spoudaios and teleology in the poetics

8/10/2019 Spoudaios and Teleology in the Poetics

1/19

merican Philological ssociation

and Teleology in the PoeticsAuthor(s): George F. HeldSource: Transactions of the American Philological Association (1974-), Vol. 114 (1984), pp. 159-176Published by: The Johns Hopkins University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/284145.

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2/19

Transactions

f

theAmerican

hilological

ssociation

14

1984)159-176

IHOYz?AIOI

AND

TELEOLOGY

IN

THE

POETICS

GEORGE F. HELD

Universityf Missouri

"Thoughthe Greeks

reated

tragedy,

. .

they

never

developed

a

theory

f

thetragicwhich, eachingbeyondthephenomenon fdrama,might ouch

on

man's

spiritual ttitudetowards

the world

as

a whole."'

Though

the

Greeks did

develop

theories f

tragedy,

hey

did

not,

n

Lesky's opinion,

develop any

whichevinces

"conception

f the

tragic

n the

modern,

more

philosophical

ense."2

mplicit

n

these statements s

Lesky's acceptance

of

Kommerell's conclusions

bout

Aristotle's

iew

of

tragedy,

.g.,

that

tragedy

or

Aristotle

s

ust

tage tragedy

"die

angefuhrte

rag6die")3

nd

that Aristotle n the Poetics

(unlike Horace

in

the Ars

Poetica)

is not

concerned to informpoetshow theyare to conceive ("angreifen")what

they

create.4Kommerell

concludes fromthe

manner

n

which

Aristotle

defines

ragedy

hat

he

does not

think f

tragedy

s a

thing

n

itself;

t

is

merely

a

basis

("Anlage") for the

production

f a

particular

ffect, .e.,

catharsis,

and,

as

such, is

merely a

formless

potentiality,which is

conceivable

only

in

relation

to

its effect.5 he

art of the

tragedian

is,

therefore, or Aristotle

to use

Kommerell'sown

examples)

like eyesight

rather

hanthe art

of

building.6 n both

there s

a passingfrom

otentiality

to

actuality,but whereas in

the latter

this

process produces

not

merely

building tself, ut concrete ndividualbuildings, n the formerwhat is

produced is

merely an

effect,

ight itself.

Aristotle,

e asserts,

has no

general

aesthetic

oncept or

quality n

mind to

which he

would

relate all

1

Albin

Lesky, Greek

Tragedy,

transl.

H.

A. Frankfort

London

1967)

4.

Quotations of

Greek

texts

herein will be

taken from

he

Oxford

Classical

Texts unless

otherwisenoted.

I

wishto

thank

he TAPA

referee or

his

helpful

riticisms

nd

especiallymy

dissertation

directors,D. J.Mastronarde nd M. Griffith,ortheirhelpful criticisms nd theiropen-

mindedness n

allowing me in

my

dissertation o

broach

the

speculative

subject

discussed

herein.

2

Lesky

(above, note

1)

6.

3

Max

Kommerell,

essing

und

Aristoteles

Frankfort

957) 58.

4

Kommerell

above,

note3)

55.

5

See

Kommerell

above,

note 3) 58-60.

6

Kommerell

above, note

3)

60.

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3/19

160

George

F.

Held

particular

xamples

of tragedy.

His

approach throughout

he

Poetics is

historical nd descriptive, is

sole purpose

Beobachtetes

u erklaren."8

Kommerell's nd Lesky'sconclusions bout Aristotle's iewof tragedy

have gone unchallenged

n the scholarly

iterature;

nd at least some

of

themhave sufficiently

ained

acceptance to reappear

n the works f other

scholars

as if

established

fact. Golden,

for

example, posits

without

argument hat

Aristotle id

not distinguish

etween tragedy

nd comedy

"on

the

basisof any essential

ualityof the action

tself."9

hisview is

also

held

by Schuetrumpf.10

esky's

opinions re

also implicitly

ndorsed

by

Else,

who

holds

that

"Aristotle

hought he pathos

the

basic, ndispensable

'part'

of the tragic plot,""1

nd

Jones,who concludes

that"what Aristotle

finds ssentiallyragic" s changeof fortune.'2 o theory f tragedywhich

makes

pathos

or change

of fortune he

onlyessential

lement

n

tragedy

can be said

to be "philosophical"

r to "touch on

man's spiritual

ttitude

towardsthe world

as a whole."

Yet there s

considerable

vidence

that

Kommerell

nd Lesky

have overstated

heir ase-and

notmerely ecause

the Poetics

is

too

informal

nd provisional

document

for the strict-

constructionisteading

f

t

n which hey

ndulge.

My

subsequentpresentation

f this

vidence

falls

ntotwo

main

parts.

In the firstdiscussAristotle's efinitionfcomedy.Kommerell nd Lesky

base their onclusions

bout

Aristotle'smodes

of thought

n

regard

to art

solely upon

the

manner of his

definition

f

tragedy. They

completely

ignore

his definition

f

comedy

n

which

Aristotle

emonstrates

he

very

modes of thought

f which

they

ssert

him

to

be

incapable.

In

the

second

part

I

argue

that

o--rov8aZos9,

avAXos

nd

yEXoios

are

for

Aristotle

teleological

erms

nd that

hisusage

of them

n

the

definitions

f

tragedy

and comedy

s evidence

thathe

means todistinguish

etween

ragedy

nd

comedy

longteleological

ines.

Tragedy

s

an imitation f an action

which

is significantlyelldirected owardman'sproper nd, happiness; omedy

is

an imitationof

an

action

of the

opposite

sort.

This is

not

the

only

distinction

hich

Aristotle ould

draw between

he

actions f

tragedy

nd

comedy-and

for

hatreason s

not

nearly

s

paradoxical

s it

may

seem.

t

is,

moreover,

distinction

hich

s

obviously philosophical"

n

nature,

nd

just

s obviously

an apply

to actions

ff

s well

as

on the

tage.

7

Cf. Kommerell

above,

note 3)

55:

"Ebenso

ist eine

Begrundung

der

Kunst

aus

der

Kunstheraus, lso aus einen asthetischWertbegriff,em Aristoteles anz fremd" nd 133:

"ist der

Mythos

ein

solcher

uberlieferter

usammenhang

des

Geschehens

nicht

in einer

ganz bestimmten

ualitat."

8

Kommerell

above,

note

3) 54.

9

L.

Golden,

"Is Tragedy

the Imitation

f a

Serious

Action'?,"

GRBS

6 (1965)

284.

10

See

Eckart

Schuetrumpf,

ie Bedeutung

des

Wortes

'Oovs

n der

Poetik

des

Aris-

toteles,

Zetemata

49

(Munich

1970) 63-64 and

78.

11

Gerald

F. Else,

Aristotle's

Poetics:

the

Argument Cambridge,

Mass.

1957)

229.

12

John

Jones,

On

Aristotle

nd

Greek Tragedy

New

York

1968)

16.



4/19

Y7Tov8aLos9

nd

Teleology

n

the Poetics

161

* * *

Lesky does not

tell

us

whether he

Greeks,

who

created

comedy

as

well as tragedy, ver developed a theory f the comic "which, reaching

beyond

the

phenomenon

of

drama, might

touch on man's

spiritual

tti-

tude towardsthe world

as

a

whole,"

but

this,

t can

be

shown

from

the

manner

of

Aristotle's

efinition

f

comedy,

he would be

wrong

to

deny.

That

definition

s

"less

complete

than the definition

f

tragedy

at

the

beginning

of

the next

chapter,

but is

parallel

as far as it

goes."'13

he

definition

f

comedy

is

indeed

parallel

to

the

definition

f

tragedy

but

less

complete

than it in two

respects:

1)

the elements

which

belong

to

both tragedyand comedy primarily s art forms, .e., completeness,

length, ype

of

language,

manner of

presentation:

hough

mentioned

n

the definition f

tragedy, hey

are omitted

from

the

definition

f

com-

edy;

apart

from the

word

,utpn,qos,

herefore,

here is

nothing

n the

definition

f

comedy

which

ties it to "the

phenomenon

of

drama";

and

(2) the effect n a

spectator.Aristotle

oes not define

omedy n terms f

its

effecthere,

and

there s

no

evidence that he did

so in the

supposed

lost

second book of the

Poetics: "If

he

actually defined

comedy

in

terms

of its

effect,

t is

strange

hatno

intelligible,

learly-marked

estige f his

definition as come down to us."'14 ut Aristotle's efinitionfcomedy is

also

more

complete

than his

definition

f

tragedy

n

one very

mportant

respect:

t

contains n

explicit

definition

f

a universal

bstract oncept,

TO

yEAoLov, which is

"das spezifisch

Komische,"'15

he essential quality

which

belongs to all

comedy,

stage and otherwise.'6

hat

r0

yEXoZoV

is

indeed a universal

oncept, nd

not imited

n reference o

"the phenom-

enon

of drama,"

would

seem

likely from

he fact,which no

one denies,

that

Aristotle ntends

his

definition f To

yEXOLov as

a rebuttal

o Plato's

conclusions about its nature in Philebus

48A-5OB.17

Plato had argued

13

G. M.

A.

Grube, Aristotle:On

Poetry

nd

Style

New

York

1958) 10, note

1.

14

Lane Cooper,

An

Aristotelianheory

f

ComedyNew

York

1969) 64.

15

Johannes

Vahlen,

Beitrage

zu

Aristoteles'

Poetik,

Neudruck bes.

v. H.

Schone

(Leipzig-Berlin

1914)

16.

16

Elder

Olson, The

Theory of

Comedy

(Bloomington,

ndiana

1975) 51,

asserts

that

Aristotle's

tatement bout

TO

yEAo?ov,

hough t

"has

nvariably een

treated

s a

definition,"

cannot

be

one

because

"Aristotle

would

never

have

permitted definition

with a

negative

differentia,

or a

negative

term is

always

ambiguous

and

hence can

state the nature of

nothing."Negativedifferentia otwithstanding,viewAristotle'statement s a definition.

The

reason

for

he

negative

differentias that

Aristotle

wishes

pointedly

o deny what

Plato

asserts:

n intrinsic

onnection

etween

omedy

and

evil

which

causesharm.

17

Cf. Edward Poste's

commenton

Phlb.

49c2

in The

Philebus

of

Plato

(Oxford

1960)

ad

loc.:

'Aristotle's

efinition f the

Ridiculous

seems

to have

been

suggested

by this

passage."

Plato in

this

passage

is

primarily

oncernedto

demonstrate hat

ome

forms f

pleasure are

mixed with

pain,

and

discusses

the

nature

of

comedy

only

incidentally to

this

purpose-because the

pleasure

derived

from

t,

he

believes, s of

this

ype.

His

treatment

f

the

subject,

accordingly, s

cursory

nd

tendentious, is

reasoning

nd

psychology,n my



5/19

162 George F. Held

that the subject matter f

comedy (ra

yEXoLa)

is self-ignorancea'yvota)

in one's friends

LktAo)

who are weak and without power to do one

harm, self-ignorancewith regard to the extent of their wealth, beauty

and virtue,

speciallywisdom.'8And since ignorance s a form f evil, as

Plato explicitlypoints out

in

the dialogue (49D9: Ov'Kov3v

r7v

ayvotav

EL7TO,UEV

OTLt

KaKoV

7raLv;)

it is a

formof evil

(KaKov)

which he asserts s

the

subject

matter

of

comedy and

the

proper object of comic laughter.

That Plato's

remarks n

the Philebus are

directedat comedy as a univer-

sal phenomenon

nd not merely t stage comedy is obvious frommuch

else in his

discussion,

ut

especially fromthe followingwords 502-3):

Ev

TpaywioLaLS


6/19

-7rov8aLOs

nd

Teleology

n

the

Poetics

163

imitation

s

not

ust

forms

f

self-ignorance

r

people

afflicted

ith

them

(cavXoTE'pWV

is

probably

masculine),

but almost

all

forms

of evil

and

thoseafflictedwiththem.The onlykind of evil or evil personwhichhe

would

exclude is the most

extreme

kind-complete vice

or

wholly

vicious persons.

The reason

he gives for their xclusion

makes

clear how

he

would

define the

comic more

narrowly

han Plato.

To

yEAoZov,

e

says,

consists f that which

is

faulty

or

ugly

but does not

cause

pain

or

harm. For

Aristotle,

hen,

vil which causes

pain

or

harm to

anyone

not

just

potentially

o

oneself, s in Plato's

theory)

s not

comic.

But,

plainly,

it

is not

onlywholly vicious

persons nd extreme

vice which

cause

pain

or harm.

Arguably ll,

and

certainly

most,

forms f

vice,

faults nd

ugli-

ness, physicalor ethical, cause at least some pain or harm,physicalor

ethical, either to those who

have

them

or to others.

And

just

as

plainly,

the

misfortunes,

vils,

and

vices

of

stage

comedy

are

therein

epresented

as

causing

a

good deal of

pain

or

harm

to the

comic

characters.

Aristotle's

efinition f

ro

yEOoLov, herefore,

f

taken

as

an

attempt

"Beobachtetes u

erklaren," ither

n

the sense of

defining

he particular

essence of

stage

comedy

or

its

appropriate

subject

matter, must

be

deemed a

sorry

failure,20

nd

contradicts he

implicationsof

what

he

himselfhas said in 49A31-32. To thisit may be objected that the evil

actions

represented

n

stage

comedy only

seem

to

but do not

reallycause

pain

or

harm.

This,

however,

s

true also of

actions on

the

tragic stage.

Admittedly, much

greater degree

of

verisimilitude

ertainsgenerally

to the

actions,

nd

so

also

to

the

pain and

suffering,

f

stage

tragedy

han

of

stage

comedy.

But

althoughthe

difference n

verisimilitude

etween

the two

genres

is

relative, not

absolute, Aristotle's

xclusion from the

comic of that

which

causes

pain

or

harm is

stated

n

absolute,not

rela-

tive

terms.

And

if he

had

the

suggested dea in

mind,

he

ought to have

stated texplicitly, ot eft tforus to infer.

His definition f

ro

yEXoiozV,

owever, makes

quite

good sense if

taken

as

directed

at

the

comic

in

a

universal,

hough

omewhat

refined,

sense.

"Deaths,

beatings,etc."

are in

real life

as well as on

the

comic

stage sometimes

bjects

of

laughter, ut the

theorist s

under no

obliga-

tion to

make the

comic coextensive

with

the

laughable.

Aristotle,s also

Plato,

did

not

think t

was. His

definition

s, as it

were, a

"persuasive

20

Some mightexplain Aristotle's xclusion of pain and harmfromcomedy by arguing

that

he has in

mind

not

rowdyOld

Comedy,

but

the

much more

innocuous

Middle

and

New.

But

this is

a

lame

argument:

Middle

and New

Comedy

undoubtedly

ncluded

incidents

involving

pain

and/or

harm,

as, for

example,

Knemon's

fall

into a

well in

Menander's

Dyscolus.

And,

as

Cooper

(above, note

14) 18-41

has

shown,

there

s

no rea-

son to

believe,

as

some

have, that

Aristotle

iscounted he

importance

f

Aristophanes, he

leading

representative

f

Old

Comedy. It

is,

therefore,

most

unlikely

that he

would

not

have

expected his

theory

f

comedy

to

apply

to

Aristophanes'

lays

as

well

as those

of his

successors.



7/19

164

George

F. Held

definition":2'

t includes

withinthe comic only

what we ought

to laugh

at, not all

at which we sometimes

do. Olson on

this point, as on many

others, as gotten o the bottom f Aristotle'smeaning.22 is distinctions

between comic, malevolent, nd scornful

aughter

re implicit n Aris-

totle'sdefinition

f comedy. The things

t which

the latter wo are typi-

cally

directedhe excludes from the

comic. His

definition f the comic

encompasseswhat

takes place on

the comic stage, for there

nothing

really painfulor harmful

ccurs,but

it is not directed,first nd

foremost,

at the

"phenomenon

f

drama."

To yEAoi2ov is frequently

ranslated nto English

as "the ludicrous,"

but

it

is

much more

appropriately

endered

"the comic." "The laugh-

able" would of coursebe the most iteraltranslation, ut is less prefera-

ble

for several reasons: ro

y6\oZov,

as

I have

shown,

s

not

in

fact, as

Aristotle

efines

t,

coextensivewith

the

laughable; "laughable"

is not as

commonly

used

in

ordinaryEnglish

as

was

yEXoZosg

n

Greek;

and "the

laughable"

s

simply

not the

standard riticalterm

n

English

for

expres-

sing

the essence

of

comedy.

Aristotle's hoice

of

yEXoios

to

refer

o

the

essence

of comedy

is

itselfnot

without

ignificance

hough

in this, of

course,

he was strongly nfluenced

by

Plato's

use of

the

word

in

the

Philebus. Anotheradjective,

KWMLKO ,23

was also available to him and

might

have

performed

this same

function,

but it

normally

meant

"comic"

only

n a narrow

ense, .e.,

"of

or

relating

o

stage

comedy."

As

Else

remarks, 'Comic'

would be

a

good

term but seems to

have been

still

o

closely

associated

with theatrical

roduction

n

Aristotle's

ay

.

that

it

lacked the

necessary cope

to

designate

the

object

of

comedy

as

such."24LEXoLOS, however,

n

common

usage

already possessed

he

neces-

sary scope,

which

K&)MLKO

might

have obtained

solely

with

the

aid of a

definition.

ristotle's

reference

or

yAoZoso

over

KWMLK9os

to refer o

the

essenceof comedy is, therefore,n itself o some extent ndicativeof his

recognition

hat comedy

as a whole

is more universal

han

stage comedy

and

of

his intention

o relate his definition

f

stage

comedy

to

thisbroad-

er,

more universal

henomenon.

The

scope

of the

Greek

adjective

TpayLKoS'

was

significantlyreater

than

that

of

KWIALKOS.

It

frequently

meant "of

or

relating

o

stage trag-

edy,"

but

could

also mean "solemn"

or

"exalted,"

and

even

on occasion

might

be used

in a sense dentical

withthatof

the

English

"tragic";

Aris-

totle n factseemsso to use it once in the Poetics,whenhe singlesout

21

"Persuasive

definition"s

a term

which was coined

by

C. L. Stevenson,

Persuasive

Definitions,"

Mind (1938)

331f.

Its meaning

hould be obvious

frommy own usage

of it.

22

Olson (above,

note

19) 161.

23

KwI,UwpKOs,

f course,

was also available

to Aristotle, s

also

rpay biuo

in

place

of

7pay

KoLS', but since

these

other words are

mere cognates

of

KxwpKoS

and

rpaytov

and

Aristotle ever

uses either

one of them,

my discussion

will ignore

them.

24

Else (above,

note 11) 186.



8/19

17rovbadov

nd

Teleology n

the Poetics

165

Euripides as "most

tragic"

TpayLKcwTaTos,:

53A29)

of the

tragedians.

n

any

case, therecan be

no

doubt

that,

f

Aristotle ad

attempted

o

define

the tragic,he would have employedno adjectiveotherthan

TpayLKos

to

form

the articular

noun

to serve

as his

definiendum.

This

obviously

he

has

failed

to do. He

has,

however,

done,

as it

were,

the

next

best

thing:

to

include in his definition f

tragedy

he

adjective

o7rovbdLos,

hich

in

both

Aristotle

nd other

writers

s

frequently

n

antonym

to

the

key

word,

yEXotos-,hich

he

had

just

used

to denote the essence of

comedy.

17rovbdatos

oes not denote

the

essential

quality

of

tragedy, .e., the

tragic, he whole essence

of

tragedy,

ut it does

denote an

essential

ual-

ityof

tragedy, .e., a

part

of its

essence.

7rovbados-

s not

identical in

functionwithyEXoLoswhichdenotes the whole essence of comedy,not

just a

part,

but its

inclusion

n

the

definition f

tragedy

s

highly

ignifi-

cant. In

view of Aristotle's

sage of its

antonym

o define the

essence

of

comedy,

it indicates an

attemptby

him

to

distinguish

etween

tragedy

and

comedy

in

terms f

contrasting,

ssential

ualities. His

assertion hat

the

7rpats

itself f

tragedy

ught to be

rovbata,

moreover,

would seem

to

indicate a desire to

distinguish etween

tragedy

nd

comedy

in

terms

of

essential qualities

belonging

to the

actions

themselves of

each. At

least it does ifwe understandhisdefinition f comedyto implythat the

7rpaets-

f

comedy

ought

to

be

yEA\oa.

Cooper

does so

understand

t,25

and

it seems

only

natural to

do so.

In view of

these

considerations,

Aristotle's

ailure o

define he

tragic

does not

seem so

significant.

t

may

be

just an

oversight-and

perhaps

due

partly

to

the

knowledge

that a

definition f TO

TpayLKov

might,

without

too much

ingenuity,be

ex-

tracted

fromhis definition

f

TpayobLa:

EO'TV

O?Vv

rpayq8thla

Ml1tls

7Tpa'Ewss

a71ovbaLas-

KaL

TreELas-

f/yeOos-

VX'frs,

271VoOv y

XWpEs

KaOTO TcUV elIJWV V TOLS'/OptSt,

bpwvTrwv

KaL

01

a'JtayyeXtas-,

bt'

E'Aeov

KaL

fr0/3ov

repaLvovoa

T7/V

T7O

TOLOVTo)WV

7raOrq1.a'Tv

KaOapcTLv.

49B24-28)

If

we

eliminate from

his

definition

f

tragedy those

elements

which

belong to

tragedy

exclusivelyor

primarily

s an

art form,

we

are left

with

two

elementswhich

we may

be

sure

Aristotle

would have

included

in

a

definitionof

TO

TpayLKov:

(1)

the

ethical-physical26

lement,

To

r7rovdtZov;and

(2) pathos.27

The

former

infer

naturally

from the

words

7rpacfEws-

ovba'as; the

latter

from he

words

EAXov Kat

xo,0ov.

So

conceived, his definition f the tragicwould be explicitly arallel to his

definition

f the

comic, which

consistsof

two

similar

elements:

1) an

25

See

Cooper

(above,

note 14)

179.

26

17rovbaiov,

ike

#aiXov

and

yeXoios, an

have

a

physical as

well as an

ethical

sense.

Cf.

EN

1098A9.

27

Cf.

Else's

remark

bout the

importanceof

pathos

in

Aristotle's

onception of

tragedy

(see

above,

page 160).



9/19

166 George F. Held

ethical-physical lement,denoted by the words

'Aa&pIIria

TL

KaL

aLoG-XO;

and (2) a negative element, the absence of pathos, as indicated by the

words

avw'vvov Ka'L

ov

40ap-LKdOV.

Whereas the comic forAristotle s

that

which

is

ugly or defective but does not cause pain or

harm, the

tragic, surmise,he would defineas that which s

a-7rov8ados9

ut causes

or, as may be inferred romPo.

53B21

and

54A4-9,

at least threatens o

cause, pain or harm.

The reader

may

surmise

omewhatdifferently,ut,

whetheror not

he accepts this admittedly uite hypotheticalAristotelian efinition f

the tragic, t should be clear fromthe preceding that a strong ase can

be made

against

Kommerell's nd

Lesky's conclusions oncerningAris-

totle'smode of thought bout tragedy nd art in the Poetics. It should

now be evident that Aristotle ould conceive of art as possessing defin-

able essence and

as

existing

n

its

own

right part from

ts

effect, hat he

did

conceive

of

comedy

in

this

way

and

very likely

could also

have

thought

f

tragedy

n

the same manner

and, lastly,

hat

he

did distin-

guish

between

tragedy

nd

comedy

"on

the

basis

of

[an]

essential

uality

of action itself." n what follows, will

no

longer

be

concerned to argue

these

points,

but rathernext to

establish

hat

o7rova&Los9

and

yEXoios

in

thePoeticsare teleological erms.

* * *

7wovbaLosg

s

employed

on

three ccasions

n

the Poetics

n

conjunction

with he word

4l,u71s0

or ts

cognate

yL1f'o1LaL.

No

one

today

doubts

hat

on

two of these occasions

48A2

and

49B10),

where

t is

applied

to

the men

imitated n tragedy,

--rov8aLos9

enotes an ethical

udgment

bout

them,

even if some insist hat

more

than

ust

an ethical

udgment

s

involved.28

But on thethird ccasion, n thedefinitionftragedy

49B24),

where tis

applied to

the action

of

tragedy tself,

cholars

have tended

to view it

rather s an aesthetic

erm,meaning

"serious."

They

have

done so

despite

theirrecognition

hat

the term

hould

be

used

univocally hroughout

he

work.29 ardie

seems

to

have

been the first

o

argue

that t

s so

used,30

nd

his ideas have been

revived

by

Grube

and

Golden.

All three scholars

support heir positionby citing49B38-50A2,

where Aristotle

nly

a few

sentences

fter he definition

f

tragedy

sserts hat

ctions

re of a

certain

sort n account

of

the

thought

nd

character

f those

who

perform

hem:

83Lay

ap

TOV'TWV KatL

rTsa

Tpace4st

Evai 4aEv 7TOLas' TLvas.31

Grube also cites

28

A. Gudeman, Aristoteles

HEPI

HIOHTIKHX (Berlin-Leipzig

1934) 270,

held that

-rov-

baiosv

n the Poetics

s

always

used

in an aesthetic ense. t means "tauglich

ur

die

Tragodie."

29

Cf. S.

H.

Butcher,

Aristotle'sTheory of Poetry

and

Fine

Art

(New

York

1951) 234-

35,

and Vahlen (above,

note 15)

267-68.

30

R.

P.

Hardie,

"The Poetics of Aristotle,"

Mind

4

(1895) 357.

31

Cf. Hardie (above,

note 30)

358,

Grube (above,

note 13)

xxi,and Golden (above,

note

9)

284-85.



10/19


11/19

168 George

F.

Held

possess n and of themselves he same qualities

as belong to that charac-

ter? Golden simply gnores

he passages cited by Grube where Aristotle

does seem to distinguish etween genreson thebasis of essential ualities

of the actions themselves.

He also ignores the fact that, though

"a

person'scharacter s

stamped on his deeds," his deeds are also stamped

on his character: There

can be no doubt . . that in Aristotle's thical

theory ction and action

alone shapes character."35he radical disjunc-

tion between action and character mplicit in

Golden's view of their

relationship

n

the Poetics

is foreign o Aristotle's

hought: he emphasis

in Aristotles on the interrelationshipetween

the two. Jones, herefore,

goes much too

far

in

asserting hat

"it

needs to be said

that

the plot-

character dichotomy s radically false to Aristotle's nderstanding f

Tragedy, hatcharacter,

ike colour,mustbe denied

even the mostprim-

itive autonomy";36ut

the autonomywhich Aristotle rants o action and

character n the

Ethics is not so great as to permit mere metaphorical

relationship etweenthem n the Poetics.

Let us consider

more closely the passage

which, f any, explains the

presenceof

a7rovat'a9S

in the definition f tragedy:

E7rEL

7rpa$EwS'

ecTTL

PLI/.L?70S,

7rpaTTETaL 8E

V7TO

TLVWV

7rpaTTovTwv,

ovs

avayK7/

rTOLOVs

rtvas

ELvat

KaTa

Te

TO ?70oS'

KaL

r77v

Ltavotav

bLa

\~ ~~~~aeL

'

a' qe7sova,s, -ra

,

v.e a..t

yap

TovTrV KaL

ras,

7rp4ELs

ELVaL4fEv 7roLasTLvas,

V

4V

ZvZ'

bVO

TrV

7rpafEwv

e1vaL, oLavotav

Kat

t'7os,]

KaL

Kara

ravTasv

Ka

TvyxavovO-L

Kaca

7rorvyxavovctL

7TavTes))....

(49B36-50A2)

Aristotle ddresses

himself

pecifically

o

the

question

of

why

actions

are

of a

certain

quality,

nd

asserts hat

they

are so

because

of

the

6oso

nd

bIaivota which

cause them. From the

proximity

f this

passage

to

the

definition

f

tragedy,

and

the

repetition

n it of the

words

pln/SO-ts

,rpace4sc romthat definition

s well as the obvious

purport

f

the

pas-

sage

as

a

whole,

would conclude

not

only

that herein

ies

the

explana-

tion for rovba'aS

in

the

definition f

tragedy,

ut that

this

passage

was

specifically

ntendedby

Aristotle

o

provide

n

explanation

or

t.

As Else

says

n

commenting

n this

passage:37

In

short,

Aristotle

means

by

7rpaTEw

he

7rpaEwv

7rovbalav

Kat

reXEL'as,

fthe

efinition:

e s

thinking,

ot f ll

action',

ut

pecifi-

cally

f

he

ragic

ctionwithts

ompleteness

nd ts eriousness.

...

The reference

o thedrama s

also

mplicit

n

elva'

.ba,.lEv

which-certainlyot y ccident-reappearselow

A6).

Else, however, hough

he has much to

say

about

the

passage

as a

whole,

does not

specifically

onclude,

as

I think

one

should,

that

this

passage

35

Else (above,

note 11) 71.

Cf. EN

1105A26-B12.

36

Jones above,

note

12) 31.

37

Else

(above,

note 11) 241.



12/19

?Irovbatos,

and Teleology

n the Poetics

169

affords n

explanation

for the

presence

of

a-rovbalas-

n the definition

f

tragedy.

The genuineness f the sentence

rEbVKV

. . .

'Oos has been widely

impugned.

Vahlen

and

Gomperz believe

it to

be

out

of

place

because Kat

iaTa

TavTav

ought

to follow

immediately

after

rota'S

Ttvas38

Else

agrees,

concludes

that t is an

interpolation,39

nd

asserts,

moreover,

hat

"it

is

a crude

and

misleadingparaphrase"

of

the

preceding

entence.40n

that

entence

blta

s

constructed

with the

genitive,

not the

accusative,

nd

denotes

mere

instrumentality,

ot

causality.

The

subsequent sentence,

therefore,

ntroduces somewhat

different

dea,

to which

Else

objects

as

follows:

The

doctrine s

in

fact

not

really

Aristotelian. he

two causes

of

action, accordingto Aristotle E.N.

6.2.1139A31;

De An. 3.10.433A10-

30),

are

mind or reason

(Xo\yos,LacoLa,

or

vovs;

but the

vov3s

an be

mere magination,

vrTaTLa) and desire

"p4tvs).

It

is true

of course that

character

ends

by shaping

one's

desires."'4'Schuetrumpf

grees

that

7rEfqVKEV...

'OoS may

be

out

of

place

for

the reason

given

by

Vahlen

and

Gomperz,

but

argues against Else

that there s no

conflict

etween

this

sentence and

the

preceding

one

and that

its

meaning s sufficiently

Aristotelian. e

points

out

that vov3s,

hich

Else holds to be one of the

causes of action, tselfnecessarily nvolvesan

'OLK'

'`tvS

and in the pas-

sage

from

he

Ethics cited

by Else (1139A31) is

in

factreplaced by 'OLK'

i'es

in the

very

next

sentence,

so that even this

passage shows

the

involvement

f

'Oo0S

n

causing action. But he also points

out that it is

clear from other

passages

in

the

Ethics that it is 7rpoaLpEo-Ls

hich for

Aristotle

s

ultimately

the

cause of action, and holds

that

Z7osv

nd

bLa'VoLa

are the

constituent

lements

of

7rpoaL'pEo-Ls-nd in

the passage

from the Poetics

function ogethervirtually s does

7rpoaLpEo-Ls

n the

Ethics:42

Haufig,

wenn

auch mit

wechselnden

Begriffen, ringt

uch

sonst

Aristotelesum

Ausdruck, ass Charakter nd Denken das

Handeln

bestimmen.43

it

diesen

beiden Begriffen mschreibt r, wie oben

gezeigt wurde, die

beiden Bestandteile der

7rpoaLpeo-Lvs

ie

7rpoalpfELT

is

nach

EN44

die

Bewegungsursache

er

Handlungen.

38

See Vahlen

(above, note

15) 20-21 and

Theodor

Gomperz,Zu

Aristoteles'Poetik, Ein

Beitrag

zur

Kritik

und

Erklarung

der Kapitel I-VI

(Vienna

1888) 29-31.

39

D.

W.

Lucas,

Aristotle:Poetics

(Oxford 1968) ad

loc., also

believes

the

passage to be

an interpolation.

40

Else

(above, note

11) 240.

41

Else

(above, note

11) 240,

note 70.

42

Schuetrumpf

above, note

10) 84-85.

43

Cf.

EN

1144A6:

E7rL

O

EpyoV

a7TOTEAELTaL

KaTa

T77V

pOVP7LV

Kal T1PV

7)OLK47V

pET47V

and Pol.

1323B32f.The

passages cited in this

note

and the next

are taken

directlyfrom

Schuetrumpf's

wn

notes.

See

Schuetrumpf

above,

note

10) 84,

notes6 and 7.

44

Cf.

EN

1138A31:

rpa4Ews

kv

o'v

apXn'

7rpoalpEfOL

b'0Ev X7

KLV7)oLT

&aAA'

Ov'

Oi

EVEKa).f.

also

EN

1139A33

andMetaph.

1065A32.



13/19

170

George

F. Held

Schon as

passt urPoetik, o a

dOog

nd

LtavoLa

gemeinsamls die

UrsachenawTta)

derHandlungen

ezeichnet

ind....

So istdiese

Vorstellung

anz mEinklang it

erEthik es

Aristoteles.

I agree with

Schuetrumpf's

onclusions bout

this

passage as far as

they go,

but believe

that they do not

go far

enough, for he fails to

see

that this passage explains

the reason

for

ff7rovbaLaS

in

the definition f

tragedy.

n fact,although

he writes

chapterentitled

Die Bedeutung

von

a6osL,

L

rov3aZoS,

4avAos

in

der

Poetik,"45 e says

nothingt all

about

ff7rovbaLaS

in

the

definition f tragedy,

for which

he has been

justly

criticizedby Rees.46

infer from

thispassage that

the

-rpa^6s9

f

tragedy

s

ff7rovbaLa

ot merely because

it is

performedby characters

who are

ff7rovbaLoL

ith respect o their

Oq

and bLaVoLaut because it is

a product

of and

is

caused by the o-7rovbaia

rO'6 and

bLaVoLa of these

characters.47 he

reader may perhaps

question

whether t is possible

to

attribute

o the

O'q

nd bLaVoLa

of

the tragic

characters he sort

of unity

which

the preceding statement

eems

to imply they

possess.

Clearly,

their

(6q

and bLacVoLa are not of

a

piece, but

ultimately

here should be

no

more

difficulty

n

attributing

n

over-allunity

o the?'6i7and bLa'oLa

of

these characters

han to their ctions.

f

Aristotle's

se of the

singular

-rpa^

e

in the definition f tragedy o refer o the various actionswhich

comprise

a

tragicplot

is

conceptually

ntelligible,

hen this

explanation

of

how this

-rpaLs

comes

to

be o-rovia

a

is also

conceptually

ntelligible.

This explanation

f

o-rovbaasa

does

not

of

course

entail thatthe

action of

tragedy

must

be good

in the sense

of

actually producing

a

good

result-although

that is

what

happens

in

some tragedies,

e.g.,

the

Oresteia,

and is

generally

he

rule

in

epic

which

s also

an

imitation

f

a

7rp4LsL

-7rovbaLa.

1pa6eEws

7rovbaL'aS

in

the definition f

tragedy

ntails

no

more,

nd no

less,

than

that

"the

action

of the

play

as

a whole

should

be a 'good' one (i.e., it should portray ffortso bringabout a 'good'

result)."48 r,

to

put

it

another

way,

it entails that

at least some

of the

actions

of

which the

plot

consists hould

be

o-7rov8aLaL

in

the

sense

of

being

a

product

of

the

o-7rovbaia

7'j6)

and

bLafoLa

of the

characters.

But

tragedy

s not

merely

n imitation

f actionsof

or

by ff71ov8aZoL,

or

not

all

actions of

or

by crrovtaLot

do

in

fact

emanate

fromtheir

r0ovbaia

#'dq

nd bLacVoLa.

A

o-rov8aZoS9

may purposely

ct

out

of

character:

he

may,

for

example,

for comic

effect,

mitate

a

aviAos9.

Many

things

which

o-7rovtaLot

rdinarily o, moreover, re not especiallyrelated to

their

character.

Such actions

are

not what

Aristotle has

in

mind.

45

Schuetrumpf

above,

note 10)

52-63.

46

B. R.

Rees, CR

23 (1973)

52.

47

Of course,

not

everything

hat happens

in

a

play

is a product

of the

7'0-q

nd

bLavota

of the

characters;

ome

things

naturally

ccur through

hance or are

caused

by

natural

or

supernatural

orces.

48

Humphrey

House,

Aristotle'sPoetics

(London

1956) 84.



14/19

X.rov8aLos0nd

Teleology

n

the Poetics

171

Y7-rovbaLas

t

the

very east

entails

that ome of

the actions

performed

y

the

o-7rovbaZoL

e thosecharacteristic f

them,

those

which

dentify

hem

as

o--rov8a^oL.

The reason

for

the

presence

of

o-rovbalaS

in

the definitionof

tragedy will

assume hereafter o be

that

ustgiven.

I

have

left

oT7rov-

baLos0ntranslated nd will

continueto do

so since there s no

satisfactory

English

equivalent.

In

what follows

will be

concerned

only

with

its

meaning,not its

translation.

chuetrumpf

holds

that

o-rov8aZoS9

n

the

Poetics is

an

ethical term

expressing

judgment

about

those

qualities

and

virtues

which

belong

to

'6oso n

the

Ethics,

i.e.,

moral,

not intellec-

tual,

qualities

and virtues.

believe

that

on the

contrary

7ov8aLos9

n

thePoetics, as also frequentlyn theEthics,expresses judgmentwhich

encompasses he

intellectual s well as

moral

sphere. will

present

elow

the

reasons for

my

opinion. But

Schuetrumpf

s

right

o

reject

the view

of

Gudeman that

o-7rov8aLos9

n

the

Poetics

is

an

aesthetic

term,49

nd

right lso,

I

believe, to

dispute Else's

assertion

hat

"Aristotle's ntithesis

a-rov8aZo0-.aviAos9

s

not

merely

moral,

n

any

narrow

ense

of

the word.

Political,

ocial,

and

aesthetic

lements

re

in

it from he

beginning,

nd

it

need

not

surprise

us

if

they emerge

more

clearly

later on."50

Schuetrumpfholds,on the contrary, hat only withthe words

T(J^

EV

MEyaA\7,

o

OVTCOV

Kal

EVTvXLca

(53A10)

does

Aristotle

ndicate

that

the

characters

should be

from the

upper class

and

argues that

Aristotle

would not

have

included

this

statement

f

his

previous

tatements

bout

the

tragic characters

had

contained a

"Feststellung

uber die

ausseren

Verhaltnisse es

Helden."'5'

His

disagreement

with

Else on this

point has

been

roundly

criticized

by Rees.52

Radical

disagreement n

this

point

can

perhaps be

quelled

if

scholars will

allow

a

distinction

etween the

denotation

and

connotation

f

these

words.

17rov8aLos9

nd

faviXos9,

n

my opinion, denote, as Schuetrumpfnsists, nly an ethical judgment

about

those to

whom

they

are

applied;

but they

may, I

would

allow,

even

in

the

hands of

Aristotle,

have

social,

political,

and

aesthetic

connotations s

well.

That

these

connotations

play

much of

a role in

Aristotle's

sage

of

them

n the

Poetics,

however,

do

not

believe.

It

is stated n

Cat.

10B6-10 that

a-wovbaLos0

s

the

adjective

for

pE T-:

EVLOTE

8e

Ka'L

Ovo/aTos

KXELMEVOV

V

XEYETaL

7rapWVV14W TO KaT

avTrJv

7ToLOv

AEyO/.LEVov,

Lov

ar7o

Ti?/

apTS

O

(T7rov8aLoS

TQ) yap

apET?/V

EXEWV

0rovba&ov A'yETaL,

&A\

ov 7rapwvvMws

ar7o T77

apET?/S.

49

Schuetrumpf

above, note

10)

52-55; cf.

above,

note

28.

50

Else

(above, note

11) 78.

51

Schuetrumpf

above,

note

10) 58.

52

Rees

(above,

note

46) 51.



15/19

172

George F. Held

Schuetrumpf

s aware of

the

interrelationship

f

these words. He quotes

thispassage from he Categories

and

another o the same effect

rom he

Magna Moralia (1181A28:

TO

8

cT7rovbaLov

ElvaL

4EcTL

TO

TaS

apETasq

VXELV)53nd states

without qualification

that

-"r7rov8azosv

und

oaiXos

waren ... die apEr

) und

KaKla zugehorigen Adjektive."54

He

seems

unaware, however,of

the potential

conflict etween this statement

nd

othersby

him which restrict

he udgment xpressed

by fo7rovbaZoS'

to the

moral sphere. f

ff7rov8aLos9

s

the adjective

for

pErT?,

one would

expect

that t would express udgments

bout

any kind of

apET7/,

intellectual

s

well as moral.

Schuetrumpf's

onclusions

about

how

a

7rov8aLos9

s used in the

Poetics are based on his belief that 6oso n the Poetics has the same

meaning

as in the Ethics where it

includes moral

but not intellectual

qualities55

nd,moreparticularly, is

belief

that

t

has

such

a meaning

n

48A1-5 where the

men imitated n tragedy re said to

be

o-7rovbaZoL

ith

respect

to

their

jq.56

I

disagree

with him

and

believe

that

q6oso

n the

Poetics generally

has

the same sense as

in Rh.

1

and

2 where

it

includes

intellectual

as

well as moral

qualities.57

n a

forthcoming

rticle

in

Hermes

I give all

the reasons

why.

Here

I will

give

just

one: its

usage

in

48A1-5. The meaningsof

'6OSo

and

o--rov8aLos9

here are interwined.

HGoso

n that passage

should include intellectual qualities

because

i

rzov8a

os'

there,

n

the basis

of its

usage

elsewhere

n

Aristotle, ught

to

express judgment

which

spans

the intellectual

s

well

as moral

spheres.

Though a-wov3aLos'

s used

by

Aristotle t least

once

as a

purely

moral

term,58

t

carries

a

broader

meaning

when

contrasted

xplicitly

r

im-

plicitly

with

OaviAos

or

yEAoLoS.

This

is

clear from

he discussion

f con-

templation

t the end of

the

Ethics

1175B25-79A33).

There

-7Tov8aLos9

and

its

cognates

occur

at least eleven

times,59

ot

always

in direct

applicationto those who contemplate, ut always in wayswhich imply

that

they

are

among

the ff7rovbaZoL

because

of their ntellectual

uperi-

ority.

To

say

that

the

judgment

expressed by

ff7rovtaLOS

encompasses

both moral

and

intellectual

qualities,

however,

is

not to

delineate

its

precise

meaning.

I submit

that

o-7rov8aLos9

nd

its

antonyms

are

for

Aristotle,

t

least

when contrasted

explicitly

or

implicitly

with

each

other,

teleological

terms, .e.,

they denote

respectively

good

and

bad

53

Schuetrumpfabove,note 10) 49, note 1.

54

Schuetrumpf

above,

note 10)

51.

55

Cf.

Schuetrumpf

above,

note

10)

52-53.

56 Cf.

Schuetrumpf

above,

note

10)

47-52.

57

On the

usage

of

'Oo0

in Rh.

1

and 2, see Schuetrumpf

above,

note 10)

83, note

2.

58

Cf.

Rh.

1378A16

where

7rov6atosq

s used

together

with

opOdvq.os,

to form the

moral-intellectual

ntithesis.

Bonitz'

Index Aristotelicus

istsseveral

instanceswhere

it is

used synonomously

ith

E7TLLK7'.

59

IXoAij

(Vermehren)

ather

han

o-7rovbij

hould probably

be read

at 1177A19.



16/19

,rrov8a^tos

nd Teleology

n the Poetics 173

relationship

etween

a

thing,

nimate

or

inanimate,

nd

its

proper

end

(and

form).The

following

passage (EN

1176B35-77A6)

from

the

discus-

sion of contemplationwill illustrate the teleological connotationsof

crT7rovIaLos,

nd its cognates:

ov

T27

EAos

'1

ava7ravrTLs

yLvEat

yap EvEKa

T7S1

EVEpyELasX

OKE O O

EvoaL,.Lv

8'o0 KaT apET7V lVal-

OVTOS Of

,AETa

(T7rov8?J;,

A'A

OVK

ev 7raLo3aL.

E37ATu

TE

A

TyoAev

ra rovbaLa

TrV

yEXOLWV

KatlAcTa

7ratLLa%

Kat

TOV

,E/3ATLOVOT

aft

Kat

lAoptOV Kat

avOpc7rov

aT7rov8aloTopav

TrV

evepyeLav

7/

E

TOV

ATlOVOT

Kp

ELTTWV

Kal

ETatLAoVLKWT

pa

77n.

Aristotle posits a direct

and

proportional

relationship

between the

o-7rovb

cf.

-7rovbaLoTepav)

of an activitynd theexcellence f the

part

of us

which it

employs and also

between the

a-7rovb

of

an

activity

nd

the

happiness

which it is

capable

of

producing.

Contemplation,

e

con-

cludes,

s

the most

o7rovba'a

of

activities nd the one

most

productive

f

happinessbecause it

employs

only thebest

part of

us,

vo3s.60

he

happy

life is

the

one that is lived

HuEra

ov7r07s.

It is,

therefore, nly by

manifesting

7mvb

and

by

engaging

n

o-7rovIa^LaL

7Tpa6ELv

and E'vfpyELaL

that

we

can

obtain our

end,

happiness.

The

teleological

connotations f

r-7rov8a&os

nd its cognates hould be apparent.

Another

mportant

passage for

illustrating he

teleological

connota-

tionsof

o-7rovIaZos-

s

1097A15-98A20.

There Aristotle

sserts hat all men

desire the

good, i.e., that forwhich

all

else is done

(1097A18).

Happiness,

therefore,must

be the

good,

for

we

choose

all

else for

the sake of it

(1097B1-6).

Happiness, however, an

be

obtained only by

performinghe

specificwork

,Epyov) roperto man's

nature. This

work

s

an

activity n

accordance

with reason

and virtue. t

is the

o-7rov8aZos

ho

performs

his

workwell

(cEv).Neither

4aviAos- oryE,oZos-s used in the passage,but we

may

nfer

rom he

many

passageswhere hese

words

re used as

antonyms

to

o-7rov8aZoL

hat t is the

4aVAoL

and

yEO^LOL

who do not

perform

man's

workwell and

whose

actions,

herefore,re

notwell directed

t man's

end,

happiness.

This,

I

submit,

s

the

fundamental

distinction

etweenAris-

totle's

-7rov8aZot

nd

OaviAoL,

the

distinction hich s

operative n

Po.

48A1-5.

60

EN

1177B27-78A9.

Aristotle t

one

point

1178B27-28) even

identifies

appiness

with

contemplation; nd on thisbasishe denies thatanimalscan be happy.This identifications

most

problematic:

how can it

be

reconciled

with

what else

Aristotle ays

about

happiness?

This

question and

the

general

nature

of

Aristotle's

onception of

happiness

have been the

subject of

much

recent

discussion. ee R.

Kraut,"Two

Conceptions

of

Happiness,"

PhR

88

(1979)

167-97; W. F.

R.

Hardie,

"Aristotle

n the

Best

Life for

Man,"

Philosophy 4

(1979)

35-50, esp.

36;

Klaus

Jacobi,

Aristoteles'

infuhrung es

Begriffs

evdbato.lda' im

I.

Buch

der

'Nikomachischen

Ethik,"'

Philosophisches

Jahrbuch

86

(1979)

300-325;

J.

L.

Ackrill,

Aristotle

on

'Eudaimonia,' (London

1975); Stephen

R.

L. Clark,

Aristotle'sMan

(Oxford

1975); John

M.

Cooper, Reason and

Human

Good in

Aristotle

Boston

1975).



17/19

174

George F. Held

I

conclude,

therefore, hat

when Aristotle ays that the action

of

tragedy s o7rovbaLa, he means

that it should possess

the same qualities

whichbelong o the

7rov8zaoL,

it shouldbe in accordancewith t least

some of the virtues,

moral nd intellectual, ossessed

y the

7rov8aLoL,

and

it should be to

some significantxtentwell directed

at the end proper

to

man's nature,

happiness.We may, therefore, e

specific bout the

"'good'

result" t which ffortsn tragedy

re to be made (see

above, page 170): it s

the good result f happiness.As

Olson observes,

Tragedy exhibits ife as

directed o important nds; comedyas eithernot

directed o such

ends,or

unlikely

o

achieve

them."

1

Once

again Olson has gotten o the

heart of

Aristotle'smeaning;but "important

nds" may be

reduced to one, ourfinal

end, happiness.Tragedy mitates n action which s, comedy one which s

not,well directed

t happiness.Tragedy xhibits o

us characterswho

have,

comedy characters

who have not,

the wherewithal o be happy and

who

demonstrate

hisby whattheydo

in the play tself.

Such

characters,

f

course,

may fall nto misfortune-for

variety

f

reasons:moral flaws n themselves,

onestmistakes,

hance, the enmity f

the gods, etc. And

if

theydo, they

naturally ose

whateverhappiness hey

may have.

Tragedy,moreover,

ypically resents

hem

n

the very

ct of

falling ntomisfortune;nd Aristotlelearly houghtt appropriate or t to

do

so,

as

is

evident

from

his discussion

f

the

tragic

plot

n

chapters

13 and

14. My

views

about

his

conception

f

tragedy

need

to

be reconciled

with

thesefacts nd can be.

It

should

first e notedthathappiness

orAristotle

s

not identical

with good fortune.

Happiness

for

hinm

s

a

technical

and

prescriptive erm.Virtue

nd knowledge re preconditions

or

happiness,

though

not for

good

fortune.

Happiness

nvolves

pleasure,

but

not

ust

any

kind,only

thosepleasures onsequent

o and consistent

ith

he

possession

of

virtue

nd

knowledge cf.

EN

1177A23-B1). However, hough

happiness

and goodfortune re not dentical, reedom rommisfortunesnaturally

precondition

for

happiness.

This

is

a truism

which Aristotle

nowhere

bothers o

express,

hough

t

is

implied

n his comment

hat

the man who

contemplates

s the

happiest

f

men

because,

among

other

hings,

e

is the

most like

the gods

and

they

are

most

ikely

to look after omeone

like

themselves

EN

1179A23-33).

The

fact that

happiness depends

upon

freedom rom

misfortune,oupled

withthe other

factsmentioned

bove.

requires ome

modification

f my

tatement hat

ragedy

mitates

n action

well directed t happiness: hetragic ction is well directed t happiness

only

to some extent

nd in

certain

respects;

o

some

extent

nd

in

certain

respects t is poorly

o directed.

t

is

well directed

n

respect

o

the effects

upon

it of theo-rov8aZa

~Or,

and

btaVota

of the

tragic haracters,

ut it

is

poorly

o

directed

n

respect

to

the effects

pon

it of the

moral

flawsof

these ame

characters,

heirhonest

mistakes,

hance, angrygods,

tc.

That

61

Olson (above, note 16) 3-5.



18/19

1?rov8aios9

and

Teleology

n

thePoetics

175

it is

poorlydirected

t

happiness

may

seem the more salientfact

about

it,

but

for

Aristotle t is essential hat the

tragic

action

possess

both

types

of

direction.This is evident fromhis definitionf tragedywhere thewords

7rpaEws-

o-irov8aias,

xplicitly

ttribute

o it the

one

direction,

while

the

words

\fov

Ka'L

0,8ov

implicitly

ttribute o

t

theother.

Ev8aqLoVLa, herefore,

falls within the

province

of

tragedy,

and

outside that of

comedy.

nterestingly,

ristotle

makes

a statement o

that

effect n the

Poetics,

though

the text of

this statement s

somewhat

corrupt. give itstext

s

printed

n

Else's edition:

?7

yap rpaycoba

f(LjAur0zT

-TLV

OVK

aVBpco7TCV

AXa

lTpaicv

KaL

LOV

KaL EvoaL.uoVL'as [


19/19

176 George F. Held

whole much better than

does my own interpretation.My arguments

against t have been based

rather n the belief that t is inconsistent ith

Aristotle's sage of

o-7roviao0S

lsewhere n his corpus.One should keep

in mind, however, that,

even as traditionally nterpreted,Aristotle's

definition

oes

not

fit

he

genre as a whole, forthe action of some

Greek

tragedies s not serious t all. Every definition f tragedy

which triesto

distinguish

what is distinctly ragic and which rises above the mere

tautology hat a tragedy s a play by a tragedianproduced

on the tragic

stage,

will

necessarily

have a somewhat limited applicability and

practicality. ristotle'sheory s I interprett, however,

s very practical

in one very mportant espect:

t succeeds in distinguishing

hat makes

the mosttragiccharactersmost tragic.The term tragic" an be applied

intelligibly o a Creon,64

Medea, or a Jason,but the

term, as most

people

use it and understand t, applies much

better o

an

Antigone,

n

Oedipus,

or

a

Socrates.

Why do the latter trike

us as

more

fully ragic

than

the former? he reason cannot lie in the pathos

which they uffer,

for

some of the latter sufferno more than

some of the former.The

reason must lie

in

the

o-rovb

which they manifestgenerally n their

actions and especially in

those actions which

lead directly

to

their

respective catastrophes.The example of Socrates is most noteworthy

because his

death,

n

Plato's account of

it,

nvolves ittle

or no

pathos

at

all (cf. Phd. 117B3-7),

and

yet

strikes

many

of us as

exceedingly ragic.

It can do

so only

because

the

tragic

effect f

a

catastrophe

s

in

direct

proportionnot only

to

the pathos suffered,

ut also

to

the

a-7rov8w7

manifested by

the sufferers. hat this should

be

so is

implied

in

Aristotle's heory

s

I

interpret

t. That

theory,

herefore,

s I

interpret

it,

is

not

impractical,

hough

ts

practicality

s

of a different rder than

as traditionally nterpreted.

There

is,

I

suppose,

the

possibility

hat

a7rovbaZ0s

in thedefinitionf tragedy s ambiguous, hat, onsciously r

not, Aristotle

chose

to use it there because

it can

carry

both the

teleological

onnotations

which attribute

o it

and

a

more

general sense,

approximating

he

English

"serious."

To

hold

this

possibility

o be

an

actuality

s

a convenient

way

of

making

most

ense out

of

his

definition,

and

my arguments

n

favor

of my

own

interpretation,

s far as I

can

see,

pose

no

absolute

obstacle

to

the

adoption

of

such

a view.

64

As Karl

Reinhardt,

Sophocles,

transl.

Hazel and David

Harvey

(Oxford

1979)

93,

observes,Creon's fate in Antigone is "empty,"Antigone's full." By my interpretation,

Aristotle's efinition

f tragedy

mpliesthat

the

fate of Antigone

s

more appropriate

for

representation

n tragedy

than that

of Creon.

That Antigone's

actions

are

0a7rovbaZat,

Creon's largely

4aiAat, should

be evident

from he fact

that hers

are

in

accordance

with

nature

while his are

not, as

I have shown

in

"Antigone'sDual

Motivation

for theDouble

Burial," Hermes

111 (1983)

197-201.

spoudaios and teleology in the poetics

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