split in workers power1

8/13/2019 Split in Workers Power1

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RIL on Workers Power 1995This position has got the LRCI leadership into a series of hopeless tangles and

convoluted arguments, as their positions have zigzagged in response to the

shifting circumstances of the Bosnian war.

One general feature has ecome steadil! more pronounced however, theadaptation to the feeling among sections of lieral western opinion that "our#

governments must $do something# % a sentiment that pla!s directl! into the hands

of imperialism. &o now we have the ludicrous position of the LRCI tr!ing to sound

revolutionar!, and calling for the '( and ()TO out of the Bal*ans and condemning

the oming, while at the same time demanding that #our# government sends

arms to the Bosnian forces and opens the orders to +Islamic "volunteers" going

to fight with them.

In other words -or*ers ower does not want the imperialists to fight in the

Bal*ans/ the! 0ust want them to get their clients and pro1ies to do the fighting2 (o

wonder that this reactionar! nonsense has lown the LRCI apart and e1posed it asan unprincipled loc.3

That sounds ver! li*e Li!a to me2

4err!

Introduction

Who are Workers Power?

-or*ers ower in Britain is one of the man! "left$ organisations that li*es to call

itself Trots*!ist +Revolutionar! 5ar1ist. On paper, the! li*e to appear as the

"purest$ of 5ar1ist, ut li*e so much of the rest of Britain$s left the! have gone

through a stead! process of political degeneration and opportunist adaptation.

Increasingl! the! have ecome 0ust another irrelevant sect, more interested in

selling their paper than uilding an! real struggles that can forge a new

revolutionar! vanguard and part!. The! have uilt up an "international$ in muchthe same wa! as British groups li*e 5ilitant, and their own former ancestors, the

&-6 instead of developing a genuine democratic internationalist part!, the! have

set up "satellite$ sections who must follow the line of the British leaders. The! call

this the "League for a Revolutionar! Communist International$ +LRCl, ut as we

shall see in this document the LRICI is no more than the e1tension of -or*ers

ower in Britain.

&ince our organisation, the Revolutionar! Internationalist League +RIL and

internationall! the International Trots*!ist Committee +ITC, was formed in the

earl! 789:s we have had man! deates and differences with -or*ers ower. In

our histor! there have even een suggestions that our organisations fuse as wehave oth een traditionall! more on the "left$ than most of Britain$s centrist


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groups that descrie themselves as Trots*!ist.7The differences we have had with

-or*ers ower have often seemed academic to outsiders, as if we were arguing

aout unimportant secondar! ;uestions, when reall! we were "all on the same

side$. But we have alwa!s maintained that ehind even the smallest of differences

lies a difference in method which is fundamental to uilding a successful

international revolutionar! part!.Over the past few !ears and in particular since the collapse of the &talinist

regimes in


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5ilitant and the &- and "communit! leaders$ etc. In their practical wor* this is

shown in their endless attempts to achieve 0oint conferences of centrists instead

developing action to fight racism for instance. -hilst -or*ers ower often zigzag

etween this sectarian and opportunist moods oth to the wor*ing class and

centrist left reformist leaders we will show how in theor! and practice -or*ers

ower$s method contains this ma0or wea*ness.)long with this -or*ers ower displa!s a centrist attitude to the transitional

programme, the method of Trots*!ism. -hilst churning out lists and action

programmes choc*%a loc* with fanc! transitional demands for struggles

throughout the world when it comes to practice the! desert the transitional

method altogether. It is almost as if the transitional programme is a i for them

to regurgitate and eat their reasts with, ut the! don$t reall! elieve it applies

to the situation in the concrete class struggles. This sectarian opportunist revision

of the transitional programme is given "theoretical$ legitimac! in their misnamed%

named hodgepodge "Trots*!ist 5anifesto$.-e will show that in theor! and

practice wor*ers ower re0ects the transitional programme when it is mostre;uired.

Increasingl!, -or*ers ower has een further characterised ! a total capitulation

to ourgeois democrac!, and middleclass pulic opinion. -e have said this of

them for five !ear and now some of their own sections have split awa! from them

ma*ing the same charge. The adaptation to middleclass pulic opinion has

reached its pea* in regards to the pro%imperialist polic! -or*ers ower advance in

relation to the war in Dugoslavia. ut goes ac* to their fears of raising the

demand "victor! to Ira;$ during the 4ulf war and their constant refusal to defend

the gains of the Octoer wor*ers revolution in the former &oviet 'nion from

capitalist restorationist and counter revolution which cloa*s itself in theh!pocritical gown of western "ourgeois democrac!$.

It has recently been revealed that the present leadership of Workers

Power and the LRCI has for years been advancing the policy that it is

correct to fight for bourgeois democracy within degenerated workers

states. This shows a remarkable ignorance of class rule in capitalism an

ignorance all too often shared by groups like the !"#I and $atgamna%s

"ocialist &rganiser who are so desperate to prove to the middle classes

that socialists are more in favour of bourgeois democracy than the

bourgeoisie.'"ince its first progressive period during the (nglish Civil

War and the #rench revolution bourgeois democracy has always been

the political system to which capitalist e)ploitation is best suited. It is

about abstract *human rights% that hide class power. Counter revolution

within the workers% states whether healthy or degenerate was always

going to be best disguised in bottles marked *democratic rights%

especially when the so+called *Communists% are so eager to swallow the

whole bottle without studying the ingredients. &ur pamphlet will show

how Workers Power capitulation to middle class public opinion which in

,ritain and most imperialist countries today means bourgeois

democracy has led it to adopt openly counter revolutionary positions.

What is the relevance of Workers Power?


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The British left is dominated ! ignorance and philistinism. &o often a memer of

a larger organisation, i.e. &-F5ilitant will reduce ever! political ;uestion to size,

who$s got a igger group, !ou or us> Revolutionaries who have studied histor!

*now this is asurd. Lenin split with the 5enshevi*s ecause he demanded an

organisation of professional revolutionaries, of leaders not 0ust a mass part! open

to an!one who wants to sign the dated line on a card.Our organisation, the RIL is a dramatic e1ample of wh! we value ;ualit! over

;uantit!. Over the past few !ear the RIL has led more successful struggles and

engaged with more militant wor*ing class !outh than man! of the organisations

ten or a hundred times our size. Of course we want to grow, ut uilding an

organisation that leads real struggle, and develops real leaders has alwa!s een

our priorit!.

-or*ers ower, on the other hand, is a perfect e1ample of a sect. There might

even e ten times as man! memers of -or*ers ower as are in the RIL, ut when

did the! last lead a struggle, when did the! last even organise a march>

Increasingl!, -or*ers ower hasn$t done an!thing. The! can go to other peoplesmeetings and marches, criticise ever!one else, and sell a few papers and that to

them is active political wor*. (o wonder that -or*ers ower has never tried to

even tal* to the wor*ing class !outh that the RIL attracts to political activit! the!

*now those !outh wouldn$t e in the slightest it interested in a group of people

who treat revolution li*e an interesting schoolo! ho!.

-or*ers ower has ecome a sect/ if it had the 8::: memers the &- oasts of

it wouldn$t e an! etter. It has no perspective of winning or even leading

an!thing. )nd not surprisingl! the sect has ecome a cli;ue +the term cult might

impl! something more e1citing than the mundane e1istence of this increasingl!

irrelevant group. ) cli;ue of leaders and full timers who go ac* !ears with one

another run the group and demand personal lo!alt! from all its memers. &ome of

the material from the recent splits will ma*e that so apparent we need not

comment further.

&o, !ou ma! as*, if -or*ers ower are increasingl! so irrelevant wh! waste our

time writing aout them> )nd this is e good ;uestion ecause the RIL does not

elieve that in order to win an!one to revolutionar! politics we must first deal with

the prolems of -or*ers ower. The opposite is true. The conservatism, routinist

sect that -or*ers ower has ecome onl! serves as an e1ample of how not to

uild a revolutionar! organisation, how not to win wor*ers and !outh, how to

astain from struggle and criticise ever!one else, how to turn revolution into its

opposite % into a drin*ing clu for left wing people who want e ho! and li*e to

sound sanctimonious and a little it intellectual.

art of the reason we write this pamphlet is ecause -or*ers ower has een an

important force on the left efore. 5an! people genuine aout the need for

revolution have 0oined or loo*ed with interest upon them. Gespite our

disagreements, we ourselves have fought shoulder to shoulder alongside them in

attles against police, fascists, right%wing ureaucrats or other centrist groups

tr!ing to shut us up. It is important for the education of new generations of

revolutionaries to e1amine the cause of the cancer that has ta*en over -or*ers

ower.


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But there is a wider reason. -or*ers ower is not 0ust -or*ers ower in Britain, it

is the principal section of the League for a Revolutionar! Communist International,

which as an international organisation claiming to e Trots*!ist has attracted

small ut important groups of revolutionaries in a numer of countries, who have

one of the more left%wing elements thrown up ! the fragmentation of the @ourth

International.)s a section of the international Trots*!ist Committee the RIL ta*es seriousl! the

need to engage with such forces in a fight to uild an international tendenc!

committed to the regeneration and reconstruction of the @ourth International.

-e elieve the recent split of the Latin )merican sections from -or*ers ower,

following closel! on the split of the (ew Aealand section to e a decisive turning

point for the LRCI. There is no longer an! national section within the LRCl that can

fight to reverse the degeneration. The regime will no longer allow for that, and

most of the remaining memers are too crushed and tied in terms of personal

lo!alt! to do an!thing e1cept leave.

-e don$t gloat at this depressing spectacle, nor do we wish an! harm to those

comrades who have chosen to go down the road of degeneration. @ran*l!, we

would e wasting our time to do either. Rather, we feel the recent split demands

the drawing of a alance sheet, the learning of lessons % especiall! important to

those !outh getting involved in politics for the first time, and for those e1%

memers and e1%sections of -or*ers ower which must now as* themselves

where to go ne1t.

)nd if there are people left inside -or*ers ower and the LRCl who want to uild a

genuine revolutionar! part! and are prepared to struggle to do that, then the!

should allow themselves to seriousl! consider the recent splits in their

organisation, loo* at the true nature of their origins, and discuss with the RIL and

ITC aout how to regenerate the @ourth international, to reuild a mass

international Communist art!.

The recent slits in the LRCI!ustria

In spring 788, the )ustrian section of the LRCI, )reiter%lnnenstandpun*t split. In

788 )reiter%Innenstandpun*t was the largest far left group in )ustria, iggerthan either the 5ilitant or the )ustrian RJL. )reiter%lnnenstandpun*t had won a

numer of !outh who were ;uic*l! turned into sectarians.

The final straw in the degeneration for the )reiter%Innenstandpun*t group came

when the! 0oined a right%wing &erian monarchist demonstration in Kienna. The!

shared the same platform with the apologists monarchists and clerical

counterrevolutionaries from the former Dugoslavia, and failed to utter a word of

criticism of &erian nationalism. The onl! &er memer of the LRCI did tr! to ma*e

some attac* on the monarchists and was promptl! eaten up ! &er nationalists.

-or*ers ower have refused to ever ma*e an! pulic or internal correction to this

complete deacle. It is ad enough to ma*e such a mista*e ut to go on defendingit !ears later spells disaster. The )ustrian group ceased to grow and conservative


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pessimism set in.


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resisted this defeatism until the LRCI forced it to e finall! pulished in Bolivia on

the eve of a one month general stri*e2

The! opposed -or*ers ower$s positions on =aiti and Rwanda where -or*ers

ower re0ected elementary $ar)ism in failing to distinguish imperialism

refusing to allow for the possibility of ever supporting the 2aitian

government against a !" military invasion and backing the ,ritish and!" sponsored Tutsi RP# in Rwanda during the genocidal civil war on both

sides with 2utus.

They opposed Workers Power%s call for a *democratic% Popular front with

the far right Islamic fundamentalists against the reactionary regime in

/lgeria. $any of them had opposed Workers Power%s backsliding during

the 3ulf war between imperialism and Ira4. Workers Power 5 4uickly

retreated from demanding the victory of the oppressed nation Ira4 once

the war was in full swing.

In all these conflicts, we are completel! with the sections that have split from the

LRCl, in so far as we have een ale to stud! their positions. 5an! of these

criticisms have een made ! us for man! !ears, and the! are developed in this

pamphlet. -or*ers ower did not tolerate this opposition and it is clear that the

internal regime of the LRCI made it increasingl! impossile to wage these

struggles from within. Bureaucratic suspensions and e1pulsions comined with

splits ecame inevitale.

-e have three important differences with the (ew Aealand faction, some of which

seem to e shared ! the Latin )merican sections.

Li*e man! in the LRCI, the (ew Aealand split off is "th internationalist. th

internationalism is usuall! an e1cuse for opportunist plans to lash up with an! oldleft%wing reformist, &talinist and petit%ourgeois nationalists, or for a sectarian

refusal to intervene in the crisis of leadership. The split offs from the LRCI are

proof to us, the ITC, that struggles for Trots*!ism can still develop within the

degenerated fragments of the @ourth International. -e remain committed to a

struggle for the political regeneration and organisational reconstruction of the

@ourth International, the Latin )merican groups have alwa!s supported the polic!

of a reconstruction of the @ourth International, whilst -or*ers ower sit on the

fence and tr! to pretend that the whole argument is aout numers.

The (ew Aealand section ma*es the mista*e of adopting -or*ers ower$s

schematic logic concerning the world political situation. In opposition to&talinophoic -or*ers ower$s declaration that the world political situation is

revolutionar!, the (ew Aealand group declares it is counter%revolutionar!.

)lso the (ew Aealand group claims that capitalism has alread! een restored in

the former '&&R something that part conditions their anal!sis of the world political

situation. The ITC does not elieve that the ;ualitative restoration has !et een

achieved, whilst the overall process flows rapidl! in the capitalist direction.

The overwhelming ma0orit! of the criticisms that the Latin )merican and (ew

Aealand comrades have made of the LRCI are correct. But the proof of the

pudding is in the eating, and it is practice which will e the proof. In practical

terms -or*ers ower$s centrist method has made it redundant. It surel! musthave adl! affected the wor* of the Latin )merican and (ew Aealand sections as


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well. But the most important point leading to the split for us is not the struggle

over


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is no e1ception. The statement claims that the eruvian section of the LRCI was

de%recognised in "mid%788H, having % proven unale to carr! out the minimum

oligations of a section$. Det the Octoer%(ovemer 788 issue of Trots*!ist

International, the international 0ournal of the LRCI, proudl! lists the eruvian

section amongst all its others. It laughingl! accuses the Bolivian section of failing

"to assist the


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were incorporated in or smoothed over$ ! its founding document, the so%called

Trots*!ist 5anifesto.

That is wh! comrades who are now rea*ing with -or*ers ower and the LRCI and

defending Trots*!ist positions on


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The limitations of wor*ers ower$s understanding of permanent revolution was

displa!ed at a relativel! earl! stage in its political evolution.

One of the *e! tests for Trots*!ist organisations at the eginning of the 789:s was

their attitude to the Iranian revolution of 78?8, the counterrevolutionar! Islamic

regime of )!atollah Jhomeini and the war etween Iran and Ira;. The main

international currents claiming to e C0 Trots*!ist adapted in var!ing degrees tothe spurious anti%imperialist rhetoric of the Islamic clerg!. on with tragic results for

the emerging forces of Iranian Trots*!ism. -hen the war ro*e out etween Ira;

and Iran organisations li*e the 5andelites '&@I too* an Iranian defencist position

arguing that Ira; was an agent of western imperialism and that the Jhomeini

regime$s war against Ira; was a defence of the revolution.

Ira;, then as now, was a neo%colonial countr! ut the &addam =ussein regime was

using )ra nationalism and a close relationship with the &oviet ureaucrac! to

maintain a relative independence from the imperialists. It was using the turmoil

following the fall of the &hah to strengthen its own regional position. The

imperialists saw the war as a chance to contain oth these unreliale regimes andensure that neither came out victorious.

#rom the start before the war broke out the main concern of Iran%s

Islamic government had been to derail the revolutionary mass movement

that had toppled the "hah and crush the militant forces of the working

class. It used the war to complete the destruction of the revolution. The

left+wing of the Iranian Trotskyists 6the 2


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state of emergenc! and militar! repression, to include the reactionar!,

fundamentalist Islamic &alvation @ront +@I&

In neo%colonial countries it is essential to fight for a united front of the anti%

imperialist forces of the wor*ing class and the peasants, the impoverished petit%

ourgeoisie and the uran poor fighting for their own interests against their own

capitalists and landlords, Trots*!ists have to fight for such united fronts, withoutwhich the revolutionar! victor! of the wor*ing class is impossile in the great

ma0orit! of neo%colonial countries.

The leaders of -or*ers ower were incapale of ma*ing a clear, honest distinction

etween that vital, necessar! line of struggle and the possiilit! of occasional,

episodic locs with the neo%colonial ourgeoisie, or sections of its forces, when

the! find themselves in temporar! conflict with the imperialists. The! are all

"united fronts$ and all united fronts are the! *eep reminding us, 0ust tactics$

around immediate practical ;uestions.

These "theoreticians$ use such wordQgames to tr! and 0ustif! their confusion and

the dangerousl! mista*en policies it has led to in the cases of Iran, )lgeria and

Rwanda, arguing in favour of wor*ing class support for reactionar! ourgeois

forces which are not fighting imperialism ut tr!ing to control the masses.

In the fashion of law!ers or theologians loo*ing for literar! precedents to cover

their I current positions the! "mine$ the documents of the earl! Comintern

conferences for appropriate ;uotations aout united fronts with the national

ourgeoisie. Their lifeless approach ignores the actual method of the

revolutionar! Comintern, the concrete conditions under which the discussions too*

place, and the e1perience of revolutionar! struggles in the colonial and neo S

colonial countries since then % including Trots*!$s anal!sis of the struggles in

China, India etc.

But in the wa! that opportunism and sectarianism are alwa!s opposite sides of the

same coin, -or*ers ower$s failure to appl! the method of permanent revolution

comes out in a lind sectarian attitude to nationalist movements or struggles that

are actuall! a focus for the struggles of the advanced wor*ers and the fighting

masses.

This has een particularl! clear over ;uestions of electoral support. )n earl!

e1ample was the initial refusal of -or*ers ower and the Irish -or*ers 4roup to

call for a vote to &inn @ein in the north of Ireland elections in the earl! 9:s, despite

the importance of the Repulican militar! struggle against British imperialism, letalone the clear indications of the strength of its ase among the most oppressed

and militant sections of the nationalist wor*ing class. &use;uentl! the! changed

their position, merel! commenting that the! had not realised that &inn @ain would

get so man! votes, as though it was 0ust the numer of crosses on allot papers2

5uch more recentl! we have seen a similar e1ample of this sectarianism in the

&outh )frican elections though without an! possile e1cuse that the! did not

*now the )(C would get so man! votes.

Trots*!ists have to fight to rea* the wor*ers and the masses from the )(C. In the

elections it was essential to fight for independent wor*ing class organisation and

action, including defence to e1pose the treacher! of the )(C, and to call for theunions and mass organisations to uild a -or*ers art!, all of which was the


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position ta*en ! the ITC. But this fight had to e ta*en into the living e1perience

of the masses, who saw a vote for the )(C as constituting themselves as a nation,

voting for social change and defending "their$ elections against saotage. That is

wh! we understood that on that asis and as part of that strateg! +and not for an!

other reasons consistent Trots*!ists had to e in favour of a vote for the )(C.

(ot -or*ers ower though. The! could not ring themselves to vote for the )(C.The! can vote for an! unch of counterrevolutionar! social democrats on the asis

that the! are a ourgeois wor*ers part!. But the )(C and &inn @ern are not

ourgeois wor*ers$ parties. The! are petit ourgeois or ourgeois nationalists and

the )(C, moreover, is a popular front. That is how political arguments are settled

! -or*ers ower6 it is 0ust a matter finding the right lael. -e are not ;uarrelling

with the laels here, we are disagreeing with the LRCl$s un%5ar1ist method of

settling ;uestions of revolutionar! strateg! and tactics put a movement in the

right categor! and up pops the appropriate response. This is a sectarian method

which ignores the real ;uestions of the movement and consciousness of the

masses and of the advanced sections of the wor*ing class and !outh, of theirrelationships to the various organisations and leaders, and of finding the most

effective and d!namic wa! to intervene in their struggles and change the

consciousness of the advanced wor*ers.

&o in the &outh )frican elections the LRCI ended up calling for a vote for the

-or*ers List art!, an electoral front for a small centrist sect which got less than

7 of the vote. 5oreover the! *new perfectl! well that this group actuall!

opposed fighting for the unions to form a -or*ers art!, and that their electoral

adventure was part of their saotage of the Committee for a -or*ers art!. But

never mind % the! were not nationalists and the! were not a popular front2

In oth cases the opportunism towards reactionar! ourgeois forces and the

sectarianism towards the masses, mechanical formulae have replaced 5ar1ist

anal!sis and revolutionar! strateg!.

It is not surprising. Therefore, that the most important opposition to the dominant

-or*ers ower leadership within the LRCl has come from its onl! sections in neo%

colonial countries in Latin )merica.

The co$ro$ise on the %uestion of the International&

The same mechanical approach and resort to amiguous compromise formulaemar*s the LRCl$s attitude to the vital ;uestion of the International.

There can e no more important ;uestion for Trots*!ists than the strateg! for

uilding the International. It is not possile to uild a genuinel! revolutionar!

international tendenc! without clarit! on this issue. But the L@ICI has een uilt on

an unclear compromise on this ver! ;uestion, comining sectarianism and

opportunism.

The two most recent splits illustrate the inevitale unravelling of the compromise.

The (ew Aealand faction calls for a @ifth International. The ITC disagrees with this

position and considers it fundamentall! sectarian, ut it is nevertheless a position

with some consistenc!. On the other hand the Bolivian and eruvian comradeshave historicall!, efore and since their memership of the L@ICI, stood for the


14/30

reconstruction of the @ourth International. This position is much closer to the ITC$s

% though of course there is more to a strateg! than a mere form of words.

Of course the -or*ers ower leadership has written e1tensivel! aout the

mista*es and degeneration of the main international and national Trots*!ist

groupings over the last half centur!, and the great ul* of their criticisms are

perfectl! correct. )t ottom, however, this is the same familiar, astract method,as thought the issues are settled ! listing the mista*es.

)t the end of the 78H:s the @ourth International ;ualitativel! degenerated into

centrism. Centrist methods and positions were shared ! all sections of the

leadership efore the split. Both sides in the split were mar*ed ! the same

centrist features. The resulting crisis of the @ourth International has een and

remains the sharpest e1pression of the international crisis of wor*ing class

leadership in the second half of the twentieth centur!. @or -or*ers ower,

recognising that centrist degeneration means that the @ourth International can

simpl! e pronounced dead % and the real prolems for revolutionaries can e

ignored. @or Lenin and Trots*!, recognising the points at which it was necessar! torea* with the &econd and Third Internationals respectivel! was a ;uestion of

when the fight for the political independence of the wor*ing class could onl! e

ta*en forward ! launching a new, independent revolutionar! international.

The grounds for that decision were different in the two cases. -ith the &econd

international it was determined ! the role of the ureaucratic la!ers dominating

the mass organisations in the imperialist war. -ith Trots*!$s rea* from the

Comintern, the decisive point was neither when it ecame centrist, nor when it

ecame counter%revolutionar!, ut when its conduct of polic! during the rise of

the (azis to power in 4erman! and its response to that crisis signalled that there

was no possiilit! of continuing the fight for its regeneration.

-ith the crisis of the @ourth international the ;uestion is to appl! the method of

Lenin and Trots*!, not to tr! and cull analogies from ;uite different historical

circumstances. The fragments of the @ourth International have in practice

aandoned the fight to appl! and develop the Transitional rogramme.

(evertheless the Trots*!ist programme has remained a focus internationall! for

the most politicall! advanced la!ers rea*ing from social democrac!, &talinism

and nationalism. That attraction has rought them into the centrist fragments.

Time after time this contradiction has led to e1plosions and struggles in which

some elements have sought, to a greater or lesser clarit! to reassert theTrots*!ist programme, or certain elements of it.

The origins of the LRCl$s Latin )merican sections in a struggle against the

leadership of the Bolivian OR is a case in point. )nd so to is their fight against the

LRCl$s rightward movement on


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regeneration and organisational reconstruction of the #ourth

International.

Workers Power%s leadership have never been able to take that step. ,ut

they know that in practice the forces that they can win are going to come

from struggles within the fragments of g the #ourth international so

they want to keep their options open for instance to groups like theLatin /merican comrades. 2ence they do not call for the #ifth

International. They declare that the number is not important they are

simply for a *ew% international.

This is 0ust slipper! fudge ! the -or*ers ower leadership. Of course the numer

itself is in a sense not the important thing6 what matters is the strateg!. Their

delieratel! amiguous formula means that an international grouping can e uilt

for a time at least which comines elements with opposed views on this vital

;uestion, held together ! a "catchall$ slogan which emodies no strateg! at all.

)ll that the leadership has to do is issue denunciations and ultimatums. Once

again opportunism and sectarianism are opposite sides of the same coin.

The secial oression issues and the influence of econo$is$ on

Workers Power

On few issues has the ITC e attac*ed more vociferousl! or misrepresented more

grossl! ! the -or*ers ower leadership than on the ;uestions of special

oppression. 5ore than an!where else, the continuing influence Cliffite economism

on -or*ers ower is shown in its anal!sis and polic! on special oppression which it

rather oddl! prefers to call "social$ oppression +as though there are some sections

of the wor*ing class and the masses who are not oppressed in class societ!2.

-or*ers ower has of course moved e!ond the crudities of the &- on these

;uestions. It defends lesian and ga! rights, the self organisation of women and

lac* people etc,. On some of the ;uestions of democratic rights it has correctl!

ta*en radical positions that go much further than most of the left in Britain %

calling for the aolition of the age of consent laws, for instance. But it has failed to

develop a real 5ar1ist anal!sis of the relationship etween class e1ploitation and

special oppression, which understands the roots of special oppression in the

development of class societ!, the wa!s in which oppression on the asis of race,

se1 and se1ual orientation is not directl! reducile to class e1ploitation and theessential role of all these forms of oppression in maintaining class societ!.

-ithout such an anal!sis it is impossile to develop a strateg! for the wor*ing

class to lead the struggle against an! of these forms of oppression, The ITC

maintains that the fight against all aspects of racism, se1ism and anti%lesianFanti%

ga! igotr! has a strategic role in the fight for wor*ing class power, ecause of

their role in class societ!. without this fight the wor*ing class cannot overcome its

own divisions, gain a clear understanding of capitalist societ! and its own

revolutionar! role, or win oppressed sections of the petit ourgeoisie to its

leadership. Conversel! the oppressed cannot win the struggle for lieration

without the revolutionar! victor! of the wor*ing class.


16/30

-e as* ever! honest supporter of the LRCI % where in this is the popular frontism

and capitulation to petit ourgeois leaderships which !our leaders constantl!

accuse the ITC of> Our method is ased on that which Lenin sets out in "-hat is to

e Gone> 6

... To react to every manifestation of tyranny and oppression, no matter where it

appears, no matter what stratum or class of the people it affects: to takeadvantage of every event to clarify for all +Lenin$s emphasis the world-historic:

significance of the struggle for the emancipation of the proletariat.

The method of -or*ers ower ears too man! similarities to the "economists$ who

Lenin was criticising. Thus -or*ers ower has an osession with the sociological

class composition or movements of the oppressed, especiall!, in fact, with lesian

ga! movements, rather than with the political class character and orientation of

the leadership and policies which it should e fighting for. The result is that

-or*ers ower never goes e!ond either trade unionist or democratic +civil rights

demands in relation to the movements of the speciall! oppressed.

Thus it is not the ITC, ut -or*ers ower, that limits the political struggles of the

speciall! oppressed to lieral, purel! democratic politics as well as failing to

challenge pre0udice consistentl! in the course of other struggles. The histor! of

-or*ers @lower is littered with e1amples of oth t!pes of mista*e. If we repeat

some *e! e1amples now it is ecause of the need to comat a sustained

campaign of misrepresentation % and ecause at the end of the da! the proof of

the pudding is in the eating.

The highpoint of -or*ers owers lesian and ga! wor*, and its final limit, was

without dout the Trade 'nionists against &ection 9 campaign in the late 789:s.

-or*ers ower comrades were right to ta*e the tight against &ection 9, the most

serious institutional attempt ! the state to attac* the gains of the lesian ga!

movement, into the unions. The prolem was that the! limited this to a narrow

trade union, wor*place perspective.

Thus the! called for non%cooperation ! council unions, and for stri*e action to

defend an! wor*ers who were discriminated against on grounds of se1ual

orientation. )t the Trade 'nionists against &ection 9 conferences the RIL pointed

out that the iggest affect of the &ection 9 would e in whipping up a reactionar!

anti%lesian anti%ga! climate, which would lead to an increase in ph!sical attac*s

+this is e1actl! what happened, in fact.

-e proposed a motion calling for laour movement organisations to maintain anddefend an! lesian ga! facilities threatened with closure as a result of &ection 9,

and to organise the ph!sical defence of lesian ga! centres, clus, ars etc. from

anti lesianFanti ga! attac*s.

-e are at a loss to see what is popular frontist or lieral aout this proposal, ut

wor*ers ower opposed it, and united with the &- and 5ilitant to vote it down.

The other side of the economistic outloo* which la! ehind that decision was

demonstrated at the founding conference of the )ll%Britain )nti%oll Ta1 @ederation

in (ovemer 7898. RIL memers who were delegates to the conference moved a

motion stressing the importance of drawing the most oppressed sections of

societ! into a trul! integrated movement to smash the poll ta1. The motion madeit clear that this would e impossile without a light against the influence of


17/30

racism, se1ism and homophoia in the movement, and that therefore racist, se1ist

and anti%lesian anti%ga! activit! was incompatile with memership of the anti

poll ta1 movement.

Those words were chosen with care, ecause this was not a motion to

automaticall! e1clude an!one had ac*ward ideas or aver ehaved in a pre0udiced

wa! from the fight against 7H the poll ta1. That is how wor*ers ower hasmisrepresented it, ecause in the face of the opposition to the motion from

5ilitant who controlled the conference, the! chose to astain % even though we

had won ver! wide support from delegates and were having a ma0or impact on

5ilitant memers man! of whom made it clear to our comrades that the! opposed

the line that had een imposed on them.

It was not the first time, nor was it to e the last, that -or*ers ower has failed to

challenge pre0udice or refused to support a polic! commitment to fight pre0udice

within road campaigns. )lwa!s the! defend themselves with essentiall!

economistic argument aout united fronts around immediate practical issues, and

then resort to misrepresentation.

The reverse side of this method is -or*ers ower$s repeated refusal to challenge

the limited democratic politics of the petit ourgeois leaders of the lesian ga!

movement.

) national demonstration against Clause , a measure designed to restrict

lesian and ga! adoption rights was called for @eruar! 7887. B! the time of the

demonstration, of course, the imperialist attac* on Ira; was in full swing, The RIL

too* the view that the ;uestion of the war was of central importance for ever!

struggle of the wor*ing class and the oppressed in Britain. -e raised the slogan

Kictor! to Ira; on the march, and our spea*er raised it on the platform at the end

of the march land was cheered ! a section of the demonstration. -or*ers ower

memers refused to 0oin in the slogans on the march, ut limited themselves to

calls for "lesian and ga! rights$. -hen our spea*er got down from the platform a

memer of -or*ers ower, who was due to spea* on ehalf of the =ands Off the

5iddle


18/30

since the 78M:s. These movements have ! and large developed separatel! from

the wor*ers$ movements, and under the political domination of petit%ourgeois or

ourgeois leaders, ecause of the unresolved crisis of wor*ing class leadership.

Thus the ailit! to respond to these developments as revolutionar! 5ar1ists is a

critical test of the political health of groups claiming to e Trots*!ist.

In this area, too, -or*ers ower$s rea* with its Cliffite ac*ground has eenincomplete and it has imposed a confused half%wa! house of radical democratic

and economist positions on the LRCl.

Workers Powers practice; the united front

The *e! test of revolutionar! organisations is what the! do, not what the! sa!.

)nd it is in its practice in Britain, and most notal! in its understanding, or rather

misunderstanding, of the united front that its centrism and its general rightwards

tra0ector! are most clear.

-e support what we understand to e the general criticism which the Latin

)merican comrades have made of the opportunist direction ta*en ! -or*ers

ower during the imperialist war against Ira; at the eginning of 7887, Before the

war started -or*ers ower, along with the RIL and the -or*ers International

League, argued that once war started the position of the united front =ands Off

the 5iddle


19/30

The war demonstrated what were to ecome increasingl! common features of

-or*ers ower$s practice accommodation to left%lieral opinion, which of course

is an e1pression of ourgeois "pulic opinion$ and a narrow, wooden view of the

united front which puts a duious pretence of "unit!$ aove the fight win the most

advanced wor*ers and !outh to revolutionar! politics through struggle.

)fter the war this ecame clear again in antifascist wor*, principall! in )nti%@ascist)ction +)@).

-ith the growth of racist and fascist activit! in the course of 7887, )@) could have

een an important organising centre for antifascist defence. =owever it was

dominated ! Red )ction, if a small splinter%group from the &- which has a

totall! rotten, s;uadist and sustitutionist approach to the ph!sical land thus to

the politicalP fight against fascism. It opposes uilding mass action as part of the

fight against fascism. )nd it refuses to have an! orientation to lac* and )sian

!outh under attac*. It ;uite consciousl! states that its constituenc! is white

wor*ing class !outh. )@) was uilt on the asis of these politics and -or*ers

ower did not challenge them and went along with their s;uadism.

The argument was that this was a specific limited united front for the purpose of

confronting the fascists. This was asurd on ever! count. It was a permanent

organisation. It was uilt on a definite political perspective that e1cluded mass

action and an orientation to the lac* communities, and its outloo* was promoted

in a regular magazine that was activel! sold ! -or*ers ower memers.

It was onl! the RIL that challenged Red )ction$s method in practice and through

internal discussion in )@). -e were witch hunted, e1pelled and ph!sicall!

attac*ed as a result. Our lac* comrades in particular were singled out for ause

end attac*. There are plent! of memers of -or*ers ower who *now all aout

this, ut their organisation did not defend us ecause we were undermining their

opportunist relationship with Red )ction.

Instead the! concentrated their fire on us claiming that we were tr!ing to turn )@)

into a "propaganda loc$ ! putting forward too full a programme. @or -or*ers

ower the united front had to e *ept on the level of their allies not raised to the

level that was demanded ! the nature of the struggle and the possile role of the

actual united front % in this case a small, permanent loc of left activists.

In particular we raised the ;uestion of anti%racism, ecause it was clear that

without an anti%racist perspective it is not possile to have an orientation to the

lac* and )sian communities, or to uild an integrated movement, or to comatfascism ideologicall!, or to uild mass wor*ing class action. Red )ctions

"orientation$ to the white wor*ing class +which, of course, meant that the! never

won an! white wor*ers or !outh was an asolute ostacle to uilding an effective

anti%fascist movement.

Gisgracefull! the "Trots*!ists$ of -or*ers ower ecame the attorne!s for the Red

)ction thugs. -e were treated to elaorate "theoretical$ e1planations of wh! an

antiracist united front was different from an anti%fascist united front, and wh!

therefore it was wrong to demand of )@) that it should ta*e up a fight against

racism.

Of course the! suffered the fate of all opportunists once we had een e1pelledand Red )ction were tired of them the! turned on -or*ers ower, who eventuall!


20/30

had to get out of )@). But ecause the leaders of -or*ers ower are as infallile

as the ope there could not e an! honest alance sheet of its e1perience in )@).

Instead the reason for ;uitting was put down to )@)$s sectarianism towards the

&- and the )(L.

The stor! of the -or*ers ower involvement in )@) indicates man! of its asic

political prolems U its opportunist and limited view of the united front tactic, itsinailit! to understand the importance and relevance of the struggle against

special oppression, and its leaders$ arrogant refusal to give an honest account of

political mista*es.

Workers Power and the transitional ro'ra$$e

Revising the fundamental starting point of Trots*!$s @ourth International, the

Transitional rogramme, -or*ers ower challenge the notion that the crisis of

humanit! can e reduced to the crisis of proletarian leadership. The LRCl$s

Trots*!ist 5anifesto oldl! declares6owever today it would be wrong simply to repeat that ail contemporary crises

are reduced to a crisis of leadership!!. The proletariat word-wide does not yet face

the stark alternatively of either taking power or seeing the destruction of air its

past gains. "evertheless, in many countries and, indeed, whole continents, the

crisis of leadership does reach such a level of acuteness#.$

This shows a fundamental misunderstanding of Trots*!ism. The! are sa!ing that

the crisis / of leadership can onl! e central in revolutionar! t!pe situations. But

what factors push societ! from nonrevolutionar! to revolutionar! and from

revolutionar! to counter%revolutionar! situations> )nd what factors are

responsile for the low levels of class struggle and political activit! ! the wor*ingclass in nonrevolutionar! periods. The ;uestion of leadership is fundamental to

this. The central factor remains the crisis of proletarian leadership.

Trots*! never meant that onl! the crisis of leadership was important and when

that was resolved all other factors would automaticall! fall into place. &uch an

approach, li*e -or*ers ower$s revision of Trots*!, shows an aandonment of

dialectics and a refusal to understand the d!namics of struggle. The wor*ing class

defeats suffered in recent !ears, the disorientation of wor*ers$ organisations, the

political demoralisation and disinterest on the part of some wor*ers. all of these

things are fundamentall! caused ! the crisis of leadership. The impact of defeats

can reinforce that crisis as the relationship etween the class and its leadership is

a dialectical and d!namic one.

=owever the essential point in this relationship is the crisis of proletarian

leadership6 the epoch we live in ma*es conditions for socialism ripe the

misleadership of the wor*ers and oppressed movements is capitalism$s last

salvage. The fundamental tas* of Trots*!ists remains the resolution of the

leadership crisis. To misunderstand this is to misunderstand the central asis for

the creation of the @ourth International. The LRCI$s position on the crisis of

leadership would suggest that the struggle for an international Trots*!ist

vanguard part! is no longer of prime importance rather we should 0oin up with

reformist, &talinist and centrist leaderships to "help$ the wor*ers regain their

comativel! so that in future the crisis of leadership could once again e central2


21/30

)long with this revisionism -or*ers ower have a centrist approach to transitional

demands. On paper the! can raise man! correct demands, ut when faced with

practice the! ac*slide. This is shown in the e1ample we have referred to efore.

-or*ers ower$s refusal to raise the demand of wor*erFcommunit! defence

preferring all *inds of other more lieral sounding demands instead, such as

"support lac* self%defence$ or "self%defence is no offence3.The difference etween these two approaches helps us understand the real

practical importance of the transitional method. Because of the high level of

organised racist attac*s and murders on the lac* and )sian communities in parts

of Britain man! !outh have automaticall! een forced to organise some

spontaneous level of "self%defence$. The demand for wor*erFcommunit! defence

was raised ! the R=. ecause it was ale to intercept with the most % militant

vanguard sections % in this case the !outh under attac* % and ta*e them forward

instead of 0ust giving them a slogan the! alread! organised around.

This demand posed the ;uestion of a political fight within the wor*ing class for

active organisation against racist violence and fascist activit!. It raised thefundamental ;uestion of who controls the streets, estates, schools, colleges or

wor*places. the wor*ing class lac* and white united in a struggle against racism

and fascism % or the racist state which protects the fascist and racist gangs.

The slogan of wor*erFcommunit! defence is conceived from the standpoint of

ta*ing a struggle further, developing it into a greater struggle, roadening the

involvement of sections of the wor*ing class and !outh. lt is an immediatel!

relevant concrete demand as well as one which ultimatel! leads to struggles that

threaten capitalist power itself. It is a transitional demand the RIL has een ale to

organise mass moilisations around in &hadwell for instance on a scale -or*ers

ower has never done.

The demand for "self%defence$ on the other hand ta*es nothing forward. Of course

we must support those who are defending themselves. But our tas* cannot e to

simpl! support struggles as the! spontaneousl! develop ut to ta*e them forward,

to offer them a programme which can win to raise the political level and roaden

the struggle against the capitalist s!stem. in other words to lead the struggles

with transitional demands.

This is the difference etween the transitional method, and the all too common

understanding of it ! centrists from militant to &ocialist Outloo*. -e use

transitional demands as immediatel! relevant wa!s of developing, roadeningand raising the political level of struggles toda! the! see them as ma*ing a

struggle slightl! more "left%wing$, of demanding something capitalism cannot

support of ma*ing propaganda.

-hatever the astract correctness of -or*ers owers propaganda, when faced

with sharp struggle, in the communit! campaign that drove the B( off the streets

in Bric* Lane or in organising around racist attac*s, -or*ers ower has constantl!

sided with the centrists and opposed us and our transitional demands that could

ta*e the struggles forward.

The same is true aout the wor*erFcommunit! triunal we fought for and

organised following the police murder of Brian Gouglas in &outh London this !ear.The aim of the triunal was to go e!ond the anger that man! lac* !outh and


22/30

wor*ers have towards the racist police, to challenge the illusions that somehow

the state can achieve 0ustice, and to create a movement that understands that

onl! the wor*ing class and lac* communities can deal with racist police. Our

whole conception was ased on this, the struggle for a movement that wanted

independent action against police and state murders as well as court cover ups.

-e won important sections of Lameth 'nison, the iggest trade union inLameth, to this conception and we got 'nison itself to organise such a pulic

triunal. -or*ers ower turned up and tried to close the triunal down, stating

that what was needed was an in;uir! with a panel of "important figures in the

lac* communit!$ that had estalished reputations in the e!es of lac* * and

"man! white people +5s etc. to head the in;uir!. This panel would pass verdict

on the police, not the communit! itself. -or*ers ower said this might then

convince more people that the police did murder Brian Gouglas.

The prolem was that we wanted to go e!ond that, the overwhelming ma0orit! of

lac* S !outh and white !outh who had heard aout it *new the police were

responsile for the murder % the ;uestion was what do we do aout it. Ourproposal for a triunal was to aid the uilding of a movement that ta*es 0ustice

into its own hands. -or*ers ower$s craven opportunism was conceived from the

standpoint of ma*ing attractive and acceptale propaganda. -or*ers ower$s

proposals would have demoilised an! struggle and given the ureaucrats the

control ac*.

-e are not opposed to an! numer of lieral ourgeois in;uiries, ut to raise it in

opposition to a wor*ersFcommunit! triunal, when that had alread! een

estalished ! the iggest trade union in the area, is the opposite of the

transitional method. 'nsurprisingl!, all the ran*%and% file wor*ers from Lameth

voted down -or*ers ower$s right%wing proposal.

(lectoral suort and Workers Powers conservatis$ ) adation to

social de$ocrac*

The narrow understanding of the united front is reflected also in a conservative

application of the tactic of electoral support. -e have alread! discussed an

e1ample of this in &outh )frica ut the LRCl has made apparentl! opposite ut in

fact directl! related mista*es in recent elections in Britain and @rance.

The purpose of electoral support for the Laour art!, or an! other ourgeoiswor*ers part!, is onl! as an element in rea*ing most class conscious wor*ers

from reformism. -here sections of the wor*ing class are coming into political

conflict with the reformist ureaucrac! and this is eing reflected electorall!,

Trots*!ists should in general give critical support, and see* to develop such

resistance.

On that asis the RIL called for a vote all three 5ilitant candidates in the last

general election, ecause all of them clearl! had a real ase that was in conflict

with the politics of the Laour leadership, and more generall! ecause of the

importance of the anti%poll ta1 struggle which had rought millions of wor*ers into

conflict with Laour politicians carr!ing out this Tor! polic! at local level and which5ilitant was widel! identified with.


23/30

-or*ers ower onl! supported the two candidates who had previousl! een sitting

Laour 5s and had een e1pelled ! the part!. @or them having a ase could

onl! e measured formall! in terms of Laour movement positions. The! refused

to support Tomm! &heridan the former chair of the )ll%Britain )nti%oll Ta1

@ederation in 4lasgow, even though 4lasgow had had the highest non%pa!ment of

the poll ta1 and mass moilisations to stop court officers removing the goods ofnon%pa!ers.

(ot surprisingl! &heridan got a sustantial vote % 78. -or*ers ower could onl!

"apologise$ that the! did not have an!od! in 4lasgow2 But the! have not learned

% whereas the RIL has had a general polic! of critical support for 5ilitant

candidates in local elections, -or*ers ower has refused to do the same, even

though the! normall! get etween 7: and : of the vote, and in some cases

more, and representing a significant section of the most class conscious wor*ers

who are voting for what the! see as a militant alternative to the Laour

ureaucrats.

In the @rench presidential elections earlier this !ear the LRCI stuc* to the samepolic! of ac*ing the "main$ ourgeois wor*ers$ part!, in this case the &ocialists of

the outgoing president, 5itterrand. The! refused to call for a vote for the

candidate of Lutte OuvriVre, an organisation which presents itself as Trots*!ist

and has a significant wor*ing class memership, and which regularl! pic*s up

hundreds of thousands of votes in elections. Of course, Lutte OuvriVre got M of

the vote, a significant section of the wor*ing class re0ecting the estalished social%

democratic and &talinist leaderships

In these cases -or*ers ower$s mechanical ideas of electoral support which led it

to call for at vote for the irrelevant "-or*ers List$ candidates in &outh )frica,

meant that the! ignored the development among the most class conscious

wor*ers of a measure of resistance to the etra!als of the reformists.

The LRCI and the crisis of +talinis$

5ore than an!thing else it is the development of the crisis of &talinism since 7898

that has accelerated the LRCI$s, general rightward movement, and rought the

crisis of the LRCI to a head. . )t ever! critical turn of events in


24/30

Trots*!ism within the LRCI and in general share the criticisms of the Latin

)merican comrades and the (ew Aealand faction.

These events have shown ver! clearl! that -or*ers ower has not completel!

ro*en from a Cliffite view of the &oviet 'nion, China, the east


25/30

the Baltic repulics of the &oviet 'nion. -hile avoiding the capitulation of much of

the left in the face of the headlong collapse of


26/30

lf we compare the positions of the LRCI on Lithuania and )zerai0an, it ecomes

clear 0ust how much their views have een influenced ! western ourgeois pulic

opinion. The ITC never, at an! point, called for &oviet troops to invade Lithuania

and crush the pro ourgeois nationalist movement. =owever, the LRCI did support

the occupation of )zerai0an ! &oviet troops in 788: which the ITC opposed.

-or*ers ower argued that it was necessar! to stop the massacre of the)rmenians, ut the attac*s had stopped efore the troops went in. The real

purpose was to crush the )zerai0an national movement a movement that was

less aggressivel! pro%imperialist than the Lithuanian government, and which was

much less of a threat to the &oviet orders at that time.

The difference was that whilst the western media ac*ed


27/30

Of course, we can rest assured that is was Boris$s left arm -or*ers ower was

lin*ing with2 )nd the! would proal! have held a red flag in their free hand too2

The! do have principles after all.

The Bosnian WarBut it was over the long drawn%out civil wars in the former Dugoslavia, where the

pressures of pro%imperialist ourgeois including "lieral$ ourgeoisP opinion have

een strongest that the full e1tent of -or*ers ower$s retreat from Trots*!ism has

ecome apparent, precipitating the LRCI$s latest splits.

The ITC has written on and deated the Dugoslav crisis e1tensivel! over the past

four !ears. -e have recognised that all the regional or "national$ capitalist%

restorationist factions that rl have come to power in the repulics of the former

Dugoslav federation are tr!ing to use ethnic divisions to carve out a ase for

themselves and estalish their own privileged relationship with imperialism. The

imperialists, insofar as the! have acted together, are tr!ing to e1ercise controlover the whole region ! estalishing a alance of power etween these factions.

@or these reasons the ITC has refused to give an! support to an! of the

governments, or to ta*e a defencist position in relation to an! of them in the

course of the wars etween them.

-e have argued that the onl! answer to their reactionar! nationalism, "ethnic

cleansing$ and the destruction of the econom! is to fight for independent and

integrated wor*ers$ and peasants$ defence guards. for wor*ing class control of

distriution, occupations of industries closed ! the war, and lin*s etween

wor*ers$ organisations in the different repulics. to uild action against the war

efforts of all the governments and to prepare a wor*ers$ plan for the

reconstruction of the econom! on the asis of collectivel! owned propert!, ta*ing

ac* the factories stolen ! privatisation.

)t different times -or*ers ower, too, has said man! of these things, ut the!

have onl! een irrelevant decorations to their articles, li*e ta*ing a red flag to the

defence of the -hite =ouse. The! are not a programme for action now, onl!

propaganda statements of what would e nice under ideal circumstances. The!

are flatl! contradicted ! the main line of -or*ers ower$s arguments, the

immediate choices the! have actuall! made, which have alwa!s e1cept ver!

riefl! at the ver! start of the conflict in Bosnia een for the defence of a pro%capitalist, pro% imperialist government against its rivals. @irst it was for Croatia

against &eria, than for the Bosnian government against and the Bosnian &ers.

-e support of an!one to defend themselves against genocide and the wor*ing

class, given that it is organised andFacting as an independent force, can ma*e

tactical militar! arrangements with an! forces to stop ethnic cleansing. This is a

far cr!, however, from the LRCI$s position of defence of the Croatian or Bosnian

governments.

This osition has got the LRCI leadership into a series of hopeless tangles and

convoluted arguments, as their positions have zigzagged in response to the

shifting circumstances of the Bosnian war.


28/30

One general feature has ecome steadil! more pronounced however, the

adaptation to the feeling among sections of lieral western opinion that "our$

governments must "do something$ % a sentiment that pla!s directl! into the hands

of imperialism. &o now we have the ludicrous position of the LRCI tr!ing to sound

revolutionar!, and calling for the '( and ()TO out of the Bal*ans and ,

condemning the oming, while at the same time demanding that "our$government sends arms to the Bosnian forces and opens the orders to +Islamic

"volunteers$ going to fight with them.

In other words -or*ers ower does not want the imperialists to fight in the

Bal*ans/ the! 0ust want them to get their clients and pro1ies to do the fighting2 (o

wonder that this reactionar! nonsense has lown the LRCI apart and e1posed it as

an unprincipled loc.

The struggle for consistent Trotskyism

In 7887, in the one and onl! pulic deate etween -or*ers ower and the RIL.,on the crisis of &talinism, we used Trots*!$s phrase @rom a scratch to a danger of

gangrene3 to descrie the evolution of -or*ers owers politics on this ;uestion. It

is clear new that the gangrene has gripped the whole od!.

The ITC supports those comrades who have recognised the disease and are tr!ing

to save something health!. But if the! are to move forward the! must recognise

the real roots and course of the disease in the overall sectarian, centrist method of

-or*ers ower which was written into the foundations of the LRCI.

This is the case, too, with the ureaucratic internal regime of the LRCI and with

the methods of slander and character assassination which the leaders are

resorting to. These things are not new. It is the hait of -or*ers ower, when

an!one splits from them and criticises their rightward tra0ector! to divert attention

from political ;uestions ! launching pulic campaigns " "l over propert! or

financial disputes or alleged reaches of discipline.

This was precisel! what the! did when Chris Brind left -or*ers ower, see*ing to

divert attention from the political criticisms over lesian and ga! wor*, and whip

their memers into a sense of moral outrage, with a campaign aout the

ownership of a computer +while putting ever! possile ostacle in the wa! of a

solution. &imilarl! when &teve 5asterson fought their ac*sliding during the war

against Ira; the! sought to isolate him ! concentrating on issues of discipline.It appears that histor! is now repeating itself again, with the ulic campaign

against Nose Killa.

This ureaucratic ehaviour on the national and international levels has political

roots. It is the ehaviour of a cli;ue of intellectuals in control of rightward moving

centrist sect. )s their accumulating political shifts and mis0udgements ma*es their

leadership more and more vulnerale the! can onl! defend themselves !

ureaucratic demands for lo!alt! and claims to moral superiorit!. 'nprincipled

locs lead to unprincipled politics, which lead to an unprincipled regime.

-e appeal to ever! serious comrade in and around -or*ers ower to reflect on

the lessons of the splits in the LRCl, and thin* carefull! aout where theirleadership is ta*ing them. -e appeal to them to e1amine and discuss the politics


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method and wor* of the ITC, of the RIL in Britain the )J in 4erman! and the R-L

in the '&), and compare them with the record and wor* of -or*ers ower and the

LRCI.

-e are not delivering ultimatums. -e are serious aout the need for revolutionar!

leadership, and do not elieve that it will e ! endless discussion circles and

0ournals of deate that lead nowhere. It will onl! e uilt if Trots*!ists estalish areal fighting organisation that is giving leadership new in the struggles of the most

militant wor*ers and !outh, ut on that asis we are more than read! to discuss

and wor* patientl! with an! comrades who share that goal and are re0ecting the

revisionism of -or*ers ower.

-e ma*e e1actl! the same appeal internationall! to the comrades who now find

themselves outside the LRCI. It is clear that the Latin )merican and to some

e1tent the Aealand comrades have ver! important areas of agreement with the

ITC. -e have set these out in this statement, at least in outline. 5oreover their

opposition was not 0ust to a set of positions ut to the damaging effect of the

passive political method of -or*ers ower on the wor* in their own class struggles+the notion that the Bolivian wor*ers had suffered an historic strategic defeat, for

instance.

-e recognise that all these comrades have ta*en internationalism seriousl!. -e

appeal to them to discuss the perspectives of the ITC and e1amine the wor* of our

sections as we will do with theirs.

-e hope the! will agree with us that there is no wa! forward without the

construction of an international tendenc! of consistent Trots*!ists, which is

fighting for revolutionar! leadership in real struggles and not 0ust serving as an

international literar! centre, and which therefore must e ased on a shared

strateg! and anal!sis reached ! clear and honest clarification.

)nd we hope that all those left inside the LRCI who desire such a tendenc! rea*

from its opportunist politics efore it is too late, and 0oin with us in the struggle for

a real Trots*!ist international organisation.

@irst edition6 Octoer, 788 -rite to6 RIL : Bo1 8HE. London &


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7Centrism is a political method that swings etween revolutionar! and counterrevolutionar! reformistpositions and practice. @or instance, 5ilitant Laour in Britain has engaged in practical wor* against policewhich has a revolutionar! character whilst having a reformist strateg! of demanding "police accountailit!$,as oppose to smashing the state. The &-, on the other hand, tal*s of "revolution$ and "smashing the state$ut its practice on ever! demonstration is to ensure there le no organised defence or resistance to the policewhatsoever. In oth cases these groups displa! themselves as neither reformist for counter%revolutionar!through and through, or consistentl! revolutionar!, rather the!, li*e most of the groups that claim to eTrots*!ist, are centrists.

The Trots*!ist 5anifesto$, the international programme of the League for a Revolutionar! CommunistInternational first pulished in 7898.E'&@I, the 'nited &ecretariat of the @ourth International, until recentl! led !

split in workers power1

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