spinoza as educator - rabenort

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SPINOZA AS EDUCATOR

BYWILLIAM LOUIS RABENORT, A. M.

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREEOF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY, IN THE FACULTY OF PHILOSOPHY,

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

PUBLISHED BYUfrarfurs (Mtegp, (Mumbia ItnuermtgNEW YORK CITY

1911


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SPINOZA AS EDUCATOR

BYWILLIAM LOUIS RABENORT, A. M.

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREEOF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY, IN THE FACULTY OF PHILOSOPHY,

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

PUBLISHED BYQfearl^ra (Enlkgr, iCEuIumhia ZimwrHtttj , C^ltNEW YORK CITY ^^

1911


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Z3Ckj.3?EDUC.UMARY

Copyright, 1911, by William Louis Rabenort

riirss ofFRANK II. EVOKY * CO.ALBANY. N. V.


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SPINOZAHow met the Orient and OccidentTo cast the crystal for Spinoza's brain!Hebraic prophet, subtile Moor of Spain

The Schoolman's lore, Renaissance discontent;Mystic and craftsman ; scientist intentOn human life, and sage without a stain,Of classic calm in persecution's pain;

Like sand before the fusing flame, they blent.

Through this true lens, polished by Nature's handWe look at past rainbow passion to the sphereWhere reason's achromatic ray shines clearOn things eternal; whence we understandHow to love God, the true philosophy,One way to virtue and tranquillity.

February, 1909.


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PREFACEAfter three and a half centuries Benedict Spinoza is more than

ever an intellectual force to be reckoned with. His influenceupon his own and immediately succeeding generations was of theslightest, and even when the teachings of the Jew of Amsterdamwere no longer shunned, they were still misunderstood, and bynone more profoundly than by Herder, Lessig, Goethe, and theothers of that group of enthusiastic admirers which constitutesperhaps Spinoza's most obvious influence upon civilization. Inthe History of Philosophy he looms in majestic solitude, a peakbut remotely joined to the adjacent heights. It is therefore notsurprising to find his name conspicuously absent from the roll ofphilosophers who figure in the History of Education.The bibliography at the end of this essay is evidence of the

interest manifested in Spinoza at the present time. ProfessorWilliam James quoted him as an authority on psychology, andin the preface to his "Analytic Psychology," Dr. G. F. Stoutacknowledges his pre-eminent indebtedness to Spinoza.The attempt made in the following pages to point out the

educational implications of Spinoza's philosophy seemed tonecessitate introductory summaries and interpretations whichmight have been omitted were the foundations of Spinoza'sphilosophy familiar to the students of education into whose handsthis volume may come. The essay might then have been whollydevoted to the more practical if not more congenial task of dis-cussing intensively one or another of the problems briefly treatedin the final chapter. A fuller exposition of each of these topicswould do much to clarify current educational thought, and it ishoped that the bearing of Spinoza's philosophy upon educationwill attract the labor of other hands.

It is believed that further and broader studies will justify theconclusions herein expressed. But however that may be, it seemsprobable that a refutation of Spinoza's theories can be validlyoffered only by one who tests them by actually ordering his life


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vi Preface

by them, for a while at least, and studying them while making thetrial. It was thus that Spinoza attained to his beliefs, and hisworks constitute his autobiography. It is in view of this fact thathe is characterized in the last chapter of the essay as an experi-mental philosopher.As this essay is primarily a contribution to the theory of educa-

tion and only indirectly a study in philosophy it seems proper thatthe references should be to the English versions of Spinoza's worksmost readily accessible, namely, Elwes' translation of the ChiefWorks, in the Bohn edition, " The Principles of Descartes' Philo-sophy," and the Cogitata Metaphysial, translated by HalbertHains Britain, and A. Wolf's excellent translation of the ShortTreatise. The excerpts quoted in the text are also from thesetranslations. The essay itself is, however, based upon the defini-tive Latin text of Van Vloten and Land to which any scholar whomay honor it by a critical study will of course have no difficultyin referring.

I avail myself of this opportunity to acknowledge my indebted-ness to Dr. W. H. Kilpatrick for the verification of certainreferences cited, and to Professor John Angus MacYannel forinspiration and encouragement extending now over many years.

W. R.April, 191 1.


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CONTENTSCHAPTER PAGE

I The Possibility of Education iII The Elements of Human Nature 14III The Supremacy of the Intellect 39IV The Complications of Personality 51V The Criteria of Education 62

Bibliography 86


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" No man can better display the power of his skill and dis-position, than in so training men, that they come at last to liveunder the dominion of their own reason."

Ethics, Part IV, Appendix IX.


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SPINOZA AS EDUCATORCHAPTER I

THE POSSIBILITY OF EDUCATIONThe reader, familiar with Spinoza's writings and recalling the

all too scanty story of his life, may wonder, not without warrant,at the title of this essay. Should he contend that Spinoza caredlittle for education and less for children, he will not find Spinoza'slife wanting in episodes nor his books lacking in tenets to supporthis assertion.

Since Pestalozzi, childhood has become the touchstone of educa-tion. Spinoza had little interest in children. He has little to sayabout them, and from the collocutions in which they are men-tioned, it is evident that he esteemed them but slightly. Headmits that they rank higher than slaves ; l yet speaking of thesilly behavior ascribed to ghosts he can think of no stronger con-demnation than to say that they act like madmen, fools, andchildren. 2 But all educators are not Pestalozzis nor all philoso-phers, Froebels. Education is broader than childhood, andSpinoza's interest may have been for adults. Were this so, itwould doubtless be apparent in his attitude toward his neighbors.There is, for example, his rejoinder to his landlady, the WidowVan Velden or perhaps Vrow Van der Spyck. Aware of hiseminence as a critic of the Bible, she asked him whether she couldbe saved in the religion she professed. He replied, " Your Re-ligion is a very good one ; you need not look for another, nordoubt that you may be saved in it, provided, whilst you applyyourself to Piety, you live at the same time a peaceable and quietLife." 3 Why this failure to proselyte when the questioner gave

1 Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, p. 206.2 Correspondence, letter LVI, cf. Ethics, pt. II, prop. 49, sch. IV, prop.

30. sch.3 Colerus, in Pollock; Spinoza, His Life and Philosophy, appendix, p. 395,

cf. Wolf, Spinoza, His Life and Treatise on God and Man, p. XCIX.


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2 Spiiioca as Educator

him an opening? Why did he not tell of his own way to salva-tion, " by almost all men neglected?" 4 The fear of arousing theauthorities, from which he was seldom free, can hardly have de-terred him, for his landlady was his friend and had more to gainfrom his safety than from his persecution. He may have thoughther incapable of attaining to the heights where his thought madeits abode, and so refrained from disturbing her faith. He mayhave thought as those who have departed from orthodoxv sooften do, that the faith that lives in honest doubt is not capable ofinculcation. That however is not the attitude of the typicalteacher; was it Spinoza's?

Spinoza had an opportunity to become a professional teacher.He declined the Professorship of Philosophy at Heidelberg. 5 Hetells Fabritius who offered him the place on behalf of CharlesLewis, the Elector Palatine. " It has never been my wish to teachin public " : and he gives several characteristic reasons : ( i ) Un-certainty as to how frank he could be in his lectures withoutdisturbing the established religion; (2) reluctance to arouse in-evitable controversy; and above all. (3) unwillingness to abandonphilosophical research in order to teach young students. One istempted to interpret the last reason as meaning that he feltsurer of the benefits he would gain from his own studies than ofthose he might confer by directing the studies of others ; not fromlack of confidence in his command of the subject nor his fitness asto method, but rather from his somewhat low estimate of humanability, which lie did not hesitate to express.6

His experiences with private pupils were not such as to makehim eager to teach. John Casearius 7 lodged with Spinoza andtalked with him on the best of subjects, at dinner, at supper, andduring their walks. In spite of his esteem for the young man'stalents, Spinoza was reserved with him; he did not wish to teachhim his own opinions openly.8 So he dictated to him instead thesecond part of Descartes', "Principles, treated Geometrically,"together with some of the chief points treated of in metaphysics.

Spinoza's reluctance to impose upon another the doctrines uponthe formulation of which he spent his thought and which were

1 Ethics, pt. V. prop. 47. unto.oi respondence, letters 1 .1 1 1 and LIV

Tractatus Theologioo-Politicus, p. 78,'Kuno Fischer, Geschichte ik-r neuern Philosophic, vol. 2. p. 145.1 orrespondence, letter I X


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The Possibility of Education 3what he chiefly had to offer his pupils, appears from his correspon-dence with Albert Burgh. 9 Burgh became a convert to the Romanchurch twelve years after he studied with Spinoza. He thenwrote a letter. 10 fervent, well intentioned, breathing his esteemfor his former teacher, but showing a misconception of Spinoza'sdoctrine. Burgh recalls, it is true, what Spinoza terms the chiefaim of the Tractatus Thcologico-Politicus ; namely, " to dis-tinguish between religion and philosophy," u but only to condemnthe distinction. '* The book with the impious title," 12 Burgh callsit. His confusion of eternity with infinitely long duration, hisanthropomorphic deity, and his repeated questions, plainly morethan rhetorical, as to the certainty of Spinoza's knowledge, areall proofs that Spinoza's instruction had gone for naught. Spinozawas deeply moved, yet his first impulse was to let Burgh go hisown way ; 13 " to leave your letter unanswered, thinking that timeand experience will assuredly be of more avail than reasoning, torestore you to yourself and your friends." This is sound commonsense, but we are prone to regard the spirit of the teacher as some-thing else, perhaps something more, something akin to that ofthe shepherd who leaves the ninety and nine that are safe in thefold and fares forth to seek the one that has gone astray. HadSpinoza been keen for teaching he would not have needed urgingby acquaintances to persuade him " not to fail in the offices of afriend," and to endeavor to recall to Burgh the reasonings andarguments which erstwhile had won his approval.Although the first editors tried to eliminate from the " Corre-spondence " every personal paragraph, we find other instancestherein of Spinoza's disinclination to teach. Take the correspon-dence with William de Blyenberg, 14 for example. BeginningDecember 12, 1664, with expressions of mutual esteem and pro-fessions by Spinoza of his willingness to instruct, by the followingMarch the interchange had not only become acrimonious, but hadelicited from the courteous but outspoken Spinoza the statement 15that it was waste of time to try to teach one who had Blyenbergh's

9 Kuno Fischer, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 139, 168, etc.10 Correspondence, letter LXXIII.11 Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, p. 183.12 Correspondence, loc. cit.13 Ibid., letter LXXIV.14 Ibid., letters XXXI - XXXVIII.15 Ibid., letter XXXVI.


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4 Spinoza as Educatormanner of thinking. It is plain that having discovered what aHerbartian would call Blyenbergh's apperceptive mass, Spinozadiscontinued his efforts to instruct him. There is no attempt toestablish the seeker upon the basis that Spinoza demanded as thefoundation for a friendship; merely a regretful recognition thatthis basis, which would have obligated Spinoza to something liketeaching, is absent, and a polite severance of all relations.

With his writings it is not different. One finds no refuge inthe thought that he rejected opportunities for personal instructionto purvey for the multitude who might read his books. He wasnot anxious for wide circulation, ilis manuscripts were copiedonly with his reluctant consent. The Ethics, his most im-portant work was posthumous, although he sought, though notdiligently, to publish it. The most important work publishedduring his lifetime, the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, wasavowedly for the few. After commending it to the PhilosophicReader, he says

" To the rest of mankind I care not to commend my treatise, forI cannot expect that it contains anything to please them :Therefore the multitude, and those of like passions with the multi-tude, I ask not to read my book ; nay, I would rather that theyshould utterly neglect it, than that they should misinterpret it aftertheir wont. They would gain no good themselves, and mightprove a stumbling-block to others, whose philosophy is hamperedby the belief that Reason is a mere handmaid to Theology, andwhom I seek in this work especially to benefit." lfl

But every one of these instances that may be quoted as evidencefor Spinoza's slight regard for education testifies with at leastequal force for the other side. If the quotation from the prefaceto the Theological-Political Treatise shows that the masses areincapable of learning philosophy it proves also that Spinoza be-lieved there were at least a i'ew persons who could profit by itsteaching. A consideration of the cases of the Widow VanVelden, of Burgh, of Casearius. and of Blyenbergh, showsthat Spinoza believed in the possibility of education in somesense even though he hesitated to undertake the education ofeither of these three. He would not teach Casearius bis ownopinions, but he took him a- a pupil, taught him physics, wrote

16 Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, p. n.


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The Possibility of Education 5for him the " Principles of Descartes' Philosophy," 17 andlooked for an increase of years to amend his youthful faults. 18Similarly, Spinoza did not refuse at first to instruct Blyenberghonly when he found his mind closed to certain kinds of argument.Otherwise he would have admitted him to the standing of Olden-bergh, De Vries, Tschirnhausen, and the other acquaintances whothronged his modest house, sometimes inconveniently, and towhom he gave freely of his time and strength, inviting them todraw upon him for more help when they found his expositionsobscure. His reticence toward Vrow Van Velden becomes ex-plicable when we consider his differentiation of religion andphilosophy. Pie believed that the cardinal principle of the formeris obedience to God 19 as shown by one's manner of living ; 20that it has nothing to do with learning 21 save in so far as knowl-edge is identical with the springs of behavior ; 22 that religionis knowledge of God only in the sense that deeds express knowl-edge, as a man who can build a house is said to know carpentry.It makes no difference whether a person comes to his pietyrationally or not.23 Spinoza had found the way to God by thelight of reason, but its direct rays were too bright for mostmen 24 they had to let the reflected light of revelation 25 guidethem. Illuminated by these facts, Spinoza's words to the widowhave a deeper significance. He gave her the information shesought in phrases she could understand and which exactly ex-pressed his belief ; assuming thereby that so far she was capableof education. But he did not try to make a philosopher of her.That was a task beyond them both ; moreover her piety could notin that way be improved.

IIThis examination of Spinoza's personal attitude toward edu-

cation may serve as introduction to a consideration of the placeeducation occupies in his philosophical system. It seems per-tinent to inquire whether the attitude depicted in the preceding

17 Freudenthal, Spinoza, sein Leben und sein Lehre, vol. 1, p. 114.18 Correspondence, letter XXVII.19 Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, p. 176.20 Ibid., p. 187.21 Ibid., p. 186.22 Ibid., p. 179.23 Ibid., p. 180.24 Ibid., p. 28Q.25 Ibid., pp. 78, 91.


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6 Spiiioca as Educatorparagraphs is in harmony with Spinoza's theory. And sinceSpinoza gives no systematic or explicit treatment of education,our task involves the construction of the theory of education whichis implied in his philosophy.The student who accepts the classification of the text-books and

calls Spinoza a pantheist, may well question how education evenwith the limitations suggested in the preceding paragraphs cancomport with Pantheism. If God and nature be the same whatundertaking could be more absurd than education ; what morepresumptuous than a project to change God for the better ; to givea finer texture or a better fit to Das Gottheits lebendiges Kleid.In this simpler form the charge of pantheism was made againstthe Tractatus Theologico-Politiais. by contemporaries, and denied

Spinoza.26 It would be strange, if the charge were true, thathe should afterward say.- 7 " We may .... conceive thewhole of nature as one individual, whose parts, that is, all bodies,vary in infinite ways, without any change in the individual as awhole." His unhesitating utterance shows he felt no contradic-tion, and none existed, for anything made up of parts, even toinfinity, lacked for Spinoza the mark of the absolute and eternal.-' 5

But there is a higher Pantheism. It goes as far beyond thecommon conception spoken of in the preceding paragraph, asthat transcends the etymology of the word. It is defined as thephilosophy which conceives of God as the only independentbeing.29 Spinoza says that he means by God, a substance whichis in itself and of which a conception can be formed independentlyof every other conception/5" He says, also, that from the neces-sity of the divine nature must follow an infinite number ofinfinite thing-.'' 1 all of which are in God, for without Him nothingcan be nor be conceived.82 By these technical tokens Spinoza is* Correspondence, letter XXXI.

hies, M. pi op. 13, Lemma VI I note.hies, i>t. I, prop, is, note.

29 Onturv Dictionary, cf. Baldwin, Dictionary of Psychology and Phil-osophy, also Murray, Dictionary of the English Language. Ethics, pt. I, def. [II. VI.-11 [bid., prop. 16.32 Loc. tit., prop. 15.

Note. The translation of " infinita " in this proposition presents difficul-ties and Fullerton, Elwes, and Smith, each translates it differently. The

ring of the latter is adopted as maintaining the obvious sense of theword and as most consistent with the interpretation of Spinoza's doctrineadhered to in th


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The Possibility of Education 7made a pantheist. This is not the place for an exhaustive dis-cussion of the matter, but a few facts about Spinoza's doctrine ofthe " nature of God and his manner of regarding, and providingfor things 33 may be presented in this connection least ouracceptance of this definition as a fair statement of Spinoza'sbelief, be altogether too superficial. For the relation betweenthe independent Deity and dependent nature has in Spinoza'sphilosophy some remarkable, not to say peculiar characteristics.The things that God has created differ from him : ( 1 ) They existapart from himself; 34 (2) they have qualities which he does notpossess;35 (3) God does not pertain to their essence;36 (4) thingscan be imagined, but God cannot. 37 (5) Moreover the propositionquoted above 3S refers to infinite things and not to finite things,for thus the word " infinita " is most directly translated. If thisunique dependence of nature on God be pantheism let the his-torians of philosophy make the most of it. If custom has madeit imperative to keep Spinozism and Pantheism synonymous, theonly scientific procedure is to study Spinoza's works, summarizehis theories, and exhibit the result labelled " Pantheism." 39 Andthe students of education also may search the pages of Spinoza'sbooks to ascertain whether in his system, be it pantheistic or not,nature may have possibilities of education, although God doesnot.As for the limitations which we seemed to find Spinoza recog-

nizing within nature in his own practice of education we may atonce inquire whether or not they are due solely to the fact thathuman power cannot control all the educative agencies whichreach back into the pupil's ancestry and abroad into every circum-stance of climate and society. The most direct approach to ananswer is by an examination of Spinoza's metaphysical conceptsof possibility, contingency, necessity, and impossibility. Two ofthe concepts, necessity and impossibility, have universal signifi-cance. They apply to God and the whole of nature in which manis but a speck. The other two, possibility and contingency, have

33 Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, p. 104.34 Cogitata Metaphysica, pt. II, ch. VII, p. 153.35 Correspondence, letter XXXVI.36 Ethics, pt. II, prop. 10, cor. note.37 Correspondence, letter LX.38 Supra, p. 6, ref. 31, cf., also Short Treatise, p. 142, and Ethics, V,

prop. 24.39 Britain, Introduction to the Principles of Descartes' Philosophy, p. 1.


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8 Spinoca as Educator

meaning for mankind only ; applied to God or any eternal thing-,they arc nonsense. Those things are necessary that follow fromthe nature of God and those arc impossible that contradict it.The necessary is that for which a different existence is impossible;and the impossible is that which necessarily does not exist. Forexample, the diagonals of a square bisect each other necessarily;if they did not a square would not be a square but something else.On the other hand a circular square cannot exist, it is an im-possibility. So the win ile of nature, the system of natural laws,

rom the nature of God. If motion were ever retardedwithout cause, or if two perceived together no longertended to recall one another. God would have a different nature,

i long as God remains unalterable, whatever comes to passcould not be otherwise. Mi reover, it is contrary to the Natureof God that there should ever be a centaur or a hen that laysgolden eggs. Thus determinism is not the antithesis of libertinismbut of inconsistency. Free will there is in the sense that a manhas : tell the truth, if he wishes, but not that he has

er to be mad or delirious 4 " at will. God, like everythingelse, freel) acts out his own nature, but God cannot nod his headand awake the thunder, as Jupiter was fabled t > do. He has nohead to nod.

Things could not have been brought into being bj < iod in anymanner or in any order different from that which has in factobtained." "

By this criterion, education is in harmony with the universe: itnot clash with otlur natural phenomena, except as such oppo-

sition may express I rod's will. In no sense can it clash with God'swill, [f we chot ill such a process education as that bywhich a colt learns to eat grass, education is obviously necessary.For this is one of the things that follows from being a hi"Ami we shall be able more easily to understand this, if we

refleel that when we say, that a man can do what he will with hisown, this authority must be limited not only by the power of thei but 1>\ the capacit) of the object. If. for instance, 1 say

that 1 can rightfull) do what I will with this table, 1 do not cer-tainl) mean that I have the right to make it eat grass." '-'

40 T i' ics, pi. I, prop. 33.

''-' Tractatus Politicus, p


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io Spiiwca as Educatorthem because their essence is unknown. The existence of suchthings is said to be possible, the assertion constituting a confessionof ignorance on the part of the speaker. Other things there arewhose essence we understand to be not impossible : and yet wedo not know whether there be any cause for their existence. Tfwe knew that there was a cause we should have to say they werenecessary, for they would have to exist if there were a cause ; ifon the contrary we knew that there was no cause for their exist-ence, we should call them impossible, for without an efficientcause they could not exist. But so long as we do not knowwhether or not there be such a cause, we say of such things thatthey are contingent. In view of the fact that God is the causeboth of the essence and the existence of things, Spinoza did notemphasize this distinction between things possible and things con-tingent. Even in the Cogitata Metaphysica where the distinc-tion is first made, he admits that the terms might be interchangedand in the Ethics, he calls both aspects of our ignorance as tothe necessity or impossibility of things, the contingent. For hiseye was on things eternal, and phraseology expressing as it doesmerely the limitations of the human mind, did not cause himmuch concern. ,:'

It appears therefore that we must study the thing in whoseeducation we are interested in all its properties and relations.It is also clear that whatever limitations there are will be: (i)those that pertain to the nature of the being that is trained, be itcrystal, plant, beast, or man; ( _> | those that pertain to the seriesof external causes or agencies which operate in the training.

MlProfessor Laurie 48 in his chapter on the "Possibilities and

Limitations of Education," says that education in its highest sensebecomes possible only when mankind attains to a consciousneself; when the attainments of the race are discerned potentiallyin each individual. To this theon Spinoza would doubtless havepropounded the query a- to the function performed in educationby the development of consciousness of self, race, or anythingwhatsoever, lie would have asked wherein the influences which

'' her the discussion of these terms cf. Cogitata Metaphyseh. Ill, and Ethics, I, prop, 33. For additional illustrations, cf. Tractatus

Politicus, pp. no, i.u. 139, 145, 155, 186, 246, 254,Institutes of Education, ch. I.


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The Possibility of Education 1operate in education prior to or in the absence of consciousness,differ fundamentally from those which procure education afterconsciousness appears. He might have said of education as hedid of desire, that whether we are conscious of it or not, it is thesame education. That consciousness is a highly: important anddesirable stage in the development and education of mankind,Spinoza would have agreed. He deemed the extension of con-sciousness to be the culmination of man's destiny, a very differenttheory from that proffered by Professor Laurie.The philosophy of education now in vogue regards the educa-

tional process as a phase of evolution.47 The development of manis its gospel and Froebel, its apostle. Spinoza was chiefly im-pressed by logical causation, by the irresistible consequences thatfollow from a thing understood, as the properties of a geometricalconcept follow with more or less ease but with equal certaintywhen its definition is understood. But he also felt the force ofobjective causation, natura naturata.48 Nevertheless he did notpostulate two series of events in the universe. That which fol-lows logically (objectiva) from its superior idea is the same asthat which follows (formaliter) from its efficient cause, andthings are arranged in but one order and connection. 49 Onemay not go so far as to call Spinoza an evolutionist, nor can hisfailure to recognize that process detract from his credit ; but it isimportant to observe that there is nothing in Spinozistic deter-minism much as it may differ from that which excludes freedomfrom God, that is inimical to evolution. As the theory of thepersistence of force is not at variance with evolution, 50 soSpinoza's doctrine of essence, eternal and indestructible 51 makesno discord with our daily experiences of change and growth.Man as a human organism is produced, altered, and destroyed,but not so far as he is extended substance ; 52 likewise water. 53Furthermore, Spinoza sees order and regulation in all causalchanges.54 One form cannot be changed into another indiscrim-

47 Hanus, Educational Aims and Ideals, pp. 16-20. Davidson, History ofEducation, p. 1. Monroe, History of Education, p. 651.

48 Ethics, pt. I, prop. 28, 29.49 Ethics, pt. II, prop. 7.50 Spencer, First Principles, ch. VI.51 Cogitata Metaphysica, pt. II, ch. XII.52 Ibid., loc. cit.53 Ethics, pt. I, prop. 15, note.54 Ethics, pt. I, prop. 8, note ii.


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i_> Spinoza as Educator

inately. .More iver, when he saj s that man is produced, hehas a distinctly ontogenic concept. " I beg you," he writes, toOldenherg. " I beg you, dear friend, to bear in mind, that men arenot created but born, and that their bodies already exist beforebirth, though under different for;: 1.-.'* "" It seems plain thatSpinoza would have had no quarrel with even spontaneous

ration "in a definite, limited sense" meaning "the origina from inorganic carbon compounds." 86 He would

have insisted, however, that the germ history of a man is that ofa man and not of a goat, eve:; though a similar germ shoulddevel' >p into a goat, and the resemblance of germs were so closethat one could not tell at a given stage of development into whichanimal the germ were developing.To the more comprehensive question, as to whether evolution

has universal validity. Spinoza would have given a negativereply. We ma) hold either that the universe as a totality orunity is amenable to evolution or that it is not. If it is sogoverned, it must have d from a prior form of whichthe principle was non-evolutionary, and be progressing toward anon-evolutionary universe which shall be the outgrowth and nextstage of this evolutionary universe. It will not avail to pointout that the evolutionary principle thus applied is still more com-prehensive than the past, present, and future forms of universe.for the all-comprehensive situation is subject to the same testand the same conclusion. Spinoza would doubtless have includedevolution among the eternal laws, which neither change or begin.57Education, however, which proceeds in part at least accordiiman-made rule- designed For the well-being of the race he wouldnot have so classified save in so far as these rules coincide withthe necessary laws i the universe, the system of eternal lawswhich with him was synonymous with God.The fixed or non-evolutionary character oi a law per se should

be distinguished from the evolution ni that law as an ens rationis.It i- undoubtedly true that the law of evolution as a historic con-cept or formulation originated and has been developed, is stilldeveloping, through the labors of La Place. Le Conte, Marcon,Walll \in. Romanes, DeVries; but, their formulation.- ire

nee, letter IV.* Haeckel, Evolution of Man. vol. II, p. ji.: Wolf, Short Treatise, ch. XXIV, p. [39.


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The Possibility of Education 13not the fixed and unalterable principle whose operations theyobserve in unnumbered phenomena and which they seek to phrase.Spinoza, then, looked upon education as a natural process inharmony with the developing' character of the universe. Inasmuchas God and nature would be different without it, it is a necessaryphenomenon ; and since it goes on in accordance with the natureof the being educated it is a free activity. From a human pointof view education is subject to the ever widening knowledge ofthe sciences which provide data for concluding whether certainresults are consistent with the nature of that which is educated.Having decided that from this standpoint education is possible itis further incumbent upon the student of education to ascertainwhether the agencies needed to cause education are available.For example, we may inquire whether the nature of man falls intothe classesphilosophic reader and common herdas Spinozasays, and then go on to ask whether the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus is an agency adapted to secure the end for whichSpinoza designed it. Our general conclusion is therefore that inspite of the limitations which Spinoza recognized as in Burgh,who was too young, and his landlady, who was too old, to learnphilosophy, as well as in Blyenbergh whose prejudices hinderedhim from learning it, he yet regarded the study of philosophyas a proper form of human effort. The twofold limitations whichhe recognized afford philosophic basis between learning and teach-ing, each of these processes being again subject to mutual limita-tion according as we consider the capacity of the object or thepresence of causes to put the activity into effect.


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CHAPTER IITHE ELEMENTS OF HUMAN NATURE

In seeking- the principles upon which Spinoza might have basedhis theory of education, we can do no better than accept the hintgiven in the Emendatione. " It is necessary,'" says Spinoza, inthat uncompleted work, " to have an exact knowledge of the naturewhich we desire to perfect, and also know as much as possible ofnature in general." The first of these requirements will be recog-nized as in consonance with that examination of the nature of athing which in the preceding chapter we found to be prerequisiteto pronouncing upon its educability. The correspondence of thesecond is less obvious, and a consideration of its significancemay be postponed to the last chapter of the essay. In this andthe two subsequent chapters we confine ourselves to a discussionof the nature of human beings and their place in the cosmosaccording to Spinoza's philosophy. This chapter comprises : (i)The concepts of essence, existence, and causality as they apply toman; (2) the theory of substance and attributes from the samepoint of view; (3) the relation between man's mind and body;(4) the elaboration of Spinoza's theory of body; and (5) a studyof those facts commonly regarded as mental but which Spinozadeemed modifications of the human body, namely, imagination,memory, general notions, opinion, and emotion.

I

The fact that there are human beings in the world is theoutcome of the divine nature. 1 So is the nature of human beingsitself 2 as well as the conditions under which they exist, c. g.. thelaws of thought 8 that regulate human thinking, the laws of

1 Ethics, pt. I. prop. 25.- [bid., pt. I, in'"!'. 17. o>r. 2, Dote; ibid., pt. II. prop. 10, cor.3 [bid., pt. 1 1, prop. r.'


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16 Spiiwca as Educator

mate causes lies in the province of philosophy. 13 Philosophy thuspractices the art of definition.

14

The essence of man is his will to live. 15 Since will and under-standing are identified, 1,; man's essence is the same as his ration-ality. 17 The endeavor to persist in his own being, in which man'sessence, like the essence of everything, exhibits itself, is not merelyan anticipation of Schopenhauer. Although the latter also iden-tifies will and idea,18 the meaning he attaches to both wordsdiffers from Spinoza's use of the same words. Schopenhauer hasa wholly subjective theory of ideas, whereas for Spinoza thesubject-object relation is only one and that not the fundamentalaspect of mind. With reference to " the will to live," Schopen-hauer calls the expression a pleonasm for will,19 a statementhardly in accord with Spinoza's theory, as the discussion in thenext chapter will show. By substituting conatus for " will " and" willing." Schopenhauer's assertion, " Every man is what he isthrough his will, and his character is original, for willing is thebasis of his nature." -" could then be transposed to the openingparagraph of Chapter XVI of the Theological-Political Treatise.Indeed Spinoza's eloquent description of the struggle to exist mayhave been unknown to Schopenhauer, who perhaps like mithe earlier post-Kantians, knew only the EtJiics.

" As in the state of nature the man who is led by reason is mostpowerful and independent," 21 and " as the best plan of living soas to assure to the utmost self-preservation, is that which isframed according to the dictate of reason." - 2 the identity ofreason and the conatus of man is evident. The mind is somethingwhose essence it is to think and which in so far as it is considereda sufficient cause for mental activity is called will.*8 The factthat man's essence is at once what makes him rational and whatmakes him put forth every effort for physical as well as mental"Cogitata Metaphysica, pt. II, ch. II, p. 121 ; De Intellectos Emendatione,

p. 18." Ibid., p. 3 |.15 Ethics, pt. III. prop, 7; prop, o, note."' [bid., pt II, prop. 4'J. i-~" r -17 II. id., pt. II, prop, ii, 13 and 15; ibid., pt. V, prop. 36, cor. note,is TIi.- World as Will and Idea, vol. I. bk 1. p.

id., vol. I. bk. 4. p. 354-Ibid, vol. 1, bk. 4. p21 Political Treatise, ch. Ill, sec. 7.IbiA, ch. V, sec 1.Cogitata Metaphysica, pt. II. ch. 12, p. I73


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18 Spinoza as Educatorwhich they are derived ;33 all this is quite in accord with modernpsychology. Spinoza teaches also that the substitution of abstrac-tions for essences or ideas is a prolific cause of misunderstandingand of error. An abstraction represents nothing that exists in theform shown by the abstraction, and any deduction therefromwill involve error ; whereas thinking which makes its basis uponessences inevitably conducts to truth.

2. That there is such a fact as existence in the universe is dueto the necessity of the divine nature. In this sense God is thecause of the existence of particular things, including man, as wellas of their essence. But as was pointed out in the previous sub-division of this section of this chapter, individual men are finiteand do not stand in the same relation to God as does this eternaltruth of existence. Not God but parents are the efficient causeof a man's existence." 4 Nor is God the first cause in the humanseries or in any other. God is as much the cause for the existenceof the last man as of Adam, and the power needed to preserveeach man in existence is the same as that needed for his originalcreation.3 "' All of this is tantamount to saying that the fact ofexistence can neither be nor be conceived without God. 30 Ifthere were no God nothing could exist ; if God's nature did notinvolve as a principle, the existence of particular things, nothingcould ever come into existence. As was pointed out in the firstchapter, there are many things that do not exist; 37 some becauseexistence is contrary to their nature and others because the causeneeded to bring them into existence is absent.3S And as wasshown in the same discussion a thing will exist unless there is adefinite cause why it does not exist. The difficulty of thinkingabout non-existent things is apparent from the note to the eighthproposition of the second part of the Ethica. The comprehensionin the infinite idea of God of the ideas of particular things thatcannot exist is, to use Spinoza's word, unique. He tries to illus-trate the difference between existing things and non-existingthings and their likeness in relation to God. The fact is howeverbetter stated in the Tractatus Politicus.

33 [bid., p. 29.1 Ethics, pt. I. prop. 17, cor. 2, note.

35 Tractatus Politicus, cli. J, sec. 2.^F.tliics, pt. I. prop. 8, note ii.

itata Metaphysial, pt. I, ch, 3, p. 126.38 Ibid., pt. 1. ch. 3, p. 1-5-


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The Elements of Human Nature 19"Any natural thing whatever can he just as well conceived,

whether it exists or does not exist. As then the beginning of theexistence of natural things cannot be inferred from their definition,so neither can their continuing to exist. For their ideal essenceis the same, after they have begun to exist, as it was before theyexisted." 30

It is therefore evident that there may have been a time whenman had no existence and such a time may come again ; and thismay be true of any man or of the whole race, provided a causeoperates to prevent man's existence or the cause requisite for hisexistence be lacking.40 But inasmuch as man's essence is aneternal truth it is indestructible. 41 When its existence ceases itstill retains its ideal essence.

" The human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with thebody, but there remains of it something which is eternal." 42

3. God is the cause not only of the existence of things but ofthe conditions under which they exist, and his relation is in bothcases the same, i. e., that of logical cause. If things exist theymust exist in the relation of cause and effect.43 God is not, how-ever, the first cause of any series of existence, for priority cannotbe predicated of God. " A first cause is therefore inconceivable,"but Spinoza would not have agreed with the grounds thatSchopenhauer gives for this statement, namely, that there is notneed for explaining existence by a cause, but only a coming intoexistence as an instance of change. 44 Spinoza would have saidthat Schopenhauer understood the law, by which causality operates,but that this law does not account for the presence of causality.He would have said that the relation of cause and effect conditionsthe existence of all things ; that things do not thus condition them-selves, but are conditioned to act in this relation by God.45 Causeand effect is therefore one of the particular things that followfrom the nature of God. This law characterizes all of nature inso far as it is considered apart from God. Man as part of natureis subject to the law of cause and effect. Whatever happens to

39 Tractatus Politicus, ch. 2, sec. 2.i0 Correspondence, letter XXXIX, p. 352.41 Cogitata Metaphysica, pt. II, ch. XII, p. 172, 173.42 Ethics, pt. V, prop. 23.43 Ethics, pt. I, prop. 28.44 The World as Will and Idea. Supplement to bk. 1, ch. 4, vol. II, p. 214.45 Ethics, pt. I, prop. 26.


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20 Spinoca as Educatorhim must be accounted for by an antecedent occurrence. But in sofar as man is considered in his relation to God, his present state isnot the cause of any future state. 40 In relation to the rest ofnature, however, an adequate cause will be found for every effect,and there is nothing from which some effect does not follow.

II

The way in which Spinoza envisaged thought marks his chiefdivergence from Descartes. 47 Spinoza recognized in nature aninfinite power of thinking. 48 Thought is not identical with humanconsciousness, but is conceived objectively. From contemplatingthis cognitive aspect of nature, he came to regard it as somethingthat exists of itself and hence attributed it to God. From thenature of thought follow deductively its subordinate classes. Theidea or understanding is the most general form and those that arestill more limited, such as will, the emotions, imagination, and thelike, can neither be nor be conceived without the idea. 49 Finitethought has no existence apart from particular ideas 50 nor is willanything but an ens rationis, a general name for particular voli-tions. 51 And what is said of thought is to be understood of mind,for the two are synonymous.Extensionmatterwhatever is corporeal is conceivable with-

out thought as thought is conceivable independent of extension.Pondering on the nature of matter, or extension Spinoza came toregard it as a totality whose beginning is in itself, or rather it iswithout beginning or end and therefore necessarily existent. 52Hence extension also is attributed to God. Besides thought andextension he could find nothing that must be attributed toGod : nothing else that he investigated was of such nature thatafter he understood it, it became impossible for him to think of itexcept as existing. As for the two attributes that he had found,he was not forced, it is true, to think of either thought or exten-sion, or he might think of either and neglect the other, but if he*Cogitata Metaphysica, pt I. ch. 1. p. 14- ; ibid, pt. IT, cli. XI, p. 168."Cogitata Metaphysica, prolegomenon, pp. 13, 14.48 Correspondence, letter XV, p. 292.

Ethics, pt II, :ixim II I."Ibid., pt. II. prop. 48k note, ibid, pt II, prop. 49, demonstration of

corollary.n Correspondence, letter II. p. -79.52 Ibid., letter XXIX, p. 322.


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The Elements of Hitman Nature 21did think of thought or of extension he thought of them asexisting and otherwise he could not think of them ; their respectiveessences involved existence. So he concluded that althoughthought and extension could not exhaust the characteristics ofGod, they comprehend all that man knows of him.

Before examining into the nature of the attributes of God it mayadd to our confidence in Spinoza's conclusions to note the absenceof justification for the suspicion that he based his system upon anabstraction of substance and that he smuggled into this conceptafter the manner of a prestidigitator all that he afterward deducedtherefrom. To this end it is more profitable to think his thoughtsafter him and to note how he viewed the problem than to examinethe structure of the Ethics in which he thought to marshalhis conclusions in systematic form though hampered by the geo-metric method of presentation. It is plain that his thinking did notbegin with substance as the treatment of that concept in theCogitata and in the Emendatione shows. In the Prolegomenonto the Prvncipia of Descartes we have quite as clear a clue toSpinoza's course of thought as to that of Descartes, but two pass-ages in the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus are the most succinctexpression that Spinoza made concerning his philosophic pro-cedure, his method of study and investigation. " Philosophy,"he says in one place, " is based on axioms which must be soughtfrom nature alone." 53 And in another, " As God's existence isnot self-evident, it must necessarily be inferred from ideas sofirmly and incontrovertibly true, that no power can be postulatedor conceived sufficient to impugn them." 54 This truth as wellas God's essence and providence is best, " perceived throughthe fixed and immutable order of nature," 55 as exhibited in eitherthought or extension. Surely no system could make strongerclaims than this for a foundation on the study of reality, and nonecould avow clearer intention to avoid abstraction or a preliminarysynthesis of elements. In the note to the passage just quoted,Spinoza describes the method of procedure by which any one mayrepeat for himself the perception of God's essence, His existence,and like properties.56

53 Op. cit, ch. XIV, p. 189.54 Ibid., ch. VI, p. 85.55 Ibid., ch. VI, p. 84.56 Ibid., note 6, p. 270.


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22 Spinoza as Educator

One must however guard against misunderstanding the term" general notion " in this note. It is not an abstraction, the useof which we have shown Spinoza avoided as imperiling the ap-proach to truth,"' 7 but one of the axioms spoken of in the passageabove. By a study of nature, in thought and in extension, Spinozareached an insight into the nature of God as an explorer might findtwo routes to the same destination, one by land and the other bywater.The two attributes are incommensurate. The language of ex-

tension is inapplicable to thought and vice versa, although sub-stance thinking and substance extended are one and the samesubstance. 58 This antithesis must be carefully distinguished fromthat between idea and ideation. The idea is of course alwaysthought but the ideatum may be either thought or extension.Elwes has thus made himself responsible for a misleading transla-tion of the corollary to proposition seven of the second book ofthe Ethics, an error which Fullerton avoids by adhering toSpinoza's terms without attempting to expound them. In so faras we consider ideas we must view them in the logical and eternalrelations that pertain to essences ; in so far as we consider ideatawe must understand them to refer to the finite aspects of matterand thought wherein both are governed according to the formulaeof causes and effects. But whether viewed under one form or theother the order and connection is the same. In respect to theiressences, all extended and thinking things are subsumed under oneanother in that logical relation wherein nothing can be or be con-ceived without its superior idea. In respect to their existence allfinite things whether extended or thinking are regulated by thecausal law. But whether we call them essences or ideata they are thesame things in a single concatenation. " The order and connectionof ideas is the same as the order and connection of things." r 9We must understand things to signify anything in so far as it isa cause ;G0 and everything mental and physical is a cause so faras it is finite.

5T Ethics, pt. V, prop. 36, cor. note.58 Ibid., pt. II, prop. 7, note.59 Ibid., pt. II, prop. 7.80 Ibid., pt. II, prop. 9, prop. 19.


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The Elements of Human Nature 23III

We have thus far discussed the conditions under which manexists and the character of the universe of which he is a part.The discussion has been restricted to those aspects of the propertiesstudied that are applicable to man and that property of man inwhich we are especially interested, namely, his education. Fromthis exposition it should be clear that man is comprehended underthe idea of God. But ideas follow from God in infinite ways:(1) Ideas of thinking things, that is, of forms of thought such asother ideas, volitions, emotions, etc. ; (2) ideas of extended things,i. e., body ; (3) ideas of non-existent things, such as chimeras ; and(4) ideas of things that do exist. The first or broadest idea underwhich man is subsumed, is the idea of a body which exists.61This idea constitutes the essence of man's mind and its ideatum isthe human body. The clearest statement of this theory is in thecorrespondence with Tschirnhausen. It seems advisable to quoteat length : " The human mind can only acquire knowledge ofthose things which the idea of a body actually existing involves,or of what can be inferred from such an idea. For the powerof anything is defined solely by its essence (Ethics III, vii) ; theessence of the mind (Ethics, II, xiii) consists solely in this,that it is the idea of body actually existing; therefore the mind'spower of understanding only extends to things, which this idea ofbody contains in itself, or which follow therefrom." 62 Thestatement is so lucid that comment tends to complicate and befog,but it seems well to direct attention to the absence of the articlebefore the word " body " in the translation " the idea of body " asshowing that the human mind thus stands linked to other minds,and to emphasize the fact that although the mind and the body areone and the same thing, under the attributes of thought and exten-sion respectively as well as under the aspects of idea and ideatum,yet the mind is not the idea of an existing body because that bodybegins to exist.63 What the idea is depends upon other ideas,whereas the existence of the body depends upon its relation to thebodies that produced it according to the processes of generation.

It must be counted to Spinoza's credit that he understood andB1 Ethics, pt. II. prop. II, 13.62 Correspondence, letter LXVI, p. 398.^Ethics, pt. II, prop. 6, cor.; ibid., pt. Ill, prop. 11, note.


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The Elements of Human Nature 25they are independent of thought, for the very reason that at firstblush might tempt one to think the reverse, namely, because anextended thing is not different from its idea except in aspect, thatis in respect to the attribute under which it is considered.

" The actual being of things, which are not modes of thought,does not follow from the divine nature, because that nature hasprior knowledge of the things. Things represented in ideas followand are derived from their particular attribute in the same mannerand with the same necessity as ideas follow from the attribute ofthought." 69At the risk of standing charged with superfluous comment, it

may not be amiss to note that the expression " their particular at-tribute " is used because " things represented in ideas " may beeither extended things or thinking things as was shown in thefinal paragraph of the preceding section of this chapter.

Thus, at a stroke, Spinoza made substantial the shadows ofidealism, turned the light on the Ding an Sich and left mind andmatter without a bone of contention ; for if they are one, therecan be no question about the superiority of either. Such state-ments as may be found in the letters, e. g., " from extension asDescartes conceives it, to wit, a quiescent mass, it is not onlydifficult but absolutely impossible to prove the exist-ence of bodies " 70 and that " the variety of the universe " cannot" be deduced a priori from the conception of extension only," " itmust necessarily be explained through an attribute which ex-pressed eternal and infinite essence," 7I are not to be taken asevidence that Spinoza was after all an idealist, any more than hisbelief that man's immortality consists in the fact that there issomething eternal to man's mind, whereas his body is whollytemporal, constitutes such evidence. These statements merelyvoice Spinoza's belief as to the nature of thought. It is not thebusiness of matter to be knowledge and its failure to perform anoffice contrary to its nature is no proof of inferiority.

" For instance, extension can only be called imperfect in respectto duration, position, or quantity ; that is, as not enduring longer,as not retaining its position, or as not being greater. It can neverbe called imperfect because it does not think, inasmuch as its

69 Loc. cit.70 Correspondence, letter LXX, p. 407.71 Ibid., letter LXXII, p. 409.


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26 Spinoza as Educatornature requires nothing of the kind, but consists solely in extension,that is, in a certain sphere of being." 72

But man's nature is essentially rational, as has been said, and hetends to view everything as resembling himself. As Spinozasays in another letter, " I believe that if a triangle could speak, itwould say .... that God is eminently triangular." " 3 Con-scious of this tendency, Spinoza sought not to limit God to theattributes which come within the ken of man although he believedman's knowledge of God and the world to be true so far as itgoes.

IVThe study of human anatomy was in its infancy in Spinoza's

day. Harvey had published his epoch-making essay six yearsprior to the birth of the philosopher. Spinoza lived in his youthwith a physician, Francis Van den Ende, 74 and is conjecturedwith every show of probability to have availed himself of thisopportunity to acquire the scientific knowledge of the time. It isespecially noteworthy that for the important truths of his phil-osophy the advance of science suggests no revision except per-haps of phraseology. Descartes' theory that the mind is seatedin the pineal gland he rejected. " lost in wonder that a philosopher.... who had so often taken to task the scholastics for wish-ing to explain obscurities through occult qualities, could maintaina hypothesis, beside which occult qualities are commonplace.'" 7

"

As is to be expected in view of the state of science in his day,Spinoza's account of the human body is physical rather thanbiological. Like all matter, the human body consists of " simplebodies " which are combined according to their mass. 7 '' and rateof motion. 77 He has a glimpse of the importance of time.~ s asan element of velocity, but does not use it, in this respect onlyfalling short of a complete use of the three factors, mass, velo-city, and time, on which every equation in modern physics is based.These " simple bodies " are variously combined into " compound

72 Correspondence, letter XLT, p. 357: cf. Ethics, pt. I, prop. 15, note.n Corresp adence, letter XXVI I, pp. 315, 316.74 J. Preudenthal, op. cit., p. 4-*.75 Ethics, jit. V. preface.76 ll)id., pt. II, definition after axiom 11. following Lemma 111. 7 [bid., pt. 1 1, Lemma I."Ibid., pt. II. prop. 44, cor. I, note.


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The Elements of Human Nature 27bodies " of which the law of union or relation constitutes theessence, so that one simple body may replace another or the num-ber of constituent bodies may increase or decrease without affect-ing the identity of the individual. 79 This process of combinationis carried on with the compound bodies as constituents intogreater and greater complexity, the human body being so highlycomplicated that it may lose its members without losing its essen-tial character.Each human body is one of many complex individuals that in

conjunction with other bodies of all sorts and conditions make upthe whole of nature.so Each human body maintains varyingrelations with a greater or smaller number of these surroundingbodies which resemble it or differ from it according to the numberof common elements or the resemblance between their respectivelaws of union and relation. The scheme of regulation of thesecosmic adjustments between body and body is forever beyondhuman ken. We know only in part and " are in many waysdriven about by external causes, and like waves of the sea, drivenby contrary winds we toss to and fro unwitting of the issue andof our fate." S1 If we knew all the causes that co-operate in anevent we should never need to ascribe anything to chance, " thepseudonym of God for those events which he does not choose tosubscribe with his own sign manual." 82 But from a comparisonof any unit with all the others it is evident that there is disparityinfinitely great between any body and all the rest. The force withwhich a human body endeavors to persist in its existence dependson the proportion of its constituent elements whose inherenttendency is to increase. Were it not for the fact that every otherbody has a conatus which similarly strives to carry out its poten-tialities, any given body could absorb and subjugate all others. Asit is, the power of external causes is infinitely greater than ourown.83 But by combination with other human or non-humanbodies the conatus of a man may be helped or hindered. Interfer-ence with the activity of the body may be disease 84 or even

79 Ethics, pt. II, prop. 24; ibid., pt. IV, prop. 39.80 Ibid., pt. IV, prop. 4; ibid., pt. IV, appendix VI.81 Ibid., pt. Ill, prop. 59, note.*2 Coleridge, Table Talk.83 Ethics, pt. IV, prop. 3 ; ibid., pt. Ill, prop. 6.84 Ibid., pt. IX, prop. 44, note; ibid., pt. IV, prop. 20, note


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28 Spinoza as Educatordeath. 85 Suicide is the effect of an external cause. S6 Suchchanges having once been caused remain until their effects areremoved or altered by other causes. An interesting instance ofSpinoza's harmony with modern psychology is his reference to theforce of suggestion in securing imitation. The explanation isphysiological throughout.87 Different external causes may affectthe human body similarly, the total situation being different be-cause of the difference in the cause. 88 But the number of bodiesthat can affect the human body at the same time is limited.89Xo matter what happens in the body's endeavor to preserve its

existence, through the force which is expressed physically in thelaw that unites its elements,90 whether the result be physicalgrowth, or the destruction of the body 91 in the clash and warfarewith antagonistic conati, each bent on the preservation of its ownexistence or whether it be an activity that recombines other bodies,be it fashioning a garment, assembling a machine, the erection of atemple or the collection of other human bodies into a church, aschool or a cabinet, in so far as the result is physical so is thecause.92 " Nevertheless, though such is the case." says Spinoza,

" I can scarce believe, until the fact is proved by experience, thatmen can be induced to consider the question calmly and fairly, sofirmly are they convinced that it is merely at the bidding of themind, that the body is set in motion or at rest or performs avariety of actions depending solely on the mind's will or exerciseof thought." 93

Spinoza marshalls eight lines of argument to support his con-tention that material effects have material causes.

i. Ignorance of the mechanism of the human body should giveus pause in pronouncing what it can do of its own force.

" The mechanism of the human hod} far surpasses in com-plexity all that has been put together by human art."

3. "The body can by the sole power of its nature do manythings that the mind wonders at," e. g., digestion.

85 Ibid., pt. Ill, note.86 Ibid, pt IV, prop. [8, note.87 Ibid., pt. Ill, prop. 32, note.88 Ibid, pt. IV, prop. 59."Ibid., pt. II, prop. 40, note I90 Ibid., pt. II, del', cit.91 Ibid, pt. IV. prop. 39, note.92 Ibid., pt. Ill, prop. 2, note.M Loc. cit.


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The Elements of Human Nature 294. Many actions of the lower animals transcend human

sagacity.5. The reference of the cause of bodily actions to the mind is

a refuge of ignorance.6. The reciprocal interdependence of mind and body shows

that neither is prior to the other but that both are equally original.7. " Experience abundantly shows that men can govern any-

thing more easily than their appetites."8. Somnambulism. " If we speak in dreams it is by the spon-

taneous action of the body."Convinced by this array of the facts that the body is neitherthe master nor the menial of the mind, Spinoza is wholly sane in

what he says of its care." The advantage which we derive from things external to us,

besides the experience and knowledge which we acquire fromobserving them, and from recombining their elements in differentforms, is principally the preservation of the body ; from this pointof view, those things are most useful which can so feed andnourish the body, that all its parts may rightly fulfil their func-tions. For in proportion as the body is capable of being affectedin a greater variety of ways, and of affecting external bodies in agreat number of ways, so much the more is the mind capable ofthinking. But there seem to be very few things of this kind innature, wherefore for the due nourishment of the body we mustuse many foods of diverse nature. For the human body is com-posed of very many parts of different nature, which stand in con-tinual need of varied nourishment, so that the whole body may beequally capable of doing everything that can follow from its ownnature, and consequently that the mind also may be equallycapable of forming many perceptions." 94Nor is he averse to the lighter benefits that accrue to the body." Assuredly nothing forbids man to enjoy himself save grim and

gloomy superstitions. For why is it more lawful to satiate one'shunger and thirst than to drive away one's melancholy. I reasonand have convinced myself as follows : No deity, nor anyone else,save the envious, takes pleasure in my infirmity and discomfort,nor sets down to my virtue the tears, sobs, fears and the like,which are signs of infirmity of spirit ; on the contrary the greaterthe pleasure wherewith we are affected, the greater the per-fection whereto we pass ; in other words, the more must we neces-sarily partake of the divine nature. Therefore, to make use ofwhat comes in our way and to enjoy it as much as possible (notto the point of satiety, for that would not be enjoyment) is the

94 Ethics, pt. IV, appendix 27.


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30 Spinoza as Educatorpart of a wise man. I say it is the part of a wise man to refreshand recreate himself with moderate and pleasant food and drink,and also with the perfumes, with the soft beauty of growing plants,with dress, with music, with many sports, with theatres, and the like,such as every man may make use of without injury to his neighbor.For the human body is composed of very many parts, of diversenature, which continually stand in need of fresh and variednourishment, so that the whole body may be equally capable ofperforming all the actions, which follow from the necessity of itsown nature ; and, consequently, so that the mind may also beequally capable of understanding many things simultaneously." M

It is plain that Spinoza believed that the world would go on justthe same so far as material achievement is concerned if the attri-bute of mind were relegated to the limbo of the unknown togetherwith such other attributes as there may be in excess of two.This is not saying, as the fourth chapter will show, that theworld is not better for mind, but merely, and this is startlingenough, that man could carry out the consequences of his naturewithout knowing what he is doing. Pictures would be painted,books written and read, business would be transacted exactly aswe may imagine that bees lay up honey, or snow forms itself incrystals, and for the same reason, namely, that men are men asbees are bees and snow is snow ; which is no reason at all andcannot be, for matter is not amenable to reason.

VUpon this simple theory of body Spinoza accounts for imagin-

ation, memory, and feeling. To understand these concepts it isnecessary not only to know that the human mind is the idea ofthe body, but also that there are different ideas of the human mindand of a human being. The idea of a body existing is differentfrom the idea of a body not existing; 90 the idea of a body in sofar as that body is caused by God is different from the idea of abody as caused by another body 97 and both ideas are differentfrom the idea of a body as the cause of another body. Undereach of these ideas diverse logical subdivisions are subsumed, andthe ideas are variously combined under other major ideas.The idea which constitutes the human mind is the idea of a

hies, pt IV, prop. 45, cor. II. note.III. prop, to ; ibid., pt. IV. prop. u.

97 Ibid, pt. II, prop. 19.


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The Elements of Human Nature 31particular thing which exists. The ideatum to which this ideacorresponds is the human body and that consists of innumerableelements, simple bodies and compound bodies and still more com-plex bodies. Consequently the agreement between mind andbody in human beings involves the fact that the human mind is avery complex idea ; for there is in thought an idea for each of thecomponent parts of the body, but these ideas are not combined asare the material elements that enter into the constitution of thebody. The latter are united according to the laws of extensionwhereas the corresponding ideas are subsumed, the one under theother, according to the laws of thought. Moreover, there is in therealm or attribute of thought an idea for every human body aswell as for the bodies of animals, plants, and minerals.98 That isto say, such things have minds. In every situation in which thehuman body is brought into relation to one or more other bodies,the ideas of all the bodies are subsumed under an idea which notonly expresses this relation but corresponds in thought to thewhole physical combination." But body A affected by body Bis a different situation from body B affected by body A ; hencethere is an idea for each respective situation. In other words themind of one person differs from the mind of every other.

" The images of things are modifications of the human body,whereof the ideas represent external bodies as present to us ; inother words, whereof the ideas involve the nature of our body,and, at the same time, the nature of external bodies as present." 10

Spinoza was not sure whether the physiological modificationwas on the retina or in the brain. 101 The fact that both wereconcerned did not, apparently, suggest itself to him. " Whenthe mind regards bodies in this way we say it imagines." 102These images or the knowledge of them need not be mental pic-tures for they do not necessarily recall the figure of things. 103The factors that govern the operation of the imagination, that isto say, the formation of imagesfor there is no faculty of imagin-ation apart from the particular images that the body formsare:(1) The bodily situation that constitutes the image may continue

98 Ethics, pt. II, prop. 13, note.99 Ibid,, pt. II, prop. 16.

100 Ibid., pt. Ill, prop. 27.101 Ibid., pt. II, prop. 48, note.102 Ibid., pt. II, prop. 17, note.103 Loc. cit.


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32 Spinoza as Educator

or recur after the external cause has been removed or has evenceased to exist; and (2) more than one external cause may affectthe body simultaneously. From these two factors result the va-garies of imagination, its uncertainties, the nature of abstractionsand of memories.To have an image of a thing permits us to predicate nothing as

to the existence of such a thing. Given certain bodily modifica-tions and the image is there. It may be the image of somethingthat exists and is present to the senses, or it may be absent thoughstill existing, or it may have ceased to exist or may never haveexisted. In either case, the thing will be imagined in the sameway unless there be added to the images an idea which specifiesthe truth, whatever that may be, concerning the existence or non-existence of the thing imagined. The strength and glory of theimagination consists in the vigor with which the body forms imagesand has nothing to do with the question whether or not therebe such things as are imagined. 104 The image exists and may beas wild and improbable as " Gorgons and hydras and chimaerasdire."The number of external causes that may act on the body at the

same time is unlimited. The bodily state produced tends to recurif any of the causes that contributed to the original state againoperate on the same body. Thus association of images is reallyan association of things linked to one another through the bodywhich they have chanced to affect. A memory is such an associa-tion when at least one of the external causes of the image isabsent. Memory is therefore physiological and means the repeti-tion of a physical state after it has once passed. On the mentalside it involves an interval of time during which the thing re-membered shall have been forgotten : that is, there shall have beenintroduced the idea which negatives the existence of that thing.Memories are physical states recalled by other physical states withwhich they have become accidentally connected through simul-taneous action upon the human body.

Spinoza makes no provision for recognition in recollection, butit is obviously implied in his theory >^i consciousness. Believingthat if we know a thing we know that we know it. he doubtlessdid not feel that recognition in memory was a distinct problem.104 Ethics, pt. II, prop. 17 note.


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The Elements of Human Nature 33The same external causes are not always in conjunction with

the human body but may combine in any conceivable fashion.Consequently, a given physical state may be associated not withone but with several different causes, according as now one andthen the other operates on the body in conjunction with a thirdcause. As a result an image will not always recall the same asso-ciated image but may recall different images at different timeshence what Spinoza terms the wavering of the imagination, 105a phrase well calculated to describe the flightiness of mindswhose chief activity is imagination, and which he seems to regardas genetically the root of the concept of contingency.When the association of images is limited to those of one kind,as when we remember in rapid succession all sorts and conditionsof men, we are prepared to form an abstract notion of the thingremembered. All abstract notions or ideas are confused images.

" They arise to wit from the fact that so many images, for in-stance, of men, are formed simultaneously in the human mind, thatthe powers of imagination break down, not indeed utterly, but tothe extent of the mind losing count of small differences betweenindividuals (e. g., color, size, etc.) and their definite number andonly distinctly imagining that in which all the individuals, in sofar as the body is affected by them, agree ; for that is the point, inwhich each of the said individuals chiefly affected the body ; thisthe mind expresses by the name man and this it predicates of aninfinite number of particular individuals." 106Another type of image is the bodily modification which results

from the sight of printed words, the hearing of a spoken word, orthe reaction that follows upon any symbol. 107 Such images as wellas all memories and abstractions make up the first and lowest kindof knowledgeopinion ; 10S the only possible source of error. It istherefore impossible to have an image of God, because in so far aswe know the divine nature we know it truly, though, of course byno means completely. 109 Many inferences might be added to thisaccount of the imagination, but the important fact has been re-peatedly stated although it cannot be too strongly emphasized, i. e.,

105 Ethics, pt. II, prop. 44, cor. I, note.106 Pt. II, prop. 40, note I.107 Ibid., loc. cit., not 2.108 De Intellectus Emendatione, p. 8.109 Ibid., pt. II, prop. 47, note ; Correspondence, letter LX, p. 387.

3


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34 Spinoza as Educator" The essence of words and images is put together by bodily mo-tions, which in no wise involves the conception of thought." uoTo word- and images Spinoza might have added emotions for

these also are put together by bodily motions and do not involvethe conception of thought. The principle according to which theelements of the body are united seeks constant accretion wherein itexhibits its essence as the conatus conscrz-andi. A constant growthin efficiency is therefore the natural tendency of every humanbeing, a tendency which may be helped or hindered by externalbodies. The transitions from a given degree of efficiency to a higherone due to the conatus cannot be accompanied or represented byimages, for images are those bodily states whose ideas involve theideas of other bodies. Those transitions from one state of bodilyefficiency to another in which the tendency of the human essenceis helped, checked, or overcome by external causes are to beunderstood as transitions from image to image as well as frombodily modification to bodily modification. Every change fromimage to image does not necessitate a change in efficiency. Thetransition from one state of efficiency to another that is greater orless is an emotion. 111

Vs there is in the attribute of thought an idea which correspondsto the image in the attribute of extension, so there is an idea ofthe increase or decrease of bodily power. Although we lack thewarrant of any explicit statement from Spinoza, it seems certainthat he would have been willing to apply the term image indiffer-ently to the bodily modification and to the idea thereof whichinvolves the existence of an external cause. He employs the termemOti< i 1 in this double sense, which for him is fundamentally asingle one. From this usage arises the possibility of misunder-standing what an emotion is in the attribute of thought. Tt is notthe transition from the idea of one image or bodily state to the ideaof a different image or bodily state, but it is the idea of such transi-tion. n - A second liability to error arises from the fact that Spin-oza's analysis ^i these transitions between physical states is couchedin terms of the ideas of the transitions and of the ideas of theimages. This is doubtless due to the fact that language expresses

110 Ethics, pt. 1 1. prop. 49, cor. note.ni [bid., pt. 111. def. Ill : ibid, pt. IV, appendix i.11 - ll>i


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The Elements of Human Nature 35the nomenclature of feeling- from the standpoint of mind. Weare thus prepared to understand his statement that the out-ward modifications of the body observable in an emotion, e. g.," trembling, pallor, sobbing, laughter, etc., are attributable tothe body only, without any reference to the mind." 113 There areideas of these modifications of the body involved in the complex ideawhich comprehends whatever modifies the body as it exists, andwhich constitutes the mind of man. But those ideas do not enterinto the idea of the transition from one bodily state to another,which transition is emotion ; for neither the transition nor the ideaof it trembles, nor is pale nor has any of the mentioned symptoms,which are merely the accompaniments and therefore the signs ofthe chance in efficiency.The classification of the emotions depends upon : ( I ) Whether

the change in efficiency is the outcome of the body alone, that is,the conatus, or the result of the interaction between the body andother bodies ; and (2) whether the force for existence becomesgreater or less. Under the former aspect we have actions andpassions ; under the latter, pleasure and pain. In so far as thehuman essence or conatus is a thing of body and mind together itis called appetite. 114 Consciousness of appetite is desire, 115 butit is immaterial whether this distinction be made or not, forstrictly speaking the physical effects are the effects of appetite." For whether a man be conscious of his appetite or not, it remainsthe same appetite." 116 If the endeavor to persist in its own exist-ence be the sole cause for increased efficiency, the transition thusoccasioned is called an action or activity; 117 if external causescontribute to the efficiency or if they counteract it to such anextent that the body's efficiency decreases, the transition or emo-tion is called a passion or passivity. lls Pleasure and pain areboth passive states wherein man passes to greater and to lesspower 119 respectively. Inasmuch as a man's desire, that is,consciousness of appetitus or conatus, may be an ingredient ofany emotion, Spinoza's designation of desire as a co-ordinate emo-113 Ethics, pt. Ill, prop. 59, note.114 Ibid., pt. Ill, prop, 9, note.u5 Ibid., loc. cit.116 Ibid., pt. Ill, Definitions of the Emotions, I, Explanation.117 Ibid., pt. Ill, Definition?, II; ibid., pt. II, prop. 1.118 Ibid., pt. Ill, General Definition; ibid., pt. IV, prop. 2.m Ibid., pt. Ill, prop. 2, note; ibid., pt. Ill, Definition of the Emotions,

II, III ; Explanation.


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tion with pleasure and pain must be regarded as a departure fromstrict logical classification. Desire as man's essence in whateveraspect is more fundamental than either action, passion, pleasureor pain, and save for its great convenience as a locution could beomitted from Spinoza's presentation with distinct advantage toclearness. 120 Spinoza moreover recognizes as pleasure those emo-tions which arise from desire or human essence alone 121 in spiteof the restriction upon the meaning of pleasure above noted, andlogically points out that from the conatus alone only pleasure canbe derived, since man's essence could never be the cause of alessening in his power. 122 Spinoza calls the active emotionsfortitudo, and divides them into animositas and generositas, bothof which involve the social element which is the subject of thefourth chapter ; that chapter therefore affords a more convenientplace for the discussion of these emotions and what they denote.

Spinoza's treatment of the emotions, although not physiological,is concrete throughout. He believed that there are no passiveemotions save such as are joined to some object, and that thereare as many emotions as there are objects whose conjunction withthe human body produces the change in its efficiency. 123 Sincethe same objects affect different persons or the same person atdifferent times the actual number of emotional states exceeds cal-culation. 124 The additional fact that emotions may be associatedwith bodies that do not cause them directly leads to the statementthat anything can be the cause of any emotion. 125 And this inturn makes possible the substitution of causes 126 and hence thesubstitution of emotions. 127 Imitation as a means for arousingand strengthening feeling lends support to this theory. 12S Thedistinction between the pleasure arising from increased efficiencyof particular organs and that which is due to the greater power of

120 The fundamental character of desire in relation to pleasure and painis clear from Ethics, pt. Ill, prop. 13, cor. note; prop. 27, note I; prop. 37;prop. 59.

i 21 Ibid., pt. Ill, prop. 58.122 Ibid., pt III, prop. 59.123 Ibid., pt 111. prop. 56.

bid., pt. Ill, prop. 51 ; ibid., pt. IV, prop. 33.125 Ibid., pt. 111. prop. 15.126 Ibid., pt III, pro]'. 48.1 -"7 Ibid., pt. Ill, prop. 4.}.128 Ibid., pt 111. prop. 27, 31; Definitions of the Emotions. XXXIII.Explanation.


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The Elements of Human Nature 37the organism as a whole 129 is as sane as it is important, and thisestimate applies also to his dictum : " Desire arising from pleasureis, other things being equal, stronger than desire arising frompain." 13 But modern as are these scattered statements that arehere collected to illustrate the fact that his observations place himin accord with the most modern theory of the emotions, they areperhaps less striking than his remark that we esteem things goodbecause we desire them, and not the reverse. 131

Spinoza knew that his way of treating the emotions was a de-parture from ordinary method. In the eloquent paragraphswhich begin the Third Part of the Ethics and which are paralleledby the Introduction to the Political Treatise, he says

" Most writers on the emotions and on human conduct seem tobe treating of matters outside nature than of natural phenomenafollowing nature's general laws. They appear to conceive man tobe situated in nature as a kingdom within a kingdom ; for theybelieve that he disturbs rather than follows nature's order, that hehas absolute control over his actions, and that he is determinedsolely by himself. They attribute human infirmities and fickle-ness, not to the power of nature in general but to some mysteriousflaw in the nature of man which accordingly they bemoan, deride,despise ; or as usually happens, abuse."

Needless to say, the attitude here condemned did not die outwith the seventeenth century. Spinoza continues :

" Nothing comes to pass in nature, which can be set down to aflaw therein ; for nature is always the same so thatthere should be one and the same method of understanding thenature of all things whatsoever, namely through nature's universallaws and rules. Thus the passions of hatred, anger, envy, and soon, considered in themselves, follow from this same necessity andefficiency of nature ; they answer to certain definite causes, throughwhich they are understood, and possess certain properties asworthy of being known as the properties of anything else, whereofthe contemplation in itself affords us delight."The bearings of Spinoza's philosophy on education are reserved

for the last chapter of this essay where the problem of disciplineis discussed at length. Yet as we turn from the aspects of thehuman body summarized in this chapter to a consideration of the129 Ibid., pt. IV, prop. 43, 60.130 Ibid., pt. IV, prop. 18.131 Ibid., pt. Ill, prop. 9, note.


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place of intellect in Spinoza's system it is inspiring to reflect uponhis dignified, indeed lofty, attitude toward those instances of humanfrailty especially characteristic of youth, which perplex and irritatethose teachers whose task is control and discipline and who toooften are themselves swept into the vortices of passion by theirfailure to understand, if not to admire, the emotions of others, notto sav their own.


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The Supremacy of the Intellect 41complex physical units, 20 save in appearing under a differentattribute, that of thought.The activity of thought is not that of body though both are

aspects of human essence. 21 The latter is motion, the former,will. Will is that which forces one conclusion and not another tofollow from a given premise. It is the affirmation of ideas.

" It is the faculty whereby the mind affirms or denies what istrue or false, not the desire wherewith the mind wishes for orturns away from any given thing." 22

Will is not a mental fiat which causes voluntary movements ofthe body. Mind, of which will is a form or function, cannotdetermine body to rest, motion, or anything whatsoever. Sinceevery idea involves an affirmation will and intellect are one andboth are but the general name for individual thoughts and voli-tions.23The will is not free to act without cause nor to transgress the

laws of thought. But it is never more free than when operatingaccording to the nature of mind.

" The soul acts according to fixed laws, and is, as it were, animmaterial automaton." 24

" It is plain that the dictates of the mind are but another namefor the appetites ; and therefore vary according to the varyingstate of the body." 25

" Men are mistaken in thinking themselves free ; their opinionis made up of consciousness of their own actions, and ignoranceof the causes by which they are conditioned. Their idea of free-dom, therefore, is simply their ignorance of any cause for theiractions." 26To strengthen the position set forth in these extracts Spinoza

enumerates some of the things that the will cannot do. It cannotcontrol the appetite nor speech, it cannot prevent men from doingthings they repent of. It cannot manacle the mind that it ceasesknowing, nor curtain it against consciousness. " It is not withinthe free power of the mind to remember or forget a thing at

20 Ibid., pt. V, prop. 22.21 Ibid., pt. Ill, prop. 9, note.22 Ibid., pt. II, prop. 48, note.23 Loc. cit.24 De Intellectus Emendatione, p. 32.25 Ethics, pt. Ill, prop. 2, note.26 Ibid., pt. II, prop. 35, note.


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42 Spinoza as Educatorwill." 27 We may desire to obey a command to believe or wishwith all the heart to yield adherence to a thesis at the behest ofthose in authority, or at the entreaty of those whom we love.Spinoza asks one of the most eloquent questions in the history ofthought: " What shall we do if reason prove recalc

spinoza as educator - rabenort

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