A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC RULE ON ADOPTION A. DOMESTIC ADOPTION Section 1. Applicability of the Rule. This Rule covers the domestic adoption of Filipino children. Section 2. Objectives. (a) The best interests of the child shall be the paramount consideration in all matters relating to his care, custody and adoption, in accordance with Philippine laws, the nited !ations ( !) "onvention on the Rights of the "hild, ! #eclaration on $ocial and %egal Principles Relating to the Protection and &elfare of "hildren with $pecial Reference to Foster Placement and 'doption, !ationally and (nternationally, and the )ague "onvention on the Protection of "hildren and "ooperation in Respect of (nter*country 'doption. (b) The $tate shall provide alternative protection and assistance through foster care or adoption for every child who is a foundling, neglected, orphaned, or abandoned. To this end, the $tate shall+ (i) ensure that every child remains under the care and custody of his parents and is provided with love, care, understanding and security for the full and harmonious development of his personality. ,nly when such efforts prove insufficient and no appropriate placement or adoption within the child-s e.tended family is available shall adoption by an unrelated person be considered. (ii) safeguard the biological parents from ma/ing hasty decisions in relin0uishing their parental authority over their child1 (iii) prevent the child from unnecessary separation from his biological parents1 (iv) conduct public information and educational campaigns to promote a positive environment for adoption1 (v) ensure that government and private sector agencies have the capacity to handle adoption in0uiries, process domestic adoption applications and offer adoption*related services including, but not limited to, parent preparation and post*adoption education and counseling1 (vi) encourage domestic adoption so as to preserve the child-s identity and culture in his native land, and only when this is not available shall inter*country adoption be considered as a last resort1 and (vii) protect adoptive parents from attempts to disturb their parental authority and custody over their adopted child. 'ny voluntary or involuntary termination of parental authority shall be administratively or 2udicially declared so as to establish the status of the child as 3legally available for adoption4 and his custody transferred to the #epartment of $ocial &elfare and #evelopment or to any duly licensed and accredited child*placing or child*caring agency, which entity shall be authori5ed to ta/e steps for the permanent placement of the child. Section 3. Definition of Terms. For purposes of this Rule+ (a) 3"hild4 is a person below eighteen (67) years of age at the time of the filing of the petition for adoption. (b) 3' child legally available for adoption4 refers to a child who has been voluntarily or involuntarily committed to the #epartment or to a duly licensed and accredited child*placing or child*caring agency, freed of the parental authority of his biological parents, or in case of rescission of adoption, his guardian or adopter(s). (c) 38oluntarily committed child4 is one whose parents /nowingly and willingly relin0uish parental authority over him in favor of the #epartment. (d) 3(nvoluntarily committed child4 is one whose parents, /nown or un/nown, have been permanently and 2udicially deprived of parental authority over him due to abandonment1 substantial, continuous or repeated neglect and abuse1 or incompetence to discharge parental responsibilities. (e) 3Foundling4 refers to a deserted or abandoned infant or child whose parents, guardian or relatives are un/nown1 or a child committed to an orphanage or charitable or similar institution with un/nown facts of birth and parentage and registered in the "ivil Register as a 3foundling.4 (f) 3'bandoned child4 refers to one who has no proper parental care or guardianship or whose parents have deserted him for a period of at least si. (9) continuous months and has been 2udicially declared as such. (g) 3#ependent child4 refers to one who is without a parent, guardian or custodian or one whose parents, guardian or other custodian for good cause desires to be relieved of his care and custody and is dependent upon the public for support. (h) 3!eglected child4 is one whose basic needs have been deliberately not attended to or inade0uately attended to, physically or emotionally, by his parents or guardian.

(i) 3Physical neglect4 occurs when the child is malnourished, ill*clad and without proper shelter. (2) 3:motional neglect4 e.ists when a child is raped, seduced, maltreated, e.ploited, overwor/ed or made to wor/ under conditions not conducive to good health or made to beg in the streets or public places, or placed in moral danger, or e.posed to drugs, alcohol, gambling, prostitution and other vices. (/) 3"hild*placement agency4 refers to an agency duly licensed and accredited by the #epartment to provide comprehensive child welfare services including, but not limited to, receiving applications for adoption, evaluating the prospective adoptive parents and preparing the adoption home study report. (l) 3"hild*caring agency4 refers to an agency duly licensed and accredited by the #epartment that provides ;. That . . . despite the proddings and pleadings of said spouses, respondent refused to change his surname from $ibulo to %ahom, to the frustrations of petitioner particularly her husband until the latter died, and even before his death he had made /nown his desire to revo/e respondentHs adoption, but was prevented by petitionerHs supplication, however with his further re0uest upon petitioner to give to charity whatever properties or interest may pertain to respondent in the future. ... ... ...

I6@. That respondent continued using his surname $ibulo to the utter disregard of the feelings of herein petitioner, and his records with the Professional Regulation "ommission showed his name as Dose Felvin F. $ibulo originally issued in 6C>7 until the present, and in all his dealings and activities in connection with his practice of his profession, he is Dose Felvin F. $ibulo. ... ... ...

I6=. That herein petitioner being a widow, and living alone in this city with only her household helps to attend to her, has yearned for the care and show of concern from a son, but respondent remained indifferent and would only come to !aga to see her once a year. I6 (t was only much later when adoption was given an impetus in law and still later when the welfare of the child became a paramount concern. 7 $pain itself which previously disfavored adoption ultimately relented and accepted the Roman law concept of adoption which, subse0uently, was to find its way to the archipelago. The 'mericans came and introduced their own ideas on adoption which, unli/e most countries in :urope, made the interests of the child an overriding consideration. C (n the early part of the century 2ust passed, the rights of children invited universal attention1 the Eeneva #eclaration of Rights of the "hild of 6C;< and the niversal #eclaration of )uman Rights of 6CB. ?y then, the new law,;; had already abrogated and repealed the right of an adopter under the "ivil "ode and the Family "ode to rescind a decree of adoption. "onsistently with its earlier pronouncements, the "ourt should now hold that the action for rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by petitioner after R.'. !o. 7BB; had come into force, no longer could be pursued. (nterestingly, even before the passage of the statute, an action to set aside the adoption is sub2ect to the five*year bar rule under Rule 6@@ ;= of the Rules of "ourt and that the adopter would lose the right to revo/e the adoption decree after the lapse of that period. The e.ercise of the right within a prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill the re0uirements of a vested right entitled to protection. (t must also be ac/nowledged that a person has no vested right in statutory privileges. ;< &hile adoption has often been referred to in the conte.t of a Iright,I the privilege to adopt is itself not naturally innate or fundamental but rather a right merely created by statute. ;B (t is a privilege that is governed by the stateHs determination on what it may deem to be for the best interest and welfare of the child. ;9 Fatters relating to adoption, including the withdrawal of the right of an adopter to nullify the adoption decree, are sub2ect to regulation by the $tate. ;> "oncomitantly, a right of action given by statute may be ta/en away at anytime before it has been e.ercised.;7

&hile R.'. !o. 7BB; has un0ualifiedly withdrawn from an adopter a conse0uential right to rescind the adoption decree even in cases where the adoption might clearly turn out to be undesirable, it remains, nevertheless, the bounden duty of the "ourt to apply the law. Dura lex sed lex would be the hac/neyed truism that those caught in the law have to live with. (t is still noteworthy, however, that an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child. For instance, upon the grounds recogni5ed by law, an adopter may deny to an adopted child his legitime and, by a will and testament, may freely e.clude him from having a share in the disposable portion of his estate. &):R:F,R:, the assailed 2udgment of the court a 0uo is 'FF(RF:#. !o costs. $, ,R#:R:#.Davide& ,r.& # ., .& 6nares7$antiago& #arpio and A2cuna& ,, .& concur.

8.R. No. 114410 M#-c& 252 1556

200

NERISSA ?. PERE?2 petitioner, vs. T:E COURT OF APPEALS #n. RA7 C. PERE?2 respondents. ROMERO2 J.:p

Parties herein would have this "ourt duplicate the feat of Ming $olomon who was hailed in ?iblical times for his sagacious, if, at times unorthodo., manner of resolving conflicts, the most celebrated case being that when his authority was invo/ed to determine the identity of the real mother as between two women claiming the same infant. $ince there could only be one mother, the daunting tas/ that confronted the /ingG2udge was to choose the true one. (n the instant case, we are faced with the challenge of deciding, as between father and mother, who should have rightful custody of a child who bears in his person both their genes. &hile there is a provision of law s0uarely in point, the two courts whose authority have been invo/ed to render a decision have arrived at diametrically opposite conclusions. (t has fallen upon us now to li/ewise act as 2udge between the trial court, on the one hand, and the appellate, on the other. ,n the issue of custody over the minor Ray Pere5 ((, respondent "ourt of 'ppeals ruled in favor of the boyHs father Ray ". Pere5, reversing the trial courtHs decision to grant custody to !erissa L. Pere5, the childHs mother. Ray Pere5, private respondent, is a doctor of medicine practicing in "ebu while !erissa, his wife who is petitioner herein, is a registered nurse. They were married in "ebu on #ecember 9, 6C79. 'fter si. miscarriages, two operations and a high*ris/ pregnancy, petitioner finally gave birth to Ray Pere5 (( in !ew Aor/ on Duly ;@, 6CC;. Petitioner who began wor/ing in the nited $tates in ,ctober 6C77, used part of her earnings to build a modest house in Fandaue "ity, "ebu. $he also sought medical attention for her successive miscarriages in !ew Aor/. $he became a resident alien in February 6CC;. Private respondent stayed with her in the visa and was not employed. .$. twice and too/ care of her when she became pregnant. nli/e his wife, however, he had only a tourist

,n Danuary 6>, 6CC=, the couple and their baby arrived in "ebu. 'fter a few wee/s, only !erissa returned to the .$. $he alleged that they came home only for a five*wee/ vacation and that they all had round*trip tic/ets. )owever, her husband stayed behind to ta/e care of his sic/ mother and promised to follow her with the baby. 'ccording to Ray, they had agreed to reside permanently in the Philippines but once !erissa was in !ew Aor/, she changed her mind and continued wor/ing. $he was supposed to come bac/ immediately after winding up her affairs there. &hen !erissa came home a few days, before Ray ((Hs first birthday, the couple was no longer on good terms. That their love for each other was fading became apparent from their serious 0uarrels. Petitioner did not want to live near her in*laws and rely solely on her husbandHs meager income of PB,@@@.@@. 1 $he longed to be with her only child but he was being /ept away from her by her husband. Thus, she did not want to leave RD (Ray Dunior) with her husband and in*laws. $he wished for her son to grow up with his mother. ,n the other hand, Ray wanted to stay here, where he could raise his son even as he practiced his profession. )e maintained that it would not be difficult to live here since they have their own home and a car. They could live comfortably on his P6B,@@@.@@ monthly income 2 as they were not burdened with having to pay any debts. Petitioner was forced to move to her parentsH home on Eui5o $treet in Fandaue. #espite mediation by the priest who solemni5ed their marriage, the couple failed to reconcile. ,n Duly ;9, 6CC=, !erissa L. Pere5 filed a petition for habeas corpus 3 as/ing respondent Ray ". Pere5 to surrender the custody of their son, Ray L. Pere5 ((, to her. ,n 'ugust ;>, 6CC=, the court a 8uo issued an ,rder awarding custody of the one*year old child to his mother, !erissa Pere5, citing the second paragraph of 'rticle ;6= of the Family "ode which provides that no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. The dispositive portion of the ,rder reads+ &):R:F,R:, foregoing premises considered, ,rder is hereby issued ordering the respondent to turn over the custody of their child Ray "ortes Pere5 ((, his passport and round trip tic/et to herein petitioner with a warning that if he will escape together with the child for the purpose of hiding the minor child instead of complying with this ,rder, that warrant for his arrest will be issued.$, ,R#:R:#. 4

pon appeal by Ray Pere5, the "ourt of 'ppeals, on $eptember ;>, 6CC. 1 The appropriate petition for adoption ($p. Proc. !o. @B>*?) was filed by herein petitioners over the child before the Regional Trial "ourt of Ri5al, Fourth Dudicial #istrict, ?ranch 9> which, on ;@ 'ugust 6C7>, rendered a decision 2granting the petition. The child was then /nown as 'ngelie 'nne Fa2ardo. The court ordered that the child be Ifreed from parental authority of her natural parents as well as from legal obligation and maintenance to them and that from now on shall be, for all legal intents and purposes, /nown as 'ngelie 'nne "ervantes, a child of herein petitioners and capable of inheriting their estate .I 3 $ometime in Farch or 'pril 6C7>, the adoptive parents, herein petitioners !elson and Lenaida "ervantes, received a letter from the respondents demanding to be paid the amount of P6B@,@@@.@@, otherwise, they would get bac/ their child. Petitioners refused to accede to the demand. 's a result, on 66 $eptember 6C7>, while petitioners were out at wor/, the respondent Eina "arreon too/ the child from her IyayaI at the petitionersH residence in 'ngono, Ri5al, on the prete.t that she was instructed to do so by her mother. Respondent Eina "arreon brought the child to her house in ParaOa0ue. Petitioners thereupon demanded the return of the child, but Eina "arreon refused, saying that she had no desire to give up her child for adoption and that the affidavit of consent to the adoption she had e.ecuted was not fully e.plained to her. $he sent word to the petitioners that she will, however, return the child to the petitioners if she were paid the amount of P6B@,@@@.@@. Felisa Tansingco, the social wor/er who had conducted the case study on the adoption and submitted a report thereon to the Regional Trial "ourt of Ri5al in the adoption case, testified on ;> ,ctober 6C7> before the :.ecutive Dudge, Regional Trial "ourt of Pasig in connection with the present petition. $he declared that she had interviewed respondent Eina "arreon on ;< Dune 6C7> in connection with the contemplated adoption of the child. #uring the interview, said respondent manifested to the social wor/er her desire to have the child adopted by the petitioners. 4 (n all cases involving the custody, care, education and property of children, the latterHs welfare is paramount. The provision that no mother shall be separated from a child under five (B) years of age, will not apply where the "ourt finds compelling reasons to rule otherwise. 0 (n all controversies regarding the custody of minors, the foremost consideration is the moral, physical and social welfare of the child concerned, ta/ing into account the resources and moral as well as social standing of the contending parents. !ever has this "ourt deviated from this criterion. 6 (t is undisputed that respondent "onrado Fa2ardo is legally married to a woman other than respondent Eina "arreon, and his relationship with the latter is a common*law husband and wife relationship. )is open cohabitation with co*respondent Eina "arreon will not accord the minor that desirable atmosphere where she can grow and develop into an upright and moral*minded person. ?esides, respondent Eina "arreon had previously given birth to another child by another married man with whom she lived for almost three (=) years but who eventually left her and vanished. For a minor (li/e 'ngelie 'nne ". "ervantes) to grow up with a sister whose IfatherI is not her true father, could also affect the moral outloo/ and values of said minor. pon the other hand, petitioners who are legally married appear to be morally, physically, financially, and socially capable of supporting the minor and giving her a future better than what the natural mother (herein respondent Eina "arreon), who is not only 2obless but also maintains an illicit relation with a married man, can most li/ely give her. ?esides, the minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with the full /nowledge and consent of respondents. ' decree of adoption has the effect, among others, of dissolving the authority vested in natural parents over the adopted child, e.cept where the adopting parent is the spouse of the natural parent of the adopted, in which case, parental authority over the adopted shall be e.ercised 2ointly by both spouses. 1 The adopting parents have the right to the care and custody of the adopted child 4 and e.ercise parental authority and responsibility over him. 5 '"",R#(!E%A, and as recommended by the :.ecutive Dudge, Regional Trial "ourt of Pasig, )on. :utropio Figrino, the Petition is ER'!T:#. The custody and care of the minor 'ngelie 'nne "ervantes are hereby granted to petitioners to whom they properly belong, and respondents are ordered (if they still have not) to deliver said minor to the petitioners immediately upon notice hereof This resolution is immediately e.ecutory. $, ,R#:R:#.5elencio7(errera (#hairperson!& 'aras& $armiento and Regalado& ,,.& concur.

8.R. No. L-16104

Octo+e- 312 1562

TRUSTEES:IP OF T:E MINORS 6ENI8NO2 AN8ELA #n. ANTONIO # $)-n#'e. PERE? 7 TUASON2 P:ILIPPINE NATIONAL 6ANA2 9).ici# 8)#-.i#n o* 6ENI8NO PERE?2 ANTONIO M. PERE?2 2udicial guardian*appellant, vs. 9. ANTONIO ARANETA2 trustee*appellee. Alfonso "elix& ,r. for judicial guardian7appellant. Araneta and Araneta for trustee7appellee. CONCEPCION2 J.:

This is an appeal by writ of error from an order of the "ourt of First (nstance of Ri5al denying a motion of appellant, 'ntonio F. Pere5, as 2udicial guardian of his children, the minors ?enigno, 'ngela, and 'ntonio, all surnamed Pere5 y Tuason. (n pursuance of the provisions of the will of the late 'ngela $. Tuason J which was probated in $pecial Proceedings !o. B7B of said "ourt J appellee D. 'ntonio 'raneta was on Farch ;= of the same "ourt, as trustee of property be0ueathed by the deceased to some of her heirs, including her grandchildren, the aforementioned minors. ,n ,ctober @ a s0uare meter and two (;) sales each of lot of ;@,@@@ s0uare meters and a sale of a lot of ;76,@ up to and until late 6C76 your petitioner lived with Roberto %im "hua as husband and wife and out of said union they begot two (;) children, namely, Robert Rafson 'lon5o "hua who was born in Eeneral $antos "ity on 'pril ;7, 6C>> and Rudyard Pride 'lon5o "hua who was born in #avao "ity on 'ugust =@, 6C>7. ' .ero. copy of the birth certificate of each child is hereto attached as anne. I'I and I?I, respectively. =. That the aforementioned children who are still minors today are both staying with herein petitioner at her address at Nue5on 'venue, "otabato "ity1 =). (t was this "ourt which first too/ cogni5ance of the case when the petition was filed on Duly ;, 6CC;, doc/eted as $pecial Proceeding !o. ==6 and an order of publication issued by this "ourt on Duly 6=, 6CC;. &):R:F,R:, in view of the foregoing, the motion to dismiss is hereby denied for lac/ of merit. ,n =6 'ugust 6CC;, upon motion of private respondent, the trial court issued an order appointing Romulo %im special administrator of the decedentHs estate. 4 y, a first cousin of the deceased, as

,n the same day, the trial court, li/ewise, issued an ,rder appointing Florita 8alle2o as guardian over the persons and properties of the two minor children. 5 Thereafter, petitioner filed a Fotion dated ;B ,ctober 6CC= 10 praying that the letters of administration issued to 8alle2o be recalled and that new letters of administration be issued to her. $he, li/ewise, filed a Fotion dated B !ovember 6CC= 11 to declare the proceedings a mistrial. ?oth motions were denied by the trial court in its ,rder dated ;; !ovember 6CC=. 12 PetitionerHs motion for reconsideration of the order was denied by the trial court in an ,rder dated 6= #ecember 6CC=. 13 'ssailing the last two orders of the trial court, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition (Rule 9B) with the respondent "ourt of 'ppeals, doc/eted as "' E.R. !o. $p. ==6@6, alleging that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in+ (6) unilaterally and summarily converting, if not treating, the guardianship proceedings into an intestate proceeding1 (;) summarily hearing the intestate proceedings without 2urisdiction and without any notice to herein petitioner whatsoever1 and (=) issuing the 0uestioned order (sic) on the alleged pretension that herein petitioner has no personality to intervene in $P% Proc. !o. ==6 0uestioning the highly anomalous orders precipitately issued ex7parte by the public respondent R.T.". without notice to the petitioners. Petitioner in the main argued that private respondent herself admitted in her opposition to petitionerHs motion to dismiss filed in the trial court and in open court that the original petition she filed is one for guardianship1 hence, the trial court acted beyond its 2urisdiction when it issued letters of administration over the estate of Roberto %. "hua, thereby converting the petition into an intestate proceeding, without the amended petition being published in a newspaper of general circulation as re0uired by $ection =, Rule >C. The "ourt of 'ppeals, in its decision promulgated on 6C 'pril 6CC9@, of the Regional Trial "ourt (RT") of Pasay "ity, ?ranch 66C in "ivil "ase !o. 9>B*7B*79@ #ecision that the #eed of 'bsolute $ale dated ;@ February 6C7< e.ecuted by !ave in their favor was null and void on the ground that !ave was found incompetent since the year 6C7@. The "ourt of 'ppeals, in its #ecision, dated 6@ 'pril ;@@6, granted the appeals of $.F. Fernando Realty "orporation and the Pabale siblings. (t ruled thus+

&):R:F,R:, premises considered, the appeal filed by $. F. Fernando Realty "orporation, represented by its President, $esinando F. Fernando as well as the appeal interposed by Rommel, :lmer, :rwin, Roller and 'manda, all surnamed Pabale, are hereby ER'!T:#. The #ecision of the Regional Trial "ourt of Pasay "ity, ?ranch 66C in "ivil "ase !o. 9>B*7 $"R' ;@6, ;6@ R6CC6S), reiterated 9ope2 vs. Reyes (>9 $"R' 6>C R6C>>S) in regard to the distinction between bar by former 2udgment which bars the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand, or cause of action, and conclusiveness of 2udgment which bars the relitigation of particular facts or issues in another litigation between the same parties on a different claim or cause of action. The general rule precluding the relitigation of material facts or 0uestions which were in issue and ad2udicated in former action are commonly applied to all matters essentially connected with the sub2ect matter of the litigation. Thus, it e.tends to 0uestions necessarily implied in the final 2udgment, although no specific finding may have been made in reference thereto and although such matters were directly referred to in the pleadings and were not actually or formally presented. nder this rule, if the record of the former trial shows that the 2udgment could not have been rendered without deciding the particular matter, it will be considered as having settled that matter as to all future actions between the parties and if a 2udgment necessarily presupposes certain premises, they are as conclusive as the 2udgment itself.6; 'nother case, Orope2a 5ar)eting #orporation v. Allied %an)ing #orporation, further differentiated between the two rules of res judicata, as follows+ There is =+#- +y !-io- B).%'ent= when, as between the first case where the 2udgment was rendered and the second case that is sought to be barred, t&e-e i$ i.entity o* !#-tie$2 $)+Bect '#tte-2 #n. c#)$e$ o* #ction . (n this instance, the 2udgment in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the second action. ,therwise put, the 2udgment or decree of the court of competent 2urisdiction on the merits concludes the litigation between the parties, as well as their privies, and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same cause of action before the same or other tribunal. ?ut where t&e-e i$ i.entity o* !#-tie$ in the first and second cases, +)t no i.entity o* c#)$e$ o* #ction, the first 2udgment is conclusive only as to those matters actually and directly controverted and determined and not as to matters merely involved therein. This is the concept of res judicata /nown as=conc )$i,ene$$ o* B).%'ent.= $tated differently, any right, fact, or matter in issue directly ad2udicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in which 2udgment is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the 2udgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or sub2ect matter of the two actions is the same.6= (n sum, conclusiveness of 2udgment bars the re*litigation in a second case of a fact or 0uestion already settled in a previous case. The second case, however, may still proceed provided that it will no longer touch on the same fact or 0uestion ad2udged in the first case. "onclusiveness of 2udgment re0uires only the identity of issues and parties, but not of causes of action. "ontrary to 'lamayri-s assertion, conclusiveness of 2udgment has no application to the instant Petition since there is no identity of parties and issues between $P. PR,". !o. 6,69 issued by the RT" in $P. PR,". !o. 6B*7 to 6C77. )ence, for this "ourt, the RT" #ecision dated ;; Dune 6C77 in $P. PR,". !o. 6B*7;.79 ;@@.@@ ;@@.@@ ;@@.@@ 9@@.@@ 6@,@@@.@@ P;9,9>;.79, ... ...

"ert. !o. @C696, $erie I#I, for three shares of I%a

('ccount receivable)* ?alance of Promissory !ote dated Fay 6@, 6C=B, e.ecuted by I%a Eran2a, (nc.,I in favor of &. '. $tegner T,T'% '$$:T$

and in addition thereto, the minors were to receive monthly pensions from the . $. 8eterans 'dministration. 'lthough there is no evidence on record, the decision of the trial "ourt states that the said will of &. '. $tegner was duly admitted to probate and this statement was never refuted by any of the parties. ,n !ovember 66, 6C=9, Duanita T. $tegner, widow of the deceased and mother of the minors, petitioned the "ourt of First (nstance of Fanila for the issuance in her favor of letters of guardianship over the person and properties of her children, which petition was granted by the "ourt in its order of !ovember 6=, 6C=9, upon the filing by the petitioner of a bond in the sum of PB@@. The 8eterans 'dministration, however, recommended that the guardianship over the properties be placed in the hands of a solvent trust company doing business in Fanila.

The Philippine Trust "ompany thereafter filed a petition, which was later amended, praying that in view of the will of &. '. $tegner appointing said company as guardian for the estates of the minors, letters of guardianship for the properties of Dames, )enry, Ruth, "atherine and Fildred $tegner be issued upon in its favor, and upon agreement of the parties, the "ourt set aside its previous order and appointed Duanita T. $tegner as guardian over the persons of the minors and the Philippine Trust "ompany as guardian of their properties. Dames :. $tegner reached the age of ma2ority and was conse0uently released from guardianship by order of the "ourt of Farch ;7, 6C, /nown as the Eeneral ?an/ing 'ct) which provides that deposits or moneys received by a trust corporation as guardian or trustee can be loaned and invested in accordance with the provisions governing loans and investments of savings and mortgage ban/s, unless otherwise directed by the instrument creating the trust. 'ppellants, on the other hand, maintain that the properties of the wards were received by the guardian in a fidei commissary capacity which parta/es of the nature of aI commodatumI for the benefit of said minors, thus re0uiring court authori5ation before said funds could be invested. 'lthough the conte.t of the will of &. '. $tegner unmista/ably conveys the testatorHs intention to create a trust and ma/e the Philippine Trust "ompany a trustee, it must be remembered that upon said companyHs application and by agreement of the parties, the "ourt in its order of February ;=, 6C=>, appointed the Philippine Trust "ompany as guardian (not as trustee) of the properties of the minors, and there is no showing either that when the will of &. '. $tegner was presented and allowed to probate in case !o. @ of the "ourt of First (nstance of Fanila, appellee was appointed as such trustee. )aving assumed office as IguardianI of the properties of the wards, the company should be governed, in the management of the funds of said minors, by the provisions of the Rules of "ourt on guardianship and not by the rules on trust corporations under the "orporation %aw. Petitioner*appellee, however, asserts that although it did not secure previous 2udicial approval of those investments, they were included in the annual accountings which were passed upon by the court from time to time. (n support of such contention, the 8ice*president of the Philippine Trust "ompany too/ the witness at and and testified that for the investments made in the mortgage of the Tambunting ?rothers, the 8eterans 'dministration when notified offered no ob2ection and recommended approval thereof, and such investment was approved by the "ourt on Duly ;;, 6C=C1 that the investments in the mortgages of "adsawan and T. de 8era were included in the inventory of Duly 9, 6C, 6C. R9S The records disclose that in a decision dated Farch S in "'*E.R. $P !o. S that he thought all along that under $ection 9, Rule C9 of the Revised Rules of "ourt, he could issue the 0uestioned writ to protect and preserve the rights of the wards in the light of the sworn assertion of the guardian, %ina Francisco*8ele5, that the complainants were indebted to her wards, who were already senile, to the tune of PB million1 that even as the complainants had priorly been cited by the guardian in a motion to re0uire them to appear for e.amination as debtors of her wards and against whom she (guardian) had initiated the filing of si. (9) informations for violation of ?.P. ?lg. ;;, they (complainants) did not appear to oppose the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment1 that the department store of the complainants that the sheriff opened, because the former had abandoned the same, R67S was located at the Franda Fall, a building owned by the wards1 and that the opening of the store and the attachment of the items found therein, which were all inventoried, contrary to the claim of the complainants, were done in the presence of a senior police inspector and a )agawad of the barangay.

R6CS

Respondent 2udge vehemently denied having committed any fraud, dishonesty or corruption. )e put forward the submission that, if at all, he merely committed an error of 2udgment and set forth the prayer that+ &):R:F,R:, it is respectively prayed, and considering that the Respondent Dudge will be retiring on !ovember ;7, 6CCC and who has reached the age of wal/ing under the shadow of death and has no other means in life to support his remaining years of his life e.cept the benefits he may be given by the government for his duties or services, and for humanitarian reasons, the case be dismissed.4 R;@S 't the ensuing investigation, the complainants never appeared despite substituted service R;6S and service by mailR;;S on them of the notices of investigation. ,nly the respondent 2udge appeared and after his oral motion to dismiss R;=S had been denied,R;S ,n the other hand, the respondent 2udge 2ustified the disputed writ of preliminary in2unction he issued in this wise+ The legal guardian filed a verified Fotion To "ite $pouses %eonardo and Teresa #aracan To 'ppear For :.amination and Fanifestation &ith $upplemental Fotion praying that upon filing of these pleadings a writ of preliminary attachment be issued. (t appears from the verified motion that the spouses %eonardo and Faria Teresa #aracan is ( sic) indebted to the wards amounting to Five Fillion Pesos (PB,@@@,@@@.@@). That when the said spouses was ( sic) was (sic! charged by the wardRsS through the legal guardian of 8iolation of ?.P. ;;, said spouses started concealing and ta/ing away all the assets real and personal in order to pre2udice the wards and considering that the obligation or indebtedness was incurred through fraud, they have been concealing and disposing the property in order to avoid and frustrate the intention of the wardRsS to attach preliminarily their petition. (t was also alleged that $pouses #aracan are leasing a place located at the Franda Fall ?uilding owned by the Franda "orporation of which the wards are the ma2ority stoc/holders. )owever, they have been deliberately and by stealth removing all the wares and goods in the said $amut $ari #epartment $tore in order to pre2udice the said wards, their creditors. &):R:F,R:, a writ of preliminary attachment is hereby issued in this case in order to stop the further concealment or disposal of the assets of RtheS $pouses #aracan in order to pre2udice the wards herein as their creditors upon RtheS filing of a bond in the amount of three hundred thousand pesos (P=@@,@@@.@@), let a writ of preliminary attachment be issued in this case directing and ordering the #eputy $heriff of this "ourt to sei5e all the personal properties of the $pouses #aracan andGor real estate within the Province of Pampanga, for safe/eeping not to e.ceed F(8: F(%%(,! P:$,$ (PB,@@@,@@@.@@) until further orders from this "ourt. $, ,R#:R:#.R;7S (t is, therefore, beyond cavil that, as found by the "ourt of 'ppeals, the respondent 2udge 3clearly e.ceeded RhisS 2urisdiction4 in issuing the writ. (narguably, a guardianship court e.ercises but a limited 2urisdiction that cannot e.tend to the determination of 0uestions of ownership. 'part from that, the ?.P. ?lg. ;; cases filed by the wards against the herein complainants can not be utili5ed by the respondent 2udge as basis for the issuance of the writ simply because the cases are not before the guardianship court over which he was then presiding. $imilarly, the fact that herein complainants were deliberately and by stealth removing all their wares and goods from their store to the pre2udice of the wards to whom they (complainants) were

indebted to the tune of PB million is entirely foreign to the guardianship proceedings1 and the guardian-s remedy was to institute a collection suit against the complainants in the proper court and therein apply for a writ of attachment. ?e that as it may, the mind feels ill at ease to conclude that respondent 2udge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law or of /nowingly rendering an un2ust order. For it has been held that+ . . . if every error of the 2udge should be punished, then perhaps no 2udge, however good, competent, honest and dedicated he may be, can ever hope to retire from the 2udiciary without a blemished record and a tarnished image.R;CS (n Dela #ru2 v. #oncepcion&F43I later reiterated in -ingarts v. ,udge $ervillano 5. 5ejia&R=6S this "ourt had the occasion to e.pound on the nature and the wisdom behind the twin charges of gross ignorance of the law andGor /nowingly rendering an un2ust 2udgment. There we declared thus+ To constitute gross ignorance of the law, the sub2ect decision, order or actuation of the 2udge in the performance of his official duties must not only be contrary to e.isting law and 2urisprudence but, most importantly, he must be moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption. (n the case before us, the administrative complaint does not even allege that the erroneous decision of respondent was thus motivated. Mnowingly rendering an un2ust 2udgment is both a criminal and an administrative charge. 's a crime, it is punished under 'rt. ;@< of the Revised Penal "ode the elements of which are+ (a) the offender is a 2udge1 (b) he renders a 2udgment in a case submitted to him for decision1 (c) the 2udgment is un2ust1 and (d) the 2udge /nows that his 2udgment is un2ust. The gist of the offense therefore is that an un2ust 2udgment be rendered maliciously or in bad faith, that is, /nowing it to be un2ust. 'n un2ust 2udgment is one which is contrary to law or is not supported by evidence or both. The source of an un2ust 2udgment may be error or ill* will. There is no liability at all for a mere error. (t is well*settled that a 2udicial officer, when re0uired to e.ercise his 2udgment or discretion, is not liable criminally for any error which he commits, provided he acts in good faith. ?ad faith is therefore the ground of liability. (f in rendering 2udgment the 2udge fully /new that the same was un2ust in the sense aforesaid, then he acted maliciously and must have been actuated and prevailed upon by hatred, envy, revenge, greed or some other similar motive. 's interpreted by $panish courts, the term 3/nowingly4 means sure /nowledge, conscious and deliberate intention to do an in2ustice. Fere error therefore in the interpretation or application of the law does not constitute the crime. The nature of the administrative charge of /nowingly rendering an un2ust 2udgment is the same as the criminal charge. Thus, in this particular administrative charge, it must be established that respondent Dudge rendered a 2udgment or decision not supported by law andGor evidence and that he must be actuated by hatred, envy, revenge, greed or some other similar motive.R=;S True it is that subse0uently, the far stricter norm of allowing only permissible margins of error has been adopted, thus+ &e need not belabor 2urisprudence to accommodate respondent-s argument which in effect posits that not every 2udicial error bespea/s ignorance of the law and that, if committed in good faith, does not warrant administrative sanction. $o we have ruled and so we have acted, but only in cases within the parameters of tolerable 2udgment. &here, however, the issues are so simple and the facts so evident as to be beyond permissible margins of error, to still err thereon amounts to ignorance of the law which, hopefully, was not merely feigned to subserve an unworthy purpose. R==S ,nly recently, however, the doctrine of bad faith as the ground for accountability has again come to fore. Fr. Dustice %eonardo '. Nuisumbing wrote+ . . . To establish her guilt, it is indispensable that the chec/s she issued for which she was subse0uently charged, be offered in evidence because the gravamen of the offense charged is the act of /nowingly issuing a chec/ with insufficient funds. "learly, it was error to convict the complainant on the basis of her letter alone. !evertheless, despite this incorrect interpretation of a rule of evidence, we do not find the same as sufficiently constitutive of the charges of gross ignorance of the law and of /nowingly rendering an un2ust decision. Rather, it is at most an error in 2udgment, for which, as a general rule, he cannot be held administratively liable. (n this regard, we reiterate the prevailing rule in our 2urisdiction as established by current 2urisprudence+ &e have heretofore ruled that a 2udge may be held administratively accountable for every erroneous order or decision he renders. To un2ustifiably hold otherwise, assuming that he has erred, would be nothing short of harassment and would ma/e his position doubly unbearable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering 2ustice can be infallible in 2udgment. The error must be gross or patent, malicious, deliberate or in evident bad faith. (t is only in this latter instance, when the 2udge acts fraudulently or with gross ignorance, that administrative sanctions are called for as an imperative duty of this "ourt. 's a matter of public policy then, the acts of a 2udge in his official capacity are not sub2ect to disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous. Eood faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations are sufficient defenses in which a 2udge charged with ignorance of the law can find refuge. 'nd in a later case, Fr. Dustice Nuisumbing was even more trenchant when he said+ The other charges, namely ignorance of the law and issuing an un2ust 2udgment, deserve consideration since the direct contempt order of respondent 2udge, under the attending circumstances it was issued, appears to be clearly erroneous. The supposedly contemptuous language used in a pleading was not submitted to respondent but filed in another court presided by another 2udge stationed in "ebu literally miles away from where respondent holds court in %eyte. 's this "ourt ruled in Ang vs. #astro@ se of disrespectful or contemptuous language against a particular 2udge in pleadings presented in another court or proceeding is indirect, not direct, contempt as it is not tantamount to a misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court or 2udge as to interrupt the administration of 2ustice.

)owever, administrative liability for ignorance of the law andGor /nowingly rendering an un2ust 2udgment does not immediately arise from the bare fact of a 2udge issuing a decisionGresolutionGorder later ad2udged to be erroneous. ,therwise, perhaps no 2udge, however competent, honest or dedicated he may be, can ever hope to retire from the 2udiciary with an unblemished record. For liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed order, decision or actuation of the 2udge in the performance of official duties must not only be found erroneous but, most importantly, it must also be established that he was moved by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred, or some other li/e motive. $imilarly, a 2udge will be held administratively liable for rendering an un2ust 2udgment * one which is contrary to law or 2urisprudence or is not supported by evidence * when he acts in bad faith, malice, revenge or some other similar motive. #n fine$ bad faith is the ground for liability in either or both offenses. Conversely$ a charge for either ignorance of the law or rendering an un"ust "udgment will not prosper against a "udge acting in good faith. %bsent the element of bad faith$ an erroneous "udgment cannot be the basis of a charge for any said offenses$ mere error of "udgment not being a ground for disciplinary proceedings.C34D (n the case on hand, there is not a scintilla of evidence, not even any remote indication, that the respondent 2udge, in issuing his erroneous writ of preliminary attachment, was impelled by ill*will, malice, revenge, personal animosity, impulse to do an in2ustice, greed, corrupt consideration or any other similar motive. ,n the contrary, the testimony of the respondent stands out unrebutted because of the failure of the complainants to appear despite due notice. )e declared that he does not /now and had never seen the complainants before. R=BS )e was prompted to issue the assailed writ of attachment only * ?ecause these spouses #aracan were renting a big store in the Franda Fall owned and operated by the wardRsS who are now senile. That is the reason why ( granted the petition for 2udicial guardianship. 'nd when they learned that the wards who are the spouses are no longer handling the business in the mall, and there-s already a legal guardian, they too/ away the most valuable items of their big store dealing in dry goods and the store was then $amuJt $ari and they left without paying any rentals, without paying their obligation amounting to several millions of pesos padloc/ed the store and they only left old stoc/s which are almost valueless and, in fact, the items sei5ed by the sheriff is ( sic) intact in the office of the sheriff and despite the notice issued by the sheriff for them to retrieve the same in view of the fact that the preliminary writ of attachment was dissolved, they failed to do so. R=9S and that * . . . ( have been very careful in dealing with this matter as ( was on the verge of retiring at that time. (n fact, my last wor/ing day fell on !ovember ;9, 6CCC. 'nd on that very day when ( attended the last day of my public service, that was the time that ( suffered the heart attac/ and ( was hospitali5ed at the )eart "enter for two months and until now, ( am still under observation and medication and convalescing from my complicated disease, because my disease were pulmonary disease (sic). ( suffer pleurisy of the lungs. )owever, my /idney again functioned so the dialysis stopped and the only disease now that ( am suffering is the lung disease and the pulmonary disease. That is all, Aour )onor.R=>S The respondent 2udge furthermore e.plained that he was of the impression that the portion of $ection 9, Rule C9 of the Revised Rules of "ourt reading 3ma/e such orders as will secure the estate against such embe55lement, concealment or conveyance4 authori5ed him to issue the writ of attachment to preserve the status 8uo and the real rights of the wards.R=7S nder the obtaining circumstances, it is apropos to 0uote Dustice Nuisumbing once more+ 3(t ought to be remembered that bad faith is not presumed and he who alleges the same has the onus of proving it. (n this regard, the complainants have not discharged that burden of proof . . ..4R=CS Re+ The charges of oppression and gross partiality. $imilarly, there is no factual support to the charges of oppression and partiality. 'nd again, this is for the reason that the complainants, instead of presenting evidence, had played truant from the investigation. The "ourt finds the recommendation of Dustice 8alde5 well*ta/en. 'nent the charges of gross ignorance of the law and /nowingly rendering an un2ust 2udgment or order, the "ourt in #anson v. /architorenaR;= and @;*>6C;) and a petition for cancellation of his name appearing in Fartin-s birth certificate (doc/eted as "ivil "ase !o. N*@;*C (6CC=)1 6;B %. :d. ;d of 'rticle ((( of the "onstitution. &e addressed this as follows+ The contention is untenable. The /ernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but against testimonial compulsion. The right against self*incrimination is simply against the legal process of e.tracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. (t does not apply where the evidence sought to be e.cluded is not an incrimination but as part of ob2ect evidence.

,ver the years, we have e.pressly e.cluded several /inds of ob2ect evidence ta/en from the person of the accused from the realm of self*incrimination. These include photographs,;7 hair,;C and other bodily substances.=@&e have also declared as constitutional several procedures performed on the accused such as pregnancy tests for women accused of adultery, =6 e.pulsion of morphine from one-s mouth =; and the tracing of one-s foot to determine its identity with bloody footprints.== (n ,imene2 v. #aLi2ares,=< we even authori5ed the e.amination of a woman-s genitalia, in an action for annulment filed by her husband, to verify his claim that she was impotent, her orifice being too small for his penis. $ome of these procedures were, to be sure, rather invasive and involuntary, but all of them were constitutionally sound. #!' testing and its results, per our ruling in 6atar,=B are now similarly acceptable. !or does petitioner-s invocation of his right to privacy persuade us. (n Ople v. Torres,=9 where we struc/ down the proposed national computeri5ed identification system embodied in 'dministrative ,rder !o. =@7, we said+ An no uncertain terms& we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all incursions into individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements that enhance public service and the common good.. . (ntrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards that enhance public service and the common good. )istorically, it has mostly been in the areas of legality of searches and sei5ures, => and the infringement of privacy of communication =7 where the constitutional right to privacy has been critically at issue. Petitioner-s case involves neither and, as already stated, his argument that his right against self*incrimination is in 2eopardy holds no water. )is hollow invocation of his constitutional rights elicits no sympathy here for the simple reason that they are not in any way being violated. (f, in a criminal case, an accused whose very life is at sta/e can be compelled to submit to #!' testing, we see no reason why, in this civil case, petitioner herein who does not face such dire conse0uences cannot be ordered to do the same. #!' paternity testing first came to prominence in the nited $tates, where it yielded its first official results sometime in 6C7B. (n the decade that followed, #!' rapidly found widespread general acceptance.=C $everal cases decided by various $tate $upreme "ourts reflect the total assimilation of #!' testing into their rules of procedure and evidence. The case of -ilson v. 9umb9 of the Family "ode, "hristopher D. is under the parental authority of his mother, the herein petitioner, who, as a conse0uence of such authority, is entitled to have custody of him. 2 $ince, admittedly, petitioner has been deprived of her rightful custody of her child by private respondent, she is entitled to issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. (ndeed, Rule 6@;6 W6 ma/es no distinction between the case of a mother who is separated from her husband and is entitled to the custody of her child and that of a mother of an illegitimate child who, by law, is vested with sole parental authority, but is deprived of her rightful custody of her child. The fact that private respondent has recogni5ed the minor child may be a ground for ordering him to give support to the latter, but not for giving him custody of the child. nder 'rt. ;6= of the Family "ode, Ino child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.I 3 !or is the fact that private respondent is well*off a reason for depriving petitioner of the custody of her children, especially considering that she has been able to rear and support them on her own since they were born. Petitioner is a mar/et vendor earning from P;,@@@ to P=,@@@ per month in 6CC= when the RT" decision was rendered. $he augments her income by wor/ing as secretary at the "omputer $ystem $pecialist, (nc. earning a monthly income of P Te.. "rim. Rep. 9B91 99 'm. $t. Rep. 7;6@.) &hether intentionally or unintentionally, whether maliciously or negligently, the result is as disastrous to the rights of the person who might possibly have been granted admission to the Philippine (slands. Fines for contempt of court at least have the merit of ma/ing customs officials more careful in the performance of their duties. Faulty Eovernmental routine should not be permitted to defeat a writ as fundamental in nature as is habeas corpus. (t is said, however, by the ma2ority, that for there to have been a contempt of court, the order issued by the 2udge should not only have been one re0uiring attendance to show cause why the writ should not issue, but should further have contained a clause in the nature of a preliminary in2unction. There is no gainsaying that a negative always ma/es an affirmative stronger. 't the same time it is not usually considered necessary for courts to e.plain their meaning by restating it in an opposite manner. The order issued by Dudge "oncepcion was a 2udicial one, a replica of hundreds of other, which should have been respected by the respondent. (nstead, the action of the respondent made compliance impossible and served to defeat the

petition for habeas corpus. From the moment the order was received by the respondent, the person of the petitioner was technically in the custody of the law, and when the respondent interfered with such custody a contempt of court was committed. (t is not desired by this opinion to critici5e unduly the conduct of the (nsular "ollector of "ustoms. (t is only desired to uphold the hands of the lower court in the legitimate performance of its functions, and to ma/e /nown that such orders must be respected.Araullo& ,.& concurs.

&R(T ,F 'FP'R, T): R %: ,! T): &R(T ,F 'FP'R, $ection 6. Petition. * The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ shall cover e.tralegal /illings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. $ec. ;. &ho Fay File. * The petition may be filed by the aggrieved party or by any 0ualified person or entity in the following order+ 6. 'ny member of the immediate family, namely+ the spouse, children and parents of the aggrieved party1 ;. 'ny ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, in default of those mentioned in the preceding paragraph1 or =. 'ny concerned citi5en, organi5ation, association or institution, if there is no /nown member of the immediate family or relative of the aggrieved party. The filing of a petition by the aggrieved party suspends the right of all other authori5ed parties to file similar petitions. %i/ewise, the filing of the petition by an authori5ed party on behalf of the aggrieved party suspends the right of all others, observing the order established herein. $ec. =. &here to File. * The petition may be filed on any day and at any time with the Regional Trial "ourt of the place where the threat, act or omission was committed or any of its elements occurred, or with the $andiganbayan, the "ourt of 'ppeals, the $upreme "ourt, or any 2ustice of such courts. The writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. &hen issued by a Regional Trial "ourt or any 2udge thereof, the writ shall be returnable before such court or 2udge. &hen issued by the $andiganbayan or the "ourt of 'ppeals or any of their 2ustices, it may be returnable before such court or any 2ustice thereof, or to any Regional Trial "ourt of the place where the threat, act or omission was committed or any of its elements occurred. &hen issued by the $upreme "ourt or any of its 2ustices, it may be returnable before such "ourt or any 2ustice thereof, or before the $andiganbayan or the "ourt of 'ppeals or any of their 2ustices, or to any Regional Trial "ourt of the place where the threat, act or omission was committed or any of its elements occurred. $ec. ;) hours after service of the writ, the respondent shall file a verified written return together with supporting affidavits which shall, among other things, contain the following+

6. The lawful defenses to show that the respondent did not violate or threaten with violation the right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party, through any act or omission1

;. The steps or actions ta/en by the respondent to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the person or persons responsible for the threat, act or omission1

=. 'll relevant information in the possession of the respondent pertaining to the threat, act or omission against the aggrieved party1 and

T): R %: ,! T): &R(T ,F 'FP'R,R:$,% T(,!'cting on the recommendation of the "hairperson of the "ommittee on Revision of the Rules of "ourt submitting for this "ourt-s consideration and approval the proposed Rule on the &rit of 'mparo, the "ourt Resolved to 'PPR,8: the same. This Rule shall ta/e effect on ,ctober ;, following its publication in three (=) newspapers of general circulation. $eptermber ;B, ;@@>.

($gd.) R:!'T, $. P !, #hief ,ustice

8.R. No. 146640

Fe+-)#-y 112 2010

8EN. ALEKANDER 6. 7ANO2 C&ie* o* St#**2 A-'e. Fo-ce$ o* t&e P&i i!!ine$2 LT. 8EN. ;ICTOR S. I6RADO2 Co''#n.in% 8ene-# 2 P&i i!!ine A-'y2 #n. MA9. 8EN. RALP: A. ;ILLANUE;A2 Co''#n.e-2 1t& In*#nt-y Di,i$ion2 P&i i!!ine A-'y2 Petitioners, vs. CLEOFAS SANC:E? #n. MARCIANA MEDINA2 Respondents.

#:"($(,!

CARPIO MORALES2 J.:

,n #ecember ;7, ;@@>, respondent "leofas $anche5 ("leofas) filed before this "ourt a petition doc/eted as E.R. !o. 67@7=C for issuance of a &rit of 'mparo with Fotion for Production and (nspection directed against Een. )ermogenes :speron (Een. :speron), the then "hief of $taff of the 'rmed Forces of the Philippines ('FP). ,n Danuary ;, ;@@7, the "ourt6 resolved to issue a &rit of 'mparo and ordered Een. :speron to ma/e a verified return of the writ before "ourt of 'ppeals Dustice :dgardo $undiam, who was ordered to hear and decide the case which was eventually redoc/eted as "'*E.R. $P !o. @@@6@ &RG'. "leofas amended her petition; on Danuary 6 and thus had no personal /nowledge about the victimsalleged disappearance or abduction on $eptember 67, ;@@91 that he was informed by his immediate predecessor that no individuals were detained in the camp as it did not even have detention facilities1 and that in compliance with Een. :speron-s directive, their command was conducting further investigation to verify the allegations in the petition.69

%t. $umangil denied having spo/en to Dosephine inside the camp on $eptember ;6st (nfantry ?atallion inside )acienda %uisita on $eptember ;th (nfantry #ivision, which had 2urisdiction over the place of disappearance of !icolas and )eherson, should e.ert e.traordinary diligence to follow all possible leads to solve the disappearances of !icolas and )eherson. The Philippine 'rmy should be reminded of its constitutional mandate as the protector of the people and the $tate. R:%(:F$ &hile as &e stated hereinbefore that &e could not find any lin/ between respondents individual military officers to the disappearance of !icolas and )eherson, nonetheless, the fact remains that the two men are still missing. )ence, &e find it e0uitable to grant petitioners some reliefs in the interest of human rights and 2ustice as follows+ 6. (nspections of the following camps+ "amp $ervillano '0uino, $an Figuel, Tarlac "ity, any military camp of the >th (nfantry #ivision located in '0ua Farm, )acienda %uisita, Tarlac "ity, within reasonable wor/ing hours of any day e.cept when the military camp is on red alert status. ;. Thorough and (mpartial (nvestigation for the appropriate (nvestigating nit of the Philippine 'rmy at "amp $ervillano '0uino and the Philippine 'rmy, >th (nfantry #ivision in Fort Fagsaysay to conduct their respective investigation of all angles pertaining to the disappearances of !icolas and )eherson and to immediately file charges against those found guilty and submit their written report to this "ourt within three (=) months from notice. $, ,R#:R:#.;@ (underscoring supplied) The military officers filed a Fotion for Partial Reconsideration (Fotion), arguing in the main that since respondents failed to prove the allegations in their petition by substantial evidence, the appellate court should not have granted those reliefs.;6 The appellate court denied the Fotion by the assailed Resolution of Farch =, ;@@C.;; Ta/ing up the cudgels for the military, Een. 'le.ander Aano,;= %t. Een. 8ictor (brado,;< and Fa2. Een. Ralph 8illanueva;B (petitioners) filed the present petition for review of the appellate court-s assailed issuances, faulting it for . . . !,T "'T:E,R("'%%A #:!A(!E T): PR(8(%:E: ,F T): &R(T ,F 'FP'R, P R$ '!T T, $:"T(,! 67 ,F T): R %: ,! T): &R(T ,F 'FP'R, #:$P(T: (T$ F(!#(!E T)'T R:$P,!#:!T$ F'(%:# T, PR,8: T):(R '%%:E'T(,!$ (! T):(R P:T(T(,! F,R 'FP'R, ?A $ ?$T'!T('% :8(#:!":. . . . R'!#S . . . #(R:"T(!E P:T(T(,!:R$ T,+ (') '%%,& R:$P,!#:!T$ T, (!$P:"T "'FP $:R8(%%'!, 'N (!,, !,RT) % L,! ",FF'!#, P)(%(PP(!: 'RFA, $'! F(E :%, T'R%'" "(TA '!# '!A F(%(T'RA "'FP ,F T): >th (!F'!TRA #(8($(,! %,"'T:# (! 'N ' F'RF, )'"(:!#' % ($(T', T'R%'" "(TA1 '!#. (?) ",!# "T T),R, E) '!# (FP'RT('% (!8:$T(E'T(,! ,F T): #($'PP:'R'!": ,F T): 'EER(:8:# P'RT(:$, F(%: ")'RE:$ 'E'(!$T T),$: F, !# E (%TA '!# $ ?F(T &R(TT:! R:P,RT &(T)(! T)R:: F,!T)$ FR,F !,T(":. ;9 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The "ourt finds merit in the petition. (n ruling in favor of %t. $umangil and $gt. 8illalobos, the appellate court resolved the case on the basis of the credibility of Dosephine as a witness. (t arrived at the following findings+ To prove that these two military officers too/ or have custody of !icolas and )eherson, petitioners presented Dosephine Ealang 8ictoria, also /nown as 'ntonina Ealang, a niece of petitioner "leofas $anche5- neighbor, who allegedly saw !icolas and )eherson inside "amp $ervillano '0uino on $eptember ;6, ;@@9 when she visited her uncle, a certain Fa2or )enry Ealang, who is allegedly living inside the camp1 that a few days later, she again saw !icolas and )eherson at '0ua Farm at )acienda %uisita, where the camp of ?ravo "ompany of the >6st (nfantry ?attalion is located and where )eherson was seen sweeping the floor and !icolas was seen coo/ing, having wounds in their legs near the feet as if sustained from a gunshot wound1 that on !ovember 6, ;@@9, she went bac/ upon advice of %t. $umangil to give her a cellfone which Tech. $gt. 8illalobos handed to her for her to /now where !icolas and )eherson will be brought1 that they RsicS saw the two outside getting some woods under the watchful eye of a soldier when $umangil /ic/ed !icolas for being slow and thereafter, she did not see the two anymore. &hile Dosephine Ealang 8ictoria-s story of how she saw the sub2ect two missing persons (!icolas and )eherson) appeared initially as plausible, however, her credibility as a witness had been successfully destroyed by the following witnesses presented by the respondents. 6) ?arangay "aptain Rodolfo P. $upan of "ut*"ut ((, Tarlac "ity, attested that she /nows a certain woman named Dosephine Ealang 8ictoria who introduces herself as 'ntonina Ealang, niece through the cousin of his wife and a long*time resident of "ut*"ut (( since birth until she lived with her partner Philip 8ictoria and they still visit and goes to her auntie or sibling-s house1 that he /nows the reputation of Dosephine 8ictoria as bad regarding her telling the truth, her truthfulness and integrity, /nown to fool others and invents stories for money reasons, that she cannot be trusted even if she is under oath before Eod and the $tate. ;) 's if that is not yet enough, Eloria Ealang Fansalay testified that she is a resident of "ut*"ut (( since birth in 6C9< and she /nows Dosephine Ealang 8ictoria because she is her niece being the daughter of her older brother1 that she even too/ care of 'ntonina as a child but her general reputation in telling the truth, her fidelity and integrity is bad, /nown to fool others, a liar and invent RsicS stories for reason of money. =) "larita Ealang Ricafrente saying that she is a resident of "ut*cut (( and 'ntonina Ealang is a niece and attested the same negative reputations against 'ntonina. (t appears that said negative testimonies of Dosephine Ealang 8ictoria-s relatives were never successfully rebutted by her and the "ourt gives credence to them. !o ill motive RsicS were established against the said witnesses to testify against 'ntonina Ealang. Furthermore, 'ntonina Ealang stated that she was in "amp $ervillano '0uino when she first saw !icolas and )eherson riding in an army truc/ because she was visiting her uncle, Fa2or )enry Ealang, allegedly living in the camp. Parenthetically, this story of 'ntonina Ealang was put to doubt. T$E :dgard Reyes who attested that as a meter reader in the camp, Fa2or Ealang was no longer residing there in $eptember ;@@9. This testimony and revelation of T$E Reyes only bolstered the testimonies of the other witnesses on 'ntonina Ealang-s penchant to invent stories or tell a lie. (n sum, &e are not inclined to give credence to the claims of 'ntonina Ealang that the two missing person RsicS she saw first in "amp $ervillano '0uino and later, in '0ua Farm, were !icolas and )eherson. !otably, 'ntonina Ealang never did see the faces of the two but were /nown to her through photographs. "ertainly, there may be a difference between photographs and the faces in person. To be noted also is that even the two wives of !icolas did not ma/e an e.press attestation that they saw !icolas and )eherson in the company of those armed men who passed their place in the early morning of $eptember 67, ;@@9.;> (underscoring supplied) !,T'?%A, respondents neither moved for reconsideration nor appealed the appellate court-s $eptember 6>, ;@@7 #ecision. The entrenched procedural rule in this 2urisdiction is that a party who did not appeal cannot assign such errors as are designed to have the 2udgment modified. 'll that said appellee can do is to ma/e a counter*assignment of errors or to argue on issues raised at the trial only for the purpose of sustaining the 2udgment in his favor, even on grounds not included in the decision of the court a 8uo or raised in the appellant-s assignment of errors or arguments.;7 This tenet is enshrined as one of the basic principles in our rules of procedure, specifically to avoid ambiguity in the presentation of issues, facilitate the setting forth of arguments by the parties, and aid the court in ma/ing its determinations. ' party who fails to ac0uire complete relief from a decision of the court has various remedies to correct an omission by the court. )e may move for a correction or clarification of 2udgment, or even see/ its modification through ordinary appeal. There is thus no basis for the "ourt to s/ip the rule and e.cuse herein respondents for failure to properly avail themselves of the remedies in the face of the parties- contentions that have remained disputed.;C &hat is thus left for the "ourt to resolve is the issue of whether the grant of the R:%(:F$ =@ by the appellate court after finding want of substantial evidence are valid and proper. $ections 6> and 67 of the 'mparo Rule lay down the re0uisite standard of proof necessary to prove either party-s claim, vi5+ $:". 6>. ?urden of Proof and $tandard of #iligence Re0uired. * The parties shall establish their claim by substantial evidence. The respondent who is a private individual or entity must prove that ordinary diligence as re0uired by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty.

The respondent who is a public official or employee must prove that e.traordinary diligence as re0uired by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty. The respondent public official or employee cannot invo/e the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed to evade responsibility or liability. $:". 67. Dudgment. * The "ourt shall render 2udgment within ten (6@) days from the time the petition is submitted for decision. (f the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate1 otherwise, the privilege shall be denied. (emphasis and underscoring supplied) The re0uisite standard of proof substantial evidence * spea/s of the clear intent of the Rule to have the e0uivalent of an administrative proceeding, albeit 2udicially conducted, in resolving amparo petitions. To the appellate court, the evidence adduced in the present case failed to measure up to that standard substantial evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as ade0uate to support a conclusion. $ince respondents did not avail of any remedy against the adverse 2udgment, the appellate court-s decision is, insofar as it concerns them, now beyond the ambit of review. Feanwhile, the re0uirement for a government official or employee to observe e.traordinary diligence in the performance of duty stresses the e.traordinary measures e.pected to be ta/en in safeguarding every citi5en-s constitutional rights as well as in the investigation of cases of e.tra*2udicial /illings and enforced disappearances.=6 The failure to establish that the public official observed e.traordinary diligence in the performance of duty does not result in the automatic grant of the privilege of the amparo writ. (t does not relieve the petitioner from establishing his or her claim by substantial evidence. The omission or inaction on the part of the public official provides, however, some basis for the petitioner to move and for the court to grant certain interim reliefs. (n line with this, $ection 6< of the 'mparo Rule provides for inte-i' o- !-o,i$ion# -e ie*$ that the courts may grant in order to, inter alia, protect the witnesses and the rights of the parties, and preserve all relevant evidence, vi5+ $:". 6, ;@@7 #ecision of the appellate court was merely interlocutory, they had every opportunity to 0uestion the conclusion of said court, but they did not. They could have opposed petitioners- motion for reconsideration filed with the appellate court, it being a prohibited pleading=< under the 'mparo Rule, but they did not. &):R:F,R:, the petition is ER'!T:#. The assailed $eptember 6>, ;@@7 #ecision and Farch =, ;@@C Resolution of the "ourt of 'ppeals, insofar as it grants the assailed earlier*0uoted reliefs are SET ASIDE. SO ORDERED.CONC:ITA CARPIO MORALES 'ssociate Dustice

8.R. No. 140506

Octo+e- 12 2004

T:E SECRETAR7 OF NATIONAL DEFENSE2 T:E C:IEF OF STAFF2 ARMED FORCES OF T:E P:ILIPPINES2 petitioners, vs. RA7MOND MANALO #n. RE7NALDO MANALO2 respondents.

#:"($(,!

PUNO2 C.J.3

&hile victims of enforced disappearances are separated from the rest of the world behind secret walls, they are not separated from the constitutional protection of their basic rights. The constitution is an overarching s/y that covers all in its protection. The case at bar involves the rights to life, liberty and security in the first petition for a writ of Amparo filed before this "ourt. This is an appeal via Petition for Review under Rule Petition as a petition under the AmparoRule and further resolved, vi2+ &):R:F,R:, let a &R(T ,F 'FP'R, be issued to respondents re0uiring them to file with the "' ("ourt of 'ppeals) a verified written return within five (B) wor/ing days from service of the writ. &e R:F'!# the petition to the "' and designate the #ivision of 'ssociate Dustice %ucas P. ?ersamin to conduct the summary hearing on the petition on !ovember 7, ;@@> at ;+@@ p.m. and decide the petition in accordance with the Rule on the &rit of Amparo.C ,n #ecember ;9, ;@@>, the "ourt of 'ppeals rendered a decision in favor of therein petitioners (herein respondents), the dispositive portion of which reads, vi2+ ACCORDIN8L7, the PRI;ILE8E OF T:E @RIT OF AMPARO is 8RANTED. The respondents SECRETAR7 OF NATIONAL DEFENSE and AFP C:IEF OF STAFF are hereby R:N (R:#+ 6. To furnish to the petitioners and to this "ourt within five days from notice of this decision all official and unofficial reports of the investigation underta/en in connection with their case, e.cept those already on file herein1 ;. To confirm in writing the present places of official assignment of FG$gt )ilario a/a Rollie "astillo and #onald "aigas within five days from notice of this decision. =. To cause to be produced to this "ourt all medical reports, records and charts, reports of any treatment given or recommended and medicines prescribed, if any, to the petitioners, to include a list of medical and (sic) personnel (military and civilian) who attended to them from February 6 Raymond narrated his conversation with Een. Palparan in his affidavit, vi2+ Tinanong a/o ni Een. Palparan, I!gayon na /aharap mo na a/o, di /a ba natata/ot sa a/inKI $umagot a/ong, I$iyempre po, natata/ot din...I $abi ni Een. Palparan+ I$ige, bibigyan /o /ayo ng isang pag/a/ataon na mabuhay, bastaHt sundin nHyo ang lahat ng sasabihin /o... sabihin mo sa magulang mo * huwag pumunta sa mga rali, sa hearing, sa Marapatan at sa )uman Right dahil nilolo/o lang /ayo. $abihin sa magulang at lahat sa bahay na huwag palo/o doon. Tulungan /ami na /ausapin si ?estre na sumu/o na sa gobyerno.I;7 Respondents agreed to do as Een. Palparan told them as they felt they could not do otherwise. 't about =+@@ in the morning, )ilario, :fren and the formerHs men * the same group that abducted them * brought them to their parentsH house. Raymond was shown to his parents while Reynaldo stayed in the Revo because he still could not wal/. (n the presence of )ilario and other soldiers, Raymond relayed to his parents what Een. Palparan told him. 's they were afraid, RaymondHs parents acceded. )ilario threatened RaymondHs parents that if they continued to 2oin human rights rallies, they would never see their children again. The respondents were then brought bac/ to $apang. ;C &hen respondents arrived bac/ in $apang, Een. Palparan was about to leave. )e was tal/ing with the four ImastersI who were there+ 'rman, Eanata, )ilario and "abalse.=@ &hen Een. Palparan saw Raymond, he called for him. )e was in a big white vehicle. Raymond stood outside the vehicle as Een. Palparan told him to gain bac/ his strength and be healthy and to ta/e the medicine he left for him and Reynaldo. )e said the medicine was e.pensive at Php=B.@@ each, and would ma/e them strong. )e also said that they should prove that they are on the side of the military and warned that they would not be given another chance.=6 #uring his testimony, Raymond identified Een. Palparan by his picture.=; ,ne of the soldiers named 'rman made Raymond ta/e the medicine left by Een. Palparan. The medicine, named I'live,I was green and yellow. Raymond and Reynaldo were each given a bo. of this medicine and instructed to ta/e one capsule a day. 'rman chec/ed if they were getting their dose of the medicine. The I'liveI made them sleep each time they too/ it, and they felt heavy upon wa/ing up.== 'fter a few days, )ilario arrived again. )e too/ Reynaldo and left Raymond at $apang. 'rman instructed Raymond that while in $apang, he should introduce himself as I,scar,I a military trainee from $ariaya, Nue5on, assigned in ?ulacan. &hile there, he saw again Eanata, one of the men who abducted him from his house, and got ac0uainted with other military men and civilians.=< 'fter about three months in $apang, Raymond was brought to "amp Tecson under the ;< th (nfantry ?attalion. )e was fetched by three unidentified men in a big white vehicle. :fren went with them. Raymond was then blindfolded. 'fter a =@*minute ride, his blindfold was removed. "hains were put on him and he was /ept in the barrac/s.=B The ne.t day, RaymondHs chains were removed and he was ordered to clean outside the barrac/s. (t was then he learned that he was in a detachment of the Rangers. There were many soldiers, hundreds of them were training. )e was also ordered to clean inside the barrac/s. (n one of the rooms therein, he met $herlyn "adapan from %aguna. $he told him that she was a student of the niversity of the Philippines and was abducted in )agonoy, ?ulacan. $he confided that she had been sub2ected to severe torture and raped. $he was crying and longing to go home and be with her parents. #uring the day, her chains were removed and she was made to do the laundry. =9 'fter a wee/, Reynaldo was also brought to "amp Tecson. Two days from his arrival, two other captives, Maren :mpeOo and Fanuel Ferino, arrived. Maren and Fanuel were put in the room with I'llanI whose name they later came to /now as #onald "aigas, called ImasterI or IcommanderI by his men in the ;, ;@@>..., it e.onerated FG$gt. Ri5al )ilario a/a Rollie "astillo for lac/ of evidence establishing his involvement in any capacity in the disappearance of the Fanalo brothers, although it held that the remaining respondents were illegally detaining the Fanalo brothers and ordered them to release the latter. and was thus unaware of the Fanalo brothersH alleged abduction. )e also claimed that+ >. The $ecretary of !ational #efense does not engage in actual military directional operations, neither does he underta/e command directions of the 'FP units in the field, nor in any way micromanage the 'FP operations. The principal responsibility of the $ecretary of !ational #efense is focused in providing strategic policy direction to the #epartment (bureaus and agencies) including the 'rmed Forces of the Philippines1 7. (n connection with the &rit of Amparo issued by the )onorable $upreme "ourt in this case, ( have directed the "hief of $taff, 'FP to institute immediate action in compliance with $ection C(d) of the AmparoRule and to submit report of such compliance... %i/ewise, in a Femorandum #irective also dated ,ctober =6, ;@@>, ( have issued a policy directive addressed to the "hief of $taff, 'FP that the 'FP should adopt the following rules of action in the event the &rit of Amparo is issued by a competent court against any members of the 'FP+ (6) to verify the identity of the aggrieved party1 (;) to recover and preserve evidence related to the death or disappearance of the person identified in the petition which may aid in the prosecution of the person or persons responsible1 (=) to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning the death or disappearance1 (Dimene5 testified that this particular investigation was initiated not by a complaint as was the usual procedure, but because the "ommanding Eeneral saw news about the abduction of the Fanalo brothers on the television, and he was concerned about what was happening within his territorial 2urisdiction.B7 Dimene5 summoned all si. implicated persons for the purpose of having them e.ecute sworn statements and conducting an investigation on Fay ;C, ;@@9.BC The investigation started at 7+@@ in the morning and finished at 6@+@@ in the evening. 9@ The investigating officer, Technical $gt. :duardo %ingad, too/ the individual sworn statements of all si. persons on that day. There were no other sworn statements ta/en, not even of the Fanalo family, nor were there other witnesses summoned and investigated96 as according to Dimene5, the directive to him was only to investigate the si. persons.9; Dimene5 was beside %ingad when the latter too/ the statements. 9= The si. persons were not /nown to Dimene5 as it was in fact his first time to meet them.9< #uring the entire time that he was beside %ingad, a subordinate of his in the ,ffice of the Provost Farshall, Dimene5 did not propound a single 0uestion to the si. persons.9B Dimene5 testified that all si. statements were ta/en on Fay ;C, ;@@9, but Farcelo Fendo5a and Rudy Fendo5a had to come bac/ the ne.t day to sign their statements as the printing of their statements was interrupted by a power failure. Dimene5 testified that the two signed on Fay =@, ;@@9, but the 2urats of their statements indicated that they were signed on Fay ;C, ;@@9. 99 &hen the $worn $tatements were turned over to Dimene5, he personally wrote his investigation report. )e began writing it in the afternoon of Fay =@, ;@@9 and finished it on Dune 6, ;@@9. 9> )e then gave his report to the ,ffice of the "hief of Personnel.97 's petitioners largely rely on Dimene5Hs (nvestigation Report dated Dune 6, ;@@9 for their evidence, the report is herein substantially 0uoted+ (((. ?'"MER, !# ,F T): "'$: = (t was an e.ercise for the first time of the "ourtHs e.panded power to promulgate rules to protect our peopleHs constitutional rights, which made its maiden appearance in the 6C7> "onstitution in response to the Filipino e.perience of the martial law regime. >< 's the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of Ie.tralegal /illingsI and Ienforced disappearances,I its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof. I:.tralegal /illingsI are I/illings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or 2udicial proceedings.I >B ,n the other hand, Ienforced disappearancesI are Iattended by the following characteristics+ an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or organi5ed groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect ac0uiescence of the government1 the refusal of the $tate to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to ac/nowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law.I>9 The writ of Amparo originated in Fe.ico. IAmparoI literally means IprotectionI in $panish.>> (n 67=>, de Toc0uevilleHs Democracy in America became available in Fe.ico and stirred great interest. (ts description of the practice of 2udicial review in the .$. appealed to many Fe.ican 2urists. >7 ,ne of them, Fanuel "rescencio Re2Yn, drafted a constitutional provision for his native state, Aucatan, >C which granted 2udges the power to protect all persons in the en2oyment of their constitutional and legal rights. This idea was incorporated into the national constitution in 67, vi2+ The federal courts shall protect any inhabitant of the Republic in the e.ercise and preservation of those rights granted to him by this "onstitution and by laws enacted pursuant hereto, against attac/s by the %egislative and :.ecutive powers of the federal or state governments, limiting themselves to granting protection in the specific case in litigation, ma/ing no general declaration concerning the statute or regulation that motivated the violation.7@ $ince then, the protection has been an important part of Fe.ican constitutionalism. 76 (f, after hearing, the 2udge determines that a constitutional right of the petitioner is being violated, he orders the official, or the officialHs superiors, to cease the violation and to ta/e the necessary measures to restore the petitioner to the full en2oyment of the right in 0uestion. Amparo thus combines the principles of 2udicial review derived from the .$. with the limitations on 2udicial power characteristic of the civil law tradition which prevails in Fe.ico. (t enables courts to enforce the constitution by protecting individual rights in particular cases, but prevents them from using this power to ma/e law for the entire nation.7; The writ of Amparo then spread throughout the &estern )emisphere, gradually evolving into various forms, in response to the particular needs of each country.7= (t became, in the words of a 2ustice of the Fe.ican Federal $upreme "ourt, one piece of Fe.icoHs self*attributed Itas/ of conveying to the worldHs legal heritage that institution which, as a shield of human dignity, her own painful history conceived.I 7< &hat began as a protection against acts or omissions of public authorities in violation of constitutional rights later evolved for several purposes+ (6) Amparo libertad for the protection of personal freedom, e0uivalent to the habeas corpus writ1 (;) Amparo contra leyes for the 2udicial review of the constitutionality of statutes1 (=) Amparo casacion for the 2udicial review of the constitutionality and legality of a 2udicial decision1 ( "onstitution, the Erave 'buse "lause, provides for the 2udicial power Ito determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lac/ or e.cess of 2urisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Eovernment.I The "lause accords a similar general protection to human rights e.tended by the 'mparo contra leyes, Amparo casacion, and Amparo administrativo. Amparo libertad is comparable to the remedy of habeas corpus found in several provisions of the 6C7> "onstitution.77 The "lause is an offspring of the .$. common law tradition of 2udicial review, which finds its roots in the 67@= case of M#-+)-y ,. M#.i$on.7C &hile constitutional rights can be protected under the Erave 'buse "lause through remedies of in2unction or prohibition under Rule 9B of the Rules of "ourt and a petition for habeas corpus under Rule 6@;,C@ these remedies may not be ade0uate to address the pestering problem of e.tralegal /illings and enforced disappearances. )owever, with the swiftness re0uired to resolve a petition for a writ of Amparo through summary proceedings and theavailability of appropriate interim and permanent reliefs under the Amparo Rule, this hybrid writ of the common law and civil law traditions * borne out of the %atin 'merican and Philippine e.perience of human rights abuses * offers a better remedy to e.tralegal /illings and enforced disappearances and threats thereof. The remedy provides rapid 2udicial relief as it parta/es of a summary proceeding that re0uires only substantial evidence to ma/e the appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner1 it is not an action to determine criminal guilt re0uiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages re0uiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility re0uiring substantial evidence that will re0uire full and e.haustive proceedings.C6 The writ of Amparo serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem of e.tralegal /illings and enforced disappearances. (t is preventive in that it brea/s the e.pectation of impunity in the commission of these offenses1 it is curative in that it facilitates the subse0uent punishment of perpetrators as it will inevitably yield leads to subse0uent investigation and action. (n the long run, the goal of both the preventive and curative roles is to deter the further commission of e.tralegal /illings and enforced disappearances. (n the case at bar, respondents initially filed an action for IProhibition, (n2unction, and Temporary Restraining ,rderI C; to stop petitioners andGor their officers and agents from depriving the respondents of their right to liberty and other basic rights on 'ugust ;=, ;@@>, C= prior to the promulgation of the Amparo Rule. They also sought ancillary remedies including Protective "ustody ,rders, 'ppointment of "ommissioner, (nspection and 'ccess ,rders and other legal and e0uitable remedies under 'rticle 8(((, $ection B(B) of the 6C7> "onstitution and Rule 6=B, $ection 9 of the Rules of "ourt. &hen the Amparo Rule came into effect on ,ctober ;, they moved to have their petition treated as an Amparo petition as it would be more effective and suitable to the circumstances of the Fanalo brothersH enforced disappearance. The "ourt granted their motion. &ith this bac/drop, we now come to the arguments of the petitioner. PetitionersH first argument in disputing the #ecision of the "ourt of 'ppeals states, vi2+ The "ourt of 'ppeals seriously and grievously erred in believing and giving full faith and credit to the incredible uncorroborated, contradicted, and obviously scripted, rehearsed and self*serving affidavitGtestimony of herein respondent Raymond Fanalo. C< (n delving into the veracity of the evidence, we need to mine and refine the ore of petitionersH cause of action, to determine whether the evidence presented is metal*strong to satisfy the degree of proof re0uired. $ection 6 of the Rule on the &rit of Amparo provides for the following causes of action, vi2+ $ection 6. 'etition. * The petition for a writ of Amparo is a remedy available to any person whose -i%&t to i*e2 i+e-ty #n. $ec)-ity i$ ,io #te. o- t&-e#tene. /it& ,io #tion by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ shall cover e.tralegal /illings and en*o-ce. .i$#!!e#-#nce$