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SPQR Scenario Book 1

© 2008 GMT Games LLC



BENEVENTUM, 275 BCPyrrhus of Epirus vs. Roman Consul M. Curius Dentatus—p. 3

BAGRADAS PLAINS, 255 BCXanthippus vs. Roman Consul M. Atilius Regulus—p. 8

CANNAE, 216 BCHannibal Barca vs. Consul G. Terentius Varro—p. 10

ZAMA, 202 BCHannibal Barca vs. Proconsul P. Cornelius Scipio—p. 16

CYNOSCEPHALAE, 197 BCKing Phillip V of Macedon vs. Consul T. Quinctius Flamininus—p. 20

Great Battles of the Roman Republic3rd Edition

SPQRSCENARIO BOOK

GMT Games, LLCP.O. Box 1308, Hanford, CA 93232–1308www.GMTGames.com

SPQRSCENARIOS

scenario designmark hermanrichard h. berg

game developmentalan ray

art directorrodger macgowan

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RULES FOR COMPETITIVE PLAYWe have designed the following battles/scenarios to be as historically accurate (within the limits of available research materials) as possible. While this allows them to be excellent tools for study and solitaire play, some of the battles, because they were not balanced historically, will fall short of that gamer’s paradise of “perfect” game balance.

We understand that many of you prefer an “I Want to Win” approach to wargaming, as opposed to, say, a “What’s Happening Here” view. Well, we like to be All Things to All People, here at GMT, and we are aware, as noted above, that “history” often fails to cooperate with our desire to produce balanced “games”. To ameliorate, if not entirely remedy, this situation, we offer two suggestions for Competitive Play. These methods will provide a more even balance; however, the “end result” may often not reflect “historical” objectives or realities.

#1: The Rout Point Bid Method. This method works best for those players who are familiar with both the game AND the battle. In essence, each player bids Rout Points to play a specific side … usually the favored one. The winning bid then subtracts the number of Rout Points he has bid from the total required to rout his chosen side.

Example: Two gamers want to play Zama; they both want to play Scipio. Player #1 bids 25 RP’s, but player #2 offers 35 as his bid. #2 gets to play Scipio, but his army now routs when it reaches 195 points … not the 230 listed.

#2: The Game Rule Fix Method. In this method we simply suggest certain rules to play— or ignore—that should balance the game.

SIZE AND TROOP QUALITY CHARTSThe Size and Troop Quality charts included in the Victory section of each battle show the number of units involved, the army’s total Size, the total Rout Points and the average per unit TQ. For the average TQ calculation, the unit TQ (not Rout Points) is used for Skirmishers, Elephants, and double-size units.

CREDITSOriginal System Designed By: Mark Herman

Game System Designed By: Mark Herman/ Richard Berg

Beneventum and Cynoscephalae Designed by: Mark Herman

Bagradas, Cannae, and Zama Designed by: Richard H. Berg

Game Developed By: Richard H. Berg

3rd Edition Development: Alan Ray

Box Cover and Counter Art: Rodger B. MacGowan

Map Art: Leland Myrick

Rules Layout: Neil Randall

Art Director: Rodger B. MacGowan

Rules Editing / Index: Gene Billingsley

Historical Commentary: Richard H. Berg and Mark Herman

Latin Consultant: Caesar (Sid)

Playtesters: Mike Reed, Dick Vohlers, James Stormes, Keith Schlesinger, Boyd Schorzman, David Fox, Joseph Holt



Historical BackgroundAfter an unsuccessful four year campaign in Sicily, Pyrrhus returned, again, to aid Tarentum. Pyrrhus’s reputation—which, even a hundred years later, was quite impressive—brought thousands of Samnites, Bruttians, Lucanians, Sabines, and other Italians back into his by-now depleted mercenary force. Led by his somewhat short-handed corps of war elephants, Pyrrhus, once again, marched on Rome. Consul M. Curius Dentatus (the last name coming from a particularly noticeable set of buck teeth) quickly gathered his consular army and moved south to intercept him. He camped about 130 miles southeast of Rome near the town of Beneventum (at that time named Maleventum; obviously as things got “better” the name changed) and waited for Pyrrhus.

Pyrrhus approached Beneventum with an army consisting of 20,000 foot, 3,000 cavalry and some 15 elephants. The cavalry were mostly his Thessalian units whereas, in addition to his Macedonian-style phalanxes, most of the 20,000 foot were sword-armed, Italian-colonial Greeks. The Roman army under the Consul Dentatus consisted of a fairly typical Consular army (17,000 foot and 1,200 cavalry), who’s contingent of alae sociorum was a bit reduced by sizeable defections of Sabines and other Italians to the Tarentine/Pyrrhic cause.

Pyrrhus’s patrols detected the Roman defensive positions and he de-cided on a surprise night attack. His approach march took longer than planned (Lex Murphus, no doubt), and the Romans, upon detecting the Epirote army, sprang to arms and repulsed the initial assault with Pyrrhus losing eight elephants.

Dentatus now decided to offer battle and fight Pyrrhus on the plain adjoining his camp. The initial Roman attack failed, due in part to Pyr-rhus’s skillful use of his remaining elephants plus some stiff Epirote/mercenary resistance. However, a second Roman assault managed to stampede the elephants into their own positions. The shaken Macedo-nian phalanx retreated from the field in disorder, and the Romans had a victory—albeit just barely.

Dentatus’ victory convinced Pyrrhus to give up his dreams of western conquest and he departed for Greece. Casualties are unknown, but Pyr-rhus returned to Greece with approximately 8,000 foot and 500 cavalry. He was killed in a minor engagement three years later, leaving the Southern Greeks on the Italian peninsula without strong leadership. In 272 BC Rome conquered Tarentum, and two years later she completed her subjugation of all Southern Italy with the capture of Rhegium.

Beneventum was the pivotal battle in the Roman Republic’s bid for Italian peninsular hegemony. It is the first of three battles (Cynoscep-halae and Pydna are the other two) where the Roman Manipular Legion met—and defeated—a purely Alexander/Macedonian style army in a stand-up fight. It is also an interesting study in the Roman use of a fortified camp in support of its battle plan.

Pre-Game NotesThis is an unusual scenario, mainly because of the very palpable pres-ence of the Roman Camp, as well as the fact that Beneventum was a somewhat unusual Meeting Engagement. There is a host of special rules

THE BATTLE OF BENEVENTUMPyrrhus of Epirus vs. Roman Consul M. Curius Dentatus—Southern Italy, 275 BC

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and some interesting “artillery”. The scenario does have a relatively small number of units, and, with no set deployment, players are free to explore their own strategies and tactics.

It should also be noted that there is not that much “hard” information on this battle, and the classical descriptions of it are often quite conflicting. No one is even quite sure exactly where it took place! We have tried to provide the best “game” given the available information.

MapUse the Beneventum map.

Difficulty And BalanceThe Set-Piece battle is a good scenario for those not overly familiar with the system. The Meeting Engagement is more formidable and requires that players know a lot about what their units can do—aside from adding a bunch of extra rules.

The Romans are slightly favored, more so in the Set-Piece battle. Results in the Meeting Engagement depend much on what the Epirote player does at night. The Rout Point Bid method is the best one to use here, as this is a difficult scenario for which to supply rules adjustments.

Playing time is about two hours for the Set-Piece battle; another hour for the Meeting Engagement

INITIAL DEPLOYMENTTHE NIGHT ATTACK/MEETING ENGAGEMENT The Roman Army under Curius DentatusThe Romans use the III and V Legions and Alae. Roman units are deployed inside the Camp according to the following setup.

Leaders Hex

M. Dentatus (OC) 3305 Three (3) Tribunes 3205 Two (2) Prfct Soc 3405 One (1) Prfct Eqt 3304

Units Hex(es)

III Legion (All units face SE vertex)

III VE (a)[a] 3504, 3604 or 3704III HA (a–d) 3607, 3608, 3610, 3611III PR (a)[b] 3507III (b–d) 3508, 3510, 3511 III TR (a–c) 3407, 3408, 3410 III RC 3411

V Legion (All units face NE vertex)

V VE (a)[a] 2904, 3004 or 3104V HA (a–d) 3007, 3008, 3010, 3011V PR (a) [b] 3107V PR (b–d) 3108, 3110, 3111 V TR (a–c) 3207, 3208, 3210 V RC 3211

a = One Velites unit from each Legion gets to sleep; the other two are in the Camp Guard, below.

b = The Primus Principes of the legion

Alae Sociorum (III and V)

The Player may designate either ala as left or right wing. The alae are grouped by standard cohorts/triarii, standard cavalry, and then the extraordinaires of both the cohorts and V cavalry. IMPORTANT: The alae are short on cavalry (only one non-extraordinaires cavalry unit from each ala is used) and foot (do not use the alae Triarii and reduce the number of cohorts by one—i.e., there should be 8 cohorts and one cohort extraordinaires from each ala).

Alae Cohorts (Number in [#] is number of units that start in hex)

Left Wing 2907, 2908, 2910, 2911 (two per hex; all units face South vertex)Right Wing 3707, 3708, 3710, 3711 (two per hex; all units face North vertex)Alae Cavalry 3105, 3505 (units face NW or (one from each ala) SW vertex)AS/III CE, AS/V CE[c] 3204, 3404 (units face NW or SW vertex)AS/V RC EX [c] 3304 (units face NW or SW vertex)

c = The Cohorts and Ala Extraordinaires

Camp Guard (Face units either toward a gate or toward outside of camp if in a tower)

III VE (b, c), V VE (b, c)[d] 2806, 3303, 3312, 3806

AS/III VE (a, b), AS/V VE (a, b),III Scorpion (a, b), 2803, 2813, 3803, 3813 (one VE and V Scorpion (a, b) one Scorpion in each hex)

d = At the instant of Roman Alert, these gate guards are immediately placed in a vacant Velites tent hex, facing any direction.

The Epirote/Italian Army under Pyrrhus of EpirusAt the beginning of the scenario there are no Epirote units on the map. All Epirote units enter the map during the Approach March Phase.

The Epirote ArmyThe Leaders are Pyrrhus, Alexander, Leonatus, and Milon. Not much is known about the Epirote command structure below Pyrrhus. One of his best generals, Megacles, bought the farm at Heraclea (ostensibly while in disguise as Pyrrhus!). For that matter, most of his “staff” was killed at either Heraclea or Asculum. Alexander was Pyrrhus’s second-oldest son, and, at the age of 23, was certain to have been given some level of command (his oldest son, Ptolemy, was regent in Epirus; consider his youngest son, Helenus, to be “part of” Alexander). Leonatus was the fellow who (supposedly) saved Pyrrhus’ life at Heraclea, in an incident that smacks a bit too much of “Alexander and Cleitus at the Granicus”, if you ask me. Milon is mentioned (often) in several minor Epirote roles.

The Epirote Army is divided into five (5) sections:

Advanced Guard

Macedonian LC; Greek Mercenary LC (1–2); Epirote SK Slingers (1–3); Cretan SK Archers (1–2); and the Thracian LI (1–4)

Main Body

Macedonian PH (1–6); Epirote HO/HI (1–3); Thessalian HC (1–5); The Guard HC (a pretty good indication Pyrrhus is with this group); Indian EL (1–3)



Left Flank Guard

Samnite MI (1–2); Bruttium MI (1–2)

Right Flank Guard

Lucanian MI (1–2), Sabine MI (1–2)

Rear Guard

Italian MI (1–2)

Approach March OrderThe Approach March Phase precedes the start of play, before using the normal Sequence of Play. The Approach March Phase continues until either the Romans are alerted or the Epirote player declares he is done.

The order of entry of the above five (5) sections of the Epirote army, Initial Approach March (IAM) Multiple, and Entry Hex is:

Advanced Guard (4x/3044); then the1. Main Body (2x/3143, 3044 and/or 2943; units may be split amongst 2.

these hexes, or they may all enter through the same hex); then the Left Flank Guard (2x/2644); then the3. Right Flank Guard (2x/3343), and finally the4. Rear Guard (1x/3044). 5.

In the Initial Approach March Phase, each separate section of the Epirote army moves its full movement allowance times its IAM Multiple (cohe-sion costs are incurred for terrain but not for multiple moves in the same turn). Thus, the Macedonian Light cavalry in the Advance Guard would enter through hex 3044 and have a Movement Allowance of ‘32’ (8 x 4 = 32). If at any point during this movement the Romans are alerted (see below) then the Approach March Phase is immediately concluded. There is no further Epirote Approach movement; the Scenario now starts according to the standard Sequence of Play.

Initial Approach March ProcedureDuring the Initial Approach March Segment the Epirote Army enters the map with each unit from a named section (e.g., Advanced Guard) expending its MA the number of multiples indicated. Complete the movement of one multiple with all units in that section before beginning the next multiple. Leaders may be placed with any section, but they use the IAM Multiple of the section with which it enters the map. After all units have conducted their Initial Approach March and if the Romans are not yet alerted, then the Epirote player can choose to conduct an Extended Approach March.

As each unit enters the map it pays the terrain cost of the entry hex plus a number of movement points equal to the number of units from that section that have entered by the same hex ahead of that unit. Therefore, if a Cretan Archer is the third unit to enter the game during the IAM via 3044, it uses 3 MPs: 1 for the hex and 2 for the two previous units. The Epirote player must move all of his units onto the map during the Approach March Phase; he may not hold any back. Exception: if movement of an Epirote units during the Initial Approach March Phase results in a Roman Alert, all Epirote Approach Movement ceases and play resumes using the standard Sequence of Play.

Important: All Epirote units that do not enter the map by the conclu-sion of Game Turn 1, never get into play but DO count as eliminated units for determining Army Withdrawal.

Extended Approach MarchAfter completing the Initial Approach March Phase, the Epirote player, if his units have not been spotted, now announces whether he will ex-tend his Approach March or not. If he doesn’t, then the Scenario begins immediately with Turn 1. If he elects to extend his Approach March,

he now moves his army section by section in the same order as during the Initial Approach March. This time, all units may move up to two Movement Allowance multiples (2x). Upon completing each section’s movement—or at the instant of Roman Alert—he rolls a one die for each entire section and consults the Night March Fatigue table to de-termine the number of cohesion for each unit due to Fatigue. Compare the one die roll to each unit’s TQ in that section and apply the indicated result. Elephants are not subject to fatigue and thus are not affected by any die roll. Any cohesion point penalties called for are immediately applied to all units that have moved from that section. After all units have completed their Extended Approach March, or the Romans are alerted, the Scenario begins.

Night March Fatigue Table

Die roll EffectSame as or lower than TQ No Effect1, 2 higher than TQ 1 Cohesion Hit3+ higher than TQ 2 Cohesion Hits

Roman AlertNo Roman unit may move or fire until the Roman Army is alerted. The Roman army is alerted the instant that any Roman unit has a LOS (see below) to an Epirote unit . . . or, at the beginning of Game Turn 5, whichever comes first. All un-alerted Roman commanders are consid-ered “Finished” (and thus the Romans can do nothing) until alerted.

If Alert occurs during the • Approach March Phase, all Roman com-manders are eligible to be activated at the start of the immediately succeeding first turnIf Alert occurs • during a standard (post-Approach) turn, Roman com-manders with Initiative ratings lower than those of “Finished” Epirote leaders remain Finished for that turn. Only those Roman leaders whose Initiative Ratings would make them eligible to be used (as per 5.12) are alert and capable of command

Example: Leonatus and Milon have been activated and are finished for the turn. During movement under an Order given by Alexander, the Romans are alerted. Only Dentatus, with an Initiative Rating of ‘5’, is eligible to be activated. All the other tribunes and praefects are Finished for that turn.

Upon alert all Roman units are eligible to receive orders. Line Com-mands are permitted inside the camp. Remember to place Velites gate guards in their tent hexes.

Time of Day and Line of SightLOS—and Roman Alert—is dependent on the lighting conditions. There are three lighting conditions in this scenario: night, dawn, and day.

The • entire Approach March Phase occurs at NightGame Turns 1 through 3 use Dawn Lighting Conditions• Game Turns 4 to conclusion are Day Lighting Conditions•

There are three Alert Lines on the map: the Night Alert Line, the Dawn Alert Line and the Day Alert Line. At ANY time an Epirote unit moves “inside”—closer to the camp—the Alert Line corresponding to the Lighting Conditions—it is spotted and the Romans are alerted. Exception: Woods will block Alert LOS. The Alert LOS extends into a woods hex—but never through.

Example #1: It is Night. An Epirote unit moves from 3024 to 2923 to 2823 to 2723. It was spotted the instant it entered 2823—even though it finished its movement outside the Night Alert Line.

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Example #2: It is Dawn. An Epirote unit is in 1114. It moves into 1214 and then into 1313. Its movement has not alerted the Romans because, even though it is inside the Dawn Alert Line, the trees block LOS.

An Example of Approach March: First the Epirote Advanced Guard enters at hex 3044 and each unit moves 4 times its movement allowance (32 hexes cavalry, 24 hexes skirmisher, 20 hexes Light Infantry) in a Southwesterly direction with the lead cavalry unit near hex 1321. The Main body enters next at hexes 2943, 3044, 3143 (2 x MA) and follows the Advanced Guard with the lead unit near hex 2034. The Left Flank Guard then enters at hex 2644 and moves to the left of the Main Body followed by the Right Flank Guard entering at hex 3343 which con-forms to the right of the Main Body. The Initial Approach March Phase concludes with the Rearguard entering at hex 3044. Epirote units at no time came within 10 hexes of a Roman unit (it being a Night Turn) and therefore the Romans are not alerted. The Epirote commander decides not to extend Extended Approach March, and the Scenario begins using the normal Sequence of play.

MEETING ENGAGEMENT; Free Set-Up ScenarioIf it’s a stand up/set piece fight you want, first deploy the entire Roman army in any hex from xx18 and west inclusive. Units may be placed inside the camp. Then, set up the Epirote army in any hex from xx31 and east inclusive. Ignore all Approach March rules. It is daylight. Play continues using all other rules.

Design Note: Although the standard, face-off battle did occur at Be-neventum, there is little information as to who stood where. We therefore leave it to your skill and imagination to fill in the blanks.

Line Command Eligibility

Roman Epirote1. *Velites (VE) 1. *Elephants (EL)2. *Hastati (HA) and Ala

Cohorts (CO/CE)2. *Skirmishers (SK) and Thra-

cian Light Infantry (LI)3. *Principes (PR) and Ala

Cohorts (CO/CE)3. Hoplites (HI), Medium (MI),

and Light (LI) Infantry4. Triarii (TR) 4. Phalanxes (PH) and Hoplites

(HI)5. All Cavalry 5 All Cavalry6. **Velites (VE), Cavalry,

AS/CE

* = Do not have to be adjacent; see 4.24.** = This special line may be used for exiting the Camp. Once all Roman leaders are outside the camp, it may not be used as a Line.

SPECIAL RULESThe Roman CampThe Roman penchant—rigorously applied—for pitching a fortified camp at the end of each day’s march (usually in the early afternoon) is well-known. As noted, above, Dentatus had encamped to await Pyrrhus’ next move. There are special Terrain effects for the Camp—and a special chart for them: the Roman Camp Terrain Effects Chart. We have no desire to write a whole series of rules on siege warfare. We have tried, however, to give some idea of what the Epirote player could try to do

(if sufficiently deranged). The Epirotes did not have any siege equip-ment (or, at least none that we are aware of); their ability to attack the camp was extremely minimal. And a berm, in case you’re wondering, is a low “wall” formed by the dirt that is dug out of the ditch. From the bottom of the ditch to the top of the berm was about eight feet. Roman camps usually did not have “permanent” walls. In addition, the gates did not actually have “doors”; entrance was blocked by a barrier, as is represented on the map. The entire camp is Level-2 elevation, same as the hill it is on.

Historical Note: The Roman Camp is a “hex” version of the typical Roman Consular Army camp as detailed and drawn by Polybius. It is quite accurate as to placement of the units (with some minor adjust-ments for play); it is also “to scale”.

Exiting the CampDuring the first 5 Game Turns after being Alerted the Roman units inside the Camp are restricted as to which gate through which they may exit the camp. After that 5th turn the restriction is removed. In addition, all Roman commanders inside the camp are capable of issuing a Line Command without resorting to a Strategy die roll.

Unit Organization Exit Gate

Legions III and V Porta Decumana Ala Left Wing Cohorts Porta Principis SinistraAla Right Wing Cohorts Porta Principis Dextra All other units except Camp Guard Porta PraetoriaCamp Guard Any Gate

Historical Note: It often took some time, perhaps a couple of hours, for an army of this size to deploy from inside a camp.

ScorpionesScorpions have no TQ, Type, Size, or Movement Allowance; their only rating is their Range. A scorpion may fire:

twice per Game Turn when the Roman player is active, and;• twice per enemy Orders Phase at any activated enemy unit that is • range and Line of Sight

However, the scorpion’s hex must be occupied by a friendly infantry unit in order to fire.Scorpions may fire at any time during the phase/turn. The first time an artillery unit fires, place an appropriate (Turn/Phase) “Fired” marker on it. The second time it fires, flip the marker over to its “Finished Fire” side. There is no need for an Order or Line Command; the Roman player simply states he is firing his scorpion. A scorpion may be fired in any direction, up to a range of seven hexes. If an Epirote unit enters a Tower hex, the scorpion is automatically destroyed. Scorpions never run out of Missiles.

TowersNo more than one infantry unit and one Scorpion unit may occupy a tower hex at any one time.

A Roman infantry unit capable of missile fire in a Tower Hex gains the following fire benefits:

Subtract one (-1) from its Missile Fire die roll at its normal ranges• It may fire at a Range of one greater than its usual maximum range. • If it does so, it requires a ‘0’ die roll to achieve a hit (and there is no die roll adjustment for being in the tower, as above)



The Scorpion’s Fiery Sting, or What a Flaming Arrow You Are (Optional Rule)There is a great deal of disagreement as to whether the Romans used “flame arrows” against Pyrrhus’s elephants. The bolts fired by scorpi-ons were certainly capable of being wrapped in rags, covered with oil or pitch, lit, and thus launched. The controversy centers on just how the Romans could have used them in the field, the oil needed for the flammable coating not being easily available. The story goes that when the elephants forced the Romans back they came within range of the scorpions, from which one or more flame “arrows” were fired, scaring the ivory out of the tuskers—a not unwarranted reaction. Anyway, it’s too nifty a piece of chrome to pass up.

Each scorpion can be converted to launching flame missiles, simply by the Roman Player saying so.

The BenefitsA hit on an elephant unit with a flame arrow is an automatic rout (and subsequent rampage). No other type of unit is affected by a flame arrow other than the regular effect of a missile hit (if one of these shafts hits you, the fact that you are now on fire is not going to either improve or worsen your already dead condition).

The DrawbacksThe range is reduced by one (to a maximum of six hexes), and, except • for one and two hex ranges, add one to any die roll when determin-ing hits. This accounts for the increased air resistance firing bolts wrapped in rags and soaked in oil would haveOnce started, the tower may not stop using flame arrows (the fire • was hard to extinguish)If an Infantry unit occupying a Tower which is using flame arrows • routs, some screaming legionary kicks over the bucket of Greek Fire and, essentially, torches both the unit and the entire tower. The unit is eliminated. Treat the hex thereafter as a hex which no one can enter (it’s burning) for the remainder of the scenario. Involuntary entry into a burning tower hex eliminates the unit.

Roman Flaming Pigs, or Bringin’ Home the Bacon (Optional Rule) Several sources—such as the usually unreliable Dionysius and the usually reliable H.H. Scullard—talk about the use of “flaming pigs” to distract and scare the elephants (war gamers already introduced to such items as Russian Tank Dogs and the Union Exploding Mules at Valverde will probably not bat an eye here). As everyone knows, elephants under strain have an unusual fear of small animals who make screeching noises. Someone appears to have experimented with the idea of letting a few porkers loose amongst the behemoths, as little else seemed to be working. When this had some effect, the military-industrial complex up-graded the system by tarring Old Porky with some pitch, setting him ablaze, letting him loose, and, then, abada, abada, abada, that’s all folks!! It seems the combination of burning ham hocks and squealing porkers was supposed to unnerve the elephants even more (perhaps this would have worked even better were the elephants kosher). Knowing that someone is sure to write in asking why we have not included this bit of arcana (which Scullard maintains is reasonably possible—even probable), we give you the opportunity to recreate this Great Moment in Military History.

At any two (2) times during the game the Roman Player, instead of is-suing an Individual Order, may roll on the FLAMING PIG Table. This counts as an Individual Order . . . an Order of Pork Chops!!

The Flaming Pig TableDie Roll Pig from Hell

0 Elephant designated by die roll attacks the nearest com-bat unit—be it Roman or Epirote—directly to its front. If more than one target, roll die. If further away than 4 hexes, treat as No Effect.

1–7 No Effect, but breakfast is served8 Add one Cohesion Hit to any one Elephant9 For any one Elephant roll die. Add number of Cohesion

Hits equal to die roll minus TQ, with the total being at least one

Triarii DoctrineThis rule is in effect for this scenario.

Retreat EdgesThe Epirotes use the east map edge, the Romans the west map edge.

VICTORYPlay continues until:

The Epirotes have at least five combat units inside the Roman Camp • and there are no Roman combat units inside the camp, at which point the Epirotes automatically win; ORStarting with Game Turn 10, all non-routed, Roman units are inside • their camp. If the Roman player retreats all of his units into the camp he loses; OR One Army Withdraws•

The Roman Army withdraws when units with Rout Points totaling 120 have been eliminated. The Epirote Army routs when units with Rout Points totaling at least 100 have been eliminated.

Pyrrhus is worth 25 Rout points if wounded; if he’s killed, the Roman Player wins. Scorpions are worth 0 Rout Points.

Size and Troop Quality

Army Units Size Rout Points

Rout Ratio Avg TQ

Epirote 40 213[a] 252 40% 5.7

Roman 55 169 337 35% 6.1

a = Elephant Sizes (15 points) were excluded

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Historical BackgroundIn the beginning, the First Punic War went pretty much in favor of the Romans. The Carthaginians were a naval power, and her land armies—ill-trained and with a poor appreciation of operations and tactics—fared poorly against the disciplined Roman legions. Surprisingly, however, Rome, even though her navy was built virtually from scratch, managed to land an apparent knock-out blow against the Carthaginian fleet off Ecnomus (Sicily) in 256 B.C. Following that victory, the Romans de-cided to bring the war to Africa and landed Marcus Atilius Regulus and his consular army near Carthage. Unfortunately for Regulus, most of his cavalry had been sent elsewhere. Even so, he had great initial success against the few forces the Carthaginians sent against him, and he was all set to deliver what he felt sure would be the coup de grace. The Carthaginians, however, finally had a bit of luck. They managed to secure the services of a Spartan “general”, Xanthippus, who, while no genius, was one of the few people in the area who had any working knowledge of land army operations and tactics. He restructured the Carthaginian army, drilled it to an acceptable level of training, and explained to them how they could use the flat expanses of Northern Africa to their advantage. He then set out to lure Regulus into a fight, and the consul, despite the alarming indications that the Carthaginians were up to something new, took the bait. In mid-winter, 255 B.C., on the plains near the Bagradas River, Regulus and Xanthippus finally faced off. To counter the Carthaginian front wall of almost 100 elephants, Regulus deployed his maniples in a formation that shortened his flanks but extended his depth to withstand (at least to his way of thinking) the charge of the elephants. Unfortunately, his flank was protected by a woefully inadequate cavalry contingent, and the Carthaginian 8–1

(!!) superiority in horse would prove telling . . . .as it usually did. The Carthaginian war elephants kept the Roman infantry lines busy, her cavalry routed that of the Romans, the African phalanxes charged home and, together with the cavalry, they totally shattered Regulus’ legions. There would be no quick end to the war.

Pre-Game NotesIt is recommended that players not familiar with the system play this scenario first; it is the best battle with which to learn the game, see how the combat units work, and experiment with the various tactics available. Historical Note: This is the 1st Punic War Bagradas battle, not the one which Scipio fought at the end of the 2nd Punic War.

MapUse either the Zama or the Cannae map. If you wish, you can ignore any and all terrain on the map—although, even with the site of this battle being unidentified, it took place in pretty much the same area as Zama (whose exact site is questionable, too), so the terrain is likely to be quite similar.

Difficulty And BalanceThis is the “easiest” historical battle in the game. Playing time is be-tween 1 1/2–2/12 hours; although it could be over in a matter of minutes if the Roman Player isn’t careful.Balance heavily favors Carthaginians, whose superiority in mounted troops (both cavalry and elephants) is an object lesson in combined arms. Aside from the obvious Rout Point Bid method, as a Rules Fix, provide the Romans with all of their Alae cavalry, as suggested.

THE BATTLE OF THE BAGRADAS PLAINSXanthippus vs. Roman Consul M. Atilius Regulus—North Africa, Winter, 255 BC



INITIAL DEPLOYMENTThe Carthaginian Army under XanthippusAll units face southeast. Do not use 4.5; Carthaginian Subordinate commanders are reliant on Xanthippus for LC ability. The Carthaginian may NOT use Replacement leaders.Leaders Hex Xanthippus (OC) 1923Hasdrubal 2031Hamilcar 2011Bostar w/ any unit

Units Hex(es) Elephant LineAfrican EL (1–19) 2212–2230

Left WingCarthaginian HC (1–5) 2106–2110N. African LI (1–3) 2006, 2008, 2010

Main LineAfrican PH (1–7) 1909–1922Celtic MI (1–9) 1924–1932

Right WingCarthaginian HC (6–10) 2131–2135 Iberian LI (1–3) 2032, 2034, 2036

The Roman Army under M. Atilius RegulusAll units face northwest. The Romans have a full Consular Army, minus the cavalry of the alae (a telling absence). The two standard-skill legions/alae (III and V) are used. Regulus deployed with his maniples in double depth, rather than extended line, so they do not start stacked. Leaders Hex Regulus (OC) AnywhereTwo (2) Tribunes, Two (2) Prfct Soc One with each separate HA/PR line, with/adjacent to any infantry unitTwo (2) Prfct Eqt 2808, 2833

Units Hex(es) Right Wing CavalryIII RC 2808

Left Wing CavalryV RC 2833

Velites LineAS/III VE (a, b) 2712, 2714 III VE (a–c) 2716, 2718, 2720V VE (a–c) 2722, 2724, 2726AS/V VE (a, b) 2728, 2730

Hastati LineAS/III CO (a–c) 2812, 2814, 2816 III HA (a, b) 2818, 2820V HA (a, b) 2822, 2824AS/V CO (a–c) 2826, 2828, 2830AS/III CO (d, e) 2914, 2916 III HA (c, d) 2918, 2920V HA (c, d) 2922, 2924AS/V CO (d, e) 2926, 2928

Principes LineAS/III CE 3012AS/III CO (f, g) 3014, 3016

III PR (a, b) 3018, 3020V PR (a, b) 3022, 3024AS/V CO (f, g) 3026, 3028AS/V CE 3030AS/III CO (h, i) 3114, 3116III PR (c, d) 3118, 3120V PR (c, d) 3122, 3124AS/V CO (h, i) 3126, 3128

Triarii LineAS/III TR (a, b) 3316, 3317III TR (a–c) 3318, 3319, 3320V TR (a–c) 3321, 3322, 3323AS/V TR (a, b) 3324, 3325


Roman Carthaginian1. *Velites (VE) 1. *Elephants (EL)2. *Hastati (HA) and Ala

Cohorts (CO/CE)2. Celtic Medium (MI), Iberian

Light (LI) Infantry3. *Principes (PR) and Ala

Cohorts (CO/CE)3. Phalanxes (PH), Celtic Me-

dium (MI) Infantry4. Triarii (TR) 4. Carthaginian Heavy (HC)

Cavalry5. Legion Cavalry (RC) 5 *N. African Light (LI) Infantry

6. *Iberian Light (LI) Infantry

* = Do not have to be adjacent; see 4.24.

SPECIAL RULESTriarii DoctrineThis rule is in effect for this scenario.

Alae Cavalry (Optional)If you want to balance the game a bit, give Regulus his alae cavalry, placing the Romans on one wing and the alae on the other. You could also change the Roman deployment, if you wish. Whatever you do, it couldn’t be worse than what Regulus did.

Retreat EdgeRetreat Edges are those that are directly behind the respective armies.

VICTORYCarthaginian Army withdraws when units with Rout Points totaling at least 110 have been eliminated. The Roman Army withdraws when units with Rout Points totaling 125 have been eliminated. When using the Alae cavalry variant, the Roman army withdraws when units with Rout Points totaling 135 have been eliminated.



Rout Ratio

Avg TQ

Carthaginian 51 187[a] 279 40% 5.6

Roman 58 174 354 35% 6.1Roman/w Alae Cavalry 64 192 391 35% 6.1

a = Elephant Sizes (95 points) were excluded

SPQR Scenario Book10


Historical BackgroundIn 219 B.C., Hannibal Barca, commanding-general of the Carthaginians in Spain—and avowed enemy of Rome—led an army of some 35,000 men and 34 elephants across the Alps into Italy to challenge the growing mercantile power of the Republic of Rome. In 218 B.C., he defeated Sempronius’ legions when they rashly splashed across the icy Trebbia River to attack the Carthaginians. The Romans lost 20,000 men; in the ensuing winter, Hannibal lost all his elephants (save one) plus one of his eyes. He did, however, gain the allegiance of the vaunted, sword-swinging Celts. Advancing into central Italy the following spring, he ambushed Flaminius’ legions on the shores of Lake Trasimene, driving the entire army into the lake. A second Roman force had been lost. In both battles, the Romans, regardless of the situation, had used the same tactics they always used, relying on the weight of their infantry to break the center of the enemy (Carthaginian) line.

The Romans now adopted the strategy, propounded by consul, Q. Fa-bius Cunctator (the Delayer), of avoiding battle with Hannibal, hoping he’d get tired of stomping around the peninsula and simply go home. It didn’t work; at least not initially. Hannibal took the opportunity to lay waste to the countryside, forcing the Roman people to send another army against him. Therefore, in the summer of 216 B.C., the two newly-appointed consuls, Caius Terentius Varro and Lucius Aemilius Paullus, led their newly-raised consular armies to join with a similar force under previous consuls Servilius and Atilius. This huge army of (supposedly) eight double legions—some 75,000+ men, the largest, by far, yet seen in Roman history (however, see further notes on this, below)—found

Hannibal seizing the grain depot at Cannae, just south of the Aufidus (today, the Ofanto) river. Paullus, the more experienced general, cautioned against facing the Carthaginians too soon. Unfortunately, it was Varro’s day to command (they alternated command each day, a remarkable system virtually guaranteed to produce disastrous results) and he was intent on avenging the two previous losses.

The battlefield at Cannae would, at first glance, seem ideal for the Ro-mans’ purposes: the river and the hills would anchor their flanks and prevent the fabled Numidian cavalry from running amok. Unfortunately, the short frontage, between the river and the hills, forced the Romans to squeeze their far-too-many maniples into an unwieldy formation (and the Numidians ran amok anyway). The result was the greatest defeat ever suffered by a Roman army, and a battle so masterfully fought by Hannibal, a military genius in the same rank as Alexander or Caesar, that it is, even today, the subject of intense scrutiny and study. (See the note, below, on Victory.)

Pre-Game NotesEvery working historian worth his salt has an opinion on this battle—and most of them differ. As such, the game provides the player/historian with many opportunities to examine one of the most famous and studied battles of all time. Just how did Hannibal do it?!?

Because of its unusual nature—and its fame—this has been a difficult battle to “design”. We shy away from “You Must Do This” rules which force a historical outcome. We have made several scenario changes … to go along with Basic Rules changes that address some factors especially

THE BATTLE OF CANNAEHannibal Barca vs. Consul G. Terentius Varro—Southern Italy, August 2, 216 BC



A Long, but Important, Design/Historical Note: There is a major difference of opinion about the size and make-up of the Roman army at Cannae: how many legions were actually present? Polybius, our most reliable ancient source, states there were eight double legions, almost 80,000 men. Delbruck and Connolly agree. However, there is evidence which would seem to contradict that number. As we have noted, above, a consular army invariably consisted of two double legions. That would have given the two new consuls an army of four double legions. Several sources then state that this force may have been “augmented” by an additional levy of allied troops up to a strength of around 45,000+, a very large army for the time, and probably larger (although not by much) than Hannibal’s. Despite the loss of two battles to Hannibal—both with two-legion armies—the Romans still felt secure in their ability to overcome the Carthaginian invader, as well as the point that all other legions previously raised and in the field were busy elsewhere. (Livy proffers a total of 13 legions in existence at the time of Cannae; other historians give this number as 18, so that leads us nowhere.) Quite simply, where did the other four legions come from? And exactly how did the Carthaginians manage to envelop an army twice their size?

There is also the question of the size of the Roman cavalry contingent, driven from the field so quickly. With four legions, it would have been about 4800, definitely outnumbered by Hannibal’s 10,000 or so horse as virtually all sources indicate. With 8 legions, there would have been almost 10,000 Roman mounted troops; even with their inferior skills, this number would have been virtually impossible to drive from the field with the speed and ease obviously exhibited by the Carthaginians at that time. (It took about 20 minutes for the Iberian and Gallic cavalry to simply blow away the Roman right wing.) Finally, there is the Roman proclivity (not limited, to be sure, to them alone) to magnify their defeats so as to highlight later victories.

On the other hand, there are a large number of scholars—both ancient and modern—who do accept the eight-legion theory. Peter Connolly, in refuting many of the above arguments, points out the following:

The Romans had previously fielded a four-legion consular army against the Celts in 225 B.C.;1. The Cannae “army” was led by two consuls and two proconsuls, indicating greater size and more legions;2. The “missing” 4000 cavalry had been destroyed at Lake Trasimene; 3. The non-presence of the triarii, the usual rear defensive line, enabled Hannibal to complete his encirclement (Delbruck, however, says, 4.

definitively, that the triarii were present—they simply were not tactically trained to turn and face the rear while the rest of the army was going forward); and

The Senate perceived Hannibal as the greatest threat to the existence of the state and reacted accordingly.5. Therefore, an 8-legion army would not be unrealistic. The fact that the Romans considered Cannae such a monumental disaster—one far in excess of similar losses at Trebbia and Trasimene—gives further credence to the eight-legion theory. For the record, we go with the eight-legion thesis.

There is a second problem. Although the course of the Aufidus/Ofanto has changed over the years, it is agreed that the distance between the river and the hills was around 3km. Given the manner in which the Roman army was drawn up, the cavalry had a frontage of about 1200–1500 meters, leaving around 1500+ meters for the legions. (Delbruck sets out the Roman infantry frontage at only 700+ meters!!) That’s some 57,000 men packed into a frontage of a mile. That’s quite a job of “packing”. Granted, the ground was chosen by Hannibal, and Varro, who insisted on fighting there (Paullus recommended moving on) had the military insight of an armadillo. But such a battlefield would totally negate the manpower advantage that Varro would have had. His ability to (possibly) stretch out his frontage to outflank his opponent was completely negated by the terrain restrictions. Surely, he would have been advised of the dangers in fighting at such a place; then again, hubris played no small part in the military mind of many such, inferior Roman consul/commanders. Polybius states that the maniples of the legions assumed a frontage of only 5 soldiers per maniple, which (if you get out your trusty calculator) would make the “game” frontage (of about 1500 meters for both infantry and cavalry, each) about right. If you believe this set of facts, this forced the Romans to greatly extend the depth of their army—as we have done with the “historical” deployment.

Another bone of contention that designers must wrestle with is the supposed 10,000 troops the Romans left in their camp. What, exactly, were they? Firstly, if you do accept that this happened, then the Romans must have had eight double legions; otherwise, they would not have reduced their army by 25% to fight a foe that had already defeated them twice. Perhaps these were the hastily-raised allied troops used to augment the four double legions. Many sources state that the 10,000 were mostly triarii. Delbruck, who goes into much detail over this point, insists that only 25% were triariii; the rest were velites. We have opted for his figures, as the remaining velites are sufficient to cover the Roman frontage and there would have been no need for a second line of velites.

As if all of this were not enough, there is the problem with Hannibal’s half-moon, “circular” infantry formation. Polybius is quite definite about this, but what exactly did he mean? Several military historians insist that such a formation would have been tactically injudicious, as it would have been impossible to move. Then again, perhaps Hannibal, aware of the Roman tactical doctrine of always throwing their weight against the enemy center, never intended to move. The staggered, step-like formation we have chosen is what we feel is a more likely interpretation of Polybius’ hyperbole.

Despite the many variations-on-a-theme possible with all of the above information, we have chosen, as our base/historical scenario, the Polybius-Delbruck-Connolly, eight double-legion version. (When set up, the Roman army is indeed an imposing sight.) We have also pro-vided some deployment information for playing a four-legion battle, as per the “revisionist” hypotheses of Livy and DeSanctis. Players are always free to change their actual deployments, whether they use four or eight double-legions. Simply keep the respective armies on and behind their front set-up lines.

A Note to Players: We heartily suggest that, if interested in this “problem”, you read—at least—Delbruck’s chapter on the battle.



applicable to Cannae but certainly endemic to the era. Ultimately, it is our feeling that Cannae was Cannae because:

A great general was having his Best Day• The Roman army was led by mediocrities who followed Roman • tactical doctrine to the letterHannibal was most aware of what the Romans would do, especially • with Varro in command, andVarro, a nonentity at best, was having the worst possible day.•

Understanding this, be aware that repeating the Carthaginian success will take a superior Carthaginian player playing at his top form. Some good die rolls won’t hurt, either.

MapUse the Cannae map.

Difficulty And BalanceThis is a very large battle with a lot of counters. As such it presents both sides with many tactical problems and decisions. We suggest you NOT tackle Cannae until you have a solid, working knowledge of both the game system and the different armies. We estimate the playing time around 6–8 hours.

Balance for the basic, eight-legion game, slightly favors of the Carthag-inians. The sheer weight of the Roman numbers may be just enough to overcome their terrible command structure (which can be very frustrat-ing for the Roman player). Balance for the four-legion scenario, heavily favors of the Carthaginians.

This is a difficult battle to play competitively, because of the large num-ber of variants available. For competition, we suggest the following:

When playing the 8-legion version, use the Volturnus Rule; the • Romans may not use the Paullus variant or the Proconsul rule. Then use the Rout Point Bid method.For the 4-legion version, use the Paullus and Proconsul variants, do • not use Volturnus. Then use Rout Point Bid method.

INITIAL DEPLOYMENT The Carthaginian Army under Hannibal BarcaAll units are faced northeast

Leaders Hex Hannibal Barca (OC) + Surus 1914Mago Barca 1924Hasdrubal Gisgo 2106 Hanno 2329Maharbal [a] 2237

Units Hex(es)

Left WingCeltic LN (1–10) [c] 2202–2206; 2101–2105Iberian LN (1–5) [c] 2002–2006African Phalanxes (1–3) [b] 2402/2403, 2404/2405, 2406/2407

Skirmish Line

Balearic SK Slingers (1–11) 2409–2429, odd# hexes only

CenterCeltic MI (1), Iberian LI (1–3) 2218–2221Celtic MI (2), Iberian LI (4–6) 2114–2117

Celtic MI (3), Iberian LI (7–9) 2121–2124Celtic MI (4), Iberian LI (10–12) 2011–2014Celtic MI (5), Iberian LI (13–15) 2025–2028Celtic MI (6–9) 1907–1910Celtic MI (10–13) 1928–1931Celtic MI (14–17) 1804–1807Celtic MI (18–21) 1832–1835

Right WingNumidian LC (1–10) 2235–2239; 2135–2139African Phalanxes (4–6) [b] 2431/2432, 2433/2434, 2435/2436

a = Maharbal, a great cavalry commander, is capable of issuing Line Commands without resorting to Hannibal’s Strategy rating. In essence, this makes the Carthaginian command totally independent and remark-ably effective. b = Players who wish to start from the point where Hannibal withdrew his African phalanxes in preparation of his double envelopment plan (see Historical Victory note, below) should place the African phalanxes in the following hexes, facing as noted: 1702/1703 and 1735/1736 (fac-ing Northeast), and 1604/1504, 1405/1305, 1534/1635 and 1333/1434 (facing Southeast). They should also move up Maharbal’s Numidian cavalry to the 2400 line so that his frontage is extended and covered. The African phalanxes were supposedly composed of “half-caste” Africans and Carthaginians, who were Phoenician, not African . . . although exactly what that entailed is a source of major (and somewhat acrimonious) disagreement these days. It all depends on how “politically correct” you wish to be. There is also some indication that these units were not phalanxes in the Macedonian sense, but, rather, an extended line of spearmen. Perhaps. However, Hannibal tended to use them as if they were Macedonian-style phalanxes, so we have opted for that “class” of unit. The African Phalanxes were out front before the battle began, most likely to disguise Hannibal’s deployment, especially as the wind was blowing in the Roman’s eyes. Unless you really like to fiddle with this sort of pre-battle maneuver, we heartily suggest that, as the Ro-man Player can see everything on the map anyway, you start with the Phalanxes withdrawn, as noted.c = Polybius, as well as several modern sources, refer to these as “heavy” cavalry. However, other, modern information, based on archaeologi-cal evidence, indicates that the Spanish and Celtic horse were more lancers than what we consider, in game terms, heavy cavalry. They had shields, helmets, long spears and carried swords; but they had no body armor. They also often dismounted and fought on foot, although, it appears, not here.Carthaginian Line Composition: The Carthaginian center—all that Medium and Light Infantry—is not deployed in what the basic rules would consider a line. However, the Carthaginian Player may treat these units as being in a line as long as each unit is in an adjacent hex … and there are no spaces between units.

The Roman Army under Consul G. Terentius VarroAll units are faced southwest.

The Romans use all 8 legions and all 8 alae. However: Only the legion cavalry and the alae cavalry from the VII, XIV, XV 1.

and XIX Alae are used. Do NOT use the cavalry from the I, III, V and X Alae.

The following units are not used in this battle:2. a. All Alae Triariib. All Alae Velitesc. Remove one Velites unit from each of the I, III, V and X legion



All of the above (a–c) represent the c. 10,000 men left in the camp.

3. Skill-Level Adjustment: The Roman army at Cannae was not an “elite” bunch; half of them were rather hastily raised, the other half approaching manic depression. To include an elite and a veteran legion will provide them with far too much staying power. Therefore, the following units are Depleted:

All LG, HI, and LI from I, III, V, and X Legion• All LG, HI, and LI from I, III, V, and X Alae• All Cavalry from the I and X Legion•

Leader Hex Varro (OC)[a] 3106Paullus[a] 3129Servilius[a] 3229Atilius[a] 3627Three (3) Tribunes, two (2) Prfct Soc with/adjacent to any infantry unit

Two (2) Prfct Eqt 3103, 3136

a = May command any units. Historically, Varro started the battle in charge of the legionary cavalry. Paullus, Servilius and Atilius may NOT be replaced if killed.

Units Hex(es)

Velites Line

All Legion Velites (VE) (See Note #2) 2909–2928

Hastati Lines

All Hastati (HA) from any 2 legions PLUS 12 alae cohorts (CO)—hastati in center, alae on each side—in each of the following: lines:3010–3028 (even hexes only; two units per hex)3110–3128 (even hexes only; two units per hex)3210–3228 (even hexes only; two units per hex)3310–3328 (even hexes only; two units per hex)

Principes Lines

All Principes (PR) from any 2 legions PLUS 12 alae cohorts (CO/CE)—principes in center, alae on each side—in each of the following lines:3410–3428 (even hexes only; two units per hex)3510–3528 (even hexes only; two units per hex)

All Principes (PR) from any 2 legions PLUS 8 alae cohorts (CO)—principes in center, alae on each side—in the following line:3612–3626 (even hexes only; two units per hex)

All Principes (PR) from any 2 legions in the following line:3716–3722 (even hexes only; two units per hex)

Triarii Line

All Legion Triarii (TR) 3807–3830 (one unit per hex)

Right Wing Cavalry

All Legion RC 3001–3008

Left Wing Cavalry

Alae RC (See Note #1) 3030–3041

Legion units are always placed in the center; cohorts alae on the wings.

THE REVISIONIST, “DeSanctis/Livy”/4 Legion, DEPLOYMENTFor those of you who want to see what happens if the Romans do have only four double legions, try this version. Your main problem, as the Roman, is that while your army is now halved—your opponent’s isn’t! Recommended mostly for “what if” play and people with a virulently anti-Roman strain in their psyche.

The Roman Army under G. Terentius VarroAll units are faced west.

Use all units in (only) the Recruit skill Legions (and alae): VII, XIV, XV and XIX. This scenario assumes that the units left in camp were the recently levied “additions”. In case of activation ties (5.12), Roman leaders go first.

Leader Hex

Varro (OC) 3005Paullus 3028Servilius 3110Atilius 3228Two (2) Tribunes with/adjacent to any infantry units

Prfct Eqt 3036

Note on Leaders: Because of the presence of two consuls and two proconsuls, we have reduced the number of tribunes to 2, the praefects equitum to one, and eliminated the praefects sociorum. The consuls and proconsuls can command any troops.

Units Hex(es)

Velites Line

All Velites (VE) 2908–2927

Hastati Lines

All Hastati (HA) from any 2 legions PLUS 12 alae cohorts (CO)—hastati in center, alae on each side—in each of the following lines:

3009–3027 (odd hexes only; two units per hex)

All Hastati (HA) from any 2 legions PLUS 8 alae cohorts (CO)—hastati in center, alae on each side—in each of the following lines:3111–3125 (odd hexes only; two units per hex)

Principes Lines

All Principes (PR) from any 2 legions PLUS 12 alae cohorts (CO/CE)—principes in center, alae on each side—in each of the following lines: 3209–3227 (odd hexes only; two units per hex)

All Principes (PR) from any 2 legions PLUS 8 alae cohorts (CO)—principes in center, alae on each side—in the following line:3311–3325 (odd hexes only; two units per hex)

Triarii Line

All Triarii (TR) 3409–3427 (even hexes only; two units per hex)

Right Wing Cavalry

All Legion RC 3001, 3003, 3005, 3007

Left Wing Cavalry

All Alae RC 3030–3041



Legion units are always placed in the center; cohorts alae on the wings.


Roman Carthaginian1. *Velites (VE) 1. *Balearic SK Slingers2. *Hastati (HA) and Ala

Cohorts (CO/CE)2. Celtic Medium (MI), Iberian

Light (LI) Infantry3. *Principes (PR) and Ala

Cohorts (CO/CE)3. African Phalanxes (PH)

4. Triarii (TR) 4. Celtic and Iberian Lancer (LN) Cavalry

5. Legion Cavalry (RC) 5 All Cavalry6. Alae Cavalry (RC)


SPECIAL RULES

Overall CommandersHannibal is the Carthaginian Overall Commander. Historically, Varro was in command of the Romans at Cannae (but, see below). For OC purposes, Paullus will replace Varro (and vice versa), if the latter is killed.

The Paullus VariantBecause command was switched daily (between consuls), players may designate Paullus as OC if they wish to alter play balance. He is somewhat a better commander than Varro (who, all things considered, was a major jerk). It might be interesting to see what the result would have been had Paullus, not Varro, been in charge. If trying this, Varro may NOT automatically use a Line Command (as does Paullus when Varro is in charge.)

The Proconsul VariantPlayers who find the Carthaginians too successful (which we don’t feel will happen in the eight-legion deployment) may address the Ro-man’s main problem—command—with the following variant. The two proconsuls—Servilius and Atilius—may issue one Line Com-mand each turn without being within Varro’s range by rolling the die when it is their Phase (either initial or Momentum). If the dieroll is a 0–4, they may issue the LC; if it is a 5–9 they are Finished. Add one (+1) to the die roll if this is a Momentum Phase; +2 if it is the second Momentum Phase.

Important: This rule should be used ONLY as a play balancing element for competitive play.

Triarii DoctrineThis rule is in effect for this scenario.

Terrain NoteThe Aufidus River is uncrossable. It may not be entered and is consid-ered impassable terrain for that purpose. Although they are not visible, both flanks are, essentially, “anchored”—by the river on the Roman right and the plateau on the left—both represented by the edge of the map. (It worked out really nicely . . . .)

Swords of the CeltsNo, it’s not a forgotten Christopher Lambert Classic Movie (which, in itself, is an oxymoron) . . . . it’s a rule that simulates the fear—and the casualties—created by the Celtic long sword and the way it was used. The Celts swung it in huge, whooshing circles, slashing at anything in range. Unfortunately, the Celts were somewhat undisciplined and liable to disintegrate after the impetus of their initial attack was spent, which is the reason for their (relatively) low TQ. They were almost purely offensive.

In the Charge section of Shock Attack (8.33), units defending against any attack that includes Celtic infantry add one (+1) to the Pre-Shock TQ Check die roll.

Play Note: This rule is NOT applicable to any other battle. Why? Mostly, because the term “Celts” is somewhat generic, and the Celts at Cannae were different from those at Zama and elsewhere (the latter were more Gauls than Celts, but we already had far too many counters anyway . . . .)

Historical Note: The Celts, who in the previous century had fought pretty much in the altogether, by this period had donned pants that looked as if they came from a close-out sale in double-knits. As for their unusual hair-do’s, if you’ve ever had the misfortune to see the infamous boxing promoter, Don King, you get a pretty good (actually a great) idea what the Celts’ hair looked like.

The Volturnus (Optional) It was a hot August day when the battle took place. (Actually, several sources state it took place in June; regardless, it was hot.) Even worse, a debilitating wind (known then as a volturnus, and which we, today, would call a sirocco) had whipped up from the south and was blowing a steady stream of dust to the NE—right into the face of the Roman army. The midday sun, over the shoulders of the Carthaginians, shone directly into the Roman eyes, not helping the situation either. (Leads you to believe Varro had laid off about 20,000 talents on the Carthagin-ians, eh?) This rule, considered optional for those not wishing to bother with an extra dieroll and some low-level math, simulates the effect of the Volturnus.

At the start of each turn, prior to any Leader Activation, is the Volturnus Phase, as below. The Roman Player rolls the die. If he rolls a 0–6, the wind is blowing. A 7–9, the wind has stopped, temporarily, and there is no effect that turn.

Volturnus Phase. The Roman player checks to see whether the wind is still blowing the dust into his face.

If the Volturnus is blowing, any unit that begins movement facing into a West or Southwest vertex (as below) reduces its MA (for all purposes, including withdrawal) by one (all Roman units start the game with this problem). Any Roman missile units facing in those directions reduce their range by one (to a minimum of 1 hex) and lower their Missile Hit number by one (to a minimum of 0) in each range.

The Volturnus always blows from the same direction; it does NOT change.

Note: We highly recommend that you use this rule if you are playing for an historical result.

Retreat EdgeThe Romans retreat toward the northeast edge of the map while the Carthaginians retreat toward the southwest edge.



VICTORYMore Historical Digression: Cannae was the greatest Roman defeat in its entire history; all or parts of eight (or four) legions were either totally destroyed or so obliterated that they were useless. (The actual survivors—who included the future Scipio Africanus, a tribune at the battle—were, for the most part, exiled to hard times in Sicily, and the legions were not used for active duty until Scipio took them to Africa, where they redeemed themselves at Zama, 14 years later.) Estimates of the Roman dead go to upwards of 50,000—including Consul Paullus, the two former consuls serving as proconsuls, Servilius and Atilius, as well as 80 senators—three times the number of dead for both sides at Antietam and more than several WWI battles! As for Varro, despite his having been bonked on the noggin by a Balearic slinger’s stone—the one wound least likely to have any effect on his abilities—he fled back to Rome where he was actually congratulated by “the people” for “not giving up”. (Boy, I bet several politicians would love to have his “spin” flack!) However, despite the Senate’s remarkable leniency, Varro does not appear to have been given any office higher than Rat Catcher for the rest of his career.

To feel that the players can—or even should—recreate this result is folly. Anyway, who would want to play the Romans? The object of the game is not to see what happened—which we already know—but to see, perhaps, why it happened and how it might have turned out differently. We have provided rules that create the problems and advantages of both sides; whether or not they lead to such a predestined end is the measure of your abilities as gamers. The Army Withdrawal Levels (and percentages), below, reflect the designers’ estimations of the overall Cohesive Strength and Discipline of the opposing armies. While Hannibal’s force was pretty much a mercenary one, the soldiers showed remarkable allegiance to Hannibal, with whom they stayed for over a decade with hardly a murmur. On the other hand, at least four of the Roman legions at Cannae were raw recruits. Players will note the rather large Average TQ that the Roman army had, even with those recruits. This was a reflection of the innate discipline and training that even the newest legions had. Rome’s prob-lems lay not in this area but, usually, with her commanders and their stolid—and virtually non-existent—ideas concerning tactics.The Carthaginian Army withdraws when units with Rout Points totaling 195 have been eliminated. For the 8-Legion version, the Roman Army withdraws when units with Rout Points totaling 240 have been elimi-nated. When using the 4-Legion version, the Roman army withdraws when units with Rout Points totaling 165 have been eliminated. Hannibal is worth 25 Rout Points if wounded; if he is killed the Romans win automatically.



Rout Ratio

Avg TQ

Carthaginian 78 351 486 40% 5.8

Roman [4 Legions] 128 384 665 25%[a] 5.2

Roman [8 Legions] 208 636 1,202 20%[a] 5.8

No adjustment has been made for Depleted units

a = the low Roman Rout Ratios reflect the fact that this army was newly raised, and few men had seen any previous action.

A Historical Note on Victory: O.K. You’ve got the eight-legion ver-sion set up and you want to know how Hannibal did it. Well, we’re sure it wasn’t quite as easy as it looks—but, with our trusty pair of hindsight glasses firmly in place, it sure looks easy. In essence, at Cannae, Hannibal raised the Macedonian system to its finest hour, combining each of the separate weapons system in his command—and especially his cavalry—to neutralize everything the Romans could throw at him.

Using the historical set-up, Hannibal’s initial move was to withdraw his African phalanxes so that they were now deployed as per the note in the Carthaginian set-up. With Varro still trying to walk and think at the same time, Hannibal now had both his cavalry wings charge their undermanned Roman counterparts at the same time, quickly driving them from the field. (Actually, Hannibal’s left wing cavalry had the more immediate success, after which it circled behind the Roman triarii to assist Maharbal.) With their flanks unguarded—and threatened by cavalry—the Romans had nowhere to go but into their usual (and tired) strategy of trying to break the opponent’s center by moving forward, en masse, against the unusually deployed Carthaginian foot. Hannibal, however, had seen two previous Roman armies in action and he had devised a tactical deployment that would “bend, but not break”. As the Roman lines approached, Hannibal’s Celtic and Spanish infantry gradually withdrew the center of their line (taking some heavy losses as they did so from the inexorable legions) so that the original convex formation became concave, with the Romans in the center. At this point, the African phalanxes closed in on each side of the Romans, and Hannibal’s cavalry returned from their pursuit of the Romans to close up the rear. The entire Roman army was now encircled, and the rest of the day was given over to methodical slaughter of the legions.

At Cannae, it was shown that, given an exceptional commander—and Hannibal was truly an exceptional commander—who could anticipate the enemy and control the various forces in his com-mand, the Macedonian system could prevail . . . as long as it had superiority in cavalry.



Historical BackgroundMany historians consider Zama one of the most important battles in Western civilization. Perhaps that is reading too much into its obvious political conclusion: Rome’s Mediterranean expansion. With wonderful hindsight, however, it is fairly easy to see that Carthage was doomed as a political entity; her inefficient, city-state form of government was no match for the Roman concept of people and state. Rome’s ascendancy was simply a matter of time, and Zama helped to hasten that date. From a military point of view, however, Zama is an immensely important battle. On one level it shows what a genius Hannibal truly was; his army at Zama was inferior to Scipio’s; yet, Hannibal came rather close to win-ning. On a loftier plane, Zama is the proving ground of the flexibility of the Roman legionary system—as implemented by the insightful mind of Scipio Africanus—and its superiority to the powerful, yet linearly rigid, Macedonian system. The latter would live on for another 50 or so years, suffering further repeated blows at Cynoscephalae (see below), Magnesia (Antiochus and the end of the Seleucids) and Pydna (Perseus and the end of Macedonia). The Roman legions would continue to hold sway for the next several centuries. Delbruck further adds to its importance by arguing that it was the first use of echelon tactics; i.e., the different lines of troops were not there to simply provide depth but to be used for differing tactical purposes—as well as acting as a reserve. In 210 B.C., with Hannibal’s army still on the loose in southern Italy, the young Publius Cornelius Scipio was chosen to command the Roman forces in Spain. Scipio was something of a surprising choice, given his youth and lack of experience in public office—although not overly shocking given Scipio’s ideas on how to conduct the war against Carthage and the people’s demand for some sort of action. (Fabius Cunctator was still implementing the theory that Rome could bore Hannibal to death; exhausted by ennui, he would then go home. It pretty much worked.)In a few short years, the son of a consul from the First Punic War had proven himself to be an exceptional field commander, with a victory over

Hasdrubal at Baecula and a masterful, tactical showpiece win at Ilipa. In 205 B.C. he was elected consul where, in the Senate, he went face-to-face with the delaying strategy of Fabius. Scipio advocated taking the war directly to Carthage; the only way to get Hannibal out of Italy was to force him to return to Africa to defend his city-state. To this end—albeit with some senatorial reluctance—he was handed the command of Sicily and its two legions, mostly remnants and veterans of the Cannae fiasco. After raising some additional forces to flesh out his consular army, he set off for North Africa where, in a series of stunning maneuvers, he won several land and naval battles, forcing the Carthaginians to sue for peace. In the meantime, with Mago’s army having been destroyed in Liguria, the Carthaginians demanded Hannibal return to Carthage, as Mago’s defeat had nullified whatever “Italian strategy” Hannibal had. Hannibal’s arrival seemed to strengthen the backbone of the Carthaginians, and they repudiated the peace treaty through a variety of actions that the Romans, as was their wont, assigned to the usual Punic Treachery. Hannibal’s army was in bad straits, however, especially in the all-important area of cavalry. Even worse, after a series of political and military maneuvers involv-ing claims to the Numidian throne, Scipio had acquired the services of Masinissa, the new Numidian king, along with the cream of his capable light cavalry. Although Hannibal was aware of these developments, he assumed that he could bring Scipio to battle before Masinissa arrived. And to strengthen his outnumbered cavalry wing (which included about 2000 Numidians led by one of Masinissa’s leftover rivals), he quickly trained a corps of 80 or so war elephants. (However, see the note on Hannibal’s elephants, below.) Both generals were now set for battle; all they needed was a place.The site of the Zama battlefield has never been firmly pinpointed. If you read Polybius/Livy closely, it seems to have taken place closer to the village of Naraggara. We have used the map from H.H. Scullard’s book, Scipio Africanus, Politician & Soldier, (it also appears in Liddel Hart’s book, with an added cross-battlefield trail) which is based on that con-

THE BATTLE OF ZAMAHannibal Barca vs. Proconsul P. Cornelius Scipio—North Africa, 202 BC



tained in the Kromayer-Veith Atlas (a German work extremely difficult to obtain through the normal, local-library channels—or through any channels, for that matter). If interested, we suggest you consult Scullard for a discussion on all possible sites, of which Veith’s selection—and our choice—appears the most reasonable. Zama is pretty much a set-piece battle. We have provided only one sce-nario, although the players may feel free to change deployments within the parameters of the original dispositions. There are some problems in terms of unit types and numbers, and where/how they deployed. We do know that Scipio had an augmented, two-legion consular army; see the notes on the Roman army under their deployment. Hannibal’s somewhat hastily assembled army is somewhat easier to pin down, although num-bers and weapons system types are evasive. It appears that Hannibal, aware of his inferiority in mounted troops, placed the onus of victory on his infantry. To that end, he hoped that one of two things would happen: either his elephants would drive off the Roman cavalry, or the Roman cavalry would recklessly pursue the undermanned Carthaginian horsemen off the battlefield, allowing Hannibal’s infantry to go head-to-head with the legions.Well, the elephants proved a bust (Scipio pretty much saw to that), but Hannibal was on the money about the Roman cavalry chasing the Africans hither and yon. That left it up to the infantry, and, despite the eagerness of some of Hannibal’s newest recruits to be elsewhere, his veterans were pretty much holding their own against Scipio’s relentless legionnaires when Laelius returned with the cavalry, hit Hannibal’s lines from the rear, and sealed Carthage’s doom. Hannibal, himself, escaped, but the 2nd Punic War was over—and so was Carthage’s prominence. Hannibal, still a fairly young man, sought employment in the Near East. He was on the field at Magnesia when the Romans decided to put a quick end to the machinations of the Seleucid ruler, Antiochus the Great, in 190 B.C. (So was Scipio, although the latter was ill and had little input). It is something of a measure of Antiochus’ lack of genius that, having one of history’s greatest tacticians at his side, he failed to put him to any significant use. Rome eventually decided that Hannibal was a major pain regardless of where he was, so they declared him an outlaw and finally tracked him down in Bythnia (northern Turkey), where he had been help-ing King Prusias in his contre-temps with Pergamum. With his house surrounded, Hannibal, bitter and tired, committed suicide.

MapUse the Zama map.

Difficulty And BalanceWhile not as massive as Cannae, Zama presents both players with problems that are best tackled by experienced players. The playing time about six hours and with two equal players the Romans are slightly favored. For competitive play, use the following Rules Fixes for a better balanced game:

Hannibal gets the Elite Phase in the first turn (this is historically • what occurred anyway)Do not use the Blow, Scipio, Blow Rule.• Use the full complement of 80 elephants, all of which are “veteran” el-• ephants. They do not start Depleted, and they get Elephant screens.

INITIAL DEPLOYMENTS The Carthaginian Army under Hannibal BarcaAll units are faced northwest.

Leaders Hex Hannibal Barca (OC)+Surus AnywhereHasdrubal Gisgo AnywhereHanno AnywhereTychaeus 3236

Units Hex(es) Skirmish LineBalearic SK Slingers (1–7) [a] 2811, 2814, 2817, 2820, 2823, 2826, 2829

Elephant LineAfrican Elephants (1–16)* 2906–2936, even number hexes only

Left Wing CavalryNumidian LC (1–5) 3133–3137

Right Wing CavalryCarthaginian HC (1–5) [g] 3104–3108

Mercenary LineCeltic MI (1–10)[c] 3110–3131Ligurian MI (1–6)[c]

Balearic Med MI (1–2)[b, c]

Mauritanian MI (1–4)[b, c]

LeviesN. African LI (1–6)[d] 3310–3331Carthaginian MI Levies (1–16)[d]

Reserve LineAfrican Phalanx (1–5) [e, f] 3716–3717, 3718–3719 3720–3721, 3722–3723 3724–3725Bruttium HI (1–12) [f] 3710–3715, 3726–3731* = All elephant units start Depleted. Additionally, they do not have elephant screens, so the “a” missile capability is ignored. Important: See the Special Rule, below, on Hannibal’s elephants.a = Although none of the “ancient” sources mention the slingers, several modern (reliable) sources state they were most surely present—as Han-nibal was never without them in Italy and he must have brought some of those back with his Old Army when he returned to Carthage. b = Polybius specifically mentions “heavily-armed” infantry from the Balearic Isles and Mauretania (Morocco). Historically, troops from these areas were invariably light-armed infantry and/or skirmishers. It is, however, highly likely that Hannibal re-armed them with heavier weapons (if not armor), as they were in the same line with the Ligurians and Celts. If they were light infantry/skirmishers, they would not have been so deployed.c = Remnants of Mago’s Army, composed of mercenaries from a variety of areas from Spain to Northeast Italy. These units may deploy in their line as the player wishes, as there is no indication as to how they were intermixed within that line.d = Termed, variably, as Libyans, Africans, whatever. These—and their compatriot Carthaginian levies—were extremely unreliable, hastily trained troops. Although they constitute a second “line”, it appears Hannibal intended to use them to extend his first line as the battle de-veloped. They may be intermixed as the player sees fit. See the Special Rule on these units, below.e = Although the presence of “4000 infantry from Macedonia” (pha-langites??) is mentioned in several sources, many modern historians consider these more legend than fact. Actually, they tend to use the word “annalistic”, which should not be confused with “analistic”, which is what some of these authors appear to be as you slog through their works. We agree with those modern interpretations and have left the Macedonians out. If you wish, use two Macedonian phalanx units instead of two African phalanx units. f = Hannibal’s veterans, the “Old Army of Italy”g = Although the Carthaginian Sacred Band cavalry is not mentioned as being at Zama, there is no reason to assume it should not have been.



The Roman Army under P. Cornelius ScipioAll units are faced southeast.Scipio has a full consular army augmented by the addition of about 7000 “volunteers” (plus Masinissa’s 10,000 Numidians). The presence of these volunteers (Polybius’ term) creates somewhat of a problem, as it is not clearly stated how or where they were used. Liddell Hart says these were “Scipio’s men”, used to augment the legions to an expanded strength of 6500 infantry. As Scipio had some time to train these volunteers while in Sicily, and he did engage in several minor battles before Zama, we have adopted Liddell Hart’s position (although reducing his numerical estimate)—at least for game purposes—that they were deployed with the hastati and principes lines, being similar in weaponry to the cohorts of the alae. Serendipitously, this allowed us to extend Scipio’s lines so that they were equal in length to the opposing infantry lines, as is indicated in the sources. To do so, we also lengthened the third, Triarii, line with the cohorts extraordinaires plus some of the volunteer cohorts. The velites front was extended by the Numidian light infantry, as has been suggested by some of the sources. Granted, much of this is surmise; however, we do feel that our guesses have been “educated” ones. You can always redeploy; we won’t tell a soul.The Roman should use the I and X legion and alae, plus 22 additional cohort units (but NO extraordinaires) from any of the recruit-level alae (AS/VII, AS/XIV, AS/XV, or AS/XIX). The color borders of these auxiliary, recruit-cohorts still apply for stacking rules. If players wish to alter balance, they can substitute legions/alae of lesser skill levels. The Historical deployment uses Scipio’s non-staggered, manipular formation, with the so-called elephant lanes (See the note on Han-nibal’s elephants). Several sources say the “historical” legions present were the V and VI.

Leaders Hex Scipio (OC) AnywhereMasinissa[a] With/adjacent to any Numidian cavalry unitLaelius[b] With/adjacent to any Legion or Alae CavalryTwo Tribunes (2), two Prfct Soc[c] With/adjacent to any infantry units

a = Masinissa has a Charisma rating of “2C’. This means it may be used only when stacked with a Numidian cavalry unit. Masinissa may automatically issue a LC in his Initial Phase, regardless of where he is on the battlefield. Momentum-generated LCs follow 4.25 (Masinissa was quite a capable commander in his own right). If killed, Masinissa may NOT be replaced.b = Scipio’s old buddy, and Polybius’ confidant, Gaius Laelius, was the Praefectus Equitum in charge of all Roman cavalry. If killed, he is replaced by a Praefect Equitum.c = Roman Tribunes and Praefects Sociorum may command any and all types of legion/alae infantry.

Units Hex(es) Velites LineI VE (a–c), X VE (a–c) 2313–2323 (Odd numbered hexes only)AS/I VE (a, b), AS/X VE (a, b) 2309, 2311, 2325, 2327

Hastati LineI HA (a–d), X HA (a–d) 2217, 2219, 2221 2223 (two per hex)AS/I CO (a–e), AS/X CO (a–e) 2211, 2213, 2215, 2225, 2227 (two per hex)Recruit CO (6) 2209, 2229, 2231 (two per hex)

Principes LineI PR (a–d), X PR (a–d) 2017, 2019, 2021, 2023 (two per hex)AS/I CO (f–i), AS/X CO (f–i) 2011, 2013, 2027, 2029 (two per hex)AS/I CE, AS/X CE 2015, 2025Recruit CO (8) 2007, 2009, 2031, 2033 (two per hex)Triarii LineI TR (a–c), X TR (a–c) 1819–1824AS/I TR (a, b), AS/X TR (a, b) 1817–1818, 1825–1826 Recruit CO (8) 1813–1816, 1827–1830

Left WingI RC, X RC, AS/I RC (a, b, EX),AS/X RC (a, b, EX) 2205–2208, 2104–2107Right WingNumidian LI (1–4) * 2329, 2331, 2333, 2335Numidian MI (1–6) * 2133–2135, 2233–2235Numidian LC (1–10) * 2236–2240, 2136–2140

* = Use the Numidian counters that are part of the Roman counter-mix; not the ones that are part of the Carthaginian mix. Play Note: Yes, there’s an odd ala cohort in each line, which means it has to start stacked with a cohort from a different ala. Nothing tragic, and you’re always free to change the deployment, if you wish. The present situation arose from (a) the fact that ‘9’ is an odd number, and (b) Scipio’s army was a bit of a mix-and-match affair, in which he has upped the strength of his legions, so such intermingling was possible.


Roman Carthaginian1. *Velites (VE), Numidian

Light (LI) Infantry1. *Elephants

2. *Hastati (HA) and Ala Cohorts (CO)

2. Celtic, Ligurian, Balearic, Mauretanian MI

3. *Principes (PR) and Ala Cohorts (CO/CE)

3. African Phalanxes (PH), Brut-tium HI

4. Triarii (TR) and Alae Co-horts (CO)

4. Carthaginian Heavy (HC) Cavalry

5. Legion and Alae Cavalry (RC)

5 Numidian Light (LC) Cavalry

6. Numidian Light (LC) Cavalry

6. N. African Light (LI), Levy (MI) Infantry

7. Numidian Medium (MI) Infantry

7. **Balearic Slingers (SK)

* = Do not have to be adjacent; see 4.24.** = Can be within three hexes of another (and no intervening units, etc.)

SPECIAL RULESBlow Scipio, BlowHannibal, with a severe shortage of cavalry (which was to prove de-cisive), decided to augment his horse with a corps of war elephants. His plan, according to most historians (see, though, note on Hannibal’s elephants) was to neutralize Scipio and Masanissa’s horse by placing his pachyderms up front and have them charge the Romans at the outset to drive off their cavalry and disrupt their front line (Shades of



Porus at the Hydaspes!!). Unfortunately, he had little time to train his elephants (the reason for their low TQ), and Scipio was ready for them. Not only did he supposedly modify the standard legionary checkerboard deployment to create lanes for the charging elephants (for which bit of silliness we refer you, yet again, to the elephant note), but, at the start of the battle, he set up quite a din of trumpets and shouts, all of which served to frighten the untrained tuskers, many of which ran wild before they could even get going.Therefore, at any time during the game—but only once—instead of a Line Command from Scipio (and only The Scipster), the Roman Player may turn on his Punic Ghetto Blaster. He rolls one die for each elephant on the map. If the die roll is higher than the TQ, that elephant immediately suffers a number of cohesion hits equal to the difference (all standard rout rules applying); if it is the same as or lower, there is no effect.

Levy Retreat and Old Guard RallyThe Carthaginian second line of infantry—the North African and Carthaginian levies—was a hastily raised group. In order to “stiffen their collective spines”, Hannibal placed them in front of his veterans with the idea that the latter would stop the levies from running away. To recreate this, we give the Carthaginian Player two possibilities with any routing North African Light Infantry or Carthaginian Levies:

If one of these units routs, instead of retreating it directly back, the • Carthaginian may “rout” it sideways and around the third line (of African Phalanxes and Bruttium infantry). Once they pass the Old Guard, they head directly for the map edge; ORThey head directly backward, as in the standard rule. The instant they • move adjacent to an (un-routed) African Phalanx/Bruttium unit, the Carthaginian player rolls the die. If the die roll is the same as or lower than the TQ of the Old Guard unit, the routing levy/light infantry is automatically rallied. If it is higher, the routing unit is eliminated AND the Old Guard unit suffers one cohesion hit. Only Old Guard units may so rally routing levies.

Either option may be applied to individual units. The rule applies only to routing North Africans and levies—as these were the only units that Hannibal instructed the Old Guard to worry about.

Hannibal’s ElephantsOne of the more interesting questions surrounding Zama concerns Hannibal’s elephants. The first arises as to numbers. Polybius states there were about 80; Delbruck and Veith argue for a much lower figure: perhaps 15–20. That question is not as much fun, however, as how they were to be used.By this time it was quite apparent to everyone that elephants had little effect against trained infantry, especially when covered by disciplined skirmishers. Their best use was against enemy cavalry, who, no mat-ter how well-trained the horses were, still had major troubles with the pachyderms. What, then, were Hannibal’s elephants doing arrayed in a line directly opposite Scipio’s infantry—especially as Hannibal was so deficient in cavalry? Delbruck’s rather common sense answer is quite interesting. They were simply buying time, creating enough of a disturbance so that Scipio’s cavalry would be gone, having chased Hannibal’s cavalry off the field. With all cavalry gone, and the elephants having delayed Scipio’s deploy-ment of his foot, Hannibal could now fight this battle on a pure infantry/power basis, where he was probably superior in numbers. This is such an obvious, possible (and Hannibal-like) solution that it comes as some-what of a surprise that few post-Delbruckian scholars have adopted it. We think it sounds as reasonable as all get-out. Which brings us back to the question of numbers. If Hannibal had that many elephants (80), why didn’t he split their usage, assigning half to counter-balance the cavalry and the other half against the infantry? If you agree with Delbruck’s

hypothesis concerning Hannibal’s tactics you have to also agree to a lower elephant figure. Of course, you will notice, that, when using all 80 elephants, Hannibal does pretty much get to cover both the Roman infantry and cavalry. “Is a puzzlement.” A tangential question arises over Scipio’s infantry deploying without the usual manipular intervals. Polybius states he was creating lanes for the elephants to pass through. Think about that for a second. Never mind the fact that elephants were mostly used against cavalry, so that Scipio would have had to have been amazingly prescient to discern Hannibal’s rather unique use for his elephants. The really amazing thing is that Scipio would have been dumb enough to expect the elephants to simply charge right down those open lanes—rather than into the troops. How thoughtful of them. I don’t think so.In any case, players are free to adjust the numbers of elephant units avail-able to Hannibal according to whom they believe. We have provided an initial deployment of 16 units (80 pachyderms). The lowest the Carthagin-ian should go is 4 units. Try this: roll the die twice, adding them together. The number rolled is the number of elephant units the Carthaginian player gets to use. If greater than 16, he gets 16. If less than 4, he gets 4. They still deploy in the same line. Their location is up to the Carthaginian player; however, the two-space line restriction still applies.

Triarii DoctrineThis rule is NOT used in this scenario.

Retreat Edges The Romans retreat toward the northwest edge. The Carthaginians retreat toward the southeast edge.

VICTORYThe Roman Army Withdraws when units worth 230 Rout Points have been eliminated. The Carthaginian Army Withdraws when units worth 170 Rout Points have been eliminated. This number remains the same regardless of how many elephants the Carthaginian player gets.

Hannibal is worth 25 Rout Points if wounded; if he is killed the Ro-mans win automatically. Scipio is treated normally; his death is NOT an automatic Carthaginian victory.



Rout Ratio

Avg. TQ

Carthaginian 94 336[a] 483 35% 5.4

Roman 106 340 657 35% 6.2

a = Elephant Size points (80) were excluded

A Note about Victory: At Zama, Scipio was able to neutralize the advantages that Hannibal could produce with the Macedonian system by gaining superiority in cavalry—and using it, something which previous Roman commanders rarely understood. With his mobility and maneuver thus severely restricted, Hannibal was forced to rely almost entirely on the power of his infantry reserve to break the Roman line. There is also a possibility that he specifi-cally relied on the fact that the superior Roman cavalry would chase the Carthaginian horse, thus rendering them unavailable! That he almost succeeded in doing this—and it was only the late return of Laelius and Masinissa with the cavalry that spelled a quick end to the battle—is further testament to Hannibal’s genius.



Historical BackgroundBy the end of the 3rd century, B.C., Macedon, and her king, Phillip V was still the dominant force in the eastern Mediterranean. Her army, a direct descendent of Alexander’s, was still much feared, as was the Macedonian style of warfare, which still emphasized combined arms but placed far more reliance on the power of the phalanx than Alexander ever did—or would have. While Rome was going the way of increased flexibility and maneuver, the Macedonian phalanx was becoming, if possible, more rigid than ever.

During the 2nd Punic War, Phillip sided with Carthage. Although this arrangement produced no pitched battles between Rome and Macedon, it became known, historically, as the First Macedonian War. After some indecisive skirmishing, an uneasy peace was negotiated that enabled Rome to concentrate its energies on defeating Carthage. Legend has it that Phillip supplied Hannibal with several thousand men at Zama, but there appears to be no support for this story.

In 200 BC, with Rome now the dominant power in Italy and the Western Mediterranean, Rhodes and Pergamum petitioned her for aid against continuing Macedonian aggression in the Dardanelles and Egypt. This petition focused Roman attention on the Aegean and its unresolved business with Phillip. Rome demanded complete Macedonian with-drawal from Greece. Phillip agreed in part but wanted to maintain control over Demetrius in Thessaly, Chalcis in Euboea, and Corinth in Achaea, which the king had called the “fetters of Greece”. A Greek delegation sent to Rome gave the Senate a lesson in Greek geography and the negotiations ended in an impasse. However, as a result, the Senate voted Consul Lucius Quinctius Flamininus two Roman Legions plus 6,000 allied foot and 300 allied cavalry to prosecute the Second

THE BATTLE OF CYNOSCEPHALAEKing Phillip V of Macedon vs. Consul T. Quinctius Flamininus—Greece, 197 BC

Macedonian War to conclusion.

Upon arrival in Greece, Consul Flamininus conducted a series of nego-tiations that allied most of Greece with Rome for its coming showdown with Phillip. This gave the Roman army, reinforced by almost 10,000 men from the Aetolian League, a grand total of 23,000 foot and 1,100 cavalry to face Phillip’s 23,500 foot and 2,000 cavalry. From some-where—probably a gift from Masinissa—Flamininus also managed to attract the services of 20 elephants, which were to play a surprisingly decisive role in the coming battle. Aficionados of Alexander the Great will notice the diminution of the Macedonian cavalry wing, despite its numerical superiority to that of the Romans, both in numbers and effectiveness. This was due, in part, to the hilly and rocky Greek ter-rain, most of which negated the capabilities of cavalry; Cynoscephalae would be a major example. It also reflected a reduced appreciation of Alexandrian tactics. And, given the equality of strength in both armies, the approaching battle would be won by the respective tactical systems and not weight of numbers.

Both armies lurched forward in an attempt to seek each other out. Phillip and Flamininus knew they could not keep their respective co-alitions in the field indefinitely, so each wanted to fight quickly. Near Pharae, in Thessaly, reconnaissance forces from both sides came into contact, although no battle occurred because the respective command-ers felt the terrain was too constricted by walls and enclosed farms. The Macedonians then headed for a supply region to replenish their stocks of food. The Romans moved parallel to the Macedonians to cut them off from the needed grain, with the two forces being separated by a long ridge called Cynoscephalae (so named for its resemblance to a “dog’s head”). On the third day of marching a torrential storm



arose drenching the forces and causing a heavy fog. The Macedonians tried to march on but could not make any headway in the storm. They withdrew to camp, leaving a strong outpost on the ridge. The Roman army stayed in camp but sent out a reconnaissance party to locate the Macedonians. With a heavy fog obscuring visibility, the two patrols bumped into each other on the rain-soaked ridge. With the Macedonians holding the heights, both sides sent back for reinforcements. The battle of Cynoscephalae was on.

Flamininus reluctantly sent reinforcements, forcing the Macedonians off the ridge. Phillip felt compelled to reinforce his exposed unit and prevent its destruction. These fresh Macedonian forces reclaimed the ridge from the Romans as the fog began to lift. Perceiving an op-portunity to destroy part of the Roman army, Phillip now reluctantly committed his entire army. Flamininus followed suit, and a full-scale, pitched battle began.

Phillip took personal command of his right wing, and as soon as it formed on the ridge he doubled the depth of the phalanx and attacked the Roman left. This maneuver was, momentarily, successful; however, it separated the Macedonian army into two sections, with the Macedonian left wing under Nicanor still deploying from march column. Flamininus, seizing the moment, sent his right wing, lead by his elephants, slamming into the Macedonian left. An unknown Roman tribune, most likely from the Triarii, noticing that the Macedonian army was now split in two, exposing the flanks of the phalanxes, seized the initiative—and the day (carpe diem, for those of you who collect Latin idioms)—by leading 20 Roman maniples (the entire principes and triarii lines from one Ro-man legion) into the rear of the Macedonian right wing. This Roman maneuver—a text-book example of flexibility versus rigidity—shattered the Macedonian army and Phillip’s hopes of Greek hegemony, leading to a swiftly negotiated conclusion to the Second Macedonian War.

Even more important, Cynoscephalae was the first major confrontation between the Roman legions and a full-blown Alexandrian/Macedonian army led by phalanxes. (Both Hannibal and Pyrrhus adapted the Mace-donian system rather than used it.) While Phillip’s phalanxes could not be budged in a head-to-head confrontation (the legions that attacked them frontally suffered heavy losses; see the notes on the Phalanx in the terminology section), they could, if outflanked, be easily defeated. Both the difficulty of the terrain at Cynoscephalae and the ability of the legion to maneuver freely, and in sections, enabled this to happen. The day of the phalanx was rapidly drawing to a conclusion, a curtain that would finally be drawn some 30 years later, at Pydna.

PRE-GAME NOTES:Play Note: This battle is great fun, especially if you play the Fog and Hidden Movement rules. That it is a pure meeting engagement, allows players to experiment with their units—and their tactics. It can also be used as a “play-first” scenario using the Set-Piece deployment.

MapUse the Cynoscephalae map.

Difficulty And BalanceThe set-piece battle is a fairly easy one, but the aspects of hidden move-ment that the fog creates in the Meeting Engagement make that a more complex affair. Do not underestimate how difficult it is to move fairly rigid formations in this type of terrain. Playing time for the set-piece battle is around two hours; add at least another hour for the Meeting Engagement.

This battle is fairly even, with a slight edge to the Romans. A lot depends on how the players handle the difficulties of the terrain. For competi-tive play use the Rout Point Bid Method. A Rules Fix would be to use the optional Augmented Roman Cavalry rule, but do not increase the Rout Point Withdrawal Level! This addition will, of course, help the Romans..

INITIAL DEPLOYMENT THE MEETING ENGAGEMENT This scenario lists the historical “turns” of arrival. When using the optional “Fog” rule, these will probably change.

Roman Army under T. Quinctius FlamininusMost Roman units start off map (in camp). A small reconnaissance party is on a ridge. Within 3 hexes of Hex 2020: Aetolian Lt (LC) Cavalry; Aetolian Lt (LI) Infantry (1, 2); Prfct Eqt* * = May give Individual Orders (not LC) to infantry until Tribune or Praefect Sociorum enters game and is within range.

Roman ReinforcementsAll Roman reinforcements enter the map through the Hexes in the SE corner of the map marked with an R (1037, 1038, 1039, 1040, 1041, 1042, 1043, and 1044). The maximum number of combat units that may enter play in any one turn is 16. There is no limit on the number of leaders that can enter per game turn. Once Roman units have entered play they may not voluntarily leave the map. The III and V Alae So-ciorum are much reduced in strength, reflecting what Flamininus was granted by the Senate. Note that the Praefects and Tribunes may give orders to the Greek allies.

Game Turn 3 [Group #1]AS/V EX RC V; Apollonian Lt (LI) Infantry; Aetolian Lt (LI) Infantry (3,4); Cretan Lt (LI) Infantry; Cretan (SK) Archer (1–5–6); Prfct Soc (1)

Game Turn 8 [Group #4] (Roman player picks the order of unit entry)III Legion; V Legion; AS/III Alae* ; AS/V Alae** ; The Aetolian League [Aetolian (HI) Hoplites (1–8), Athamanian Med (MI) Infantry (1–3)]; African Elephants (1–4); Consul Q. Flamininus; Tribunes (2); Prfct Soc (2); Prfct Eqt (1) * = (without velites, cavalry and cohorts ‘a’ and ‘b’)** = (without velites, cavalry ‘a’ and ‘b’, and cohorts ‘a’ and ‘b’)

Macedonian Army under Phillip VOnly a small reconnaissance party is on the map at the start. Within 2 hexes of Hex 2718: Thessalian HC (1, 2); Macedonian LI (1–4); Philocles* * = Philocles was actually the King’s prefect and garrison commander of Corinth, but we needed another leader.

Macedonian ReinforcementsThe Macedonian reinforcements enter the map through the Hexes marked with an M (4216, 4217, 4218, 4219, 4220, and 4221). The maximum number of combat units that can enter play in any one turn is five (5). There is no limit on the number of leaders that can enter per game turn. Once Macedonian units have entered play they may not voluntarily leave the map.Game Turn 5 [Group #2]Macedonian HC (1–3); Illyrian LI (1–4); Mercenary HI (1–3); Epirote (SK) Slingers (1–3); Cretan (SK) Archers (1–4–6) (1–2); AthenagorasGame Turn 7 [Group #3]Macedonian Phalanxes (PH) (1–12); Thracian LI (1–4); Phillip V; Nicanor

Fog (Optional)As noted above, the battle started while a heavy fog covered the field, which led to both sides blundering into each other. To simulate this we have provided a quasi-double-blind (limited) hidden movement rule. As this does require a bit of “bookkeeping”, we make it optional.



Given the few counters affected—and the fun and historicity it adds to the game—we heartily recommend it. If you play without it, use the reinforcement arrival turns listed, above. If using the Fog rule, these arrivals are dependent upon who sights whom—and when.

There are three visibility conditions: Heavy Fog, Light Fog, and Clear. Visibility affects the distance over which a Line of Sight can be attained. The Fog Effect Table, below, lists the maximum LOS distance for the given visibility conditions—no unit can see any other unit that is outside the allowed maximum—plus any effect on movement allowances. All normal LOS rules still apply.

Visibility at the start of the game is Heavy Fog. Starting with the 3rd Game Turn, a “Fog Lifting” die roll is made at the start of the turn, before any other phase. If the die roll falls within the given range, the Fog lifts one level from Heavy to Light, or from Light to Clear. Once visibility is Clear no further Fog lifting die rolls are necessary.

Fog Lifting Die Roll TableGame Turn Die Roll to lift Fog one level3, 4 0–15 0–36 0–67 till Clear 0–8

Visibility Effect ChartVisibility Max LOS Distance Effect on MovementHeavy Fog 5 hexes MA halved, rounded upLight Fog 10 hexes Reduce MA by one (–1)Clear 25 hexes* None

* There is a limit because there was still a fine mist that hindered distance visibility.

The Fog/Hidden Movement RuleIn addition to the above, neither side places any of his units on the map for the first turn. He simply writes down to where they have moved; all movement and cohesion rules apply. However, the following deploy-ment restrictions apply:

The Roman Praefect Equitum is placed in 2020. Combat units must • be placed either in 2020 or south of 2020 and within range.The Macedonian leader, Philocles, is placed in 2718. Combat units • must be placed either in 2178 or north of 2178 and within range.

All units in the Reconnaissance parties MUST stay within their leader’s range at all times.

At the start of turn 2, the players place the Leader Counter, ONLY, on the map. Starting with turn 3, this comes after the Visibility die roll. Each player then notes where his other units are (by look-ing at the piece of paper on which he has written their most recent location). If any of his units can attain a LOS to the enemy Leader counter, he states so—and, at this point, BOTH sides now place all their units (that are in play) on the map (if Distrust is imminent, refer to the written movements).

Play continues using Hidden Movement until a sighting is made.

Fog Reinforcement ScheduleReinforcements, as you may have noted, are listed by group. When playing the Fog rule they do not, necessarily, arrive in the listed turn. The groups are eligible to enter, as follows:

Group #1: One Turn after LOS is attainedGroup #2: Three turns after LOS is attainedGroup #3: Five Turns after LOS is attainedGroup #4: Six turns after LOS is attainedExample: If initial LOS is attained at the start of Game Turn 3, Group #1 may enter in turn 4; Group #2 in turn 6; Group #3 in turn 8; and Group #4 in turn 9.

Hidden Movement (Advanced Optional Rule)Players wishing even more “realism” can use Advanced Hidden Move-ment. Nothing arcane here, simply determine—based on fog and LOS (of which there is not much between the two armies at the beginning—which units can see which. Ones that could/cannot be seen, including arriving reinforcements, do all their movement hidden, until sighted. This will require a bit more paper work, plus some agree-to-before house rules, but it does create some mass confusion. This confusion is not helped by the fact that both sides have the same-colored counters; however, we already told you that.

THE SET-PIECE BATTLEIf it’s a stand up/set-piece fight you want, without all of the early stum-bling around in the fog, then this scenario is for you. This deployment approximates the decisive moment of the battle, when the main armies had partially deployed on the field and Phillip unleashed the Double Depth Phalanx charge that almost carried the day. As the Romans lost the initial battle on the heights, some Roman units are not deployed as they are considered to have been routed from the field during the early fighting.Important: The game starts with the Macedonian Player using an Elite Initiative Order (5.5), with Phillip as the selected leader, even though Phillip is not an elite OC. He may use this only in the first game turn.

Roman Army under T. Quinctius FlamininusAll Roman units are facing north. Place the Roman leaders avail-able—Flamininus, 2 Tribunes, 3 Praefects Sociorum and 2 Praefects Equitum—in any hex occupied by a friendly unit (the Romans are not deployed in their usual checkerboard fashion).

Units Hex(es)

Right WingV RC 2210AS/V RC (ex) 2211AS/V (c–i), AS/V CE 2315, 2316, 2317, 2318, 2115, 2116, 2117, 2118AS/V TR (a, b) 1916, 1917

CenterV VE (a–c) 2312, 2313, 2314V HA (a–d) 2319, 2320, 2321, 2322V PR (a) 2119V PR (b–d) 2120, 2121, 2122V TR (a–c) 1919, 1920, 1921III VE (a–c) 1824, 1825, 1826III HA (a–d) 1827, 1828, 1829, 1830III PR (a) 1627III PR (b–d) 1628, 1629, 1630III TR (a–c) 1428, 1429, 1430

Left WingIII RC 1842Aetolian 1840AS/III CO (c–i), AS/III CE 1832, 1833, 1834, 1835, 1632, 1633, 1634, 1635AS/III TR (a, b) 1433, 1434



Aetolian League

Aetolian HI (1–8) 1836, 1837, 1838, 1839, 1636, 1637, 1638, 1639Athamanian MI (1–3) 1436, 1437, 1438

ElephantsAfrican Elephants (1–4) 1926, 1929, 1932, 1935

Note: The Hoplites and the Athamanians of the Aetolian League ARE supposed to be red. We realize that keeping track of even these few units that are the same color as the Macedonians is a bit of a pain. We feel, however, that keeping the nationality colors consistent is important as this series grows and provides increasing opportunity for design-your-own construction sets.

Macedonian Army under Phillip VAll Macedonian units are facing south, unless indicated to be In Col-umn. Leader HexPhillip V 2819Philocles Any hex occupied by a Macedonian unitAthenagoras Any hex occupied by a Macedonian unitNicanor Any hex occupied by a Macedonian unit

Units Hex(es)Macedonian HC (1–3),Thessalian HC (1–2) 2606, 2607, 2608, 2609, 2610Thracian LI (1–4) 2611, 2612, 2613, 2614Mercenary HI (1–3) 2713, 2714, 2715Macedonian Phalanxes (1–6)* 2716–2717, 2718–2719, 2720–2721 Macedonian LI (1–4) 2722, 2723, 2724, 2725Illyrian LI (1–4) 2735, 2736, 2737, 2738Macedonian Phalanxes (7–12) ** 2730–2731, 2729–2829, 2928–3028, 3127–3227, 3326–3426, 3525–3625* = In Double Depth, two units per hex ** = In Column


Roman Macedonian1. *Velites (VE), Greek Skir-

mishers (SK)1. Phalanxes

2. *Hastati (HA) and Ala Cohorts (CO/CE), any 4 Greek Infantry

2. Skirmishers (SK), Light (LI) Infantry

3. *Principes (PR) and Ala Cohorts (CO/CE)

3. Hoplites (HI), Light (LI) Infantry

4. Triarii (TR) 4. African Phalanxes (PH), Brut-tium HI

5. All Cavalry 5 All Cavalry6. Greek Allied Infantry7. Elephants


SPECIAL RULESMacedonian Double-depth PhalanxesPhillip V, in an effort to increase the crushing pressure of the phalanxes, implemented a formation which doubled their depth. The Macedonian player may recreate this, using the rules in 9.5.

The Macedonian Phalanxes which begin on the right flank start the game in double-depth formation. All other Macedonian Phalanxes begin deployed as single units (in column). They may be formed into double-depth during the battle, as per 9.51.

Augmented Roman Cavalry (Optional)Most sources state that the Roman cavalry contingent at Cynoscep-halae was significantly smaller than that of a normal Consular army. This is probably due to the difficulty of transporting horses overseas. If you want to play with a full contingent of Roman cavalry add the missing 5 Roman Alae cavalry units to Group #4. For the Set-Piece battle place the AS/V RC in hexes 2008, 2009 and the AS/III RC in hexes 1843–1845.

Triarii DoctrineThis rule is NOT used in this scenario.

Retreat Edges The Romans retreat toward the south map edge. The Macedonians retreat toward the north edge.

VICTORYIn the Meeting Engagement, the Roman army withdraws when units worth 140 Rout Points have been eliminated, while in the Set-Piece battle the Roman withdrawal level is 135 Rout Points. In both versions, Macedonian army withdraws when units worth 115 Rout Points have been eliminated.

Phillip is worth 25 TQ points if wounded, if he is killed the Romans win automatically.


Meeting Engagement


Rout Ratio Avg TQ

Macedonian 37 220 291 40% 6.1

Roman 76 230[a] 408 35% 5.4

Set Piece


Rout Ratio

Avg. TQ

Macedonian 32 215 281 40% 6.2

Roman 71 209[a] 386 35% 5.6

a = Elephant Size points (20) were excluded



The following, abstract “battle” is provided for gamers not familiar with the system who want to see how things work before starting to get down to the serious, histori-cal blood-letting. One player commands the Romans, the other, the Carthaginians. This is a truly “hypothetical” battle; more of a heavy skirmish, to be sure. The Romans have more “counters” and better TQ (more or less); the Carthaginians have more “men” (about 6000–5000) and a decided advantage in mounted troops. They also have Hannibal.MapUse the Cannae MapRomansUse the III Alae Legion, with Flamininus, one Tribune, and two Praefects Equitum (in case you wish to split your cavalry to both wings).

By Mark Herman & Richard Berg

The Roman Art of War: The Legion Under the RepublicThe Roman military originally used a Hoplite style of warfare through-out the period of its tutelage under, and liberation from, the Etruscans. Sometime during the early 4th century BC, after the Gauls had oc-cupied Rome (around 390 BC?) and withdrawn, a legendary military leader named Camillus reorganized and rearmed the Roman Legion. The Century (100) was originally an administrative unit based on the voting rolls of the old Servian army. Camillus linked two centuries together into a tactical unit called a maniple. The two centuries of a maniple could either be in line (side by side) or in column (one behind the other). He then organized the maniples into three lines based on a new doctrinal specialization. The first and second lines were the Hastati and Principes respectively. These lines were armed in the new style with the sword as their main armament. The third line, the Triarii, were the older more experienced soldiers and were armed and arrayed in a Hoplite-like phalanx.

The Hastati and the Principes were the one-two punch of the legion. The manipular organization of the Legion, with its clearly defined chain of command, allowed the Romans to use its superior tactical organization to execute line changes during battle. A typical Roman battle would see the Velites harass the enemy battle line while screening their own forces. Upon a signal the Velites would withdraw through the gaps between the Hastati maniples, deployed in column formation. Then the Hastati line would advance toward the enemy battle line and deploy into line formation. The Hastati battle line would then break into a run just as they were about to come in contact with the enemy and throw their pila (Roman javelin). The pila volley would disrupt the front ranks of the enemy just as the Hastati closed for hand to hand combat. If the Hastati began to tire or become disrupted, the Principes would move into intervals to relieve them. This was probably done using a well rehearsed battle drill whereby the Hastati pulled one Century out of the line and then disengaged the second, which moved back through gaps in the Principes maniples, also deployed in column formation. As the Principes columns moved forward, the Hastati maniples cleared out of the gaps allowing the Principe to deploy their rear Centuries forward

into line. The Principes closed with the enemy, who were now faced with a fresh missile volley and charge.

This use of tactical reserves for the main battle line gave Rome a huge advantage over a Phalanx-style formation. Whereas the Macedonian model was to attack the flanks of the enemy and roll up his battle line, the Roman system was designed to frontally shatter it. A Phalanx, with its tight formation had little tactical flexibility and could not move re-serves to relieve the front ranks. The Legion’s ability to keep constant and fresh pressure on an enemy battle line nearing exhaustion helped defeat their Latin and Southern Greek neighbors who used a more rigid doctrine. The Legion, however, was not invincible. The Samnites, using a similar system, gave the Romans a significant challenge such as their victory in 321 BC at Caudine Forks. It was for this last eventuality that the Triarii, a defensive formation, were in the third line.

The Triarii were the most experienced campaigners in the Legion and were near the end of their military service. They were armed with spears in a modified Hoplite Phalanx formation. The saying went, “The last resource is in the Triarii.” If the Hastati and Principes were unable to prevail against the enemy then the Roman commander would prob-ably withdraw. The Principes would withdraw through the Triarii, as the Hastati had done earlier, while the Triarii moved forward. The rear centuries of the Triarii would then move from column to line forma-tion and present the enemy with a solid front of spears as the Legion withdrew in good order from the field to their nearby camp.

One of the key weapons of the post-Camillan Legion was a Spanish sword variant, the gladius. The gladius produced fearful wounds, mak-ing it superior to the spear, and a reduced reach which required superior mobility to employ it against spear-armed opponents. To gain the re-quired mobility the body armor of the Legionary soldier was lightened significantly and compensated for by a superior shield, the scutum. The scutum, probably borrowed from the Samnites, covered most of a man’s body and substituted for the necessity of heavier armor.

It had become apparent to ancient generals that once opposing Hoplite battle lines came into contact it became a pushing match, due to the difficulty of bringing a spear to bear at a range less than the length of

CarthaginiansTwo African Phalanxes, four Iberian light infantry, 2 Balearic sling-ers, 2 Numidian Light Cavalry, 2 Celtic Lancers, 2 Elephants (Afri-can); Hannibal (but no Leader Elephant), Mago, and Tychaeus.

DeploymentRomans set up first; Carthaginians second. Make sure there are at least five hex rows between armies and that both sides are fairly equidistant from the edge of the map.

Players may use any “optional” rules they wish, although, as you are learning the system here, we recommend keeping it to a minimum. We suggest limiting Hannibal to one LC per turn.

VictoryThe Romans Rout when they have “lost” 34 Rout Points; the Carthaginians rout when they have lost 25 Rout Points. Elephant losses do NOT count towards this total (the rates are fairly low to make this relatively quick).

SPQR DESIGNERS’ NOTES

A LEARNING SCENARIO



its shaft. When the Legionary soldier was in contact with the enemy he would thrust out from behind his body shield, then withdraw behind it. In this manner he was able to defeat a spear-armed opponent by coming into direct contact where his shorter and more maneuverable sword gave him the edge. It is interesting to note that the other solution to this problem, which Phillip II of Macedon chose, was to lengthen the shaft and attack from a standoff range.

Livy credits Hannibal as saying that one of the key innovations that placed Pyrrhus in the highest ranks of military commanders was his use of the defensive camp. If this is true then the Romans took their most important doctrinal innovation from another culture. The Romans weren’t originators, but they knew how to reverse engineer with the best of them. If this supposition is true then they adopted this technique around 277 BC when Pyrhus was in Sicily. It has been said that the Legionary soldier was actually an engineer trained as an infantryman. This may be true based on the great skill that Roman armies exhibited in siege craft. A Roman camp was designed to hold an entire Consular army. At the conclusion of each day’s march the Consular army built its defensive camp to protect the army from surprise attack and to have a nearby refuge if a battle went against them.

Pyrrhus vs. RomeWith some notable exceptions, Rome produced a series of political generals whose only saving grace was their ability to implement the solid Roman doctrine in a fairly rigid and competent manner. As long as the opponent was not a military genius (Alexander, Pyrrhus, or Hannibal), the solid Legionary soldier would usually prevail. When a first-class general was the opponent, he was usually able to exploit the organizational deficiencies inherent in the Roman tactical system.

The Consular army used infantry instead of cavalry as its shock arm. This limited the mobility and speed with which force could be brought to bear on the enemy. In addition all of its missile armed troops were on foot and there was a notable absence of bow-armed units. The cavalry was meant to protect the flanks of the Legion, not break the enemy army. The lackluster quality and doctrine of Roman and Allied cavalry made a Consular army vulnerable to superior shock cavalry penetrating its flanks and disrupting the legionary infantry. The lack of mobility and range of the Roman missile forces also created opportunities for horse archer armed forces such as occurred at Carrhae. A combined arms Macedonian style army was well equipped to defeat the Roman Legions in battle as witnessed by the early, but costly, victories of Pyrrhus in his initial encounters with Rome. Pyrrhus had all of the pieces, except he was short in the quantity and quality of his cavalry arm.

Pyrrhus had been campaigning in the west since 280 BC. In the five years he spent there, he did not receive substantial reinforcements and his ability to transport horses by sea was limited. Due to the large defections in Rome’s Southern Greek allies, she was under-equipped with cavalry against Pyrrhus and lost the first two battles (Heraclea and Asculum). Additionally, the Romans seem to have had problems with the Epirote Elephant corps. In the end Pyrrhus didn’t have a sufficient superiority in cavalry to prevail, nor the manpower to pull it off. He was one Pyrrhic victory too far.

Hannibal vs. RomeRome was vulnerable to a combined arms army, especially one well equipped and well led. Hannibal brought both of these factors to bear on the Romans and the result was Cannae. The Carthaginian army that fought in Italy succeeded tactically, but failed operationally and strategi-cally. Hannibal was able to win an unbroken string of battlefield victories until Zama but failed to defeat Rome. He failed because operationally the Roman navy denied Carthage command of the sea, hampering his ability to maintain the size and quality of his army. He also failed operationally because be was unable to conduct a successful siege of Rome and win the war. He failed strategically because he was unable

to create the kinds of defections amongst Rome’s Southern Greek allies which his strategy was predicated upon. In the end, his inability to solve these problems and the destruction of his overland reinforcements at the Battle of the Metaurus, led to his withdrawal from Italy.

At Zama, Rome resolved the tactical problems that had plagued their forces in Italy. They were led by their first great general, Scipio Afri-canus, who had removed their deficiency in cavalry by enlisting the defecting Numidian cavalry on their side. The resulting Roman victory at Zama metamorphosed the city state into a world-class power.

Phillip V vs. RomeLike the Romans, the Macedonian tactical system had changed and the Phalanx had become the primary shock arm instead of its cavalry. The Battle of Cynoscephalae pitted two armies of similar philosophy against each other. The primary difference was the armament of the opposing infantry battle lines. The extra-length sarissa used by Phillip’s army, around 21 feet long, was a replacement for the 14 to 18 foot sarissa from earlier times. This extra reach presented problems for the Roman sword-armed infantry, as witnessed by the Roman left flank yielding to this tactical system at Cynoscephalae. Phillip’s battle line, however, was very unwieldy, especially over rough ground. In the final analysis, Phillip V, although a competent general, was no Alexander. In the end it was the new Phalanx’s extreme flank vulnerability in rough terrain that won the 2nd Macedonian War for Rome.

Could Alexander the Great Have Conquered Rome?In 323 BC Alexander was at the height of his fame and experience. Assuming he had the time, and we know he had the inclination, he probably would have conquered Rome. Why do I come to this conclu-sion? In 321 BC the Samnites defeated the Romans at Caudine Forks. It wasn’t until 295 BC that Rome won the decisive battle of Sentinum and it took until 290 BC before the Samnites were totally subjugated. A confrontation between Alexander and Rome would have occurred around 318 to 313 BC when Rome was not a world class power. When Rome came up against Hannibal, another General who used Combined arms warfare, it faired poorly. It was Hannibal’s inability to raise the Southern Greeks in revolt against Rome that led to his strategic defeat. Alexander the Great would not have had this problem because Rome had not yet conquered the Southern Greeks nor consolidated her po-sition in Central Italy. Unfortunately, death was life’s way of telling Alexander to slow down. Anyway, if you own Alexander and SPQR, try it out and see what happens.

Game As HistorySPQR has been designed to allow you to investigate the Roman tacti-cal system in battle. We’ve attempted to supply information sufficient for you to understand the doctrine and try and employ it under game conditions. It is in this manner that the game can become living history. The way you can accomplish this in the game is to have your Hastati in two stacks of two counters separated by one hex. Two hex rows behind the Hastati are the four Principes counters in the same formation. One hex row behind them are the three Triarii counters each separated by one hex. In front of this formation are the Velites counters. First the Velites move forward and throw a missile volley or two at the enemy. After they are pila depleted (dePILAtated?!), withdraw them through the three lines of the Legion to replenish their missile supply. Using a line command, the Hastati move forward and un-stack creating a solid front. When adjacent to the enemy battle line, they throw their pila then commence shock combat. If the Hastati do not rout the enemy, give another line command and pull them back through the gaps between the Principes stacks, which then are given another line command to move them into contact with the enemy. If all else fails, pull your Principes back through your Triarii, close ranks, and hope for the best. Rome rarely rewarded failure and neither does SPQR, so if the Triarii are employed you probably are going to lose the battle.



The Evolution of the Alexander DesignRoman doctrine was predicated on the smooth line changes which allowed a simple set of signals to move large bodies of men into complicated tactical maneuvers. It was recipe warfare that allowed lackluster political appointees to win tactical victories. The game por-trays the Roman leadership as superior in executing line commands, but individually they are mediocre commanders in situations requiring more creative solutions.

The stacking rules are far more advanced and complex than in Alex-ander, although they allow you to conduct the wide range of line and formation changes which were the sine que non of the Roman legion. We have hopefully reduced the burden these critical rules require through the color coding system we have employed.

During Alexander’s invasion of Persia his highly disciplined cavalry would remain under control even after routing the enemy. It appears that this was a unique characteristic which only the Companion cavalry

A Brief Note: There are few “ancient” sources—e.g., Livy, Dionysius, Plutarch, and that bunch—cited, below. This game is not intended as the definitive treatise on Roman tactics, and most ancient sources are pretty much summed up and covered in the more modern works. Poly-bius, of course, being the main (and, in our opinion, the most reliable) work on the era, is required reading. We wish we could have gotten hold of Walbank’s book of commentaries on Polybius, but it was, to our surprise, nowhere to be found.

Adcock, F.E., The Roman Art of War Under the Republic (Barnes & Noble, Inc., NY, 1970) Actually, a series of lectures given at Oberlin College in 1939, this short book is mostly valuable for its psychological insights into the Romans at war. Makes a good point that it mattered little how mediocre Roman generals were—and most were often less than mediocre; it was Roman discipline, steadiness and courage that won the battles.

Bowder, Dana (Ed.), Who Was Who in the Roman World (Cornell U. Press, Ithaca, NY, 1980) Handy, dandy reference book with a write-up on virtually everybody. Has good bibliographical source info for all listings, plus lots of “pictures” (mostly coins and busts, to be sure.)

Bradford, Ernle, Hannibal (McGraw Hill, New York, 1981). Rather good, generic history of the general, with some fairly incisive comments on the various battles. Bradford opts for 8 legions at Cannae, giving that size as the reason for the ensuing Roman confusion and disaster and stating the Carthaginians were so superior in command and unit morale that numbers mattered little, if at all.

Connolly, Peter, Hannibal and the Enemies of Rome (Silver Burdett Co., Morristown NJ, 1985). Originally part of a larger work (“Greece and Rome at War”), this book has a lot of information and schematic graph-ics on Cannae, including good analysis of latter-day terrain, as well as excellent information on the Celtic and Spanish troops.It also contains a great, birds-eye view painting of the start of the battle. A Polybius supporter, Connolly puts forth cogent arguments for an eight-legion Roman army at Cannae. Good deployment plan for Bagradas Plains.

Connolly, Peter, The Roman Army, (Silver Burdett Co., Morristown NJ, 1985). Also originally part of “Greece and Rome at War”, this work has excellent visual information on what the army of the Republic looked like. Unbelievably, these two valuable books are usually found in the Children’s section of the library!! I guess if a book has pictures and large print . . . . can you see an 8-year old checking out the difference between hastati and principes?? Don’t let the pictures fool you; Con-nolly is a major historian of decided impact.

Cook, S.A., Adcock, F.A., and Charlesworth, M.P. (Editors), The Cam-bridge Ancient History (Cambridge University Press, London, 1978). This massive, multi-volume work, is actually a series of articles on virtually every aspect of ancient history. Vol VIII covers the Punic Wars, with author B.L. Hallward pushing the augmented, 4-legion theory at Cannae. Vol IX contains good basic information about the wars with Pyrrhus (Beneventum) and the Macedonians (Cynoscephalae). Good news: an extensive bibliography. Bad News: virtually all books listed are in German or Italian. Bunch of pedants, if you ask me . . . .

de Beer, Sir Gavin, Hannibal (The Viking Press, NY, 1969) Pretty much standard Hannibal bio, although well-written and informative. Big advantage is that it has lots of pictures, showing battlefield terrain, locations, etc. For those visual aids alone, highly recommended.

Delbruck, Hans, Warfare in Antiquity (Transl. by Walter Renfroe; Uni-versity of Nebraska Press, Lincoln and London, 1990). A new edition of the first volume of Delbruck’s “History of the Art of War”, 1920 edition. Delbruck was, probably, the first, great modern military histo-rian, and his insights are still fresh. Extensive discussions of Cannae (Hans is an 8 double-legion man, although he discusses the possibility of a smaller force) and Zama, as well as dozens of other battles, plus Delbruck’s ability to combine common sense with historical insight, make this an invaluable book. He is, however, wrong on the Indian vs African elephant debate.

Dorey, T.A., and Dudley, D.R., Rome Against Carthage (Doubleday & Co., Garden City, N.Y., 1972) A workable, general history of all three Punic Wars with very little hard information on the individual battles. A point of (very) minor interest is that the authors have consular (221) blowhard, Marcus Minucius—not Atilius—as co-commander of the Roman center at Cannae. Where they got that particular bit of arcana would be interesting to speculate on (for at least 30 seconds).

Gabba, E., Republican Rome: The Army and the Allies (transltd from Italian) (Oxford Co., London, 1976) Boy, when I saw this title I thought we had hit paydirt. All goes to prove you can’t tell a book by its cover—or its title. Essentially a collection of essays by the author—a historian of some repute, I’m given to understand—none of which cover the title. Actually, I wasn’t ever quite sure what they covered. Heavy stuff, much use of Greek (untranslated, of course . . . take that, you peasants), and about as readable as a Victorian legal contract. Also somewhat less interesting.

Garoufalias, Petros, Pyrrhus, King of Epirus (Stacey International, London, 1979) Fairly definitive study of the Epirote mercenary. Mostly

seemed to possess. During the period depicted by SPQR and even later, Cavalry after an initial success would pursue their enemy for varying lengths of time effectively removing them from the battle. The Duke of Wellington as late as Waterloo bemoaned this deficiency in his own cavalry units. We have captured this phenomenon with the Cavalry Pursuit rules which can remove successful cavalry from the battle for varying amounts of time. At Zama it is the return of the Numidian cavalry that helps carry the day for Rome.

ConclusionDuring the period of the Republic, Rome destroyed or conquered all organized competitors around the Mediterranean rim. These victories prevented any successor states from arising to challenge Rome’s control and security. The Legions had done their work well. After the Civil Wars and during the Empire period the Legions met a host of unorganized and disjointed cultures who were never a serious strategic threat to Rome.

SPQR SOURCES



concerned with strategic and political factors. Very little on Beneven-tum, although he does talk much about the terrain. The prose style is rather overblown and fawning, somewhat reminiscent of Boys’ Wonder Book of Pyrrhus. However, the notes (which are longer than the narra-tive) are very good and contain excellent numerical information. Book should have carried the subtitle, “The Eagle Has Landed”.

Hackett, Gen. Sir John (Editor), Warfare in the Ancient World (Facts on File, New York, 1989) This is as good a basic book on ancient warfare as you are likely to find. Good chapter on the early Roman legions a la Polybius, plus a great painting (yet again by Connolly) of Cynoscep-halae. Contains Connolly’s argument concerning the number of pila in actual use. The authors of the various chapters are pretty much the experts in their respective fields.

Jones, Archer, The Art of War in the Western World (U. of Illinois Press, Chicago, 1987). A valuable survey of the whys and wherefores of military developments, the book has an excellent section comparing the Roman and Macedonian systems. If you are at all serious about military history, this book is sine qua non.

Keppie, Lawrence, The Making of the Roman Army (Barnes & Noble Books, Totawa, NJ, 1984) Good survey book covering development of Roman Army. Anyone who alludes to Gilbert & Sullivan and uses the movie, Spartacus, as a visual reference for Roman deployment meth-ods can’t be all bad. The book’s appendices are especially invaluable, although mostly for the legions of the early empire. Learned that the Latin word, “as”, denoted a small-denomination coin. Do you suppose imperial soldiers were paid with a piece of As?

Liddell Hart, B.H., A Greater Than Napoleon, Scipio Africanus (Biblo and Tannen, NY, 1976) One of the earliest modern-day Scipio bios, it’s a rather “harumphy” attempt to elevate Scipio to super-star status.The intro is a hoot, claiming Lincoln would have fallen into obscurity had he not been shot, Ludendorff was all set for iminent stardom, and who can remember the name of a marathon winner. Well, he got the last one right. Bluntly states Polybius is the only reliable source, although he does give specific numbers for Scipio’s “expanded” legions at Zama. Reading this, I couldn’t help but picture C.Aubrey Smith in “The Four Feathers”. Very readable, with good maps, again thanks to Kromayer-Veith. Someone want to explain the title to me?

Polybius, The Rise of the Roman Empire (translated by Ian Scott-Kilvert) (Penguin Books, NY, 1979) The “basic” book for this era, Polybius, a Greek taken as hostage after the Romans defeated the Macedonians

at Pydna in 168 B.C., is our most reliable, antiquarian source. He was also a friend of Gaius Laelius (see Zama OoB), which may have given him access to inside information on Scipio. Aside from his coverage of the Punic Wars, he provides an in-depth view of the Roman military system of the time. Since only a few of Polybius’ forty books survived, there are significant gaps in the narrative—sort of like reading “Moby Dick” without all that stuff on the whaling industry—but it has excel-lent footnotes. Required reading.

Pratt, Fletcher, The Battles That Changed History (Hanover House, NY, 1956). One of the few books to contain more than a passing mention of Pyrrhus. The chapter on Beneventum was, if not incisive, at least available. Pratt’s breezy style tends to diminish any depth or credence he might otherwise have, so it’s difficult to know exactly how much you can trust him. He does mention some terrain details (gleaned from Dodge, to be sure), and, for those literary and PBS mavens out there, the maps in the book were drawn by Edward Gorey!

Scullard, H.H., The Elephant in the Greek and Roman World, (Cornell University Press, Ithaca NY, 1974) A really good book covering just about anything you would want to know about elephants at war. Scullard discusses all the sources, and all the possibilities, as well as giving some good battle information and elephant numbers. He also discusses—quite seriously—the possibility of the use of “flaming pigs”, which he feels were probably used. As a bonus, it’s quite readable.

Scullard, H.H., Scipio Africanus, Soldier and Politician (Cornell U. Press, Ithaca, N.Y., 1970) A valuable book, with not only excellent insight into the mind of Scipio, but good analyses of his battles. Our source for the Zama map, Scullard taking his from Kromayer-Veith. (K-V is a German work on ancient battlefields.) Best of all, he writes well (although his physical resemblance to Donald Pleasance is a bit disconcerting).

Stewart, John, “The Elephant in War,” in MHQ, The Quarterly Journal of Military History; Vol 3 No. 3 (MHQ, Inc., NY, 1991) Good survey article of use of elephants in warfare. Contains some good information on Pyrrhus, the Flaming Pigs, and the African-Indian argument.

Webster, Graham, The Roman Imperial Army, 3rd Ed. (Barnes & Noble Books, Totowa, New Jersey, 1985). A classic work on the Roman army, its tactics, etc. The introduction contains a good description and analysis of the armies of the Republic. Basic Library material. It also contains a nice section on the varieties of Roman “artillery” in use.



8.54 Shock Combat Results Chart CRT Columns

DR 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

0 6(1) 5(2) 4(2) 4(2) 3(2) 3(2) 3(2) 3(2) 3(2) 3(2) 3(2) 2(2) 2(2)

1 6(1) 4(2) 4(2) 3(2) 3(2) 3(2) 3(2) 3(2) 3(2) 2(2) 2(2) 2(3) 2(3)

2 5(1) 4(2) 4(2) 3(2) 3(2) 3(2) 2(2) 2(2) 2(2) 2(2) 2(3) 2(3) 2(3)

3 5(1) 4(2) 4(2) 3(2) 3(2) 2(2) 2(2) 2(2) 2(2) 2(2) 2(3) 2(3) 2(4)

4 5(2) 4(2) 3(2) 3(2) 3(2) 2(2) 2(2) 2(2) 2(3) 2(3) 2(3) 2(4) 1(3)

5 4(2) 4(2) 3(2) 3(2) 2(2) 2(2) 2(2) 2(3) 2(3) 2(3) 2(3) 2(4) 1(3)

6 4(2) 4(2) 3(2) 2(2) 2(2) 2(2) 2(2) 2(3) 2(3) 2(3) 2(4) 2(4) 1(4)

7 4(2) 4(2) 3(2) 2(2) 2(2) 2(2) 2(3) 2(3) 2(3) 2(3) 2(4) 1(4) 1(4)

8 4(2) 3(2) 2(2) 2(2) 2(2) 2(3) 2(3) 2(3) 2(3) 2(4) 2(4) 1(4) 1(4)

9 3(2) 3(2) 2(2) 2(2) 2(3) 2(4) 2(4) 2(4) 2(4) 2(4) 1(4) 1(4) 1(6)

8.52 Shock Superiority Chart

Attacker Weapons/Armor System vs. Defender

Defender Type PH+ HI+ LG+ MI+ BI+ LI HC+ RC+ LN+ LC EL+ CH+

[PH] Phalanx – – – – DS DS DS DS DS DS DS –

[HI] Heavy Inf – – AS – – – DS DS DS DS – –

[LG] Legion Inf – – – – – DS DS•# DS• – DS• – –

[MI] Medium Inf AS – AS – – – – DS – DS• – –

[BI] Barbarian Inf AS – AS – – DS – – – DS – –

[LI] Light Inf AS AS AS – AS – – – – DS• – –

[SK] Skirmisher AS AS AS AS AS AS AS AS AS AS AS AS

[HC] Heavy Cav – – – – – – – DS – – AS AS

[RC] Roman Cav – – – – – – – – – – AS AS

[LN] Lancer Cav – – – – – – AS – – – AS AS

[LC] Light Cav – – – – – – AS AS AS – AS AS

[EL] Elephant – – – – – – – – – – ** –

[CH] Chariot – – – – – – – – – – – –

Note: Always read down the Attacker Column. Use Available Weapons System most advantageous to each player.Note: Any Shock attack against units In Column is automatically Attack Superior.

AS = Attacker Superior: Double the Defender’s Cohesion Hit result on the Shock Combat CRTDS = Defender Superior: Triple the Attacker’s Cohesion Hit result on the Shock Combat CRTDS• = If defender has missile capability and is Missile No, treat as No SuperiorityDS•# =Same as DS•; In addi-tion, if attacker is Cataphracted Heavy Cavalry, treat as No Su-periority+ = Units Must Attack, if they moved– = No Superiority: Cohesion Hits normal for both sides** = If Indian Elephants are attacking African Elephants, Indian Elephants are AS; other-wise treat as No Superiority

Note: Regardless of weapons/armor type, any unit that attacks an enemy through its flank or rear is automatically Attack Superior with the exception that Cavalry and Elephants are never Attack Superior against Elephants due to position.

Terrain Adjustments (Use best position avail-able to defender). 1L All Defenders are in Woods or Marsh*1L Any Defender on a higher terrain level than the Attacker(s) *2L All Defenders on higher terrain than Attacker(s)1R All Defenders on lower terrain than At-tacker For effects of the Roman Camp, see the Roman Camp Terrain Chart

Phalanx Defense1L Per supporting Phalanx when a Phalanx is attacked frontally by moving Heavy Infantry2L Per supporting Phalanx when a Phalanx is attacked frontally by moving non-Heavy Infantry other than a PhalanxAll adjustments are cumulative, except for “*” items, which are either/or.

Die Roll ModifiersIf a Leader is stacked with an attacking unit, • add his Charisma rating to the die rollIf a Leader is stacked with a defending unit, • subtract his Charisma rating from the die rollIf an attacking Leader has been killed, subtract • his Charisma rating+2 from the die rollIf a defending Leader has been killed, add his • Charisma rating +2 to the die roll

#(#) = Attacker Cohesion hits (Defender Cohesion Hits)NotesIf Attacker Superior, Double (2X) defender Cohesion hitsIf Defender Superior, Triple (3X) attacker Cohesion hits

Pass-Thru (9.11)Halve (round down) hits to infantry unit(s) performing • Pass-ThruReduce hits to Elephant(s) by 1•

Halve hits incurred in attacks against only Skirmishers with a maximum of 1 hit (9.21)

Column AdjustmentsSize Ratio Difference (SRD)—Shift a number of columns right/left based on the ratio of the sizes [8.36 Step Two]

Depletion1L Any attacking unit is Depleted1R Any defending unit is De-pleted



6.27 Movement Cost Chart Cohesion Penalties [a] to Enter/Cross

Terrain TypeMP Cost to Enter/Cross PH, HI

LG, MI, LI, SK Cavalry Elephant Chariot

Clear 1 0 0 0 0 0

Woods [COL] 2 1 1 1 0 1

Broken [COL] 1 1[e] 0 1 0 1

Marsh [COL] 2 1 1 1 P P

Stream +0 1[e] 0 0 0 0

Village Impassable

River Impassable

Dirt Road No Effect

Roman Road ½ [b] 0 0 0 0 0

Up 1 Level +1 1[e] 0 0 0 0

Up more than 1 Level [COL] [g]

+1 per level 1 per level

1 1 0 0

Down 1 Level 0 1[e] 0 0 0 0

Change Facing (per vertex) PLUS

1(2) [c], [d], [f] 0 0 0 0 0

Change Facing in Woods/Broken/Marsh (per vertex)

0 1 1 1 0 1

GMT Games, LLCP.O. Box 1308, Hanford, CA 93232–1308www.GMTGames.com

P = Prohibited; unit cannot enter the hex.a = Leaders never incur cohesion hits; treat as cavalry. b = To use the road movement rate, the unit must begin and end its movement out of range of enemy missile fire and at no time move into enemy missile range. At no time may the unit move within two hexes of an enemy combat unit. The instant the unit violates these restric-tions it must stop. c = All non-legion/ala infantry, except for Skirmishers (SK), and all cavalry pay a cost of 1 MP per vertex shifted. Roman legion/ala infantry pay a cost of 1 MP to change facing in any direction regardless of the number of vertices shifted. Skirmishers do not pay MP to change facing.d = It costs 3 MP for a Phalanx to Reverse Face (6.44). It costs Elephants and Chariots 2 MP per vertex shifted.e = The cohesion cost does not apply to Phalanxes In Column (6.46). However, as pertains to moving up levels, this exception only applies to the first level moved up in the Orders Phase. The unit incurs the hit for any additional upward movement in that phase.f = A unit using the Roman Road does not pat any facing change cost when doing so to conform to the road.g = This line applies to units moving up more than one level in any given Orders Phase.

Special CostsReverse Face Maneuver• ......... 3 MPStack to form Double Depth• .. +1 MPManipular Line Extension• ...... –2 to Movement

Allowance

COL = The Cohesion costs listed also apply to units In Column (See 6.7). Units In Column do NOT pay Cohesion costs for those terrain effects without the COL designation.

Elephant Rampage TableDie Roll Result

0 Move Rampaging Elephant in the direction of the nearest friendly unit. A leader elephant is eliminated instead.

1–6 Move Rampaging Elephant in the direction indicated on the Compass on the map.

7–9 First Rampage die roll – Ram-• paging elephant moves directly away from the unit that caused the rampageSubsequent die roll – Rampaging • Elephant is eliminated. A leader elephant is instead immediately Rallied with Cohesion Hits equal to TQ minus 2.

10.29 Rally TablePrinted TQ

Die Roll

3, 4, 5 6, 7, 8, 9

0, 1 1 1

2, 3 2 2

4, 5 2 2

6, 7 2 3

8, 9 3 4

Die Roll Modifiers+2 If the unit was previously Depleted.Rallied units are automatically Depleted. Rallied foot units are automatically Mis-sile No.

Die Roll of DoomDie Roll Result

0, 1 Re-Activation is possible. Play immediately transfers to the op-posing player, who may activate any one of his leaders, regardless of whether the leader is Finished or not! Such a Re-Activated leader may not use Momentum himself.

2–8 Leader attempting Momentum is Finished. Go Back to Phase “A”.

spqr scenario book spqr - gmt gamesgmtgames.com/gbsp/spqr08scenariobook.pdf · size and troop...

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