G.R. No. L-54919 May 30, 1984

POLLY CAYETANO, petitioner,

vs.

HON. TOMAS T. LEONIDAS, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of Branch XXXVIII,

Court of First Instance of Manila and NENITA CAMPOS PAGUIA, respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

On January 31, 1977, Adoracion C. Campos died, leaving her father, petitioner Hermogenes

Campos and her sisters, private respondent Nenita C. Paguia, Remedios C. Lopez and Marieta C.

Medina as the surviving heirs. As Hermogenes Campos was the only compulsory heir, he

executed an Affidavit of Adjudication under Rule 74, Section I of the Rules of Court whereby he

adjudicated unto himself the ownership of the entire estate of the deceased Adoracion Campos.

Eleven months after, on November 25, 1977, Nenita C. Paguia filed a petition for the reprobate

of a will of the deceased, Adoracion Campos, which was allegedly executed in the United States

and for her appointment as administratrix of the estate of the deceased testatrix.

In her petition, Nenita alleged that the testatrix was an American citizen at the time of her death

and was a permanent resident of 4633 Ditman Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.; that

the testatrix died in Manila on January 31, 1977 while temporarily residing with her sister at

2167 Leveriza, Malate, Manila; that during her lifetime, the testatrix made her last will and

testament on July 10, 1975, according to the laws of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., nominating Wilfredo

Barzaga of New Jersey as executor; that after the testatrix death, her last will and testament was

presented, probated, allowed, and registered with the Registry of Wins at the County of

Philadelphia, U.S.A., that Clement L. McLaughlin, the administrator who was appointed after

Dr. Barzaga had declined and waived his appointment as executor in favor of the former, is also

a resident of Philadelphia, U.S.A., and that therefore, there is an urgent need for the appointment

of an administratrix to administer and eventually distribute the properties of the estate located in

the Philippines.

On January 11, 1978, an opposition to the reprobate of the will was filed by herein petitioner

alleging among other things, that he has every reason to believe that the will in question is a

forgery; that the intrinsic provisions of the will are null and void; and that even if pertinent

American laws on intrinsic provisions are invoked, the same could not apply inasmuch as they

would work injustice and injury to him.

On December 1, 1978, however, the petitioner through his counsel, Atty. Franco Loyola, filed a

Motion to Dismiss Opposition (With Waiver of Rights or Interests) stating that he "has been able

to verify the veracity thereof (of the will) and now confirms the same to be truly the probated

will of his daughter Adoracion." Hence, an ex-partepresentation of evidence for the reprobate of

the questioned will was made.

On January 10, 1979, the respondent judge issued an order, to wit:

At the hearing, it has been satisfactorily established that Adoracion C. Campos, in

her lifetime, was a citizen of the United States of America with a permanent

residence at 4633 Ditman Street, Philadelphia, PA 19124, (Exhibit D) that when

alive, Adoracion C. Campos executed a Last Will and Testament in the county of

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A., according to the laws thereat (Exhibits E-3 to

E-3-b) that while in temporary sojourn in the Philippines, Adoracion C. Campos

died in the City of Manila (Exhibit C) leaving property both in the Philippines and

in the United States of America; that the Last Will and Testament of the late

Adoracion C. Campos was admitted and granted probate by the Orphan's Court

Division of the Court of Common Pleas, the probate court of the Commonwealth

of Pennsylvania, County of Philadelphia, U.S.A., and letters of administration

were issued in favor of Clement J. McLaughlin all in accordance with the laws of

the said foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills (Exhibits E to E-10);

and that the petitioner is not suffering from any disqualification which would

render her unfit as administratrix of the estate in the Philippines of the late

Adoracion C. Campos.

WHEREFORE, the Last Will and Testament of the late Adoracion C. Campos is

hereby admitted to and allowed probate in the Philippines, and Nenita Campos

Paguia is hereby appointed Administratrix of the estate of said decedent; let

Letters of Administration with the Will annexed issue in favor of said

Administratrix upon her filing of a bond in the amount of P5,000.00 conditioned

under the provisions of Section I, Rule 81 of the Rules of Court.

Another manifestation was filed by the petitioner on April 14, 1979, confirming the withdrawal

of his opposition, acknowledging the same to be his voluntary act and deed.

On May 25, 1979, Hermogenes Campos filed a petition for relief, praying that the order allowing

the will be set aside on the ground that the withdrawal of his opposition to the same was secured

through fraudulent means. According to him, the "Motion to Dismiss Opposition" was inserted

among the papers which he signed in connection with two Deeds of Conditional Sales which he

executed with the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP). He

also alleged that the lawyer who filed the withdrawal of the opposition was not his counsel-of-

record in the special proceedings case.

The petition for relief was set for hearing but the petitioner failed to appear. He made several

motions for postponement until the hearing was set on May 29, 1980.

On May 18, 1980, petitioner filed another motion entitled "Motion to Vacate and/or Set Aside

the Order of January 10, 1979, and/or dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. In this motion, the

notice of hearing provided:

Please include this motion in your calendar for hearing on May 29, 1980 at 8:30

in the morning for submission for reconsideration and resolution of the Honorable

Court. Until this Motion is resolved, may I also request for the future setting of

the case for hearing on the Oppositor's motion to set aside previously filed.

The hearing of May 29, 1980 was re-set by the court for June 19, 1980. When the case was

called for hearing on this date, the counsel for petitioner tried to argue his motion to vacate

instead of adducing evidence in support of the petition for relief. Thus, the respondent judge

issued an order dismissing the petition for relief for failure to present evidence in support thereof.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. In the same order,

respondent judge also denied the motion to vacate for lack of merit. Hence, this petition.

Meanwhile, on June 6,1982, petitioner Hermogenes Campos died and left a will, which,

incidentally has been questioned by the respondent, his children and forced heirs as, on its face,

patently null and void, and a fabrication, appointing Polly Cayetano as the executrix of his last

will and testament. Cayetano, therefore, filed a motion to substitute herself as petitioner in the

instant case which was granted by the court on September 13, 1982.

A motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the rights of the petitioner Hermogenes

Campos merged upon his death with the rights of the respondent and her sisters, only remaining

children and forced heirs was denied on September 12, 1983.

Petitioner Cayetano persists with the allegations that the respondent judge acted without or in

excess of his jurisdiction when:

1) He ruled the petitioner lost his standing in court deprived the Right to Notice

(sic) upon the filing of the Motion to Dismiss opposition with waiver of rights or

interests against the estate of deceased Adoracion C. Campos, thus, paving the

way for the hearing ex-parte of the petition for the probate of decedent will.

2) He ruled that petitioner can waive, renounce or repudiate (not made in a public

or authenticated instrument), or by way of a petition presented to the court but by

way of a motion presented prior to an order for the distribution of the estate-the

law especially providing that repudiation of an inheritance must be presented,

within 30 days after it has issued an order for the distribution of the estate in

accordance with the rules of Court.

3) He ruled that the right of a forced heir to his legitime can be divested by a

decree admitting a will to probate in which no provision is made for the forced

heir in complete disregard of Law of Succession

4) He denied petitioner's petition for Relief on the ground that no evidence was

adduced to support the Petition for Relief when no Notice nor hearing was set to

afford petitioner to prove the merit of his petition a denial of the due process and a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

5) He acquired no jurisdiction over the testate case, the fact that the Testator at the

time of death was a usual resident of Dasmarias, Cavite, consequently Cavite

Court of First Instance has exclusive jurisdiction over the case (De Borja vs. Tan,

G.R. No. L-7792, July 1955).

The first two issues raised by the petitioner are anchored on the allegation that the respondent

judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when he allowed the withdrawal of the petitioner's

opposition to the reprobate of the will.

We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge. No proof was adduced

to support petitioner's contention that the motion to withdraw was secured through fraudulent

means and that Atty. Franco Loyola was not his counsel of record. The records show that after

the firing of the contested motion, the petitioner at a later date, filed a manifestation wherein he

confirmed that the Motion to Dismiss Opposition was his voluntary act and deed. Moreover, at

the time the motion was filed, the petitioner's former counsel, Atty. Jose P. Lagrosa had long

withdrawn from the case and had been substituted by Atty. Franco Loyola who in turn filed the

motion. The present petitioner cannot, therefore, maintain that the old man's attorney of record

was Atty. Lagrosa at the time of filing the motion. Since the withdrawal was in order, the

respondent judge acted correctly in hearing the probate of the will ex-parte, there being no other

opposition to the same.

The third issue raised deals with the validity of the provisions of the will. As a general rule, the

probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due

execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the

requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally come

only after the court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. However, where

practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before

it is probated, the court should meet the issue. (Maninang vs. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478).

In the case at bar, the petitioner maintains that since the respondent judge allowed the reprobate

of Adoracion's will, Hermogenes C. Campos was divested of his legitime which was reserved by

the law for him.

This contention is without merit.

Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner and thus, the

respondent judge should have denied its reprobate outright, the private respondents have

sufficiently established that Adoracion was, at the time of her death, an American citizen

and a permanent resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A. Therefore, under Article

16 par. (2) and 1039 of the Civil Code which respectively provide:

the law which governs Adoracion Campo's will is the law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is

the national law of the decedent. Although the parties admit that the Pennsylvania law does

not provide for legitimes and that all the estate may be given away by the testatrix to a

complete stranger, the petitioner argues that such law should not apply because it would be

contrary to the sound and established public policy and would run counter to the specific

provisions of Philippine Law.

It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, as provided

for by Article 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the national law of the decedent must apply.

Finally, we find the contention of the petition as to the issue of jurisdiction utterly devoid of

merit. Under Rule 73, Section 1, of the Rules of Court, it is provided that:

SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien,

his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled,

in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resided at the time of his

death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of

any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the

settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion

of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the

place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be

contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the

original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.

Therefore, the settlement of the estate of Adoracion Campos was correctly filed with the Court of

First Instance of Manila where she had an estate since it was alleged and proven that Adoracion

at the time of her death was a citizen and permanent resident of Pennsylvania, United States of

America and not a "usual resident of Cavite" as alleged by the petitioner. Moreover, petitioner is

now estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the probate court in the petition for relief. It is

a settled rule that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief,

against his opponent and after failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same

jurisdiction. (See Saulog Transit, Inc. vs. Hon. Manuel Lazaro, et al., G. R. No. 63 284, April 4,

1984).

Lukban vs. Republic , 98 Phil 574

Lourdes G. Lukban, petitioner herein, contracted marriage with Francisco Chuidian on

December 10, 1933 at the Paco Catholic Church, Manila. On December 27, of the same year,

Francisco left Lourdes after a violent quarrel and since then he has not been heard f rom despite

diligent search made by her. She also inquired about him from his parents and friends but no one

was able to indicate his whereabouts. She has no knowledge if he is still alive, his last known

address being Calle Merced, Paco, Manila. She believes. that. he is already dead because he had

been absent for more than twenty years, and because she intends to marry again, she desires that

her civil status be defined in order that she may be relieved of any liability under the law.

We believe that the petition at bar comes within the purview of our decision in the case of

Nicolai Szartraw, 46 Off. Gaz., 1st Sup., 243, wherein it was held that a petition for judicial

declaration that petitioners husband is presumed to be dead cannot be entertained because it is

not authorized by law, and if such declaration cannot be made in a special proceeding similar to

the present, much less can the court determine the status of petitioner as a widow since this

matter must of necessity depend upon the fact of death of the husband. This the court can declare

upon proper evidence, but not to decree that he is merely presumed to be dead. (Nicolai

Szartraw, 46 Off. Gaz., 1st sup. 243).

The philosophy behind the ruling that such judicial pronouncement cannot be made in a

proceeding of this nature is well expressed in the case above-cited. Thus, we there said that A

judicial pronouncement to that effect, even if final and executory, would still be a prima facie

presumption only. It is still disputable. It is for that reason that it cannot be the subject of a

judicial pronouncement or declaration, if it is the only question or matter involved in a case, or

upon which a competent court has to pass * * *. It is, therefore, clear that a judicial declaration

that a person is presumptively dead, because he had been unheard from in seven years, being a

presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of finality or

become final.

Appellant claims that the remedy she is seeking for can be granted in the present proceedings

because in the case of Hagans vs. Wislizenus, 42 Phil., 880, it was declared that a special

proceeding is an application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a

particular fact; but, as already said, that remedy can be invoked if the purpose is to seek the

declaration of death of the husband, and not, as in the present case, to establish a presumption of

death. If it can be satisfactorily proven that the husband is dead, the court would not certainly

deny a declaration to that effect as has been intimated in the case of Nicolas Szartraw, supra.

Appellant also claims that the present petition can be entertained because article 349 of the

Revised Penal Code, in defining bigamy, provides that a person commits that crime if he

contracts a second marriage before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by

means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings and, it is claimed, the present petition

comes within the purview of this legal provision. The argument is untenable for the words

proper proceedings used in said article can only refer to those authorized by law such as those

which refer to the administration or settlement of the estate of a deceased person (Articles 390

and 391, new Civil Code). That such is the correct interpretation of the provision in question

finds support in the case of Jones vs. Hortiguela, 64 Phil., 179, wherein this Court made the

following comment:

For the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse

judicially declared an absentee. The declaration of absence made in accordance with the

provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable the taking of the necessary

precautions for the administration of the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil

marriage, however, the law only requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven

consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not know his

or her former spouse to be living, that such former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the

spouse present so believes at the time of the celebration of the marriage (section III, paragraph 2,

General Orders, No. 68)."

The decision appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement; as to costs.

Pars, C.J., Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B. L. and

Endencia, JJ., concur.

Baybayan vs. Aquino, 149 SCRA 186

This is a petition for certiorari to annul and set aside the Order issued by the respondent Judge on

4 December 1975, which dismissed, without prejudice, the petitioners' complaint filed in Civil

Case No. 231-R of the then Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, as well as the Order, dated 24

December 1975, which denied petitioners' motion for the reconsideration of said order.

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

On 19 January 1960, herein private respondents Norberto Padua, Paulina Padua, Felisa Padua,

Dionisia Orpiano, Laureano Orpiano, Leonardo Orpiano, Josefina Orpiano, Valentina Orpiano,

Servillano Delfin, Gertrudes Delfin, Pastora Delfin, Lorenzo Delfin, Fausta Delfin, Dionisio

Oria, Faustina Oria, Amado Oria, and Benjamin Oria, all claiming to be the nephews and nieces

of one Vicente Oria who died intestate sometime in 1945 in Balungao, Pangasinan, filed a

petition for the summary settlement of the decedent's estate, the value of which did not exceed

P6,000.00. The petition was filed in the then Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Tayug

Branch. The case was docketed therein as Special Proceeding No. T-300.1

After due publication and hearing, the probate court issued an order adjudicating the estate to the

heirs of the decedent, who were ordered to submit a project of partition.2 Sometime in 1971, the

case was transferred to the Rosales Branch of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan where it

was docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 24-R.

On 18 September 1974, the probate court confirmed the adjudication earlier made and ordered

Eulalia Evangelista to deliver the respective shares of her co-heirs; to make an accounting of the

produce thereof from 1960; and to deliver said produce to her co-heirs or pay its equivalent. A

writ of execution was subsequently issued pursuant thereto.3

A writ of possession was also issued sometime thereafter, and the private respondents were

placed in possession of their respective shares.4 However, when a representative of the

private respondents went to cultivate the portion adjudicated to said private respondents,

he was prevented by Jose Diaz and Cipriano Evangelista. In view thereof, the private

respondents filed a motion to cite said Jose Diaz and Cipriano Evangelista in contempt of court.5

As a consequence, herein petitioners Pedro Baybayan, Cipriano Evangelista, and the spouses

Bartolome and Consuelo Baybayan, claiming to be the registered owners of the lots involved,

filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Rosales Branch, docketed therein

as Civil Case No. 231-R, against the Deputy Sheriff and the herein private respondents, for the

quieting of their title, plus damages, and to restrain said defendants from enforcing the writ of

execution issued in Spec. Proc. No. 24-R.6

Meanwhile, at the hearing of the motion for contempt in Spec. Proc. No, 24-R, the question of

the identity of the lands subject of Spec. Proc. No. 24-R, was brought up, so that the probate

court ordered a relocation survey and commissioned a geodetic engineer to undertake said

survey. After the survey, the commissioner submitted to the Court a report stating, among others,

that the lands which were delivered by the Deputy Sheriff to the heirs of Vicente Oria, pursuant

to the writ of possession issued by the probate court, are registered in the names of herein

petitioners under TCT No. 50269 and TCT No. 50270 of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan.7

By reason thereof, the probate court, in an order dated 30 October 1975, dismissed the contempt

charge against Jose Diaz and Cipriano Evangelista. However, the same court ordered the

petitioners to amend their complaint filed in Civil Case No. 231-R since "it is necessary that

an amended complaint be filed by Pedro Baybayan in order to determine whether or not

the property in question is part of the property under Spec. Proc. No. 24-R, inasmuch as it

is now the property claimed by him which is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.

50269. "8

Pursuant thereto, the herein petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion in Civil Case No. 231-R, to

which was attached an amended complaint wherein some defendants were dropped.9 The

respondent Judge, however, found that the Amended Complaint did not comply with his

order of 30 October 1975 to exclude Lot E and dismissed the case, "without prejudice on

the part of the plaintiffs to file a proper complaint for the recovery of ownership or

possession of the property in controversy which is Lot B in the relocation plan and formerly

covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 23684, now under Transfer Certificate of Title No.

50269."10

The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the order,11 but the motion was denied on

24 December 1975.12 Thereupon, they filed with this Court a petition for certiorari for the

review of the orders of the lower court. The Court treated the petition as a special civil action f or

certiorari.13 Counsel for the petitioners, in this petition, contends that the respondent Judge had

no authority under the law, both substantive and procedural, to issue the questioned orders

because the order to amend the complaint was issued in, and in connection with Spec. Proc. No.

24-R where the herein petitioners are not even parties.

The contention, in our opinion, is not meritorious. While it may be true that the order to amend

the complaint filed in Civil Case No. 231-R was issued in Spec. Proc. No. 24-R, so that it cannot

ordinarily bind the herein petitioners who are not parties in said special proceedings, it appears,

however, that the petitioners voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the

probate court, when they filed an Omnibus Motion in Civil Case No. 231-R, wherein they

prayed for leave to amend their complaint in accordance with the order of the probate court of 30

October 1975. They cannot now be allowed belatedly to adopt an inconsistent posture by

attacking the jurisdiction of the respondent trial Judge to whom they submitted their cause

voluntarily.

We find, however, that the respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion, amounting

to lack of jurisdiction, in dismissing the complaint filed by the petitioners, for their alleged

failure to amend their complaint to exclude therefrom Lot E which the respondent Judge found,

in his order of 30 October 1975, issued in the probate court, to be owned by the petitioners

Cipriano Evangelista and Consuelo Baybayan. The findings of the respondent Judge as to the

ownership of Lot E after the hearing conducted in Spec. Proc. No. 24-R do not justify the order

to amend the complaint since the determination of the ownership of the said lot by the

respondent Judge presiding over a court exercising probate jurisdiction is not final or ultimate in

nature and is without prejudice to the right of an interested party to raise the question of

ownership in a proper action.15

It is a well-settled rule in this jurisdiction, sanctioned and reiterated in a long line of decisions,

that "when questions arise as to ownership of property alleged to be a part of the estate of a

deceased person, but claimed by some other person to be his property, not by virtue of any right

of inheritance from the deceased, but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate, such

questions cannot be determined in the courts of administrative proceedings. The Court of First

Instance, acting, as a probate court, has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such contentions, which

must be submitted to the Court of First Instance in the exercise of its general jurisdiction as a

court of first instance.'"16

Besides, the order to amend the complaint is vague and hazy and does not specify what the

amendments should be or how the complaint should be amended so that the petitioners should

not be f aulted if the amended complaint subsequently filed by them in Civil Case No. 231-R

does not contain the allegations that the respondent Judge would want to appear therein.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and a writ issued, setting aside the Orders issued by

the respondent. Without costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Petition granted Orders set aside.

Notes.What determines the jurisdiction of the court are the facts alleged in the complaint or

petition, not the facts averred in the answer or opposition of the adverse parties. (Salao vs.

Crisostomo, 138 SCRA 17.)

Violation of the State's right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue. Decision

rendered in disregard of the fundamental right to due process is void for lack of jurisdiction.

(People vs. Bocar, 138 SCRA 166.)

As a rule, during the pendency of special proceedings, the probate court retains control and

jurisdiction over incidents connected with it, including its orders not affecting third parties who

may have acquired vested rights. (Candelario vs. Canizares, 4 SCRA 738.)

[Nos. L-3087 and L-3088. 31 July 1954]

In re: Testate Estate of the deceased JOS B. SUNTAY. SILVINO SUNTAY, petitioner

and appellant. In re: Intestate Estate of the deceased JOS B. SUNTAY, FEDERICO C.

SUNTAY, administrator and appellee

1.WlLLS; PROBATE OF WlLLS; ASSIGNMENT OF INTEREST IN THE ESTATE, NOT A

BAR TO PROBATE OF A LOST OR FOREIGN WlLL. In an intestate proceeding that had

already been instituted in the Philippines, the widow and child of the testator are not estopped

from asking for the probate of a lost will or of a foreign will just because of the transfer or

assignment of their share, right, title and interest in the estate of the deceased. The validity and

legality of such assignments can not be threshed out in the probate proceeding which is

concerned only with the probate of the will.

2.ID.; ID.; PROOF OF LOST WILL; PROVISIONS OF WILL MUST BE PROVED BY AT

LEAST Two CREDIBLE WITNESSES; WHO ARE CREDIBLE WITNESSES.Granting that

a will was duly executed and that it was in existence at the time of, and not revoked before, the

death of the testator, still the provisions of the lost will must be clearly and distinctly proved by

at least two credible witnesses. "Credible witnesses" mean competent witnesses and not those

who testify to facts from or upon hearsay.

501

VOL. 95, JULY 31, 1954

501

Suntay vs. Suntay

3.ID.; PROBATE OF WILL is A PROCEEDING IN REM; NOTICE TO ALL PARTIES

ESSENTIAL FOR ITS VALIDITY.In the absence of proof that the municipal district court of

Amoy is a probate court and on the Chinese law of procedure in probate matters, it may be

presumed that the proceedings in the matter of probating or allowing a will in the Chinese courts

are the same as those provided for in our laws on the subject. It is a proceeding in rem and for the

validity of such proceedings personal notice or by publication or both to all interested parties

must be made.

4.ID. ; ID. ; PROCEEDINGS LIKENED TO A DEPOSITION OR TO A PERPETUATION OF

TESTIMONY.The proceedings had in the municipal district court of Amoy, China, may be

likened to a deposition or to a perpetuation of testimony, and even if it were so, notice to all

interested parties was necessary for the validity of such proceedings.

5.ID.; WILLS PROVED IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY; PROBATE SHOULD BE IN

ACCORDANCE WlTH ACCEPTED BASIC AND FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS AND

PRINCIPLES.Where it appears that the proceedings in the court of a foreign country were

held for the purpose of taking the testimony of two attesting witnesses to the will and the order of

the probate court did not purport to allow the will, the proceedings cannot be deemed to be for

the probate of a will, as it was not done in accordance with the basic and fundamental concepts

and principles followed in the probate and allowance of wills. Consequently, the will referred to

therein cannot be allowed, filed and recorded by a competent court of this country.

6.WILL, PROBATE OF; LACK OF OBJECTION TO PROBATE OF LOST WILL DOES

EXECUTION.The lack of objection to the probate of a lost will does not relieve the proponent

thereof or the party interested in its probate from establishing its due execution and proving

clearly and distinctly the provisions thereof by at least two credible witnesses, as provided for in

section 6, Rule 77 of the Rules of Court.

7.ID. ; APPEALS ; JURISDICTION OF SUPREME COURT TO REVIEW FINDINGS OF

FACT AND LEGAL PRONOUNCEMENTS IN CASES INVOLVING MORE THAN

P50,000.In an appeal from a judgment of the probate court, the Supreme Court, in the exercise

of its appellate jurisdiction, has the power to review and correct erroneous findings of fact and

legal pronouncements of the probate court, where the amount involved is more than P50,000.

502

502

PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

Suntay vs. Suntay

APPEAL from a decree of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. Pecson, J.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court

Claro M. Recto for appellant.

Sison & Aruego for appellee.

PADILLA, J.:

This is an appeal from a decree of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan disallowing the

alleged will and testament executed in Manila on November 1929, and the alleged last will

and testament executed in Kulangsu, Amoy, China, on 4 January 1931, by Jose B. Suntay.

The value of the estate left by the deceased is more than P50,000.

On 14 May 1934 Jose B. Suntay, a Filipino citizen and resident of the Philippines, died in the

city of Amoy, Fookien province, Republic of China, leaving real and personal properties in the

Philippines and a house in Amoy, Fookien province, China, and children by the first marriage

had with the late Manuela T. Cruz namely, Apolonio, Concepcin, Angel, Manuel, Federico,

Ana, Aurora, Emiliano and Jose, Jr. and a child named Silvino by the second marriage had with

Maria Natividad Lim Billian who survived him. Intestate proceedings were instituted in the

Court of First Instance of Bulacan (special proceedings No. 4892) and after hearing letters of

administration were issued to Apolonio Suntay.

After the latter's death, Federico C. Suntay was appointed administrator of the estate. On 15

October 1934 the surviving widow filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan for

the probate of a last will and testament claimed to have been executed and signed in the

Philippines on November 1929 by the late Jose B. Suntay. This petition was denied because of

the loss of said will after the filing of the petition and before the hearing thereof and of the

insufficiency of the evidence to establish the loss of the said will- An appeal was taken from said

order denying the probate of the will and this Court held the evidence before the probate court

sufficient to prove the loss of the will and remanded the case to the court for further proceedings

In spite of the fact that a commission from the probate court was issued on 24 April 1937 for the

taking of the deposition of Go Toh, an attesting witness to the will, on 7 February 1938 the

probate court denied a motion for continuance of the hearing sent by cablegram from China by

the surviving widow and dismissed the petition. In the meantime the Pacific War supervened.

After liberation, claiming that he had found among the files, records and documents of his late

father a will and testament in Chinese characters executed and signed by the deceased on 4

January 1931 and that the same was filed, recorded and probated in the Amoy district court,

Province of Fookien, China, Silvino Suntay filed a petition in the intestate proceedings praying

for the probate of the will executed in the Philippines on November 1929 (Exhibit B) or of the

will executed in Amoy, Fookien, China, on 4 January 1931 (Exhibit N).

There is no merit in the contention that the petitioner Silvino Suntay and his mother Maria

Natividad Lim Billian are estopped from asking for the probate of the lost will or of the foreign

will because of the transfer or assignment of their share right, title and interest in the estate of the

late Jose B. Suntay to Jose G. Gutierrez and the spouses Ricardo Gutierrez and Victoria Goo

and the subsequent assignment thereof by the assignees to Francisco Pascual and by the latter to

Federico C. Suntay, for the validity and legality of such assignments cannot be threshed out in

this proceedings which is concerned only with the probate of the will and testament executed in

the Philippines on November 1929 or of the foreign will allegedly executed in Amoy on 4

January 1931 and claimed to have been probated in the municipal district court of Amoy,

Fookien province, Republic of China.

As to prescription, the dismissal of the petition for probate of the will on 7 February 1938 was no

bar to the filing of this petition on 18 June 1947, or before the expiration of ten years.

As to the lost will, section 6, Rule 77, provides:

No will shall be proved as a lost or destroyed will unless the execution and validity of the

same be established, and the will is proved to have been in existence at the time of the

death of the testator, or is shown to have been fraudulently or accidentally destroyed in

the lifetime of the testator without his knowledge, nor unless its provisions are clearly

and distinctly proved by at least two credible witnesses. When a lost will is proved, the

provisions thereof must be distinctly stated and certified by the judge, under the seal of

the court, and the certificate must be filed and recorded as other wills are filed and

recorded.

The witnesses who testified to the provisions of the lost will are Go Toh, an attesting witness,

Anastacio Teodoro and Ana Suntay. Manuel Lopez, who was an attesting witness to the lost

will, was dead at the time of the hearing of this alternative petition. In his deposition Go Toh

testifies that he was one of the witnesses to the lost will consisting of twenty-three sheets signed

by Jose B. Suntay at the bottom of the will and each and every page thereof in the presence of

Alberto Barretto, Manuel Lopez and himself and underneath the testator's signature the

attesting witnesses signed and each of them signed the attestation clause and each and every

page of the will in the presence of the testator and of the other witnesses, but did not take part in

the drafting thereof ; that he knew the contents of the will written in Spanish although he knew

very little of that language (answers to the 22nd and 23rd interrogatories and to X-2 cross-

interrogatory, Id.) and all he knows about the contents of the lost will was revealed to him by

Jose B. Suntay at the time it was executed (answers to the 25th interrogatory and to X-4 and X-8

cross-interrogatories, Id.); that Jose B. Suntay told him that the contents thereof are the same as

those of the draft (Exhibit B) (answers to the 33rd interrogatory and to X-8 cross-interrogatory,

Id.) which he saw in theoffice of Alberto Barretto in November 1929 when the will was signed

(answers to the 69th, 72nd, and 74th interrogatories, Id); that Alberto Barretto handed the draft

and said to Jose B. Suntay: "You had better see if you want any correction" (answers to the 81st,

82nd and 83rd interrogatories, Id.) ; that "after checking Jose B. Suntay put the 'Exhibit B' in his

pocket and had the original signed and executed" (answers to the 91st interrogatory, and to X-18

cross-interrogatory, Id.); that Mrs. Suntay had the draft of the will (Exhibit B) translated into

Chinese and he read the translation (answers to the 67th interrogatory, Id.); that he did not read

the will and did not compare it (check it up) with the draft (Exhibit B) (answers to X-6 and X-20

cross-interrogatories, Id.).

Ana Suntay testifies that sometime in September 1934 in the house of her brother Apolonio

Suntay she learned that her father left a will "because of the arrival of my brother Manuel

Suntay, who was bringing along with him certain document and he told us or he was telling us

that it was the will of our ex ather Jose B. Suntay which was taken from Go Toh. . . ." (p. 524, t.

s. n., hearing of 24 February 1948} ; that she saw her brother Apolonio Suntay read the

document in her presence and of Manuel and learned of the adjudication made in the will by her

father of his estate, to wit: one-third to his children, one-third to Silvino and his mother and the

other third to Silvino. Apolonio, Concepcion and Jose, Jr. (pp. 526-8, 530-1, 542, t. s. n. Id.) ;

that "after Apolonio read that portion, then he turned over the document to Manuel, and he went

away," (p. 528, t. s. n., Id.). On cross-examination, she testifies that she read the part of the will

on adjudication to know what was the share of each heir (pp. 530, 544, t. s. n., Id.) and on

redirect she testifies that she saw the signature of her father, Go Toh, Manuel Lopez and Alberto

Barretto (p. 546, t. s. n., Id.).

Anastacio Teodoro testifies that one day in November 1934,before the last postponement of the

hearing granted by the Court,Go Toh arrived at his law office in the De los Reyes Building and

left an envelope wrapped in red handkerchief; that he checked up the signatures on the envelope

Exhibit A with those on the will placed in the envelope (p. 33, t. s. n., Id.); that the will was

exactly the same as the draft Exhibit B. (pp. 32, 47, 50, t. s. n., Id.).

If the will was snatched after the delivery thereof by Go Toh to Anastacio Teodoro and returned

by the latter to the former because they could not agree on the amount of fees, the former coming

to the latter's office straight from the boat that brought him to the Philippines from Amoy, and

that delivery took place in November 1934 (p. 273, t. s. n., Id.), then the testimony of Ana Suntay

that she saw and heard her brother Apolonio Suntay read the will sometime in September 1934,

must not be true.

Although Ana Suntay would be a good witness because she was testifying against her own

interest, still the fact remains that she did not read the whole will but only the adjudication and

saw only the signature, of her father and of the witnesses Go Toh, Manuel Lopez and Alberto

Barretto. But her testimony on cross-examination that she read the part of the will on

adjudication is inconsistent with her testimony in chief that after Apolonio had read that part of

the will he turned over or handed the document to Manuel who went away.

If it is true that Go Toh saw the draft Exhibit B. in the office of Alberto Barretto in November

1929 when the will was signed, then the part of his testimony that Alberto Barretto handed the

draft to Jose B. Suntay to whom he said: "You had better see if you want any correction" and that

"after checking Jose B. Suntay put the 'Exhibit B' in his pocket and had the original signed and

executed" cannot be true, for it was not the time for correcting the draft of the will, because it

must have been corrected before and all corrections and additions written in lead pencil must

have been inserted and copied in the final draft of the will which was signed on that occasion.

The bringing in of the draft on that occasion is just to fit it within the framework of the

appellant's theory. At any rate, all of Go Toh's testimony by deposition on the provisions of the

alleged lost will is hearsay, because he came to know or he learned of them from information

given him by Jose B. Suntay and from reading the translation of the draft into Chinese.

Much stress is laid upon the testimony of Federico C. Suntay who testifies that he read the

supposed will or the alleged will of his father and that the share of the surviing widow, according

to the will, is two-thirds of the estate. But this witness testified to oppose the appointment of a

co-administrator of the estate, for the reason that he had acquired the interest of the surviving

widow not only in the estate of her deceased husband but also in the conjugal property. Whether

he read the original will or just the copy thereof (Exhibit B) is not clear. For him the important

point was that he had acquired all the share, participation and interest of the surviving widow and

of the only child by the second marriage in the estate of his deceased father. Be that as it may, his

testimony that under the will the surviving widow would take two-thirds of the estate of the late

Jose B. Suntay is at variance with Exhibit B. and the testimony of Anastacio Teodoro. According

to the latter, the third for strict legitime is for the ten children; the third for betterment is for

Silvino, Apolonio, Concepcion and Jose Jr.; and the third for free disposal is for the surviving

widow and her child Silvino.

Hence, granting that there was a will duly executed by Jose B. Suntay placed in the envelope

(Exhibit A) and that it was in existence at the time of, and not revoked before, his death, still the

testimony of Anastacio Teodoro alone falls short of the legal requirement that the

provisions of the lost will must be "clearly and distinctly proved by at least two credible

witnesses." Credible witnesses mean competent witnesses and those who testify to facts

from or upon hearsay are neither competent nor credible witnesses.

On the other hand, Alberto Barretto testifies that in the early part of 1929 he prepared or drew up

two wills for Jose B. Suntay at the latter's request, the rough draft of the ex irst will was in his

own handwriting, given to Manuel Lopez for the final draft or typing and returned to him; that

after checking up the final with the rough draft he tore it and returned the final draft to Manuel

Lopez; that this draft was in favor of all the children and the widow (pp. 392-4, 449, t. s. n.,

hearing of 21 February 1948) ; that two months later Jose B. Suntay and Manuel Lopez called on

him and the former asked him to draw up another will favoring more his wife and child Silvino;

that he had the rough draft of the second will typed (pp. 395. 449 t. s. n., Id.) and gave it to

Manuel Lopez (p. 396. t. s. n., Id.); that he did not sign as witness the second will of Jose B.

Suntay copied from the typewritten draft [Exhibit B] (p. 420, t. s. n., Id.) ; that the handwritten

insertions or additions in lead pencil to Exhibit B. are not his (pp. 4157 435-6, 457, t. s. n., Id.)

; that the final draft of the first will made up of four or five pages (p. 400, t. s. n., Id.) was signed

and executed, two or three months after Suntay and Lopez had called on him (pp. 397-8, 403,

449, t. s. n., Id.) in his office at the Cebu Portland Cement in the China Banking Building on

Dasmarias street by Jose B. Suntay, Manuel Lopez and a Chinaman who had all come ex rom

Hagonoy (p. 398, t. s. n., Id.); that on that occasion they brought an envelope (Exhibit A) where

the following words were written: "Testamento de Jose B. Suntay" (pp. 399, 404, t. s. n., Id.);

that after the signing of the will it was placed inside the envelope (Exhibit A) together with an

inventory of the properties of Jose B. Suntay and the envelope was sealed by the signatures of

the testator and the attesting witnesses; that he again saw the envelope (Exhibit A) in his house

one Saturday in the later part of August 1934, brought by Go Toh and it was then in perfect

condition (pp. 405-6, 411, 440-2, t. s. n., Id.) ; that on the following Monday Go Toh went to his

law office bringing along with him the envelope (Exhibit A) in the same condition; that he told

Go Toh that he would charge P25,000 as fee for probating the will (pp. 406, 440-2, Id.) ; that Go

Toh did not leave the envelope (Exhibit A) either in his house or in his law office (p. 407, t. s. n.,

Id.); that Go Toh said he wanted to keep it and on no occasion did Go Toh leave it to him (pp.

409, 410, t. s. n., Id.).

The testimony of Go Toh taken and heard by Assistant Fiscal F. B. Albert in connection with the

complaint for estafa filed against Manuel Suntay for the alleged snatching of the envelope

(Exhibit A), corroborates the testimony of Alberto Barretto to the effect that only one will was

signed by Jose B. Suntay at his office in which he (Alberto Barretto), Manuel Lopez and Go Toh

took part as attesting witnesses (p. 15, t. s. n., Exhibit 6). Go Toh testified before the same

assistant fiscal that he did not leave the will in the hands of Anastacio Teodoro (p. 26, t. s. n.,

Exhibit 6). He said, quoting his own words, "Because I. can not give him this envelope even

though the contract (on fees) was signed. I. have to bring that document to court or to anywhere

else myself." (p. 27, t. s. n., Exhibit 6).

As to the will claimed to have been executed on 4 January 1931 in Amoy, China, the law on the

point is Rule 78, Section 1. of the rule provides:

Wills proved and allowed in a foreign country, according to the laws of such country, may be

allowed, filed, and recorded by the proper Court of First Instance in the Philippines, Section 2.

provides:

When a copy of such will and the allowance thereof, duly authenticated, is filed with a petition

for allowance in the Philippines, by the executor or other person interested, in the court having

jurisdiction, such court shall fix a time and place for the hearing, and cause notice thereof to be

given as in case of an original will presented for allowance.

Section 3 provides:

If it appears at the hearing that the will should be allowed in the Philippines, the court shall so

allow it, and a certificate of its allowance, signed by the Judge, and attested by the seal of the

court, to which shall be attached a copy of the will, shall be filed and recorded by the clerk, and

the will shall have the same effect as if originally proved and allowed in such court.

The fact that the municipal district court of Amoy, China, is a probate court must be

proved. The law of China on procedure in the probate or allowance of wills must also be

proved. The legal requirements for the execution of a valid will in China in 1931 should

also be established by competent evidence. There is no proof on these points. The unverified

answers to the questions propounded by counsel ex or the appellant to the Consul General of the

Republic of China set forth in Exhibits R-1 and R-2, objected to by counsel for the appellee, are

inadmissible, because apart from the fact that the office of Consul General does not qualify and

make the person who holds it an expert on the Chinese law on procedure in probate matters, if

the same be admitted, the adverse party would be deprived of his right to confront and cross-

examine the witness. Consuls are appointed to attend to trade matters. Moreover, it appears that

all the proceedings had in the municipal district court of Amoy were for the purpose of taking the

testimony of two attesting witnesses to the will and that the order of the municipal district court

of Amoy does not purport to probate the will. In the absence of proof that the municipal district

court of Amoy is a probate court and on the Chinese law of procedure in probate matters, it may

be presumed that the proceedings in the matter of probating or allowing a will in the Chinese

courts are the same as those provided for in our laws on the subject.

It is a proceeding in rem and for the validity of such proceedings personal notice or by

publication or both to all interested parties must be made. The interested parties in the case were

known to reside in the Philippines. The evidence shows that no such notice was received by the

interested parties residing in the Philippines. The proceedings had in the municipal district court

of Amoy, China, may be likened to a deposition or to a perpetuation of testimony, and even if it

were so it does not measure or come up to the standard of such proceedings in the Philippines for

lack of notice to all interested parties and the proceedings were held at the back of such

interested parties.

The order of the municipal district court of Amoy, China, which reads, as follows:

ORDER:

SEE BELOW

The above minutes were satisfactorily confirmed by the interrogated parties, who declare that

there are no errors, after said minutes were loudly read and announced actually in the court.

Done and subscribed on the Nineteenth day of the English month of the 35th year of the

Republic of China in the Civil Section of the Municipal District Court of Amoy, China.

HUANG KUANG CHENG

Clerk of Court

CHIANG TENG HWA

Judge

does not purport to probate or allow the will which was the subject of the proceedings. In view

thereof, the will and the alleged probate thereof cannot be said to have been done in accordance

with the accepted basic and fundamental concepts and principles followed in the probate and

allowance of wills. Consequently, the authenticated transcript of proceedings held in the

municipal district court of Amoy, China, cannot be deemed and accepted as proceedings leading

to the probate or allowance of a will and, therefore, the will referred to therein cannot be

allowed, filed and recorded by a competent court of this country.

The decree appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.

Pablo, Bengzon, A. Reyes, Labrador and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

Pablo, Bengzon, Reyes, A. and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

Palaganas vs. Palaganas

This case is about the probate before Philippine court of a will executed abroad by a foreigner

although it has not been probated in its place of execution.

The Facts and the Case

On November 8, 2001 Ruperta C. Palaganas (Ruperta), a Filipino who became a naturalized

United States (U.S.) citizen, died single and childless. In the last will and testament she executed

in California, she designated her brother, Sergio C. Palaganas (Sergio), as the executor of her

will for she had left properties in the Philippines and in the U.S.

On May 19, 2003 respondent Ernesto C. Palaganas (Ernesto), another brother of Ruperta, filed

with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for the probate of Rupertas

will and for his appointment as special administrator of her estate.1 On October 15, 2003,

however, petitioners Manuel Miguel Palaganas (Manuel) and Benjamin Gregorio Palaganas

(Benjamin), nephews of Ruperta, opposed the petition on the ground that Rupertas will should

not be probated in the Philippines but in the U.S. where she executed it. Manuel and Benjamin

added that, assuming Rupertas will could be probated in the Philippines, it is invalid nonetheless

for having been executed under duress and without the testators full understanding of the

consequences of such act. Ernesto, they claimed, is also not qualified to act as administrator of

the estate.

Meantime, since Rupertas foreign-based siblings, Gloria Villaluz and Sergio, were on separate

occasions in the Philippines for a short visit, respondent Ernesto filed a motion with the RTC for

leave to take their deposition, which it granted. On April, 13, 2004 the RTC directed the parties

to submit their memorandum on the issue of whether or not Rupertas U.S. will may be probated

in and allowed by a court in the Philippines.

On June 17, 2004 the RTC issued an order:2 (a) admitting to probate Rupertas last will; (b)

appointing respondent Ernesto as special administrator at the request of Sergio, the U.S.-based

executor designated in the will; and (c) issuing the Letters of Special Administration to Ernesto.

Aggrieved by the RTCs order, petitioner nephews Manuel and Benjamin appealed to the Court

of Appeals (CA),3 arguing that an unprobated will executed by an American citizen in the U.S.

cannot be probated for the first time in the Philippines.

On July 29, 2005 the CA rendered a decision,4 affirming the assailed order of the

RTC,5 holding that the RTC properly allowed the probate of the will, subject to respondent

Ernestos submission of the authenticated copies of the documents specified in the order and his

posting of required bond. The CA pointed out that Section 2, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court does

not require prior probate and allowance of the will in the country of its execution, before it can

be probated in the Philippines. The present case, said the CA, is different from reprobate, which

refers to a will already probated and allowed abroad. Reprobate is governed by different rules or

procedures. Unsatisfied with the decision, Manuel and Benjamin came to this Court.

The Issue Presented

The key issue presented in this case is whether or not a will executed by a foreigner abroad

may be probated in the Philippines although it has not been previously probated and

allowed in the country where it was executed.

The Courts Ruling

Petitioners Manuel and Benjamin maintain that wills executed by foreigners abroad must first be

probated and allowed in the country of its execution before it can be probated here. This, they

claim, ensures prior compliance with the legal formalities of the country of its execution. They

insist that local courts can only allow probate of such wills if the proponent proves that: (a) the

testator has been admitted for probate in such foreign country, (b) the will has been admitted to

probate there under its laws, (c) the probate court has jurisdiction over the proceedings, (d) the

law on probate procedure in that foreign country and proof of compliance with the same, and (e)

the legal requirements for the valid execution of a will.

But our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad although

the same have not as yet been probated and allowed in the countries of their execution. A

foreign will can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction. Article 816 of the Civil Code states

that the will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in

accordance with the formalities prescribed by the law of the where he resides, or according to

the formalities observed in his country.

In this connection, Section 1, Rule 73 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that if the

decedent is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the RTC of the province where he has an

estate may take cognizance of the settlement of such estate. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 76

further state that the executor, devisee, or legatee named in the will, or any other person

interested in the estate, may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition the court

having jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the same be in his possession or not,

or is lost or destroyed.

Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a will must show, so far as known

to the petitioner: (a) the jurisdictional facts; (b) the names, ages, and residences of the heirs,

legatees, and devisees of the testator or decedent; (c) the probable value and character of the

property of the estate; (d) the name of the person for whom letters are prayed; and (e) if the will

has not been delivered to the court, the name of the person having custody of it. Jurisdictional

facts refer to the fact of death of the decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the

province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the

estate he left in such province.7 The rules do not require proof that the foreign will has already

been allowed and probated in the country of its execution.

In insisting that Rupertas will should have been first probated and allowed by the court of

California, petitioners Manuel and Benjamin obviously have in mind the procedure for the

reprobate of will before admitting it here. But, reprobate or re-authentication of a will already

probated and allowed in a foreign country is different from that probate where the will is

presented for the first time before a competent court. Reprobate is specifically governed by Rule

77 of the Rules of Court. Contrary to petitioners stance, since this latter rule applies only to

reprobate of a will, it cannot be made to apply to the present case. In reprobate, the local court

acknowledges as binding the findings of the foreign probate court provided its jurisdiction over

the matter can be established.

Besides, petitioners stand is fraught with impractically. If the instituted heirs do not have the

means to go abroad for the probate of the will, it is as good as depriving them outright of their

inheritance, since our law requires that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless

the will has been proved and allowed by the proper court.8

Notably, the assailed RTC order of June 17, 2004 is nothing more than an initial ruling that the

court can take cognizance of the petition for probate of Rupertas will and that, in the meantime,

it was designating Ernesto as special administrator of the estate. The parties have yet to present

evidence of the due execution of the will, i.e. the testators state of mind at the time of the

execution and compliance with the formalities required of wills by the laws of California. This

explains the trial courts directive for Ernesto to submit the duly authenticated copy of Rupertas

will and the certified copies of the Laws of Succession and Probate of Will of California.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Court of Appeals decision in

CA-G.R. CV 83564 dated July 29, 2005.

ESCHEAT:

CATALINA BALAIS-MABANAG, assisted by her husband, ELEUTERIO MABANAG,

petitioner, vs. THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY, CONCEPCION D.

ALCARAZ, and RAMONA PATRICIA ALCARAZ, respondents.

Actions; Judgments; Pleadings and Practice; In every action, indeed, the parties and their counsel

are enjoined to present all available defenses and objections in order that the matter in issue can

finally be laid to rest in an appropriate contest before the court.The petitioner did not raise any

issue against Ramonas qualifications to own land in the Philippines during the trial or, at the

latest, before the finality of the RTC judgment. The petitioner was thereby deemed to have

waived the objection, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, to wit: Section 1.

Defenses and objections not pleaded.

Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed

waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court

has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action pending between the same

parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of

limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim. (2a) In every action, indeed, the parties and their

counsel are enjoined to present all available defenses and objections in order that the matter in

issue can finally be laid to rest in an appropriate contest before the court. The rule is a wise and

tested one, borne by necessity. Without the rule, there will be no end to a litigation, because the

dissatisfied litigant may simply raise new or additional issues in order to prevent, defeat, or

delay the implementation of an already final and executory judgment. The endlessness of

litigation can give rise to added costs for the parties, and can surely contribute to the unwarranted

clogging of court dockets. The prospect of a protracted litigation between the parties annuls the

very rationale of every litigation to attain justice. Verily, there must be an end to litigation.

Same; Same; Res Judicata; It is fundamental that the judgment or final order is, with respect to

the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation

thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the

commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the

same title and in the same capacity.The petitioner cannot now insist that the RTC did not settle

the question of the respondents qualifications to own land due to non-citizenship. It is

fundamental that the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as

to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties

and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special

proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity. Thus,

in Gabuya v. Layug, 250 SCRA 218 (1995) this Court had the occasion to hold that a judgment

involving the same parties, the same facts, and the same issues binds the parties not only as to

every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat their claims or demands, but also as to any

other admissible matter that might have been offered for that purpose and all other matters that

could have been adjudged in that case.

Same; Same; Same; Requisites; Legal Research; The guiding principle of the doctrine of res

judicata was formulated by Vice Chancellor Wigram in an English case circa 1843; The doctrine

of res judicata is also known as estoppel per rem judicatam and involves both cause of action

estoppel and issue estoppel.For res judicata to bar the institution of a subsequent action, the

following requisites must concur: (a) the former judgment must be final; (b) it must have been

rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties; (c) it must be a

judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be between the first and second actions identity of

parties, identity of the subject matter, and identity of cause of action. The guiding principle of the

doctrine of res judicata was formulated by Vice Chancellor Wigram in an English case circa

1843, thus: xxx that where a given matter becomes the subject of litigation in, and of

adjudication by, a court of competent jurisdiction, the court requires the parties to that litigation

to bring forward their whole case, and will not (except under special circumstances) permit the

same parties to open the same subject of litigation in respect of matter which might have been

brought forward as part of the subject in contest, but which was not brought forward, only

because they have, from negligence, inadvertence, or even accident, omitted part of their case.

The plea of res judicata applies, except in special cases, not only to points which the court was

actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point

which properly belonged to the subject of litigation, and which the parties, exercising reasonable

diligence, might have brought forward at the time. The doctrine is also known as estoppel per

rem judicatam and involves both cause of action estoppel and issue estoppel. The purpose of the

doctrine is two-foldto prevent unnecessary proceedings involving expenses to the parties and

wastage of the courts time which could be used by others, and to avoid stale litigations as well

as to enable the defendant to know the extent of the claims being made arising out of the same

single incident.

Citizenship; Escheat; Land Titles; Solicitor General; Although the law does not categorically

state that only the Government, through the Solicitor General, may attack the title of an alien

transferee of land, it is nonetheless correct to hold that only the Government, through the

Solicitor General, has the personality to file a case challenging the capacity of a person to

acquire or to own land based on non-citizenship.It should also be pointed out that the

petitioner was not the proper party to challenge Ramonas qualifications to acquire land. Under

Section 7, Batas Pambansa Blg. 185, the Solicitor General or his representative shall institute

escheat proceedings against its violators. Although the law does not categorically state that only

the Government, through the Solicitor General, may attack the title of an alien transferee of land,

it is nonetheless correct to hold that only the Government, through the Solicitor General,

has the personality to file a case challenging the capacity of a person to acquire or to own

land based on non-citizenship. This limitation is based on the fact that the violation is

committed against the State, not against any individual; and that in the event that the

transferee is adjudged to be not a Filipino citizen, the affected property reverts to the State,

not to the previous owner or any other individual. Herein, even assuming that Ramona was

legally disqualified from owning the subject property, the decision that voids or annuls their right

of ownership over the subject land will not inure to the benefit of the petitioner. Instead, the

subject property will be escheated in favor of the State in accordance with Batas Pambansa Blg.

185.

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Argue Law Firm for petitioner.

Ferrer & Ferrer Law Office for private respondents Alcaraz.

BERSAMIN, J.:

The issue of citizenship of the registered owner of land cannot anymore be raised to forestall the

execution of a final and executory judgment where the objecting party had the opportunity to

raise the issue prior to the finality of the judgment. The time for assailing the capacity of the

winning party to acquire the land was during the trial, not during the execution of a final

decision.

Antecedents

As culled from the assailed decision dated December 5, 2000 of the Court of Appeals (CA),1 and

from the Courts decision promulgated on October 7, 1996 in G.R. No. 103577,2 the following

are the antecedent facts.

On January 19, 1985, Romulo A. Coronel, Alarico A. Coronel, Annette A. Coronel, Annabelle

C. Gonzales, Floraida C. Tupper, and Cielito A. Coronel (Coronels) executed a document

entitled receipt of down payment, stipulating that they received from respondent Ramona

Patricia Alcaraz (Ramona), through Ramonas mother, respondent Concepcion D. Alcaraz

(Concepcion), the sum of P50,000.00 as downpayment on the total purchase price of

P1,240,000.00 for their inherited house and lot, covered by TCT No. 119627 of the Registry of

Deeds of Quezon City.

The receipt of down payment contained other stipulations, as follows:

We bind ourselves to effect the transfer in our names from our deceased father, Constancio P.

Coronel, the transfer certificate of title immediately upon our receipt of the down payment

above-stated amount. On our presentation of the TCT already in our name, we will immediately

execute the deed of absolute sale of said property and Miss Ramona Patricia Alcaraz shall

immediately pay the balance of the P1,190,000.00.

On February 6, 1985, the property originally registered in the name of the Coronels father was

transferred in the name of the Coronels under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 327043 of

the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City.

On February 18, 1985, the Coronels sold the property covered by TCT No. 327043 to the

petitioner for the higher price of P1,580,000.00 after the latter delivered an initial sum of

P300,000.00. For this reason, the Coronels rescinded their contract with Ramona by depositing

her downpayment of P50,000.00 in the bank in trust for Ramona Patricia Alcaraz.

On February 22, 1985, Concepcion, through one Gloria P. Noel as her attorney-in-fact, filed a

complaint for specific performance and damages in her own name in the Regional Trial Court

(RTC) in Quezon City against the Coronels, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-44134.4 Concepcion

subsequently caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on TCT No. 327403.

On April 2, 1985, the petitioner had a notice of adverse claim annotated on TCT No. 327403 in

the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City.

On April 25, 1985, the Coronels executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of the petitioner.

On June 5, 1985, TCT No. 351582 was issued in the name of the petitioner.

It is relevant to mention that on May 24, 1985 the petitioner moved to have her answer in

intervention admitted in Civil Case No. Q-44134.5 Her intervention was allowed on May 31,

1985.

Earlier, on May 19, 1986, Concepcion sought leave of court to amend the complaint for the

purpose of impleading Ramona as a co-plaintiff.7 The amended complaint naming both

Concepcion and Ramona as plaintiffs was attached to the motion.8 On June 25, 1986, the

amended complaint was admitted.9

On March 1, 1989, the RTC rendered its decision, disposing:

WHEREFORE, judgment for specific performance is hereby rendered ordering defendant to

execute in favor of plaintiffs a deed of absolute sale covering that parcel of land embraced in and

covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 327403 (now TCT No. 331582) of the Registry of

Deeds for Quezon City, together with all the improvements existing thereon, free from all liens

and encumbrances, and once accomplished, to immediately deliver said document of sale to

plaintiffs, and upon receipt thereof, the plaintiffs are ordered to pay defendants the whole balance

of the purchase price amounting to P1,190,000.00 in cash. Transfer Certificate of Title No.

331582 of the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City in the name of intervenor is hereby cancelled

and declared to be without any force and effect. Defendants and intervenor and all other persons

claiming under them are hereby ordered to vacate the subject property, and deliver possession

thereof to plaintiff. Plaintiffs claim for damages and attorneys fees, as well as the counterclaims

of defendants and intervenors are hereby dismissed.

No pronouncement as to costs.

So Ordered.

Upon denial of the motion for reconsideration, the Coronels and the petitioner interposed an

appeal to the CA, which promulgated a judgment on December 16, 1991, fully upholding the

decision of the RTC.

Thus, the petitioner and the Coronels appealed the CA judgment to this Court (G.R. No.

103577), which affirmed the CA on October 7, 1996.

Thereafter, the decision of the RTC became final and executory.

Acting on the respondents motion for execution, the RTC issued a writ of execution on October

1, 1997. However, the petitioner and the Coronels filed their motion to stay execution and

supplemental motion for reconsideration, which the RTC denied on March 10, 1998.

Upon failure of the petitioner and the Coronels to comply with the writ of execution, the RTC

approved the respondents motion for appointment of suitable person to execute deed, etc., and

ordered on April 8, 1998 the Branch Clerk of the RTC, Branch 83, Quezon City, to execute the

deed of absolute sale in favor of Ramona in lieu of the defendants (i.e., the petitioner and the

Coronels).

On May 19, 1998, the petitioner and the Coronels filed in the CA a petition for certiorari

assailing the RTCs orders of October 1, 1997 and March 10, 1998, but the CA dismissed the

petition on July 30, 1998.

On August 21, 1998, the petitioner and the Coronels presented their motion for reconsideration

in the CA.

On September 2, 1998, the RTC held in abeyance the respondents motion reiterating previous

motion to resolve respondents motion, whereby the respondents sought an order to direct the

petitioner to surrender her TCT No. 331582, and the Registrar of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel

the petitioners copy of said TCT for her failure to comply with the earlier order for her to

surrender the TCT to the Registrar of Deeds pending resolution by the CA of the petitioners

motion for reconsideration.

Ultimately, on September 30, 1998, the CA denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration.

The petitioner thus appealed to the Court, which denied her petition for review for being filed out

of time. The Court also denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration on April 21, 1999.

Thereafter, the respondents moved in the RTC for the resolution of their pending motion. After

the RTC granted the respondents pending motion on July 29, 1999, the petitioner filed a motion

for reconsideration against such order, but the RTC denied her motion on September 23, 1999.

Following the denial of her motion for reconsideration, the petitioner commenced a special civil

action of certiorari in the CA to assail the RTCs action (CA-G.R. SP No. 55576). However, the

CA dismissed her petition through its decision dated December 5, 2000, Rollo, pp. 61-69, and

denied her motion for reconsideration on April 16, 2002.11

Issues

Hence, this appeal, in which the petitioner submits that the CA erred in sustaining the

registration by the Registrar of Deeds of the deed of absolute sale despite the lack of indication

of the citizenship of the buyer of the subject property; and in sustaining the order of the RTC

directing the Branch Clerk of Court to execute the deed of absolute sale without first requiring

the defendants to execute the deed of absolute sale as required by the decision.

Ruling

The petition lacks merit.

Res judicata barred petitioners objection

In the complaint dated February 22, 1985, respondent Concepcion, as plaintiff, categorically

averred that she was a Filipino citizen. The petitioner did not deny or disprove the averment of

Filipino citizenship during the trial and on appeal. The petitioner did not also advert to the issue

of citizenship after the complaint was amended in order to implead Ramona as a co-plaintiff,

despite the petitioners opportunity to do so.

Yet, now, when the final decision of the RTC is already being implemented, the petitioner would

thwart the execution by assailing the directive of the RTC for the Branch Clerk of Court to

execute the deed of absolute sale and by blocking the registration of the deed of absolute sale in

the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City, on the ground that Ramona was disqualified from owning

land in the Philippines.

The petitioners move was outrightly unwarranted.

First: The petitioner did not raise any issue against Ramonas qualifications to own land in

the Philippines during the trial or, at the latest, before the finality of the RTC judgment.

The petitioner was thereby deemed to have waived the objection, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 9 of

the Rules of Court, to wit:

Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded.Defenses and objections not pleaded either

in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the

pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that

there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the action is

barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim. (2a)

In every action, indeed, the parties and their counsel are enjoined to present all available

defenses and objections in order that the matter in issue can finally be laid to rest in an

appropriate contest before the court. The rule is a wise and tested one, borne by necessity.

Without the rule, there will be no end to a litigation, because the dissatisfied litigant may simply

raise new or additional issues in order to prevent, defeat, or delay the implementation of an

already final and executory judgment. The endlessness of litigation can give rise to added costs

for the parties, and can surely contribute to the unwarranted clogging of court dockets. The

prospect of a protracted litigation between the parties annuls the very rationale of every litigation

to attain justice. Verily, there must be an end to litigation.

Second: The petitioner cannot now insist that the RTC did not settle the question of the

respondents qualifications to own land due to non-citizenship. It is fundamental that the

judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter

that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their

successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special

proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity.13

Thus, in Gabuya v. Layug,14 this Court had the occasion to hold that a judgment involving the

same parties, the same facts, and the same issues binds the parties not only as to every matter

offered and received to sustain or defeat their claims or demands, but also as to any other

admissible matter that might have been offered for that purpose and all other matters that could

have been adjudged in that case.

Third: The present recourse has not been the only one taken by the petitioner and her counsel to

assail the qualification of Ramona to acquire and own the subject property. In fact, the Court

catalogued such recourses taken for the petitioner herein in A.C. No. 5469, entitled Foronda v.

Guerrero,15 an administrative case for disbarment commenced on June 29, 2001 by Ricardo A.

Foronda (an attorney-in-fact of the respondents) against Atty. Arnold V. Guerrero, the attorney

of the petitioner,16 as follows:

1. Catalina Balais-Mabanag, assisted by her husband Eleuterio Mabanag v. Hon. Estrella T.

Estrada, et al. docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 47710:

A special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for temporary

restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction filed with the CA, on the ground that the

respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion, excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing

and/or refusing to stay the execution of its decision. The respondent put forth the argument that

Ramona Patricia Alcaraz, being a foreign national, was incapacitated to purchase the subject

property due to the limitations embodied in the 1987 Constitution.

The petition was denied, with the CA ratiocinating as follows:

We are not impressed. We find the trial courts stand on the matter to be legally

unassailable. In the first place, petitioner is not the proper party to question the qualification or

eligibility of Ramona Alcaraz. It is the State, through the Office of the Solicitor General, which

has the legal personality and the authority to question the qualification of Ramona Alcaraz to

own rural or urban land. In the second place, the decision sought to be executed has already

gained finality. As held by the Supreme Court, when a courts judgment or order becomes final

and executory it is the ministerial duty of the trial court to issue a writ of execution to enforce its

judgment (Rollo, pp. 65-66).

This petition was filed by the respondent on behalf of his clients asking the Supreme Court to

review the decision of the CA dismissing the petition for injunction in CA-G.R. SP No. 47710.

The petition was denied for having been filed out of time, and the motion for reconsideration

therefrom was denied with finality on April 21, 1999.

3. Spouses Eleuterio & Catalina Mabanag v. Ramona Patricia Alcaraz and the Register of

Deeds for Quezon City docketed as Civil Case No. Q-97-31268:

A complaint for Declaration of Inability to Acquire Real Property and Damages filed in

the RTC QC, Branch 83. In its Order dated July 9, 1999, the court dismissed the case on the

grounds of res judicata and forum shopping. The RTC observed that for failure of the plaintiffs

in this case to get a favorable decision from the earlier case, they tried to prevent the execution

by disqualifying the herein defendant Alcaraz

4. Catalina Balais-Mabanag, assisted by her husband, Eleuterio Mabanag v. Emelita L

Mariano, Concepcion D. Alcaraz and Ramona P. Alcaraz, et al. docketed as Civil Case No. Q-

01-43396:

An action for Annulment of Title and Deed of Absolute Sale and Damages with Prayer for

Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. In its Order dated March

20, 2001, acting on the injunctive aspect of the case, the RTC denied the injunction prayed for

for failure of the plaintiff to make at least a prima facie showing of a right to the issuance of the

writ. The subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by the respondent on behalf of his clients

was denied on June 18, 2001. Acting on the defendants Special and Affirmative Defenses and

Motion to Dismiss, the court issued an order dated January 16, 2002 dismissing the complaint

finding that the decision in Civil Case No. Q-44134 had already been turned over to complainant

as attorney-in-fact of defendants Alcarazes.

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