sport superstition and difficulty of sport task

7/30/2019 Sport Superstition and Difficulty of Sport Task

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Sport Superstition as a Function ofSkill Level and Task Difficulty

Perry B. W right and Kristi J. ErdalColorado College

Gmelch 's (1974) claim that professional athletes were m ore superstitious during difft-cult tasks than easy tasks was tested in a golf putting experiment. Forty college students. 26male and 14 female, of varying golfing ab ilities, were tested in 20 easy putts from 3 feet, and20 difftcult putts from 9 feet. Using four colored balls, superstitious behavior was defined asselecting the same colored ball after a made putt, consistent with the methodology of VanRaalte, Brewer, Nemeroff, and Under (1991). Skill level was assessed by a median split oftotal putts made. There was a signiftcant interaction between level ofputt difficulty and skilllevel on superstitious behavior. Low skill participants were more superstitious in the easyputting task than the difficult putting task, and high skill participants were m ore supersti-tious in the difficult putting task than the easy putting task. Gmelch's claims were .supportedby the high skill participants' behavior and may be explained by the uncertainty hypothesis.The tow skill participants' behavior did not support Gmelch's claims, and may be betterexplained by the reciprocal nature of learned helplessness and superstitious behavior.

Address Correspondence To: Kristi J. Erdal, Ph.D., Department of Psychology, ColoradoCollege, 14 East Cache La Poudre Street, Colorado Springs, Colorado, 8090 3, Phone: 719-38 9-6598, E-mail: kerdal@ ColoradoCollege.edu.187


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188 /Journal of Sport Beha vior. Vol. 31. No. 2Superstition appears to arise from situations of uncertainty (Burger & Lynn, 2005 ; Feison& G melch, 1979; Vyse, 1997). Skinner (1948) w as one of the first to docum ent 'sup erstition' as

a way of describing the behaviors pigeons showed w hen reinforced with food on a fixed timeinterval. The pigeons were presented with a situation in which it was unclear why and whenfood reinforcement was to be given. The pigeons repeated specific beh aviors that appeared toresult in positive reinforcement. Skinner suggested that these beha viors were a result of thepige ons' chance ac tions being paired unintentionally with the reinforcement, which seemed togive the pigeon an illusion of control over the food presentation.Superstition is wholly about the illusion of control. Hum ans demonstrate m uch of thesame behavior as Skinner's (1948) pigeons (Ciborowski, 1997). When put in situations ofuncertainty, individuals may try to achieve control by investing in irrelevant objects or ac-tions, believing there to be a causal link between these objects or actions and particular

results. Jahoda (1969) reported a distinction between 'causal' superstition and 'coincidental'superstition. A causal superstition was suggested to be part of a conscious belief; while acoincidental superstition was more ambiguous about what behaviors individuals believedcaused a particular outcome. Ciborowski and Jahoda both suggested that superstition was anaccumulation of conditioned responses which provided a foundation for a conscious beliefabou t causality. It may also provide a foundation for the illusion of con trol.It is often difficult to draw a distinction between rituals, pre-performance routines, andsuperstition in sport. Ritual is typically defined as a conscious activity that focuses on copin gwith a high-stress situation, such as taking a deep breath before shooting a free throw inbasketball. Similar to rituals, pre-performance routines are specific actions and movem ents,

such as taking practice swings before hitting a golf ball, which have been shown to effectivelyimprove performance (Burke, Czech, & Ploszay, 2004; Cohn, 1990). Vyse (1997) made the dis-tinction that a routine became superstition when an action gained special magical significance,such as carrying a rabbit's foot to bring good luck. Rudski (2004) defined superstition as aperson's false belief that s/he can influence an outcome in a situation when realistically s/hehas no con trol. What is parad oxical is that performing an action or carrying a lucky object asa way of controlling external factors may actually provide physical or mental relief to the pointthat it directly affects performance . Indeed, superstition may be seen as a psycholog icalplaceb o (Neil, 1980). Ciborowski (1 997) argued that if an individual believed thata particularbehavior could improve performance, that behavior should not be considered superstitious.One condition that appears to be common for all superstitious behavior is situations ofuncertainty, termed the "uncertainty hypothesis" (Burger & Lynn, 2005). Vyse (1997) sug-gested that the basic human desire to gain control in ambiguous situations was a significantmotivating factor in superstitious behavior display. Superstitious beh avior may be generated


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. . - S p o r t S u p e r s t i ti o n a s a F u n c t i o n o f S k i l i a n d D i ff i c u l ty . . . /1 8 9by needs to establish control as well as to enhance self-efficacy. That is, attributing outcom esto controllable factors has been consistently associated with high self-efficacy (Band ura,1 9 9 7 ; Haney & Long, 1995), while attributing outcomes to uncontrollable factors has beenconsistently associated with low self-efficacy and learned helplessness (Bandura. 1997;Seligman, 1975). In situations of uncertainty, the attempt to gain control through superstitiousbehavior m ay have a positive affect on self-efTlcacy. In con trast, no attempt to gain controland engage in supers titious behav ior may indicate very low self-efficacy and even learnedhelplessness. /

Rudski, Lischner, and Albert (1999) conducted an experiment in which participants wereput in situations of uncertainty. Participan ts completed a 100 trial compu ter task which in-volved choosing between two letters. Before testing began, participants were assigned togroups in which points were either randomly awarded or subtracted with different probabili-ties. With the aim of achieving the most points , participants w ere put in a situation in which ifwas unclear how points could be gained or how to prevent po ints from being taken. Becauseof the ambiguous nature of point distribution, participants began to generate superstitiousrules for point acqu isition. Participan ts tended to show a 'Win-Sfay, Lose-Shift strategy'( O n o , 1987), indicating that people often repeated responses that resulted in positive out-come s and changed responses after receiving a negative outcome. Superstitious rule genera-tion and having confidence in these rules increased as the probability of receiving positivereinforcements increased. The study suggested that the development of superstitious beha v-ior was a function of different reinforcement schedules, and that people create superstitionsbased on their apparent success or failure in a task.Researchers have found that sport has an inherent quality of creating situations ofuncertainty, which predict display of superstitious behavio r. In one of t h e only experimentaldesigns to elicit superstitious behavior in sport. Van Raalte, Brewer, Nemeroff, and Linder(1991 ) had participa nts hit 50 total putts on a putting green from a distance of 3.5 mete rs. Aftereach putt, the participants were given the opportunity to choose from four different coloredballs. Using the 'Win-Stay, Lose-Shift strategy' (On o, 1987), selecting the same colored ballafter a made putt was operationally defined as superstitious behavior. As expected, there wasa negative correlation between chance orientation and the number of times the participantsselected the same colored ball after a made putt. The presen t study was modeled after the VanRaalte et al. experiment but utilized a different method of ego-involvement, included partici-pants without restriction due to skill levels, and assessed the impact of task difficulty onsuperstitious behavior. The Van Raalte et al. (199 1) study offered a way in which superstitiousbehavior could be quantified and experimentally assessed in sport while most other researchon sport superstition has been qualitative and/or correlational (Anderson, Neil, & Sheppard,


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190/Journa l of Sport Behavior. Vol. 31. No. 21981; Brown &Todd, 2003; Buhrman, Brown, & Zaugg, 1982; Burger& Lynn, 2005; Ciborowski,1997;Gmelcb, 1974).

Bubrmann et al. (1982) tested the differences in superstition rituals between male andfemale b asketball players. Contrary to historical research (e.g., Conklin, 191 9), they did notfind that females demonstrated more superstitious bebavior; however, tbe type of ritualsperformed between genders was significantly different. Females were more concerned withappearance rituals; whereas, male superstition was related to equipment use and repetitiveactions. Anderson et al. (1981) studied male and female hockey players and found minimaldifferences between the genders; rather, tbey established that superstitions were more a func-tion ofthe level of athletic involvement.Brown and Todd (2003 ) assessed differences in superstitious behavior between NCA ADivision 1 and Division 111 track and field athletes. Tbe results illustrated tbat athletic identity

and external locus of control had a positive relationsh ip with superstitious behavior. Division1 track and field athletes showed significantly more superstitious behavior and athletic identitythan tbe Division MI track and field athletes. Because a grea ter level of athletic iden tity isindicative of greater ego-involvement (Brewer, Linder, & Van Raalte, 1993), these findingssupported Anderson et al.'s (1981) researcb tbat ego-involvement was a key element in thedevelopment of sport superstitions.Burger and Lynn (2005) successfully found cross-cultural differences in superstitiouspractices between Japanese and Am erican professional baseball players. Japanese playerstook more responsibility for poor performance than American players, consistent withAnderson's (1999) findings tbat individuals from collectivist societies were more likely to take

responsibility for failure than individuals from individualistic societies. Japanese players weremore likely to believe that their performance was a reflectioii of their effort, not luck, indicatingthat attributing failure to one's lack of effort rather than to some external source of luck is aculturally derived conce pt. As predicted, tbe Japanese baseball players were less likely tobehave superstitiously than the American baseball players.Baseball itself has been anecdotally described to be a sport that yields the most super-stitious behaviors (Ciborow ski, 199 7). C iborowski researched a collegiate baseball team overthree years by video recording the players during their gam es. The ba tters were scored on 33preset superstitious movements, such as touching a particular body part, gripping the bat indifferent ways, or stepping in and out of the batte r's box. During interviews, uniformly, theathletes were surprised at the number of extra movements they made while batting, and tbeydenied that there was a causal connection between those superstitious movements and aforeseeable ou tcome . Ciborowski observed that the amount of extra superstitious movem entsincreased wben the team was losing or the outcome was uncertain, comp ared to when the team


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S p o r i S u p e r s t i t i o n a s a F u n c t i o n o f S k i l l a n d D i f f i c u l t y . . . / 1 9 1was comfortably winning. Being comfortably in the lead seemed to provide a greater sense ofcontrol and a lack of need to appeal to luck for success.

Consistent with the uncertainty hypothesis, and Ciborowski's (1997) observations thatmore superstitious behavior arose in situations of greater risk and more uncertainty, Gmelch(1974) had stated that baseball players were more likely to behave superstitiously while battingrather than fielding. He explained that fielding is an activity that typically yields a high rate ofsuccess, whereas an exceptional batter only gets a hit 1/3 of t h e time he or she steps up to theplate. Because batting yields such a low rate of success compared to fielding, Gmelch hypoth-esized that the amount of superstitious behavior was a function of the level of difficulty anduncertainty of the task. Gm eich never tested this hypo thesis.The purpose of this study was to test the ideas Gmelch (1974) developed through

observation in baseball, with the experimenlal m ethod developed by Van R aalte et al. (1991).Con sistent with Gmelch 's hypo thesis about situalional difficulty increasing superstitious be -havior, it was hypothesized that participants would show more superstitious behavior (cho os-ing the same color ball after a made putt) when completing a difficult golf-putting task ascompared to an easier putting task.Method

ParticipantsParticipants were 26 male and 14 female undergraduate students. Golfing skill was not aprerequisite for participation. All participants were given $5 com pensation and the incentiveto win $50 for making the most putts.Materials

The golf-putting apparatus was a 4'X 16 'bo ard elevated T from the floor on lOc inde rblocks. Three pieces of 2 " x 4" wood were nailed to the edges of the board to provide b ump ers,and green felt turf was nailed to the top of the board . A standard golf hole w as cut in the wo od.An 8 ' PVC pipe was propped at an anglefrom he back of a chair near the experimenter to a smallbucket in the seat of another chair by the participant in order to return the ball to the partici-pant. As in Van Raalte et al.'s (1991 ) experimen t, four colored b alls were used (royal b lue, pink,red, and chartreuse). A blackboard was used to record nam es and rankings.The easy condition was a three-foot putt, and the difficult condition was a nine-footputt, established after 1 1 pilot participants averag ed 3/10 made putts on the difficult conditionand 9/10 on the easy condition. These success ratios paralleled Gm elch's (1974 ) observa tions.


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1 9 2 /Journal of sport Behavior. V o l . 3 1 , N o . 2ProcedureUpon arriving at the lab, the following rules of the competition were explained to theparticipants. The participants w ere eligible to win $50 if they made the most points. Eachparticipant received one point for every made putt from the easy condition and two points forevery made putt from the difficult cond ition. The participa nts took 20 shots from the difficultc o n d i ti o n a n d 2 0 f r o m t h e e a s y c o n d i t i o n . A c o i n w a s f l ip p e d t o d e t e r m i n e w h i c h c o n d i t i o n th eparticipant would do first. All participants were led to believe that their names and rankingswould be posted on the blackboard, in order to increase ego-involvem ent. They were told thatthe study assessed how one's attitude positively or negatively affected their putting ability.The participants signed an informed consent form after which they filled out a filler "attitudes"questionnaire.

The participants removed their shoes to prevent tear in the green. They were asked tostep up on the putting green, pick one ball at a time out of the bucket, and take three practiceputts from a distance of 3 .5 feet, at which time they were told that the procedure must remainthe same for each participant in order to reduce "extraneous variables." The experimenterexplained that after each shot the participant must stay still until the experimenter finishedrecording data and observations. Once the experimenter looked up at the participant, s/hecould then prepare for the next shot. This was actually to allow time for the ball that w a s justused to get back to the bucket so that the participants could choose from all four balls on eachtrial. The experimenter recorded if the participants made the shot, and what color ball theyused. After completing the putting, participants were debriefed about the deception. Theywere told that the attitude questionnaire was a filler, and that their names and rankings wouldnot stay up on the blackboard. They were then given their compensation.

Results '^The primary independent variable of the experiment was the putting distances betweenthe easy and difficult conditions. The dependent measure was superstitious behavior, deter-mined by the number of times a made putt was coupled with staying with the same colored ball,consistent w ith Van Raalte et al. (19 91) . A paired Mest revealed no significant differencebetween the number of superstitious behaviors in the easy condition (A/ ^ 8.9, SD ^ 5.31) and

the difficult condition (M - 9.88 , SD = 5.41), /(39) = - . 6 2 , p = .54.A median sp lit was performed in order to assess the impact of skill level on supe rstitiousbehavior. P articipants who made 20 or fewer total p utts were considered of low skill ( = 20; 10females and 10 males), and those who made m ore than 20 putts were considered of high skill (


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S p o r i S u p e r s t i t i o n a s a F u n c t i o n o f S k i l l a n d D i f f i c u l t y . . . / 1 9 3= 2 0 ; 4 females and 1 6 males). All participants taken together made 7 8 % of the putts in the easycondition and 2 1 % of the putts in the difficult cond ition. High skill participants m ade 88% ofthe putts in tbe easy condition and 29% of the putts in the difficult condition. Low skillparticipants m ade 68 % of t h e putts in the easy condition and 14% of the putts in the difficultcondition. T-tests revealed no significant difference between males and females on supersti-tious behavior in either the easy or difficult conditions, p > .05.

A repeated measures analysis of variance revealed an interaction between skill level andtask difficulty on superstitious behavior, F (1,38) = 8.24, p = .007, ti = .42 . The low skillparticipants demonstrated greater superstitious behavior in the easy condition than in thedifficult condition; whereas, the high skill participants demonstrated greater superstitiousbehavior in the difficuU condition than in the easy cond ition. (See Figu re 1).

Figure 1\ Superstitious behavior as a function of skill level and task difficulty14 ,

Low Skillj High Ski l l !

Easy DifficultTask Difficulty


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194 / Journal of Sport Behavior, Vol. 31. No. 2The results of the four conditions were subjected to four chi-square analyses in order todetermine which conditions differed from chance and in which direction . That is, on any given

made putt, by chance there w as a .25 probability that the participant w ould stay with the samecolored ball and a .75 probability that the participant w ould change balls. Chi-square analysesdetermined that neither low skill participants putting in the difficult condition nor high skillparticipan ts putting in the easy condition w ere choosing colored bails significantly differentfrom chance, p > .05. The low skill participants putting in the easy condition chose to stay withthe same colored ball after a made putt significantly more often than one would expect bychance, x- ( 1 , n = 20) = 9.92, p < .01 . The high skill participants putting in the difficult conditionchose to stay with the same colored ball after a made putt significantly more often than onewouldexpect by chance, x^( l,fl = 2 0 ) = 1 2 . 5 l , p < . 0 LDiscussion

The aim of the current study was to parallel Gme lch's (1 974) ob servations that baseballfielders, who were successful 9 out of 10 times, showed less superstitious behavior thanbatters, who got a hit 3 out of 10 times. Contrary to prediction, there was no significantdifference between superstitious behaviors in the easy vs. difTicult conditions for all partici-pants combined; however, after a median split was conducted to account for skill level, asignificant interaction was found between skill level and task difficulty on superstitious be-hav iors. It was further determined that the low skill participants putting in the easy conditionand the high skill participants putting in the difficult condition showed superstitious behaviorabove what one would expect by chance.The percentages of made putts for the high skill participants reflected Gmelch's (1974)baseball observations. Consistent with the hypothesis, the high skill participants showed nosuperstitious behavior in the easy condition compared to the difficult con dition . The high skillparticipants were likely more confident in their ability to make the putt from the short distanceand did not need to reiy on luck, chance, or ball color. Also consistent with the originalhypothesis, high skill participants struggled more with the 9' putt, ostensibly causing them torely more heavily on external variables, which would account for the greater superstitiouspractices in this condition.These findings appeared to reflect the role of the uncertainty hypothesis (Burger &Lynn, 2005). Superstitious behavior increased as the outcome of the situation became lesscertain. Because professional baseball players would presumably be labeled high skill ath-letes, these findings support Gmelch's (1974) observations that professional baseball playersshow more superstitious behavior during more difficult activities.


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S p o r t S u p e r s t i ti o n a s a F u n c t i o n o f S k i ll a n d D i ff ic u l ty . . . / 1 9 5The percentages of made putts for the low skill participants did not reflect the ratio

Gmelch (1974) described with professional baseball players, indicating that the putting taskswere more challenging for these participants than for the high skill participants. Consequently,participants who were considered of lo w skill showed a very difTerent effect from the high skillparticipants. They established superstitious behavior in the easy condition and not in thedifficult condition since the 3 ' putt was not as easy for the low skill participants as it was for thehigh skill participants. Perhaps the low skill participants did not have the same confidence intheir ability to make the short putt, so they felt the need to rely on externa l sourc es such as ballcolor. The feeling of uncertainty that the high skill participants may have had in the difficultcondition were likely similar to the feelings of uncertainty the low skill participants felt in theeasy condition.The lack of superstitious behavior in the difficult condition for the low skill pa rticipan tssugge sts that the putting task may have been too difficult for them. Skinner (195 3) might haveargued that the inter-reinforcement interval was too great, that the low skill putters could notdevelop a ball color superstition because they did not have enough reinforcements to make an(illusory) correlation between ball color and made putt. Given that our participants, unlikeSkinn er's p igeons, brought w ith them variable skill levels of which they were cognizant, and acomprehen sion of how reinforcement could occur, however, we suggest a slightly more cogn i-tive explanation. Rather than looking for some kind of external assistance, such as luck in aparticular color of ball, the low skill participants may have demonstrated a form of learnedhelplessness (Matute, 1994; Rudski, 2004; Rudski et a l , 1999). In this instance, the low skill

participants likely had little to no confidence in their ability to make the 9' putt, so theyessentially 'gave up.'Learned helplessness, in which repeated exposure to aversive events cause a person torealize that their actions have no effect on the outcome o f an event, produc es a sense of futilityfor the individual to respond. Rudski et al. (1999) suggested that there was a reciprocal rela-tionship between superstition and learned helplessness. In Rudski et al.'s experiment of ran-dom reinforcement scheduling for both point losing and gaining, learned helplessness wasapparent, in that participants who were in the point losing condition recognized the fiitility ofresponding. While points were not taken from participants in the current study, a form oflearned helplessness may have been evident with the low skill participants. Low skill partici-

pants were consistently missing the difficult putts, meaning that these aversive events couldhave contributed to a feeling o f fiJtility in performing well. It appear s that in some situations ofuncertainty, learned helplessness and superstition are opponent processes. Some individualsdevelop superstitions as a way of trying to control the uncontrollable; while individualsexperiencing learned helplessness do not believe their actions have an effect on an outcome,and they 'give up.'


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196 /Journal of sport Behavior. Vol. 31, No. 2This study adds insight into the complex nature of superstition in sport. Co nsistent withAnderson et al. (1981) and Buhrmann et al. (1982), no gender differences were found on

superstitious behavior. But unlike gender, skill level appeared to play a role in superstitiousbehavior. That is, consistent with Brown and Todd's (2003) research on Division I and Division111 track athletes, the current study found that high skill athletes demonstrated greater super-stitious behavior in difficult situation s. Although re search ers have specu lated that supersti-tious behavior is a function of the level of task difficulty (Gmelch, 1974), none had examinedthis experimentally. The Van Raalte et al. (1991) experimental model provided the basic method-ology for the present study, which quantified superstition in terms of the interaction betweentask difficulty and skill level. This present study, in turn, was able to provide some empiricalsupport for theorists like Gmelch.

This being said, it is possible that the results of the current study could have refiectedmethodological inadequacies. Reproducing superstitious behavior in a laboratory setting ischallenging because certain qualities of sport in practice cannot be fully replicated. Properincentive to succeed may have been insufficient in the current study. A $50 p rize o stensiblycould have attracted or deterred participants; however, the participants were drawn from arelatively financially homogeneous pool, suggesting that the incentive did not yield a non-representative sample. A public display of names and rankings could have pro vided differentlevels of ego-involvement based on each individual's predisposition to that incentive, withmore self-conscious participants feeling potentially more pressure to perform. Similarly, whilea priori divisions of high and low skill participants are typically considered optimal, primingparticipants about golf skill prior to the experiment may have put unequal pressure on partici-pants. That is to say, participants provid ing skill information, particularly information suggest-ing high skill, before the putting task might have felt more pressure to perform, as opposed tothose who rated them selves as low skilled. Con versely, particip ants provid ing skill informa-tion after the putting task might have been m otivated to lie about their skill level based on theirperformance during the experiment. For this reason, we chose to assess skill level based onperformance.Regarding the measure of superstitious behavior, although a survey by Van Raalte et al.(1991) revealed that royal blue, red, hot pink, and chartreuse were favorite colors amongcollege students, using these c olors did not necessarily rule out the color preference variable.Seven participants used the same color ball throughout the entire experiment. Four of theseparticipants were from the low skill group, and three were from the high skill group indicatingthat this type of superstitious behavior was not contingent upon skill level. Lastly, the numberof participants ( = 40) w as relatively low and representative only of college stude nts, barringglobal generalization from these data. However, the moderate - strong effect size indicated


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s p o r t S u p e r s ti ti o n a s a F u n c t i o n o f S k i ll a n d D i ff ic u l ty . . . / 1 9 7that the interaction between skill level and task difficulty is potentially qu ite important inunderstanding superstitious behavior in sport.

With these limitations in mind, this experiment revealed important infonnation aboutwhat type of people, and under what situations, superstitious behavior may be seen. Accord-ing to this study, athletes of higher skill were more likely to demo nstrate superstitious behaviorin difficult tasks than in easy tasks, supporting the uncertainty hypothesis and Gmelch's(1974) ideas. Low skill participants appeared to show a reverse effect, in that more supersti-tious beha vior was performed in the easy task than the difficult task. This indicated that a formof learned helplessness may have come about in response to the difficulty of the 9' putt.Future research should delve more deeply into the relationship between superstition andlearned helplessness, perhaps revealing what circumstances cause the shift from supersti-tious practices to learned helplessness.Development of learned helplessness in a sporting situation is likely the worst possiblescena rio for an athlete. Sport, by nature, requires a sense of belief and self-efficacy that onecan perform well and accom plish tasks. The feelings of futility inherent in learned helples snessessentially restrict hope of performing w elt. It is the aim of sport psycholog ists to rid ath letesof feelings of futility and instead give athletes confidence in their ability to be successftil. Inthis respect, the development of sport superstitions may be an indicator of hop e. How ever, toomany superstitious practices may also inhibit performance because the athlete will not befocusing on physical and mental skill development, suggesting a complex relationship be-tween superstitious behav ior and psychologically healthy practices. It may be possible that

sport psychologists will be able to determine what amount of superstitious behavior mayoptimize an individual athlete's p erformance.References

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Bandura, A. (1997). Self-efficacy: T h e exercise of control. New York: W.H. Freeman.Brewer, B. W., Van Raalte, J. L., & Linder, D. E. (1993). Athletic identity: Hercu les'm usc les o rAchilles heel? International Journal of Sport P sychology, 24, 237-254.


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198/Journal of Sport Behavior. Vol. 31, No. 2Brown, C , & Todd, M. (2003). Cha racteristics associated with superstitious behavior intrack and field athletes; Are there NCAA divisional level differences? Journal of

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Jahoda , G. (1969 ). The psychology of superstition. Londo n: Allen Lane The Penguin Press.Matute, H. (199 4). Learned helplessness and superstitious behavior as opposite effects ofuncontrollable reinforcement in human s. Learning and Motivation, 25, 216-232.Neil, G. (19 80) . The place of superstition in spor t: The self-ftjifilling prophesy . CoachingReview, 3,40-42.Ono, K. (1987). Superstitious behavior in humans. Journal of the Experimental Analysis ofBehavior, 47,2^\-21 \.Rudski, J. (2004). The illusion of control, superstitious belief, and optimism. CurrentPsychology: Developmental. Learning, Personality. Social, 22, 306-315.Rudski, J., Lischner, M. I., &A lbert, L. (199 9). Superstitious rule generation is affected byprobability and type of outcome. Psychological Record, -/P, 245-260.Seligman, M. (1975). Helplessness: On depression, development and death. San Francisco:W.H. Freeman.


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S p o r t S u p e r s t it io n a s a F u n c t i o n o f S k i ll a n d D i ff ic u l ty . . . / 1 9 9Skinner, B. (1948 ). Superstition in the pigeon. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 38 168-

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sport superstition and difficulty of sport task

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