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Report 2011

Spotlight onEUPolicy Coherencefor Development

A Lisbon Treaty provisionA Human Rights obligation

Concord Report 15(AW):Layout 1 26/10/11 8:45 PM

Contributors to the Introduction wereKarin Ulmer (APRODEV), Rilli Lappalainen(Kehys - Finland), Blandine Bouniol andColin Kampschöer (CONCORD).

The drafting of the Institutional Frameworkchapter was coordinated by Karin Ulmer(APRODEV), with contributions from SaraJespersen and Laura Sullivan (ActionAid)and Blandine Bouniol (CONCORD).

The drafting of the Food Security chapterwas coordinated by Laust Gregersen(CONCORD Denmark), with contributionsfrom Patrick Mulvany (PracticalAction/UKFG), Nora McKeon (Terra Nuova- Itay), Sara Jespersen, Laura Sullivan andAlberta Guerra (ActionAid), Pascal Erard(CFSI/CSUD), Maureen Jorand(CCFD/CSUD), Laurent Levard (Gret),Karin Ulmer (APRODEV), Lies Craeynest(Oxfam), Stineke Oenema (ICCO), GiseleHenriques (CIDSE), Aurèle Destree(Glopolis), Amy Horton (WorldDevelopment Movement) and JonasSchubert (Terre des Hommes InternationalFederation).

The drafting of the Natural Resourceschapter was coordinated by SaraJespersen (ActionAid) with contributionsfrom George Boden (Global Witness - UK),Denise Auclair (CIDSE), Laust Gregersen(CONCORD Denmark), Sally Nicholson(WWF), Suzan Cornelissen (EVF), KoenWarmenbol (11.11.11 – Belgium), AnkeKurat (VENRO - Germany) and MartinHearson (BOND - UK).

The drafting of the Human Securitychapter was coordinated by Peter Sörbom(CONCORD Sweden) with contributionsfrom Karine Sohet (APRODEV), SébastienBabaud (Saferworld - UK) and RominaVegro (BOND - UK). Advice was given bythe European Peace Liaison Office (EPLO).

The drafting of the Migration chapter wascoordinated by Blandine Bouniol(CONCORD) with contributions fromMichaël Oberreuter (SOLIDAR), PaulinaBanas (Caritas Europa), Pascale Charhon(EUNOMAD), Cecilia Roselli (GVC -Italy)and Sophia Wirsching (Brot für die Welt -Germany).

The input of the CONCORD HumanRights-Based Approach group wascoordinated by Anders Dahlbeck(ActionAid).

Production coordination by Daniel Puglisi(CONCORD).

Creative Direction: arccomms.co.uk.

Thanks to all of you for your continuingsupport throughout the process.

This report was successively coordinatedby Romain Philippe, Colin Kampschöerand Blandine Bouniol (CONCORD).

Images from:Piers Benatar/Panos Pictures/ActionAidBlandine BouniolEuropean Commission Audiovisual libraryOxfamDreamstime

For further information about this report:[email protected]

Please go to our website for case studies,EU country pages and other materialrelated to Policy Coherence forDevelopment:www.coherence.concordeurope.org

CONCORD is the European NGO Confederation for Reliefand Development. It is the main NGO interlocutor with theEU institutions on development policy. As of 2011 it has26 national associations, 18 international networks and1 associate member representing 1,800 NGOs which aresupported by millions of citizens across Europe. Itsmembers are national NGO platforms and internationalNGO networks.The main objective of the Confederation is to enhancethe impact of European development NGOs vis-à-vis theEuropean Institutions by combining expertise andaccountability.

Acknowledgements


Contents

Contents

3

Foreword 5

Executive Summary 7

Introduction 11

1.0 EU Institutional FrameworkThe toolbox of EU PolicyCoherence for Development 17

2.0 Food securityFood Security and the Right to Food 25

3.0 Natural resourcesThe Right to enjoy and benefitfrom Natural Resources 37

4.0 Human securityThe nexus between Development and Security 47

5.0 MigrationLabour Migration and Integrationthat benefits Development 57

Acronyms 66

Spotlight onEU Policy Coherencefor Development


Forewordby Birgit Schnieber-Jastram

Member of the European ParliamentStanding Rapporteur for PolicyCoherence for Development


The former German Chancellor from Hamburg, HelmutSchmidt, famously remarked: "People who have a visionshould go see a doctor". What he wanted to say is thatnowadays there are no clear-cut solutions or easydecisions in politics. Rather, politicians have to weighalternatives against each other and decide which is themost convenient or, at times, the least inconvenient. Often,both parties in a political argument bring forward goodreasons or fair interests to support their view.

Nowhere is this more obvious than in the case of PolicyCoherence for Development. On the one hand you havethe special interests of Europeans, for instance the farmersor fishermen. On the other hand, it is clearly documentedhow agricultural subsidies have been great obstacles tothe competitiveness of small African farmers or how thecommon fisheries policy threatens the livelihoods offishermen in developing countries and forces them to usetheir vessels for piracy or dangerous trafficking of migrants.

Whose interests should prevail here? I think that in order toguarantee Europe's long-term success in a fast-changingworld, we will probably have to sacrifice some specialinterests. The reason is quite simple. The world hasbecome very small, whether you look at markets, theenvironment, or security. Politicians in developing anddeveloped countries alike must respond to this historicalchallenge. But if they take such difficult but farsighteddecisions they also need the support of citizens and civilsociety!

A rather clear-cut case is the illicit outflows from developingcountries due to tax evasion of multinational companies.They amount to an estimated $160 billion per year in Africaalone. Compare that with the roughly €8 billion theEuropean Commission is annually spending ondevelopment aid and you clearly see the incoherence.Not only do developing countries loose a big share of theirrevenues, but European taxpayers might even have tocompensate for harms to the environment or the livelihoodof people due to irresponsible practises of resourceextraction companies. More and more companies seemto understand that transparency and corporate social

responsibility initiatives in this sector are in effect pro-business. A more responsible conduct of their operationsbenefits them in many ways: it produces legal security,sustainable long-time partnerships and poses a safeguardagainst renationalization, reopening of negotiations orexpulsion.

That is why the European Parliament created the StandingRapporteur for Policy Coherence for Development. TheStanding Rapporteur has to monitor and mobilise allEuropean political actors to ensure that the goals ofdevelopment policy are not infringed upon.

However, designing coherent policies is not an easy task.Success largely depends on the means and tools availablegiven the complexity of the task. As Standing Rapporteur Ihope that my upcoming biennial report on PCD will bringsome improvements. Yet, to really bring improvements, Ineed more resources at my disposal. The tireless work andaccumulated expertise of civil society groups in the area ofdevelopment policies, like CONCORD, is an invaluableasset for the work of the Rapporteur.

The most important incoherencies are well known. Theircorrection is a matter of political will. I admit that it is nevereasy to sacrifice short-term interests in order to achievelong term benefits. If politicians take such courageous andfarsighted decisions they need the support of citizens andcivil society! Politicians in developing and developedcountries alike must respond to this historical challenge.The reason is quite simple: developing countries are ourfuture just as we are the future of developing countries - weare each other's future!

Forew

ord

5


The Union shall take

account of the objectives

of development cooperation

in the policies that it

implementswhichare

likely toaffect developing

countries.” Article 208 of the Lisbon Treaty


7

ExecutiveSummary

Spotlight on PolicyCoherence forDevelopment

With this Report, CONCORD aims to uncoversome policy incoherencies between EU policiesand development objectives. As stipulated in theLisbon Treaty, the EU is committed to eradicatepoverty in developing countries. Safeguarding theEU’s own prosperity doesn’t oppose the goal ofimproving the living standards of poor people indeveloping countries. In fact, the reality of today’sinterconnected world is that the first cannot beachieved without the latter. With Article 208 of theLisbon Treaty, Policy Coherence for Development(PCD) became a treaty obligation. The articleimplies that all EU policies must be in support ofdeveloping countries' development needs, or atleast not contradict the aim of poverty eradication.The principle of PCD presents a differentapproach which introduces broader and longerterm objectives into policy making. Together withdevelopment policy and effective aid, PCD is asignificant and complementary instrument thatcan have a significant impact on sustainabledevelopment, poverty eradication and respect forHuman Rights.In the Report, a Human Rights-Based Approach is applied tothe EU policies that are assessed against the PCDbenchmark. This requires a focus on the protection of theHuman Rights of the poor and most marginalised people insociety; something that the EU should embrace, being anactive leader in promoting and defending Human Rights.

PCD is not only a treaty provision but also an obligation toensure the effective implementation of Human Rights forpoor people and accelerated progress towards povertyeradication.

CONCORD welcomes efforts that have been made so far,but calls upon the EU for a more solid and properimplementation of PCD in all EU policies. The ambition forCONCORD is for the EU to change incoherent policies, as it

has become increasingly apparent that PCD has thepotential to make a difference for millions of people indeveloping countries. Throughout the Report, a number ofrecommendations to redress coherence are proposed to theEU institutions, which are accountable for the properimplementation of the Lisbon Treaty.

The Report includes a chapter on the institutional frameworkand four thematic chapters focusing on policy areas relatingto Food Security, Natural Resources, Human Security, andMigration. All chapters examine in more detail EU policies,policy measures, functions and tools in place that promote orundermine efforts towards the effective implementation ofPCD.

Institutional Framework

PCD is a political commitmentwhich requires continued politicalwill to translate into the right policychoices favourable to poor peopleliving in developing countries. TheEuropean Commission Presidenthas a great role to play asguardian of the Treaty; while theEU Council and the EuropeanParliament must exercise theirlegislative power in a responsiblemanner, taking account of the impact of EU policies beyondthe EU borders. Also needed is an adequate institutional set-up as well as a toolbox of policy-making instruments andmechanisms to systemize the implementation of PCD. Anumber of these tools and set-ups already exist, such asimpact assessments, the European Parliament StandingRapporteur on PCD and the EU Ombudsman. But they mustbe improved; mandates of specific functions must beclarified in terms of their ability to deal with PCD matters, andcapacity must be strengthened in EU institutions and inMember States. Very importantly, the voice of peopleaffected by the lack of coherence must be heard. Thus, moreadequate systems, including formalised complaintsmechanisms, must be put in place to bring out evidence ofincoherencies and redress the situation, in compliance withthe PCD obligation.

Executive

Sum

mary

Only

7 out of 164ImpactAssessments ofproposed newpolicies bythe European Commissionhave lookedat the impacton developing countries(2009-2011)



Food Security

Today, 925 million people throughout the globe suffer fromhunger. Securing access to safe food is a universal HumanRight which all States are mutually obliged to respect,protect and fulfil. The EU has a special responsibility in this,being the world’s largest actor in agricultural trade.Realising the Right to Food requires changes in bothmodels of production as well as improved access toaffordable and nutritious food. In this context, the EUneeds to change several of its current policies affectingfood security in the world’s poor countries ranging fromtrade, agriculture, financial regulation, climate, andinvestment in foreign land. The reform of the EU’s CommonAgricultural Policy (CAP) is a decisive opportunity todemonstrate the Union’s willingness to help facilitatedeveloping countries’ transition to feeding themselves.This requires a U-turn from the EU to recognise that thegrowing global demand for food does not legitimisesubsidising European exports. The EU must demonstrategreater efforts to make PCD an operational element of theCAP. To limit excessive food price volatility for both farmersand consumers, the EU should also lead the way forimproved international governance of food security basedon the Right to Food. In addition to market regulation, foodbuffer stocks can help both safeguarding food security andmaintaining price stability. EU policies that drive globaltrends such as land-grabbing must include strongsustainability criteria that cover both social andenvironmental aspects, especially concerning biofuelsproduction.

Natural Resources

Many resource-rich countries remain amongst the poorestin the world. Citizens do not benefit from the natural wealthwhich is enshrined in the land they inhabit. It is howeverestablished by international Human Rights treaties thatmen and women across the globe have the right to benefitfrom these resources. Natural resources constitute acrucial component to achieve human and socialdevelopment, provided that they are used in a sustainablemanner. The EU is one of the actors pursuing aggressivestrategies to access resources from developing countries.EU policy-makers nonetheless have an obligation toensure that their policies in pursuit of imports fromdeveloping countries do not undermine developmentobjectives or lead, directly or indirectly, to human sufferingand human rights violations. The 10% ‘renewable energyfor transport’ target of the EU Renewable Energy Directive(RED) poses challenges to development objectives. REDadds to the pressures on land and water in particular. TheEU should revise this policy and impose strongsustainability criteria. The EU Raw Materials Initiative onthe other hand, lacks incentives for developing countriesto engage in the value added process of extractedresources, which is something the EU should encourage.The first step towards enabling developing countries tomake effective use of their natural resources is to ensuregreater disclosure and public oversight of the revenueflows to governments from multinational extractivecompanies. The EU must help by requiring all Europeancompanies involved in the extraction of resources todisclose their financial information.

ExecutiveSum

mary

8

almost1 in 7 people

on the planet go to bed

hungry everynight,

while 1/3 of the food

produced for human

consumption gets lost

orwasted.

Revenues fromnaturalresource exports fromAfrica, Asia and LatinAmericaamount to

that of EUdevelopmentaid.

24 times


Executive

Sum

mary

9


Human Security

At the core of human security is the fundamental right tolife, physical safety and freedom from premature andpreventable death. Human security and justice should beconsidered as basic entitlements and should be providedfor the benefit of the people in respect of their rights and inresponse to their feeling of insecurity. The EU’s security anddevelopment agenda recognises that there can’t be“sustainable development without peace and security, andthat without development and poverty eradication there willbe no sustainable peace”. However, there has been littleprogress to put policies into practice that properly addressthis connection. Security policies of several EU MemberStates clearly show clashes between economic and/orsecurity self-interests, and PCD. The EU should notadvance its economic and security interests to thedetriment of partner countries and their populations. Toavoid doing harm and to seize opportunities to build longterm peace, EU policies must be more ‘conflict-sensitive’and adopt a long term preventative approach. Despite a2008 Council Position, EU arms exports to notoriousHuman Rights abusers and conflict hotspots are still areality. Arms exports pose a huge threat to human securityand seriously hamper sustainable development. Adequatemechanisms must be put in place to ensure that control ofexports of military technology and equipment arerespected, in compliance with the PCD obligation.

Migration

For a while now, migration has been at the centre of EUpolicy debates. The EU currently hosts around 31.8 millionmigrants. All people have been given the choice to exercisetheir right to migrate or to stay in their country, butwhichever choice they made, their rights to live their liveswith dignity should be respected. The lack of decent workremains a major push factor of labour migration, while, atthe other end of the migration journey, access to adequateemployment poses serious challenges to the migrants’integration in their host countries. A common trend in EUinitiatives is their focus on managing migration flows withthe view to realise the EU’s unilateral economic objectives,without exploring the full potential of migration anddevelopment, which could benefit the migrantsthemselves, and both the host country and the country oforigin. The current restrictive approach to EU migrationpolicy, steered by the EU Global Approach to Migrationlacks consideration for development implications andHuman Rights requirements. Decent work and labourissues are key factors that EU migration and integrationpolicies need to address in more depth, aligning with thePCD obligation. The implementation of social and legalprotection of migrants has to improve in the EU as well asglobally. To this end, the EU should use its internationalleverage in promoting international standards protectingmigrant workers. The EU Member States must also sign,ratify and implement the UN International Convention forthe Protection of Migrant Workers and their families.

90%ofthe 214millioninternationalmigrantsAreworkersandtheir families

NOLOW-INCOMEFRAGILE OR CONFLICT-AFFECTED COUNRTYHAS YET ACHIEVED ASINGLEMDG


PCDaims toprevent thesquandering ofmoney on policiesdetrimental todevelopment


Introduction


Context of the Spotlight ReportThe European Union (EU) and its MemberStates are facing key economic challenges inresponse to the financial crisis and the ongoingproblems in the eurozone. Austerity measuresand budget cuts lay ahead to tackle deficits.However, these difficulties don’t give justificationfor the EU to turn inward. The rest of the world isalso affected by this persistent and repetitivecrisis, and men and women in developingcountries continue to suffer the hardest fromother global challenges such as food insecurityand climate change. The EU remains a majorglobal player, its decisions can make adifference. The EU is committed to eradicatepoverty in developing countries, as stated in theLisbon Treaty1. In times of global crisisdevelopment cooperation and developmentconsiderations make sense more than ever: notonly for solidarity - a value that lies at the veryheart of the foundation of the EU itself - but alsofor reasons of economic and social stability,international peace and preservation ofbiodiversity. Just like prosperity within the EU,improving the living standards of poor people indeveloping countries is in the EU’s interest. Inour interconnected world, it would be a mistaketo think that the EU could achieve one withoutthe other.

Two parallel avenues must be taken: making developmentaid effective and a stronger implementation of PolicyCoherence for Development (PCD).

2011 provides an opportunity for the EU to deepen andreaffirm its commitment to aid effectiveness at the 4th HighLevel Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF4) in Busan, SouthKorea. Implementation of existing aid effectivenesscommitments could significantly increase the impact of theEU’s development policy. It is vital that EU Member Statesstay firmly focused on meeting their long-standing OfficialDevelopment Assistance (ODA) commitments. To do so, allEU Member States must adopt binding national legislationor action plans setting out how they will reach theirrespective ODA spending targets by 2015.

But it’s not all about aid.

Next to ODA commitments and the aid effectivenessagenda, Policy Coherence for Development should be atop political priority for the EU.

The PCD principle has been on the European agenda fordecades and was supported in the 2006 EuropeanConsensus on Development2. With Article 208 of theLisbon Treaty, PCD became a treaty requirement1:”The Union shall take into account the objectives ofdevelopment cooperation in the policies that it implementswhich are likely to affect developing countries2”. PCDrecognises that development cooperation and aid alonecannot meet the needs of developing countries. It impliesthat all EU policy areas must be in support of developingcountries' development needs, or at least not contradictthe aim of poverty eradication.

Adhering to PCD is not about committing more resourcesto development cooperation, but aims to prevent thesquandering of money on policies detrimental todevelopment objectives. This being said, PCD is not to beopposed to aid, and should not be used as a pretext not tofulfil EU aid commitments.1

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Objectives and Structureof the ReportWith this report, CONCORD aims at uncovering policyincoherencies between EU policies and developmentobjectives in four policy areas: Food security, Naturalresources, Human security, and Migration.

The report visits the full cycle of policy making and sets outrecommendations on the political attentions and themechanics of the system as well as specificrecommendations in each policy area covered. Theambition for CONCORD is for the EU to change certainpolicies, as it has become increasingly apparent that PCDhas the potential to make a significant difference formillions of people’s lives in developing countries.

The report seeks to expose as much as possible concreteexperiences of people in developing countries who areaffected by incoherent EU policies. The task is difficult:indeed, there is no traceability system to monitor policyimpact, like there is in a food production chain to guaranteethe agreed quality standards. We demonstrate thenegative impact of EU policies through clear, meaningfuland real examples, where the link to an EU initiative can beestablished. It can be difficult to point out the sole EUimpact as in development contexts there are often a myriadof actors involved (e.g. donors, governments in developingcountries, private companies). We have taken the view toaddress the EU as a policy-making entity in the EU territory,but as well as a powerful actor on the global scene thatcontributes to set global policy trends. Therefore,incoherencies resulting of the negative influence ofinternational bodies or systems that the EU supports in oneway or another are also exposed in this Report.

The first chapter of this report looks at the PCDmechanisms that the EU put in place and gives ananalysis of the challenges and the dangers for PCD in theexisting political reality.

The thematic chapters of this Spotlight report examine inmore detail policies and policy measures in place thatpromote or undermine efforts towards effective promotionof PCD.

To illustrate the different policy areas, this report is usingcase studies of actual situations where the lack ofcoherence is blatant.

Policy Coherence forDevelopment: a vision,an obligation, a toolPolicy Coherence - for what?

In response to the financial and economic crises, weobserve a more blunt affirmation by the EU of itsunilateral domestic interests. This is justified with theneed to keep up with tougher global competitiveness.Conversely, the principle of Policy Coherence forDevelopment (PCD) presents a different approachwhich introduces broader and longer term objectivesinto policy making. In the end, this may be even morereasonable and cost-effective. It may provide moreinnovative and balanced solutions, rather than to putpressure on weaker social and economic groups tosign on to trade-offs that are unacceptable to them.Thus, putting more responsibility for the EU to deliveron its fair contribution to sustainable globaldevelopment can present a more cost-effective andeconomic way to achieve well-being for all.

The definition of PCD is challenged because of theconfusion being created by the use by different EUinstitutions of the concept of “coherence”: the “D” inPCD is of paramount importance here. The purposeof the coherence effort needs to be explicitly extendedto account for the external impacts EU policies mayhave on people in developing countries. The purposeof greater (unqualified) coherence to promote EUinterests is not per se in contradiction with PCD, sincethe promotion of development objectives is an intrinsicpart of the EU acquis and EU policy interests.

Introduction

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Policy Coherence for Development – what’s in it?

EU policy making is complex and subject to many vestedand conflicting interests. The commitment to PCDacknowledges these conflicts and can act as an incentiveto address the interests of all stakeholders. PCD promotestransparency and participative policy making that opens upnot only to European but also to affected stakeholders inthird countries, including those without voice or marginal tothe centre of policy making.

It supports increased accountability on decision making,provided that impact on sustainability in third countries, i.e.social, economic and environmental impact and wellbeingof future generations, is taking place in the very earlystages of policy making.

The PCD process is a practical way of increasingknowledge and insights concerning intended orunintended policy impact. PCD can encourage EUinstitutions to engage in a more open policy process,inviting critical voices and examining new policy optionsrather than to discard them quickly. It could invite anecdoticand empiric evidence and qualitative data from the groundthat may not fit current models used or meet request forquantitative, indicators or ways of measurement.

Closed expert meetings run by the donor community couldbe opened up and become participative multi-stakeholderround tables that include all affected groups. The primaryobjective would not be to align and harmonise policies butrather to design policies in a way that promote learning andaccountability and become an institution of exchange.

Accounting for PCD also contributes to improving“responsive governance”. Importantly, PCD goes beyondrequests for transparency and introduces accountabilitynot only on policy making but also on policy impact.Monitoring needs to become more of a multi-disciplinaryapproach that includes findings from different policyframeworks and qualitative approaches to assess impact.The challenge is to accept non causal and non-linearimpacts and to allow for evidence based analysis that takeaccount of interconnectedness of policies and actors aswell as the responses and interactions of people on theground.

It is clear that together with development policy andeffective aid, PCD is a significant and complementaryinstrument that can have a markedly beneficial impact onsustainable development, poverty eradication and respectfor Human Rights.

Policy Coherence for Development – how to do it?

For CONCORD, complying with EU obligations underArticle 208 TFEU and Article 3(5) TFEU, primarily meansadopting the overarching principle of ‘do no harm’ in theEU’s external relations with developing countries.CONCORD considers this as a more straightforward andrealistic starting point as opposed to the EC’s prevailingrhetoric on win-win situations which neglects those socialand economic groups that are losing out.

A Human Rights-Based Approach (HRBA) provides adeepened understanding of the PCD concept as itthrashes out the building blocks of development andprovides insights into the development processunderstood as a sharing of responsibilities, not a quick fix.The HRBA describes a dynamic relationship of right-holders and duty-bearers, of sharing responsibilities and ofengaging in a process of progressive realisation of rights.An HRBA to development policy and any EU internal orexternal policies likely to affect developing countriesrequires a focus on the protection of the Human Rights ofthe poor and most marginalised people in society. Withoutaddressing the obstacles to the realisation of rights we willnever progress towards a sustained eradication of poverty.

This is something that should be embraced by the EU asan active leader in promoting and defending HumanRights, both within and outside its borders. Human Rightsare a core value of the EU and are legally enshrined in itstreaties, laws and policies.

Applied to PCD, a HRBA helps to explicitly address thehierarchy issue at the time of assessing the potentialimpact of a given policy. The Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights takes precedence over other legalframeworks in the legal hierarchy, and the protection andadvancement of Human Rights should always prevail overany other selective and unilateral interests.

Two decades of gender mainstreaming provide insightsinto the enhancement of women’s rights and the struggleinvolved. The gender mainstreaming approach itself canprovide lessons for ‘mainstreaming a PCD’ approach, itsrisks and its opportunities. A hierarchical structure thatdepends on a top down decision making and is controlledby experts can easily fall short to enhance women’s rightsand promote the struggle for gender justice.

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Policy Coherence for Development –how to make it happen?

CONCORD welcomes previous progress made on raisingthe profile of PCD, with commitments such as the biennialreporting of the EU on PCD, the European Parliament (EP)resolution on PCD3, the creation of the position of the EPStanding Rapporteur on PCD, the reference to PCD in theEP resolution on the CAP reform4. However, as this Reportdemonstrates, a lot more needs to be done!

Despite this, there is still a huge gap between statedintentions and the reality of EU policies and their impact onpeople living in poverty in developing countries. It isobvious that a strong legal basis for PCD is not enough. Animportant step towards giving more weight to developmentobjectives and respect for Human Rights in different EUpolicies is to increase awareness and to generate politicalwill.

There is an urgent need to substantiate PCD throughreinforcing capacity and the procedures mechanisms,tools and instruments to put PCD commitments intoaction. For instance, PCD should become more evidence-based and independent ex-ante and ex-post assessmentof the impact of EU policies on poverty reduction indeveloping countries should be more systematic. Also, amechanism is presently missing to correct EU policies andmeasures which are found to be in breach of Article 208TFEU. Recognising that this is the case for some existingpolicies is a starting point which this report aims to assist inachieving. The next step is to put in place an effectivemechanism that allows for people’s voices to be heardwhen their rights are being or already in danger of being –violated.EU policies must not negatively impact on theirlives and block their efforts to live a decent life free frompoverty – this has to take the shape of the possibility ofredressing EU policies that do not respect the PCDobligation.

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Only

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EU institutionalframework: thePCD toolbox

1.0


Achievement of an objective as vast as theeradication of poverty requires an unerringcommitment to Policy Coherence forDevelopment (PCD) and the coordinated andconsistent use of all tools, policies andresources towards the objective at hand, as setout in the Article 208 of the Treaty on theFunctioning of the European Union (TFEU).

Political will is essential to make sensible policychoices that reflect the commitment to PCD.The examples of the need of this is underlyingthroughout this report both in here and thefollowing thematic chapters. In this chapterthough, we will look further into the practicalitiesand institutional aspects of PCD: both thosethat exist but might suffer from lack of capacity,and those that have yet to be created.

For the PCD agenda to advance, the EU needsto move the focus from process to progress andresults. This means not only recording potentialareas of challenges in the early stages of policymaking and going ahead with these policies, butputting in place serious safeguards that ensurethat those challenges do not materialise, or iffailure to do that, ensure a correctivemechanisms when impact of harm can beexposed by actors, including civil society.

1. Mapping and assessment of existingmechanisms relating to PCD and how toimprove themDifferent mechanisms and institutional set-ups exist thatprovide incentives, facilitate monitoring and compliancewith commitments and obligations. The following list is onlya selection of existing mechanisms.

1.1 Legal provisions

Beyond Article 208 TFEU, there are a number of legalprovisions that can be referred to as examples to promotePCD.

• The Cotonou Partnership Agreement Article 12makes an explicit reference to PCD and provides for theconsultation of ACP countries at an early stage, “wherethe Community intends […] to take a measure whichmight affect [their] interests.” It is also possible for ACPcountries to “transmit their concerns in writing […] andsubmit suggestions for amendments”.

In spite of its great potential for inclusive policy dialogue,this PCD mechanism has been hardly used so far,probably due to a lack of awareness and capacity. Moreproactive action is needed.

As encouraged by the European Parliament5, CONCORDproposes that the Joint Parliamentary Assemblynominates two standing rapporteurs on PolicyCoherence for Development (one from an ACP countryand one from the EU). They will ensure the coherence ofEU and ACP policy with development, foster the JPA’sdiscussions and positions on these subjects, publish abiennial report notably focusing on implementation ofArticle 12, and examine possible complaints from thoseaffected negatively by incoherencies.

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• Since 1995, EC trade and association agreementscontain human rights clauses6 that condition traderelations and provide for the suspension of preferences incase of systemic and severe human rights violations.Existing weaknesses in consistency, transparency andprocedural fairness should be overcome by applyingtransparent criteria and benchmarks concerning labour,environmental and human rights compliance in partnercountries, including any specific recommendations forimprovements where necessary7.

•Safeguards8 are a tool designed to protect key interestsin case of non-predictable developments. Safeguardscould be further developed, introduced and flexibilitiesenhanced in agreements with third countries that takespecific account of PCD obligations towards developingcountries.

1.2 Mechanisms in the decision-making andprogramming processes of the EuropeanCommission

There are many instruments that could be used to assessif policies contradict and undermine each other and ifincoherence exists or synergies can be promoted, at anearly stage.

• Impact Assessments

Four different kinds of assessments can be identified thatare used or discussed at EU level. These are the ImpactAssessment6 (Directorate General of the EC)9,Environmental Impact Assessment10, SustainabilityImpact Assessment (a policy tool developed by and forDG Trade)11, and the more recently debated HumanRights Impact Assessments, in particular in case ofnegotiation of bilateral or regional trade agreements12.

Today, a large number of EC legislative proposals as wellas non legislative policy initiatives must be accompaniedby an Impact Assessment (IA). IAs are currently released atthe same time as the concerned legislative proposal.

CONCORD Denmark has run a screening exercise on allEC IAs between 2009-2011 asking whether the EC meetsits obligations to look at the impact on third countries13.The new Guidelines in force since 2009 stipulate that:“Every IA should establish whether proposed policyoptions have an impact on relations with third countries. Inparticular they should look at: […] impacts on developingcountries – initiatives that may affect developing countriesshould be analyzed for their coherence with the objectivesof the EU development policy. This includes an analysis ofconsequences (or spill-overs) in the longer run in areassuch as economic, environmental, social or securitypolicy”14.

CONCORD Denmark examined a total of 164 IAs out ofwhich they considered 77 to be relevant for developingcountries. The screening showed that only 7 IAs arelooking at all at the impact on developing countries15.Some from these 7 only take note of but do not assesshow it is affecting developing countries; none of therelevant IA has considered impact on developing countriesin 201116.

It can be concluded that a key policy instrument actuallyexists but is not used properly or to its full potential. Thismay be due to lack of capacity or possibly, lack of politicalwill and consensus.

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Therefore, CONCORD recommends that ImpactAssessments should be made more transparent andprovide for participation of CSOs before, during and afteran IA. It is therefore necessary that IAs are made availablein due time before a policy proposal is made so that theconclusions of the IA can be taken into account and otherstakeholders can comment and be consulted on how bestto ensure that identified challenges or potential pitfalls withconsequences for developing countries are safeguardedagainst. This has a great potential to turn light on blindspots and work towards asking those questions andmeasure those impacts that matter most for affectedgroups that are excluded from the policy making process.

The IA Board, at the EC Secretariat General, examines andissues opinions on all the Commission's impactassessments. CONCORD requests that at least one of theEC high-officials who compose the IA Board is adevelopment expert and undertakes a specialresponsibility to verify the quality of the IA on developingcountries, in line with the PCD obligation. CONCORD alsocalls on the IA Board to take its mandate opportunity todraw on external expertise to associate civil societyorganisations to the IA process.

Moreover, CONCORD recommends that the EP beformally consulted on the EC list of new policy initiativesand screening exercise and be invited to comment onidentifying key conflicting issues prior to a final list of IAs.

• Inter-Service Consultation takes place amongst ECservices at every step of the policy-making process, inorder to balance out all policy options. This is a veryimportant mechanism to ensure that developmentconcerns are raised at the earliest stage possible andPCD is on the agenda of non-development DGs.

But this requires strengthening in terms of politicalimportance and capacity, especially to enable DGDEVCO to carry out a proper screening of all relevantpolicy proposals tabled for inter-service consultation.

• PCD focal points have been appointed amongst staff inselected EC DGs as well as in the External actionService. These could be of great support to DG DEVCOin processes such as IAs and inter-service consultations.However, staff turnover and lack of proper trainingundermine the great potential of such mechanism.

Here also, increased political importance and capacityare needed.

• The European Commission Country Strategy Papersand the Guidelines for Programming refer now to PCDand should be used to contribute to introduce PCDscrutiny in check in the programming exercise andprovide concrete recommendations on how to improvePCD. The participation of CSO in political dialogue in thirdcountries should be the starting point for inviting criticalvoices in this exercise and become part of a multi-stakeholder group approach that has a PCD mandateand beyond the donor community and governmentrepresentatives.

Any mid-term reviews of programming should includespecific mandate to screen impact and policies to ensurePCD.

1.3 Reporting

Since 2007, the EU produces a biennial report on theprogress made towards enhancing PCD in twelve policyareas17. The third EU progress report is expected in late2011. The report is steered by DG DEVCO, drawing fromMember States’ and EP’s feedback on a questionnaire.

The PCD questionnaire sent to Member States shouldprovide an incentive for policy dialogue between differentgovernment ministries and departments, as well as withParliaments and civil society. The questionnaire should askexplicitly for positive and negative impacts of policies. Itshould provide incentives for a more honest account andencourage institutions of exchange that allow looking atincoherence and the lessons that can be learnt. Theanswer to the questionnaire should be made publicsystematically.

Whereas CONCORD commends the efforts of the EU togather information and involve all actors both at EU andnational level, it is vital that this information is taken on fromprocess to progress. If the lessons learned are notcapitalised upon in the shape of redressing incoherentpolicies or bettering the systems to monitor and asses ex-ante impacts, then the exercise is of serious limited use.

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1.4 European Parliament Standing Rapporteur onPCD

This is a permanent position that was created in May 2010,following the adoption of the European Parliamentresolution on Policy Coherence for Development18, whoseconclusions CONCORD supports. The position is currentlyheld by MEP Birgit Schnieber-Jastram, for a two yearmandate. The PCD Standing Rapporteur, who sits in theparliamentary committee on development (DEVE), isresponsible for promoting PCD within the EuropeanParliament (EP) through fostering more interaction betweenDEVE and other committees where development concernsare not central. The Standing Rapporteur is due also toproduce a biennial report on PCD.

In 2011, Birgit Schnieber-Jastram organised threenetworking workshops to gather expertise (including fromcivil society), support and advice on policy priorities, oncollection of evidence and reporting on complaints. Herreport is expected for the end of 2011.

While individual MEPs are spearheading awareness onPCD issues and DEVE increasingly puts PCD on thecommittee agenda, the EP still record a rather weak overallpolitical support for PCD and a lack of capacity to engagein the task (as mirrored in other institutions).

Promoting PCD requires more opportunities for interactionand dialogue for MEPs who are active in areas relevant tothe external dimension but not yet looking at specificconcerns relating to sustainable development and globalfairness; likewise between EP Committees with a clear anddirect international dimension (International Trade,Fisheries, Development, Human Rights) and thosefocusing on domestic issues that have a direct or indirectimpact on developing countries (Agriculture, Environment,Industry).

To this end, more cross-committee hearings should beorganised (notably at the initiative of the PCD StandingRapporteur). More permanently, a cross-committee PCDsupport group, composed of MEPs “focal points” in theirrespective committees, should be established to helpcarrying out the tasks of the Standing Rapporteur andformalise contacts with other MEPs. This will helpaddressing PCD challenges and creating policy synergies.

CONCORD looks forward to seeing the mandateof the PCD rapporteur further unfold in concreterecommendations for actions by the European Parliament.

1.5 EU Ombudsman

Set up in 2001, the EU Ombudsman acts on instances ofmaladministration in the activities of the Union institutions,bodies, offices, or agencies19. The Ombudsman institutionhas proven to be flexible. According to the current EUOmbudsman, “the term "maladministration" has beeninterpreted broadly and in a manner that makes it possibleto include respect for the rule of law, for principles of goodadministration, and for fundamental rights in theOmbudsman's remit. This means that allegations that theinstitutions have breached a fundamental right fall withinmy mandate”20.

PCD is now also part of his mandate, as he assuredAPRODEV and MEP Franziska Keller, in his response totheir joint submission on a case of unfair trade practices inbreach of PCD, presented in 2011.

However, in the same response, the EU Ombudsmanindicated that the complaint concerned the merits of EUpolicy and included very broad allegation of failure tocomply with a Treaty requirement, but did not identifyinstances of maladministration, which the Ombudsmancould help clarifying. He also specified that he was not aninstitutional advocate for development goals, or for PolicyCoherence for Development. Nor was his role to substitutehis judgment for that of the Commission, or any otherinstitutions, in relation to policy matters.21

It is obvious that the PCD mandate of the EU Ombudsmanis very unclear.

What CONCORD recommends is to create a specialinstance, such as a specialised Ombudsman, with thespecific responsibility to receive and investigate potentialcharges of PCD breaches, including unfair trade practices,to initiate a mediation process and to search for adequatesolutions and redress. This special Ombudsman should actas a low key dispute settlement procedure for PCDconflicts with minimum bureaucratic constraints. It shouldbe made clear that civil society actors would have directaccess to this special Ombudsman.

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A website for the special PCD Ombudsman similar to theexisting EU Ombudsman should be set up wheresubmissions (accepted and refused) are posted. Thiswould be a helpful tool to pull and share substance andanalysis on PCD and to increase accountability when this ismade publicly accessible to interested groups.

1.6 Incentives and awareness raising outside theinstitutional framework

More and more institutions (e.g. OECD), think tanks (e.g.ECDPM) and civil society organisations have produceddifferent kinds of PCD – related material - methodologicalbooklets, policy analyses andcase studies. This SpotlightReport by CONCORD, and the previous edition publishedin 2009, should be counted amongst them. The list wouldbe too long though the importance of the awareness suchinitiatives create and in some cases capacity buildingamong a diverse set of actors is duly noted.

Nevertheless, it is worth highlighting the PCD Award ofFairPolitics, an initiative of the Evert Vermeer Foundation.Every year, following a thorough monitoring of MEPs’activities, a prize is delivered to the Fair Politician of theYear, i.e. an MEP champion on PCD. In 2011, the prizewent to MEP Catherine Grèze22.

CONCORD welcomes such initiatives and stronglyencourages the EU to engage with these, support themwhere appropriate and take due note and respond to anyrecommendations that might follow from such initiatives. Itis our firm belief that a wide range of actors from civilsociety as well as other international fora needs to beclosely involved in the complex exercise of monitoring andadvancing the PCD agenda.

2.0 General recommendations toEU institutions

2.1 Face it: Barroso must walk the Lisbon talk

The President of the European Commission should beresponsible within the College of Commissioners andaccountable for the PCD agenda as he is the guardian ofthe treaties. This would be a solid guarantee to ensureeffective fulfilment of PCD obligations, and that dueconsideration for PCD is given in the decision-makingprocess when there is conflict of interest or contradictionbetween several policies23.

The EC President should be actively supported by the HighRepresentative / Vice-President of the Commission, and bythe Commissioner for Development, who both have adirect responsibility for ensuring relations with developingcountries on behalf of the EU and have considerableexpertise.

In the Foreign Affairs Council, the High Representative andMinisters across the EU should fully understand supportand deliver on greater Policy Coherence for Development.

In order to ensure continued attention to PCD at thehighest level of governance, a PCD rolling workprogramme should be developed by every EU Presidencywhich would set priorities in terms of upcoming policyreforms or new policies which could raise PCD issues. DGDEVCO and thus the Commission should keep working ontheir own work programme to play a catalysing role for theMember States to also move forward and identify priorities.

The European Commission and the Council areaccountable to the European Parliament for the PCDobligation enshrined in the Treaty. Therefore, the EuropeanParliament has a great role to play too here, and also as alegislative body.

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Spotlight onEU Policy Coherencefor Development Barroso

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2.2 Get prepared: put resources into place toadvance PCD capacity

Capacity is a recurrent challenge to the effective realisationof PCD and affects different dimensions and differentinstitutions.

• More capacity should be allocated to EC DG DEVCO toengage in providing substance and content to the PCDobligations and support this by more analytical reports.

• DG DEVCO in particular should allocate resources and amandate to actively engage at early stages of IAs andinter-service consultations and be allowed time to consultwith external stakeholders with expertise of monitoringand evaluating impacts on human rights anddevelopment objectives in developing countries.

• Very importantly is also the investment in capacity-building for staff in all relevant DGs and the EEAS as wellas government officials in the Member States.

• A strategy for awareness-raising and dialogue at the levelof EU Delegations should be elaborated with the view toimprove incorporation of partner countries’ concerns inpolicy-making.

• The EP Standing Rapporteur on PCD should besupported with a reinforced secretariat, means tofacilitate a PCD support group composed of MEPs fromdifferent committees, as well as access to study units andresearch budget.

2.3 Anticipate: better analyse PCD situations andcreate more inclusive policy-making

There is an immediate need to ensure that PCD goes frombeing a reporting exercise and a “tick in the box” to realimprovements in men and women’s lives and thuspositively impact on development objectives. Broad-based consultations and democratic debates indeveloping countries should be an integral part of EUpolicy-making processes. Only this way can PCD assist inadvancing the rights of men and women to achieve theirdevelopment objectives and assist them in eradication ofpoverty across the global South.

To this end, it is recommended that:

• the process to define, monitor and evaluate EC CountryStrategy Papers is used for gathering information aboutthe impact of EU policies on a developing country andform the basis for recommendations for policy change;

• two standing rapporteurs on PCD are appointed at theJoint ACP-EU Parliamentary Assembly, in order strengthenthe JPA work on PCD issues and activate the Article 12 ofthe Cotonou Partnership Agreement when necessary.

Additionally, it is recommended that the EC takes on a roleof gathering information and formalising analyses on policyimpact with a view to improve policy making and amendexisting policies if need be. This requires setting up andusing a database in the different policy areas to record andobserve relevant empiric trends constituting obstacles tohuman-centred development in developing countries.

The result of the analysis and dialogue exercises should beintegrated in the relevant policy proposals. Eventually, thismeans that PCD should be properly “mainstreamed” in allEU policies, starting with explicit references to article 208and 3(5) of the TFEU. This would allow for anticipatingmistakes, as well as increasing accountability for PCD.

Two decades of gender mainstreaming and twin-trackapproaches provide lessons and valuable insights intowhat works and what doesn’t work for a progressiveagenda. Importantly, there is clear evidence that withoutcontinuous political pressure from women and civil societyorganisations to act upon enhancing women’s rights andending gender discrimination, gender mainstreamingwould risk to become a simple bureaucratic managementapproach that ticks of a box instead of being an ally in thestruggle for gender justice.


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2.4 React: put in place a mechanism for complaintand corrective action

The EU needs to go beyond analysing potential impactsand accept the evidence of existing situations where EUpolicies are undermining development objectives. It isrecommended that adequate space is given for affectedstakeholders (including from developing countries) to beheard and that a due process follows in order to potentiallyrevise policies with harmful impacts on developmentobjectives and human rights.

Therefore, it is recommended to set up for all relevant EUpolicies and agreements – notably the forthcoming policiesidentified in the European Commission PCD WorkProgamme – a formalised complaint mechanism open tocitizens and affected communities (e.g. civil societyorganisations, farmers organisations, women andgrassroots organisations) to address harmful effects of EUpolicies on sustainable development in developmentcountries, and to trigger an investigation.

Concretely, this means including a provision in the relevantpolicy/agreement document that specify the procedure todirect complaints.

Should the complaint be overlooked, the specialOmbudsman for PCD will be entitled to investigate andinitiate a mediation process with the view to search foradequate solutions and redress.

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almost 1 in 7 people onthe planet go to bed

hungry everynight,

while 1/3 of the food

produced for human

consumption gets lost

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Food Security andthe Right to Food

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In today’s increasingly interdependent world, thepolicies enforced by the European Union (EU)have a critical impact on global food securitysustainable development paths. Thedevastating consequences of the last threeyears’ food, economic, and climate crisesclearly demonstrate the failure of currentinternational policies, financial and agriculturalmarket architectures to guarantee food security,especially for the poorest and most vulnerablepeople.

1. Human Rights-Based Approachto Food SecurityThe alarming figures observed in 2008, where food pricehikes forced 100 million people into hunger24 and again in2010 where 44 million have already been driven intoextreme poverty25 cannot be reversed if food is consideredmerely as a tradeable commodity. Secure access toadequate and safe food is a universal Human Right whichall states of the international community are mutuallyobliged to respect, protect and fulfill. This includes anextraterritorial obligation not to violate the Right to Food ofthe people of other countries26. As the world’s largest actorin agricultural trade, the EU has a special responsibility in

this respect27. Only by adopting a Human Rights-BasedApproach (HRBA) to global food security can Europe takeon the international leadership urgently needed in the fightagainst hunger. Realising the Right to Food requireschanges in both models of production as well as improvedaccess to affordable and nutritious food.

A HRBA food policy is, above all, a people-centered policythat addresses the structural causes of hunger rather thanrelying on international markets to guarantee food security.Today, the world produces more than enough food foreveryone28. Yet, almost 1 out of 7 people on the planet goto bed hungry every night29. Conversely, 1/3 of the foodproduced for human consumption gets lost or wasted30.Hunger results from unequal distribution of food and whenpeople are deprived from their rights of access to andcontrol over the natural, financial and technologicalresources necessary to feed themselves with dignity.Participation by and empowerment of the most vulnerablepeople, who are often directly involved in domestic foodproduction in developing countries, is thereforefundamental. 75 % of the world’s poorest people still residein rural areas where around 4/5 households are engaged infarming31.

A HRBA food security policy has to be rooted in localrealities. Realisation of the right to food for all can only beachieved by enabling sustainable agricultural production inevery region of the world with a particular focus on

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The UN defines the right to adequate food as aHuman Right, inherent in all people ”to have regular,permanent and unrestricted access, either directly orby means of financial purchases, to quantitatively andqualitatively adequate and sufficient foodcorresponding to the cultural traditions of people towhich the consumer belongs, and which ensures aphysical and mental, individual and collective fulfillingand dignified life free of fear.”Source:Website of the UN’s Special Rapporteur on Right to Food,www.srfood.org

Definition of the Right to Food24

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smallholder farming. 85% of farmers in developingcountries produce on less than 2 hectares of land32. Thereare some 500 million smallholder farms worldwide; morethan 2 billion people depend on them for their livelihoods.These small farms produce about 80 % of the foodconsumed in Asia and sub-Saharan Africa33 with womenplaying a pivotal role. Investing in women farmers andgiving them the same access as men to agriculturalresources could reduce the number of hungry people in theworld by 12% to 17% or 100 to 150 million people,according to the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation(FAO)34.

The challenge is to make smallholder farming profitableand benefit from an equitable trade regime that allows poorcountries to develop sustainable domestic production. Butwhile the EU recognises that advancing local smallholderfarming is particularly essential in developing countries,other EU policies continue to undermine this very objective.As demonstrated in this chapter Europe’s unsustainableagricultural production and subsidised exports,speculation on food commodities, greenhouse gasemissions and use of foreign farmland for its own food andenergy production are examples of policies whose externalimpacts are inconsistent with the goal of eradicating globalhunger.

2. The EU’s Food Security policy and theInternational AgendaThe last four years food crisis has put agriculture back onthe international agenda. FAO’s estimation that globalagricultural production has to increase by 70% to feed theworld’s growing population in 2050 has propelled a lot oftalk about reinvesting in agriculture. However, it is oftenoverlooked that the FAO also concluded that: “The onlysustainable solution to the problem of hunger lies inincreasing the productivity of the poor and food-insecurecountries”35.

In terms of financial resources, this implies that totalinvestment in developing countries’ agriculture needs torise by 60%36. But the trend in development aid flows runcounter to this goal. The share of global aid to agriculture

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International Human Rights legal Framework

The right to adequate food is recognised in severallegal instruments under international law. It isencoded in Article 25 of the Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights adopted by General AssemblyResolution 217 A (III) on 10 December 1948 and inArticle 11 of the International Covenant onEconomic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted on16 December 1966. But the right to adequate food isalso recognised in specific instruments such as theConvention on the Rights of the Child (Art. 24(2)(c)and 27(3)), the Convention on the Elimination of AllForms of Discrimination against Women (Art. 12(2)),or the Convention on the Rights of Persons withDisabilities (Art. 25(f) and 28(1)).

At the World Food Summit in Rome in 1996, the rightto food was given operational content by 185countries and the European Community in the RomeDeclaration and Plan of Action. They confirmed that :“The right to adequate food is realized when everyman, woman and child, alone or in community withothers, has physical and economic access at alltimes to adequate food or means for itsprocurement.” [Ref General Comment 12 of theInternational Covenant on Economic, Social andCultural Rights (ICESCR)]

As recognised in customary international law, theright to food imposes on all States obligations notonly towards the persons living on their nationalterritory, but also towards the populations of otherStates (extraterritorial obliagtions). These two sets ofobligations complement one another. The right tofood can only be fully realised when both ‘national’and ‘international’ obligations are fulfilled.

For more info, see www.srfood.org

Human Right to Food

Art 208 Lisbon Treaty

EU Food SecurityPolicy Framework

Governance of theGlobal Food System,

especially the FAOCommittee on worldFood Security (CFS)

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International Assessment ofAgricultural Knowledge, Scienceand Technology for Development(IAASTD)The IAASTD report “Agriculture at a Crossroads” from2009, was prepared by 400 scientists from across theworld over 4 years. It was approved in 2008 by 58developed and developing countries, including manyEU Member States. The IAASTD was co-sponsored bythe World Bank, FAO, UNEP, UNESCO, UNDP, WHOand the GEF.

The IAASTD concludes that business-as-usual will notwork. Realising the Right to Food requires changes inboth models of production as well as improved accessto affordable and nutritious food. These changesneeded – based on a thorough scientific assessment -echo much of what has been proposed by civil societyorganisations over the years and then confirmed byseveral recent reports . They include the need to shifttowards more ecological forms of production by small-scale food providers.

Key messages include the need for:

- agriculture to be viewed as multi-functional;

- increased emphasis on agro-ecological approachesand use of appropriate technologies;

- increased support to small-scale farmers, throughpolicies and investments;

- empowerment of women;

- integration of local and traditional knowledge withformal knowledge;

- equitable trade reform with national flexibility; and

- increased investments in farmer-focused R&D andextension services.

Source: IAASTD (2009) Agriculture at a Crossroads. Global Reporthttp://www.agassessment.org

The reformed Committee onWorld Food Security (CFS)Key features of the reform document are the following:

• CFS is defined as “the foremost inclusive internationaland intergovernmental platform” for food security,based in the UN system.

• Explicitly includes defending the right to adequatefood in the CFS’s mission.

• Recognises civil society organisations - small foodproducers and urban movements especially – as fullparticipants and affirms their right to autonomouslyself-organise to relate to the CFS.

• Enjoins the CFS to negotiate and adopt a GlobalStrategic Framework (GSF) for food security providingguidance for national food security action plans as wellas multilateral institutions.

• Empowers the CFS to take decisions on key foodpolicy issues and promotes accountability bygovernments and other actors.

• Arranges for CFS policy work to be supported by aHigh Level Panel of Experts in which the expertise offarmers, Indigenous Peoples and practitioners isacknowledged alongside that of academics andresearchers.

• Recognises the principle of “subsidiarity” and theneed to build links between inclusive policy spaces atnational, regional and global levels. The CFSbecomes a year-round process and not an annualglobal meeting.

Important issues on the agenda of the CFS currentlyinclude the negotiation and implementation of theVoluntary Guidelines on Responsible Governance ofTenure of Land, Forest and Fisheries, measures toaddress price volatility, reflection on what forms ofinvestment in which models of agriculture are bestsuited to support smallholder production/food securityand the launching of a broad consultative process onprinciples for responsible investment in agriculture;development of the Global Strategic Framework.

More information on: http://www.fao.org/cfs

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The EU’s Food Security PolicyThe EU’s Food Security Policy Framework was adoptedin March 2010, following a large stakeholders’consultation. It provides the context for its work on foodsecurity in developing countries. The policy include fourthemes:

1) increasing availability of food through moreecological, biodiverse and resilient forms of production,following the findings of IAASTD;

2) Improving access to food by using the Right to Foodapproach and supportive frameworks, implementingthe Voluntary Guidelines to Support the ProgressiveRealisation of the Right to Adequate Food in theContext of National Food Security, including its 18guiding principles;

3) Improving nutrition through appropriate policies andstrategies and coordination across sectors, referring toEU’s nutrition policies;

4) Improving crisis prevention and management throughimproved food markets and forms of supplymanagement including through improving (local)storage of farm products.

Source: European Commission (2010) An EU policy framework to assistdeveloping countries in addressing food security challenges(COM(2010)127 final)

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has declined even more sharply: from 17% in the early1980s to 6% in 200937. Today, only 4,4 % of EU15 and theCommission’s total development aid is allocated toagriculture38.

Yet, encouragingly, proposals for radical changes in theglobal food system, mainly from non-governmentaldevelopment organisations (NGDOs), smallholder farmermovements - backed up by recent reports and researchfindings like those of the IAASTD (see box on previouspage) - are now finding support in some official quarters ofthe EU and the UN39. The proposals are centred on theurgent need to relocalise food systems; to end developingcountries dependence on international marketsand toenforce the right of the poorest people to regain controlover the factors affecting their livelihoods. These principlesare embodied in the food sovereignty frameworkdeveloped by the social movements of peasant and familyfarmers and other small-scale food providers40.Furthermore, calls by African farmers’ networks for areorientation of agricultural investments in the framework offood sovereignty were recently agreed at a workshop inYaounde, Cameroun41.

The decision to reform the FAO’s Committee on WorldFood Security (CFS) to transform it into an inclusive,authoritative global forum deliberating on food issues withthe mission of ensuring the global right to food is animportant step (see box on previous page). It is essentialthat the EU makes every effort to defend this new and stillfragile policy space. In this respect, the EU shouldespecially support the autonomous Civil SocietyMechanism and consult with its own civil society indetermining the positions it takes in the CFS.

In terms of Europe’s own approach, the new EU FoodSecurity Policy Framework, adopted in 2010,demonstrates crucial progress (see box on previous page).The policy recognises the Right to Food and has a focus


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on creating an enabling environment for the smallholdersector as the single most effective instrument for increasingfood security in developing countries. The EuropeanParliament adopted a similar approach with its resolutionon Food Security adopted in July 201142.

A vital element in the EU Framework is that it recognisesthat policies need to be formulated with the participation oflocal stakeholders who are the foundations of food andnutrition security. In particular, the EU has committed to“actively support greater participation of civil society andfarmer organisations in policy making and researchprogrammes and increase their involvement in theimplementation and evaluation of governmentprogrammes”43. The EU has also taken into account therecommendations of the IAASTD, including the need toshift towards support for agro-ecological production.IAASTD has demonstrated how problem-oriented researchincorporating local expertise can increase productivity inways that protect the natural resource base whilemitigating and helping agriculture adapt to climate change.Moreover, agro-ecological production does not depend oncommercial nitrogen fertilisers, which are oftenunaffordable for poor smallholders, and can damagesoils44.

3. The Impact of EU policiesThe EU’s efforts in combating hunger must be anchored ina comprehensive analysis of the situation of global foodinsecurity and the situation of developing countries45.

More than one-third of all States are now classified as Low-Income Food-Deficit Countries (70 countries) by the UN46.These countries are confronted with a very roughtransitional challenge of reducing dependency oninternational food markets in order to limit vulnerability toprice and climate shocks by relocalising their foodsystems.

To play a positive to role in enhancing the food security ofdeveloping countries, the EU needs to change several of itscurrent policies affecting food security in the world’s poorcountries ranging from trade, agriculture, financialregulation, climate, investment in foreign land.

3.1 EU trade and agricultural policies

Global trade and agricultural regimes have critical impactson poor countries development paths. Agricultureaccounts for between 30% to 60% of GDP and up to 70%of employment in the Least Developed Countries’ (LDC)47.Research shows that agricultural development in poorcountries is three to four times more effective in alleviatingpoverty than growth in other sectors and that one Euroincreased income in agriculture generates between twoand three Euros in their GDP48. Yet, realisation of thispotential is hampered by the current international traderegime which disincentives agricultural development inpoor countries by systematically favoring cheap importsfrom capital-intensive producers from wealthier nations.

Since the 1980s, oversupply on international markets byheavily subsidised producers from the EU and other richcountries have depressed world prices and kept them lowuntil the break out the global food crisis 2008. In parallel,trade liberalisation and absence of tariff protection haveundermined the ability of local producers in poor food-importing countries to live from their crops, particularlyunder the WTO regime49. FAO documented 12,000 casesover the period 1980–2003 of import surges leading to lowprices on domestic markets, which drove less competitivelocal producers out of business. And the frequency has

UN Special Rapporteur on the Right toFood, Olivier De Schutter, officialcommunication on the EU CAP reformThe strategic objective today should beto support developing countries to “feedthemselves”; not be “feed theworld”[…] Ifincreases in food production rise intandemwith furthermarginalization ofsmall-scale farmers in developingcountries, the battle against hungerandmalnutritionwill be lost.

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increased for almost all commodities since the Agreementon Agriculture (AoA) entered into force in 199450. Thecourse of Africa illustrates this depressing developmentvery well. In the 1980s, the continent was a net exporter ofagricultural products. Today, it is a net importer heavilyreliant on world markets to guarantee food security for itsown people51.

In many respects, the reform of the EU’s CommonAgricultural Policy (CAP) is a decisive opportunity todemonstrate the Union’s willingness to help facilitatedeveloping countries’ transition to feeding themselves.This however requires a u-turn from the EU, which shouldrecognise that the rising global demand for food does notlegitimise subsidising European exports. Poor countriesshould be allowed to develop and safeguard their basicinstitutions and infrastructure prior to opening nationalagricultural markets to international competition52.

Over the last 30 years the EU’s Common Agricultural Policyhas undergone comprehensive reforms. Export subsidiesaccounted for 50% of CAP expenditure in 1980, and hadbeen cut to 2% in 200853. Since the mid-1990s a centralaim of the reforms has been to make the CAP paymentscomply with the rules of WTO, which has resulted in thecurrent, more discrete, subsidy system consisting mainlyof so called direct aid payments to European farmers.

Direct aid is “decoupled” from production in the sense thatfarms receive payments per hectare of farm landregardless of what they decide to produce on this land.The direct aid is compatible with the WTO’s “Green box”which implies that they are “considered not to distort tradeand therefore permitted with no limits”54. On thisbackground, the Commission often argues that the CAP’snegative impact on developing countries is a thing of thepast55. Yet, at a closer look, it becomes apparent that thepresent subsidy system still allows the EU to dumpagricultural products on the international market.

According to the EC, direct aid accounts for an average of29% of European farms’ factor income during the period2007-2009 and in some EU countries like Denmark, it isnearly 70%56. Clearly these figures suggest that much EUagricultural production would not be economicallysustainable, in the absence of the direct aid support57.

While maintaining sustainable agriculture across Europethrough public support may be a legitimate policyobjective, farm subsidies must not be allowed to result inthe export of products at prices lower than the cost ofproduction, unless to achieve mutually agreed non-trade

concerns. Yet, research on the effects of the decoupledpayments from Humboldt Agricultural Universityestablishes “that commodities for which the EU is a netexporter are sold below cost, for extended periods of timeand in substantial quantities”58. For instance, the returns ofGerman dairy exports only covers 49-56 % of theproduction cost and 49-56% on sugar beets59. Suchheavily subsidised production is inarguably unfaircompetition for poor local farmers in developing countrieswhere financial support of such magnitude is by no meansavailable.

In the 2010-2011 debate on the CAP reform, there havebeen signs that the EU is becoming willing to addressdevelopment concerns in the future CAP. In June 2011 theEuropean Parliament adopted a resolution, which calls for“the EU to ensure consistency between the CAP and itsdevelopment and trade policies; … and not jeopardisefood production capacity and long term food security inthese countries and the ability of those populations to feedthemselves, while respecting the principle of PolicyCoherence for Development (PCD)”60. This brings hopethat the PCD principle will be incorporated in theforthcoming legislation regarding the CAP from 2014.


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FAO estimates that around 150 million small-scale dairyfarming households amounting to750 million people areengaged in milk production, the majority of them indeveloping countrie61. Cows are one of the most valuableassets that poor rural households can own, providingincome, nutritional milk and manure for fertilizer. Dairyfarming is a potential pathway out of poverty for millions ofpeople in the developing world, especially for women. ButEU subsidised exports continue to hold back dairyfarmers in the developing world.

The EU’s deployment of its internal ‘safety net policies’can indeed displace the negative impact of market crisesto other regions of the world. This was the case when theCommission reintroduced export subsidies for dairyproducts during the milk market crisis in 2009 – an actionthat was later heavily criticized by the EuropeanParliament, that concluded that the export refundsconstitute “a blatant violation of the core principles ofpolicy coherence for development.”62 Since 1984, thevolume of milk produced in the EU has been limited by aquota. The quota arrangement is due to be eliminatedfrom 2015. Combined with the EU’s current practice andfurther market-orientation of the sector, this raises seriousconcerns that the external impacts of the EU’s milk policymay even worsen.

Cameroun: European subsidies ruin localmarkets

In Cameroon, German NGO “Brot für die Welt” has beensupporting the development of milk production for over10 years to enable smallholders to supply the localmarket. However, the local milk markets are now beingundercut by cheap milk powder from the EU. In north-west Cameroon, dairy farmers need at least €0.61tocover production costs for a litre of fresh unpasteurisedmilk, while in recent years, milk made from Europeansubsidised milk powder costs as low as €0.4 per litre.

“As a politically engaged woman, it makes me especiallyangry - here is another brilliant project, which manywomen can benefit greatly from, being jeopardised by EUexports. We’ve already been through all that with thecheap chicken parts from Europe. Small businesses runby women were driven out of the market then as well,”explains Tilder Kumichii. Who works at ACDIC, theCitizens’ Association for the Defence of CollectiveInterests, to which many smallholders in the regionbelong.

Source: BROT (2010) Milk Dumping in Cameroon

UnderminingWest Africa’smilk production

In West Africa, customs duties barely reach 5% and localfarmers are squeezed out of the dairy value chain bysubsidised European milk powder. Regional production istherefore unable to meet domestic market demands.

In Burkina Faso nearly 1 out of every 2 litres of milkconsumed in the country was imported in 2006 and inurban areas the figure was as high as 9/10 litres.European subsidised milk powder accounted for half ofthe cheap imports. Today, unfair market condiitionscontinue to undermine local milk production. In January2010, milk made from imported powder was sold atnearly half (340 CFA francs per litre) the price of localfarmer’s fresh milk (700 CFA francs per litre).Source: GRET (February 2010) The CAP’s impact on African Agriculture:focus onmilk, published by VECO (Belgium), Terra Nuova (Italy) andPractical Action/UK FoodGroup

HowEU subsidies hurt Bangladesh’s dairy farmers

In Bangladesh, one of the world’s poorest countries, 1.4million family dairy farms support 7 million people whowork on very small plots of land. But milk powder importsdeter small producers from producing more milk to satisfylocal demand.

Whole milk powder is imported and marketed directly toconsumers, and skimmed milk powder is imported andused for production of dairy products. In 2009,Bangladesh spent around €68 million on imports ofpowdered milk that disincentivised local production.Between 20% and 50% of imports of skimmed milkpowder came from the EU in recent years. However, forevery million kilos of imported European milk powder, 350jobs could be created in Bangladesh in local farming andrelated activities.

Source: ActionAid Denmark (2011) If the CAP doesn’t fit,change it - How EU taxpayers undermine Bangladeshi dairy farmers

Brief: http://www.ms.dk/graphics/Ms.dk/Dokumenter/IftheCAPdoesntfitchangeit.pdf

Full report: http://www.ms.dk/graphics/Ms.dk/Dokumenter/Milking-the-poor-english-version.pdf

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Case Study: EuropeanMilk Exports



Recommendations:

•The EU must demonstrate greater efforts to make PolicyCoherence for Development an operational element ofthe CAP and lead the way for new internationalgovernance of food security based on the universalHuman Right to food.

•The principle of Policy Coherence for Development mustbe enshrined in the legislative text of the future CAP,including a recognition that the purpose of the CAP is notto feed the world and should not jeopardize the foodproduction capacity and long-term food security ofpeople developing countries and their ability to feedthemselves.

•The new CAP legislation must contain obligations tomonitor the impacts of the use of CAP instruments andagricultural exports to food-insecure developingcountries on an ongoing basis. Production should bemanaged in a way that prevents subsidised EU exports tocompete with local agricultural production in poorcountries.

•The EU should fully comply with the developing countries’demands to be granted the possibility to define, protectand promote their own agricultural policies in accordancewith the needs of their people, including those sufferingfrom food insecurity.

•The EU should eliminate export subsidies on agriculturalproducts, while aiming, in all places where agriculturaltrade rules are discussed, and especially in the WTO, thatall trade partners should also eliminate their exportsupport policies in their various forms.

3.2 Price volatility and speculation

Since 2008, the world has experienced extreme pricevolatility on food commodities resulting in massive hungercrises. As markets are increasingly integrated in the worldeconomy, shocks in the international arena can now traveland affect domestic markets much quicker than before.FAO estimates that the market’s expectation of how muchthe price of a commodity might move in the future is nowmore than 35% for many basic stable foods (see figurebelow).


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The uncontrolled price movements affect and disruptfarmer’s production planning in all regions of the world.Yet, the poorest people and farmers in developingcountries feel the most devastating consequences. In theleast developed countries poor households spendbetween 50% and 80% of their income on food- comparedto 16% in the EU63. As the largest actor on the worldmarkets, the EU has a responsibility to tackle the situation.

Food markets are tightening due to pressure from growingpopulations, changing diets, diversion of food to biofuelsand climate change, but these factors cannot fully explainthe extreme price movements.64 Excessive speculation onfood derivatives in deregulated financial markets hasserved to exacerbate the dramatic increases and volatilityin food prices the world witnessed in 2008, and again since201065. Holdings in commodity index funds, the mainvehicle for financial investments in agriculturalcommodities, rocketed from €11bn ($13bn) in 2003 to€204bn ($317bn) in 2008, increasing commodity priceinflation66.

As the EU’s agricultural policy becomes more market-oriented, it is expected that European agriculturalcommodity derivatives markets will continue to grow. Yet,European regulation is more relaxed than in the UnitedStates, where the implementation of the Dood Frank Actimpose positions limits on the derivative markets tohamper excessive speculation.

The issue of food price volatility and speculation is high onthe political agenda in 2011, with market reform processesunderway in both the EU and US, and with calls for actionby France during its G20 presidency. The high level panelof experts on food security at the CFS said in July 2011that “action regarding transparency in futures markets andtighter regulation of speculation is necessary.”67 However,the financial sector is lobbying strongly to weaken anyproposals substantially.

Besides regulation, better global governance is alsofundamental to get the extreme price volatility undercontrol and establishing food buffer stocks can serve askey tool. Managed correctly, local, national and regionalfood stocks can be a key tool in both safeguarding foodsecurity and maintaining price stability by strengthening theability of governments to limit excessive price volatility forboth farmers and consumers.

Reserves can be used to smooth out volatile agriculturalcommodity markets by purchasing grain or otherfoodstuffs when there is a surplus on the market andreleasing it during lean times, at moderate prices.Effectively-managed public buffer stocks, both regionaland national, can help to ensure that food is availableduring humanitarian emergencies or climatic catastrophe.In doing so, they can provide food to the hungry andvulnerable when most needed, at moderate prices or ifnecessary for free. Food reserves have an importantimpact on food markets behaviours. Their mere existencecan calm volatility, and they can support the easing of foodprice spikes by giving an injection into the market whensupply is low, limiting the potential impacts of speculationduring such periods.

Moreover, if buffer stocks target public procurement fromsmallholder and women farmers, they can help to supportsmall-scale agriculture. If domestic purchases for reservescan be made when prices are low and there is more in themarket (i.e. during harvest times) then it can help to pushprices up in support of producers, thus stabilising pricespaid to farmers and helping them to predict their marketsand future agricultural investments. Reserves at both theregional and the national level can support each other andfurther enhance price stabilisation through collaboration.

Recommendations:

CONCORD urges the EU and its Member States to:

•stand up to the interests of the financial sector and aimfor strong regulatory measures including in the Markets inFinancial Instruments Directive (MiFiD) by increasingtransparency of financial transactions and limitingexcessive speculation through aggregated position limitsof traders;

•collaborate to improve governance, transparency andoversight of global food markets at both international anddomestic level;

•Collaborate to bolster the global food reserve system byestablishing buffer stocks on local, national and regionallevel. These buffer stocks must target publicprocurement from smallholder and women farmers, theycan help to support small-scale agriculture.

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Land-grabbing frenzy inCambodiaIn rural areas, at least 3 million hectares – more than halfof Cambodia’s total arable landmass - has beengranted to private companies as concessions for thedevelopment of agro-industrial plantations and miningprojects. Sugarcane is the one of the leading ‘boomcrops’ driving the Cambodian land-grabbing frenzytoday. Over the last two years, there has been a rapidexpansion in the Cambodian sugar industry, with morethan 80,000 hectares in land concessions beinggranted to private companies for industrial sugarcaneproduction.

Forest clearing, sand dredging and large-scale seizureof productive land threaten the ecological balance andthe livelihoods and food security of rural families.Dozens of rural and indigenous communities have beenforcibly evicted and rendered homeless by landconcessions in the last five years, while considerablymore have faced economic displacement in the form ofreduced access to subsistence farming and grazingland, and the destruction of forests that they have usedfor generations for collecting food and forest products.Local and international Human Rights observers,including the UN Office of the High Commissioner onHuman Rights, have also documented serious andwidespread human rights abuses and environmentaldamage caused by these companies affecting morethan 12,000 people.

Source: APRODEV (2010) Bittersweet, A Briefing Paper on IndustrialSugar Production, Trade and Human Rights in Cambodia


3.3 Climate change and foreign land use

The evolving hunger crises in East Africa is just the mostrecent of a range of events which show that the world isnow witnessing the devastating impact on human inducedclimate change on global food security. In 2010, forest firesin Russia, draughts in Brazil and floods in Australiaplumped global food supplies, pushing 44 million peopleinto extreme poverty. Developing countries bear the bruntof climate change. According to the IntergovernmentalPanel on Climate Change (IPCC), yields from agriculturecould be reduced by up to 50% in some developingcountries because of climate change68.

The EU must act to reduce its greenhouse gas emissionsacross all its policies and address its unsustainableproduction and consumption patterns. The EU’s currentfood production takes up 2.2 times the bio-capacity ofEurope’s agricultural land. Especially the EU’s import ofanimal feed has dramatic environmental impacts. Whensoybean prices rose in 2007 it doubled deforestation inSouth America, which is the largest supplier of soy to theEU. Reducing the EU’s dependency on protein cropimports which are inflicting severe environmental damagein countries exporting to the EU and could also help reducegreenhouse gas emissions.69

The EU’s policies to secure its own food and energy supplyresult in aggressive appropriations of farmland indeveloping countries depriving local people of control overthe resources of the land they inhabit and on which theirlivelihood depends. EU net food imports presently require35 million hectares of land outside Europe to be produced,equivalent to the entire territory of Germany70. On top ofthis, the EU’s demand for biofuels is also a main driver foraccelerating the use of foreign land.

For instance, ActionAid has recently documented howplans for a biofuels plantation in the Dakatcha Woodlands,Kenya, will violate the Human Rights of an indigenouscommunity of over 20,000 people71 (see NaturalResources chapter of this report). This case illustrates apan-African trend. FAO estimates that the last three years20 million hectares of farmland on the African continent hasbeen acquired by foreign interests72.

In Asia, the same destructive trend is observed. APRODEVhas demonstrated how in Cambodia today, hundreds ofthousands of people are being alienated from their homes,farmlands, forests and fisheries as the country’s rulingelites and foreign investors plunder the country for privateprofit in the name of ‘development’ (see box)73.


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Recommendations:

CONCORD calls on the EU and its Member States to:

• reduce Europe’s ecological footprint on developingcountries by revisiting unsustainable production andconsumption patterns in the EU and other regions. Priorityareas are:

- to limit the EU dependence on imports of animal proteinfeeds of unsustainable animal husbandry productionmodels by promoting forage crops and moderate meatconsumption habits;

- to limit the dependence on nitrogen fertilisers whose usecontributes to global warming, by promoting integrationbetween agriculture and livestock activities, legumescrops and organic farming.

• ensure and monitor that the UN Voluntary Guidelines onResponsible Governance of Tenure of Land is respectedacross all relevant policies;

• ensure that policies that assist in driving global trendssuch as the grabbing of land and water include strongsustainability criteria that cover both social andenvironmental aspects equally comprehensively, withspecial regards to biofuels production;

• lay out a clear path across all relevant policies tocontribute to the greenhouse gas reduction targetsadopted by the EU and towards the objective of an 80 %reduction target of EU’s emissions by 2050;.

• in the Rio+20 process, ensure that agriculture is a coreissue in global policy and practice because it is both thecause and a key component of any solution to the world’senvironmental, climate and social problems.

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EU net food importspresently require

35millionhectaresoflandoutside Europe to beproduced, equivalent to the entireterritory of Germany.


Revenues fromnatural

resource exports from

Africa, Asia and Latin

Americaamount to

that of EUdevelopmentaid.24 times


TheRight to enjoy andbenefit fromnaturalresources

3.0


The link between the rural poor and theenvironment is strong. Natural resources havenumerous functions and form part of a range ofcrucial elements of our lives. They are often hardto categorise or prioritise in value. Poor men andwomen depend on land, water, forest andmarine resources and cannot afford thetechnical alternatives that we associate withmodern life in the ‘developed world’. Housingmaterials, food and energy are also takendirectly from natural resources. Therefore, thedeterioration of the natural environment andcompeting use of natural resources bycommercial interests have a drastic impact onthe living conditions of the poor.

1. Natural Resources and Human RightsNatural resources form the very basis of everyone’s livesaround the world. They constitute a crucial ingredient toachieve human and social development. Men and womenacross the globe have the right to benefit from theseresources as established by international Human Rightstreaties74. In order to guarantee the Human Rights ofpeople today and for the benefit of future generations theseresources must be used in a sustainable manner. The verysustainability of ecosystems and our planet is intrinsicallylinked to human, social and political rights as they cannotbe achieved without sustainable development or efficienteradication of poverty. The failure to do so, or the perhapsinvoluntary encouragement to neglect this presents aconsiderable obstacle to achieving developmentobjectives.

Natural resources can be classified in two categories:

- Type I: The “renewable” resources which people,particularly in the developing world and indigenouscommunities, are directly reliant on, and which we areultimately all reliant on, such as clean water, fish stocks,clean air, land etc. Although these have monetary value,their inherent value may be that they are immediatelyuseful to people and directly related to development.

- Type II: Minerals, hydrocarbons and other “non-renewable” resources which tend to be of commercialvalue when extracted - particularly for the developedworld - but not of any inherent value in their natural state(i.e. buried beneath the ground). The governance appliedto the management of these resources, including more orless transparent and participatory processes, is directlylinked to men and women’s rights and their path todevelopment objectives.75

The two categories are interlinked and both form the basisfor considerable international trade and large shares ofmany countries’ public revenues.

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Global resource use is on the rise, and the European Union(EU) is one of the actors pursuing aggressive strategies toaccess resources. Europe is highly reliant on the import ofthis resource base on which to build its growth andwellbeing. A reflection of this can be seen in its tradebalance which is highly uneven when it comes toresources76. Revenues from natural resource exports fromAfrica, Asia and Latin America amount to 24 times that ofEU Official Development Assistance (ODA)77. Thisdependency forms the basis for significant interaction andtrade with developing countries and poses bothopportunities and challenges in terms of Policy Coherencefor Development (PCD).

If the revenues from the sale of natural resources ofdeveloping countries are properly collected and managedthen they have the potential to lift millions out of povertyand constitute an important “development enabler”78.They indeed hold potentially huge transformative powerfor communities across the global South. Thus, to ensurefull realisation of rights in accordance with the internationalrights acquis, it becomes essential that women and menhave access to “type I” renewable natural resources. Atthe same time, they should share in the benefits from theextraction and sale of “type II” whilst having a say in howthese resources are managed.

Paradoxically, while developing countries contain a largeproportion of the world’s most valuable metals andminerals, many resource-rich countries remain amongstthe poorest in the world. Poor people do not benefit fromthis natural wealth, enshrined in the land they inhabit.

Several reasons explain this: one of them being the lack ofeffective taxation on extraction activities and tax evasion.Companies in the extraction sector – including Europeanones – benefit from tax incentives offered by or negotiatedwith developing countries.79 Yet many of these companiesescape even more taxation by directing profits to taxhavens. On a global scale, more than US$ 1 trillion is

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International Human Rightslegal Framework

The international bill of Human Rights containsseveral references to natural resources and thefact that it is “the inherent right of all peoples toenjoy and utilize fully and freely their naturalwealth and resources” as stipulated in Article 1 ofthe International Covenant on Economic, Socialand Cultural Rights (ICESCR), adopted on 16December 1966. Other important points ofreference are article 17 on property rights andarticle 25 on the right to food in the UniversalDeclaration of Human Rights adopted by GeneralAssembly Resolution 217 A (III) of 10 December1948 and Article 11 of ICESCR.

Natural resources also feature in the 2007 UNDeclaration on the Rights of Indigenous peoplewhere it is several times underscored that thisderives out of a fear that their right to “land,territories and resources” have been violated orthat they have suffered discrimination inexercising this right . These elements repeat inthe ICESCR as well as in the 1969 UNDeclaration on Social Progress andDevelopment.

Most explicitly does it stand in the 1986 UNDeclaration on Right to Development: “Thehuman right to development also implies the fullrealization of the right of peoples to self-determination, which includes, subject to therelevant provisions of both InternationalCovenants on Human Rights, the exercise of theirinalienable right to full sovereignty over all theirnatural wealth and resources”.

The inherent right of allpeoples to enjoy and

utilise fully and freely theirnatural wealth and

resources

Art 208 Lisbon Treaty

EuropeanConsensus onDevelopment

Governance andsustainable

consumption

CommonAgricultural

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EU LandInvestment

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EU Energyand biofuels

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illegally moved out of developing countries every year,about two thirds of it due to commercial tax evasion Capitalflight from poor countries amounts to ten times total globalODA80.

Another reason why poor people in resource exportingcountries do not benefit from this natural wealth is thatthese countries tend to be associated with poorgovernance, conflict, corruption, deterioration of theenvironment and human rights violations. The sectorcontinuously fails to generate wealth through a process ofvalue-added or reinvested in diversifying the economic.This process, known as the “resource curse”, cannot bedissociated from the policies of foreign companies andgovernment.

Therefore, as trade partners and regulators of companies,banks and international financial markets, the EU has acrucial role to play. EU policy-makers have an obligation toensure that EU policies in pursuit of its imports fromdeveloping countries do not undermine developmentobjectives or lead, directly or indirectly, to human sufferingand human rights violations.

Firstly, the EU must ensure that its consumption of non-renewable and renewable natural resources is at globallysustainable levels. Moreover, the environmental impacts ofits economic activities and demand for (renewable)resources on developing world communities and globalgoods (such as rain-forests and oceans) should notjeopardize the rights of today’s peoples or those of futuregenerations. Secondly, the EU must ensure that trade innatural resources contributes to stability, economic growthand diversification rather than conflict, corruption, poorgovernance and environmental degradation.

2. The EU’s support to natural resources anddevelopmentThe EU understands the inter-play between development,Human Rights and natural resources. This is reflected in itslegal base81, organisational structures82, politicalstatements83, development objectives84, and as a signatoryto several international treaties85.

Within the range of policy areas that the EuropeanCommission manages under its development policy, thereis a specific policy for natural resource management. Theview portrayed is that the poorest are extremely vulnerableto climate change and that protecting natural resources,biodiversity and avoiding environmental degradation is ofutmost importance86. This vision fits with the EU’s ownenvironmental policies but raises several questions aboutEU consumption levels and the coherence of other specificpolicies with development objectives.

Some aspects of EU development policy itself areclosely related. For example, the efforts increasinglyfocused on assisting and encouraging developingcountries to strengthen their capacities on domesticresource mobilisation87 has a clear link to the wealth thatdeveloping countries could generate from the effectivemanagement of their natural resources, both renewableand non renewable. However, for a positive impact,transparency and good governance of the nationalgovernments in developing countries must be guaranteed.Equally crucial is the need for foreign investors tocontribute to the levels of transparency needed.

Another challenge is to establish a sustainable and diverseeconomic base in a country and appropriate mechanismsto ensure that more men and women benefit from thewealth created. The transformative power of economicgrowth is promoted by the EU in Europe as well as in itsrelations with third countries88. It derives from anunderstanding of development and progress based on theEU’s own increased prosperity and levels of material well-being throughout its history. However, it is not necessarilysupported by the policies that govern the EU’s own importof resources, which has different priorities.

Remarkably, the EU has a comprehensive understandingof the challenges that resource rich developing countriesface and many EU programmes in partner countries arecommendable.

However, there are clear examples of incoherencebetween some EU internal policies and developmentobjectives. They have an inevitable impact on developingcountries through direct trade and investment.

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The EUmust reduce itsconsumption of resourcesandmove towardsa low-resource, sustainableeconomicmodel thatpromotes sharp increasesin recycling andmultipleuse of products.


In Dakatcha, Kenya a community of 20.000 people’sdaily lives and livelihoods have been threatened by anattempt by an Italian company to acquire 50,000hectares of land to produce the biofuels crop jatropha.This has happened without proper consultation of thecommunity, nor any alternative land or compensationbeing offered to them. The company is responding tothe growing market for biofuels in the EU driven by newtargets on biofuels. The company was to lease the landat a rate of €2 per hectare per annum, well under themarket rate and putting into question the idea of thebenefits that biofuels companies are bringing to Africa.The community use the land to produce food, honey,medicine, for wood and for eco-tourism. This story istold and retold by different communities across Africa,Asia and Latin America as European investors move into produce the biofuels that European does not havethe land surface to produce themselves.

September 2011 update: Following intense pressurefrom civil society organisations, the Kenyan governmenthas now banned jathropha in Kenya’s coastal region,and the local authorities have out pressure on NII tostop their existing plantations in the region.

Source: ActionAid (May 2011) Fuelling Evictions. Community cost of EUbiofuels boom.

http://www.actionaid.org.uk/doc_lib/aa_dakatcha_report.pdf

Case Study: DakatchaCommunity in Kenya


3. Non-development policiesthat impact on the right of accessto natural resourcesSpecific EU policies deal with the facilitation of access tocertain resources or promote behaviour within the EU thatnecessitates the import of commodities and raw materials.Clearly, it is a complex area where many policies interactand influence the ability of the EU to access the naturalresources (renewable and non-renewable) that it desires.Nevertheless, it is crucial that these policies do not,voluntarily or involuntarily, conflict with the EU’s obligationto ensure PCD.

A fundamental point is to ensure that the EU’s resourceconsumption is in line with its own view of sustainableresource management in developing countries.Sustainable consumption of resources is central to tacklingthe environmental challenges that the world faces. The EUmust reduce its own consumption of resources movetowards a low-resource, sustainable economic model thatpromotes sharp increases in recycling and multiple use ofproducts. This should be done to promote equitable use ofthe world’s limited natural resources, and poverty reductionin developing countries.

3.1 The Renewable Energy Directive

The 2009 EU Renewable Energy Directive (RED)89 posesserious challenges to the achievement of the EUdevelopment objectives. Within the RED is a 10% target forrenewable energy use in transport by 2020, an admirablegoal. However it poses major problems for Human Rightsand poverty eradication as it adds to the pressures on landand water in particular. Access to land and water arecrucial natural resources and enablers of pro-poordevelopment. Land is a key factor of production, which isessential to peoples’ ability to achieve the right to food.92% of the EU target will be met by first generationbiofuels, which Europe has nowhere near enough land toproduce90. As a result, companies are responding bymoving to places where large amounts of land and watercan be cheaply and easily acquired: predominantly thedeveloping world, thus posing a real obstacle to food

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Therefore, CONCORD recommends that:

• The EU revises its 10% target in the RenewableEnergy Directive;

• The EU ensures that policies that assist in driving globaltrends such as the grabbing of land and water includestrong sustainability criteria that cover both social andenvironmental aspects equally comprehensively.

3.2 RawMaterials Initiative

The EU is committed to pursuing peace and security, therule of law and respect for Human Rights through itsCommon Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). It is alsohighly dependent for its own prosperity on the secure andpredictable import of oil, gas and other commodities. In2009, imports of fuels and mining products to the EU wereworth 325 billion Euros93.

The EU Raw Materials Initiative94 seeks to ensure both asecure supply of raw materials for the EU and to facilitatedevelopment and security in producing countries. In turn,this facilitates a secure supply. Yet looking more closely atthe policy clearly exhibits a hierarchy of value between thetwo objectives. The latter (development and security inproducing countries) requires that the EU ensures that itsactions, and those of EU companies, governments andbanks, do not contribute to corruption, conflict, and poorand unaccountable governance in natural resource richcountries.

The risk of violation of rights is twofold. Firstly, countriesmiss out on tax revenue because of the current flawedregulation of (often European) companies. This presents alost opportunity to generate revenues so vital for poorcountries. The second is a lack of transparency andregulation of companies, which drives corruption, conflictand unaccountable governance so that people in resourcerich countries do not benefit from the revenues that thecountry generates. Simply increasing revenue generationand collection does not necessarily bring about equitableand just development. As a result, the EU is in danger ofnot failing its own obligations on Policy coherence for

security. A large number of these, and some of the mostpowerful, are European companies91. The EU has a clearrole to play in monitoring and redressing behaviour bythese companies either incentivised by certain EU policiesor insufficiently regulated (see chapter on food security).

RED does include a clause that outlines a monitoringscheme on elements of social sustainability (article 23).Yet its inability to make these elements an integral part ofthe mandatory sustainability criteria, the presumed lengthof the process, and the uncertainty whether results willactually lead to necessary changes in the legislation meansthat it might be too late for many communities. With RED,the EU has essentially adopted a policy which is provokingHuman Rights violations, undermining the fight againstpoverty and flouting its PCD obligation92.

The Dakatcha case in the box illustrates a wider problemwhich is unfolding across Africa and in other parts of thedeveloping world, where land rights are already underthreat. This is incoherent with the EU’s developmentobjectives. In the specific case of Dakatcha, there is a dualresponsibility of the country that gives the green light to theinvestments as well as of those implementing the policiesthat drive the investment, i.e. the EU.

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PiersBenatar/PanosPictures/ActionAid



Development. The lack of coherence of the Raw MaterialsInitiative was also pointed out by the European Parliamentin 201195.

The revenues earned by developing countries from naturalresources represent the largest flow of money from thedeveloped to the developing world. This represents ahugely important source of revenue for the latter with thepotential to lift millions out of poverty. Instead, the trade innatural resources has often helped contribute to povertyand suffering. In some countries, such as the DemocraticRepublic of Congo -which supplies the EU with 71% of itsCobalt needs-96, competition over natural resources hasfuelled armed conflict. This is fuelled when foreigncompanies source minerals from actors who use revenuesto fund conflicts. In others, such as Turkmenistan, naturalresource wealth has fuelled corrupt and repressiveregimes. Part of the problem is that foreign companies paybribes and do not disclose legitimate payments they make,fuelling corruption and unaccountable governance.Another part are opaque financial institutions in Europe thathave been used to facilitate high level corruption andcommodity-fuelled conflict. They have allowed corruptelites and warlords to deposit looted revenues from naturalresources in EU banks, enabling them to spend therevenues without hindrance and maintain their grip onpower97 (see section on Transparency Directive).

As a result of these failures to regulate Europeancompanies and banks, the revenues that are raised inpartner countries are currently not being directed to moresustainable and job-intensive sectors of the economy. Anassociated problem is that the RMI presents no incentivesfor developing countries to engage in the value addedprocess. Instead, there is a preference that they exportpure raw materials for processing and value-adding inEurope or elsewhere. This exemplifies a huge missedopportunity for developing countries to generate wealth ina larger and more sustainable manner than the simpleexport of raw materials (see section on trade).

CONCORD recommends that:

• the EU encourage value-added process of raw materialsand natural resources in developing countries;

• the EU upholds the ‘OECD Due Diligence Guidance forResponsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas’ and enshrines itsprovisions in law.

• the EU ensures that European laws against bribery areeffectively enforced.

• the EU should strengthen and properly enforce its anti-money laundering regulations.

• the EU ensures that European companies no longerengage in tax avoidance and thereby impede developingcountries ability to raise domestic revenues cruciallyneeded and rightfully theirs;

• instead of promoting the unilateral Raw MaterialsInitiative as it is today, the EU should support atransparent international process for the worldcommunity. The aim should be to address how tocooperate in managing raw materials in order to reduceglobal over-consumption and transfer knowledge on thesustainable management of resources.

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96 European Commission Communication tackling the challenges in thecommodity markets and on raw materials of 2 February 2011 (COM(2011) 25 final)

97Global Witness (March 2009) Undue Diligence. How Banks do Business withCorrupt Regimes; Global Witness (November 2009) The Secret life of aShopaholic. How an African dictator's playboy son went on a multi-million dollarshopping spree in the U.S.; Global Witness (October 2010) International Thief.How British Banks are Complicit in Nigerian Corruption.

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Glencore, the world’s biggest commodity trader,excited the financial world by announcing its entranceto the London Stock Exchange in May 2011. ButGlencore’s flotation has also helped to highlight theneed for multinational companies generally to revealmore about their finances, in order to help governmentsto collect the taxes their countries are owed.

Glencore owns most of a copper mining firm in Zambiawhich, a leaked auditors’ report suggests, may haveconducted a series of tax irregularities. The auditors,from accountants Grant Thornton and the Norwegianfirm Econ Poyry, said they did not trust what the coppermine had told them about its costs. They alsosuggested that the copper mine have used derivativestrades to shift profits out of Zambia. Both allegationssuggest that the mining company, Mopani CopperMines Plc, may be artificially reducing its profits inZambia. Glencore, for its part, strongly denies Mopanihas done anything wrong. At the same time thecompany previously obtained a EUR 48 milliondevelopment loan from the European Investment Bank.

What is certain is that Zambia desperately needs taxrevenues, notably for funding public services. In Zambiaaverage life expectancy in the country is 46. Higher tax

revenues could pay for better health and educationsystems which allow people to live fuller lives. Taxdodging is a particular problem for developingcountries, whose tax authorities often lack theresources to be able to tell whether wealthy individualsand companies are paying the right amount of tax.

Financial secrecy is at the heart of the problem and oneof the reforms which would help to solve it is greatertransparency, not least in the accounts of multinationalcompanies. A new requirement for companies to reporttheir profits, sales, and taxes for every country in whichthey operate would help governments to identifysuspicious cases where companies appear to beavoiding tax.

The improved transparency brought by country-by-country reporting would give power firmly back to thepeople. With more information available aboutcompanies’ tax payments to governments, citizens willbe able to put pressure on politicians to see it is spentwell. Companies too will come under more scrutiny, andbe forced to explain their tax planning practices or riskconsumer boycotts.

Sources: Christian Aid / Counterbalance / Friends of the Earth / Eurodad

Case Study: Mopani Copper Mines in Zambia



3.3 Transparency Directive

The first step towards enabling developing countries tomake effective use of their natural resources is to ensuregreater disclosure and public oversight of the revenueflows to governments from extractive companies.Transparency in this area would deter governmentalcorruption and help to tackle the problem of corporate taxavoidance and evasion, which drains revenues from thecoffers of poor countries.

In many countries rich in natural resources such as theDemocratic Republic of Congo, Cambodia and Peru, localcivil society organisations have highlighted that citizenshave little or no information about the terms of deals signedbetween extractive companies and their governments. Norabouthow much money is being paid to their countries inrevenue or whether this is appropriate in relation to theprofits being generated. When people know how muchmoney is given and received for the wealth beneath theirfeet, they can ask their government questions about thefairness of these revenues and demand that it spendsadequate proportions on public services, such as schools,hospitals and water provision.

Whilst the EU’s support for the Extractive IndustriesTransparency Initiative98 is welcomed, this is not sufficientto tackle the misappropriation of natural resource revenue.

In 2004, the EU adopted legislation that defines theminimum requirements on periodic financial reporting andthe disclosure of major shareholdings for companies thattrade securities on regulated markets in EU MemberStates; the so-called Transparency Directive99. This aimedat enhancing transparency on EU capital markets.

Before the end of 2011, the European Commission willmake proposals to revise this legislation as well asaccounting rules. This is an opportunity to strengthen thesystem and enable EU companies to demonstrate thevalue of their financial contribution to developing countries.A disclosure of financial information on a country-by-country and project-by-project basis is needed in order tobetter monitor businesses’ operations and dealings withgovernments. Companies should also be required todisclose revenues, sales, profits and a total value for intra-group transactions, so as to curb the risk of tax avoidanceand evasion. This information would allow resource rich

developing countries to gain access to the informationthey require helping tackle corruption and more accuratelycalculate the tax liabilities of large multi-nationalcompanies operating in the extractive industries,especially those domiciled in EU Member States or theiroffshore jurisdictions, and their subsidiaries.

CONCORD urges the EU to:

• require all European companies extracting naturalresources to disclose their financial information on acountry-by-country and project-by-project basis;

• tighten its money-laundering regulations so that the EUfinancial system, including offshore tax havens under thejurisdiction of EU Member States, is not used to facilitatetax evasion and avoidance and the laundering of lootedpublic funds from developing countries;

•ensure that all EU Member States have public registriesof the ultimate owners of corporate and legal vehicles,known as the beneficial owner.

3.4 EU trade policies

Europe's trade with developing countries should besustainable, support people, their Human Rights, andenable those countries to protect and develop theirdomestic processing industries and the environment.

The tension between Human Rights and trade is obviousand much discussed. The EU founding treaties stipulatethat trade must comply with Human Rights100. There arealso Human Rights clauses in all of the EU’s preferentialtrade schemes. However, in practice, the EU is veryhesitant to make effective use of it. They argue thatsensitive issues are better addressed from a broadergovernance perspective and that cooperation anddialogue are the favoured tools to achieve improvement ofHuman Rights situations. Preferential trade regimes are anincentive based tool to support development purposes notto be used to ‘punish’ developing countries. Such anapproach means that if the EU imports and provides amarket for products produced in violation of HumanRights, it’s violating the EU’s own Human Rightsobligations. Therefore specific product related sanctionscan be an effective way to improve the Human Rightssituation. This may be in contrast to general tradesanctions.

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If the EU is to support development as well as theprinciples of justice and equity, it is vital that developingcountries are in a position to reap the full benefits from theirraw materials and natural resources, including throughtaxing the extraction companies and using policymeasures to encourage in-country value addition, asdiscussed above. It is also important that they are free tomanage those raw materials in the interest of theirpopulations and the environment – by for exampleadopting policies to discourage extraction or exportation.

At present EU trade policy-making runs counter to this,focusing instead on establishing a supply of cheap rawmaterials to be processed -and the benefits reaped- inEurope. This extremely unbalanced trade structure has adeeply negative effect on countries which get stuck in therole of raw material suppliers, never moving up the valuechain to get more value from their natural resources.

To re-balance policy in this area, the EU should:

• fully respect the right of developing countries to useexport restrictions in the public interest;

•stop pushing for the elimination of, or restrictions on theuse of, export taxes in all fora, such as trade negotiationsat the WTO, in bilateral Free Trade Agreements andEconomic Partnerships Agreements and in otherprocesses such as Generalised System of Preferences;

• refrain from abusing Trade Defence Instruments tocounter the use of export taxes.

4. ConclusionThe EU still has some way to go to fulfil its obligation onPCD, as to be regards to the role of natural resources in theEU’s economy. On the one hand, the EU encouragesmonetarisation and free trade of natural resources. On theother , it recognises the need for this to go in tandem withthe abilities of countries to realise their people’s rightsthrough adequate transparency, right to information andultimately rights to food, land, and other natural resources.In the best cases, the EU putting in place safeguards forthese principles not to be violated. In the worst, the EU isfuelling the resource curse, bad governance and siphoningof profits that should have been raised as domesticrevenues in line with the EU’s own vision for developingcountries financing for development.


Beirut,BlandineBouniol

NOLOW-INCOMEFRAGILE OR CONFLICT-AFFECTED COUNRTYHAS YET ACHIEVED ASINGLEMDG


Human security:the nexus betweendevelopment and security

4.0


In States that are in conflict or post-conflictsituations, the government often lacks the abilityto satisfy the basic needs of the population.They face difficulties controlling their ownterritory and have a weak rule of law. Suchcountries tend to have a democratic deficit andhuman rights violations are common. One of themajor threats to poverty eradication is a returnto armed conflict.

1. Human Rights at the core of HumanSecurityMore than 740,000 men, women and children die eachyear as a result of armed violence in the world. Armedconflicts cost Africa around $284 billion between 1990 and2005. That is almost as much as the total amount ofdevelopment aid the continent received in the sameperiod. Furthermore, fragile States are way off-course formeeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), withonly 14% on track to achieve MDG on maternal mortality,17% on track to achieve the HIV/AIDS MDG, and 28% ontrack to achieve the gender equality MDG101.

The security and development agenda materialised at EUlevel with the Council Conclusions on Security andDevelopment and again on an EU response to situations offragility in 2007. They stem from the recognition “that therecannot be sustainable development without peace andsecurity, and that without development and povertyeradication there will be no sustainable peace”. Howeversince then there has been little progress to put this nexus inpractice, that is, defining how security policies can supportdevelopment objectives and how aid can be more effectivein tackling root causes of insecurity and conflict.

At the same time, global military spending levels –stimulated by the war on terrorism – have climbed back tothe heights they reached during the Cold War. The currenttotal military expenditure is a colossal sum of money; onethat – if it could be re-allocated - would be sufficient toachieve the MDGs five times over102. While militaryspending in Europe fell slightly in 2010 due to theeconomic crisis, military spending remains high at $382billion103. Four EU Member States are on the top ten list ofthe world’s biggest military spenders, namely the UK,France, Germany and Italy.

The core of human security is the fundamental rightsto life, physical safety and freedom from premature andpreventable death. Human security is often defined as“freedom from want and freedom from fear” and the UNHuman Security Commission agrees that it entails a “clearfocus on individual human lives in contrast to the notationof national security in the military context”104. The primacyof Human Rights is what distinguishes the human securityapproach from traditional State-based approaches.

The 1994 UN Human Development report referred to 7realms of human security. However, if a person has lowsense of security triggered by events in one area of life,then most likely human security is compromised in otherrealms, too. Human security can affect both men andwomen. Yet, due to the prevalence of violence againstwomen, they may often be at risk in ways different to men.Therefore human security should include a clear women’srights perspective105. The UN Security Council Resolution1325 on Women Peace and Security needs to be at thecentre: it is not just a matter of protecting women fromviolence in war but about empowering women through thesecurity agenda.

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2. EU Policies in practice

2.1 How to put the development-securitynexus in practice

Violent conflicts cost lives, cause Human Rights abuses,displace people, disrupt livelihoods, set back economicdevelopment, exacerbate State fragility, weakengovernance and undermine national and regional security.Preventing conflicts and relapses into conflict, (…) istherefore a primary objective of the EU’s external action(Council Conclusions on Conflict prevention of 20 June2011)

The European External Action Service (EEAS) wasintroduced by the Lisbon Treaty to help conduct andcoordinate the EU’s foreign affairs and security policy.Consistent with the Treaty’s provisions, Europe’s primarygoal should be to establish rights-based foreign policiesand fair and mutually beneficial cooperation with thirdcountries. The EU should not advance its economic andsecurity interests to the detriment of beneficiary countriesand their populations. Contradictions between securityand development goals begin when the object of securityinitiatives becomes merely about the State’s safety,safeguarding EU investments and access to raw materialsrather than the protection of people. Human security andjustice should therefore be considered as basicentitlements and should be provided for the benefit of thepeople in respect of their rights and in response to theirfeeling of insecurity. Human development and humansecurity share four fundamental perspectives: they arepeople-centred; they are multi-dimensional; they havebroad views on human fulfillment in the long term; and theyaddress chronic poverty106.

The human security approach urges institutions like theEEAS to offer protection which is institutionalised,responsive, preventative. In this way, people will faceinevitable downturns “with security”.

It is concerning that countries and regions of strategicimportance to the EU would benefit most from efforts andfinancial support. This would come to the detriment ofcountries and regions where needs are greater, but whichmay be of less strategic interest to the EU. The EEAS isresponsible for European security and will also be closelyinvolved in aid programming. Therefore it is important toensure that the EEAS recognises and abides by the reality

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Despite theeconomic crisis,globalmilitaryspending remainsas high as US$382billion in 2010

The Union's action on the international scene shallbe guided by the principles which have inspired itsown creation, development and enlargement, andwhich it seeks to advance in the wider world:democracy, the rule of law, the universality andindivisibility of Human Rights and fundamentalfreedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles ofequality and solidarity, and respect for the principlesof the United Nations Charter and internationallaw(Art. 21 TFEU)

CONCORD favours the definition of human securityprovided by the International Commission onIntervention and State Sovereignty in its report onthe Responsibility to Protect (2002): Human securitymeans the security of people – their physical safety,their economic and social well-being, respect fortheir dignity and worth as human beings, and theprotection of their human rights and fundamentalfreedoms.

The primacy of human rights is what distinguishesthe human security approach from traditional state-based security approaches. The core of humansecurity is the fundamental rights to life, physicalsafety and freedom from premature and preventabledeath. Human security is often defined as “freedomfrom want and freedom from fear”.

As a broad, flexible and context-specific concept,human security provides a dynamic framework thatenables the development of solutions that areembedded in local realities. An adequate conceptionof human security must comprise not only a workingdefinition of human security, but also an account ofthe process by which individual institutions or nationscan adapt and operationalise the concept to a formthat is relevant to their own institutional capabilitiesand cultural contexts. Unfortunately, both are lackingat EU level for the moment

Right to life, physical safetyand freedom from premature

and preventable death

Art .21, 23 and 208of Lisbon Treaty

EU External Action,Common Foreign andSecurity Policy and

European Security andDefense Policy

framework

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UN SecurityCouncil

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Risk Reduction

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ParisDeclaration andAccra Agenda

for Action on AidEffectiveness

EU SecurityStrategy


that aid driven by regional and global security concerns hashistorically been the least conducive to humandevelopment. The prioritisation of long term conflictprevention that aims to address the root causes of conflictsthrough the adoption of ‘conflict-sensitive’ approaches canbe a way forward. It can ensure the security anddevelopment nexus is a mutually reinforcing dynamic. Therelationship between the concept of human security andCommon Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missionsshould be explored in this regard. The ambivalent conceptof security underlying CSDP missions hampers theireffectiveness. Human security, for which the EU shouldadopt a working definition in line with UN debate, must beclearly endorsed in the mandates of CSDP missions andbe their driving force. Human security should constitute thenexus between short-term and long-term impact ofmissions. The implementation of the commitments madeby the EU should be enhanced by the setting up of theEEAS.

Recommendations:

•Screening of policies and programmes: Conflictsensitivity has been identified as a very importantapproach to contribute to conflict prevention. All EUexternal policies should be subject to an analysis of theirimpact on conflict dynamics and according to a holistichuman security concept that includes the ”EUComprehensive Approach”107 addressing gender inconflict as well as the EU Gender Action Plan’srecommendation related to conflict108.

•Coordination: The EEAS should provide the EU and itsMember States with the ability to coordinate and employthe appropriate range of policies, incentives andinstruments available for complex situations. Whilstupholding its fundamental principles of equality andsolidarity, and respect for the principles of the UnitedNations Charter and international law, including HumanRights. It is crucial that these interventions are inaccordance with the objective of eradication of poverty,as foreseen by the obligation of Policy Coherence forDevelopment (PCD).

•Transparency and Accountability: The EU and itsMember States have a joint responsibility to ensure thatdecision-making processes leading to joint initiatives infavour of peace and human security are transparent anddemocratic. Information on their implementation must bemade available to national and European parliaments andto civil society actors, including Women’s Rightsorganisations, and populations directly or indirectlyconcerned by the operation.

•Security constellations:When elaborating holisticresponses to human security needs, it is necessary toinclude all relevant security providers and proponents in acoordinated effort to strengthen human security. Prioritiesto be addressed should be identified through a survey ofperceived threats to human security by the populationand the intensity of the feeling of insecurity –disaggregated by different target groups. The EEASshould revolve around helping individuals work togetherwith their local civil society networks, communities, andnational governments to improve peoples’ skills inachieving security and in providing different humansecurity strategies.

•Responsible investment policies and monitoring:Responsibility of the EU in developing countries and inparticular in conflict-prone areas should be addressed byregulating all European, or European facilitated,investments to conflict sensitive corporate socialresponsibility principles. Guidelines and monitoringmechanisms should be established in this view for allpublic or private investments supported -even partially orindirectly- or facilitated by EU or Member States publicresources.

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The Joint EC-EEAS paper, European Strategy forSecurity and Development in the Sahel was endorsed byEU Member States in March 2011109. It is the firstgeographic security strategy adopted since theestablishment of the EEAS and provides a good exampleon how internal EU security concerns may influence theway EU development cooperation and funding is usedand targeted; a clear case of lack of coherence fordevelopment.

Both the analytical and programming parts of thestrategy focus exclusively on security issues and areshort at putting them in a broader context ofdevelopment challenges and economic and politicalcooperation at regional level. There is no analysis of pastand current EU cooperation and its possible impact, no‘do no harm’ reflection, no in-depth analysis of the originof the present problems and no discussion onopportunities and aspects of development which are notdirectly related with security. Indeed, the strategy ismainly a response to new urgent priorities with regard toEU security: ”Preventing AQIM (Al-Qaida in the Maghreb))attacks and its potential to carry out attacks on EUterritory, to reduce and contain drug and other criminaltrafficking destined for Europe, to secure lawful trade andcommunication links (roads, pipelines) across the Sahel,North-South and East-West, and to protect existingeconomic interests and create the basis for trade and EUinvestment. Improving security and development in Sahelhas an obvious and direct impact on the EU internalsecurity situation”.

In spite of the regional dimension of the problems and therole to be played by other Sahel and Maghreb countries incountering AQIM threats as well as drug and armstrafficking, the EU strategy focuses on three countriesonly, Mauritania, Mali and Niger. Moreover, while regionalactors like the African Union, the Arab Maghreb Union andthe ECOWAS and its crisis-response mechanism arementioned, the way the EU intends to support them isunclear. The three countries are qualified as ”fragile Stateswith fragile governance and unresolved internaltensions”.This seems to justify the fact that the newstrategy ignores partner countries’ policies and prioritiesor their broader development and political context.

The strategy is mainly based on EU’s expectations andanalysis and, as far as we know, has been developedwithout any consultation of non-State actors orconcerned populations. While 20% only of the 10thEuropean Development Fund (EDF) have been spent sofar in Mali, the EU comes with fresh EDF money to bespent on new priorities with a new geographic focus withthe objective of increasing the three States’ capacities to”fight threats and handle terrorism and organised crime ina more efficient and specialised manner”.

Of course, security is important for development in theSahel, however this strategy fails to analyse and addresslong-term human security and development challenges ofthe region and to take Sahel States and populations’ ownvision and aspirations into account and its long-termimpact on development en human security isconsequently doubtful.


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Case Study: European Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel


It has also failed to mainstream conflict-sensitive practices,for example through the systematic use of conflict analysisto inform Country Strategy elaboration and programmingprocesses, and then monitor and evaluate their impactagainst progress or setbacks on the conflict dynamics.Some good practice exists, but it is still undertaken on anad hoc rather than a systematic basis.

The EU has gradually strengthened its relations with civilsociety on these issues, in order to better link its decisionsto the needs of people and not only that of the State. It hasalso realised in recent years that in order to achieve positivechanges in third countries, it needs to support andempower the actors in broader society to demand bettergovernance and service delivery from their Stateinstitutions, and be in a position to hold the State intoaccount. However, once again, this people-centredperspective, which is central to conflict prevention andhuman security, is not applied systematically enough.

Recommendations:

Ten years after the adoption of the Gothenburgprogramme, the EU should take advantage of theestablishment of the EEAS, to take the necessary steps toensure that conflict prevention becomes central to itsexternal actions, by:• raising awareness across the institutions on the rationale,

benefits and practical implications of mainstreamingconflict prevention;

• setting up the appropriate institutional mechanismsenabling an integrated and conflict-sensitive approach tocountry and regional strategies, programming andassessment across the EU;

• putting more emphasis on strengthening sustainableState-society relations through balanced support to theactors of positive change in the wider society;

2.2 The EU Programme for the Prevention of ViolentConflict

“The Union shall define and pursue common policies andactions, and shall work for a high degree of cooperation inall fields of international relations, in order to (…) preservepeace, prevent conflicts and strengthen internationalsecurity (…)”. Article 21.2-c) TFEU

In 2001, the EU adopted an ambitious Programme on theprevention of violent conflicts, aiming to respond to on-going and emerging challenges around the world110. Oneof the objectives was then to strive for coherence across awide range of policy areas (security, development, trade,etc.) to ensure that, at best, they would mutually reinforcetheir contributions to preventing conflicts, or, at least, thattheir respective implementation would not undermine eachother’s impact. This actually requires that conflictprevention is mainstreamed across all external actioninstruments, which has a number of strategic, institutionaland practical implications. It means that EU policies,strategies and programmes should be more “conflict-sensitive” to avoid doing harm, and to the maximum extentpossible use the opportunities to build long term peace. Inorder to do so, the EU also needs the adequateinstruments and practices, embedded in a conduciveinstitutional culture that will favor a long term preventativeapproach.

However, we are still facing a significant implementationgap whereby the commitments made since 2001 have yetto be translated in concrete and systematic measuresacross the EU institutions, policies and programmingprocesses. Instead, the EU has concentrated its efforts inbuilding short term crisis management and crisis responsecapacities. Whereas these instruments are important inaddressing conflicts around the world in the short term,their contribution cannot be considered as a preventativeresponse, driven by a long term vision.

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3. EU Arms Trade policiesThe export of arms poses a huge threat to human security.Arms are used to kill people and force them to flee. Sellingarms to unstable regions increases the risk of armedviolence breaking out. Huge sums of money that could bespent on health care, education and other public goods arespent on arms. Several EU Member States are large armsexporters, and this is one area where economic and/orsecurity self-interest clearly clash with ambitions forincreased PCD. Despite this, the selling of conventionalarms is not at all addressed in the EU’s PCD WorkProgramme 2010- 2013.

In the period 2006-2010, the USA and Russia were theworld’s largest arms exporters; followed by Germany,France, the UK, the Netherlands, China, Spain, Italy andSweden111. In December 2008, the EU Code of Conducton Arms Trade was converted into the legally bindingCouncil Common Position 2008/944/CFSP definingcommon rules governing the control of exports of militarytechnology and equipment (but it does not includecommercial civilian arms). It states that “Member States aredetermined to prevent the export of military technology andequipment which might be used for internal repression orinternational aggression or contribute to regionalinstability.” However, the Common Position has done littleto prevent EU exports to Human Rights abusers andconflict hotspots. Saudi Arabia received about 20%of theUK’s export of conventional arms in 2010. The EU grantedexport licenses for €834.5 million worth of arms exports toLibya in the first five years after the arms embargo waslifted in October 2004. India and Pakistan have boughtlarge amounts of arms from EU countries despite the factthat they have been engaged in a long-term conflict withone another.

Furthermore, the EU Common Position says that MemberStates must take into account whether the proposedexport would seriously hamper the sustainabledevelopment of the recipient country when assessingapplications for export licenses. Despite this, EU countriessell arms to countries suffering from severe poverty. Forexample, in 2006, Sweden gave the go-ahead to export amilitary radar surveillance system to Pakistan for €814million, which is 12 times more than Pakistan’s annualbudget for water and sanitation112.

The establishment of the EU Common Position has beenaccompanied by development towards a more unifiedEuropean Defence Market113. The 2009 Directive on intra-EU transfers of defence products114 poses newchallenges regarding Member States’ future possibilities tohave full control over the ultimate destination of defenceequipment that leaves the EU via other Member States.

The various research programs, think tanks andparliamentary intergroups which have been involved in thedevelopment of the European CFSP have also beenshown to entail close ties to the largest European defencecompanies. This is a matter of concern for an open andtransparent monitoring of the impact of EU Member Statesarms trade115.

Small arms and light weapons

The problem of small arms and light weapons (SALW)poses a huge threat in many societies, rich and poor.740,000 people are victim of armed violence every year;for the majority of them, i.e. 490,000 persons, this occursin countries that are not affected by armed conflicts116.Armed violence affects all societies, all countries andpeople of all walks of lives. Women are disproportionatelyaffected by gun violence. Although men comprise around90% of deaths by guns, they are almost 100% of thebuyers, sellers and users. Women are also victimised bysexual violence at gunpoint, through threats and othertrauma, and through their role as caregivers and survivors.In this way, armed violence is a heavily genderedphenomenon117. The EU is engaged in the negotiations onthe Arms Trade Treaty, a multi-lateral treaty that wouldcontrol the international trade of conventional weapons,including SALW. It is being officially negotiated within theUN framework and can be a very important step forincreased arms control. In addition, SALW has beenaddressed by the EU in its Strategy to combat illicit tradeand excessive accumulation of SALW and theirammunition in 2005.

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ODA to zones of conflict and fragile States is oftenintegrated in comprehensive approaches that combineforeign policy and diplomacy, development assistance andin some cases military support. Development assistance isin this context frequently seen as an intervention that booststhe impact of other types of support, i.e. military ordiplomatic. More and more countries are in favor ofbroadening the OECD/DAC definition and reportingguidelines of ODA in order to enable military spending to becounted as ODA.

Of specific concern is the practice to use ODA as a forcemultiplier for military support which mostly relates to theAfghan context (see Afghanistan example in the box). SomeEU donors have made their aid conditional on the politicaland military cooperation of communities and aidorganisations. Military forces have been used to deliver aid.Research shows that such use of ODA is costly,exacerbates conflict and produces poor developmentoutcomes in Afghanistan118. In some instances theseinitiatives have also turned beneficiary communities intotargets of attack.

In contrast with the Paris Declaration’s principles on localownership, alignment and mutual accountability, EU crisisresponses and Member States’ comprehensive initiativesare often driven by their own political and security objectivesrather than local needs. Donor-driven agendas also impacton prospects for coordination with other donors,international and regional actors, as well as the local Stateand civil society organisations. When implemented withinthe right framework, development assistance can deliverimportant support in fragile States. Such framework isunder discussion in the International Dialogue on Peace-building and State-building in which fragile States are takinga growing leadership and that produced the MonroviaRoadmap on Peace-building and State-building anchoredon 5 main objectives119:

- Legitimate Politics - Foster inclusive political settlementsand conflict resolution

- Security - Establish and strengthen people’s security

- Justice – Address injustices and increase people’s accessto justice

- Economic foundations – Generate employment andimprove livelihoods

- Revenues and services - Manage revenues and buildcapacity for accountable and fair social service delivery

Recommendations:

• Mechanisms should be put in place to ensure that theprinciples in the EU Common Position on control ofexports of military technology and equipment arerespected. Thus, the EU Member States should keepunder constant review the Human Rights situation incountries to where EU Member States export arms. Theyshould also agree on a list of countries involved in armedconflicts to which arms exports should be banned inprinciple. The EU’s own economic interests must besubordinated to sustainable development and humansecurity in the receiving country.

• In the development of a European Defence Market, it isimportant to further develop and reinforce the existinginstruments in the Common Position with the objective ofachieving an effective EU arms export control mechanismas a complement to the unified European defence market.

• Transfers of conventional arms should be addressed inthe EU’s future PCD Work Programme.

• Regarding the Arms Trade Treaty, the EU should push fora legally binding international instrument establishingcommon international standards for the import, exportsand transfers of conventional weapons. The Treaty shouldrequire State Parties to assess all applications of armstrade against the highest possible standards andparameters, including the respect for Human Rights, theConvention on the Rights of the Child on the involvementof children in armed conflict, and internationalhumanitarian law, and a thorough analysis of the risk ofdiversion to unintended users. The Treaty should includetransparency, monitoring and assistance provisions.

4. Aid Effectiveness in fragile Statesandmilitarisation of aidWhen it is suggested that development aid is used to“promote security”, the key questions are about how it isused, where, and for what purpose. While we must guardagainst the potential negative effects of linking developmentmore closely with security, we must equally recognise aid’spotential to promote increased human security and justice.

Donors increasingly direct development assistance towardsfragile States and zones of conflict. In 2009, OfficialDevelopment Aid (ODA) to fragile States increased of 11%and in total represented one third of all ODA. This increasedcommitment is in accordance with EU and Member States’policies and aid strategies. An increasingly commonrationale used by donors is that ODA should not onlyalleviate poverty but also be fully integrated within foreignpolicy and in some cases combined with defence policy ofMember States.

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25 out 27 EU Member States have contributed to NATO’sAfghanistan ISAF force and provide developmentassistance to the Afghan Government or the trust fundsestablished by the international community. Under theauspices of ‘comprehensive approach’ a large part ofMember States development funding is directed to areasin which the same State has troops. This exposesEuropean development assistance to two types ofdifficulties: i) the coordination of assistance andalignment with national reconstruction directives isvague. Incentives and priorities of the individual EU Stateoften take precedence on the Afghan NationalDevelopment Strategy (ANDS); ii) several States try anduse development assistance as a ‘force multiplier’ fordiplomatic and military efforts.

The Peace and Reintegration Trust fund serves as a goodexample of challenges inherent in securitisation of aid.The trust fund was developed in 2010 to act as a newsoft counterinsurgency tool. Low-level opposition groupfighters would be given jobs and vocational training inexchange for allegiance towards the Afghan government.As such, development aid in the thematic area ofvocational training was connected to military strategy.Despite the fact that vocational training is a nationaldevelopment priority that features in the ANDS, itsconnection to military aims confuses the implementationof any new project. Is the implementing agency workingto support community based capacities or is it trying todiminish the recruitment base of armed oppositiongroups? Furthermore the question is whether thedecisions to implement vocational training programs arebased on local needs or the strategic value of specificdistricts in the counterinsurgency campaign.

The development of the trust fund and its implementationis also problematic from the perspective of Afghanwomen and the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on

women, peace and security. Women were only marginallyinvolved in the decision-making process leading up to theAfghan Peace and Reintegration plan and the trust fund.Grave concerns therefore remain as to how the trust fundwill affect women’s position in local communities.

With regards to participation, Afghan women have beenmarginalised throughout the decision-making process. Atthe London Conference in January 2010 and the Kabulconference in July 2010, women participants werebasically ignored by organisers. On its own initiative, theAfghan Women’s Network (AWN) prepared a statement,and one representative was invited to read it at theconference. Any funding for peace and reintegrationefforts in Afghanistan should be conditioned to themeaningful participation and involvement of women inhigh negotiation and decision-making bodies. Womenshould be consulted and their needs and rights must beconsidered in the design and implementation ofprogrammes funded by the Peace and Reintegration TrustFund.

Sources: Human RightsWatch (July 2010) The Ten-Dollar Talib andWomen’sRights. AfghanWomen and the Risk of Reintegration and Reconciliation;Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies (October 2010) AfghanWomenSpeak. Enhancing Security and Human Rights in Afghanistan; CARE(October 2010) FromResolution to Reality. Lessons learnt from Afghanistan,Nepal and Uganda onwomen’s participation in peacebuilding and post-conflict governance.


Case Study: Afghanistan - Aid and civil-military relations


Recommendations:

• There should be no further erosion of the civiliancharacter of development cooperation and ODA throughthe inclusion of military or quasi-military expenditures orthe channeling of aid through military actors.

•Assistance to fragile States and States in conflict by ECand other EU donors, should be delivered in accordancewith the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda of Action onaid effectiveness, the Council conclusions on EUresponse to situations of fragility (2007) and the OECDDAC Principles for Good International Engagement inFragile States and Situations.

•The EU should adopt the long awaited plan of action onthe situation of fragility and conflict, with the objective ofdeveloping concepts and guiding principles for the EU'srole in situations of fragility. In doing so, it should take intoaccount the principles and objectives of the MonroviaRoadmap on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding developedin the context of the International Dialogue onPeacebuilding and Statebuilding as well as the DACguidance on State building, transition financing and riskmanagement in fragile situations. It should also complywith the PCD obligation.

•The main focus of attention in fragile situations should bepeople and their security. The EU should facilitate andpromote credible and transparent processes of politicaldialogue and negotiation. Such processes must allow allinterest groups in the society to voice their concerns andbe taken into the process in a manner that builds trust inthe political process. Special attention, within this focus,should be paid to the so called "invisibles", themarginalised and discriminated communities, groups orsections in a society, i.e.people in a particularly vulnerableposition due to a lack of rights.

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Labourmigration andintegration that benefitsdevelopment

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The arrival of approximately 48,000 migrantsfrom the Maghreb in Italy and Malta in the first halfof 2011 has again put migration at the centre ofEU policy considerations and debates.

The EU currently hosts around 31.8 millionmigrants (37% come from other Europeancountries, 25% from Africa, 20% from Asia, 17%from Americas and 1% from Oceania) with anincreasing migratory pressure on the EU’sSouthern and Eastern borders120. It is estimatedthat between 6% and 15% of the total number ofmigrants in the EU are irregular migrants121.

CONCORD approaches the question of thecoherence of migration policy with developmentobjectives by analysing what has influencedmigrants’ choices in their pursuit of a decentliving. In particular we look at how migrants fromdeveloping countries were enabled or hinderedto exercise their full rights and to participatepositively in the development process of theircountry of origin – all along the migration journey.

While ‘decent work’ is a development objectiveand a specific Millennium Development Goal,which the EU committed to achieve122, lack ofdecent work remains a major push factor oflabour migration. When migrants arrive to theirdestination, their integration in the host country isa real challenge. Their low access to adequateemployment jeopardizes migrants’ capacity toparticipate in their country of origin developmentand to fully enjoy their rights. The currentrestrictive approach to EU migration policy posesadditional obstacles, because of its lack ofconsideration for development implications andHuman Rights requirements.

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1. A Human Rights-Based Approach to thelinks between migration, decent work anddevelopmentA Human Rights-Based Approach to migration and decentwork means putting people as rights holders at the centre ofanalysis. People choose to exercise their right to migratefrom or to stay in their country; but whatever their decision,their rights to live their life with dignity should be respected.This also entails that irrespective of their legal status,migrants should not be subject to exploitation, or precariousand unsafe working conditions. Furthermore, adevelopment dimension implies that the systematic respectof migrant workers’ Human Rights all along the migrationjourney is key to enable these migrants to become actors ofchange in both their countries of origin and their receivingcountries.

1.1 Universal Human Rights applicable to migrants

Migrants are protected by the core Human Rights treaties123

because this body of law applies to ‘everyone’ and isuniversal in its application. Thus, just like for everyone,migrants enjoy freedom from abuses such as slavery, forcedlabour and child labour. They have the right to equality; tofreedom of religion and belief; to the progressive realisationof social, economic and cultural rights, including health,housing and education; as well as to labour rights such ascollective bargaining, workers compensation, socialsecurity, and a just and affordable working environment.

These rights apply to everyone irrespective of one’snationality and must be guaranteed without discriminationbetween citizens and aliens. A basic principle of HumanRights is that entering a country in violation of immigrationlaws does not deprive an irregular migrant of his or her mostfundamental Human Rights, nor does it erase the obligationof the host State to protect these individuals.

In Europe too, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of theEuropean Union foresees fundamental rights applying toeveryone and therefore including migrants.

1.2 Labour rights

Workers’ rights are also addressed in a wide range ofuniversal standards, some specifically addressing thesituation of migrant workers. Migrant workers arespecifically protected in a number of internationalconventions, namely the ILO Convention 97 on Migrationfor Employment and ILO Convention 143 (supplementaryprovisions) on Migrant Workers and the UN Convention onthe Protection of the Rights of Migrant Workers and TheirFamilies. But none of the EU Member States have ratifiedthem yet.

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Universal HumanRightsapply toeveryoneirrespectiveof one’s nationalityormigration status.

Labour Migration and Development

Migrants are protected by the core HumanRights treaties because this body of lawapplies to ‘everyone’ and is universal in itsapplication. These rights apply to everyoneirrespective of one’s nationality and must beguaranteed without discrimination betweencitizens and aliens. A basic principle of HumanRights is that entering a country in violation ofimmigration laws does not deprive an irregularmigrant of his or her most fundamental HumanRights, nor does it erase the obligation of thehost State to protect these individuals.

In Europe too, the Charter of FundamentalRights of the European Union foreseesfundamental rights applying to everyone andtherefore including migrants.

Workers’ rights are also addressed in a widerange of universal standards: some of themspecifically address the situation of migrantworkers. Migrant workers are specificallyprotected in a number of internationalconventions protecting, namely the ILOConvention 97 on Migration for Employmentand ILO Convention 143 (supplementaryprovisions) on Migrant Workers and the UNConvention on the Protection of the Rights ofMigrant Workers and Their Families. But noneof the EU Member State have ratified it yet.

EU GlobalApproach to

Migration

UN HumanRights instrumentsILO conventions

relevant to migrant workersUN Convention on theProtection of the Rights

of Migrant Workersand TheirFamilies

EUdevelopment

policy

Migration,Mobility andEmploymentPartnerships

EU policy onMigration andDevelopment

EUlabour

migrationpolicy

MillenniumDevelopment

Goals

EUIntegration

Agenda

Right to migrateRight to equal treatment

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2. Labour issues in the external and internaldimensions of migration and developmentThe benefits of migration depend on the degree to whichmigrants are protected and empowered by countries fromwhich they come from and the Member States in whichthey live and work, regardless of their legal status. In boththe external and internal dimensions of the migration anddevelopment nexus, decent work is a key analytical factorwhich EU public policies need to address in more depth, inthe spirit of the principle of Policy Coherence forDevelopment (PCD).

2.1 External dimension: poverty and lack of decentwork opportunities as push factors of forcedmigration

Poverty as well as the lack of decent work are major drivingforces behind international migration, particularly in thedeveloping world. In fact, 90% of the total internationalmigrants, estimated by the International LabourOrganisation at 214 million in 2010, are migrant workersand their families. The majority of these are low skilled,seeking a more prosperous life124.

Decent work sums up the aspirations of people in theirworking lives – for opportunity and decent income; labourrights, voice and recognition; personal development; aswell as non-discrimination including gender equality. Arecurring statement by migrants interviewed for theSOLIDAR research “Through the eyes of migrants -Thesearch for Decent Work”, is that they would have stayed intheir home countries if they could earn enough to live onand support their families.

2.2 Internal dimension: adequate employment for asuccessful integration of migrants

The integration of migrants in EU Member States isdetermined to a large extent by their opportunities toactively participate in gainful employment, afford a decentliving and actively participate in all spheres of society.Research findings have highlighted the “capabilityapproach“ or the ability of individuals to pursue and realizethe goals they value. Integration stands as “thedevelopment and use of capabilities for participating on anequal footing to the sharing of prosperity and well being”125.

Barriers continue to prevent residents of third countrynationals for short or long term stays to participate in thelabor market of the Member States of the essentialintegration, as demonstrated by numerous reports of theEuropean Agency of Fundamental Rights Studies. TheILO126 confirmed the existence of large and persistent

patterns of structural discrimination and disadvantagesaffecting migrants in the EU. Even when scarcity of datamakes it difficult to provide precise statistical evidence,several reports confirm that in most EU Member Statesmigrants have much lower labour force participation andemployment rates than the majority of workers fromEU/EEA countries. In some Member States, migrants fromnon EU countries have activity rates that are 15-40%below that of the majority of the population. The samepatterns of distinct disadvantages apply to the situation ofethnic and religious minorities when it comes to income,wages and salaries when marked differences betweennationals and migrants can be observed in all EU MemberStates127.

National labour markets are highly segmented alongnational or ethnic lines where a majority of third countrynationals are employed in low skilled, low paid professionsand experience dangerous working conditions.Furthermore, the lack of recognition of foreign diplomasleads to a phenomenon of brain waste, where qualifiedmigrants are employed in low-qualified jobs.

Irregular migrants are more likely than other migrants toexperience precarious working conditions, socialexclusion and a situation of dependence vis-a-vis theiremployer in a grey legal area affording no social and healthsecurity welfare, or labour rights protection againstmistreatment and exploitation128. An example of this is thedomestic work sector, a major source of employment forundocumented migrant workers. In fact, in industrialisedcountries, domestic work accounts for between 5 and 9 %of all employment, with the vast majority of these workersbeing women.129

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in some EUMemberStates, migrantsfromnon-EUcountries haveactivity rates thatare 15 to 40%belowthat of themajorityof the population


3. Assessment of relevant EU policies andrecommendations for greater coherence fordevelopmentThe entry into force of the Treaty on the Functioning of theEuropean Union, with its article 79 specific on migration,has ensured a stable, comprehensive and moreaccountable legal framework for the development of EUmigration policy, through a greater involvement of theEuropean Parliament in the decision making process.

While rhetoric about the linkages between migration anddevelopment is increasingly used, a common trend in EUinitiatives is their focus on managing migration flows withthe view to realize the EU’s unilateral economic objectives.Yet the full potential has not been fully explored for themigration and development nexus for a triple win: thebenefits of the migrants themselves, for the host countryand their country of origin.

To change this, coherent EU internal and external policiesas well as related binding instruments are necessary.

3.1 The EU Global Approach onMigration

At the time of writing this report, migration policy is in atransitory phase since the European Commission willannounce before the end of 2011 the future direction of theGlobal Approach to Migration (GAM) that was adopted bythe European Council in 2005130. However, recentlyadopted strategic documents already reveal a consistenttrend in the EU’s approach to migration policy, whichreflects a restrictive vision centred on economic anddemographic considerations, and largely discarding thehuman dimension and migrants’ rights.

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SOLIDAR and its partners carried out case studies insix countries, investigating migrants’ reasons forsearching for jobs abroad and the reality of decentwork in Europe and in their homes in developingcountries.

Living and working at home in the Philippines

The current daily minimum wage in the Philippinesamounts to 404 Philippine pesos (6.75 Euros) per day,yet the National Wages and Productivity Commissionestimates that the minimum living wage should beabout 917 pesos (15.31 Euros) per day.

Aida left as soon as she finished her studies to work inKuwait, Hong Kong and Italy. She took this decisiontogether with her husband as he could not find a job inthe Philippines. Instead he agreed to take care of theirchildren while Aida has been working abroad.

Living and working in Europe

Working in Europe enabled the migrant workersinterviewed to double their income. Anita earnsbetween 600-800 Euros a month as a freelancedomestic worker in Italy. A huge increase compared toHK$400 (40 Euros) monthly salary in Hong Kong. Pazwas able to supplement her 100 euro salary in Franceby taking part-time jobs such as dog-walking, etc

In addition to the cost of travel, the stringent entryregulations in Europe also make it difficult for Filipinodomestic workers to enter Europe, leading some toresort to a “backdoor” entry. Anita’s case is a classicexample of a backdoor entry to Europe. She paid ahuge amount for a fake employer in Hong Kong whothen arranged for her Schengen visa to Europe. Herpapers identified her as travelling with an employer ona holiday in Europe. Anita flew via Moscow and Paristo Italy then procured a tourist visa and worked as afreelance domestic worker.

Source: SOLIDAR (2010) Through the eyes of migrants – The search fordecent workhttp://cms.horus.be/files/99931/MediaArchive/Migration_CaseStudies_web.pdf


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Case Study: Through the eyes ofmigrants – The search for decentwork


The Justice and Home Affairs Council in June 2011concluded that the GAM should aim at the immediateneighbourhood of the Union, together with other “selectedsignificant source and transit countries of migration flows”131. The European Commission’s Communication “Adialogue for migration, mobility and security with thesouthern Mediterranean countries” demonstrated a strongfocus on the use of leverages such as visa and mobilityprivileges in return for better border management andparticipation in readmissions programmes132. The June2011 European Council also supported and reinforcedsuch a conditionality approach133.

All these statements lead to a question of prevailinginterests: if policy proposals are to represent a true“mutual benefit” of both EU and its (selected) partners,as suggested by the broad rhetoric in the samedocuments, there should be no need for such extensiveuse of leverages. It is clear that the EU’s priority is set onserving the unilateral economic interests of the EU,including the management of migration flows, rather thanreflecting a sincere concern to protect Human Rights andassisting developing countries in line with EU’scommitment to PCD.

Other policy developments corroborate this view. Forinstance, the Europe 2020 Strategy adopted in 2015134

has a key Strategy Goal to reach 75% level of employmentin the EU. This can only be achieved through capitalising onhighly skilled labour migration. Yet, so far the EU has notmade it clear how it intends to reconcile this strategy withsupporting inclusive growth and avoiding brain drain indeveloping countries.

The direction of the migration debate sparked by the 2011events in the Mediterranean confirms our analysis: bordersecurity, skilled migration and re-admission are currentpriorities. At the same time, the push factors of forcedmigration - including poverty, unemployment, lack ofdecent work opportunities, climate change, persecution,conflict, or political repression - are insufficientlyaddressed.

In such context of increased focus on border security andskilled migration, it is feared that the crucial developmentdimension of migration and the connection with the EUCharter of Fundamental Rights could be sidelined in futureEU migration policy deliberations and the revision of theGAM. It becomes clear that a paradigm shift is necessaryto bring PCD into the EU migration policy framework.

The NGOs’ experience from the ground demonstrates thatthe strong focus on border management and combatingillegal migration does not prevent people from crossingborders. Instead, it results in people travelling and living ininsecure situations, without access to basic services,where their fundamental rights are exposed to violation.

The right balance in the future GAM will be to open legalchannels for migration, while ensuring the protection ofmigrants’ rights. This should go in tandem with measuresaiming at stimulating inclusive growth and sharing itsbenefits in the EU and in developing countries.

‘Circular migration’, understood as a possibility formigrants to freely travel and reside between the country oforigin and their destination - rather than a restricted, likelyconditional, back and forth movement or a return migration– is instrumental in striking this balance. The NGOs workingdirectly with migrants report that migrants’ potential toinvest in their countries of origin is strengthened andcapitalised on the most when they enjoy a secureresidence status and do not have to worry about losingsocial rights. The right to move freely between country ofresidence and of origin, is the most conducive forestablishing income generating activities through whichmigrants can transfer knowledge and generate jobs backhome. Such an approach would be in line with the PCDprinciple. Circular migration should be a central point of theGAM revision.

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The revision of the GAM should be used as an opportunityto emphasise the inter-linkages with other policy areas.This should be done instead developing parallel policyinitiatives which might lead to increased policyincoherence, duplication and inefficient use of limitedresources. The priority of the development pillar of theGAM – improving synergies between migration anddevelopment - needs to be based on the connectionbetween development, migration and non-discriminationpolicies.

In addition, the international and EU Human Rightsframeworks and regulations that are related to migrantsneed to be referred to, drawing from the conviction thatensuring full Human Rights facilitates social cohesion. Thespecificity of women’s migration and the rights of migrantwomen must be addressed too.

Recommendations:

In the context of the revision of the GAM:

•A common EU approach to migrant’s rights must beadopted. This encompasses equal treatment of migrantswith EU citizens, the portability of social rights, collectivebargaining, social protection and access to lifelonglearning.

•The future GAM must make explicit references to HumanRights legal frameworks. Special attention to migrantwomen’s rights.

•The ‘targets’ set in the EU PCD Work Programme135

should be part of the political basis in the GAM revisionprocess. In particular the target consisting in seeking“further progress in the definition and implementation of acommon approach to migrants’ rights”.

• In order to improve the GAM coherence withdevelopment, policy inter linkages between development,migration and non-discrimination policies must beaddressed.

•The EU should establish genuine circular migrationschemes for both highly-qualified and low-skilledmigrants.

3.2 Mobility Partnerships

The main instruments of the GAM are the MobilityPartnerships136, which so far have been signed with CapeVerde, Moldova, Georgia and Ghana. MobilityPartnerships have been presented as a long-term policystrategy in reaction to the 2011 events in theMediterranean137, and negotiations are ongoing withEgypt, Tunisia and Morocco.

The EU views Mobility Partnerships as “a long-termframework based on political dialogue and operationalcooperation” with the aim to regularise and institutionalisemigration flows. Yet their soft law nature as well as plannedEU imposed conditionality in negotiations, raises thequestion as to whether Mobility Partnerships areconsistent policy tools with regard to the developmentpillar of the GAM and the push factors of forced migration.

Take the example of the Mobility Partnerships signed withCap Verde, Georgia and Moldova. Their primary objectiveseems to be meeting the unilateral interests of the EU;reinforcing border controls with these countries of transitfor migration routes from the Sahel region and fromCentral and Southern Asia respectively.

The review of the GAM should be the opportunity to verifythe common baseline and the objectives of such aninstrument, in order to bring it in line with Human Rightslegal frameworks.

At the same time, their implementation should be adaptedaccording to the situation of the partner country vis-à-visthe EU and vis-à-vis its regional partners. The EU shouldbe attentive not to impede regional integration (includingmovement of people) in other parts of the world.

Recommendations:

The normative framework for Mobility Partnershipsshould be clarified to ensure that they are based onthe internationally-agreed Human Rights Conventionsand EU obligations. They should support the developmentobjectives of the partner country, preserving andpromoting the rights of its population and Diasporaabroad.


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3.4 European Agenda for Integration

Establishing equality and meaningful integration ofmigrants in European host societies continues to be one ofthe key challenges facing EU Member States. It closelyintersects with migration as a priority area in PCD.

To make migration work for development, the EU needs toaddress the linkages between migrants’ social inclusion,non discrimination and integration strategies at large for thebenefit of the countries of destination and countries oforigin.

The European Commission’s European agenda for theintegration of third country nationals141 released in July2011 recognises that the most pressing challenges tomigrants’ integration include:

• the prevailing low employment levels of migrants,especially for migrant women,

• the rising unemployment and high levels of overqualification,

• the increasing risks of social exclusion and the gaps ineducational achievement.

In this context, the EU and its Member States have a criticalrole to play to ensure that the Europe 2020 Strategysucceeds in creating inclusive labour markets that addressthe needs of the most vulnerable groups, includingmigrants. The existence of the EU’s Equality Directives andthe broader recognition in diverse European public policiesof the needs to foster equality in the context of labourmarket activation are not enough.

It is positive to note that the EU Integration Agendaacknowledges the external dimension of integrationpolicies. Notably the link needed with the country of originas regards better pre-departure measures, beneficialcontacts between Diaspora communities and theircountries of origin as well as circular migration schemes.

3.3 International Labour Rights Standards fordecent work

In the current migration policy debate at EU level, there areonly vague references to the push-factor of forcedmigration from developing countries, in terms of lack ofdecent work in the countries of origin. This indicates arather inconsistent EU approach since, in parallel, the EU iscommitted to promoting decent work and social protectionworldwide138. Consequently, to effectively promote thedevelopment pillar of the GAM, the EU will have to put theadvancement of international labour rights standards andtheir comprehensive ratification at the centre of relatedpolicy deliberations, as well as their implementation by EUMember States.

The EU has robust legislation on non-discrimination139 andhas ratified a large number of international conventions andinstruments relating to human and migrants’ rights. Theirproper enforcement to all persons residing on EU territorymust be largely improved.

However, this protection system lacks an importantelement: no Member States has yet ratified the UNConvention on the Protection of the Rights of MigrantWorkers and Their Families140.

Recommendations:

• The EU should ensure the full implementation ofprovisions contained in the EU non-discriminationlegislation, international instruments protecting HumanRights, the recommendations of the Council of Europeconcerning the protection of migrant workers and ILOconventions.

• The EU Member States should sign, ratify and implementthe UN International Convention for the Protection ofMigrant Workers and their families.

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Older migrants from Senegal living in France in thevillage of Thialy had set up associations aiming atproviding support to their village of origins withinvestment in basic social infrastructure such as primaryschools, drinking water or health services.

Their children, the second generation of young peopleborn in France, became aware of the positive impact ofthe projects carried out by their parents in their homevillage. As a result, they decided to organise a trip backto Senegal to better understand the migration history oftheir parents and the work undertaken by theirassociations. This is how the association “Nouvel Espoirde Thialy” was formed in 2008, bringing together morethan fifty members, all from the village of Thialy. Adelegation of young people born in France went toSenegal to grasp the realities of villages that most ofthem did not know. They decided to invest in a schoolproject, building on the successful past projectdeveloped by their parents. To mobilise support for thisproject, these young people carried out developmenteducation projects concentrating on the migrationpathway of their parents and their integration in theFrench society. In doing so, they were themselvesbetter able to apprehend their parents’ migration historyin a positive light.

Through the “New Hope from Thialy” association, notonly a school project was successfully achieved butalso, second-generation migrants managed to becomecredible interfaces of the French local public authoritieson various thematic subjects related to migrationroutes.

Source: EUNOMAD (2010) Migration and Development. European Guideto Practices.


Now, there is a need to establish policy linkages betweenthe GAM, including its development pillar, and theintegration debate; a connection that has been overlookedso far and absent in the EU’s PCD Work Programme 2010-2013.

The current restrictive and conservative debate onmigration does not make it easy. The links betweensecurity, criminality and migration have increasinglybecome part of discourse of mainstream populist politicalparties and widely relayed by the media. According tovarious studies and EU polls, this has contributed tonegative perceptions of migrants and asylum seekers inpublic opinion142. This is why making the positivecontribution of migrants to host societies more visibleshould be an essential component of any integration policy.

In receiving countries, migrant associations alreadycontribute greatly to the process of integration of migrantcommunities. Moreover, multilateral projects promoted bycivil society in the area of co-development show thatmigrants, diasporas and their organisations can play a roleof "intercultural facilitators". This is essential fordevelopment and partnerships between host countriesand countries of origin. These initiatives need to besupported.


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Case Study: Second-generationSenegalese migrants inFrance pursuing their parents’cooperation with ‘their’home villages

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In this context, the dynamics of migrant integration inEuropean host societies plays a fundamental role in thecreation of cohesive social environments that can preparethe ground for sustainable co-development. This requiresbetter coordination of civil society consultation processes;better policy mainstreaming and linkages between projectsfunded in the area of migration, asylum, development andintegration. What is needed is “shared interest, genuinereciprocity” which is the basis of the “triple win” (migrants,countries of origin and receiving countries).

Recommendations:

•The external dimension of the Integration Agenda shouldbe approached in a more holistic way - and well beyondthe issue of pre-departure measures - looking at it fromthe perspective of the migrant in the country of origin.

•Any conditions to the right to migrate should be removed;these include too stringent pre-departure provisions.

•The EU institutions should organise more knowledgesharing on external dimension of integration, invitingdiverse stakeholders from development and migrationbackgrounds.

•Migrants’ integration should be addressed in the EU’sfuture PCD Work Programme as an area of public policythat is key in contributing to an effective migration anddevelopment nexus.

4. Conclusion: the need for a social and legalprotection agenda for migrantsThe majority of migrants constitute a very vulnerable groupthat is driven by the lack of decent work opportunities andfaces an “exploitation trap” in receiving societies.

To break this trap, a new paradigm should be adopted,based on a sustainable development-focused, migrant-centered and rights-based approach to migration. Respectfor universal Human Rights, the ratification and effectiveimplementation of international labour standards and theachievement of MDG 1 B should drive policy efforts.

A firm, legally binding catalogue of coherent policies needsto be devised, while the implementation of social and legalprotection of migrants has to improve in the EU as well asglobally. To this end, the EU should use its internationalleverage in promoting international standards protectingmigrant workers.

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SpotlightonPolicyCoherenceforDevelopment

66

ACP: African, Caribbean and Pacific Groupof States

ANDS: Afghan National DevelopmentStrategy

AoA: Agreement on Agriculture

AQIM: Al-Qaida in the Maghreb

AWN: Afghan Women’s Network

CAP: Common Agricultural Policy

CFS: Committee on world Food Security

CFSP: Common Foreign and SecurityPolicy

CRMW: Convention on the Protection ofthe Rights of Migrant Workers and TheirFamilies

CSM: Civil Society Mechanism

CSOs: Civil Society Organisations

DAC: Development Assistance Committee

DEVE: European Parliament Committee onDevelopment

EC: European Commission

ECDPM: European Centre forDevelopment Policy Management

ECOWAS: Economic Community Of WestAfrican States

EDF: European Development Fund

EEA: European Economic Area

EEAS: European External Action Service

EP: European Parliament

EU: European Union

DG DEVCO: Directorate GeneralDevelopment Cooperation

FAO: Food and Agriculture Organisation

GAM: Global Approach to Migration

GDP: Gross Domestic Product

GEF: Global Environment Facility

GSF: Global Strategic Framework

HLF4 in Busan: High Level Forum on AidEffectiveness Four in Busan, South Korea

HRBA: Human Rights-Based Approach

IA: Impact Assessment

IAASTD: International Assessment ofAgricultural Knowledge, Science andTechnology for Development

ICESCR: International Covenant onEconomic, Social and Cultural Rights

ILO: International Labour Organization

IPCC: Intergovernmental Panel on ClimateChange

ISAF: International Security AssistanceForce

JPA: Joint Parliamentary Assembly

LDC: Least Developed Countries

MEP: Member European Parliament

MDGs: Millennium Development Goals

MiFiD: Markets in Financial InstrumentsDirective

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NGDO: Non-Governmental DevelopmentOrganisation

NGO: Non-Governmental Organisation

ODA: Official Development Assistance

OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

PCD: Policy Coherence for Development

RED: Renewable Energy Directive

RMI: Raw Materials Initiative

SALW: Small Arms and Light Weapons

TFEU: Treaty on the Functioning of theEuropean Union

UK: United Kingdom

UN United Nations

UNDP: United Nations DevelopmentProgramme

UNEP: United Nations EnvironmentProgramme

UNESCO: United Nations Educational,Scientific and Cultural Organization

UNSCR: United Nations Security Councilresolution

WHO: World Health Organization

WTO: World Trade Organization

List of acronyms


CONCORD's first reportSpotlight on PolicyCoherence was publishedin 2009. Thematic chaptersincluded: climate change,trade, agriculture, migrationand finance. Nationalprofiles covered: Belgium,the Czech Republic, theNetherlands,Sweden.

Find out the latest information on PCDand read our report online on ourdedicated website:

www.coherence.concordeurope.org

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Spotlight onEUPolicy Coherencefor DevelopmentA Lisbon Treaty ProvisionA Human Rights obligation

NW Action Aid InternationalNW ADRAAS ALDANW APRODEVNP Austria: Globale VerantwortungNP CONCORD BelgiumNP Bulgaria: BPIDNW CARE InternationalNW Caritas EuropaNW CBM InternationalNW CIDSENP Czech Republic: FoRSNP Cyprus: CYINDEPNP CONCORD DenmarkNP Estonia: AKU

NW EU-CORDNW EurostepNP Finland: KehysNP France: Coordination SUDNP Germany : VENRONP Greece: Hellenic Committee of NGOsNP Hungary : HANDNW IPPF European NetworkNW Islamic Relief WorldwideNW Handicap InternationalNP Ireland: DochasNP Italy: ONG ItalianeNP Latvia: LapasNP Luxembourg: CercleNP Malta: SKOP

NP Netherlands: PartosNW Oxfam InternationalNW Plan InternationalNP Poland: Grupa ZagranicaNP Portugal: Plataforma ONGDNP Romania: FONDNW Save the Children InternationalNP Slovakia: MVRONP Slovenia: SLOGANW SolidarNP Spain: CoNgDeNP CONCORD SwedenNW Terres des hommes FINP United Kingdom: BONDNW World Vision International

This report is co-financed by the European Union. The views expressedin this publication do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the EuropeanCommission.

Publisher:O. Consolo, CONCORD, 10 square Ambiorix,B-1000 Brussels. November 2011.

CONCORD a.i.s.b.l.: 10 square Ambiorix - 1000 Brussels,Belgium - Tel: +32 2 743 87 60 - Fax: +32 2 732 19 34.

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