spoerri 2008
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U.S. POLICY TOWARDS ULTRANATIONALIST POLITICAL PARTIES
IN SERBIA: THE POLICY OF NON-ENGAGEMENT EXAMINED
Marlene SpoerriPhD Candidate in the Department ofEuropean Studies,Universiteit van Amsterdam,[email protected]
Abstract1
In Serbia, as in much of the WesternBalkans, established democracies face
both a moral and political dilemma: to
acknowledge ultranationalist partiesdemocratic legitimacy as popularly
elected actors or to isolate them as
symbols of the regions authoritarian
past. In Serbia, the US has opted for the
latter, erecting a cordon sanitairesimilar to those employed domesticallyagainst ultranationalist parties in
Western Europe. This article seeks to
identify the goals underlyingisolationist policies and in so doing, to
1 A version of this article was first presented atthe 3rd Central European University Graduate
Conference in the Social Sciences, Budapest,Hungary. I am grateful for the constructivecomments and criticisms of Matthew Adams,
Vasyl Buchko, Kate DeBusschere, JonathanLHommedieu, David Jijaleva, Tamas Meszerics,and Julien Theron. I am also grateful for the
comments and criticisms offered by colleagues atthe American Graduate School of International
Relations and Diplomacy where embryonic ideasrelated to the central argument of this article were
presented in April 2006. I also acknowledge thesupport of David Lundberg, the School ofInternational Studies, the Division of Education,Arts and Social Sciences and the University ofSouth Australia in preparing both the conference
paper and this article. The author alsoacknowledges the comments of two anonymousreviewers.
gauge the extent to which such goalsare being met. This is accomplished by
examining current US policy towards
ultranationalist political parties in the
Republic of Serbia.
Introduction
With the process of democraticconsolidation in the Western Balkansnow under way, the question of whetherand how the governments of WesternEurope and North America shouldapproach the most conspicuous vestigeof post-communist politicsthe
prominence of ultra-nationalist politicalpartiesis becoming increasinglypoignant. Policies aimed at isolatingsuch groups by banning diplomatic,financial and other forms of contacthave failed to deny them their popularappeal; to the contrary, ultranationalistforces are making electoral gains
precisely where foreign opposition totheir existence is most severe. Thus,despite a decade of intense international
pressure, citizens in Bosnia-Herzegovina continue to vote alongethnic lines for parties that espouseintolerant rhetoric. While in Serbia, theultranationalist Serbian Radical Partycould very well be on the verge offorming a coalition government. Havingfailed to abolish support forultranationalist forces in thesecountries, the time has come to reviewsuch policies.
This article takes an initial step in thisdirection. In addition to identifying the
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goals underlying isolationist policies inthe Western Balkans, it gauges theextent to which such goals are beingmet. It does so by examining currentUS policy towards ultranationalist
political parties in the Republic ofSerbia.2 On the basis of interviewsconducted with local politicians, USdiplomats and aid-providers, the articleconcludes that the policys impact islimited and is thus in need of revision.This argument is developed in threestages. First, the reader is presentedwith an overview of the current policyof non-engagement, along with anintroduction to the ultranationalist
parties in question: the Serbian RadicalParty (SRS) and the Socialist Party ofSerbia (SPS). Next, the goals of the
policy are identified. Finally, thesegoals are examined in light of recentevents in Serbia and conclusionsregarding their effectiveness are drawn.
Thecordon sanitaire: A policy of non-engagement
Since the fall of the Milosevic regime inOctober 2000, Serbias ultranationalist
parties have been met with markedlydifferent fortunes. Long chastised for itsanti-reformist and anti-democratic
2While this article focuses on US policy, it should
be noted that the European Union also employs acordon sanitaire. Given that the EU does not havea joint foreign policy, however, theimplementation of the ban is not always runsmoothly, a prime example being the divergentsteps taken following SRS Deputy Nikolicsappointment as Speaker of Parliament. Notablyhowever, none of the major European political
party institutes target ultranationalist parties intheir programs.
sentiments, the SRS is the only party inSerbia to have enjoyed a solid base ofsupport since the pro-reformist coalitioncentered on the Democratic Party (DS)left government in early 2004. For overfour years, support for the party hashovered at 30 percent, making the SRSthe most popular party in Serbia by asignificant margin.3 The SPS, bycontrast, has witnessed little but setbackfollowing its heyday at the helm ofSerbian politics in the 1990s. Followingthe extraditions of its former President,Slobodan Milosevic, to The Hague inmid 2001, its popularity has dwindledto the single digits. Whatever its losses,however, the SPS is one of just ten
parties in Serbian parliament,occupying a total of 16 seats.4 As aconsequence, ultranationalist partiescurrently make up just under 40 percentof Serbias 250-seat parliament.Although Serbias ultranationalist
parties have failed to form a governingcoalition since reformist partiesassumed power in October 2000, fearthat they will do so in the futurecontinue to challenge the longevity ofSerbias liberal trajectory.5
3 Steven Woehrel, Serbia and Montenegro:
Current Situation and US Policy, CRS Report forCongress(June 21, 2006), 4.
4Four of the ten parties in Serbias parliament areminority parties, each of which boasts no morethan one to three seats in parliament.5At the time of writing, Serbias ultranationalistforces were in coalition talks with the DemocraticParty of Serbia. It remained unclear as to whethersuch a coalition would actually be forged. Shouldthese parties succeed, they would represent thefirst ultranationalist coalition government sinceMilosevics ouster in 2000.
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The parties quasi-fascist, populistprogram[s]6 combined with theirrefusal to renounce their roles inwartime atrocities have made both theSPS and SRS the bane of Serbias pro-European majority. In Serbia, as inmuch of the Western Balkans,established democracies face both amoral and political dilemma: toacknowledge ultranationalist partiesdemocratic legitimacy as popularlyelected actors or to isolate them assymbols of the regions authoritarian
past. In Serbia, the US has opted for thelatter, erecting a cordon sanitairesimilar to those employed domesticallyagainst ultranationalist parties inWestern Europe. Cordon sanitaire,literally quarantine line, refers to a
policy of non-engagement throughwhich extremist parties are politicallyisolated with the aim of circumventingtheir proliferation. Ultranationalist
parties, here defined as organizationswhich advocate a brand of nationalismso severe that it calls a statesinternational interests and cross-bordercooperation into question, often fallwithin this category.
Little has been written regarding theeffectiveness of non-engagement but itsrecord appears to be mixed. In Serbia,where a US policy of non-engagementwith the SRS and the SPS has been the
6 This quote was made in reference to the SRS.See: Judy Batt, The Question of Serbia,Institute for Security Studies81 (August 2005), 8.Likewise, Balkans expert Sabrina Ramet labelsthe SRS neo-fascist in her article, The DenialSyndrome and its Consequences: Serbian PoliticalCulture Since 2000, Communist andPostcommunist Studies40 (2007), 41-58, 48.
norm since 2000, the impact appearsnegligible: the SRS has more supporttoday than it did when the policy wasfirst implemented. Although the policyis reported to be unofficial insofar asthe origins of its mandate remainunclear and a paper-trail is lacking,interviews with US officials reveal thatit is rigorously adhered to.7 USdiplomats and donors are not permittedto engage with representatives ofultranationalist parties or to support
projects in which SRS officials partake.As one representative of the NationalDemocratic Institute for InternationalAffairs (NDI)a US organizationspecialized in the provision of political
party assistanceexplained, I canhave no contact with the SRS, not evento send a letter.8 As a result, none ofthe instruments typically employed toreform parties in new or strugglingdemocraciesincluding diplomaticcontacts and democracy assistanceareapplied in connection with Serbiasultranationalist parties. The followingsection examines these instruments ingreater depth.
Strategies of engagement
Until recently, it was common practiceto conceive of political transformationas an exclusively domestic affair. Onlyafter the onset of the third wave of
7 I collected a total of 80 interviews in Serbia(March and June/July 2007) and the US (April2007). Interviews were conducted with USdiplomats and donors, Serbian politicians,academics, and journalists.8 Anonymous, National Democratic Institute,Interview conducted in Belgrade, Serbia, onMarch 9, 2007.
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democratization in the late 1970s didexogenous factors receive systematicattention. To this end, establisheddemocracies have increasingly soughtto support, and in some cases, impose,democracy in foreign contexts, a
practice referred to as democracypromotion. This article examines asubset of this field pertaining to
political parties. It seeks to understandwhy and to what effect Western actorsmay opt not to work with select partiesin new democracies.
In spite of their current malaise,political parties continue to fulfillunique functions which civil societycannot adequately perform.9 Thus, intheir quest to bolster democracy abroad,democracy promoters seek tostrengthen political parties democraticattributes, including their representativecapacities, their legislative competence,and their ability to functioncooperatively with their opponents. TheUS party institutes work to enableselect parties to engage directly with thedomestic electorate so that they may
become more receptive to their voterspreferences. Western Europeans, bycontrast, take pride in helping partiesdevelop more ideologically coherent
9Some of the functions unique to parties include,though are not limited to: the aggregation andrepresentation of citizens interests, the provisionof a structured vehicle of political participation,and the translation of policy preferences into
public policies. For more on this see: IvanDoherty, Democracy Out of Balance: CivilSociety Cant Replace Political Parties, PolicyReview(April/May 2001), 25-35.
programs.10Whatever their differences,the ultimate goal of all democracy
promoters is clear: To help strengthenor reform parties in new or strugglingdemocracies all around the globe.11
There are a number of ways to workwith parties. A combination ofdiplomacy and political party assistanceforms the backbone of US efforts to
promote the democratic development ofSerbias political parties and partysystem. While diplomacy aims toencourage, assistance aims to enable
parties to implement the codes ofconduct conducive to a democratic
political party system. Each year, theUS devotes over 60 million dollars to
political party assistance.12 Suchassistance is meant to bolster partiesorganizational structures, teach moderncampaign techniques, and enablelegislative competencies with theultimate goal of facilitating thedemocratic process in newlydemocratizing countries13To meet theseobjectives donors posses a toolkit
10The six German political party foundations, theparteienstiftungen, are trendsetters in this regard.
They seek out ideological sister parties abroad inan effort to assist platform building in mannermore in line with the classically left-right
ideological spectrum witnessed in Europe.11 Thomas Carothers, Confronting the Weakest
Link: Aiding Political Parties in NewDemocracies (Washington, DC: CarnegieEndowment International Peace, 2006), 77.12 Thomas Carothers estimates the total figurespent in 2005 to stand at $68 million. See:Thomas Carothers, (2006): 85.13 USAID Political Party DevelopmentAssistance, United States Agency forInternational Development (Washington DC,1999).
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supported the violent expansionistpolicies lead by Milosevics SPS. Thepartys pro-regime sentiments,combined with its leaders manipulationof domestic sympathy for the Serbminority living abroad, ensured that by1992 the SRS had won 73 of Serbias250 parliamentary seats.1616The partysrapid rise to prominence owed much tothe charisma of its leader, Vojislav
16
Vladimir Goati, Partije i Partijksi Sistem u
Srbiji(Belgrade: OGI Centar, 2004), 250.
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Figure 1: The Engagement Continuum(Tool employed)
None DC DC & Limited PPA DC and PPA D.S. & limited PPA
Non-Engagement Limited-Engagement Full-
(Type of Engagement)
D.C. = Diplomatic Cooperation, D.S. = Diplomatic Support, PPA. = Political Party Assistance
Table 1: SRS Results from Republican Parliamentary Elections 1992 - 200717
Elections No. of MPs % of total MPs
December 1992 73 29.2
December 1993 39 15.6
September 1997 82 32.8
December 2000 23 9.2
December 2003 82 32,8
January 2007 81182
32,4
May 2008 77 29,4
17Ibid, 250. Data after 2004 is drawn from the Center for Free Elections and Democracy (CESID), at http://www.cesid.or
18Although the SRS actually increased its share of the national vote by 1% from 2003 to 2007, legislative reforms low
for minority parties to enter parliament meant that there were fewer seats to divvy up amongst the non-minority parties
the vote, the SRS actually lost one seat in parliament.
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Seselj, whose affinity for nationalistrhetoric and populist tactics struck achord throughout Serbia. By the late-1990s the SRS was the party of choicefor many of those who questionedMilosevics nationalist credentials inthe aftermath of the Dayton Accords.Strong parliamentary results inSeptember 1997 (see table 1) broughtthe party executive powers: the SRSformed a coalition government withMilosevics SPS and Yugoslav Left; a
party lead by Milosevics wife, MirjanaMarkovic.
The SRSs grip on power was short-lived. Domestic and internationaldissatisfaction with the Milosevicregime culminated in October 2000,when Milosevic was forced to stepdown from the federal Presidency. Pro-establishment parties met a similar fatein the parliamentary elections ofDecember 2000, with the SRS taking in
just nine percent of the popular vote.In February 2003 Seselj was indictedfor crimes against humanity andviolations of the laws or customs of war
by the ICTY.1The charges referred totwo sets of activities: Seseljs closerelationship to the paramilitary group,the Seseljevci, and his role as a verbalinstigator of war crimes. DespiteSeseljs indictment, the SRSrefused todistance itself from its leader, optinginstead to capitalize on public antipathytoward the ICTY by toting Seselj as a
19 To see the initial ICTY Indictment against
Seselj, go to:http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/ses-ii030115e.htm.
victim of an anti-Serb agenda. Withsupport for DOS coalition partieswaning, the SRS achieved what the USgovernment referred to as aspectacular victory, becoming by farthe largest party in the Serbian
parliament2, taking in almost 28percent of the vote in the republicanParliamentary elections of December2003.3 Regardless of its successhowever, the SRS was unable toassemble the parliamentary majoritynecessary to form a governing coalition.An alliance between several of Serbiascentrist parties ensured that the SRSwould remain in the opposition. Historyrepeated itself in January 2007, with the
party taking in 29 percent of the vote,once again proving unable to form agoverning coalition. Despite the partysrepeated failure to obtain executive
powers, Vojislav Seselj remains theformal president of the SRS.
Seseljs leadership is not the onlysource of continuity within the party.On each of the most pressing politicalissues the partys views remainidentical to those it held over a decadeago. In fact, the SRS party programissued in 1996remains virtuallyunaltered to this day. Thus, the party is(officially) opposed to transatlantic
integration224, insists that Kosovo
20Woehrel (2006), 4.
21 The partys greatest competitor at the time,
Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunicas DSS,
received just 18 percent of the vote.22
It should be noted that the SRS has wavered in
its opposition to transatlantic integration, inparticular its stance towards EU membership.(See for example: Jovan Komsic, Politicke
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remain an integral part of Serbianterritory, denounces the ambitions ofthe ICTY, denies Serbias complicity inthe atrocities of the Yugoslav wars, andmaintains territorial ambitions beyond
Serbias recognized borders23.5 Indeed,
as Sabrina Ramet notes, the fact thatthe neo-fascist SRS remains themost popular party in Serbia continuesto shed doubt on the direction of
Serbias democratic trajectory24
.6
stranke u Srbiji i evropske vrednosti programi i
praksa in: Zoran Lutovac, Politicke Stranke uSrbiji I Evropska Unija(Belgrade:Friedrich EbertStiftung, 2007), 9-49.) In 2003, SRS Deputy
Tomislav Nikolic stated that he fully supportedEU membership. Again, in March 2007 he
proclaimed himself not to be opposed to EU
membership. In May 2007 Nikolic reversed hisstance on the issue, expressing his transformationfrom a mere Euro-skeptic to a full-scale EU
opponent. See: Nikolic: State of EmergencyCould Put off Elections, Ministry of ForeignAffairs, 10 May 2007, available at:http://www.mfa.gov.yu/Bilteni/Engleski/b100507
_e.html#N2. In recent months, the partys position
has proven inconsistent, to say the least. Duringthe run-up to Presidential elections in 2008,
Nikolic campaigned on a moderately pro-EUplatform, stating that Serbias relationship with
Russia need not preclude EU membership.Throughout the campaign, however, he wasadamant that Serbias interests in Kosovo would
prohibit EU accession; should the EU acceptKosovos independence, Serbia would refuse EUmembership. Following Kosovos declaration of
independence in February 2008, the SRSleadership was a vocal critic of select EU memberstates decision to recognize the declaration. It is
worth noting that a similar position was also takenby Serbias Prime Minister, Vojislav Kostunica,president of the Democratic Party of Serbia.23
These views were reiterated in Seseljs political
testament, released in late 2006.24
Sabrina Ramet, The Denial Syndrome and its
Consequences: Serbian Political Culture Since2000, Communist and Postcommunist Studies40(2007), 41-58, 48.
Socialist Party of Serbia
The founding of the SPS predates thatof its ultranationalist counterpart. In thesummer of 1990, the League ofCommunists of Serbia merged with thesmall, left-leaning Socialist Alliance ofWorking People in Serbia to form theSocialist Party of Serbia. Whereas the
political successors of communistregimes had generally fared poorlyagainst their pro-democratic opponentsthroughout Central and Eastern Europe(with the notable exceptions of Bulgariaand Romania), in Serbia the collapse ofthe communist party was in name only.The SPS proved victorious in Serbiasfirst-ever post-communist elections,winning 77.6 percent of seats in
parliament (see table 2). Although itfailed to attain a majority of votescaste, the partys lead was decisive: itsnearest opponent, the Serbian RenewalMovement (SPO), received 16 percentof the vote or 8 percent of seats in
parliament.
The SPSs electoral success stemmedfrom its origins in the communist party.The monopoly on state institutions andnational infrastructure that had once
belonged to the League of Communistsof Serbia was simply transferred to theSPS. Slobodan Milosevic, the partyscharismatic leader, exploited thisadvantage to its fullest. It was largely inthis manner that the SPS sustained its
predominant position in parliamentthroughout the 1990s.
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Table 2: SPS Results from Republican Elections 1990 - 2007251
Elections No. of MPs % of total MPs
December 1990 194 77.6
December 1992 101 40.4
December 1993 123 49.2
September 199726
2 110 44.0
December 2000 37 14.8
December 2003 22 8.8
January 2007 16 6.4
May 2008273
20 7.6
25Goati (2004), 250. All data after 2004 were drawn from www.cesid.org.
26The SPS ran for office in coalition with JUL and New Democracy.
27The SPS ran for office in coalition with United Serbia and United Pensioners Party.
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The relationship between the SRStheembodiment of Serb nationalismandthe SPSthe successor of thecommunist partyis something of a
paradox. Though not always symbiotic(in late 1994 Milosevic even had Seseljimprisoned), the two parties foundcommon ground on Serbias so-callednational question. Writes OgnjenPribicevic, although ideologicallyalmost poles apart, Milosevic and Seseljshared very similar, sometimesidentical, approaches to most of the
problems related to the breakdown ofthe Socialist Federated Republic of
Yugoslavia281 More often than not,
Seselj provided the mouthpiece forpolicies supported by Milosevic. Byvirtue of its association with its founderand President, the SPS should thereforenot be considered any less nationalisticthan its right-wing counterpart. Indeed,the partys ultranationist sentimentswere on display when in May 1999 the
ICTY launched what would be the firstof three indictments against Milosevicfor war crimes committed throughoutthe territories of the former Yugoslavia.Like the SRS, the SPS refused to breakties with its leader, despite hisextradition to The Hague in June 2001.It was only after Milosevics passing inMarch 2006 that the party elected a new
president, Ivica Dacic. Perhaps not
surprisingly, the party chose tocommemorate Milosevic as a hero,
28Ognjen Pribicevic, Changing Fortunes of the
Serbian Radical Right in The Radical Right inCentral and Eastern Europe since 1989, ed.Sabrina Ramet (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania StateUniversity Press, 1999), 193-212.
whose aims were those of defending
the Serbian people.29
Like the SRS, the policies of the SPS
have exhibited remarkable continuitysince October 2000. Although the partyintroduced new programs in 2002 and2006, its positions on the most pressing
political issues, including the so-callednational question and cooperation withthe ICTY remain substantively
unaltered.30
During the run-up to
Presidential elections in January 2008,the SPS candidate, Milutin Mrkonjic
publicly stating that armed interventionin Kosovo was a legitimate means ofdefending state sovereignty. In hiswords, We will defend every citizen ofKosovo by arms.314In the aftermath ofKosovos declaration of independence,the partys president, Ivica Dacic, wentso far as to propose national legislationexplicitly forbidding domesticorganizations, political parties included,
from recognizing the territorys claims.
325 Indeed, whatever the partys
29Dacic Takes over Socialist Party,B-92Radio
and Television, 4 December 2006, available at:http://194.109.152.234/eng/news/comments.php?nav_id=38375.30 See for example: Programska Deklaracija
Sedmog Kongresa SPS, Socialist Party ofSerbia, 2006, available at:
http://www.sps.org.yu/uploads/progdekl7.pdf.31
As quoted in: Mrkonjic: Branicemo gradjane
Kosova, b92 Radio and Television, January 15,2008, available at:
http://xs4.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2008&mm=01&dd=15&nav_id=280668.32
SPS Zabraniti one sto priznaju, B92 Radio
and Television, Febuary 18, 2008, available at:http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=20
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rhetorical moderation, the SPSsperspective on the Yugoslav wars andSerbias conduct therein has changedlittle since October 2000. Only whenthe partys stances on such issues areupturned, will the labelultranationalist lose its validity.
Considering these parties past andcurrent practices, it comes as littlesurprise that the establisheddemocracies hesitate to embrace themas potential harbingers of a peaceful,democratic Serbia. That the US goes sofar as to employ a cordon sanitaire ismore so in light of its overriding aim tosupport democratic transformation inSerbia. Why, after all, refuse contactwith ultranationalist parties if doing somight possibly bring about pro-democratic reforms within the party?Why not attempt to make these partiessafe for democracy? The followingsection answers these questions byassessing the goals underlying US
policy towards the SRS and SPS.
The goals of thecordon sanitaire: Is it
working?
US policy towards the Western Balkansis rooted in the desire to achieve peaceand stability after a legacy of violent
conflict and ethnic-strife33.6 Central to
such aims are efforts to mitigate thepower of ultranationalist forces (partiesamong them), bolster liberal democraticdevelopment, and finally, facilitate the
08&mm=02&dd=18&nav_category=640&nav_id
=285339.33
Woerhol (2006).
regions future within a united Europe.Bearing these overarching goals inmind, what purposes might the cordon
sanitaire serve? The following listincludes goals which were explicitlyarticulated during my discussions withUS representatives working in Serbia,as well as those which logically stemfrom the broader context of US policyin the Western Balkans. Such goalsinclude:
Decreasing popular supportfor ultranationalist parties: Tolessen the likelihood that either theSPS or SRS enter government, theUS may seek to ensure that publicsupport for the parties decreases or,at the very least, does not increase.By erecting the cordon sanitairethe US sends a very clear messageto Serbian voters that an SRS/SPS-lead government would leaveSerbia politically isolated.
Keeping ultranationalist
parties out of power: By denyingdiplomatic contacts and political
party assistance to ultranationalistparties, the US signals theconsequences likely to followcross-party cooperation with thesegroups. In demonstrating itsantipathy towards ultranationalism,the US hopes to prevent center-right parties (namely the DSS)from establishing a coalitiongovernment which would provideultranationalist forces withexecutive control.
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Limiting ultranationalist
parties influence on policymaking:In outlining its aversion toultranationalist parties, the US mayalso seek to lessen the extent towhich these parties programmatic
preferences impact upon Serbianpolicy. The isolation of Serbiasultranationalists could potentiallyserve to undermine their base ofsupport, thereby challenging theirgrip on Serbias politicaltransformation.
Inciting change within
ultranationalist parties: Byisolating ultranationalist parties, theUS tacitly conditions its assistanceon programmatic and ideologicalreform within these parties. Having
been refused US assistance andcooperation, it is clear to SRS andSPS representatives that unlessthey reject ultranationalism, theywill continue to be ostracized bythe international community.
Maintaining ideologicaldistance from ultranationalism: Bydenying US assistance and contactsto the SRS and SPS, the cordon
sanitaire may likewise seek tohighlight US opposition toultranationalism. In refusing tocommunicate with these parties,
the US sends a clear message that itopposes a politics based on ethnicexclusion.
In sum, it is conceivable that in itsdesire to bring peace and stability to theWestern Balkans, the US employs the
cordon sanitaire to serve a variety ofpurposes, each aimed at eliminating therelevance and prevalence ofultranationalist forces. The goalssketched above are therefore directed atcross-cutting levels: the Serb electorate,the party system as such, the republican
parliament, ultranationalist partiesthemselves, and the US public at large.Given that the cordon sanitaire likelyserves an amalgamation of theaforementioned purposes, to whatextent are its goals being met? Thefollowing pages examine each of thesegoals in greater depth.
Decreasing support for
ultranationalist parties
Perhaps the chief aim of the cordonsanitaire is that of quelling furthersupport for Serbias ultranationalist
parties. Were this goal being met, onewould expect support forultranationalist parties to stagnate and,ideally, decrease, in the aftermath of the
policys implementation. The evidenceindicates that the policys record ismixed in this regard.
If comparing the evolution of theparties cumulative popular supportfrom the date of regime change(October 5, 2000) to today, we see thatthe policy has been largely ineffective:the parties cumulative share of votes in
both parliamentary and presidentialelections, as well as these partiescombined share of seats in parliament,has increased since the policy was firstimplemented in 2000 (see figure 2).Although Serbias ultranationalist
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Figure 2: Combined SRS/SPS Party Strength 1990-2008341
0
510
15
20
25
30
35
40
4550
2000 2003/2004 2007 2008
Combined
share
of
votes
SRS/SPSinparliamentar
Combined shareofvotes
SRS/SPScandidatesin1s
presidentialelections
Combined shareofSRS/
parliament
34 The Presidential elections held in September 2000 were at a Federal level, as opposed to the Republican level.
parliamentary elections of May 2008 the SPS competed in coalition with two small parties. As such, the share of votes f
elections is slightly lower than is reflected in this graph. All data concerning election results were drawn from Goati (
www.cesid.org.
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Figure 3: Combined SRS/SPS Party Strength from 1990-2000 and 2000-2008352
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
19902000 20002008
Combinedsh
SRS/SPSinpa
elections
Combinedsh
SRS/SPScand
Roundofpre
elections
Combinedsh
seatsinparlia
35All data concerning election results were drawn from Goati (2004), 250 and CESID, available at: www.cesid.org.
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parties fared minor cumulative lossesfrom 2003/2004 to 2007/2008, the
parties recently experienced asignificant turn of fortunes in SerbiasPresidential elections held in January2008, with their support increasing bymore than ten percentage points. Thissuggests that the implementation of thecordon sanitaire has failed not only todiminish support for ultranationalist
parties but also to stabilize that supportat more modest levels.
If, however, the post-communist periodis viewed in its entirety (and the resultsof 2000 are taken to represent ananomaly), the outlook is less somber.As figure 3 demonstrates, the combinedshare of votes for the SRS and SPS in
parliamentary elections has decreasedconsiderably from 1990 to the present.From 1990-2000 the combined share ofvotes for the SRS and SPS in
parliamentary elections averaged 52.6percent, while from 2000-2008 thatfigure was just 40.6. Viewed in terms ofseats in parliament, from 1990 2000the SRS and SPS occupied a combinedaverage of 72.2 percent of seats in
parliament, as compared to 2000-2008when they held an average of just 34.8
percent of seats in parliament. Therehas also been a cumulative decrease insupport for SRS and SPS presidentialcandidates.
Unfortunately, such divergent findingsare ultimately inconclusive. While, onthe one hand, support forultranationalist forces has risen sincethe policy was first implemented in2000, it has diminished, in some cases
considerably, since the 1990s. Thisspeaks to a mixed record of success inwhat is perhaps the policys chief goal.
Keeping ultranationalist parties out
of power
At the time of writing, more than sevenyears have passed since Milosevic leftoffice and Serbias ultranationalist
parties have yet to regain control of therepublics executive branch. Despitestrong public support for the SRS, the
party has failed to reassume executivepowers. Likewise, the SPS has yet topartake in a coalition government. Thisindicates that at least one goal of thecordon sanitaire; that of effectivelysidelining Serbias ultranationalists, has
been met.
On the surface, this is irrefutable. As ofMay 2008, the SRS and the SPS havefailed either to form a coalitiongovernment or to obtain the Serbian
presidency36. To date, the closest theseparties have come to executive controlwas the silent support the SPS providedthe government of the DSS, the G17Plus, the Serbian Renewal Movement,and New Serbia. It is noteworthy,however, that the election results ofMay 11, 2008 have provided Serbiasultranationalists with their firstopportunity to form a post-Milosevicgovernment. Although coalitionnegotiations were still ongoing at thetime of writing, the SRS and SPScoalition had already achieved what hadhitherto been beyond reach: a pledge ofsupport from Kostunicas DSS. In fact,less than 24 hours after the election
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results were announced, DSS and SRSspokesmen confirmed that the two
parties were engaged in coalitionnegotiations37.1 By May 13just twodays after parliamentary elections werestagedthe parties announced that theyhad drafted an agreement laying out thecharacter and goals of Serbias nextnational government38.2 Were theSPS coalition to agree to these terms,Serbias ultranationalists would havethe number of mandates necessary toform a governing majority. Such analliance would place executive powersin ultranationalist hands.
By all accounts, the results of the May11 elections have crowned the SPS asthe next governments kingmaker. Itis uncertain whether they will chose toform a government with the SRS andDSS or opt instead to forge an alliancewith the DS-lead coalition, For aEuropean Serbia. Regardless of theiroptions, two things are now clear: 1) theDSS no longer opposes a republican-level alliance with Serbiasultranationalists, and 2) the nextSerbian government will most likelyinclude at least one ultranationalist
party: the SPS. Neither of these speaksto the cordon sanitaires success.
37 DSS, SRS discuss next cabinet, b92 Radio
and Television, May 12, 2008, available at:http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-article.php?mm=5&dd=12&yyyy=2008.38
Radicals, DSS come up with draft
agreement, b92 Radio and Television, May 13,2008, available at:http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-article.php?mm=5&dd=13&yyyy=2008.
Limiting ultranationalist parties
influence on Serbian policy
Intimately connected with theaforementioned goals is that of limitingultranationalist parties influence onSerbian policy. The cordon sanitairehas been less successful in this regards.Perhaps the clearest indication hereof isoffered by Freedom HousesNations inTransit Index. As figure 4 illustrates,Serbias transition to liberal democracystagnated in the midst of 2002. This
period corresponds to an upsurge inpopular support for Serbiasultranationalist parties, which brieflyebbed after Djindjics assassination inMarch 2003 but increased markedly inthe months thereafter39.3
As a consequence of ultranationalistsresurgence, the DSS-led governmentdid not command the votes necessary to
pass legislation on its own. To get itsproposals accepted by parliament, itdepended on the support on theopposition, including Serbias extremist
parties. According to the ICG, TheKostunica government has also had torely covertly on that extremist party[the SRS] to pass several key laws andhas often acted as though it were acoalition partner. 40Serbias first post-Milosevic constitution adopted in 2006
39
For polling data pertaining to popular support
for Serbian political parties during this period,
see: Strategic Marketing Research, available at:http://www.smmri.co.yu/code/navigate.asp?Id=65.40
International Crisis Group, Serbia Spinning its
Wheels,Europe Briefing, 39 (23 May 2005), 2.
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Figure 4: Freedom Houses Nations in Transit Score for Serbia41
0
0,5
1
1,5
2
2,5
3
3,5
4
4,5
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2
41 Nations in Transit examines the process of democratic reform in the post-communist states of Europe and Eurasia. Co
1 representing the highest and 7 the lowest level of progress (Freedom House 2007).
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is exemplary of this phenomenon. Notonly has autonomy to the Serbian
province of Vojvodina been limited, butit has become considerably easier forauthorities to call a state of emergency,and the independence of the judiciaryhas been compromised. There is in factlittle doubt that the constitution was the
product of a bargain between the DS,the DSS, the SRS, and the SPS.421
Of perhaps even greater significance forSerbias tardy trajectory was the silentsupport the SPS provided to theKostunica government. In 2004, theDSS-lead coalition formed a minoritygovernment. To achieve the majoritynecessary for a working quorum, thecoalition depended on the silent supportof the SPS. It goes without saying thatSPS support did not come withoutconcessions. It was thus reportedlyunder SPS pressure that the governmenthalted forcible (i.e. involuntary)extraditions to the ICTY43.2Likewise, itwas thanks to SPS demands that thegoverning coalition supported thecontroversial Law on the Rights of
Indictees in the Custody of the
International Criminal Tribunal and
Members of their Families, entitlingSerbian indictees and their families tofree legal representation,accommodation in The Hague, andtravel to and from the Netherlands.Additionally, SPS representatives were
42 International Crisis Group. Serbias New
Constitution: Democracy Going Backwards,Europe Briefing,44(8 November 2006), 4.43
Despite this policy, the voluntary nature of
DSS-lead extraditions, including that of GeneralSretan Lukic, was in question.
awarded lucrative posts in state-ownedfirms as well as positions in publicservice. There is thus little doubt thethird goal of the cordon sanitaire, thatof limiting ultranationalists influenceon Serbian policy, has not beenachieved.
Inciting change withinultranationalist parties
The cordon sanitaire has had even lesssuccess in facilitating transformationwithin ultranationalist parties. Althoughthere is a marked decrease ininflammatory rhetoric, neither the SRSnor SPS has abandoned itsultranationalist sentiments. Both partiesrenounce cooperation with the ICTY,refuse to admit to Serbias complicity inatrocities conducted during theYugoslav wars, and have yet torenounce the use of violence in Kosovo.Thus, the SRS adheres to the same
party program that it did in 1996443andits party magazine is tellingly entitledVelika Srbija (Greater Serbia). In factthe most radical version of SRSnationalism was put forth by VojislavSeselj as late as 2006. In his politicaltestament, Seselj instructed partymembers never to abandon their pursuitof a Greater Serbia and to persistentlyfight to free Republika Srpska Krajinaand Republika Srpska and to unite allSerbian territories.45 The SPS, for its
part, has publicly stated that violence is
44Jovan Komsic (2006): 15.
45 Seseljs testament available at:
http://www.srpskinacionalisti.com/sadrzaj.php?tip=ves&is117328.
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a legitimate means to maintain Serbsovereignty in Kosovo and mostrecently supported legislation whichwould effectively deny domesticorganizations the freedom to recognizeKosovos independence. A keyindicator of these partiesultranationalist sentiments can bewitnessed in parliament, which both
parties regularly exploit as a platformfrom which to hurl rhetorical abuse atcolleagues from opposing parties. Onewidely reported example took place inlate 2006, during the parliamentary
proceedings for the nomination ofSerbias Deputy Prime Minister. SRS
parliamentarian Zoran Krasic publicallybranded the G17 Plus nominee, IvanaDulic-Markovic, as an Ustasha46.5 TheSRS proceeded to launch a virulentcampaign against Dulic-Markovic,repeatedly questioning her loyalty to theSerbian state, as well as that of her
brother and father. Indeed, both SRSand SPS MPs regularly resort toslanderous rhetoric, profanity, andsimilarly provocative behavior.
To be sure, the parties are alsoentertaining modest, if cosmetic,reforms. In recent years, each party hassought to target its public relationseffort at the so-called losers ofSerbias transition. Withoutsubstantively altering their policy
46Ustasha refers to a nationalist organization
aimed at securing independent statehood forCroats. They came to power briefly in World WarTwo, having allied with the Nazis. They areaccused of large scale atrocities against Serbs andother minorities, including the establishment ofnumerous concentration camps.
preferences, the parties now emphasizesocioeconomic issues such as pensionreform, privatization, and collegetuition fees, rather than high-profile(and highly divisive) issues such as theGreater Serbia project or cooperationwith the ICTY. According to the SRSssocioeconomic program, for example,the fight against corruption andcriminals ranks highest amongst its listof concerns47.6 During his Presidentialcampaign, the SRS candidate, Tomislav
Nikolic, even refrained from wearingthe standard party badge depicting a
portrait of Vojislav Seselj. According toNikolic, doing so would have served todivide Serbs; as a presidentialcandidate, his intention was to representSerbia in its entirety. As for the SPS, iteagerly portrays itself as a run-of-the-mill left-of-center European party. Asone member stated, We are a left
party. We want to be included in the leftparties of Europe. Every country needsa party to take care of the losers oftransition. 48 7The SPS has also goneto great lengths to stress its pro-European orientation. It thusemphasizes its support for EUmembership and has been markedly lessemphatic about its opposition to NATOmembership.
Unfortunately, such changes remainonly skin-deep. Whatever its claim toEuropean ideals, members of theSocialist International were
47 Party program as listed on the website of the
Serbian Radical Party.48
Dejan Backovic, Socialist Party of Serbia,
interview conducted on 10 February 2007 inBelgrade, Serbia.
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unconvinced by the SPSs self-professed transformation; its applicationfor membership was denied on thegrounds of the partys unrepentantultranationalism and its leading role inthe Yugoslav wars. Moreover, despitethese parties alleged aversion tocorruption and criminality, past
practices on the part of the SRS andSPS call the veracity of such statementsinto question49.8 And, as stated above,the parties positions on the so-callednational question, includingcooperation with the ICTY, have goneunchanged. Clearly then, the fourth goalof the cordon sanitaire, that of incitingchange within ultranationalist parties,has gone unmet.
Maintaining ideological distance
The final goal of the cordon sanitaireisthat of indicating US disapproval ofultranationalism. As regards this goal,there is little doubt that it has beenachieved. Indeed, few have reason todoubt the sincerity of this conviction orthe scope of the schism between US andultranationalist policies. On virtually allfronts, US and SRS/SPS policies areirreconcilable: Where these partiesofficials regularly invoke theVirovitica-Karlovac-Karlobag line USrepresentatives consistently condemn
49 The links between both parties to Serbias
underworld has been well documented. See forexample, Maja Miljkvic and Marko Attila Hoare,
Crime and the Economy under Milosevic and hisSuccessors, in Sabrina Ramet, Serbia since1989: Politics and Society under Milosevic and
After (London: University of Washington Press,2007), 192-226.
the Greater Serbia project50.9While theUS was one of the foremost advocatesof an independent Kosovo, the SRS andSPS continue to insist on Serbiasterritorial continuity. By refusing todevote taxpayers money to theestablishment of contacts with or the
provision of assistance to Serbiasultranationalists, the US has sent a clearsignal that such positions will not besupported by the US administration.
Conclusion
In light of the assessment laid outabove, what course of action should USdemocracy promoters take when itcomes to ultranationalist parties inSerbia and the Western Balkans atlarge? Should they maintain the statusquo or has the time come to consider
possible alternatives to the cordonsanitaire?
As we have seen, in Serbia the policycan claim modest successes. Two goalsof isolationism have thus far been met:at the time of writing, neither the SRSnor the SPS has gained hold of theexecutive branch and ideologicaldistance from ultranationalism has beenattained. Both are reputableachievements: executive powers wouldenable ultranationalists to determine thecourse of Serbian politics, while itscondemnation of ultranationalism
provides the US with clear moralauthority. Unfortunately, the policys
50The line is a euphemism for the Greater Serbia
project referring to the geographical borders of aunited Serbian nation.
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successes end there. The goal oflessening support for ultranationalist
parties has been only vaguely realized.Compared to the support these parties
boasted in the 1990s, their popularityhas waned considerably. Yet since theimplementation of the policy in 2000,support for these parties has actuallyincreased, so much so that few woulddeny their corrosive impact on Serbiasliberal democratic trajectory. Notably,two of the policys goals have not beenrealized: apart from cosmeticalterations, both parties exhibitremarkable continuity with theMilosevic era and, despite their lack ofaccess to the executive branch, both
parties continue to exert pressures onnational policymaking. Such failuresare significant, not least because of thegrowing likelihood of an SRS-DSS-SPSalliance and the numerousconsequences such a government wouldhave on Serbias international standing.
Table 3: Goals Met and Unmet5110
Goal Result
Decreased party strength 2Lack of power5211 3
Policy influence 1
Change within party 1
Maintaining distance 3
Total 10
513 = goal achieved, 2 = state of ambiguity, 1 =
goal unachieved. A score of 15 would representtotal success and a score of 5 total failure. Thescore of 10 places the policy precisely in the
middle, reflecting a state of overall ambiguity.52
At the time of writing, the SPS was on the
verge of forming a coalition with either the SRSor the DS. Should they form either such coalition,this score would decrease.
After all, when in May 2007 Nikolicwas appointed Speaker of Parliament,the repercussions hereof were morethan rhetorical: the Serbian Dinar fell torecord lows against the Euro and theBelgrade Stock Exchange declineddramatically. Thus, if tallying the totalsof successes and failures, one is forcedto conclude that there is ample room forimprovement (see table 3).As has been demonstrated, the policysinability either to promote changewithin ultranationalist parties or tonegate their impact on national policy isworrisome, not least because thedirection of Serbias transition remainsso precarious. It is telling that anincreasingly vocal group of USgovernment officials and assistance
providers doubt the wisdom ofmaintaining this policy. One USAIDofficial based in Serbia remarked that,Personally, I think that we should bereviewing that policy.
5312 Indeed, formany of those working in Serbia, the
policy seems untenable, with oneUSAID employee calling the policyridiculous
5413and another silly54.14
Whatever the policys successes, itsfailures call its relevance into question.The task now is to devise a policy thatwould exert a moderating influence onSerbias ultranationalist parties, without
53 Anonymous, USAID Belgrade, interview
conducted in Belgrade, Serbia on March 2, 2007.54
Anonymous, USAID Belgrade, interview
conducted in Belgrade, Serbia on June 21, 2007.55
Anonymous, USAID Economics and
Governance Office, interview conducted inBelgrade, Serbia on March 15, 2007.
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compromising the achievements thathave thus far been made.
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