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Spinoza’s Axiology

After experience had taught me that all the things which regularly occurin ordinary life are empty and futile, and I saw that all the things which werethe cause or object of my fear had nothing of good or bad in themselves,except insofar as [my] mind was moved by them, I resolved at last to try tofind out whether there was anything which would be the true good, capableof communicating itself, and which alone would affect the mind, allothers being rejected—whether there was something which, once foundand acquired, would continuously give me the greatest joy, to eternity. (TIE,G ii.;C i.)

In these opening lines of the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect—among the most stirring in all his corpus—Spinoza raises a question thathas long vexed philosophers:what,if anything,is truly valuable? Spinozawas to return to this question in many of his works, from the early TdIEand Short Treatise to his mature masterpiece, the Ethics.Because it was soimportant to him,it should not be surprising that his answers have beenthe subject of a number of studies.1 For all their differences, however,

1 These include: H. A.Wolfson, The Philosophy of Spinoza, i [Spinoza] (Cambridge, MA:Harvard University Press, ), esp. f.;David Bidney,The Psychology and Ethics of Spinoza[Psychology] (New Haven,CT: Yale University Press,), esp.ch.;E.M.Curley,‘Spinoza’sMoral Philosophy’, in Marjorie Grene (ed.), Spinoza:A Collection of Critical Essays (GardenCity, NY: Anchor Books, ), –;William K. Frankena, ‘Spinoza’s “New Morality” ’[‘New Morality’], in Maurice Mandelbaum and Eugene Freeman (eds.), Spinoza: Essays inInterpretation (LaSalle, IL: Open Court Publishing, ), –; Ruth Mattern,‘Spinoza andEthical Subjectivism’ [‘Ethical Subjectivism’], in Charles E. Jarrett, John King-Farlow, and F. J. Pelletier (eds.), New Essays on Rationalism and Empiricism (Canadian Journal of Philosophy,supplementary vol. () ), –; Jonathan Bennett, A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics [Study](Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, ), ch. ; Don Garrett, ‘Spinoza’s Ethical Theory’[‘Ethical Theory’], in Don Garrett (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, ), –; Charles Jarrett, ‘Spinoza on the Relativity ofGood and Evil’ [‘Good and Evil’], in Olli Koistinen and John Biro (eds.),Spinoza:MetaphysicalThemes (Oxford:Oxford University Press,),–.

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there is a common theme to these studies: that Spinoza was a relativistabout value. In one of the earliest studies,Wolfson argues that Spinozaused language stressing the dependence of value on human cognitionand imagination in order to express his ‘conception of the relativity ofgood and evil’ in the Short Treatise and the Ethics.2 Most recently, Jarrettopens his paper by stating that ‘Spinoza appears to maintain that goodand evil are relative in at least three ways.’3 Disputes about how,precisely,his relativism ought to be understood have kept the ink flowing butthere has been essential agreement among most commentators thatvalue obtains solely in relation to us.

As noted below, there are texts in support of a relativistic interpreta-tion.Yet there are others which suggest that Spinoza wasn’t an unquali-fied relativist. Shortly after the above excerpt, he speaks in the TdIE ofthe successful completion of his quest for a ‘true good’(and, in addition,a ‘highest good’) (§). In the Ethics he says that some things are ‘cer-tainly good or bad’ (EIVP) and something is ‘necessarily good’which‘agrees with our nature’ (EIVP).Texts like these (and others to becited below) are hard to fit into an unqualified relativistic framework,where value is not obviously thought of as ‘true’ or ‘certain’ or ‘neces-sary’. Indeed, texts like these have led some of the best Spinoza com-mentators to conclude that his thoughts on value are incoherent.Bidney states the accusation well when he writes,‘Spinoza’s Stoic ration-alism with its acknowledgment of absolute moral standards is incompatible withhis biological naturalism which teaches the complete relativity of all good and evil,virtue and vice, to the requirements of self-preservation.’4

This essay offers a fresh perspective on Spinoza’s axiology, differingfrom others by emphasizing the metaphysical grounds on which it issecured.By connecting Spinoza’s axiology to his metaphysics,a new andcrucial distinction will be made possible—the distinction between non-circumstantially relatively valuable goods and circumstantially relativelyvaluable ones.This distinction will preserve the essential truth of the rel-ativist reading—that goods are only relatively valuable—while alsoaccommodating the notion that some goods have value which doesn’tchange with the circumstances. In addition, new light will be shed onother key properties which Spinoza accords to value.

Jon Miller

2 Wolfson,Spinoza,. 3 Jarrett,‘Good and Evil’,.4 Bidney,Psychology, (his italics).

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It will be useful to begin with some basics.Spinoza writes in EIVPDem,‘Insofar as a thing agrees (convenit) with our nature, it cannot be bad(by P). So it must either be good or indifferent.’5 Like many in the his-tory of Western philosophy,6 Spinoza thought that goods do not admit ofa bivalent division. Instead, there are three categories of value—bad(malus),good (bonus),and indifferent (indifferens).While there is apparentlynothing special about his acceptance of a tripartite division of value, thebasis that Spinoza provides for the determination of value is more distinct-ive. In the text just quoted, he alludes to this basis: it concerns the thing’s‘agreement’with our nature.He elaborates in the Corollary to EIVP:

insofar as [a thing] does not agree with our nature, it will necessarily be differ-ent from it or contrary to it. If it is different from it, then (by P) it can be nei-ther good nor bad.And if it is contrary,then it will also be contrary to that whichagrees with our nature,i.e.(by P),contrary to the good,or (seu) bad.Nothing,therefore, can be good except insofar as it agrees with our nature.

If something ‘agrees’ with our nature, it is good; bad if it disagrees; andneither good nor bad—that is,indifferent—if it neither agrees nor disagrees.

One might wonder why something should be good just because itagrees with our nature. To this, Spinoza might ask us to considerthe opposite case—the case where something is deemed bad because it


5 Curley renders ‘malus’ as ‘evil’ here and elsewhere. In his ‘Glossary-Index’, he says that hestruggled over the correct translation,debating between ‘evil’ and ‘bad’before settling on ‘evil’with the understanding that it was to be taken as deflationary (C i. ). Because ‘evil’ has amoralistic connotation that is lacking in Spinoza’s Latin, it will be replaced throughoutwith ‘bad’.This preserves the contrast (intended by Spinoza) between malus and its opposite,bonus,and reorients the interpretation from the moral to the axiological.Cf.G.H.R.Parkinson(ed. and trans.),Spinoza:Ethics (Oxford:Oxford University Press,), n..

6 This is true of Plato,Aristotle, and the Stoics, to take but three obvious and influentialexamples.For Plato, see,e.g.Laws a–b and Diogenes Laertius (D.L.) Lives of the PhilosophersIII., where he is said to have thought that ‘there are three kinds of goods: goods of themind,goods of the body and external goods’ (trans.by R.D.Hicks (Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversity Press,)).For Aristotle, see, e.g.Nicomachean Ethics I. and the pseudo-Aristotletext Divisiones Aristoteleae .: ‘Of goods, some are in the soul, some in the body, and someexternal. For example, justice and practical wisdom and courage and self-control and suchthings are in the soul;beauty and good condition and health and strength are in the body; andfriends, the eudaimonia of one’s fatherland and wealth are among externals. So there arethree kinds (eide) of goods: those in the soul, those in the body and those external’ (my transla-tion).For the Stoics, see, e.g.D.L.VII.:‘[The Stoics] say that some existing things are good,others are bad, and others are neither of these’ (trans. by A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley inThe Hellenistic Philosophers, i (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,),).


disagrees with our nature. For example, suppose someone eats somespoiled food and is stricken by food poisoning. That food disturbsher natural physical processes and states; as a result,we would say that itis bad for her. Our reason for saying so, Spinoza would argue, is exactlythe one he cites—it disagrees with her nature.Or,to take another exam-ple, suppose a suitor’s desire for a romantic relationship is thwarted by hisrejection by his would-be lover. Since his desires are a part of his nature—they are a part of his mind—her rejection disagrees with his nature andis therefore bad. In both these examples, the goods in question receivetheir valuation from their consistency with the agent’s nature (whetherphysical or mental).Because they are inconsistent—or, to use Spinoza’sword, contrary—with the agent’s nature, they are bad.

To be sure, it is possible for something to be agreeable (or disagreeable)by being inert and inefficacious.As the examples in the previous para-graph suggest, however, this is not the conception of agreement ordisagreement that Spinoza has in mind.When he speaks of a good asagreeing or disagreeing with us, he means that it has an effect on ournatures:it interferes with our natures when it disagrees and contributes tothem when it agrees. It is here, in the effect that the thing has on us, thatthe connection between how something agrees with our natures and itsvalue lies:if it increases our ability to act,then it is good;otherwise,it is bador indifferent.7 There are other standards by which value may be deter-mined,but for Spinoza it emerges out of a good’s ability to affect us.Thenotion that the usefulness of a good determines its value is so fundamentalto Spinoza’s thought that he makes them his official Definitions of goodand bad:EIVD,‘By good I shall understand what we certainly know tobe useful to us’;and EIVD,‘By bad,however,I shall understand what wecertainly know prevents us from being masters of some good.’

From the foregoing,a question arises.It is evident that Spinoza deter-mines value in terms of use. However, a theory of value which definesvalue in terms of use can be satisfactory only if an account is provided ofthe agent using the good in question.The reason is simple: it is impos-sible to say whether a thing is useful and therefore valuable for an agentunless it is known what sort of being that agent is. To understandSpinoza’s views on this matter—that is,to understand his views on naturesor essences—we need to explore his doctrine of self-preservation orconatus, for he defines essences in terms of conatus.

Jon Miller

7 The connection between one’s nature and one’s ability to act will be made plain shortly.


Conatus first appears in the Ethics at the beginning of Part III: ‘Eachthing,as far as it is in itself (quantum in se est),strives to persevere in its being’(EIIIP).8 It is a fact about us—and all other beings—that we strive tocontinue to exist; this fact animates all of our actions (EIIIP).The indi-vidual and collective actions that each of us undertakes to remain in exis-tence are, by Spinoza’s lights, fundamental to who we are. He writes inEIIIP:‘The striving (conatus) by which each thing strives to persevere inits being is nothing but the actual essence of the thing.’ It is not the casethat we have some ‘core’essence apart from the actions we take to remainin existence; there is no more basic entity which is the source of theseactions that might itself be identified as our essence. Rather, Spinozaargues,our essence just is our conatus—that is,our essence is our individualand collective strivings to preserve our being. He offers different argu-ments for this claim. In the Cogitata Metaphysica, for example,he says thatthere is at most a ‘distinction of reason’and not a ‘real distinction’betweenour essence and our strivings.While one can speak of our essence apartfrom our strivings—this is a hallmark of a distinction of reason—one can-not truly conceive the former without the latter.Try as one might, onewill always find oneself thinking of individual strivings when one thinksof an essence,proof that there is not a real distinction between the two.9

The introduction of conatus and the emphasis on the power of actingnecessitates the introduction of another factor into the discussion. Itmay be that something is useful if it furthers (or at least does not inhibit)our ability to act so as to preserve our being.Spinoza thought,however,that we have two radically different powers of action and as a result,he thought there were two radically different orders of value.To explainthis—that is,to explain why he thought that we have two different pow-ers of action and, consequently, that there are two different orders ofvalue—a digression into his metaphysics is necessary.

In Part I of the Ethics, we are taught that there is one and only onesubstance (EIP).10 This substance—more precisely, the attributes of


8 The account of conatus given in this paragraph is necessarily condensed and makes noclaims to originality.Among the many excellent commentaries which the reader may consultfor more is the collection of articles in Section One of Yirmiyahu Yovel (ed.), Desire andAffect:Spinoza as Psychologist (New York:Little Room Press,).

9 See Cogitata Metaphysica, I.VI, II.V and II.VI (C i.,–).10 The following overview draws on many sources, including Bennett,Study,chs.,,and ,

and Michael Della Rocca,‘Spinoza’s Substance Monism’,in Koistinen and Biro (eds.),Spinoza:Metaphysical Themes,–.


this substance—is capable of being ‘perceived’ by the ‘intellect’ inmore than one way (EID and P).Perhaps other intellects would per-ceive the substance differently than the human intellect; however, weperceive substance as extended and as thinking (EIIP–).Even thoughwe perceive substance in two radically different terms, its essential unityis not sacrificed.As Spinoza says,‘The order and connection of ideas isthe same as the order and connection of things’ (EIIP). Because hethought that substance is capable of being perceived in two differentways,his theory is sometimes called a dual aspect theory.11There is onlyone substance but it has two aspects which are related to each other insuch a way that, if an attempt were made to provide an account of sub-stance in terms of one attribute, a correlate to that account would befound in the other attribute. If one were to describe a state of substanceusing physicalistic terminology, one would also be able to describe thatstate using mentalistic terms.As Spinoza puts it in EIIPS,‘the thinkingsubstance and the extended substance are one and the same substance,which is now comprehended under this attribute,now under that.’

Two other points. First, the dual aspect theory just mentioned,according to which substance is perceivable as thinking and asextended, is often referred to as parallelism. As the metaphor of paral-lelism suggests, the two orders—the mental and the physical—runparallel to one another without ever intersecting. A thought can leadto another thought but it can never produce or otherwise affect a body,and vice versa. It is true that substance is changing (or: appears to ourintellects as though it were changing); and since we perceive substanceunder the attribute of thought and the attribute of extension, thechanges happen simultaneously. But there is an insurmountable con-ceptual barrier between the thinking and the extended realms,such that interaction between them is impossible. As Spinoza says inEIIIP, ‘The Body cannot determine the Mind to thinking, and theMind cannot determine the Body to motion,to rest or to anything else(if there is anything else).’

The second point is that the parallelism existing between the attributesof substance also exists, mutatis mutandis, in individual modifications of

Jon Miller

11 For example, Thomas Nagel writes, ‘Searle identifies me as a defender of propertydualism. I prefer the term “dual aspect theory,” to express the view deriving from Spinoza thatmental phenomena are the subjective aspects of states that can also be described physically’(‘Searle:Why we are not Computers’, reprinted in Thomas Nagel,Other Minds:Critical Essays– (Oxford:Oxford University Press, ),–, at n. .


substance such as you and me.12 As modifications of substance, the para-meters of our natures are closely circumscribed by its nature. Since sub-stance is perceived as both thinking and extended, we too must be boththinking and extended beings (EIIA and A). Insofar as we are thinkingbeings, only thoughts are relevant to our mental actions and passions; quaextended beings,only bodies matter to the states of our bodies.As Spinozasays in EIIP,‘The modes of each attribute have God for their cause onlyinsofar as he is considered under the attribute of which they are modes,andnot insofar as he is considered under any other attribute.’ Because paral-lelism applies to us,we have two radically different powers of action:men-tal powers and physical powers.These powers cannot be assimilated orreduced,one to the other: the physical involves the notion of force studiedby physics whereas the mental involves the notion of inference or somesimilar conceptual counterpart studied by logic (taking ‘logic’very broadly).

That said, we can now return to axiology. This digression waslaunched at the moment when the significance of conatus for Spinoza’saxiology emerged. It was observed that for Spinoza, something is usefuland hence valuable if it increases our power of action.This power ofaction is a thing’s conatus and ergo its essence. Now, because we haveboth physical and mental aspects which, although unified in oneessence,do not interact and are not reducible one to the other,we haveeffectively two radically different powers of action: we have mentalpowers and we have physical powers.Because we have two radically dif-ferent powers of action, there must be two different kinds of goods con-tributing to the maintenance and increase of these powers. Sincewhatever is useful to us is valuable,we have to conclude that two differentkinds of things are valuable,because two different kinds of things are use-ful.Clear evidence of this dualism of value is discernible in Spinoza’s texts.

Take first the issue of value for the body.Whether something will beuseful for our bodies is determined by its effect on our bodies’essences.13 Our bodies’ essences are defined in terms of the proportionof motion and rest among their parts.14 So, things are useful and hence


12 For more on this, see Michael Della Rocca,Representation and the Mind–Body Problem inSpinoza [Representation] (Oxford:Oxford University Press,), esp. ch..

13 Here and throughout the talk is of our bodies’‘essences’and our minds’ ‘essences’.This shouldnot be taken to imply that we have two different essences,one for our bodies and a second for ourminds.Our essences are unified even if they are also describable in (at least) two sets of terms.

14 Cf. EIIPS, EIVPS. For discussion, see Alan Gabbey,‘Spinoza’s Natural Science andMethodology’, in Garrett (ed.),The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza,–, at –.


valuable to the body if they aid the body’s essential proportion ofmotion and rest.15 As Spinoza says in EIVP: ‘Those things are goodwhich bring about the preservation of the proportion of motion andrest the human Body’s parts have to one another; on the other hand,those things are bad which bring it about that the parts of the humanbody have a different proportion of motion and rest to one another.’This conception of physical goods is expanded on a few pages later:

To use things, therefore, and take pleasure in them as far as possible—not, ofcourse, to the point where we are disgusted with them, for there is no pleasurein that—this is the part of a wise man.

It is the part of a wise man, I say, to refresh and restore himself in moderationwith pleasant food and drink,with scents,with the beauty of green plants,withdecoration,music, sports, the theater, and other things of this kind,which any-one can use without injury to another. For the human Body is composed ofa great many parts of different natures,which constantly require new and variednourishment, so that the whole Body may be equally capable of all the thingswhich can follow from its nature, and hence, so that the Mind also may beequally capable of understanding many things. (EIVPCorS)

Here, one forms the image of a person who partakes fully of physicalgoods. Such a person does so, however, not because he accepts a hedo-nistic moral outlook, not because he thinks of pleasure as the highestgood.16 Rather,he is motivated by the benefit they bring to his body—that is to say, by the different sorts of nourishment they provide which

Jon Miller

15 A few words are in order about the relationship between this conception of essence—theconception of essence as consisting in the proportion of motion and rest among the body’sparts—and the earlier conception of essence—the conception of essence as conatus. ThatSpinoza thinks his general conception of essence is to be cashed out in terms of this ratio whenit comes to the body is clear from the digression in physics after EIIP and other places.Theidea seems to be that the body’s identity consists in this ratio with the result that the destruc-tion of this ratio also leads to the destruction of the body. Any individual, insofar as it is a physical being, must seek to preserve the ratio of motion and rest among its parts if it is toremain in existence.These efforts at self-preservation constitute the essence of the individualas a physical being.

16 Acceptance of pleasure as the highest good is, of course, the hallmark of Epicureanism.Some commentators have taken Spinoza to be an Epicurean: see, e.g. the collection of articlesin Archives de Philosophie (), and Edwin Curley,Behind the Geometrical Method [Method](Princeton: Princeton University Press, ), –. Curley argues that the pleasure whichmay attend an increase of our power of action constitutes part of the joy that is the highest good().Yet, merely showing that pleasure attends the highest good does not suffice to establishSpinoza as an Epicurean. In addition, it must be shown that one seeks the highest good becauseit is pleasurable. Spinoza does not think that this is the case; rather, he thinks one pursues thegood because of the benefit it brings to oneself.


the body requires for optimal functioning. Insofar as physical things—food, drink, theater, green plants—are useful to the body, they arevaluable and hence good (cf.EIVAppXXX).

On the general issue of goods of the body, partial development inSpinoza’s views from the TdIE is discernible.There, he hews a muchmore intellectualistic line.The ‘highest good’, he argues, is ‘the know-ledge of the union that the mind has with the whole of Nature’ (§).Distinguished from this is the ‘true good’,which is defined as ‘Whatevercan be a means to [one’s] attaining’ the highest good (§).Because thehighest good is confined to the achievement of the mind, the class oftrue goods is similarly restricted. Spinoza does not go so far as to denyany value whatsoever to goods that he will later count among the truegoods of the body. But he insists that these goods are of secondaryworth.They can contribute to the body’s maintenance, but since thebody’s maintenance is itself less important than the mind’s, they too areaccorded lower status and not valued as true goods (§). Spinoza mayhold the views that he does in the TdIE about the body and goods of thebody because, at the time of its writing,he had not yet fully formulatedthe doctrine of substance monism and its attendant parallelism found inthe Ethics. Because he did not yet conceive of things as having oneessence perceivable in two different ways, he did not yet have a way ofvaluing the body and things which contribute to its well-being withoutconcurrently introducing an entirely new order of goods.

Turning now to goods of the mind, Spinoza took the mind to bemade up of ideas.17 In EIIPDem and elsewhere in the early part ofPart II, when discussing the nature of the human mind, Spinoza treats‘idea’ as synonymous for ‘knowledge’.18 Given the synonymy betweenthe two concepts, since the mind is an aggregate of related ideas, it mustalso be an aggregate of related knowledge.To put it in colloquial terms,insofar as we are our minds, we are what we know (cf. EIVPDem,


17 For an excellent discussion of how the mind is made up of ideas,see Paul Eisenberg,‘Howto understand De Intellectus Emendatione’, The Journal of the History of Philosophy (),–.

18 Because it features in Spinoza’s solution to so many philosophical conundrums, it shouldcome as no surprise that he does not always use ‘idea’ in such a way as to make it synonymousfor ‘knowledge’. For some texts equating idea with knowledge, see EIIPDem (‘For thehuman mind is the idea itself, or knowledge (sive cognitio) of the human body’), EIIPDem(‘this idea,or knowledge’),EIIPDem (‘The idea,or knowledge’),etc.For discussion,see PaulKashap, ‘Spinoza’s Use of “Idea” ’, in Robert Shahan and John Biro (eds.), Spinoza: NewPerspectives (Norman:University of Oklahoma Press,),–.


EVPS).Because and insofar as the mind is knowledge, knowing is itspeculiar power.As Spinoza says,‘the power of the Mind is defined onlyby understanding’ (EVPref ). Now, because the mind is an aggregate ofrelated knowledge and its peculiar power is knowing or understanding,what is useful to the mind will be knowledge or understanding. AsSpinoza says, ‘What we strive for from reason is nothing but under-standing; nor does the Mind, insofar as it uses reason, judge anythingelse useful to itself except what leads to understanding’ (EIVP).Because what is useful to the mind is ‘what leads to understanding’ andbecause useful things are good, things are good (or bad) for the mindonly insofar as they further its capacity for knowledge. Spinoza says inEIVP, ‘We know nothing to be certainly good or bad, except whatreally leads to understanding or what can prevent us from understanding.’Of course, there are many possible objects of knowledge or under-standing: we could spend our time learning baseball trivia or about theprice of tea in China.However, the basic metaphysical and ethical justi-fication for the acquisition of knowledge or understanding must be, forSpinoza,that it will increase our power of action. We might increase ourpower of action in certain respects or contexts by knowing more aboutbaseball, but the effects of such knowledge are bound to be limited.For knowledge to be more versatile, useful in a wider range of circum-stances, it must be about an object that itself has a richer nature. In gen-eral, the rule for determining the utility of an item of knowledge wouldbe:the greater the propositional or conceptual content of the essence ofthe thing being known—as Spinoza might say, the more ‘ideas’ it has—the more the useful knowledge or understanding of such a thing will be.Since nothing has a richer essence than God, ‘a Being absolutelyinfinite’ (as Spinoza puts it in EID), ‘the greatest thing the Mind canunderstand is God’ (EIVPDem).That is, ‘Knowledge of God is theMind’s greatest good; its greatest virtue is to know God’ (EIVP).19

It was said above that partial development is discernible in Spinoza’saxiology from the early TdIE to his mature works. Emphasis must beplaced on ‘partial’, for while Spinoza did admit in his later works what

Jon Miller

19 A point of clarification:the reason that knowledge of God is more useful than knowledgeof other things is not that God is a global or universal being.The generality or universality ofthe object known is not important for it is possible that general or universal beings could haverelatively impoverished conceptual or propositional content.Instead,the utility of an object ofknowledge is solely determined by the richness of the object’s content,the number of ideas (toemploy a word that Spinoza might use) it contains.


he refused in his early ones—namely, that goods for the body are or canbe truly valuable—he continued to think of the mind’s goods as morevaluable than the body’s.For example,he writes in Chapter Four of theTheological-Political Treatise (TTP), ‘Since our intellect forms the betterpart of us, it is evident that, if we wish to seek what is definitely to ouradvantage,we shall endeavour above all to perfect it as far as we can, forin its perfection must consist our supreme good’(G iii.).20The super-iority of the good of the mind to that of the body is echoed in the Ethics(cf., e.g. EIVP). It also raises important questions about the precisestatus of the mind’s good.The most pressing of these questions, at leastfor present purposes, can be cast by reference to some of Spinoza’sclosest philosophical predecessors.

In the Platonic Socrates,we find arguments purporting to prove thatknowledge alone is intrinsically and unconditionally good, becauseknowledge alone necessarily benefits us by constituting the basis forthe right use of all goods.21The Stoics followed Socrates insofar as theythought there were goods of true intrinsic value, though they supple-mented the argumentative basis for this claim by showing how thosegoods must be valuable, given the nature of those who possessedthem.22Thus virtue is good for Stoics because by it humans are able toachieve harmony between themselves and the world around them.Both Socrates and the Stoics argued that the good attains its value fromits usefulness, and both thought that because the specific goods theyidentified as good are necessarily useful, they are true goods. Becauseother goods are sometimes useful and sometimes not, their preferredgoods transcend other goods in terms of value. On all these pointsSpinoza’s predecessors agree. The question we can ask Spinoza is—do any of his goods transcend all other goods in terms of value?More specifically, is the highest good of the mind—knowledge orunderstanding of God—on the same order of value as other goods,just higher up than the rest, or is that good qualitatively different fromother goods?


20 This and all translations of the TTP are by Samuel Shirley in Michael L. Morgan (ed.),Spinoza:Complete Works (Indianapolis:Hackett Publishing,).

21 See especially Euthydemus a–a and Meno c–a. For a very different version ofSocrates’views,where he is depicted as arguing that knowledge can sometimes be harmful,seeXenophon’s Memorabilia IV.ii.–.

22 See e.g.D.L.VII.,, and Cicero,Tusculan Disputations .,–.


Most Spinoza commentators think that he held there is a continuumof value,so that although knowledge or understanding of God occupiesone extreme of the continuum,nonetheless it is not essentially differentfrom other goods. Since all other goods are only relatively valuable, itfollows as a consequence of this interpretation that knowledge of Godis only relatively valuable, too.This consequence follows because it isassumed that the good formed by knowledge of God shares its naturewith the good formed by other types of knowledge.An interpretationof this sort has recently been advanced by Jarrett.According to Jarrett,‘Spinoza’s theses concerning the relativity of good and evil appear to besuccinctly expressible with the help of a five-term relational predicate:x is better than y for agent z at time t for attaining goal g.’23 Using thisfive-term predicate, Jarrett explains that ‘ “x is good” ’ is shorthand for‘ “x is better than any other available alternative for z at t regardingg”. . .’.24 On Jarrett’s account, although knowledge of God wouldalways be valuable because it would always be better than any otheravailable alternative, it cannot be said that knowledge of God hasany absolute value; it is only valuable for humans and it is only morevaluable than the other goods that humans might acquire.

To assess the merits of the relativistic interpretation, the formulationof relativism must be tightened. Taken broadly, relativism may bedefined as the view that a good x is valuable iff x is valuable to or forsome subject S. Within this definition, we may distinguish betweennon-circumstantial versus circumstantial relativisms.

. Non-circumstantial relativism: the view that a good x is valuable iffx is valuable for some subject S, irrespective of S’s actual or possiblecircumstances.

. Circumstantial relativism: the view that x is valuable iff x is valuablefor S, given S’s actual or possible circumstances.

The significance of the distinction between () and () lies in the rel-evance of S’s circumstances to the value that x has for S.According to (),S’s circumstances are irrelevant to x’s value, with the result that x willalways have value for S, whereas () stipulates the relevance of S’s cir-cumstances to x’s value: x may or may not have value for S, dependingon her or his circumstances. Even though they differ in this respect,

Jon Miller

23 Jarrett,‘Good and Evil’,. 24 Ibid..


() and () are still relativistic theories of value, since both of them makevalue relative to the subject S.25

Most relativistic interpretations of Spinoza are circumstantial becausethey link determinations of value to the agent’s circumstances. Thisis true of Jarrett,who argues that value is derived from or determined bythe actions of a particular agent pursuing a particular goal at a particulartime. On Jarrett’s account, if you change any of the circumstantialfactors—the agent or the goal or the time—you might get a differentvalue-determination.Take the following example, discussed by Jarrett,from EIVPref:

As far as good and bad are concerned, they also indicate nothing other thanmodes of thinking, or notions we form because we compare things to oneanother.For one and the same thing can,at the same time,be good,and bad,andalso indifferent.For example,Music is good for one who is Melancholy,bad forone who is mourning, and neither good nor bad to one who is deaf.

In some circumstances music will be good whereas in others it will not:it may help distract one person from her headache and so be good for herwhile causing a headache in another person and so be bad for him.Whatmakes music valuable, Spinoza says here, is not something intrinsic tomusic itself; rather, its value is entirely dependent on the conditions andnatures of those who hear it.Texts where Spinoza made value dependenton circumstances can be multiplied to such an extent that it is impossibleto deny that he took many goods to have their values circumstantiallydetermined.26The only real question is whether this is true for all goods.

An important passage of EIVPS forces this question on us. In thepassage in question, Spinoza writes that reason demands everyoneshould seek ‘what is truly useful to him’ (quod reverâ utile est; G ii. ).Because reason does not issue demands which cannot be achieved(ibid.), there must be things which are ‘truly useful’ to us.The questionthat we would like answered is—what does Spinoza mean by ‘truly’?Two interpretations suggest themselves. First, a good x can be truly


25 Though there are certain affinities between them,non-circumstantial relativism must bedistinguished from an absolutist or non-relativistic theory of value. Like the former, the non-relativistic theory does not tie value to circumstances. In addition, however, non-relativismtakes the significant extra step of severing all ties between value and the subject.While non-circumstantial relativism holds that goods can only have value for the subjects who possessthem, non-relativism contends that there are goods which have value, simpliciter. See also thenext section,where the related concept of unconditional value is discussed.

26 See, e.g.EIIIPS,EIIIPS (at G ii.),EIVPDem,EIVP.


useful to someone if it helps him obtain his goals, given the exigenciesof his circumstances.For example,water may be truly useful to a thirstyperson, or a new friend may be truly useful to a lonely person, justbecause of the thirst or loneliness.To someone who is not thirsty orlonely, it is possible that neither water nor new friendship would be trulyuseful.The second interpretation takes the ‘truly’ to mean that the goodx is not possibly not useful. If x is not possibly not useful, it is necessarilyuseful.To say that something is necessarily useful is to say that it is usefulwithout condition or regardless of circumstance.To say this is to say thatit is non-circumstantially valuable. Now, when this passage fromEIVPS is taken out of context, it must be admitted that both interpre-tations can be given of it: there is nothing in the wording or ideas whichfavors one reading over the other.Placed in context,however, it seems tome that the second is more natural. For in this part of the ScholiumSpinoza is emphasizing the unconditionality or (as he calls it) ‘absolute-ness’ of the demands that reason places on rational agents. Given thatreason’s demands are unequivocal—they apply across circumstances—itseems natural to suppose that at least some of the goods which mighthelp us to meet those demands will also be valuable in all circumstances.

Though EIVPS seems to imply that there are non-circumstantiallyrelatively valuable goods, the implication is not incontestable. Othertexts are less ambiguous. For example, Spinoza writes in EIVP, ‘Weknow nothing to be certainly good or bad, except what really leads tounderstanding or what can prevent us from understanding.’ The keyword here is certainly (certò): that which leads to understanding iscertainly good.Some things—say,water or friendship—may not be cer-tainly good; they may be only uncertainly good, because they may beuseful only at specific times.But anything which does certainly aid ourquest for understanding is certainly good.There is no need to considerwhat’s going on in our lives: if something increases our body of know-ledge, it is sure to be useful and hence valuable; if it impedes knowledgeacquisition, it is definitely harmful.The irrelevance of circumstances tothe utility and value of epistemically beneficial goods places them in adifferent axiological category from non-epistemic goods.

Other problematic texts for the circumstantially relative interpreta-tion could be cited,27 but it will be more instructive to build a positive

Jon Miller

27 For a subtle attempt to read the passage of EIVPref quoted above in terms favorable tothe non-circumstantial relativist, see Curley, Method, –. Curley himself is not arguing for


case for a non-circumstantially relative reading. Essentially, the positivecase sees Spinoza as believing in some non-circumstantially relativelyvaluable goods because of his views on human nature.The argumentis this:

. Human nature can be properly conceived in terms of the nature ofthe human mind.

. The human mind is by nature knowledge.. Knowledge is benefited by knowledge.. Because that which benefits is valuable,knowledge is valuable.. Because of how our conatus is constructed, there is some knowledge

which is always useful.. So this knowledge is non-circumstantially valuable.

Since this forms the core of the non-circumstantially relative reading,let’s go through it systematically,examining each step and its connectionto the others.

The first premiss relies on parallelism,which sanctions the perceptionof individual modes under any of the attributes of substance: one andthe same mode can be perceived as a thinking being or as an extendedbeing. Regardless of which way the mode is perceived, an account canbe given of its nature in the terms provided by that perception.So,whena mode which is a human being is perceived as thinking,an account canbe given of this mode which construes its nature in thinking or mental-istic terms.When such an account is given, the nature of the humanbeing turns out to be its mind.

Now, the question arises as to the nature of the mind.There are twopoints to be made here,the first of which can be obtained from EIIPCor:

[T]he human mind is a part of the infinite intellect of God.Therefore,when wesay that the human Mind perceives this or that, we are saying nothing but thatGod, not insofar as he is infinite, but insofar as he is explained through thenature of the human Mind,or insofar as he constitutes the essence of the humanMind,has this or that idea . . .


a non-circumstantial relativistic reading; he shows no sign of being aware of the distinctionbetween circumstantial versus non-circumstantial relativism, and in any case his purpose is todefend the claim that the notion of a human exemplar plays an important role in Spinoza’sethics. Nonetheless, although this was not his intention, it would be a substantial blow to thecircumstantial relativists if Curley succeeds in explaining how EIVPref can be read in a waythat is compatible with non-circumstantial relativism,because that text is a key piece of evid-ence in the circumstantial relativists’ case.


Here the dependency of the human mind on God is forcefully stated.Also forcefully stated is the idea that the human mind is comprised outof one type of thing: at bottom, the mind is made up of God’s infiniteintellect. That’s the first point: in Spinoza’s metaphysical psychology,only one kind of material forms the contents of the mind.The secondpoint concerns the nature of those contents. On this issue we are tolddifferent things: for example, Spinoza writes in EIVPS that ‘the veryessence of man . . . is defined by reason’whereas in EVPS,he says that‘the essence of our Mind consists only in knowledge’.There is no con-flict between these statements,however,since reason and knowledge areboth cognitive, active, intentional states and, as such, they can be read assynonymous.Because the mind is monistic and because its single com-ponent is knowledge or reason, it follows that it is by nature knowledge(or reason).

The third and fourth premisses—concerning what benefits know-ledge—draw upon the thesis that only like benefits like.For a good x tobe of use and hence of value to a subject S,x and S must share somethingin common. As a possible example, we possess the enzymes to digestcorn kernels but lack the ones needed to digest cornstalks. Because wehave the enzymes to digest the former but not the latter,we have some-thing in common with the one but not the other. Because we havesomething in common with corn but not cornstalks,corn is useful to usas a nutrient while cornstalks are not.In general,Spinoza thinks that themore a good x has in common with S, the more valuable it is to S(EIVPCor).28 Since and insofar as knowledge shares its nature withother knowledge, knowledge is the most useful and so most valuablegood for knowledge.

The fifth premiss is the one most likely to incite controversy.Understood properly, however, it shouldn’t. The core idea is this: quathinking beings, our nature is knowledge. Because our nature is know-ledge and because of the principle that like benefits like,our nature will bebenefited by knowledge. Much knowledge will be circumstantially-relatively beneficial:it will be useful in some circumstances and for some

Jon Miller

28 For further discussion of EIVP31Cor, see Don Garrett, ‘ “The Free Man Always ActsHonestly,Not Deceptively”:Freedom and the Good in Spinoza’s Ethics’, in Edwin Curley andPierre-François Moreau (eds.),Spinoza: Issues and Directions (Leiden:E. J.Brill, ), –,at f.

05-Garber-v2-chap05.qxd 31/01/2005 5:30 PM 4

people but not others. Such knowledge is therefore circumstantially-relatively valuable.Other knowledge,however,will always benefit us:nomatter who we are or what our circumstances, it is useful for us to knowcertain truths or propositions.The reason that such knowledge is alwaysbeneficial has to do with our natures or conatus: such knowledge willalways serve to preserve and increase our power of acting. If our conatusor natures were different, perhaps such knowledge wouldn’t be benefi-cial to us. But it is impossible for our conatus to be different from whatthey are, and given their actual content, such knowledge is beneficial.And it would be beneficial to any being with a conatus like ours.As aresult,because of how our conatus are, there is some knowledge which isvaluable irrespective of our circumstances.

To put the matter in a different way, for some knowledge, there willbe circumstances in which it is useful and others in which it isn’t;because use determines value, such knowledge will sometimes be valu-able and other times,not.For example, it will sometimes be useful for usto know the weather forecast; at other times, it won’t.As a result,know-ledge of the weather will sometimes be valuable and sometimes not.Most of the knowledge that we can possess will be relatively valuable inthis way.However, there is some knowledge which it is always useful forus to know:viz. rational knowledge and especially knowledge of God’snature.This knowledge is always useful because of our natures as essen-tially rational or knowledgeable beings. If our natures were different,perhaps this knowledge wouldn’t be unwaveringly useful; but ournatures necessarily being what they are, it is.As a result, such knowledgeis always valuable.It is still relatively valuable,because it is valuable for us,but it is non-circumstantially relatively valuable.

From the fifth premise, the sixth follows immediately. Given thatsome knowledge is always useful, that same knowledge must be alwaysvaluable.This is because of the connection between use and value: thatwhich is useful is valuable and so that which is useful always is valuablealways.

Such is the argument which proves that some goods—more precisely,one good, knowledge of God—are non-circumstantially relativelyvaluable. While the reasoning which leads to it may be somewhatopaque, the truth of the conclusion can be seen by stepping back andviewing Spinoza’s normative project from afar.Whether in the TdIE,



the Short Treatise, or the Ethics, Spinoza’s overarching concern is toexplain what happiness is and how we can become happy.This goalwould be incoherent if the value of the goods which are essential tohappiness were totally dependent on circumstances. In such a case, nogeneral or universal statements could be made regarding happiness;rather, they would have to be tailored to particular circumstances. Itwould make no sense to talk generally about ‘the greatest satisfaction ofMind’(EVP), for there would be no truly general satisfaction holdingacross or for all minds.Rather, there would be an indefinite disjunctionof greatest satisfactions, just as there is an indefinite disjunction of great-est satisfactions of the body.29 If the good of the mind were relative tothe subjective conditions of individual minds in the way that the goodof the body is dependent on the physical states of individual bodies,there would be no single state of happiness holding for all minds.That there is such a state implies that there must be a single, non-circumstantially relative good.

Clarifying the nature of the relativism of Spinoza’s axiology is the mainpoint of this essay.But in addition, the distinction between circumstan-tially versus non-circumstantially relative value can be used to reassess

Jon Miller

29 This is assuming that there is in fact no single non-circumstantially relative good for thebody. The argument would not be affected if there were such a good. In that case, the analogydrawn in this paragraph would fail,but since the analogy is only meant to clarify the notion ofthe mind’s greatest good, its failure wouldn’t harm the essential point being made.The diffi-culty of the question whether there is a single non-circumstantially relative valuable good forthe body might be noted.On the one hand,there doesn’t seem to be any a priori reason to sup-pose that the body can’t have a good—a perfect nutritional supplement, say—analogous in itssingularity to the greatest good of the mind.Furthermore,there are theoretical pressures,stem-ming from parallelism, for Spinoza to say that there is such a good. Given parallelism, thengiven that the mind is such that it has a single non-circumstantially relatively valuable good,there ought to be such a good for the body, too. On the other hand, whereas Spinoza oftenspeaks about the mind’s greatest good (which is non-circumstantially relatively valuable), henever speaks about the body’s greatest good.This is inductive evidence that he either didn’trecognize or didn’t acknowledge the pressure that parallelism placed on him to posit a non-circumstantially relatively valuable good for the body. In addition, there are open questionsabout whether parallelism breaks down at precisely that juncture of the argument: viz.wherethe notion of the mind’s greatest good is introduced in the latter part of the Ethics.This seemsto be the view of Bidney, Psychology, –, , etc., and Bennett, Study, . For a recentattempt to acquit Spinoza of the charge of inconsistency, see Steven Nadler, Spinoza’s Heresy[Heresy] (Oxford:Oxford University Press,), ch..


other important properties that might be attributed to any given goodby his axiology.30

For starters,we can use the distinction between circumstantially ver-sus non-circumstantially relative value to reinterpret the property ofunconditional value.While a good x might be called unconditionallyvaluable just in case its value is not subject to any conditions, the dis-tinction between circumstantially versus non-circumstantially relativevalue implies a distinction between two types of unconditional value.

. Strong unconditional value: a good x is strongly unconditionallyvaluable iff its value is not contingent on any conditions whatsoever.

. Weak unconditional value: x is weakly unconditionally valuable iffits value is contingent on only a non-circumstantially variable set ofconditions.

With this distinction, it appears that for Spinoza, no goods at all arestrongly unconditionally valuable, not even knowledge of God. Onecondition only makes knowledge of God useful and hence beneficial tous: our natures as rational, cognizing beings. But that one condition isenough to disqualify knowledge of God as strongly unconditionallyvaluable.At the same time,because our natures do not vary according tocircumstances,knowledge of God will always be useful and so it counts asweakly unconditionally valuable.There is no circumstance that we mayfind ourselves in where knowledge of God won’t be valuable;for this rea-son, it makes sense to call that good weakly unconditionally valuable.

On a related point, it is reasonable to say that knowledge of God isuniquely valuable.Whereas the value of other goods is subject to multi-ple conditions,knowledge of God is not and this alone suffices to makeknowledge of God a unique good.In addition,such knowledge provides


30 It would take us too far afield to address this issue fully,but it can be noted in passing thatthe distinction between the two types of relativity will help to solve what Steven Nadler calls‘a notorious problem in interpreting Spinoza’s ethical theory’(‘Spinoza in the Garden of Goodand Evil’, in Elmar Kremer and Michael Latzer (eds.), The Problem of Evil in Early ModernPhilosophy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, ), –, at ). On the one hand,Nadler says,Spinoza speaks of ‘good’and ‘evil’as ‘only relative to our conceptions of things,andthey do not denote anything real about things in themselves’,while on the other hand,he talksabout ‘the “true knowledge of good and evil” ’, thereby suggesting that there is something realabout things which can make normative statements about them truth-susceptible (ibid.).AsNadler argues, it would be wrong to conceive of ‘the true knowledge of good and evil’ as‘ “merely relative”to our conceptions’(ibid.).The argument of the previous section shows thatNadler is right: the true knowledge of good and evil does not rest at all on our individual con-ceptions; instead, it rests on our natures as knowing beings.


the most powerful reinforcement to our conatus.In consequence,it is themost useful good we might possess and because use determines value, itis also the most valuable good we might possess.With respect to thequestion (raised above) of whether there is a continuum of value includ-ing both knowledge of God as well as other goods, two answers can begiven. Strictly speaking, knowledge of God is on a par with all othergoods: like all other goods, it is relatively valuable and provides essen-tially the same kind of benefit to us as other goods. If we speak slightlyloosely, however, we can say that it is qualitatively different from othergoods, for it alone is not circumstantially relatively valuable, and thebenefit it provides us is far greater than that of other goods.

Although there are no strongly unconditionally valuable goods, itdoesn’t necessarily follow (for Spinoza or anyone else) that there are nointrinsically valuable goods.The reason for this has to do with the natureof intrinsic value.A good x may be called intrinsically valuable iff its valueis not derived from its contribution to another good y which is of value:that is, x is intrinsically valuable iff the source of its value is internal toitself.31 So stated, the contrast between intrinsic versus unconditionalvalue is the contrast between the value which obtains when a good hasvalue ‘in itself ’ (intrinsic) versus the value which isn’t subject to any con-ditions (unconditional).Something may be intrinsically valuable but notunconditionally so; vice versa, a good may be unconditionally but notintrinsically valuable. Spinoza seems aware that unconditional versusintrinsic value are different, for he denies that there are any stronglyunconditionally valuable goods while affirming that there are intrinsic-ally valuable goods. He writes in EIVP, ‘Joy is not directly bad, butgood (Laetitia directè mala non est, sed bona);Sadness (tristitia),on the otherhand, is directly bad.’The proof for the intrinsic goodness of joy,given inthe Demonstration for this Proposition, is straightforward: joy is the‘affect by which the body’s power of acting is increased or aided’. Sincesomething is good just in case it increases our power of acting, joy isgood.That is, joy is its own source of goodness: insofar as something isjoyful, to that extent it is good.At the same time, joy cannot be calledunconditionally valuable,because its value is contingent on our conatus.

As a final point, consider whether Spinoza was a subjectivist withrespect to value. Some commentators have argued that he is:for example,

Jon Miller

31 This conception of intrinsic value is taken from Christine M. Korsgaard, ‘TwoDistinctions in Goodness’,Philosophical Review (),–, at .


Bennett implies Spinoza is a subjectivist because he denies that ‘good-ness and badness are objectively out there in the world’.32 To evaluatethis claim, a definition of subjectivism and objectivism with respect tovalue is needed.

. Subjective value:a good x is subjectively valuable iff a subject S holdsx to be valuable.

. Objective value: x is objectively valuable iff its value is independentof what Sholds.

The ambiguous verb ‘holds’ is used here because there are any numberof ways in which value might be dependent on S’s attitude toward x: xmight be valuable because S believes it is valuable, or because S feels it isvaluable, etc.While relativism and objectivism with respect to value areusually taken to be opposed, this isn’t necessarily the case. Obviously,relativism makes the value of x dependent in some way on S.It does not,however,specify the nature of this dependence;further argument or infor-mation is needed for this specification to be established. For example,it may be that x is valuable only in relation to S’s beliefs or feelings:if S believes or feels that x is valuable, then x is valuable for S.Alternatively, x may be valuable for S independently of S’s beliefs or feel-ings: for example, x may be valuable for S if x is needed for S’s survival.In this case,x may be said to be valuable regardless of what S believes orfeels.As the latter example shows, relativism is compatible with object-ivism, for regardless of what S holds,x may be valuable for S, even if x isnot intrinsically or unconditionally valuable.This may be because S’snature is such that S needs x for her or his survival or well-being or someother end capable of making x valuable.Because x would be valuable toS independent of what S holds, x would be objectively valuable for S;but because x is valuable only insofar as S needs x, the value of x is rel-ative to S (in particular, relative to S’s needs).

Now, it is quite possible that Spinoza took some value judgments tobe dependent on what the agent holds: it is possible that the agent’sattitudes may form part of the circumstances which determine the valueof a good that is circumstantially relatively valuable. At least, it is notpart of the argument of this essay that Spinoza totally severed all con-nections between value judgments and the agent’s preferences. At thesame time it is part of the argument of this essay that Spinoza severed the


32 Bennett,Study,. See also Frankena,‘New Morality’,.


connections between some determinations of value and the agent’ssubjective preferences. In particular, the agent’s subjective states areirrelevant to the value of rational and intuitive knowledge.Such know-ledge is relatively valuable—its value is relative to our essences asrational,knowing beings—but it is also objectively valuable—no matterwhat we think or feel, it is good for us.Since at least some value is objec-tive, it is wrong to say without qualification that Spinoza promulgated asubjectivist account of value.33

To summarize: Spinoza upheld the principle that there is a justificationfor some values,above and beyond the preferences of individuals.To theextent that values are grounded on a standard independent of the atti-tudes of those who subscribe to them,they may be called ‘objective’.Hefurther argued that determinations of value are grounded on the utilityof the good in question for the agent possessing that good. Giventhat we are both physical and mental beings, both physical and mentalgoods have value for us.At the same time, since our intellects form thebetter part of ourselves, goods for the intellect are more valuable thanother goods. Certain cognitive states (such as knowledge or reason)are worth pursuing in an unqualified sense, though other goods may beworth pursuing depending on one’s circumstances.Those things shouldbe pursued because they benefit us, and they benefit us because of whowe are. Finally, the good life consists in the possession of the true good,regardless of whether or not one enjoys any lesser goods.

While some questions about Spinoza’s axiology have (hopefully)been answered, many remain.34 By way of conclusion, one of thesequestions will be addressed.The analysis given here of Spinoza’s viewson value has been almost entirely second-order: much has been said

Jon Miller

33 For discussion of other possible restrictions on Spinoza’s ethical subjectivism, seeMattern,‘Ethical Subjectivism’.

34 For instance, there are the questions whether Spinoza consistently applies his theory togoods of the body, as he ought to given parallelism, or what the interest of his theory may beto contemporary philosophers.For some indication of an important potential source of inco-herency, see n. above and, for discussion, Jarrett, ‘Good and Evil’, and Bidney, Psychology,–.On the question of contemporary interest, see Garrett,‘Ethical theory,’.


about the form of his theory but little about its contents. For example,we now know that the highest good is knowledge of God, and in whatsense this knowledge is good,but we know hardly anything about whatknowledge of God actually consists in.This is too big an issue to covercompletely in the space available, but to provide more of the flavor ofSpinoza’s axiology, a few comments should be made concerning thethings he thought valuable. Because it is the most valuable good thathumans can possess, let us take knowledge of God in particular.

Since there is no room for analysis,allow me to use an evocative quo-tation instead.35 In TTP Four Spinoza writes,

[S]ince all our knowledge, and the certainty which banishes every possibledoubt,depend solely on the knowledge of God—because,firstly,without Godnothing can be or be conceived, and secondly, everything can be called intodoubt as long as we have no clear and distinct idea of God—it follows that oursupreme good and perfection depends solely on the knowledge of God.Again,since nothing can be or be conceived without God,it is clear that everything inNature involves and expresses the conception of God in proportion to itsessence and perfection; and therefore we acquire a greater and more perfectknowledge of God as we gain more knowledge of natural phenomena.To putit another way, since the knowledge of an effect through its cause is nothingother than the knowledge of a property of that cause, the greater our know-ledge of natural phenomena, the more perfect is our knowledge of God’sessence,which is the cause of all things.So the whole of our knowledge, that is,our supreme good, not merely depends on the knowledge of God but consistsentirely therein. (G iii.–)

Knowledge of God is knowledge of nature.Not any kind of knowledgeof nature,but knowledge of the laws and rules by which nature operatesand through which the behavior of all natural phenomena are gov-erned. Initially,we strive to know nature rationally—that is,we strive toknow mutable and temporal phenomena in relation to natural laws.As our understanding deepens,however,we pass to intuitive knowledgeof nature.When this happens, we know directly the essences of naturalevents and objects (EIIPS). Such knowledge is possible because thehuman mind has ‘adequate knowledge’ of God’s essence (EIIP).


35 Among others, these commentaries on knowledge of God are especially helpful:Nadler,Heresy, at f.; Margaret D.Wilson, ‘Spinoza’s Theory of Knowledge’, in Garrett (ed.), TheCambridge Companion to Spinoza, –, at –; Yirmiyahu Yovel, Spinoza and OtherHeretics, i:The Marrano of Reason (Princeton:Princeton University Press,), at f.


When we attain intuitive knowledge of God, we have attained ourgreatest good.The ‘greatest striving (conatus) of the Mind, and its great-est virtue’ (EVP) is such knowledge, and through it arises the mind’s‘greatest possible satisfaction’ (EVP).36

Queen’s University,Ontario

Jon Miller

36 Special thanks are due to Steven Nadler for extensive and extremely helpful commentson several early versions of this essay.In addition,I gratefully acknowledge the comments (ver-bal or written) of John Carriero,Calvin Normore,the students who took my Spinoza seminarat Queen’s University in the spring of , and an anonymous referee of this journal.


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