left a

valid will which expressly provided that ASF is the sole legatee and devisee of his estate.

MALOLES II VS COURT OF APPEALS, Gorospe

GR No. 129505. 31 January 2000

MENDOZA, J.:

These are petitions for review on certiorari of the decisions of the Thirteenth and the Special

Eighth Divisions of the Court of Appeals which ruled that petitioner has no right to intervene in

the settlement of the estate of Dr. Arturo de Santos. The cases were consolidated considering that

they involve the same parties and some of the issues raised are the same.

The facts which gave rise to these two petitions are as follows:

On July 20, 1995, Dr. Arturo de Santos, Filipino and a resident of Makati City, filed a petition

for probate of his will[1] in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati, docketed as Sp. Proc.

No. M-4223. In his petition, Dr. De Santos alleged that he had no compulsory heirs; that he had

named in his will as sole legatee and devisee the Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc.; that he

disposed by his will his properties with an approximate value of not less than P2,000,000.00; and

that copies of said will were in the custody of the named executrix, private respondent Pacita de

los Reyes Phillips. A copy of the will[2] was annexed to the petition for probate.

On February 16, 1996, Judge Fernando V. Gorospe, Jr. of RTC-Makati, Branch 61 issued an order granting the petition and allowing the will. The order reads:

On 03 August 1995, the Court issued an Order setting the hearing of the petition on 12

September 1995, at 8:30 oclock in the morning, copies of which were served to Arturo de Santos

Foundation, Inc. and Ms. Pacita de los Reyes Phillips (Officers Return, dated 04 September 1995

attached to the records). When the case was called for hearing on the date set, no oppositor

appeared nor any written opposition was ever filed and on motion of petitioner, he was allowed

to adduce his evidence in support of the petition.

Petitioner personally appeared before this Court and was placed on the witness stand and was

directly examined by the Court through "free wheeling" questions and answers to give this Court

a basis to determine the state of mind of the petitioner when he executed the subject will. After

the examination, the Court is convinced that petitioner is of sound and disposing mind and not

acting on duress, menace and undue influence or fraud, and that petitioner signed his Last Will

and Testament on his own free and voluntary will and that he was neither forced nor influenced

by any other person in signing it.

Furthermore, it appears from the petition and the evidence adduced that petitioner in his lifetime,

executed his Last Will and Testament (Exhs. "A", "A-1", "A-2", "A-4", "A-5") at his residence

situated at 9 Bauhinia corner Intsia Streets, Forbes Park, Makati City; said Last Will and

Testament was signed in the presence of his three (3) witnesses, namely, to wit: Dr. Elpidio

Valencia (Exhs. "A-6", "A-7", "A-8", "A-16", "A-16-A"), Atty. Edward J. Berenguer (Exhs. "A-

3", "A-3-A", "A-9", "A-10", & "A-11"), and Atty. Victoria C. delos Reyes (Exhs. "A-12", "A-

13", "A-14", "A-17", & "A-18"), who in turn, in the presence of the testator and in the presence

of each and all of the witnesses signed the said Last Will and Testament and duly notarized

before Notary Public Anna Melissa L. Rosario (Exh. "A-15"); on the actual execution of the Last

Will and Testament, pictures were taken (Exhs. "B" to "B-3").

Petitioner has no compulsory heirs and Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc., with address at No. 9

Bauhinia corner Intsia Streets, Forbes Park, Makati City has been named as sole legatee and

devisee of petitioners properties, real and personal, approximately valued at not less than P2

million, Ms. Pacita de los Reyes Phillips was designated as executor and to serve as such without

a bond.

From the foregoing facts, the Court finds that the petitioner has substantially established the

material allegations contained in his petition. The Last Will and Testament having been executed

and attested as required by law; that testator at the time of the execution of the will was of sane

mind and/or not mentally incapable to make a Will; nor was it executed under duress or under

the influence of fear or threats; that it was in writing and executed in the language known and

understood by the testator duly subscribed thereof and attested and subscribed by three (3)

credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of another; that the testator and all the

attesting witnesses signed the Last Will and Testament freely and voluntarily and that the testator

has intended that the instrument should be his Will at the time of affixing his signature thereto.

WHEREFORE, as prayed for by the petitioner (testator himself) the petition for the allowance of the Last Will and Testament of Arturo de Santos is hereby APPROVED and ALLOWED.

Shortly after the probate of his will, Dr. De Santos died on February 26, 1996.

On April 3, 1996, petitioner Octavio S. Maloles II filed a motion for intervention claiming that,

as the only child of Alicia de Santos (testators sister) and Octavio L. Maloles, Sr., he was the sole

full-blooded nephew and nearest of kin of Dr. De Santos. He likewise alleged that he was a

creditor of the testator. Petitioner thus prayed for the reconsideration of the order allowing the

will and the issuance of letters of administration in his name. Mis spped

On the other hand, private respondent Pacita de los Reyes Phillips, the designated executrix of

the will, filed a motion for the issuance of letters testamentary with Branch 61. Later, however,

private respondent moved to withdraw her motion. This was granted, while petitioner was

required to file a memorandum of authorities in support of his claim that said court (Branch 61)

still had jurisdiction to allow his intervention.

Petitioner filed his memorandum of authorities on May 13, 1996. On the other hand, private

respondent, who earlier withdrew her motion for the issuance of letters testamentary in Branch

61, refiled a petition for the same purpose with the Regional Trial Court, Makati, which was

docketed as Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 and assigned to Branch 65.

Upon private respondents motion, Judge Salvador Abad Santos of Branch 65 issued an order, dated June 28, 1996, appointing her as special administrator of Dr. De Santos estate.

On July 29, 1996, petitioner sought to intervene in Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 and to set aside the

appointment of private respondent as special administrator. He reiterated that he was the sole and

full blooded nephew and nearest of kin of the testator; that he came to know of the existence of

Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 only by accident; that the probate proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. M-4223

before Branch 61 of the same court was still pending; that private respondent misdeclared the

true worth of the testators estate; that private respondent was not fit to be the special

administrator of the estate; and that petitioner should be given letters of administration for the

estate of Dr. De Santos.

On August 28, 1996, Judge Abad Santos ordered the transfer of Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 to Branch 61, on the ground that "[it] is related to the case before Judge Gorospe of RTC Branch 61 . . ."

It appears, however, that in Sp. Proc. No. M-4223, Judge Gorospe had denied on August 26,

1996 petitioners motion for intervention. Petitioner brought this matter to the Court of Appeals

which, in a decision promulgated on February 13, 1998, upheld the denial of petitioners motion

for intervention.

Meanwhile, Judge Gorospe issued an order, dated September 4, 1996, returning the records of

Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 to Branch 65 on the ground that there was a pending case involving the

Estate of Decedent Arturo de Santos pending before said court. The order reads: Spped

Acting on the ORDER dated 28 August 1996 of Branch 65, this Court, transferring this case to

this Branch 61 on the ground that this case is related with a case before this Court, let this case

be returned to Branch 65 with the information that there is no related case involving the

ESTATE OF DECEDENT ARTURO DE SANTOS pending before this Branch.

There is, however, a case filed by ARTURO DE SANTOS, as petitioner under Rule 76 of the

Rules of Court for the Allowance of his will during his lifetime docketed as SP. PROC. NO. M-4223 which was already decided on 16 February 1996 and has become final.

It is noted on records of Case No. M-4223 that after it became final, herein Petitioner Pacita de

los Reyes Phillips filed a MOTION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF LETTERS TESTAMENTARY,

which was subsequently withdrawn after this Court, during the hearing, already ruled that the

motion could not be admitted as the subject matter involves a separate case under Rule 78 of the

Rules of Court, and movant withdrew her motion and filed this case (No. 4343).

Octavio de Santos Maloles [II] filed a MOTION FOR INTERVENTION before Case No. M-

4223 and this motion was already DENIED in the order (Branch 61) of 26 August 1996 likewise

for the same grounds that the matter is for a separate case to be filed under Rule 78 of the Rules

of Court and cannot be included in this case filed under Rule 76 of the Rules of Court.

It is further noted that it is a matter of policy that consolidation of cases must be approved by the Presiding Judges of the affected Branches.

Initially, in his decision dated September 23, 1996, Judge Abad Santos appeared firm in his

position that "

. . . it would be improper for (Branch 65) to hear and resolve the petition (Sp. Proc. No. M-

4343)," considering that the probate proceedings were commenced with Branch 61. He thus

ordered the transfer of the records back to the latter branch. However, he later recalled his

decision and took cognizance of the case "to expedite the proceedings." Thus, in his Order, dated

October 21, 1996, he stated:

Considering the refusal of the Hon. Fernando V. Gorospe, Jr. of Branch 61 to continue hearing

this case notwithstanding the fact that said branch began the probate proceedings of the estate of

the deceased and must therefore continue to exercise its jurisdiction to the exclusion of all

others, until the entire estate of the testator had been partitioned and distributed as per Order

dated 23 September 1996, this branch (Regional Trial Court Branch 65) shall take cognizance of

the petition if only to expedite the proceedings, and under the concept that the Regional Trial

Court of Makati City is but one court.

Furnish a copy of this order to the Office of the Chief justice and the Office of the Court Administrator, of the Supreme Court; the Hon. Fernando V. Gorospe, Jr.; Pacita De Los Reyes

Phillips, Petitioner; and Octavio de Santos Maloles, Intervenor.

On November 4, 1996, Judge Abad Santos granted petitioners motion for intervention. Private

respondent moved for a reconsideration but her motion was denied by the trial court. She then

filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals which, on February 26, 1997, rendered a

decision[6] setting aside the trial courts order on the ground that petitioner had not shown any

right or interest to intervene in Sp. Proc. No. M-4343.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court - Makati, Branch 61 has lost jurisdiction to

proceed with the probate proceedings upon its issuance of an order allowing the will of Dr.

Arturo de Santos

2. Whether or not the Honorable (Regional Trial Court - Makati, Branch 65) acquired jurisdiction

over the petition for issuance of letters testamentary filed by (private) respondent.

3. Whether or not the petitioner, being a creditor of the late Dr. Arturo de Santos, has a right to

intervene and oppose the petition for issuance of letters testamentary filed by the respondent.

4. Whether or not (private) respondent is guilty of forum shopping in filing her petition for

issuance of letters testamentary with the Regional Trial Court - Makati, Branch 65 knowing fully

well that the probate proceedings involving the same testate estate of the decedent is still pending

with the Regional Trial Court - Makati, Branch 61.

HELD: First. Petitioner contends that the probate proceedings in Branch 61 of RTC-Makati did

not terminate upon the issuance of the order allowing the will of Dr. De Santos. Citing the cases

of Santiesteban v. Santiesteban[7] and Tagle v. Manalo, he argues that the proceedings must

continue until the estate is fully distributed to the lawful heirs, devisees, and legatees of the

testator, pursuant to Rule 73, 1 of the Rules of Court. Consequently, petitioner contends that

Branch 65 could not lawfully act upon private respondents petition for issuance of letters

testamentary.

The contention has no merit.

In cases for the probate of wills, it is well-settled that the authority of the court is limited to

ascertaining the extrinsic validity of the will, i.e., whether the testator, being of sound mind,

freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law.

Ordinarily, probate proceedings are instituted only after the death of the testator, so much so that, after approving and allowing the will, the court proceeds to issue letters testamentary and settle the estate of the testator. The cases cited by petitioner are of such nature. In fact, in most jurisdictions, courts cannot entertain a petition for probate of the will of a living testator under the principle of ambulatory nature of wills.

However, Art. 838 of the Civil Code authorizes the filing of a petition for probate of the will filed by the testator himself. It provides:

Civil Code, Art. 838. No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court.

The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition the court having jurisdiction for the allowance of his will. In such case, the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court for the

allowance of wills after the testators death shall govern. Miso

The Supreme Court shall formulate such additional Rules of Court as may be necessary for the allowance of wills on petition of the testator.

Subject to the right of appeal, the allowance of the will, either during the lifetime of the testator or after his death, shall be conclusive as to its due execution.

Rule 76, 1 likewise provides:

Sec. 1 Who may petition for the allowance of will. - Any executor, devisee, or legatee named in a

will, or any other person interested in the estate, may, at any time after the death of the testator,

petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the same be in his

possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.

The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition in the court for the allowance of his will.

The rationale for allowing the probate of wills during the lifetime of testator has been explained by the Code Commission thus:

Most of the cases that reach the courts involve either the testamentary capacity of the testator or

the formalities adopted in the execution of wills. There are relatively few cases concerning the

intrinsic validity of testamentary dispositions. It is far easier for the courts to determine the

mental condition of a testator during his lifetime than after his death. Fraud, intimidation and

undue influence are minimized. Furthermore, if a will does not comply with the requirements

prescribed by law, the same may be corrected at once. The probate during the testators life,

therefore, will lessen the number of contest upon wills. Once a will is probated during the

lifetime of the testator, the only questions that may remain for the courts to decide after the

testators death will refer to the intrinsic validity of the testamentary dispositions. It is possible, of

course, that even when the testator himself asks for the allowance of the will, he may be acting

under duress or undue influence, but these are rare cases.

After a will has been probated during the lifetime of the testator, it does not necessarily mean

that he cannot alter or revoke the same before his death. Should he make a new will, it would

also be allowable on his petition, and if he should die before he has had a chance to present such

petition, the ordinary probate proceeding after the testators death would be in order.

Thus, after the allowance of the will of Dr. De Santos on February 16, 1996, there was nothing

else for Branch 61 to do except to issue a certificate of allowance of the will pursuant to Rule 73,

12 of the Rules of Court. There is, therefore, no basis for the ruling of Judge Abad Santos of

Branch 65 of RTC-Makati that Branch 61 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati having begun

the probate proceedings of the estate of the deceased, it continues and shall continue to exercise

said jurisdiction to the exclusion of all others. It should be noted that probate proceedings do not

cease upon the allowance or disallowance of a will but continues up to such time that the entire

estate of the testator had been partitioned and distributed.

The fact that the will was allowed during the lifetime of the testator meant merely that the

partition and distribution of the estate was to be suspended until the latters death. In other words,

the petitioner, instead of filing a new petition for the issuance of letters testamentary, should

have simply filed a manifestation for the same purpose in the probate court.

Petitioner, who defends the order of Branch 65 allowing him to intervene, cites Rule 73, 1 which

states:

Where estate of deceased persons settled. - If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at

the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of

administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in

which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court

of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the

settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other

courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the

decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in

an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the

record.

The above rule, however, actually provides for the venue of actions for the settlement of the estate of deceased persons. In Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, it was held:

The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75, Section 1), specifically the clause "so far

as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of the state," is in

reality a matter of venue, as the caption of the Rule indicates: "Settlement of Estate of Deceased

Persons. Venue and Processes." It could not have been intended to define the jurisdiction over

the subject matter, because such legal provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing

merely with procedural matters. Procedure is one thing, jurisdiction over the subject matter is

another. The power or authority of the court over the subject matter "existed was fixed before

procedure in a given cause began." That power or authority is not altered or changed by

procedure, which simply directs the manner in which the power or authority shall be fully and

justly exercised. There are cases though that if the power is not exercised conformably with the

provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the power to

exercise it legally. However, this does not amount to a loss of jurisdiction over the subject

matter. Rather, it means that the court may thereby lose jurisdiction over the person or that the

judgment may thereby be rendered defective for lack of something essential to sustain it. The

appearance of this provision in the procedural law at once raises a strong presumption that it has

nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter. In plain words, it is just a

matter of method, of convenience to the parties.

Indeed, the jurisdiction over probate proceedings and settlement of estates with approximate

value of over P100,000.00 (outside Metro Manila) or P200,000.00 (in Metro Manila) belongs to

the regional trial courts under B.P. Blg. 129, as amended. The different branches comprising

each court in one judicial region do not possess jurisdictions independent of and incompatible

with each other.

It is noteworthy that, although Rule 73, 1 applies insofar as the venue of the petition for probate of the will of Dr. De Santos is concerned, it does not bar other branches of the same court from taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of the testator after his death. As held in the leading case of Bacalso v. Ramolote:

The various branches of the Court of First Instance of Cebu under the Fourteenth Judicial

District, are a coordinate and co-equal courts, and the totality of which is only one Court of First

Instance. The jurisdiction is vested in the court, not in the judges. And when a case is filed in one

branch, jurisdiction over the case does not attach to the branch or judge alone, to the exclusion of

the other branches. Trial may be held or proceedings continue by and before another branch or

judge. It is for this reason that Section 57 of the Judiciary Act expressly grants to the Secretary of

Justice, the administrative right or power to apportion the cases among the different branches,

both for the convenience of the parties and for the coordination of the work by the different

branches of the same court. The apportionment and distribution of cases does not involve a grant

or limitation of jurisdiction, the jurisdiction attaches and continues to be vested in the Court of

First Instance of the province, and the trials may be held by any branch or judge of the court.

Necessarily, therefore, Branch 65 of the RTC of Makati City has jurisdiction over Sp. Proc. No.

M-4343.

Second. Petitioner claims the right to intervene in and oppose the petition for issuance of letters

testamentary filed by private respondent. He argues that, as the nearest next of kin and creditor of

the testator, his interest in the matter is material and direct. In ruling that petitioner has no right

to intervene in the proceedings before Branch 65 of RTC-Makati City, the Court of Appeals

held:

The private respondent herein is not an heir or legatee under the will of the decedent Arturo de

Santos. Neither is he a compulsory heir of the latter. As the only and nearest collateral relative

of the decedent, he can inherit from the latter only in case of intestacy. Since the decedent has

left a will which has already been probated and disposes of all his properties the private

respondent can inherit only if the said will is annulled. His interest in the decedents estate is,

therefore, not direct or immediate.

His claim to being a creditor of the estate is a belated one, having been raised for the first time

only in his reply to the opposition to his motion to intervene, and, as far as the records show, not supported by evidence.

. . . . [T]he opposition must come from one with a direct interest in the estate or the will, and the

private respondent has none. Moreover, the ground cited in the private respondents opposition,

that the petitioner has deliberately misdeclared the truth worth and value of the estate, is not

relevant to the question of her competency to act as executor. Section 2, Rule 76 of the Rules of

Court requires only an allegation of the probable value and character of the property of the

estate. The true value can be determined later on in the course of the settlement of the estate.

Rule 79, 1 provides:

Opposition to issuance of letters testamentary. Simultaneous petition for administration. - Any

person interested in a will may state in writing the grounds why letters testamentary should not

issue to the persons named therein as executors, or any of them, and the court, after hearing

upon notice, shall pass upon the sufficiency of such grounds. A petition may, at the same time, be

filed for letters of administration with the will annexed.

Under this provision, it has been held that an "interested person" is one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor, and

whose interest is material and direct, not merely incidental or contingent.

Even if petitioner is the nearest next of kin of Dr. De Santos, he cannot be considered an "heir"

of the testator. It is a fundamental rule of testamentary succession that one who has no

compulsory or forced heirs may dispose of his entire estate by will. Thus, Art. 842 of the Civil

Code provides:

One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all his estate or any part of it in favor of any person having capacity to succeed.

One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he does not contravene the provisions of this Code with regard to the legitimate of said heirs.

Compulsory heirs are limited to the testators -

(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and

ascendants;

(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their

legitimate children and descendants;

(3) The widow or widower;

(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;

(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the Civil Code.

Petitioner, as nephew of the testator, is not a compulsory heir who may have been preterited in the testators will.

Nor does he have any right to intervene in the settlement proceedings based on his allegation that

he is a creditor of the deceased. Since the testator instituted or named an executor in his will, it is incumbent upon the Court to respect the desires of the testator. As we stated in Ozaeta v. Pecson:

The choice of his executor is a precious prerogative of a testator, a necessary concomitant of his

right to dispose of his property in the manner he wishes. It is natural that the testator should

desire to appoint one of his confidence, one who can be trusted to carry out his wishes in the

disposal of his estate. The curtailment of this right may be considered a curtailment of the right

to dispose.

Only if the appointed executor is incompetent, refuses the trust, or fails to give bond may the court appoint other persons to administer the estate. None of these circumstances is present in this case.

Third. Petitioner contends that private respondent is guilty of forum shopping when she filed the

petition for issuance of letters testamentary (Sp. Proc. No. M-4343) while the probate

proceedings (Sp. Proc. No. M-4223) were still pending. According to petitioner, there is identity

of parties, rights asserted, and reliefs prayed for in the two actions which are founded on the

same facts, and a judgment in either will result in res judicata in the other.

This contention has no merit. As stated earlier, the petition for probate was filed by Dr. De

Santos, the testator, solely for the purpose of authenticating his will. Upon the allowance of his

will, the proceedings were terminated.

On the other hand, the petition for issuance of letters testamentary was filed by private respondent, as executor of the estate of Dr. De Santos, for the purpose of securing authority from the Court to administer the estate and put into effect the will of the testator. The estate settlement proceedings commenced by the filing of the petition terminate upon the distribution and delivery of the legacies and devises to the persons named in the will. Clearly, there is no identity between the two petitions, nor was the latter filed during the pendency of the former. There was, consequently, no forum shopping.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decisions of the Court of Appeals are hereby

AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

NITTSCHER VS DR NITTSCHER

G.R. No. 160530 20 November 2007

QUISUMBING, J.:

For review on certiorari are the Decision[1]

dated July 31, 2003 and Resolution[2]

dated October

21, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55330, which affirmed the Order[3]

dated

September 29, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 59, Makati City, in SP Proc. No.

M-2330 for the probate of a will.

The facts are as follows.

On January 31, 1990, Dr. Werner Karl Johann Nittscher filed with the RTC of Makati City a

petition for the probate of his holographic will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to

herein respondent Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales.

On September 19, 1991, after hearing and with due notice to the compulsory heirs, the probate

court issued an order allowing the said holographic will, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Holographic Will of the petitioner-

testator Dr. Werner J. Nittscher executed pursuant to the provision of the second

paragraph of Article 838 of the Civil Code of the Philippines on January 25, 1990

in Manila, Philippines, and proved in accordance with the provision of Rule 76 of

the Revised Rules of Court is hereby allowed.

SO ORDERED.[4]

On September 26, 1994, Dr. Nittscher died. Hence, Atty. Nogales filed a petition for letters

testamentary for the administration of the estate of the deceased. Dr. Nittschers surviving spouse,

herein petitioner Cynthia V. Nittscher, moved for the dismissal of the said petition. However, the

court in its September 29, 1995 Order denied petitioners motion to dismiss, and granted

respondents petition for the issuance of letters testamentary, to wit:

In view of all the foregoing, the motion to dismiss is DENIED. The petition for

the issuance of Letters Testamentary, being in order, is GRANTED.

Section 4, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court, provides when a will has been

proved and allowed, the court shall issue letters testamentary thereon to the

person named as executor therein, if he is competent, accepts the trust and gives a

bond as required by these rules. In the case at bar, petitioner Atty. Rogelio P.

Nogales of the R.P. Nogales Law Offices has been named executor under the

Holographic Will of Dr. Werner J. Nittscher. As prayed for, let Letters

Testamentary be issued to Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, the executor named in the

Will, without a bond.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but her motion was denied for lack of merit. OnMay 9,

1996, Atty. Nogales was issued letters testamentary and was sworn in as executor.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals alleging that respondents petition for the issuance of

letters testamentary should have been dismissed outright as the RTC had no jurisdiction over the

subject matter and that she was denied due process.

The appellate court dismissed the appeal, thus:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED and

the assailed Order is AFFIRMED in toto. The court a quo is ordered to proceed

with dispatch in the proceedings below.

Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the aforequoted decision was denied for lack of

merit. Hence, the present petition anchored on the following grounds:

I. BOTH THE CA AND THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT

DISMISSING OUTRIGHT THE PETITION FOR LETTERS

TESTAMENTARY FILED BY ATTY. NOGALES WHEN,

OBVIOUSLY, IT WAS FILED IN VIOLATION OF REVISED

CIRCULAR NO. 28-91 AND ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 04-

94 OF THIS HONORABLE COURT.

II. THE CA ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE LOWER

COURT [HAS] NO JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER

OF THE PRESENT SUIT.

III. THE CA ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT SUMMONS WERE

PROPERLY ISSUED TO THE PARTIES AND ALL PERSONS

INTERESTED IN THE PROBATE OF THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL OF

DR. NITTSCHER.

IV. THE CA ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE PETITIONER WAS

NOT DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW BY THE LOWER

COURT.

Petitioner contends that respondents petition for the issuance of letters testamentary

lacked a certification against forum-shopping. She adds that the RTC has no jurisdiction

over the subject matter of this case because Dr. Nittscher was allegedly not a resident of

the Philippines; neither did he leave real properties in the country.Petitioner claims that

the properties listed for disposition in her husbands will actually belong to her. She insists

she was denied due process of law because she did not receive by personal service the

notices of the proceedings.

Respondent Atty. Nogales, however, counters that Dr. Nittscher did reside and own real

properties in Las Pias, Metro Manila. He stresses that petitioner was duly notified of the probate

proceedings. Respondent points out that petitioner even appeared in court to oppose the petition

for the issuance of letters testamentary and that she also filed a motion to dismiss the said

petition. Respondent maintains that the petition for the issuance of letters testamentary need not

contain a certification against forum-shopping as it is merely a continuation of the original

proceeding for the probate of the will.

We resolve to deny the petition.

As to the first issue, Revised Circular No. 28-91[8]

and Administrative Circular No. 04-94[9]

of

the Court require a certification against forum-shopping for all initiatory pleadings filed in

court. However, in this case, the petition for the issuance of letters testamentary is not an

initiatory pleading, but a mere continuation of the original petition for the probate of Dr.

Nittschers will. Hence, respondents failure to include a certification against forum-shopping in

his petition for the issuance of letters testamentary is not a ground for outright dismissal of the

said petition.

Anent the second issue, Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an

inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an

alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his

estate settled, in the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) in

the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an

inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial

Court) of any province in which he had estate.

In this case, the RTC and the Court of Appeals are one in their finding that Dr. Nittscher

was a resident of Las Pias, Metro Manila at the time of his death. Such factual finding,

which we find supported by evidence on record, should no longer be disturbed. Time and

again we have said that reviews on certiorari are limited to errors of law. Unless there is a

showing that the findings of the lower court are totally devoid of support or are glaringly

erroneous, this Court will not analyze or weigh evidence all over again.[10]

Hence, applying the aforequoted rule, Dr. Nittscher correctly filed in the RTC of Makati

City, which then covered Las Pias, Metro Manila, the petition for the probate of his will

and for the issuance of letters testamentary to respondent.

Regarding the third and fourth issues, we note that Dr. Nittscher asked for the allowance

of his own will. In this connection, Section 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court states:

SEC. 4. Heirs, devisees, legatees, and executors to be notified by mail or

personally.

If the testator asks for the allowance of his own will, notice shall be sent only to

his compulsory heirs.

In this case, records show that petitioner, with whom Dr. Nittscher had no child, and Dr.

Nittschers children from his previous marriage were all duly notified, by registered mail,

of the probate proceedings. Petitioner even appeared in court to oppose respondents

petition for the issuance of letters testamentary and she also filed a motion to dismiss the

said petition. She likewise filed a motion for reconsideration of the issuance of the letters

testamentary and of the denial of her motion to dismiss.We are convinced petitioner was

accorded every opportunity to defend her cause.Therefore, petitioners allegation that she

was denied due process in the probate proceedings is without basis.

As a final word, petitioner should realize that the allowance of her husbands will is

conclusive only as to its due execution.[11]

The authority of the probate court is limited to

ascertaining whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in

accordance with the formalities prescribed by law.[12]

Thus, petitioners claim of title to

the properties forming part of her husbands estate should be settled in an ordinary action

before the regular courts.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision dated July 31,

2003 and Resolution dated October 21, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55330,

which affirmed the Order dated September 29, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch

59, Makati City, in SP Proc. No. M-2330 are AFFIRMED.No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

CORTES VS CA

G.R. No. 117417 21 September 21 2000

BUENA, J.:

FACTS: Menandro A. Reselva, Milagros R. Cortes, and Florante Reselva are brothers and sister

and children—heirs of the late spouses Teodoro T. Reselva and Lucrecia Aguirre Reselva, who

died. Lucrecia Aguirre Reselva died ahead of Teodoro T. Re-selva. Teodoro executed a

holographic will which was probated, with Milagros R. Cortes, as the appointed Execu-trix. She

filed a motion before the probate court praying that Menandro A. Reselva, the occupant of the

property, be ordered to vacate which was granted. In the Appellate Court, RTC’s order was set

aside for having been issued beyond the latter’s limited jurisdiction as a probate court.

ISSUE:

HELD: Probate courts, or those in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate, cannot

adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be part of the estate and which are claimed

to belong to outside parties. Claims for title to, or right of possession of, personal or real

property, made by the heirs themselves, by title adverse to that of the deceased, or made by third

persons, cannot be entertained by the (probate) court.

Menandro A. Reselva, who refused to vacate the house and lot being eyed as part of the estate of

the late

Teodoro T. Reselva, cannot be considered an ―outside party‖ for he is one of the three

compulsory heirs involved in the settlement of Teodoro’s estate. By way of exception ―when the

parties are all heirs of the decedent, it is optional upon them to submit to the probate court the

question of title to property.‖ Here, the probate court is competent to decide the question of

ownership. More so, when the opposing parties belong to the poor stratum of society and a

separate action would be most expen­sive. Menandro’s claim is not at all adverse to the decedent

as he merely advances co-ownership with the latter.

When the controversy is whether the property in issue belongs to the conjugal partnership or

exclusively to the decedent, it is within the jurisdiction of the probate court, which necessarily

has to liquidate the conjugal partnership in order to determine the estate of the decedent. The

case at bar falls squarely under Rule 73, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court

Where estate upon dissolution of marriage.—When the marriage is dissolved by the death of the

husband or wife, the community property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and

the debts thereof paid, in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. If both

spouses have died, the conjugal partnership shall be liqui-dated in the testate or intestate

proceedings of either.‖

This case before us should be returned to the probate court for the liquidation of the conjugal

partnership prior to the settlement of the estate of Teodoro.

NERI, ET AL. VS HEIRS OF UY

GR NO. 194366 10 OCTOBER 2012

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioners

Napoleon D. Neri (Napoleon), Alicia D. Neri-Mondejar (Alicia), Visminda D. Neri-Chambers

(Visminda), Rosa D. Neri-Millan (Rosa), Douglas D. Neri (Douglas), Eutropia D. Illut-Cockinos

(Eutropia), and Victoria D. Illut-Piala (Victoria) seek to reverse and set aside the April 27, 2010

Decision2 and October 18, 2010 Resolution

3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.

01031-MIN which annulled the October 25, 2004 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)

of Panabo City, Davao del Norte and instead, entered a new one dismissing petitioners’

complaint for annulment of sale, damages and attorney’s feesagainst herein respondents heirs of

spouses Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha Ibrahim Uy (heirs of Uy).

The Facts

During her lifetime, Anunciacion Neri (Anunciacion) had seven children, two (2) from her first

marriage with Gonzalo Illut (Gonzalo), namely: Eutropia and Victoria, and five (5) from her

second marriage with Enrique Neri (Enrique), namely: Napoleon, Alicia, Visminda, Douglas and

Rosa. Throughout the marriage of spouses Enrique and Anunciacion, they acquired several

homestead properties with a total area of 296,555 square meters located in Samal, Davao del

Norte, embraced by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) Nos. (P-7998) P-21285, (P-14608) P-

51536 and P-20551 (P-8348)

7issued on February 15, 1957, August 27, 1962 and July 7, 1967,

respectively.

On September 21, 1977, Anunciacion died intestate. Her husband, Enrique, in his personal

capacity and as natural guardian of his minor children Rosa and Douglas, together with

Napoleon, Alicia, and Vismindaexecuted an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with

Absolute Deed of Sale8 on July 7, 1979, adjudicating among themselves the said homestead

properties, and thereafter, conveying themto the late spouses Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha

Ibrahim Uy (spouses Uy)for a consideration of P 80,000.00.

On June 11, 1996, the children of Enrique filed a complaint for annulment of saleof the said

homestead properties against spouses Uy (later substituted by their heirs)before the RTC,

docketed as Civil Case No.96-28, assailing the validity of the sale for having been sold within

the prohibited period. Thecomplaint was later amended to include Eutropia and Victoriaas

additional plaintiffs for having been excluded and deprived of their legitimes as childrenof

Anunciacion from her first marriage.

In their amended answer with counterclaim, the heirs of Uy countered that the sale took place

beyond the 5-year prohibitory period from the issuance of the homestead patents. They also

denied knowledge of Eutropia and Victoria’s exclusionfrom the extrajudicial settlement and sale

of the subject properties, and interposed further the defenses of prescription and laches.

THE RTC RULING. On October 25, 2004, the RTC rendered a decision ordering, among

others, the annulment of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale.

It ruled that while the sale occurred beyond the 5-year prohibitory period, the sale is still void

because Eutropia and Victoria were deprived of their hereditary rights and that Enrique had no

judicial authority to sell the shares of his minor children, Rosa and Douglas.

Consequently, it rejected the defenses of laches and prescription raised by spouses Uy, who

claimed possession of the subject properties for 17 years, holding that co-ownership rights are

imprescriptible.

THE CA RULING. On appeal, the CAreversed and set aside the ruling of the RTC in its April

27, 2010 Decision and dismissed the complaint of the petitioners. It held that, while Eutropia and

Victoria had no knowledge of the extrajudicial settlement and sale of the subject properties and

as such, were not bound by it, the CA found it unconscionable to permit the annulment of the

sale considering spouses Uy’s possession thereof for 17 years, and thatEutropia and

Victoriabelatedlyfiled their actionin 1997, ormore than two years fromknowledge of their

exclusion as heirs in 1994 when their stepfather died. It, however, did not preclude the excluded

heirs from recovering their legitimes from their co-heirs.

Similarly, the CA declared the extrajudicial settlement and the subsequent saleas valid and

binding with respect to Enrique and hischildren, holding that as co-owners, they have the right to

dispose of their respective shares as they consider necessary or fit.While recognizing Rosa and

Douglas to be minors at that time, they were deemed to have ratified the sale whenthey failed to

question it upon reaching the age of majority.Italso found laches to have set in because of their

inaction for a long period of time.

ISSUES

I. WHEN IT UPHELDTHE VALIDITY OF THE "EXTRA JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF

THE ESTATE WITH ABSOLUTE DEED OF SALE" AS FAR AS THE SHARES OF

EUTROPIA AND VICTORIA WERE CONCERNED, THEREBY DEPRIVING THEM OF

THEIR INHERITANCE;

II. WHEN IT DID NOT NULLIFY OR ANNUL THE "EXTRA JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF

THE ESTATE WITH ABSOLUTE DEED OF SALE" WITH RESPECT TO THE SHARESOF

ROSA AND DOUGLAS, THEREBY DEPRIVING THEM OF THEIR INHERITANCE; and

III. WHEN IT FOUND THAT LACHES OR PRESCRIPTION HAS SET IN.

The Ruling of the Court

The petitionis meritorious.

It bears to stress that all the petitioners herein are indisputably legitimate children of

Anunciacion from her first and second marriages with Gonzalo and Enrique, respectively, and

consequently, are entitled to inherit from her in equal shares, pursuant to Articles 979 and 980 of

the Civil Code which read:

ART. 979. Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents and other ascendants,

without distinction as to sex or age, and even if they should come from different marriages.

ART. 980. The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their own right, dividing

the inheritance in equal shares.

As such, upon the death of Anunciacion on September 21, 1977, her children and Enrique

acquired their respective inheritances,9 entitling them to their pro indiviso shares in her whole

estate, as follows:

Enrique: 9/16 (1/2 of the conjugal assets + 1/16); Eutropia: 1/16;Victoria: 1/16; Napoleon:

1/16; Alicia: 1/16; Visminda: 1/16; Rosa: 1/16 and Douglas 1/16

Hence, in the execution of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale

in favor of spouses Uy, all the heirs of Anunciacionshould have participated. Considering that

Eutropia and Victoria were admittedly excluded and that then minors Rosa and Douglas were not

properly represented therein, the settlement was not valid and binding uponthem and

consequently, a total nullity.

Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs.

The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a newspaper of

general circulation in the manner provided in the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial

settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice

thereof. (Underscoring added)

The effect of excluding the heirs in the settlement of estate was further elucidated in Segura v.

Segura, thus:

It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not apply to the partition in question which was null and

void as far as the plaintiffs were concerned. The rule covers only valid partitions. The partition

in the present case was invalid because it excluded six of the nine heirs who were entitled to

equal shares in the partitioned property. Under the rule "no extrajudicial settlement shall be

binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof." As the

partition was a total nullity and did not affect the excluded heirs, it was not correct for the trial

court to hold that their right to challenge the partition had prescribed after two years from its

execution…

However, while the settlement of the estate is null and void, the subsequent sale of the subject

propertiesmade by Enrique and his children, Napoleon, Alicia and Visminda, in favor of the

respondents isvalid but only with respect to their proportionate shares therein.It cannot be denied

that these heirs have acquired their respective shares in the properties of Anunciacion from the

moment of her death11

and that, as owners thereof, they can very well sell their undivided share in

the estate.

With respect to Rosa and Douglas who were minors at the time of the execution of the settlement

and sale, their natural guardian and father, Enrique, represented them in the transaction.

However, on the basis of the laws prevailing at that time, Enrique was merely clothed with

powers of administration and bereft of any authority to dispose of their 2/16 shares in the estate

of their mother, Anunciacion.

Articles 320 and 326 of the Civil Code, the laws in force at the time of the execution of the

settlement and sale, provide:

ART. 320. The father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal administrator of the property

pertaining to the child under parental authority. If the property is worth more than two thousand

pesos, the father or mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of the Court of First

Instance.

ART. 326. When the property of the child is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or

mother shall be considered a guardian of the child’s property, subject to the duties and

obligations of guardians under the Rules of Court.

Corollarily, Section 7, Rule 93 of the Rules of Court also provides:

SEC. 7. Parents as Guardians. – When the property of the child under parental authority is

worth two thousand pesos or less, the father or the mother, without the necessity of court

appointment, shall be his legal guardian. When the property of the child is worth more than two

thousand pesos, the father or the mother shall be considered guardian of the child’s property,

with the duties and obligations of guardians under these Rules, and shall file the petition required

by Section 2 hereof. For good reasons, the court may, however, appoint another suitable persons.

Administration includes all acts for the preservation of the property and the receipt of fruits

according to the natural purpose of the thing. Any act of disposition or alienation, or any

reduction in the substance of the patrimony of child, exceeds the limits of administration.13

Thus,

a father or mother, as the natural guardian of the minor under parental authority, does not have

the power to dispose or encumber the property of the latter. Such power is granted by law only to

a judicial guardian of the ward’s property and even then only with courts’ prior approval secured

in accordance with the proceedings set forth by the Rules of Court.14

Consequently, the disputed sale entered into by Enrique in behalf of his minor children without

the proper judicial authority, unless ratified by them upon reaching the age of majority,15

is

unenforceable in accordance with Articles 1317 and 1403(1) of the Civil Code which provide:

ART. 1317. No one may contract in the name of another without being authorized by the latter or

unless he has by law a right to represent him.

A contract entered into in the name of another by one who has no authority or legal

representation, or who has acted beyond his powers, shall be unenforceable, unless it is ratified,

expressly or impliedly, by the person on whose behalf it has been executed, before it is revoked

by the other contracting party.

ART. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified:

(1) Those entered into the name of another person by one who has been given no authority or

legal representation, or who has acted beyond his powers;

Ratification means that one under no disability voluntarily adopts and gives sanction to some

unauthorized act or defective proceeding, which without his sanction would not be binding on

him. It is this voluntary choice, knowingly made, which amounts to a ratification of what was

theretofore unauthorized, and becomes the authorized act of the party so making the

ratification.16

Once ratified, expressly or impliedly such as when the person knowingly received

benefits from it, the contract is cleansed from all its defects from the moment it was

constituted,17

as it has a retroactive effect.

Records, however, show that Rosa had ratified the extrajudicial settlement of the estate with

absolute deed of sale. In Napoleon and Rosa’s Manifestation18

before the RTC dated July 11,

1997,they stated:

"Concerning the sale of our parcel of land executed by our father, Enrique Neri concurred in

and conformed to by us and our other two sisters and brother (the other plaintiffs), in favor of

Hadji Yusop Uy and his spouse Hadja Julpa Uy on July 7, 1979, we both confirmed that the

same was voluntary and freely made by all of us and therefore the sale was absolutely valid and

enforceable as far as we all plaintiffs in this case are concerned;"

In their June 30, 1997 Joint-Affidavit,19

Napoleon and Rosa also alleged:

"That we are surprised that our names are included in this case since we do not have any

intention to file a case against Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha Ibrahim Uy and their family and we

respect and acknowledge the validity of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute

Deed of Sale dated July 7, 1979;"

Clearly, the foregoing statements constitutedratification of the settlement of the estate and the

subsequent sale, thus, purging all the defects existing at the time of its execution and legitimizing

the conveyance of Rosa’s 1/16 share in the estate of Anunciacion to spouses Uy. The same,

however, is not true with respect to Douglas for lack of evidence showing ratification.

Considering, thus, that the extrajudicial settlement with sale is invalid and therefore, not binding

on Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas, only the shares ofEnrique, Napoleon, Alicia, Visminda and

Rosa in the homestead properties have effectivelybeen disposed in favor of spouses Uy. "A

person can only sell what he owns, or is authorized to sell and the buyer can as a consequence

acquire no more than what the sellercan legally transfer."20

On this score, Article 493 of the Civil

Codeis relevant, which provides:

Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining

thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person

in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the

mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to

him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.

Consequently, spouses Uy or their substituted heirs became pro indiviso co-owners of the

homestead properties with Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas, who retained title to their respective

1/16 shares. They were deemed to be holding the 3/16 shares of Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas

under an implied constructive trust for the latter’s benefit, conformably with Article 1456 of the

Civil Code which states:"if property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it

is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from

whom the property comes." As such, it is only fair, just and equitable that the amount paid for

their shares equivalent to P 5,000.0021

each or a total of P 15,000.00 be returned to spouses Uy

with legal interest.

On the issue of prescription, the Court agrees with petitioners that the present action has not

prescribed in so far as it seeks to annul the extrajudicial settlement of the estate. Contrary to the

ruling of the CA, the prescriptive period of 2 years provided in Section 1 Rule 74 of the Rules of

Court reckoned from the execution of the extrajudicial settlement finds no application to

petitioners Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas, who were deprived of their lawful participation in the

subject estate. Besides, an "action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract

does not prescribe" in accordance with Article 1410 of the Civil Code.

However, the action to recover property held in trust prescribes after 10 years from the time the

cause of action accrues,22

which is from the time of actual notice in case of unregistered

deed.23

In this case, Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas claimed to have knowledge of the

extrajudicial settlement with sale after the death of their father, Enrique, in 1994 which spouses

Uy failed to refute. Hence, the complaint filed in 1997 was well within the prescriptive period of

10 years.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The April 27, 2010 Decision and October

18, 2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new

judgment is entered:

1. Declaring the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Anunciacion

Neri NULL and VOID;

2. Declaring the Absolute Deed of Sale in favor of the late spouses Hadji Yusop Uy and

Julpha Ibrahim Uy as regards the 13/16 total shares of the late Enrique Neri, Napoleon

Neri, Alicia D. Neri-Mondejar, Visminda D. Neri-Chambers and Rosa D. Neri-

Millan VALID;

3. Declaring Eutropia D. Illut-Cockinos, Victoria D. Illut-Piala and Douglas D. Neri as

the LAWFUL OWNERSof the 3/16 portions of the subject homestead properties,

covered by Original Certificate of Title Nos. (P-7998) P-2128, (P-14608) P-5153 and P-

20551 (P-8348); and

4. Ordering the estate of the late Enrique Neri, as well as Napoleon Neri, Alicia D. Neri-

Mondejar, Visminda D. Neri-Chambers and Rosa D. Neri-Millan to return to the

respondents jointly and solidarily the amount paid corresponding to the 3/16 shares of

Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas in the total amount of P 15,000.00, with legal interest at

6% per annum computed from the time of payment until finality of this decision and 12%

per annum thereafter until fully paid. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

NERI, ET AL. VS HEIRS OF UY

GR NO. 194366 10 OCTOBER 2012

FACTS: Anunciacion Neri had seven children: first marriage with Gonzalo Illut, namely:

Eutropia and Victoria and second marriage with Enrique Neri, namely: Napoleon, Alicia,

Visminda, Douglas and Rosa.

Throughout the marriage of spouses Enrique and Anunciacion, they acquired several homestead properties located in Samal, Davao del Norte.

In 1977, Anunciacion died intestate. Enrique, in his personal capacity and as natural guardian of his minor children Rosa and Douglas, with Napoleon, Alicia, and Visminda executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale on 7/7/1979, adjudicating among themselves the said homestead properties and thereafter, conveying them to the late spouses Uy

for a consideration of P 80,000.00.

In June 1996, the children of Enrique filed a complaint for annulment of sale of the homestead properties against spouses Uy before the RTC, assailing the validity of the sale for having been sold within the prohibited period. The complaint was later amended to include Eutropia and Victoria additional plaintiffs for having been excluded and deprived of their legitimes as children of Anunciacion from her first marriage.

RTC RULING: Rendered the sale void because Eutropia and Victoria were deprived of their hereditary rights and that Enrique had no judicial authority to sell the shares of his minor children, Rosa and Douglas.

CA RULING: Reversed the RTC ruling and declared the extrajudicial settlement and sale valid. While recognizing Rosa and Douglas to be minors at that time, they were deemed to have ratified the sale when they failed to question it upon reaching the age of majority. It also found laches to have set in because of their inaction for a long period of time.

ISSUES: Whether the father or mother, as the natural guardian of the minor under parental authority, has the power to dispose or encumber the property of the minor?

RULING: All the petitioners are legitimate children of Anunciacion from her first and second

marriages and consequently, they are entitled to inherit from her in equal shares, pursuant to

Articles 979 and 980 of the Civil Code. In the execution of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the

Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale in favor of spouses Uy, all the heirs of Anunciacion should

have participated. Considering that Eutropia and Victoria were admittedly excluded and that then

minors Rosa and Douglas were not properly represented therein, the settlement was not valid and

binding upon them.

While the settlement of the estate is null and void, the subsequent sale of the properties made by Enrique and his children, Napoleon, Alicia and Visminda, in favor of the spouses is valid but only with respect to their proportionate shares.

With respect to Rosa and Douglas who were minors at the time of the execution of the

settlement and sale, their natural guardian and father, Enrique, represented them in the

transaction. However, on the basis of the laws prevailing at that time, Enrique was merely

clothed with powers of administration and bereft of any authority to dispose of their 2/16

shares in the estate of their mother.

Administration includes all acts for the preservation of the property and the receipt of fruits

according to the natural purpose of the thing. Any act of disposition or alienation, or any

reduction in the substance of the patrimony of child, exceeds the limits of administration.

Thus, A FATHER OR MOTHER, as the natural guardian of the minor under parental

authority, does not have the power to dispose or encumber the property of the latter. Such

power is granted by law only to a judicial guardian of the ward’s property and even then only

with courts’ prior approval secured in accordance with the proceedings set forth by theRules of

Court.

Consequently, the disputed sale entered into by Enrique in behalf of his minor children without the proper judicial authority, unless ratified by them upon reaching the age of majority, is unenforceable in accordance with Articles 1317 and 1403(1) of the Civil Code.

However, records show that Napoleon and Rosa had ratified the extrajudicial settlement of the estate with absolute deed of sale. In their Joint-Affidavit and Manifestation before the RTC, ―they both confirmed, respect and acknowledge the validity of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale in 1979.‖ The ratification thus purged all the defects existing at the time of its execution and legitimizing the conveyance of Rosa’s 1/16 share in the estate of Anunciacion to spouses Uy. The same, however, is not true with respect to Douglas for lack of evidence showing ratification.

HEIRS OF TEVES VS CA, HEIRS OF IT – IT

G.R. No. 109963. October 13, 1999]

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision[1]

of the Court of

Appeals which was promulgated on August 18, 1992 affirming the July 11, 1991 decision[2]

of

Branch 38 of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental in favor of defendants-appellees.

The facts, as culled from the pleadings of the parties herein and the decision of the lower

courts, are as follows:

Marcelina Cimafranca and Joaquin Teves had nine children, namely Teotimo, Felicia,

Pedro, Andres, Asuncion, Gorgonio, Cresenciano, Arcadia and Maria. Andres, however,

predeceased both his parents and died without issue. After Marcelina Cimafranca and Joaquin

Teves died, intestate and without debts, in 1943 and 1953, respectively, their children executed

extrajudicial settlements purporting to adjudicate unto themselves the ownership over two

parcels of land belonging to their deceased parents and to alienate their shares thereto in favor of

their sister Asuncion Teves. The validity of these settlements executed pursuant to section 1 of

Rule 74 of the Rules of Court is the primary issue in the present case.

On May 9, 1984, plaintiffs-appellants Ricardo and Arcadia Teves filed a complaint with the

Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental for the partition and reconveyance of two parcels of

land located in Dumaguete, designated as Lots 769-A and 6409, against the heirs of Asuncion

Teves. The complaint was subsequently amended to include Maria Teves and the heirs of

Teotimo, Felicia, Pedro, and Gorgonio Teves as plaintiffs and the spouses Lucresio Baylosis and

Pacita Nocete, and Cecilia Cimafranca-Gamos and Cecilia Flor Cimafranca as

defendants.[3]

Plaintiffs-appellants alleged that defendants-appellees, without any justifiable

reason, refused to partition the said parcels of land and to convey to plaintiffs their rightful

shares.[4]

Lot 769, covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 4682-A,[5]

is registered in the

names of Urbana Cimafranca, one-fourth (1/4) share, Marcelina Cimafranca, the wife of Joaquin

Teves, one-fourth (1/4) share, Domingo Villahermosa, one-eighth (1/8) share, Antero

Villahermosa, one-eighth (1/8) share, Cecilia Cimafranca, one-eighth (1/8) share and Julio

Cimafranca, one-eighth (1/8) share. The present controversy involves only Marcelina

Cimafrancas one-fourth (1/4) share in the land, designated as Lot 769-A.

On June 13, 1956, Teotimo, Felicia, Pedro, Asuncion, Gorgonio and Arcadia Teves

executed a document entitled "Settlement of Estate and Sale,"[6]

adjudicating unto themselves, in

equal shares, Lot 769-A and conveying their shares, interests and participations over the same in

favor of Asuncion Teves for the consideration of P425.00. A similar deed denominated

"Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale"[7]

was signed by Maria Teves on April 21, 1959. Under such

deed, Maria conveys her own share over Lot 769-A in favor of Asuncion Teves for the

consideration of P80.00. The two settlements were denounced by the plaintiffs as spurious. The

trial court summarized the claims of the plaintiffs, viz

Maria Teves Ochotorena herself, denied having executed this Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale

over her share or interest in Lot 769 claiming that her signature in said document is a

forgery. She disowns her signature declaring that as a married woman she always signs a

document in her husbands family name. Further, she declared that on the date she purportedly

signed said document in Dumaguete City before the notary public, she was in her home in

Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte.

On Exhibit "G" which is likewise offered as Exhibit "3" for the defendants, plaintiffs hold that

said document is spurious claiming that the signatures of Pedro Teves, Felicia Teves and

Gorgonio Teves are all forgeries. To support this allegation, Helen T. Osmena, daughter of

Felicia Teves and Erlinda Teves, daughter of Gorgonio Teves were presented as

witnesses. Being allegedly familiar with the style and character of the handwriting of their

parents these witnesses declared unequivocally that the signatures of their parents appearing on

the document are forgeries.

In sum, plaintiffs argue that these fraudulent documents which defendants rely in claiming

ownership to the disputed properties are all nullities and have no force in law and could not be

used as basis for any legal title. Consequently, in their view, they are entitled to the reliefs

demanded particularly, to their respective shares of the disputed properties.[8]

The other property in dispute is Lot 6409 which was originally covered by OCT No.

9091[9]

and was registered in the name of Joaquin Teves and his two sisters, Matea and Candida

Teves. However, Matea and Candida died without issue, causing the entire property to pass to

Joaquin Teves. On December 14, 1971, Lot 6409 was adjudicated and divided in equal shares in

a "Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement & Sale"[10]

executed by Joaquin Teves children - Asuncion,

Teotimo, Felisia, Gorgonio, Arcadia and Maria Teves. In the same deed, the shares of these same

heirs in Lot 6409 were sold to Asuncion Teves for P100.00. Asuncion Teves took possession of

the land and acquired title[11]

over the same on March 22, 1972. After her death in 1981, her

children, defendants-appellees It-it herein, extrajudicially settled Asuncion Teves property,

adjudicating unto themselves Lot 6409.[12]

On July 20, 1983 a new transfer certificate of

title[13]

was issued in the names of Asuncion Teves children, namely Elisa, Susana, Norberto,

Isaac, Jaime, Felicitas, Teresita, Corazon, and Danilo, all surnamed It-it. On July 2, 1984, the It-

its sold Lot 6409 to defendants-appellees Lucrecio Baylosis, Sr. and Pacita Nocete-Baylosis for

P20,000.00[14]

and a transfer certificate of title[15]

was issued in the name of the Baylosis couple.

Plaintiffs-appellants claim that the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement & Sale covering Lot

6409 is also spurious. Their arguments were discussed in the trial courts decision as follows -

Presented as Exhibit "D" and "1" for both the plaintiffs and defendants respectively, is a

document denominated as "Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale" executed on December 4, 1971 by

and among the heirs of Joaquin Teves and Marcelina Cimafranca. This document which gave

birth to TCT No. 5761 over Lot 6409 registered in the name of Asuncion Teves It-it is

questioned by the plaintiffs as spurious for the following reasons:

1. Erasure of the word "quitclaim" is superimposed with the word "sale" in handwriting.

2. The consideration of "One peso" stated in the document is intercalated with the word

"hundred" in handwriting.

3. The signature of Maria Teves Ochotorena, Pedro Teves and Felicia Teves are

forgeries.

4. The thumbmark imposed on the name of Gorgonio Teves does not actually belong to

Gorgonio Teves who was an educated man and skilled in writing according to his

daughter.

Aside from these defects which would make said document null and void, Arcadia Teves who is

one of the living sisters of the mother of the principal defendants although confirming the

authenticity of her signature averred that in reality no consideration was ever given to her and

that her impression of the said document was that she was only giving her consent to sell her

share of the land.

Plaintiffs likewise contend that as regards the share of Ricardo Teves, son of Crescenciano Teves

who predeceased Joaquin and Marcelina, it was not at all affected in that extrajudicial settlement

and sale since neither Crescenciano Teves nor his son Ricardo Teves participated in its

execution.

Likewise, plaintiffs offered TCT No. 5761 for Lot 6409 registered in the name of Asuncion

Teves It-it as Exhibit "B" as proof that said property was later titled in trust for all the heirs of

Joaquin Teves and which was used later as basis in effecting a deed of sale in favor of co-

defendant Lucresio Baylosis. In this light, the plaintiffs argue that the sale of said property is a

nullity for it was not only attended with bad faith on the part of both the vendor and the vendee

but primarily the vendor had no right at all to part with said property which is legally owned by

others.[16]

In answer to plaintiffs-appellants charges of fraud, defendants-appellees maintained that the

assailed documents were executed with all the formalities required by law and are therefore

binding and legally effective as bases for acquiring ownership or legal title over the lots in

question. Furthermore, it is contended that plaintiffs-appellants have slept on their rights and

should now be deemed to have abandoned such rights.[17]

The trial court ruled in favor of defendants-appellees and rendered judgment dismissing the

complaint with costs against plaintiffs-appellants. As regards Lot 6409, the court declared that

the Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale executed by the heirs of Joaquin Teves and Marcelina

Cimafranca was duly executed with all the formalities required by law, thus, validly conveying

Lot 6409 in favor of Asuncion Teves. Moreover, it stated that, even granting the truth of the

imputed infirmities in the deed, the right of plaintiffs-appellants to bring an action for partition

and reconveyance was already barred by prescription. An action for the annulment of a partition

must be brought within four years from the discovery of the fraud, while an action for the

reconveyance of land based upon an implied or constructive trust prescribes after ten years from

the registration of the deed or from the issuance of the title. The complaint in this case was filed

on May 9, 1984, exactly 12 years, 1 month and 17 days after the issuance of the transfer

certificate of title in the name of Asuncion Teves on March 22, 1972. Thus, ownership over Lot

6409 rightfully belonged to defendants-appellees It-it.

Moreover, the trial court held that the extrajudicial settlements over both Lots 6409 and 769,

having been prepared and acknowledged before a notary public, are public documents, vested

with public interest, the sanctity of which deserves to be upheld unless overwhelmed by clear

and convincing evidence. The evidence presented by the plaintiffs to support their charges of

forgery was considered by the court insufficient to rebut the legal presumption of validity

accorded to such documents.[18]

The Court of Appeals upheld the trial courts decision affirming the validity of the

extrajudicial statements, with a slight modification. It disposed of the case, thus -

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the

modification in that herein defendant-appellees are hereby ORDERED to partition Lot 769-A

and deliver to plaintiff-appellant Ricardo Teves one-eight (sic) (1/8) portion thereof

corresponding to the share of his deceased father Cresenciano Teves. No costs.

The appellate court said that plaintiffs-appellants biased and interested testimonial evidence

consisting of mere denials of their signatures in the disputed instruments is insufficient to prove

the alleged forgery and to overcome the evidentiary force of the notarial documents. It also ruled

that the plaintiffs-appellants claim over Lot 6409 was barred by prescription after the lapse of ten

years from the issuance of title in favor of Asuncion Teves, while their claim over Lot 769-A is

barred by laches since more than 25 years has intervened between the sale to Asuncion Teves

and the filing of the present case in 1984.

The appellate court noted that the conveyance of Lot 769-A in favor of Asuncion Teves did

not affect the share of Cresenciano Teves as he was not a signatory to the settlements. It also

found that Ricardo Teves, Cresencianos heir, is in possession of a portion of Lot 769-A and that

defendants-appellees do no not claim ownership over such portion. Thus, the defendants-

appellees It-it were ordered to partition and convey to Ricardo Teves his one-eighth share over

Lot 769-A.

As regards the extrajudicial settlement involving Lot 6409, although it was found by the

appellate court that Cresenciano Teves was also not a signatory thereto, it held that it could not

order the reconveyance of the latters share in such land in favor of his heir Ricardo Teves

because Cresenciano had predeceased Joaqin Teves. Moreover, Ricardo Teves, by a deed simply

denominated as Agreement executed on September 13, 1955 wherein he was represented by his

mother, authorized the heirs of Joaquin Teves to sell his share in Lot 6409.[19]

Plaintiffs-appellants assailed the appellate courts decision upon the following grounds -

I. IN CONSIDERING RICARDO TEVES AS BOUND BY THE SIGNATURE OF HIS MOTHER,

INSPITE OF DEATH OF CRESENCIANO TEVES IN 1944; AND UNDER THE OLD CIVIL CODE

THE SPOUSE CANNOT INHERIT EXCEPT THE USUFRUCT;

II. IN UPHOLDING SWEEPINGLY THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY OF NOTARIZED

DEED, DESPITE CLEAR, CONVINCING, SUBSTANTIAL AND SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THAT

MARIA OCHOTORENA WAS IN MINDANAO; THE NOTARY PULIC DID NOT KNOW MARIA

OCHOTORENA AND THE SIGNATURES OF THE OTHER HEIRS IN THE QUESTIONED

DOCUMENT ARE BELIED BY COMPARISON WITH THE GENUINE SIGNATURE IN EXH. E;

III. IN VALIDATING THE ONE PESO CONSIDERATION, INSPITE OF NO OTHER VALUABLE

CONSIDERATION, THE SUPERIMPOSED P100 WAS UNILATERALLY INSERTED, SHOWING

FICTITIOUS AND SIMULATED CONSIDERATION; AND

IV. PRESCRIPTION DOES NOT START FROM A VOID CONTRACT.[20]

We affirm that the extrajudicial settlements executed by the heirs of Joaquin Teves and

Marcelina Cimafranca are legally valid and binding.

The extrajudicial settlement of a decedents estate is authorized by section 1 of Rule 74 of the

Rules of Court, which provides in pertinent part that -

If the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented

by their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without

securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of

a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds,

Thus, for a partition pursuant to section 1 of Rule 74 to be valid, the following conditions must

concur: (1) the decedent left no will; (2) the decedent left no debts, or if there were debts left, all

had been paid; (3) the heirs are all of age, or if they are minors, the latter are represented by their

judicial guardian or legal representatives; (4) the partition was made by means of a public

instrument or affidavit duly filed with the Register of Deeds.[21]

We uphold, finding no cogent reason to reverse, the trial and appellate courts factual finding

that the evidence presented by plaintiffs-appellants is insufficient to overcome the evidentiary

value of the extrajudicial settlements. The deeds are public documents and it has been held by

this Court that a public document executed with all the legal formalities is entitled to a

presumption of truth as to the recitals contained therein.[22]

In order to overthrow a certificate of

a notary public to the effect that the grantor executed a certain document and acknowledged the

fact of its execution before him, mere preponderance of evidence will not suffice. Rather, the

evidence must be so clear, strong and convincing as to exclude all reasonable dispute as to the

falsity of the certificate. When the evidence is conflicting, the certificate will be upheld.[23]

The

appellate courts ruling that the evidence presented by plaintiffs-appellants does not constitute the

clear, strong, and convincing evidence necessary to overcome the positive value of the

extrajudicial settlements executed by the parties, all of which are public documents, being

essentially a finding of fact, is entitled to great respect by the appellate court and should not be

disturbed on appeal.[24]

It is noted that the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement & Sale covering Lot 6409 purports to

divide Joaquin Teves estate among only six of his heirs, namely Asuncion, Teotimo, Felisia,

Gorgonio, Arcadia and Maria Teves.[25]

It does not mention nor bear the signatures of either

Pedro or Cresenciano Teves although they are both intestate heirs of Joaquin Teves and as such,

are entitled to a proportionate share of the decedents estate. Contrary to the ruling of the

appellate court, the fact that Cresenciano predeceased Joaquin Teves does not mean that he or,

more accurately, his heirs, lose the right to share in the partition of the property for this is a

proper case for representation, wherein the representative is raised to the place and degree of the

person represented and acquires the rights which the latter would have if he were living.[26]

However, notwithstanding their non-inclusion in the settlement, the action which Pedro and

Cresenciano might have brought for the reconveyance of their shares in the property has already

prescribed.An action for reconveyance based upon an implied trust pursuant to article 1456 of

the Civil Code prescribes in ten years from the registration of the deed or from the issuance of

the title.[27]

Asuncion Teves acquired title over Lot 6409 in 1972, but the present case was only

filed by plaintiffs-appellants in 1984, which is more than 10 years from the issuance of title.[28]

The division of Lot 769-A, on the other hand, was embodied in two deeds. The first

extrajudicial settlement was entered into by Teotimo, Felicia, Pedro, Gorgonio, Arcadia and

Asuncion Teves in 1956[29]

, while the second deed was executed in 1959 by Maria

Teves.[30]

Cresenciano was not a signatory to either settlement. However, in contrast to the

extrajudicial settlement covering Lot 6409, the two extrajudicial settlements involving Lot 769-A

do not purport to exclude Cresenciano from his participation in Lot 769-A or to cede his share

therein in favor of Asuncion. The settlement clearly adjudicated the property in equal shares in

favor of the eight heirs of Marcelina Cimafranca. Moreover, the deeds were intended to convey

to Asuncion Teves only the shares of those heirs who affixed their signatures in the two

documents. The pertinent portions of the extrajudicial settlement executed in 1956, of which

substantively identical provisions are included in the 1959 deed, provide -

5. That by virtue of the right of succession the eight heirs above mentioned inherit and adjudicate

unto themselves in equal shares Lot No. 769-A and our title thereto is evidenced by the O.C. of

Title No. 4682-A of the Land Records of Negros Oriental.

THAT FOR AND IN CONSIDERATION of the sum of FOUR HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE

(P425.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency which we have received from ASUNCION TEVES; WE,

Teotimo, Felicia, Pedro, Gorgonio and Arcadia, all surnamed Teves, do hereby sell, transfer and

convey unto Asuncion Teves, married to Isaac Itit, Filipino, of legal age and resident of and with

postal address in the City of Dumaguete, all our shares, interests and participations over Lot 769-

A of the subdivision plan, Psd, being a portion of Lot No. 769 of the Cadastral Survey of

Dumaguete, her heirs, successors and assigns, together with all the improvements thereon.

It has even been admitted by both parties that Ricardo Teves is in possession of an undetermined

portion of Lot 769-A and defendants-appellees It-it do not claim ownership over his share in the

land.[31]

Thus, contrary to the appellate courts ruling, there is no basis for an action for

reconveyance of Ricardo Teves share since, in the first place, there has been no

conveyance. Ricardo Teves is entitled to the ownership and possession of one-eighth of Lot 769-

A.

Neither does Ricardo Teves have a right to demand partition of Lot 769-A because the two

extrajudicial settlements have already effectively partitioned such property. Every act which is

intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a

partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other

transaction.[32]

The extrajudicial settlements executed in 1956 and 1959 adjudicated Lot 769-A in

equal shares unto the eight heirs of Marcelina Cimafranca. Such a partition, which was legally

made, confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to

him.[33]

Although Cresenciano, Ricardos predecessor-in-interest, was not a signatory to the

extrajudicial settlements, the partition of Lot 769-A among the heirs was made in accordance

with their intestate shares under the law.[34]

With regards to the requisite of registration of extrajudicial settlements, it is noted that the

extrajudicial settlements covering Lot 769-A were never registered. However, in the case of Vda.

de Reyes vs. CA,[35]

the Court, interpreting section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, upheld the

validity of an oral partition of the decedents estate and declared that the non-registration of an

extrajudicial settlement does not affect its intrinsic validity. It was held in this case that

[t]he requirement that a partition be put in a public document and registered has for its purpose

the protection of creditors and at the same time the protection of the heirs themselves against

tardy claims. The object of registration is to serve as constructive notice to others. It follows then

that the intrinsic validity of partition not executed with the prescribed formalities does not come

into play when there are no creditors or the rights of creditors are not affected. Where no such

rights are involved, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into an agreement for

distribution in a manner and upon a plan different from those provided by law.

Thus, despite its non-registration, the extrajudicial settlements involving Lot 769-A are legally

effective and binding among the heirs of Marcelina Cimafranca since their mother had no

creditors at the time of her death.

Except for the portion of Lot 769-A occupied by Ricardo Teves, both parcels of land have

been and continue to be in the possession of Asuncion Teves and her successors-in-

interest.[36]

Despite this, no explanation was offered by plaintiffs-appellants as to why they

instituted the present action questioning the extrajudicial settlements only in 1984, which is more

than 25 years after the assailed conveyance of Lot 769-A and more than 10 years after the

issuance of a transfer certificate of title over Lot 6409, both in favor of Asuncion Teves. Such

tardiness indubitably constitutes laches, which is the negligence or omission to assert a right

within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has

abandoned it or declined to assert it.[37]

Thus, even assuming that plaintiffs-appellants had a

defensible cause of action, they are barred from pursuing the same by reason of their long and

inexcusable inaction.

An extrajudicial settlement is a contract and it is a well-entrenched doctrine that the law

does not relieve a party from the effects of a contract, entered into with all the required

formalities and with full awareness of what he was doing, simply because the contract turned out

to be a foolish or unwise investment.[38]

Therefore, although plaintiffs-appellants may regret

having alienated their hereditary shares in favor of their sister Asuncion, they must now be

considered bound by their own contractual acts. WHEREFORE, the August 18, 1992 decision

of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. No pronouncements as to costs. SO ORDERED.

TAN VS. BENOLIRAO

GR NO. 153820 16 OCTOBER 2009

FACTS: Spouses Lamberto and Erlinda Benolirao and the Spouses Reynaldo and Norma

Taningco were the co-owners of a parcel of land located in Tagaytay City. On October 6, 1992,

the co-owners executed a Deed of Conditional Sale over the property in favor of Tan for the

price of P1,378,000.00. The deed stated:

A. An initial down-payment of TWO HUNDRED (P200,000.00) THOUSAND PESOS, upon

signing of the contract; then the remaining balance of ONE MILLION ONE HUNDRED

SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND (P1,178,000.00) PESOS, shall be payable within a period of

one hundred fifty (150) days from date hereof without interest;

B. That for any reason, BUYER fails to pay the remaining balance within above mentioned period,

the BUYER shall have a grace period of sixty (60) days within which to make the payment,

provided that there shall be an interest of 15% per annum on the balance amount due from the

SELLERS;

C. That should in case (sic) the BUYER fails to comply with the terms and conditions within the

above stated grace period, then the SELLERS shall have the right to forfeit the down payment,

and to rescind this conditional sale without need of judicial action;

D. That in case, BUYER have complied with the terms and conditions of this contract, then the

SELLERS shall execute and deliver to the BUYER the appropriate Deed of Absolute Sale;

Tan issued and delivered to the co-owners/vendors check for P200,000 as down payment for the

property, respective receipt issued by vendors.

On November 6, 1992, Lamberto Benolirao died intestate. The heirs of the deceased executed an

extrajudicial settlement of Lamberto’s estate on January 20, 1993. A new certificate of title over

the property was issued on March 26, 1993 in the names of the Spouses Reynaldo and Norma

Taningco and Erlinda Benolirao and her children.

As stated in the Deed of Conditional Sale, Tan had until March 15, 1993 to pay the balance of

the purchase price. This period was extended by two months as agreed by the parties, Tan had

until May 15, 1993 to pay the balance. Tan failed to pay and another extension was granted by

the vendors. Tan still failed to pay the remaining balance due on May 21, 1993. The vendors

demanded payment of the balance of the purchase price within five (5) days from notice;

otherwise, they would declare the rescission of the conditional sale and the forfeiture of his down

payment based on the terms of the contract.

Tan refused to comply with the vendors’ demand and instead wrote them a letter dated May 28,

1993 claiming that the annotation on the title constituted an encumbrance on the property that

would prevent the vendors from delivering a clean title to him. Thus, he alleged that he could no

longer be required to pay the balance of the purchase price and demanded the return of his down

payment.

The vendors refused to refund the down payment, Tan, through counsel, sent another demand

letter to the vendors on June 18, 1993. The vendors still refused to heed Tan’s demand,

prompting Tan to file on

June 19, 1993 a complaint with the RTC for specific performance against the vendors. Tan

alleged that there was a novation of the Deed of Conditional Sale done without his consent since

the annotation on the title created an encumbrance over the property. Tan prayed for the refund

of the down payment and the rescission of the contract.

On August 9, 1993, Tan amended his Complaint, contending that if the respondents insist on

forfeiting the down payment, he would be willing to pay the balance of the purchase price

provided there is reformation of the Deed of Conditional Sale. In the meantime, Tan caused the

annotation on the title of a notice of lis pendens.

On August 21, 1993, the respondents the property to Hector de Guzman (de Guzman) for

P689,000.

The respondents moved for the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens on the ground that it was

inappropriate since the case that Tan filed was a personal action which did not involve either title

to, or possession of, real property. The RTC issued an order dated October 22, 1993 granting

the respondents’ motion to cancel the lis pendens annotation on the title.

Meanwhile, based on the Deed of Absolute Sale in his favor, de Guzman registered the property

and TCT No. 28104 was issued in his name. Tan then filed a motion to carry over the lis

pendens annotation to TCT No. 28104 registered in de Guzman’s name, but the RTC

denied the motion.

On September 8, 1995, after due proceedings, the RTC rendered judgment ruling that the

respondents’ forfeiture of Tan’s down payment was proper in accordance with the terms

and conditions of the contract between the parties.The RTC ordered Tan to pay the

respondents the amount of P30,000.00, plus P1,000.00 per court appearance, as attorney’s

fees, and to pay the cost of suit.

On appeal, the CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the ruling of the trial court in toto.

Hence, the petition.

ISSUE:Whether or not the contract between the parties is a contract of sale or a contract of sale.

RULING: The petition is granted.

The contract between the parties was merely a contract to sell where the vendors retained

title and ownership to the property until Tan had fully paid the purchase price. Since Tan

had no claim of ownership or title to the property yet, he obviously had no right to ask for

the annotation of a lis pendens notice on the title of the property.

A contract is what the law defines it to be, taking into consideration its essential elements, and

not what the contracting parties call it as stated by Article 1485 of the Civil Code

The very essence of a contract of sale is the transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or

promised.

In contrast, a contract to sell is defined as a bilateral contract whereby the prospective seller,

while expressly reserving the ownership of the property despite delivery thereof to the

prospective buyer, binds himself to sell the property exclusively to the prospective buyer upon

fulfilment of the condition agreed, i.e., full payment of the purchase price. A contract to sell may

not even be considered as a conditional contract of sale where the seller may likewise reserve

title to the property subject of the sale until the fulfilment of a suspensive condition, because in a

conditional contract of sale, the first element of consent is present, although it is conditioned

upon the happening of a contingent event which may or may not occur.

Jurisprudence has established that where the seller promises to execute a deed of absolute sale

upon the completion by the buyer of the payment of the price, the contract is only a contract to

sell. Thus, while the contract is denominated as a Deed of Conditional Sale, the presence of the

above-quoted provision identifies the contract as being a mere contract to sell.

Contract to sell is not rescinded but terminated. What then happens to the contract?

We have held in numerous cases that the remedy of rescission under Article 1191 cannot apply

to mere contracts to sell. We explained the reason for this in Santos v. Court of Appeals,19

where

we said:

[I]n a contract to sell, title remains with the vendor and does not pass on to the vendee

until the purchase price is paid in full. Thus, in a contract to sell, the payment of the

purchase price is a positive suspensive condition. Failure to pay the price agreed upon

is not a mere breach, casual or serious, but a situation that prevents the obligation

of the vendor to convey title from acquiring an obligatory force. This is entirely

different from the situation in a contract of sale, where non-payment of the price is a

negative resolutory condition. The effects in law are not identical. In a contract of sale,

the vendor has lost ownership of the thing sold and cannot recover it, unless the contract

of sale is rescinded and set aside. In a contract to sell, however, the vendor remains the

owner for as long as the vendee has not complied fully with the condition of paying the

purchase price. If the vendor should eject the vendee for failure to meet the condition

precedent, he is enforcing the contract and not rescinding it. x x x Article 1592 speaks of

non-payment of the purchase price as a resolutory condition. It does not apply to a

contract to sell. As to Article 1191, it is subordinated to the provisions of Article 1592

when applied to sales of immovable property. Neither provision is applicable [to a

contract to sell].

We, therefore, hold that the contract to sell was terminated when the vendors could no longer

legally compel Tan to pay the balance of the purchase price as a result of the legal encumbrance

which attached to the title of the property. Since Tan’s refusal to pay was due to the supervening

event of a legal encumbrance on the property and not through his own fault or negligence, we

find and so hold that the forfeiture of Tan’s down payment was clearly unwarranted.

REILLO et. al vs SAN JOSE

GR 166393 18 JUNE 2009

FACTS: Quiterio San Jose and Antonina Espiritu Santo are husband and wife. Both died

intestate in 1970 and 1976 respectively. They have five children, to wit: Virginia, Virgilio,

Galicano, Victoria, and Catalina.

In 1998, Virginia with the help of her husband (Zosimo Fernando, Sr.) and her children (Cristina

Reillo et al) executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate where they made it appear that

Virginia was the only heir of the spouses Quiterio and Antonina. They adjudicated among

themselves the estate and then later sold it to Ma. Teresa Piñon.

Later, the other siblings found out about what Virginia did and so in October 1999, they filed a

complaint in RTC-Rizal for the annulment of the deed of extrajudicial settlement as well as the

subsequent deed of sale.

In their answer, Reillo et al (children of the now deceased Virginia) admitted that their

grandparents

(Quiterio and Antonina) indeed had five children and that their mom isn’t the only heir.

However, they alleged that what their mom adjudicated to herself is her inheritance; that other

than the parcel of land their mom adjudicated to herself, their grandparents have 12 other parcels

of land which are under the possession of Galicano et al; that as such, they are filing a

―compulsory‖ counterclaim for the partition of the other 12 parcels of land.

Galicano et al then filed a motion for the court to render judgment on the pleadings. The trial

court granted the motion. The RTC ruled that the admission of Reillo et al that there are 4 other

heirs is proof that the extrajudicial settlement is void because the other heirs were excluded. The

RTC also ruled that

Reillo et al’s counterclaim is not compulsory but rather it is a permissive counterclaim. As such,

Reillo et al should have paid docket fees therefor but they failed to do so hence their

counterclaim is dismissed. The RTC then ordered the heirs to partition the estate according to the

laws of intestate succession. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the

RTC.

Reillo et al appealed the decision of the CA on the ground that the judgment on the pleading is

void; that it is the RTC’s fault why they failed to pay the docket fees for its failure to direct them;

and that the order for partition is void because it does not come with an order of publication

pursuant to Rule 74 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the order for partition issued by the trial court is void because there was

no corresponding order for publication pursuant to the provisions of Rule 74 of the Rules of

Court.

HELD: No. The applicable rule is Rule 69 of the Rules of Court. Since the extrajudicial

settlement is void, the property is reverted back to its previous state which is: that it is part of the

estate of Quiterio and Antonina. As such, the estate is deemed undivided among the heirs. And

every action to end an in division among heirs is deemed an action for partition. Therefore Rule

69 applies and under this rule, there is no need to publish the partition in a newspaper of general

circulation.

Anent the issue of the judgment on the pleadings, the same is valid because Reillo et al failed to

raise an issue when they already admitted that there are other heirs which were excluded in the

deed of extrajudicial settlement. Their allegation that the parcel of land adjudicated by their

mother is her inheritance is not tenable because the same was not indicated in the deed of

extrajudicial settlement. In fact, what was stated was that she was the sole heir.

Anent the issue of the counterclaim, Reillo et al’s counterclaim is permissive in nature and not a

compulsory one because their claim is not ―necessarily connected with the transaction or

occurrence constituting the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim‖. Their counterclaim

consists of a claim that there are 12 other parcels of land owned by Quiterio and Antonina. Such

allegation is already entirely different from the action brought by Galicano et al., hence it is

permissive and it can even be brought in a separate proceeding. As a permissive pleading, it

requires the payment of docket fees and the RTC cannot be faulted for not directing Reillo et al

to do so. The payment is incumbent upon Reillo et al and the obligation cannot be shifted to the

RTC.

ANTONIO BALTAZAR et al. VS. LORENZO LAXA,

GR NO. 174489, 11 APRIL 2012

FACTS: Pacencia was a 78 year old spinster when she made her last will and testament entitled

"Tauli Nang Bilin o Testamento Miss Pacencia Regala" on September 30,1981.

The will was executed in the house of retired Judge Limpin, witnessed by Dra. Maria Limpin,

Francisco Garcia and Faustino Mercado.

The will was read twice to the testatrix. Her signature was afrixed at the end of the said

document on page 3 and on the left margin of 1, 2 and 4 thereof.

The witnesses affixed their signatures below its attestation clause and on the left margins of page

1,2 and 4 thereof in the presence of Pacencia and of Judge Limpin who acted as notary public.

All properties were bequeathed to respondent Lorenzo Laxa, and his wife Corazon Laxa and

their children Luna and Katherine. Lorenzo is Pacencia's nephew whom she treated as her own

son.

Six days after the execution of the will, Pacencia left for the United States, there, she resided

with Lorenzo and his family until her death on January 4, 1996

On April 27,2000, Lorenzo filed a petition with the RTC of Guagua , Pampanga for the probate

of will of Pacencia and the issuance of the letters of administration in his favor

The RTC issued an Order allowing Lorenzo to present evidence on June 22,2000

Dra. Limpin testified as to the execution of the last will of Pacencia and attested to the present

condition of his father retired Judge Limpin who acted as the notary public

On June 23,2000, petitioner Antonio filed an oppositioj which was joined by the other petitioners

contending that Pacencia's will was null and void and because ownership of the properties had

not been transferred to Pacencia before her death and that Lorenzo is disqualifiedto be appointed,

he being a citizen and resident of USA.

On January 29, 2001, the RTC issued an order denying both of their requests. Proceedings on the

petition for the probate of will continued, and Dra Limpin was called again for cross-

examination

Also, Monico Mercado testified as to his father’s (Faustino) condition that his father can no

longer talk and express himself due to brain damage. On the part of Antonio, he presented Rosie.

Rosie testified that Pacencia is in the state of being "magulyan" or forgetful based on her

personal assessment

Antonio testified that the execution of will was attended with force

The RTC denied the petition giving weight to the testimony of Rosie that Pacencia is forgetful,

hence she is unfit to execute a will.

On appeal to the CA, it was reversed. The CA ruled that" the state of being magulyan or

forgetful does not make a person mentally unsound so as to render Pacencia unfit for executing a

will.

ISSUES:

1) Whether or not the will complied with the requirements of law

2) Whether or not the will complied with requirements set forth in Section 11, Rule 76 of the

Rules of Court

HELD:

1. YES. Under Section 1, Rule 75:" Allowance necessary. Conclusive as to the execution. No

will shall be passed either real or personal estate unless it is proved and allowed in the proper

court. Subject to the right of appeal, such allowance of the will shall be valid as to its execution.

" Due execution of the will or its extrinsic validity pertains to whether the testator, being of

sound mind freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. Upon

examination of the will, it shows that the formalities laid down by the law is faithfully complied

with. Furthermore, the burden to prove that Pacencia was of unsound mind at the time of the

execution of the will lies on the shoulder of the petitioners. There was no substantial evidence

presented that will show that Pacencia was of unsound min at the time of the execution of the

will.

2. Yes. Section 11, Rule 76 states that " If the will is contested, all the subscribing witnesses and

the notary public in the case of the wills executed under the Civil Code of the Philippines, if

present in the Philippines and not insane, must be produced and examined, and the death,

absence, or insanity of any of them must be satisfactorily shown to the court. " Applying it to the

foregoing, the inability of Faustino and Judge Limpin to appear and testify before the court was

satisfactorily explained during the probate proceedings. Thus, the SC hold that, for all intents and

purposes, Lorenzo was able to satisfactorily account for the incapacity and failure of the said

subscribing witness and of the notary public to testify in court. It is an established rule, that a

testament, may not be disallowed just because the attesting witnesses declare against its due

execution; neither does it have to be necessarily allowed just because all the attesting witnesses

declare in favor of its legalization.

UY KIAO ENG vs. NIXON LEE

G.R.No. 176831 15 January 2010

FACTS: Respondent Nixon Lee filed a petition for mandamus with damages against his mother

Uy Kiao Eng, herein petitioner, before the RTC of Manila to compel petitioner to produce the

holographic will of his father so that probate proceedings for the allowance thereof could be

instituted. Respondent had already requested his mother to settle and liquidate the patriarch’s

estate and to deliver to the legal heirs their respective inheritance, but petitioner refused to do so

without any justifiable reason. Petitioner denied that she was in custody of the original

holographic will and that she knew of its whereabouts. The RTC heard the case. After the

presentation and formal offer of respondent’s evidence, petitioner demurred, contending that her

son failed to prove that she had in her custody the original holographic will. The RTC, at first,

denied the demurrer to evidence. However, it granted the same on petitioner’s motion for

reconsideration. Respondent’s motion for reconsideration of this latter order was denied. Hence,

the petition was dismissed. Aggrieved, respondent sought review from the appellate court. The

CA initially denied the appeal for lack of merit. Respondent moved for reconsideration. The

appellate court granted the motion, set aside its earlier ruling, issued the writ, and ordered the

production of the will and the payment of attorney’s fees. It ruled this time that respondent was

able to show by testimonial evidence that his mother had in her possession the holographic will.

Dissatisfied with this turn of events, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. The appellate

court denied this motion. Left with no other recourse, petitioner brought the matter before this

Court, contending in the main that the petition for mandamus is not the proper remedy and that

the testimonial evidence used by the appellate court as basis for its ruling is inadmissible.

ISSUE: Whether or not mandamus is the proper remedy of the respondent.

HELD: The Court cannot sustain the CA’s issuance of the writ.

Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of competent jurisdiction, in the name of

the state or the sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some

corporation or person requiring the performance of a particular duty therein specified, which

duty results from the official station of the party to whom the writ is directed or from operation

of law. This definition recognizes the public character of the remedy, and clearly excludes the

idea that it may be resorted to for the purpose of enforcing the performance of duties in which

the public has no interest. The writ is a proper recourse for citizens who seek to enforce a public

right and to compel the performance of a public duty, most especially when the public right

involved is mandated by the Constitution. As the quoted provision instructs, mandamus will lie if

the tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act

which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station.

The writ of mandamus, however, will not issue to compel an official to do anything which is not

his duty to do or which it is his duty not to do, or to give to the applicant anything to which he is

not entitled by law. Nor will mandamus issue to enforce a right which is in substantial dispute or

as to which a substantial doubt exists, although objection raising a mere technical question will

be disregarded if the right is clear and the case is meritorious. As a rule, mandamus will not lie in

the absence of any of the following grounds: [a] that the court, officer, board, or person against

whom the action is taken unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law

specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office, trust, or station; or [b] that such court, officer,

board, or person has unlawfully excluded petitioner/relator from the use and enjoyment of a right

or office to which he is entitled. On the part of the relator, it is essential to the issuance of a writ

of mandamus that he should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the

imperative duty of respondent to perform the act required.

Recognized further in this jurisdiction is the principle that mandamus cannot be used to enforce

contractual obligations. Generally, mandamus will not lie to enforce purely private contract

rights, and will not lie against an individual unless some obligation in the nature of a public or

quasi-public duty is imposed. The writ is not appropriate to enforce a private right against an

individual.] The writ of mandamus lies to enforce the execution of an act, when, otherwise,

justice would be obstructed; and, regularly, issues only in cases relating to the public and to the

government; hence, it is called a prerogative writ. To preserve its prerogative character,

mandamus is not used for the redress of private wrongs, but only in matters relating to the public.

Moreover, an important principle followed in the issuance of the writ is that there should be no

plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law other than the remedy of

mandamus being invoked. In other words, mandamus can be issued only in cases where the usual

modes of procedure and forms of remedy are powerless to afford relief. Although classified as a

legal remedy, mandamus is equitable in its nature and its issuance is generally controlled by

equitable principles. Indeed, the grant of the writ of mandamus lies in the sound discretion of the

court.

In the instant case, the Court, without unnecessarily ascertaining whether the obligation involved

here— the production of the original holographic will—is in the nature of a public or a private

duty, rules that the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by respondent Lee because there

lies another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Let it be noted that

respondent has a photocopy of the will and that he seeks the production of the original for

purposes of probate. The Rules of Court, however, does not prevent him from instituting probate

proceedings for the allowance of the will whether the same is in his possession or not.

There being a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the

production of the subject will, the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of. Suffice it to state

that respondent Lee lacks a cause of action in his petition. Thus, the Court grants the demurrer.

PALAGANAS VS PALAGANAS

G.R. No. 169144 26 JANUARY 2011

FACTS: This case is about the probate before Philippine court a will executed by Ruperta C.

Palaganas, a foreigner although it has not been probated in its place of execution.

Respondent filled with the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan a petition for the probate of Ruperta’ s will

and for his appointment as the special administrator of her estate. However, petitioners oppose

on the petition arguing that an unprobated will executed by an American citizen in the U.S.

cannot be probated for the first time in the Philippines.

ISSUE: Whether or not a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be probated in the Philippines

although it has not been previously probated and allowed in the country where it was executed.

HELD: Our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad although the

same have not as yet been probated and allowed in the countries of their execution. A foreign

will can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction. Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the

will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in accordance with the

formalities prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or according to the formalities

observed in his country.

In this connection, Section 1, Rule 73 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that if the

decedent is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the RTC of the province where he has an estate

may take cognizance of the settlement of such estate. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 76 further state

that the executor, devisee, or legatee named in the will, or any other person interested in the

estate, may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to

have the will allowed, whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.

Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a will must show, so far as known

to the petitioner: (a) the jurisdictional facts; (b) the names, ages, and residences of the heirs,

legatees, and devisees of the testator or decedent; (c) the probable value and character of the

property of the estate;

(d) the name of the person for whom letters are prayed; and (e) if the will has not been delivered

to the court, the name of the person having custody of it. Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact of

death of the decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the province where the probate

court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the estate he left in such province.7

The rules do not require proof that the foreign will has already been allowed and probated in the

country of its execution.

DY YIENG SEANGIO, et al. vs. REYES, et al.

G.R. NO. 140371-72 / 27 NOVEMBER 2006

FACTS: There was a petition for the probate of an alleged holographic will which was

denominated as ―Kasulatan sa pag-aalis ng mana.‖ The private respondents moved for the

dismissal of the probate proceedings primarily on the ground that the document purporting to be

the holographic will of Segundo did not contain any disposition of the estate of the deceased and

thus did not meet the definition of a will under Article 783 of the Civil Code. According to

private respondents, the will only showed an alleged act of disinheritance by the decedent of his

eldest son, Alfredo, and nothing else; that all other compulsory heirs were not named nor

instituted as heir, devisee or legatee, hence there was preterition which would result to intestacy.

Such being the case, private respondents maintained that while procedurally the court is called

upon to rule only on the extrinsic validity of the will, it is not barred from delving into the

intrinsic validity of the same, and ordering the dismissal of the petition for probate when on the

face of the will it is clear that it contains no testamentary disposition of the property of the

decedent.

Petitioners filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss contending that: (1) generally, the

authority of the probate court is limited only to a determination of the extrinsic validity of the

will; (2) private respondents question the intrinsic and not the extrinsic validity of the will; (3)

disinheritance constitutes a disposition of the estate of a decedent; and (4) the rule on preterition

did not apply because

Segundo’s will did not constitute a universal heir or heirs to the exclusion of one or more

compulsory heirs.

The RTC issued an order dismissing the petition for probate proceedings, hence, a petition for

certiorari was filed where petitioners argued as follows:

First, respondent judge did not comply with Sections 3 and 4 of the Rule 76 of the Rules of

Court which respectively mandate the court to: (a) fix the time and place for proving the will

when all concerned may appear to contest the allowance thereof, and cause notice of such time

and place to be published three weeks successively previous to the appointed time in a

newspaper of general circulation; and (b) cause the mailing of said notice to the heirs, legatee

and devisees of the testator Segundo;

Second, the holographic will does not contain any institution of an heir, but rather, as its

title clearly states, Kasulatan ng Pag-alis ng Mana, simply contains a disinheritance of a

compulsory heir. Thus, there is no preterition in the decedent’s will and the holographic will on

its face is not intrinsically void;

Third, the testator intended all his compulsory heirs, petitioners and private respondents

alike, with the sole exception of Alfredo, to inherit his estate. None of the compulsory heirs in the

direct line of Segundo were preterited in the holographic will since there was no institution of an

heir;

Fourth, as it clearly appears from the face of the holographic will that it is both

intrinsically and extrinsically valid, respondent judge was mandated to proceed with the hearing

of the testate case; and,

Lastly, the continuation of the proceedings in the intestate case will work injustice to

petitioners, and will render nugatory the disinheritance of Alfredo.

ISSUE: Whether the document executed by Segundo can be considered as a holographic will.

HELD: A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must be entirely

written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and

may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.

The document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance instrument,

conforms to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and

signed by the hand of the testator himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa (Article 783) can be

clearly deduced from the terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative

disposition of the latter’s property, the disinheritance of the son nonetheless, is an act of

disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of

the testator in favor of those who would succeed in the absence of the eldest son.

Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator, expressed in the

form and within the limits prescribed by law, must be recognized as the supreme law in

succession. All rules of construction are designed to ascertain and give effect to that intention. It

is only when the intention of the testator is contrary to law, morals, or public policy that it cannot

be given effect.

Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one who is not learned in the law should

be construed more liberally than the ones drawn by an expert, taking into account the

circumstances surrounding the execution of the instrument and the intention of the testator. In

this regard, the document, even if captioned as Kasulatan ng Pag-alis ng Mana, was intended by

the testator to be his last testamentary act and was executed by him in accordance with law in the

form of a holographic will. Unless the will is probated, the disinheritance cannot be given effect.

73