sp's land forces august-september 2010

SP’s LAND FORCES4/2010

n LT GENERAL (RETD) VIJAY OBEROI

Lately, there has been a wide debatein the media about the pros andcons of the Armed Forces (SpecialPowers) Act, 1958, (AFSPA). Thepassing of the Act, over five

decades back, was necessitated as the Armydid not have police powers and withoutthese powers, it is not possible for the Armyto operate against insurgents and terrorists.The Army is designed and structured tofight external enemies of the nation. Con-sequently and rightly, they are not givenany police powers. However, when the na-tion wants the Army to conduct counter-in-surgency and counter-terrorist operations,they must be given legal authority to con-duct operations without impediments offirst getting clearances from higher author-ities. If this is not done, they would be un-able to function efficiently and thereforewould not be able to defeat the insurgentsand terrorists at their own game.

On account of the pressure mounted byvarious groups and individuals for the re-

peal of the Act, the government has beenconsidering the issue in its totality. However,the relentless campaign for its repeal con-tinues. The Defence Ministry and HomeMinistry, as well as the Prime Minister’s Of-fice (PMO) have been considering variousfacets of the Act, as terrorists, insurgentsand their supporters on the one hand andhuman rights organisations, non-govern-ment organisations and individuals on theother, have launched a sustained campaignfor the repeal of the Act. They have vari-ously termed the Act as a tool of state abuse,oppression and discrimination; the provi-sion for immunity of security forces urgingthem to act more brutally; provide impunityfor human rights abuses and fuels cycles ofviolence; and dated and colonial-era lawthat breaches contemporary internationalhuman rights standards.

There are two schools of thought.Those opposed to it call it a ‘draconian’ lawthat needs immediate repeal. Those whowant it to continue, specifically the Army,which is deeply involved in the conduct ofcounter-insurgency and counter-terrorist

operations, is convinced that it is essentialif insurgents and terrorists are to be tackled successfully. We need to look atboth the views dispassionately and notjump to conclusions without consideringall the aspects.

The rationale for bringing the Act on thestatute books on September 11, 1958, needsto be understood without emotions cloudingthe issue. When the Army was first employedin counter-insurgency tasks in Nagaland in1950, it became apparent that fighting in-surgency was quite different from maintain-ing law and order, wherein the Army is calledout when the police is unable to handle thesituation. It is termed “aid to the civil author-ities for the maintenance of law and order”.Such assistance is for the purpose of restor-ing normalcy in a particular area at the ear-liest. In these cases, action is taken againstunruly mobs, rioting and targeting life andproperty, and the police being unable to re-strain them. In such situations, the Armyuses minimum force, acts in good faith but ina deliberate manner with adequate force.Such actions are taken in conjunction with

PAGE 4Interview with Lt General J.P. Singh, DCOAS

In an exclusive interview to SP’s LandForces, Lt General J.P. Singh who is theDeputy Chief of Army Staff (Planning & Systems) spoke on various aspects of theprocurement procedure of new weaponsand defence systems.

PAGE 7The Asymmetric BattlefieldSpecial Forces need officers who are out ofthe box thinkers with high initiative, havesharp intellect, high on adaptability, readyto give/accept blunt advice and technosavvy to exploit technology.

Lt General (Retd) P.C. Katoch

PAGE 10For Speedy Command & ControlConsidering that terrorism is here to stayand insurgencies can hardly be wishedaway, we need to be prepared against thesethreats compounded by asymmetric warfarebeing waged by our adversaries.

Lt General (Retd) P.C. Katoch

PAGE 17The Pervez-Parvez FactorViewpoint By P.C. Katoch

PLUS

Delayed by Red Tape 12Power of Information 14Protecting the Nation with a 15Cohesive BMS

Thirsting for Killer Drones 16Terror Reigning 18Business Rendezvous 20First & TechWatch 22News in Brief 23

The Misunderstood ActThose opposed to the AFSPA call it a draconian law that needs immediate repeal. Those who want it to continue are convinced that it is essential if insurgents and terrorists are to be tackled successfully.

COVER STORY>>

SP’s A N S P G U I D E P U B L I C A T I O N

R O U N D U P

August-September l 2010

IN THIS ISSUE T h e O N L Y j o u r n a l i n A s i a d e d i c a t e d t o L a n d F o r c e s

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COVER STORY <<

the available police who identify the ringleaders and step back for the Army to com-plete its actions. On most occasions, a mag-istrate is also present and the actions of theArmy are for a limited period and in a limitedarea. If any arrests are to be made orsearches are to be carried out, these are con-ducted by the police who have the necessarypowers and are backed by the presence or or-ders of a judicial person.

The situation in countering the insur-gents is quite different. The insurgents are nota visible mob and they are better armed andtrained for the type of operations they carryout. They adopt hit-and-run tactics and dis-appear after their speedy attacks, either in theadjoining jungles or hide among the localpopulace. There are neither magistrates norany police personnel present and if the Armydoes not take expeditious action, the insur-gents would melt away and attack with im-punity repeatedly. The insurgents of today, 50years after the AFSPA was enacted, are robustin every way, thus making the task of theArmy even more difficult. They are heavilyarmed, act speedily, commit heinous crimes,and disappear. With terrorism, including thesuicide variety, now added to the repertoire ofthe insurgents, the Army has had to developnew concepts for tackling them. Unless theArmy counters such actions fast withoutwaiting for orders from higher authorities, itwould not be possible to conduct efficientcounter-insurgency/terrorist operations.

Speedy actions by the Army are not con-fined to visible activities of the insurgents andterrorists. Areas where the insurgents arelikely to hide or take shelter are required to besearched, with no or minimum warning tothe insurgents; the terrorists, insurgents andtheir followers are to be disarmed immedi-ately, lest they inflict more casualties; and un-less the captured terrorists are immediatelyconfined (arrested in police parlance), there isthe danger of innocent civilians being takenas hostages or being killed. In such cases thereis neither the time to call the police, nor waitfor orders from superior authorities.

The second and equally important aspectconsidered while formulating the Act wasthat soldiers and officers of the Army needed

to be protected from prosecution for conse-quential actions taken against insurgents in‘good faith’, as part of their counter-insur-gency or counter-terrorist operations. WhileAFSPA provides such protection, the Act alsocontains the important caveat that Army per-sonnel can be prosecuted with the sanction ofthe Central government, if their actions war-rant it. There is therefore no blanket immu-nity from the laws of the land. Over the years,some Army personnel have indeed been pros-ecuted where a prima facie case existed. How-ever, it is also true that due to the exceptionalcare which all Army commanders take whentheir troops are employed against insurgents,such cases are few and far between.

The Act initially covered the geographi-cal area where counter-insurgency opera-tions against the Naga insurgents were first

launched. After the initial employment inNagaland, the employment of the Army incounter-insurgency tasks continued increas-ing, till it was progressively employed in allthe North-eastern states for such tasks.Along with such employment, AFSPA wasalso invoked in all affected states. When theinsurgency erupted in Kashmir Valley,Jammu & Kashmir in 1990, the Act was ex-tended to the Valley. Later, as the activities ofthe insurgents spread, first to the Poonch-Rajauri area, then to Doda and Bhadarwahand finally to the whole state, the entire statewas brought under the purview of the Actin stages. It can thus be seen that AFSPA wasinvoked progressively, only when the situa-tion required the employment of the Army.

Having explained the rationale for the en-actment of the Act, let me now go into some

specific details so that the reader can judge thenecessity for the Act to remain in force, wher-ever the Army is employed for counter-insur-gency or counter-terrorist operations.

The AFSPA has only seven paragraphs.Sections 1 and 2 merely deal with the titles and definitions. Section 3 delineates thevarious entities which can declare an area as‘disturbed’. A declaration is mandatory be-fore AFSPA can be applied.

Sections 4 and 5 are the substantive sec-tions, as they spell out the special powers tobe conferred and the circumstances thatmust prevail for the conferring of such pow-ers. There are a total of four special powersthat the Act permits to specified personnel ofthe armed forces. The persons are commis-sioned officers, warrant officers and non-commissioned officers or their equivalents.The four powers conferred on these person-nel are–enter and search, arrest withoutwarrant, destroy arms dumps or other forti-fications, and fire or use force after duewarning where possible.

Section 5 stipulates that the arrested per-sons are to be handed over to the police withthe least possible delay, together with a re-port of the circumstances occasioning thearrest. Section 6 gives legal cover to thetroops for any consequential action resultingfrom their actions while fighting the insur-gents and terrorists. This paragraph also laysdown the important caveat that Army per-sonnel can be prosecuted with the sanctionof the Central government, if their actionswarrant it. There is therefore no blanket im-munity from the laws of the land. The lastparagraph is about repeal.

Let me conclude by emphasising that theArmy has no desire to get embroiled incounter-insurgency tasks. It is not the job ofthe Army. However, despite over 50 years ofinsurgency in our country, the state police aswell as the Central police organisations(CPOs) have not been made capable of tack-ling insurgency. Consequently, in each case,the Army was inducted to carry out counter-insurgency/terrorist operations. This is likelyto be the norm in future too. If the nationalleadership tasks the Army for conductingsuch non-military operations, then it is in-cumbent on the leadership to also providethe legal wherewithal so that the Army is notconstrained by lack of appropriate laws. It isonly then that the operations will be con-ducted in the usual efficient manner of theArmy and would be result-oriented. Theymust also be legally protected. It is becausethese two aspects have been covered in theAct, the Army has been neutralising the in-surgents and terrorists, and has been able torestore a high degree of normalcy, enablingthe political leaders and civil officials torestart governing in earnest. The writer is a former Vice Chief of the Indian Army

India faces formidable security challenges, both

external and internal. This statement has been re-

peated so often in the past that it now fails to incite

the passion it evoked earlier. The convergence of

interests of our mighty neighbour in the Northeast

and our thorny neighbour in the West has com-

pelled the political leadership to consider a simul-

taneous military threat from two directions. For the

first time we are realistically considering a national

military strategy of a two-front engagement in a fu-

ture conflict. This naturally implies a matching ca-

pability of being able to conduct offensive and

defensive operations in two widely separated

threatres of war. Added to this are the Indian

Army’s gruelling counter-insurgency operations in

Jammu and Kashmir and in the North-eastern

region which had achieved stability from time to

time, but lack of strategy, poor governance and

slack political responses have wasted the oppor-

tunities for conflict resolution. Hence these opera-

tions are persisting.

India, in the 21st century, instead of reaping

peace dividends, is facing serious challenges to its

integrity and sovereignty than ever before. In this

backdrop, we should have expected a surge in

building new military capabilities and capacities.

However, what we are observing is a military mod-

ernisation process plagued by inordinate delays

with no accountability, supported by a convoluted

defence procurement procedure which no one un-

derstands. An apt example is the procurement of

155mm howitzers for the artillery. Despite four sets

of trials and blacklisting of two vendors till date, no

new artillery gun has been inducted in the Indian

Army since the mid-1980s and the Army’s quest

for long-range guns continues to be held hostage

to delays and indecisions. The government’s pen-

chant for transparency, honesty and virtue in all

dealings is being exploited by the unscrupulous

vendor to his advantage. The net result is endless

series of conferences and meetings but to no avail.

Modernisation of the Indian military is being

crippled by its own procedures and by the fears

and dilemmas arising out of these procedures.

This issue carries the interview of the Deputy

Chief of Army Staff (Planning & Systems) and a

number of incisive articles on Armed Forces

Special Powers Act, artillery modernisation, battle

management and net-centricity, information

assurance, among others.

ED

IT

OR

IA

L

Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor

Soldiers and officers of the Army need to beprotected from prosecution for consequential actionstaken against insurgents

EDITOR’S COMMENTSThe ongoing debate on the validity and legitimacy of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act1990 (AFSPA) in Jammu and Kashmir, always tends to evoke emotional and wrathful re-sponses by the bleeding hearts intelligentsia, least informed about the facts regarding theAFSPA. The essence of the AFSPA is briefly given in the ensuing subsequent paragraphs.Important sections of the Act are as under:Section 3: It lays down the authority which has power to declare areas which are dis-turbed. These authorities are the Union government and state governments. Section 4: Its gives the Army powers to search premises and make arrests without war-rants, to use force even to the extent of causing death, destroy arms/ammunition dumps,fortifications/shelters/hideouts and to stop search and seize any vehicles. Section 6: It stipulates that arrested persons and seized property is to be made over to thepolice with least possible delay.Section 7: It offers protection of personnel acting in good faith in their official capacity.Prosecution is permitted only after sanction of the Union government.

Scrutiny by Supreme Court The said Act in general and Sections 3, 4 and 6 in particular came up for scrutiny before aConstitution Bench of the Apex Court in the ‘Naga People’s Movement of Human Rightsvs UoI’ case. The five-judge Constitution Bench elaborately dealt with the challenge to thelegality of development of the Armed Forces Act in aid to civil power. The Court unam-biguously ruled that AFSPA cannot be regarded as a colourable legislation or a fraud onthe Constitution. The Apex Court considered and opined that conferring of powers videSection 4 of AFSPA could not be held arbitrary or violation of Article 14, 19 or 21 of theConstitution. In fact, having considered the role and circumstances under which the armedforces have to operate, the Supreme Court extended the scope of powers vested vide 4 and6 of AFSPA so as to include by implication the power to interrogate the person arrested. Italso allowed the armed forces to retain the weapons seized during the operations in theirown custody rather than to hand over to police authorities.

CrPC versus AFSPA A perusal of the various powers available to the police authorities under the provisions ofthe Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) vis-à-vis those available to the armed forces underAFSPA would reveal that the police authorities still enjoy more encompassing and widerpowers relating to arrest, search, summoning of witnesses, preventive detention, etc, thanthe powers enjoyed by the Armed Forces.

Section 45 of the CrPC disallows arrest of public servants and Section 197 providesimpunity against prosecution which is similar to Section 7 of the AFSPA. The SupremeCourt has mandated a government sanction prior to initiating prosecution against person-nel for excesses or killings committed during the maintenance of law and order.

The applicability of Section 45 of the CrPC is not allowed in the laws of the state ofJammu and Kashmir where the Ranbir Penal Code is applicable and ipso facto the personnelof armed forces can be arrested for any perceived excesses.

Owner’s pride: recently, SP’s Editor-in-Chief JayantBaranwal presented a copy of SP’s Military Yearbook2009-2010 to Defence Minister A.K. Antony in New Delhi

SP’s Land Forces (SP’s): How has your tenurein the Integrated Defence Staff helped you in comprehending the problems in the assignments of DCOAS (P&S)?Lt General J.P. Singh: As the Deputy Chief ofIntegrated Defence Staff (IDS), I was headingthe Policy Planning & Force DevelopmentBranch. The Branch was responsible fordrafting long-term integrated perspectiveplan (LTIPP) of the three services, supervis-ing overall budget analysis, and manage-ment of acquisition, procurement andtechnology related functions.

As the Chairman of the Services CapitalAcquisition Plan Coordination Committee(SCAPCC), I was responsible for detailed vet-ting of all procurement cases of the threeservices at the inception stage and thereafteras the member Secretary of the Defence Ac-quisition Council (DAC), I recorded the ac-ceptance of necessity (AoN).

This experience covers over 50 per centof my current job content. Further, throughthe experience in my previous tenure, I bringforth the best practices of the other servicesto my current assignment.

SP’s: The procurement of new weapons andother defence systems takes an inordinatelylong period of time. What are the measuresbeing taken within the services and within theIDS/MoD to overcome this drawback?DCOAS: The Defence Procurement Proce-dure 2008 (DPP 08) (Revised) states at Appendix C to Chapter 1 that the normaltime taken from accord of AoN to signingof contract will be 24 to 30 months, i.e., ifthere are no slippages in major steps. Thisis an ideal timeframe for procurementunder ‘Buy’ and ‘Buy & Make’ categories,whether ex-Global or Indian.

For Design & Development (D&D) cases,which involve DRDO and the DPSUs/PSUs,the procurement time depends on the timetaken for fructification of the design into aprototype, approval of the prototype in fieldtrials and thereafter, production by the nom-inated Production Agency (PA). This gener-ally takes a long time. Likewise, acquisitionsunder the ‘Make’ and ‘Buy & Make’ (Indian),are yet to stabilise.

The measures being taken to compressthe time taken in new acquisition cases areas follows:l Till AoN Stage: Request for Information

(RFI) placement on the MoD website, for-mulation of General Staff Qualitative Re-quirements (GSQR) based on RFIresponse, approval of Services proposalsby SCAP Committees/DPB/DAC arebeing implemented on time.

l Post-AoN Stage: The process of pro-curement post-AoN stage is a cautiouslymeasured process and with longer time-lines involving issue of request for pro-posal (RFP), TEC, composite trials, GSevaluation and CNC. Though the processis well defined in DPP 2008, the imple-mentation in many cases gets adverselyaffected due to lack of multi-vendor par-

ticipation with most vendors not havingthe capabilities to produce products intime for trials or disqualification of thecertain OEMs under vigilance scan.

SP’s: What is the current status of artillery’sequipment profile which has been adverselyreflected even in the print media? What is thestatus of procurement of 155mm guns andhowitzers, both self-propelled and towed va-riety for the plains and the mountains?DCOAS:The artillery’s vision translated into a15 years perspective plan is well constructed.Plans to enlarge surveillance and target acqui-sition (SATA) capabilities to procure advancedlong-range missiles, rockets, towed and self-propelled (SP) guns are on track.

Trials of wheeled SP guns are in progress.Towed gun trials have been put on hold dueto emergence of a single vendor situation attrials stage. RFP for mounted guns system isunder issue. We are optimistic that artillery’s

field gun modernisation programme will pos-itively stabilise in the near future.

A letter of request (LOR) for trial evalua-tion of 155mm ultra light HOW for procure-ment through foreign military sales (FMS)from USA has been initiated. Trials are likelyto commence shortly.

SP’s: Does the Army have a policy for UAVs?What are the various types that we are cur-rently contemplating?DCOAS: Army has a logical vision towards in-ducting a variety of UAVs to enhance sur-veillance abilities in strategic, operationaland tactical depth. These UAVs depending onthe reach and endurance will be operated atdifferent levels of command. However, thedata links will be so structured that any sig-nificant detection by any UAV will get trans-mitted in real time to who needs it.

Since UAVs are being acquired by allthree services and Coast Guard, HQ IDS is

the nodal agency in formulating JSQRs andmonitoring indigenous development.

SP’s: What is the state of our battlefield surveillance radars BFSRs at the unit and formation level?DCOAS: In consonance with the multi-layered, multi-medium surveillance policyand design, medium- and short-rangeBFSRs, in scaled quantity, are available fromhighest formation HQs in field to unit level.The coverage of BFSRs in our inventory isnotable. With the induction of battlefieldsurveillance system the gridded informationin an institutionalised manner will be avail-able both laterally and horizontally.

SP’s: Recent media reports have given the im-pression that consequent to the comparativetrials of the MBT Arjun with the T-90 tank, theArmy has reversed its earlier stand and is nowprepared to induct additional Arjuns beyondthe figure of 124 which had been contractedearlier. What is their current status and whatare the reasons for the change of policy, if any?DCOAS: Arjun tank and Tank T-90 are twodifferent weight class of MBTs. The twotanks were put through trials for validationof some vital operational parameters. Inthese trials, the Arjun tanks achieved the operational standards set for the equipmentin terms of mobility in the desert area andfirepower. Therefore, in sync with our perspective planning for mechanised forces,additional Arjun Mk II, which will have sig-nificant upgrades, will be inducted in theArmy for operational employment in sectorsidentified by the Army.

SP’s: Have we identified the type of lighttanks we require for the Eastern theatre andwhat is the status of procurement?DCOAS: Mechanical forces vision documentand perspective planning includes inductionof light tanks meant for specific areas. TheProvisional General Staff Qualitative Re-quirements for the light tank exists and willbe ratified shortly.

SP’s: The overhaul of our T-72 tank fleet is behind schedule by many years. How is thisissue being tackled? Are we involving the domestic industry in our quest for timely completion of this work?DCOAS: Tank T-72 M is a frontline battle tankof the Indian Army. The focus is on sizeableupgrades on T-72. In addition, the missionreliability is being ensured through layeredOH schedules. To prevent slippages at Baseoverhaul (D level) schedule, the capacities atHVF and Army Base workshop is being enhanced. In addition, a capability definitiondocument is being prepared to evaluate abil-ities of domestic defence industry to under-take base OH for T-72s.

SP’s: Reconnaissance and surveillance troopsand platoons of armoured regiments andmechanised infantry units respectively can beexcellent assets in war, if equipped appropri-

SP’s LAND FORCES 4/20104

‘Efforts are on to design and develop indigenously as also acquire transfer of technology’Lt General J.P. Singh is the Deputy Chief of Army Staff (Planning & Systems) and is responsible for equippingand developing the capability of the Indian Army. In an exclusive interview to SP’s Land Forces, General Singhspoke on various aspects of the procurement procedure of new weapons and defence systems.

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ately. Is anything being done in this regard?DCOAS: Reconnaissance and surveillance abilities at all levels are being upgradedthrough induction of suitable platforms, state-of-the-art electronic devices and training ofpersonnel. The GSQR of light armoured mul-tipurpose vehicle is in its final stages of ratifi-cation. Reconnaissance troops of armouredregiments and mechanised infantry units areon the priority list of upgradation, some ofwhich exist and some are in pipeline.

SP’s: It seems that the modernisation andgrowth of Army aviation for current and futurerequirements is largely on paper at present.What is our vision in this regard and how farhave we progressed in achieving it? What isthe state of Cheetah and Chetak helicopters?When are they likely to be replaced?DCOAS: Army Aviation, since its inception, isa valued, potent, integral force providingcombat and combat service support to theArmy through the medium of air. The IndianArmy perspective plan defines the Army Avi-ation enlarged role very logically. The growthof Army Aviation is largely happening.

The Army Aviation began by operatingcommunication and utility helicopters in1986 and was to grow in phases, with expe-rience. Army Aviation will shortly get re-placement of frontline Cheetah/Chetak. It isalready operating twin-engine ALHs. In thenear future it will be equipped withweaponised ALHs. As it gains experience andsimultaneously personnel cadre and service-cum-repair echelons enlarge, more induc-tion of platforms which are vital forintegrated battle in tactical area will happen.

SP’s: The Army needs dedicated attack heli-copters operated by the Army in direct sup-port of the field formations in war. Thepresent arrangement of operational controlis most unsatisfactory. Is anything beingdone in this regard?DCOAS: Attack helicopter is a manoeuvrearm of the land forces and is best employedas part of ground operations in tactical bat-tle area (TBA). There is no ambiguity in thedoctrine, concept, and employment of attackhelicopters as far as the Indian Air Force and Indian Army are concerned.

Army Aviation is gradually enlarging itsmanpower, support cadre and scope for employment. The experience it is gaining onsingle engine armed helicopter and soon itwill be operating twin-engine armed heli-copters, will enable it to operate aerial plat-forms which enhance the manoeuvre anddestruction in TBA.

SP’s: What is the status of the project FINSAS?If it is a part of the battlefield managementsystem, why is it being handled by the In-fantry Directorate instead of the Director Gen-eral Information Systems? How will we ensurethe compatibility of the two, in all respects, ifdifferent directorates are going to handle it?DCOAS: The FINSAS integrates weapon sub-system, target acquisition sub-system, radio

sub-system and computer sub-system.Around the world, soldier modernisationprogrammes are pitched at the Infantry pla-toon/company level while their BMS carriesout integration of assets, especially in amechanised environment.

BMS being developed by DGIS would ensure net-centricity in the tactical battlearea by provisioning of common operationalpicture (COP) and situational awareness.FINSAS is being executed in phases and interoperability between FINSAS and theBMS is being ensured. This will truly transform the infantry into a modern andversatile arm.

SP’s: What are the efforts being made formodernisation of Infantry at unit and sub-unitlevels with particular reference to firepower,mobility, surveillance and reconnaissance,and night fighting capability?DCOAS: This aspect is being pursued mostvigorously. We are in the process of procur-ing modern goggles, weapon systems andnight sights. For mobility, as per the new B vehicle policy, categorisation of light vehicleGS 4x4 and preparation of GSQR of lightspecialist vehicle is in progress.

SP’s: It seems that the Rashtriya Rifles (RR)has now been given a mandate which is re-newable every five years. What is the mod-ernisation plan of the RR and what forcemultipliers are you planning to induct in thefuture which will facilitate greater efficiencyin its operational employment?DCOAS: RR modernisation is keeping pacewith the modernisation of Infantry and is inline with operational requirements of CI/CTenvironment. Their capability developmentfocuses on enhancements in protection andmobility, intelligence and surveillance capa-bility, communication and firepower.

Acquisition of better quality light weightbullet proof jackets and ballistic helmets isbeing undertaken to improve protection. Towards better mobility, light bullet proof vehicles and mine protection vehicles arebeing procured.

Intelligence and surveillance domain focuses on enhancing individual soldiercombat effectiveness and survival by provid-ing him optical, TI and holographic sights forpersonal weapons including automaticgrenade launchers in the near future. In addition, upgraded communication meansare being inducted.

SP’s: Modernisation of Army Air Defence Ar-tillery has been neglected for a long time.What is our policy to replace obsolete gunsand missile systems of the Army?DCOAS: Army Air Defence is following a twinapproach of sustenance of the existing inventory through qualitative upgradationand induction of modern weapons tocounter futuristic threats.

The AD guns are being upgraded withstate-of-the-art electro optical fire controlsystem and drive while the associated sur-

veillance, fire control, communication andbattlefield management systems are beingrevamped. Current night blindness is beingaddressed and new training and target sys-tems are being inducted.

The perspective plan of AAD envisages alayered and tiered defence employing inte-grated family of weapon systems which include state-of-the-art guns, very short-range, short-range and medium-range sur-face-to-air-missiles. Induction of these isgathering momentum.

SP’s: Is the capital budget being providedevery year adequate for the modernisationand transformational needs of the Army?DCOAS: The current allocation of capitalbudget is adequate. However, once major ac-quisitions happen and also OFB productionlines increase their output, the contractualliability (CL) will increase, warranting in-crease in capital allocation. I appreciate thatthis increase in allocation would be requiredfrom 2012-13 onwards.

SP’s: Considering the likelihood of employmentof the Indian Army in internal security opera-tions in the future, are we equipping our unitswith surveillance, communications and othersystems which would be pertinent for our oper-ational needs in such circumstances? What pe-culiarities do you foresee in this regard whichwould require a different focus for the infantry?DCOAS: Infantry, in particular RR, is deployedin active CI/CT operations. The current mod-ernisation plan is focused on enhancing surveillance, communications, strike and survival capabilities.

Internal security operations necessitateemployment of non-lethal weapons, pro-curement of which is under process. Withan aim to improve survival capabilities, mineprotection vehicles (MPVs) are already inducted and trials on bullet proof vehiclesis in progress. The complete procurementprogramme has been planned to ensure thatthe Infantry is well-equipped for the entirespectrum of conflict.

SP’s: Army’s effort at achieving network-centricity has been adversely affected by the non-availability of the tactical communi-cation system (TCS) at the level of the Corpsand below? How far away are we from this capability?DCOAS: Network enablement will happenthrough inter-workability within the variousexisting communication systems to meet ouroperational requirements.

Future battlespace and asymmetricwarfare require a shift from voice to data-centric platforms which allow network-cen-tricity. Indian Army has formalised a frame-work to develop the same indigenously.Projects like MCCS, WiMax, DCN, etc are inthe process of implementation. Tacticalcommunication system (TCS) for TBA is adevelopment case and IPMT for the samehas been convened under MoD (Acqn) inSeptember 2009.

SP’s: Special Forces (SF) have a major role toplay in meeting national, transnational andnon-traditional challenges to our security andin raising the stakes for our adversaries tomeddle in our internal matters. How well isthis force equipped?DCOAS: The force structure of the SF is beingaugmented keeping future threats in mind.The force level of SF is being increased andthe command and control being reviewed.Modernisation of the force is under progressand is being undertaken at a very fast pace.

The capability of the SF is being en-hanced with the acquisition of the heavydrop platform/equipment, combat free allequipment (CFF), light strike vehicle (LSV),integration of aerial platforms with superiorflying capabilities, provision of 100 per centnight fighting capability, better fire supportweapons and improved surveillance and des-ignation equipment.

SP’s: What are your views on procuring equipment from the FMS route? What are theadvantages of such procurements? Are thereany disadvantages in following this route?DCOAS: FMS is a standard procedure for saleof military equipment by the US to its strate-gic partners. Its main advantage is that thestate-of-the-art equipment which is in serv-ice in the US armed forces is availablethrough government-to-government agree-ment. No trials are mandatory, though dueto our terrain and environment conditionswe would like to evaluate equipment underour operational conditions. It also caters formaintenance requirements of equipmentduring its complete life cycle.

This system can be used to fill up our crit-ical equipment voids. The Indian Army hasventured into major equipment purchasethrough this route in the procurement ofweapon locating radar. The Navy and AirForce have very recently concluded samemajor deals through this route. Challengeswith respect to transfer of technology (ToT),for which US is very selective, still remain. I am hopeful that with relationship betweenthe two countries maturing, the US will respond positively to our requests.

SP’s: Considering the importance of precisionmunitions in the future, are we planning tohave a greater percentage of precision muni-tions in the artillery?DCOAS: One of the major issues reflected inRMA is the induction of precision ammuni-tion resulting in decapitation of targetwithout much collateral damage. TGMs,SFM, weaponisation of UAVs and loiteringmunitions are some procurement that have been initiated and are in advanced stages.Establishment of UAV bases and acquisitionof hand-held target designators is alsounder way.

Efforts are on to design and develop indigenously as also acquire ToT for suchammunition which would provide a fillip tothe technology base in the country and havemulti-faceted utility.

Advanced CapabilitySeveral improvements have been brought about in the design of the Advanced Patriot anti-aircraft and anti-ballistic missile defence system toenhance its capabilities vis-à-vis the earlier variant

n JOSEPH G. GARRETT IIIVice President and Deputy Patriot ProgramsRaytheon Integrated Defense Systems (IDS)

Today’s Patriot Air and Missile Defense System is the result of con-tinual technology upgrades and on-

going modernisation. Contracts for new-build fire unitsand upgrades to currently fielded systems led to thecomplete modernisation of Patriot, thereby, improving

capabilities, eliminating obsolescence and enabling anopen, netted and distributed architecture. This created atruly next-generation Patriot.

Some of the significant improvements include Patriot software and hardware components, such as the radar digital processor (RDP), modern adjunct proces-sor (MAP), modern man station (MMS) as well as integra-tion of the Patriot advanced capability-3 (PAC-3) andmissile segment enhancement (MSE) missile integration.

The introduction of the new RDP provides the addedbenefit of digital track via missile (TVM) guidance. It alsoeliminates obsolete components within the Patriot radar,

provides a twelve-fold improvement in meantime betweenfailure and increases radar processing efficiency over theexisting Configuration-3 radar.

The modern adjunct processor vastly improves thecomputing power of the Patriot system and sets the conditions for future technology insertions.

The MMS replaces current cathode ray tube (CRT) tech-nology with 30 inch colour LCD displays with touch screensand introduces soft keys to enable future switch configura-tions and tactical screens via software upgradation. Thiswill lead to more rapid and efficient tactical decisions anddecrease the probability of confusion and fratricide.

n LT GENERAL (RETD) P.C. KATOCH

The term Special Forces generatesconsiderable ambiguity in largecross-sections in India where eventhree decades back sloppy securityguards stood outside the shops in

Connaught Place sporting olive green uni-forms, maroon berets, shoulder titles ofCommando/Special Forces and brass ontheir epaulettes. Certain sections of the mil-itary, including some senior level officerstoo fail to differentiate between SpecialForces and Special Operations Forces. In re-cent years and especially following 26/11,a host of paramilitary and police forceshave been raised (e.g. Grey Hounds, CobraForce) that are being loosely referred to asSpecial Forces, a misnomer. In our context,Special Forces actually are the SpecialForces of the Army, Marine Commandos(MARCOS) of the Navy, the fledgling Garudof the Air Force, Special Action Groups(SAGs) of the National Security Guard(NSG) and Special Groups (SGs) of the Spe-cial Frontier Force (SFF); the SAGs and SGbeing 100 per cent Army personnel on dep-utation to NSG and SFF.

Asymmetric and fourth generationwars are and will continue to be the orderof the day. These will invariably be ongoingor will be launched prior to or in conjunc-tion with conventional and nuclear wars.What needs to be understood is that asym-metric and fourth generation wars arewaged against a nation and not against the

military alone and that the response toohas to be at a national level. Special Forceshave a major role in such type of conflictsituations and as India is doing, should notbe confined to one’s own territory till theoutbreak of conventional war, but shouldbe employed to “shape the asymmetric bat-tlefield” in our favour.

Conflict ScenarioThreats and challenges facing us relate toterrorism (through land, sea and air), bordermanagement and maritime security includ-ing security of offshore assets, apart fromconventional and nuclear threats. Asym-metric forces have emerged with greaterstrategic value over conventional or nuclearforces. This will continue in the foreseeablefuture. Our continued reliance on conven-tional and nuclear forces implies a distinctdisadvantage to India. The military is brac-ing itself for a two-front war (Pakistan andChina) in addition to asymmetric threatsthat are transnational and non-traditional,but plenty of ground needs to be covered forsuccessful implementation of this new doc-trine. The changing nature of out of areacontingencies (OOACs) and the increasinglyimportant dimensions of cyber and spacewars also need to be factored in.

Our faultlines (the biggest created byMaoists/Naxals affecting 180 districts in 17states), particularly the homegrown insur-gencies, are being aided, abetted, exploitedand controlled by Pakistan and China,adroitly, advertently and inadvertently.Notwithstanding the current exuberance of


SPEC I A L OPERAT IONS <<

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The Asymmetric BattlefieldWe need officers in Special Forces who are physically and mentally tough, out of the box thinkers with highinitiative, have sharp intellect with creative intelligence, high on adaptability, ready to give/accept blunt advice,able to learn from subordinates in addition to seniors and peers, courageous as a lion, cunning as a fox andtechno-savvy to exploit technology

PHOTOGRAPH: Indian Army

Aman ki Asha with Pakistan and periodicHindi-Chini camaraderie slogans, our adver-saries relentlessly seek ways to mitigateIndia’s power and status through asymmetricwar. We may demilitarise Jammu & Kashmirhoping for Aman (peace) with Pakistan, butwhile Nobel Peace Prizes may be conferred onboth sides, we should be prepared for replica-tion/shifting of the terrorist infrastructurefrom Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) toJammu and Kashmir with horrendous conse-quences. That is the precise reason why Pak-istan has not dismantled the terroristinfrastructure in PoK and has ceded 5,164 sqkm of Indian territory in Jammu and Kash-mir to China. The jihad factory in Pakistanruns full steam with some 32,000 madrassasproducing millions of neo-drones. As per Pak-istan’s own media “This is a monstrous exper-iment in brainwashing and it is on a par with,if not worse than, Nazi Germany’s eugenics.”Hopefully, the significance of de-militarisationof Jammu and Kashmir before Pakistan dismantles the terrorist infrastructure in PoK and reins in Lashakr e-Toiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), Taliban and thelike and the ISI is understood by the powersthat be no matter pressure for dialogue in USnational interests.

Special Forces have a major role to playin meeting these transnational to our secu-rity and in raising the stakes for Pakistan andChina to meddle in our internal matters. Wehave failed to exploit the potential of ourSpecial Forces and have sought solace in suc-cessful hinterland operations like Hill Kaka,something which the regular infantry couldhave achieved.

RoleStephen Cohen wrote in The Idea of Pakistan,“The task of Special Forces is the proxy ap-plication of force at low and precisely calcu-lated levels, the objective being to achievesome political effect, not a battlefield vic-tory.” In contrast, we have been looking atbattlefield victories. Special Forces are nottactical tools for conventional war. Theyhave wide applications throughout the spec-trum of conflict including facing challengesof terrorism, information, asymmetric andNBC warfare. They can produce high resultswith no/very low signatures and can beused as a controlled response along the es-calatory ladder in the emerging strategic en-vironment. They should be central toasymmetric response that does not equateautomatically to physical attack. The keylies in achieving strategic objectives throughapplication of modest resources exploitingthe psychological component.

Other than limited employment in con-ventional wars and routine UN deploy-ments, our Special Forces have beenactively employed abroad only as part of theIndian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in SriLanka. The ideal response to asymmetricthreats is adoption of a proactive strategyensuring prevention of any attack againstIndian assets/national interests, using Spe-cial Forces as the spearhead. We have beenconsistently defensive resulting in being labelled as a “soft state” and boosting ouradversaries to bleed us with impunity.

Employment and TaskingSpecial Forces should be employed as forcemultipliers to complement the tasks per-formed by conventional forces, entailinghigh risk and high gain missions havingminimum visibility. More importantly, in thenon-war period, they should be used to con-tinuously shape the battlefield for asymmet-ric and fourth generation wars toconventional wars in a nuclear backdrop.Their employment should preferably be the-atre specific. Their strategic tasking shouldbe in concert with national security objec-tives, which requires control, tasking and coordination at the highest level.

Numerous examples exist of foreignspecial forces employed as strategic assets.Selous Scouts raised in Rhodesia in 1973were responsible for 68 per cent of all ter-rorists killed in the six-year Bush War at acost of only 40 Scouts. British SAS has beenoperating in Iraq, Afghanistan and someAfrican countries. Russia’s Spetsnaz are en-trenched in CIS and Eastern bloc countriesin one form or another. US Special Forces(USSF) were employed in Afghanistan andin Iraq a year and a half prior to the inva-sion and are reportedly inside Iran for thepast four years. Incidentally, USSF operatesin almost 160 countries though fightingonly in Afghanistan and Iraq. Core tasks offoreign special forces have been direct ac-tion, special reconnaissance, foreign inter-nal defence, unconventional warfare,counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation ofWMDs, civil affairs operation, psychologicaloperations, and information operations.The USSF too engages in the under men-

tioned undeclared tasks: l Conduct proactive, sustained “manhunt-

ing” and disruption operations globally. l Build partner capacity in relevant

ground, air and maritime capabilities inscores of countries on a steady-state basis.

l Help generate persistent ground, air andmaritime surveillance and strike cover-age over “under-governed” areas and littoral zones.

l Employ unconventional warfare againststate-sponsored terrorism and trans-national terrorist groups globally.The Special Services Group (SSG) of Pak-

istan has been gainfully used as strategic as-sets in Afghanistan, Jammu and Kashmir,Bangladesh and Nepal. Like the SSG, weneed to understand that Special Forces donot create resistance movements, but advise,train and assist the resistance movements al-ready in existence. Indian Special Forcesshould primarily look beyond our borders tonip asymmetric threats in the bud and tocontrol the fault lines of our adversaries.Their tasks should include asymmetric war-fare, unconventional/fourth generationwarfare, special operations, reconnaissance,psychological operations, counter prolifera-tion, and the like.

The TruthThere are four universally accepted globaltruths with regard to special forces. First,humans are more important than hard-ware; second, quality is better than quan-

tity; third, special forces cannot be mass pro-duced; fourth, competent special forces can-not be created after emergencies arise. Indiahas consistently flouted these global truths.Following the US invasion of Afghanistan,the Army went in for unprecedented expan-sion of its Special Forces adding four SpecialForces battalions to its then existing three ina short span of time. Similarly, post-26/11,mass expansion of the NSG has been ongoing which is at the cost of dilution of manpower, shortage of officers, inade-quate weapons and equipment and inadequate training.

India’s Special ForcesIndian Special Forces (military, expandedNSG and SFF) total in the region to over20,000, much more than the uniformedstrength of USSF, but not even one-tenththeir capabilities. Significantly, during peakhostilities in Iraq, only 900-1,200 USSF per-sonnel were employed simultaneously. Spe-cial Operations Command of the US hasstrength of only 13,000-plus, of which thePsychological Operations Teams and CivilAffairs Teams are not fighting men. Foreignarmies expand Special Forces very deliber-ately. After 9/11, the US expanded its SpecialForces only by 750. UK went in only for anaddition of a 650 strong Special Forces Sup-port Group. Pakistan has added a fourth SSGunit in recent years.

In our case, the Army already has sevenSpecial Forces battalions and plans to addanother two. By rapidly expanding our Spe-cial Forces, we have actually diluted theircapabilities; sans requisite manpower, train-

ing, weapons and equipment. Not only it isnot possible to mass produce Special Forcesrapidly, not going in for commensurate ex-pansion of requisite training infrastructuremakes the situation even worse if we are towaste this strategic asset on counter-terror-ist tasks within the country. It will take yearsof focused effort before the Special ForcesTraining School catches up with the ad-vance training requirements of the ex-panded Army Special Forces.

Manpower is the most important ingre-dient of any Special Force. This is perhapsthe reason that comprehensive probation-cum-continuation training programmes areestablished world over. These range from 3-4 to even 12 months. The SSG of Pakistanprobates a volunteer over a nine-monthschedule in all types of terrain before he isallowed to wear the SSG beret. Following acomprehensive study in 2001, six monthprobation for all ranks was introduced forour Army Special Forces. However, this wascut down to three months for officers due torapid expansion and overall shortages; a ret-rograde step. Describing the SSG of the1960s, Stephen Cohen writes, “The cuttingedge was in Special Forces. This required anew kind of officer, one with good languageskills, initiative, and political judgment.”Apart from regular professional competence,we need officers in Special Forces who arephysically and mentally tough, out of thebox thinkers with high initiative, have sharpintellect with creative intelligence, high on

adaptability, ready to give/accept blunt advice, able to learn from subordinates in addition to seniors and peers, courageous asa lion, cunning as a fox and techno-savvy toexploit technology. At present, our ArmySpecial Forces have over 60 per cent short-age of officers. This state is unlikely to improve unless the mandatory requirementof commanding officers countersigning theapplications of officers volunteering for Special Forces is removed. Equipping of ourSpecial Forces too is very slow and does notfollow the packaged concept. Vital equip-ment like hand-held laser target designatorsis yet to be procured. Besides the gestationperiod of equipping being excruciatinglylong, by the time the weapons and equip-ment are acquired, Special Forces expandfurther resulting in sharing of resources.

Intelligence is the key to Special Forcesoperations. Employment of Special Forces,particularly in asymmetric and fourth gen-eration war scenarios, requires tremendousinter-agency coordination. Acquisition, col-lation and timely dissemination of intelli-gence are major grey areas repeatedlyhighlighted during various crisis situationsincluding 26/11. Hopefully, the NATGRIDand National Counterterrorism Centre willaddress these aspects. We need to establishthe means for automated intelligence gath-ering and analysis, short-, medium- andlong-term assessments supported by an automated decision support system and fi-nally real time online dissemination alongwith a common operating picture to allconcerned, for which information tech-nologies exist.

Training is vital for success in opera-tions. Joint training of all Special Forcesparticularly joint operations training be-tween the Military Special Forces and theSFF and between Military Special Forcesand the NSG needs to be instituted. Suchtraining should be periodic and based onlikely asymmetric and non-traditional chal-lenges. Regularising the SFF also needs tobe considered seriously.

Strategic employment of Special Forcesto counter asymmetric and fourth genera-tion wars would require the express sanctionof the Prime Minister himself as in the caseof the US where the President authorisessuch actions. However, we first need a na-tional doctrine and strategy for employmentof Special Forces plus an apex organisationto oversee their manning, equipping, train-ing, consolidation, operational intelligence,inter-agency synergy and strategic tasking.The initiative will have to be taken by themilitary with adequate safeguards to crossbureaucratic hurdles. Military Special Forcesand the SFF should look primarily outwardsin response to transnational asymmetric andfourth generation warfare threats.

Silent and EffectiveSpecial Forces provide us the tools to address non-traditional challenges to our security by providing an effective medium toachieve security objectives. Success and effectiveness of Special Forces can be multi-plied by formulation of a well worked-outstrategy for their employment. Establish-ment of a streamlined command and controlstructure, streamlining the lines of author-ity, secure and seamless communicationlinks, enhanced inter-agency coordinationfor intelligence gathering and sharing andestablishment of a national inter-agencydatabase for intelligence are some of thesteps which will assist rapid decision-making. Diplomacy and conventional warcannot contend with asymmetric wars. Weneed to develop a deterrent to asymmetricand fourth generation war and the ability todemonstrate it when required. Special Forcesare a vital element of national power possessing capability of enormous freedomof action in methodology of execution in operations and should be fruitfully employed to successfully meet present andfuture challenges.

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PHOTOGRAPH: Indian Army

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Conflict situations require superiorbattlefield transparency, handlingof information and efficient com-mand and control set-up, all in atelescoped observe, orient, decide

and act (OODA) cycle. The side which is moreaware will have the decisive advantage. Suc-cessful execution of fast-moving operationswill require an accelerated decision-actioncycle and an ability to conduct operations si-multaneously, especially in combined/jointoperations. Commanders at all levels partic-ularly at the cutting edge level require requi-site information in real or near real time. Inorder to enhance operational effectiveness ofcommanders and troops, information tech-nology needs to be harnessed to act as a forcemultiplier to enable exchange, filtering, andprocessing of digital information through dueintegration. The Indian Army has embarkedon a project for acquiring a battlefield man-agement system (BMS) that will serve modernbattlefield requirements at the battalion/reg-iment and below pan-Army level with linksdown to every soldier and weapon platform.

Equipping of all battalions/regiments ofthe Indian Army with the BMS is expected tobe completed by 2017-18. The big questionis whether this project of the Army will meetthe battlefield requirements of our nationconsidering that the boundaries of the classicbattlefield of yore have blurred long since,and the Army is only one component for re-sponding to asymmetric threats.

Battlefield Management System At present, situational awareness and battle-field management in the Indian Army are adhoc, sans integration. No integration tool isavailable to support military users from indi-vidual soldier to battalion group/combatgroup commander in the tactical battle area(TBA), which can provide in near real timean appropriate, common and comprehensivetactical picture by integration of inputs fromall elements of the battle group. In the battle-field, the essential requirement is to pick upthe enemy much before he picks you up, seethe target, and direct fire in quick time usingthe best weaponry available plus monitor thepost-strike effects. In this backdrop, fieldingof the BMS was considered a vital facet of ca-pability building in the Army. Fielding of theBMS will enable faster decision-making bycommanders at all echelons, better decisiondue to reliable operational information pro-vided in real time and the ability to quicklyclose the sensor to shooter loop.

Project BMS involves integration, testingand fielding a BMS duly integrated with othercomponents of the tactical command, con-trol, communications and information (TacC3I) system. The concept aims to exploittechnology for mission accomplishment inthe TBA through rapid acquisition, process-ing and transfer of information, enhancingsituational awareness, acquiring capabilityto react to information, sharpening ability tosynchronise and direct fire, thereby establish-ing and maintaining operational tempo.

Capabilities required of the BMS wouldbe—first, provide a command and controlsystem spanning the TBA spreading acrossindividuals, detachments, combat platforms,sensors, sub-units, units to the battalion com-mander/regiment commander; second,achieve faster reaction capability and flexibil-ity in command and control by providing in-formation automatically at the right place inthe right time, thereby compressing the

OODA loop; third, provide a strong founda-tion for making decisions based on near realtime, consistent and well-structured informa-tion, thereby enhancing the information han-dling capability of commanders; fourth,strengthen information exchange by havinga strong messaging and replication mecha-nism; fifth, improve and modernise presenta-tion of information, and sixth, integrate withother command and control system.

The BMS will be integrated to the Tac C3ISystem through the command informationdecision support system (CIDSS). The infantryis to handle computer and radio sub-systemsplus software integration of Project F-INSASby themselves. This is a folly as this phase ofF-INSAS should be part of the BMS which willensure ab initio army-wide integration at bat-talion/regiment and below level. The latterapproach would also be much more cost sav-ing and reduce the development time as well.If the Infantry continue on their own, thenyet another project would have to be initiatedto integrate the F-INSAS with the BMS.

The BMS will comprise a tactical hand-held computer with individual soldiers andtactical computers at battle group headquar-ters and combat vehicles. Computers will beintegrated employing application and data-base servers connected on a data enabledcommunication network. The system will en-able generation of a common operationalpicture (COP) by integrating inputs from allrelevant sources within a battle groupthrough integrated use of GIS and GPS. Itwill be highly mobile with ability to networkitself by integration of components and pro-vide a high data rate. The communicationsshould not interfere with legacy communica-tion equipment and should easily be retrofit-ted into combat platforms. It should havevoice and data including video streamingand imaging facility optimally utilising thebandwidth available.

Conflict Dimensions As a counter to powerful states with hightechnology weapon systems, weaker states inconjunction with non-state actors have cho-sen the option of asymmetric conflictthrough a mix of regular and irregularforces, terrorism, insurgency and guerrillawarfare, simultaneously exploiting technol-ogy, networks, cyber space, political manoeu-vres and media. As far back as August 2001,in a regional conference on Security in SouthEast Asia held in Dhaka, Lt General Javed Has-

san, Commandant of the National DefenceCollege and Dr Shirin Mazari, Director Gen-eral of the Institute of Strategic Studies, bothfrom institutions enjoying Pakistan govern-ment’s patronage, vehemently stressed thatin today’s world, low intensity conflict andunconventional means like guerrilla warfare,psychological warfare, including the use ofterror, economic warfare and indirect inter-vention in the territory of a rival state, werethe more viable options to a conventional war.

The focus of wars and conflicts today ismore on the achievement of political objec-tives rather than only destruction of enemycombat potential. The spectrum of conflictcan range from conflicts between states toconflict with non-state actors and proxies.Boundaries between regular and irregularwarfare have blurred. Non-state actors/groups are increasingly acquiring conven-tional capabilities that were earlier the exclu-sive preserve of national armies. Today,conventional war may be superimposed onongoing asymmetric war. Alternatively, con-ventional conflict could either be preceded orsucceeded by a period of irregular conflictthat would require low intensity conflict(LIC) and stabilisation operations.

Today’s conflict situations show the mosteffective response from a state against supe-rior operational power of an opponent, craftydiplomacy, wily espionage, terrorism (includ-ing cyber terrorism), low intensity conflict orproxy war, employment of weapons of massdestruction including dirty/chemical/radio-logical bombs through non-state actors anda host of other asymmetric approaches. Theprinciples of asymmetric war are not to usearmed forces to compel the enemy to submitto one’s will but use all means includingarmed forces, military and non-military,lethal and non-lethal measures to compel theenemy to accept one’s interests. This in thecontext of the resurrected dialogue with Pakistan, without the latter having disman-tled its terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK) and not even show-ing serious consideration to punish the per-petrators of the 26/11 Mumbai terror attack.

Battlefield IndiaBesides conventional wars, India has beencontending with low intensity conflict andterrorist attacks including through state-sponsored non-state actors since the past fewdecades. While some 30-odd terrorist organ-isations are operating in the country, the

Maoists have created the greatest fault linecovering some 220 districts and seriously af-fecting seven states, a situation exploitable ormore candidly being exploited by our adver-saries. Despite the ongoing dialogue betweenIndia and Pakistan, the latter has no appar-ent intention of shutting down the terroristinfrastructure in POK and desist from asym-metric war against India. The Maoists havelinks with the Maoists of Nepal, while the latter draw their inspiration and supportfrom China. Chinese origin weaponry isreaching the Maoists through South andSoutheast Asia, while media has also been reporting about ULFA bases and training onChinese soil.

It requires little intelligence to deduce thatin the current state of asymmetric war beingwaged against India, the battlefield can beanywhere both within and outside the coun-try. It requires even less intelligence to surmisethat given our defensive mentality and out-dated reliance on conventional response tostate-sponsored asymmetric threats, the bat-tlefields largely will be within our own terri-tory. Gloating over an odd US remark againstPakistan will not inhibit the latter sponsoringterrorism against us or even dismantle terrorfactories in PoK. The current state of Maoistinsurgency may just be the tip of the iceberg.Future multiple 26/11 type simultaneous at-tacks are a reality. Technology has empow-ered the individual and today a singleterrorist/guerrilla can cause severe damagenotwithstanding the fear of non-state actorsacquiring WMDs including those of the ‘dirtybomb’ variety. Today’s terrorist is educated,techno-savvy, can exploit cyber space andmerge in the urban milieu.

Managing the BattlefieldWhile we have dwelt on the battlefields includ-ing the fact that besides occasional chance ofconventional conflict most of these battlefieldswill be within our territory, what forces thenwill constitute the Indian response? In theNorth and North-east, we have had a mix ofthe military, paramilitary forces (PMF) andCentral police forces (CPOs) and police forcescontending with LIC since the past fewdecades. Operation Green Hunt against theMaoists saw the combined forces of the BorderSecurity Force (BSF), Central Reserve PoliceForce (CRPF) and Indo-Tibetan Border Police(ITBP) in action. States have gone in for spe-cific counter-terrorist/counter-insurgencyforces of their own, examples being GreyHounds of Andhra Pradesh and recent addi-tion of a SWAT team in Maharashtra. The National Security Guard (NSG) with its prolif-erating hubs will invariably come into actionwhenever a major terrorist attack occurs. TheSpecial Group (SG) of the Special FrontierForce (SFF) too has similar counter-terroristtasks. In the above backdrop, will the acquisi-tion of a BMS by the Indian Army suffice atthe cutting edge for the battlefields in India?The answer should be a resounding ‘No’.While the modernisation of PMF and police forces is being given due attention now,courtesy setbacks to CPOs battling Maoists,the aspect of battlefield management toomust be given urgent attention as well for thePMF, CPOs and specific counter-terrorist/counter-insurgency forces.

Required FocusThe Ministry of Home Affairs, the NationalSecurity Advisor, the Cabinet Secretariat andthe Cabinet Committee for Security need tofocus on the following :l Examine and establish the need for a BMS

For Speedy Command & ControlConsidering that terrorism is here to stay and insurgencies can hardly be wished away, we need to be prepared against these threats compounded by asymmetric warfare being waged by our adversaries

F O U R T H O F A S E R I E S O F S I X A R T I C L E S O N B A T T L E F I E L D M A N A G E M E N T S Y S T E M

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n LT GENERAL (RETD) V.K. KAPOOR

The Indian Army has once again issued a request for information(RFI) for 155mm/52- calibre towedgun system for the Artillery on July22, 2010 and asked for replies by

August 16, 2010. This is consequent to thecancellation of the existing trials of the two155mm howitzers belonging to SingaporeTechnologies Kinetics (STK) (FH-2000) andBAE Systems (FH-77 B05 L52) respectively.The Ministry of Defence (MoD) spokesmanclaimed that trials had been abandoned dueto the non-appearance of STK’s FH-2000gun. This incident will result in considerabledelay in the induction of any new artillery

gun because the decision-making process ofchoosing a new artillery gun itself will takeanother 2-3 years and the cascading effectwill further delay the artillery modernisationplan to 2020 as it would take about 8-10years to manufacture the chosen weapon in-digenously. Artillery is looking for an out-right purchase of four hundred 155mmhowitzers and another 1,180 through localmanufacture.

Artillery modernisation has beenplagued by inordinate delays due to manyreasons, but the most relevant factor is theconvoluted procurement process which hasbeen put into place ostensibly to prevent cor-ruption and ensure transparency. The resultis that in so doing we have tied ourselves in

knots. Our procedure is not allowing themodernisation process to move forward. Itseems that every component of the Armyand civil machinery when asked for viewscan stall the process by a seemingly innocu-ous remark, sometimes just to emphasise hisimportance in the decision-making process.Moreover, the mindsets within the civil andmilitary hierarchies and the bureaucratic filepushing within the MoD has made the situ-ation unmanageable. The ultimate suffereris the Army whose modernisation is stalledat a time when multifarious challenges fac-ing it have started manifesting themselves.There is a real danger that we may have toface a conventional conflict on two fronts, intwo different theatres of war (eastern andwestern), simultaneously.

The last major acquisition of towed gun-howitzers was that of about 400 pieces of 39-calibre 155mm FH-77B howitzers with arange of 30 km from Bofors of Sweden in themid-1980s. This gun, despite political contro-versy, proved its mettle in the Kargil conflict.After more than two decades of neglect, dur-ing which many other artillery weapons likethe 100mm and 122mm field guns of Russ-ian origin and the indigenously developed75/24 Indian Mountain Gun joined the longlist of obsolete equipment in service with thearmy, tenders were floated and trials werecommenced for a 52-calibre 155mm gun toreplace all field and medium guns. Four setsof trials have been done till date and no gunhas been inducted. Meanwhile, two vendorswere blacklisted, leaving only two vendors inthe fray—STK and BAE Systems.

After completing all formalities, fresh tri-als were once again ordered in 2010 withthese two vendors even though a case of cor-

ruption in the ordnance scam was pendingagainst STK, though no charge-sheet hadbeen filed. The result is that once again thetrials have been cancelled. An interestingoutcome of all this is that the weaknesses ofour system have been quite well gauged bysome of the vendors and when they see amajor deal slipping out of their hands theyhave become adept at squealing against oth-ers or taking advantage of the weakness inthe procurement procedure to delay or derailthe proceedings. We unfortunately have notbeen wise enough to see through theirmachinations or deal with them firmly.

The Way ForwardIndia has the unenviable record of being sur-prised in nearly every war starting from the1947-48 Jammu and Kashmir operations.Let us not wait to be surprised in the nextwar in which another Army Chief will say“We will fight with what we have”. Let notour armed forces suffer for the incompetenceand neglect of a few. The only way to over-come the current impasse is to have a De-fence Procurement Agency, an empoweredbody of experts as in the UK and France,with representatives from all departmentsconcerned. The agency should be given thepower and authority to see the processthrough the entire gamut of its activities,starting from identifying the equipment upto its culmination with the signing of thecontract. This body should then be held ac-countable for all that happens or does not.This agency should be headed by a Serviceofficer or a bureaucrat with an impeccablerecord of competence, diligence and honestyand should be answerable to the apex body,the Defence Acquisition Council.

for non-military security forces to copewith the present/future threats and forensuring success in battle against terror-ists/insurgents.

l Identify and prioritise PMF, CPOs and spe-cific police units tasked with anti-terror-ist/anti-insurgency tasks that need to beequipped with a BMS.

l Of the PMF, it would be prudent that BMSfor the Rashtriya Rifles (RR) and Infantry(TA) is included in Project BMS of the In-dian Army while for the Assam Rifles(AR) and the Coast Guard, developmentbe undertaken under aegis of MHA.

l Overall development and fielding of theBMS in non-military security forcesshould be under MHA supervision to en-sure national level net-centricity least asituation arises where all these forces goon developing their own BMS for thenext decade and then think about inte-grating them, costing avoidable expen-diture and more importantly time whichis already at a premium, an examplebeing movement of Maoists being pickedup but lack of situational awareness inreal/near time to CPOs battling them.

l BMS in non-military security forcesshould be a suitable application on an in-tuitive operating system with GIS suit-ability customised to meet operationalrequirements. The voice and data com-munications should always be up. Com-puter hardware should be rugged andnon-obtrusive with retrofitment main-taining platform integrity. System inte-gration should include applicationsoftware, data links with radio systems,

integration of all available sensors plusUAV data/satellite imagery, etc.

l Upward connectivity of the BMS of thenon-military security forces throughtheir chain of command should be to theNational Counter Terrorism Centre(NCTC) and the Multi Agency Centre(MAC) linked up through NATGRID.

l State level State Counter Terrorism Cen-tres (SCTCs) as and when they come up,axiomatically as part of the state levelUnified Headquarters (UHQs), wouldneed to be networked into this grid.

l The NCTC linking all national level intel-ligence agencies would need capabilitiesof automated intelligence collection, au-tomated analysis, analyses (short-,medium- and long-term) supported by adecision support system (DSS) and onlinedissemination of the common opera-tional picture (COP) to all concerned onneed to know basis.

l With the military also networked throughthe NATGRID, the advantages that wouldaccrue including the flexibility for com-

bined security forces employment in var-ious combinations for counter-terrorist/counter-insurgency operations through-out the length and breadth of the country.

l MHA will need to be clear on issues likeevolution of an enterprise architecture,integration and interoperability, commu-nications, bandwidth and latency, intro-duction of new technologies, robustnessof transmission, message and signal rout-ing, sensor exploitation, management ofdatabases, information security, informa-tion overload, integrated logistics, dan-gers of micro management, commercialinfluences, strategic initiatives and timefor implementation.

l Given adequate focus, the aim should beto equip the PMF, CPOs and specific po-lice units tasked for counter-insurgencyoperations with a BMS by 2020, close onthe heels of the battalions and regimentsof the Indian Army being equipped by2017-18.The Army needs to review its decision of

making the Infantry develop Phase 3 of Proj-ect F-INSAS; computer and radio sub-systemsplus software integration. This should be partof Project BMS of the Indian Army ensuringab initio Army wide integration at battalion/regiment and below level, avoiding yet another project to integrate the F-INSAS withthe BMS.

Handling the BMSWithin a month of 26/11, Indonesia went infor anti-terrorist drills simultaneously em-ploying the military, PMF and police forces onmultiple targets. Considering that terrorism

is here to stay, we need to be prepared againstthese threats compounded by asymmetricwarfare waged by our adversaries.

Technology has poised commanders to seetheir areas of responsibility in depth and inreal near time. Precisely locating, identifying,tracking and attacking targets by appropriatemeans and monitoring effects is a reality. Operating in joint environments and maturecapability to conduct multi-dimensional si-multaneous operations is facilitated. Equip-ping the PMF, CPOs and specific police unitswith BMS will give us the required net-centric-ity nationally at the cutting edge. Considerableresistance can be expected in leveraging tech-nology in such manner as was the case withthe Indian Army in kick-starting Project BMS,which actually should have been fielded adecade back. The problem is the mental blockat the officer level who considers the soldier tobe naive. Soldiers using the GPS on mobiles,modern weaponry and equipment are prettymuch tech savvy. Given the requisite training,the policeman coming from the same milieuwould have little problem handling the BMS.

We need to accelerate the developmentand fielding of the BMS as part of essentialcapability building of the PMF, CPOs and spe-cific police units tasked for counter-terroristand counter-insurgency tasks. This will helpsynergise national effort in tackling futurethreats, reduce response time at the cuttingedge and more importantly result in avoid-able loss of life in security forces consideringthat the BMS will ensure heightened battle-field transparency, updated situationalawareness in real/near real time and speedycommand and control.

Delayed by Red TapeArtillery modernisation has been plagued by inordinate delays due to many reasons, but the most relevant factor is the convoluted procurement process put into place to prevent corruption and ensure transparency

Archer - 155mm FH-77 B05 L52

We need to accelerate thedevelopment and fieldingof the BMS as part of essential capability build-ing of the PMF, CPOs andspecific police units

PHOTOGRAPH: BAE System

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© 2010 Rockwell Collins, Inc. All rights reserved.


The Indian Army (IA) is making con-certed efforts to modernise. As partof this drive for transformation, en-terprise information system assetsand initiatives is a key focus area.

The Directorate General of Information Sys-tems is to ensure that fielding of enterpriselevel integrated info systems is carried out inline with the laid out doctrine and a strategythat leverages integration as the key enablerfor transforming collaboration among peo-ple, organisational processes and technologyplatforms into a cohesive and synergised in-formation age war fighting capability.

A vital challenge in this endeavour is theattempt to transform a legacy operationalframework into an information age e-enter-prise. In an e-enterprise, the tight couplingbetween functional processes and the under-lying information infrastructure amplifiesthe effect of hardware and software securityfailures and accentuates the need for secu-rity management of not only the informa-tion infrastructure but the information itself,thereby necessitating comprehensive infor-mation assurance measures to ensure thatthis mission critical resource is availableeven in the most adverse times.

As part of the modernisation drive in-cluding acquiring net-centric warfare(NCW) capabilities, the Army has a numberof information systems in various stages andhas also felt the necessity to adopt an enter-prise level view of all these systems whichare deployed, are being deployed or havebeen proposed to be deployed in the future.This has necessitated the need to adopt anoverarching perspective for the vital aspectof information security not only in the con-text of environment of the information sys-tems but also the information containedwithin the systems and the physical assets ofthe systems.

Information SecurityFor an information system and the informa-tion it contains, certain control objectivesprovide the foundation for all derivative se-curity requirements. These extremely impor-tant security control objectives are:

Confidentiality: At times called secrecyor privacy, confidentiality is the protection ofthe assets of an information system so thatthe assets are accessible only to authorisedparties. For example, protection of privilegedinformation in transit through the informa-tion infrastructure with the use of encryp-tion technologies.

Authentication: Authentication estab-lishes the validity of a user’s identity and isfundamentally verified and proven identifi-cation of the user to the information system.It determines that a user is identified to theinformation system and is authorised for theuse of that particular asset of the informa-tion system, for example, the validation ofidentity before acceptance of commands orprior to release of information.

Availability: Availability ensures theinformation and system resources are accessible to authorised system users. Auser of the system can be a person or another system that requires a given asset.For example, information residing on enter-prise servers that is available to mobileusers at remote locations.

Integrity: Integrity implies informationassets can be modified only by authorised par-

ties in authorised ways. For example, a usermay be authorised to read data from a data-base but may not modify that information.

Non-repudiation: Non-repudiation isproof of the identity of both the sender andthe recipient, preserving the responsibilityof both the originator and recipient fortheir actions. For example, validation of auser’s signature by the information ownerand validation of the information owner bythe user prior to acceptance of an informa-tion transaction.

Information AssuranceDelivery of information in real/near realtime is of extreme importance. Having infor-mation perfectly secure but delivered too lateto take operationally-critical actions, doesnot fulfill the mission. Hence, informationassurance control objectives are required tocomplement security control objectives andprovide the basis for subsequent reasoning

about system feature reliability. Informationassurance refers to the fact that informationis made available to authorised users, whenrequested, with expected integrity. Informa-tion assurance encompasses not only thebasic system security properties, but alsopolicies, procedures and personnel that areused to maintain the system and its data ina known, secure state.

Information assurance objectives thatsupport security control objectives are:l Personnel management: It refers to

the personnel practices that support theadministration of the security functionsof the info system.

l Vulnerability management: It refers tothe maintenance of the info system soft-ware updates process to ensure all knownvulnerabilities are corrected, i.e. the em-ployment of a comprehensive vulnerabil-ity scanning and remediation capability.

l Configuration management: It refersto that part of the information assurancesystem that tracks the hardware, soft-ware, and firmware configuration ofeach physical device and allows the infosystem to be maintained in a known, se-

cure state at all times. l Secure software development man-

agement: It is the systemic use of soft-ware design principles and processesthrough a security development lifecycleto ensure that the information systemsoftware is secure by design.

l Verification management: It is theprocess of testing and validation used toensure the system works correctly, i.e.,the maintenance of an independent ver-ification and validation programme thatincludes at a minimum, unit, sub-systemand system verification procedures.

Present CapabilityThe Army established the Army Cyber Secu-rity Establishment (ACSE) six years back toenhance security of the Army’s informationinfrastructure through proactive actions andcollaborations. The ACSE issued a cyber se-curity policy in 2007 and various guidelines

for desktop users, for audit and for initiatingIT projects. Advisories too are issued fromtime to time and audit security reviews of in-formation bearing networks and systems arebeing undertaken. Ad hoc computer emer-gency research team (CERT)-Army has beenestablished with a website on the Army in-tranet. Advanced skills are being sought forvulnerability analysis of networks. Limitedforensic analysis capability has been ac-quired. A testing and evaluation laboratoryis being established for evaluation of securityproducts and solutions. However, classifica-tion as a certifying authority for the Armyhas hit a dead end with non-availability req-uisite specialists (scientists-mathematicians)and stipulation of no agency below the Sci-entific Analysis Group (SAG) permitted tocertify products of confidential and aboveclassification. ACSE is also engaged inspreading security awareness in the Armyand vetting of IT projects.

Relating the existing capabilities to the in-formation assurance control objectivesclearly shows that only issues related to per-sonnel management and vulnerability man-agement are being addressed and that too

in limited form. The other information assurance objectives of configuration management, secure software developmentmanagement and verification managementare practically not being addressed in anysubstantial measure. It is evident from theabove that the ACSE in its present form andalignment has a predominant “security of infrastructure” bias rather than a desirablebias towards “information assurance.” TheArmy should take serious note of this.

What Needs to be DoneThe primary reason for lack of an enterpriseperspective on information assurance hasbeen the inability to view information fromthe strategic viewpoint and recognising themission critical nature of this resource whichis essential for success in future conflicts. Ourcapability to meet all information assuranceobjectives continues to remain fragmentedbecause of our inability to centralise controlover such information assurance assets andprovide requisite collaboration between vari-ous stakeholders such as vendors/agenciesundertaking development of information sys-tems, project/programme management of-fices involved in deployment of informationsystems and users exploiting these informa-tion systems. The US joint lessons learned pro-gramme (JLLP) highlights this necessity bysaying, “As a mission critical resource, infor-mation must be treated like any other asset es-sential to the survival and success of theforces. The complexity and criticality of infor-mation assurance and its governance de-mands that it be elevated to the highestorganisational levels.”

The Army needs to take concerted andearly steps to address this gap in capability formeeting all information assurance objectives.As a first step, an overall enterprise level in-formation security and assurance strategy(ISAS) must be defined quickly. Based on thisstrategy, the second step of establishing an en-terprise level information security and assur-ance programme (ISAP) should be taken. Thethird step of vital importance is to agglomer-ate existing organisations like the ACSE andother envisaged assets to create an Army In-formation Assurance Agency (AIAA) underthe aegis of the Directorate General of Infor-mation Systems to aid in implementing theabove. The Army has to be ruthless in follow-ing such an approach, disregarding protestsof loss of turf by others. If we hesitate in tak-ing such a step, the pace of modernisationcan hardly be accelerated in the realm of in-formation warfare. Further, stunted growthwill imply inadequate cyber security andcyber warfare capabilities severely restrictingour combat potential. As part of restructur-ing of Integrated HQ of Ministry of Defence(Army), the Army would do well to elevate theDirector General of Information Systems to aPrincipal Staff Officer, bringing him directlyunder the Vice Chief of Army Staff.

The challenges and increasing war fight-ing capabilities of our adversaries in the 21stcentury mandate an impetus for providing in-house enablers to conceptualise and gestatestate-of-the-art information systems. The pro-posed AIAA shall be the “enabling arm” thatshall play an instrumental role in makingsure that the required information assurancecapabilities are provisioned for ensuring thatinformation systems are deployed with the desired quality, at optimal cost and within thedesired timeframes.

(To be continued in the next issue)

T ECHNOLOGY>>


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Power of InformationThe challenges and increasing war fighting capabilities of our adversaries in the 21st century mandate an impetus for providing in-house enablers to conceptualise and gestate state-of-the-art information systems.Read through the first part of the article to know more about Indian Army’s modernisation efforts.



OEM/ INDUSTRY <<

n ANDREW BROWNE

India, as we know, is planning to mod-ernise the communications systemsused by its armed forces in order to giveit a military advantage. Adding com-mand and control capability through a

cohesive Battlefield Management System(BMS) will without doubt deliver this decisiveedge. But a debate about BMS is currentlygrowing in India, and it is a debate that Ihave seen in other parts of the world. Thesedebates centre around two key words—in-teroperability and integration.

As the tempo of operations increases ona daily basis, soldiers, their commanders andtheir supporting forces on the ground, in theair or at sea need to be joined up so that allcomponents of the fighting force are awareof, and can respond to any given situation.Every soldier needs to know where their al-lies are and what they are thinking, as wellas where the enemy is and how to anticipateits next move. They also need to be able toreact to the decisions of their commandersat a moment’s notice.

Speed and clarity of communication arekey to out-manoeuvring the enemy and protecting one’s own forces and people.

Put in the context of a country such asIndia, where internal threats are as much ofa concern as external threats, this capabilitywould be of benefit not only to the IndianArmy but to paramilitary, police and emer-gency forces around the country. Greater cooperation between such forces would con-tribute to greater stability and security. Forsuch cooperation to be possible interoper-ability becomes essential.

But interoperability is not simply aboutensuring that friendly military and securityforces can communicate effectively witheach other to support a defensive action orposture. Interoperability is actually the nextmajor step forward for command and con-trol capability.

Delivering such capability is not as sim-ple as it might sound. Each customer willhave their own requirements, standards anddoctrine which will have an effect on the‘shape’ of their command and control sys-tem. Yet cooperating forces will also want tobe able to share information using their re-spective systems.

For example, the British Army’s ‘Bowman’programme differs from the Royal Nether-lands Marine Corps NIMCIS programme be-cause of slightly differing requirements andequipment, yet the two systems can talk toeach other easily, underpinning the close co-operation and operational interoperability ofthe UK/Netherlands Landing Force.

But successful interoperability does notsimply result from providing a BMS-type sys-tem to every unit one wishes to include in acommand, control and communicationsframework. It also results from understandingand successfully integrating that system withalready existing legacy systems, vehicles andinfrastructure. As General Dynamics UK haslearnt from its experience in working with itscustomers, good integration is a key compo-nent of good interoperability.

It is also because of the complexity ofgetting such capabilities right that manyarmed and security forces who wish to ben-efit from command and control capability

look to General Dynamics UK Limited, thecompany recognised as the leading primesystems integrator with the greatest experi-ence of delivering cutting edge commandand control solutions around the world.

General Dynamics UK designs, fromscratch, the system that works for the cus-tomer. It can do this because it is product in-dependent. The majority of other defencecontractors do not understand this factorand attempt to impose their own solutionson the customer by offering a vertically inte-

grated system and equipment package thatdoes not necessarily fit the customer’s needs.

By taking the product independent ap-proach General Dynamics UK can more ef-fectively deliver capabilities such as anintegrated mobile tactical Internet offeringsecure-voice, secure-data, situational aware-ness and video capabilities throughout thebattlespace, to a large user population bothdismounted and in vehicles, in units, head-quarters and command posts.

A national network-centric programme

would seek to integrate land, sea, air and jointforces; it would provide appropriate informa-tion from the operative on the ground, be theysoldier, paramilitary or policemen, throughplatforms up to the joint headquarters. Sen-sors would deliver data to be processed andfused into a coherent common operating picture (COP) which would then be shared,disseminated and actioned in effective and ap-propriate ways throughout the force. Such asystem of systems would deliver inherent ben-efits in shortening reaction times, tighteningthe coherence of data and delivering effect inwhat is known as the sensor to shooter loop.

Wider coherence would also be achievedwhen all systems are integrated to operatewithin a common information domain, em-powering all users with improved situationalawareness within their area of interest. Thiscan be most effectively achieved when diverse communications types are connected– fixed infrastructure, tactical mobile, air-borne and naval datalinks and satcom, forexample. Maximising the interoperabilityand resilience of data over diverse militarynets is a specialised skill not appreciated bythe commercial world of soaring band-widths and well established standards.

A key mantra at General Dynamics UK is“Integration, not installation.” Why? Be-cause the introduction of a BMS, or any sim-ilar type of complex system, does not simplymean providing new equipment in the shapeof a soldier system to each individual soldier– though this is a key part of the hardwareprovided. It also means adding the system toevery vehicle, craft, vessel or other piece ofinfrastructure used by the customer, andmost importantly ensuring it works harmo-niously with the equipment around it. Thisapproach provides the network capability toall levels of the military necessary to ensurecohesive communications that deliver a keyadvantage on the battlefield.

Having delivered the flagship C4I systemto the British Armed Forces over the last eightyears, and having provided similar capabili-ties to Dutch, Romanian and Libyan forces aswell, General Dynamics UK is the only sys-tems integrator which fully understands thechallenges and complexity of delivering sucha system, because it has done it.

For example, integrating over 13,500new and legacy AFVs, including Russian T-72, T-90 and BMPs into a bespoke C4I sys-tem takes a global level of knowledge andexpertise that only General Dynamics UKhas the track record of delivering.

Of additional key benefit to the region isGeneral Dynamics UK’s unparalleled trackrecord of working with local partners anddeveloping indigenous capability, bringingits skills together with those of local compa-nies, many of them small or medium enter-prises (SMEs). General Dynamics UK has ademonstrable track record of ability to deliver in this area.

As a prime systems integrator, GeneralDynamics UK brings the best people andequipment together to deliver the best possi-ble solution. In India, General Dynamics UKwill partner with local industry to identify asolution to the region’s requirements whichwill benefit industry and the local armedforces for many years to come. The author is the Vice President, C4I Systems,General Dynamics UK.

Protecting the Nationwith a Cohesive BMSGeneral Dynamics UK experience of C4I programmes, and delivering interoperability and integration, is key to the success of India’s Battlefield Management System

PHOTOGRAPHS: General Dynamics

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n SANJAY KUMAR

Although the US military’s strategytowards Pakistan’s tribal region,which is at present limited to spe-cific drone attacks against hard-ened Al-Qaeda and Taliban

targets, may not have resulted in desired op-erational success, the Pakistani theatre hasproved the combat efficacy of unmanned aer-ial vehicles (UAVs), in counter-insurgency op-erations. The combat UAVs or the drones, asthey are popularly called, have reportedlyeliminated dozens of high value Al-Qaedaand Taliban targets and killed a little over 700lesser value terrorists and traits sympathisersin 2009 alone. According to Long War Jour-nal, a website which tracks US drone attacksin Pakistan, aerial attacks by unmanned com-bat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) inside Pakistan in-creased by 47 per cent to 53 in 2009, withmost strikes carried out by Predator, the killerdrone which is dreaded the most among ter-rorists in the Af-Pak region. Among those Al-Qaeda and Taliban terrorists who killed in2009 include Baitullah Mehsud, the leader ofTaliban in Pakistan.

The drone attacks, which remain the ful-crum of the US military strategy against Al-Qaeda and Taliban in Pakistan haveincreased both in frequency as well as lethal-ity under the Obama administration. Thestrategy of killing terrorists by drones hasdrawn criticism from Pakistani establish-ments who describe these attacks as gross violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty. However,it is ironical that Pakistan which continuesto lament that the US military drones havekilled more civilians than terrorists and vo-ciferously opposes the strategy of targetingterrorist hideouts on its soil because of col-lateral damages, should continue to badgerthe US for transfer of drone technology.

UCAVs: Increasingly PopularUAVs were initially developed to gather intel-ligence and conduct surveillance and recon-naissance over hostile territories or supportsearch and rescue missions in disaster situa-tions. Over the years, UAVs have acquired acertain combat character of their own. TheUS military’s success with Predator drones fir-ing Hellfire missiles against terrorists in partsof Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan in recentyears is believed to have spurred researchglobally in robotic technologies, resulting inever increasing race among Asian countriesfor acquisition of military drones. TheWikipedia lists 46 countries which are atpresent using UAVs for various purposes.

While the military use of UAVs is confinedto purposes like gathering of intelligence, sur-veillance and reconnaissance, these are in-creasingly looked upon as a potential weaponagainst insurgents. Besides avoiding loss ofhuman lives on the battlefield, a phenomenonwhich is fast catching up with most modernmilitaries, it is also responsible for the growingpopularity of UCAVs or combat-capabledrones which are now being fitted with laser-guided missiles. With intelligent machinesmarching upfront, a paradigm shift is discern-able in the way humans now seek to conductwarfare. Pakistan’s motive for seeking killerdrones needs to be viewed from a differentperspective driven as it is by its desire to gainconventional parity over arch rival India.

Pakistan’s ObsessionPakistan, which has witnessed the ferocity ofthe US military drones with increasing inten-

sity over the years, considers development ofcombat UAVs a high priority area for its ownmilitary. Persistent requests made by Pakistaniofficials to the US over the past few years, including Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari’srepeated pleas to President Barack Obama fortransfer of combat drones, however, have metwith little success. In an interview with CNNin May 2009, Zardari had said, “I need dronesto be part of my arsenal. I need that facility. Ineed that equipment. I need that to be my po-lice arrangement.” The US, which has trans-ferred billions of dollars worth militaryassistance to Pakistan over the past few years,however, is reluctant to oblige Zardari with hisrequest over fears of ‘sensitive data’ that therequested technology could be transferred toChina for reverse engineering.

The US also fears that UAVs, armed withdeadly missiles, could prove to be a potentweapon in the hands of terrorists. Given thelinkages that Pakistan’s ISI has with the ter-rorist organisations such fears are not un-founded. While keeping combat dronesoff-limits to Pakistan’s military, the US, how-ever, is considering supplying some sophisti-cated UAVs which could be used forsurveillance and intelligence gathering pur-poses to Pakistan. It is believed that the USmight supply Pakistan with 12 units of RQ-7Shadow unmanned aerial vehicles to supportits fight with extremists.

For a country which is so vehemently op-posed to drone attacks by the US military onits soil and where the public sentiments runso high against America due to the growingnumber of reported civilian deaths in droneattacks, it is highly unrealistic to assumethat Pakistan’s military will ever use killerdrones in internal insurgency situations.Employment of combat drones against localinsurgents who may be dispersed amongcivilian population will remain a difficultchoice for any military.

Though employment of UAVs againstthese ultras remains one of the options avail-able to the Indian government, the Indianmilitary is not very receptive to the idea ofusing a disproportionate force against theMaoists who are operating behind humanshields. In this backdrop, Pakistan’s requestthat it needs drones to effectively fight theterrorists on its soil is a hogwash. The use ofcombat drones by Pakistani military againstinsurgents operating on its own soil, if it everhappens, would not only make Pakistanmore of a target for suicide attacks. The

question therefore remains, why is Pakistanso desperate to get killer drones?

It is, in fact, Pakistan military’s desire togain conventional parity with the Indianmilitary which is driving it towards acquisi-tion of weapons with high-end technologies.During the Kargil War in 1999, the Israeli-built Heron and Searcher UAVs providedcrucial intelligence about the Pakistani in-truders who were occupying advantageouspositions on the treacherous mountains ofKargil. Again, the Indian military had a dis-tinct advantage over Pakistani military inbattlefield surveillance in the last major mil-itary stand-off between India and Pakistanin 2002 which followed the terrorist attackon the Indian Parliament.

Compared to the Pakistani military, theIndian forces had a larger number and widerrange of UAVs deployed against them. Eversince, Pakistan has been not only over-zeal-ous to expand the base of UAVs in all thebranches of its military, it is also desperate toacquire Predator type UAVs, capable of tak-ing out high value Indian military targets,including critical civilian infrastructure suchas power grids, communication networks,military’s command and control centres,hardened military bunkers, etc. While Pak-istani military has pre-defined usage forcombat UAVs against India’s conventionalmilitary and civilian targets, proliferation ofthis technology to terrorists would mean serious security implications for India, enabling Pakistan-based terrorists to launchattacks against India without any fear ofreprisal by the Indian security agencies.

Pakistan’s Alternative SourcesPakistan itself has a robust indigenous UAVdevelopment programme and Pakistan-made UAVs are exported to a number ofcountries, including the US (the US Depart-ment of Homeland Security uses BorderEagle surveillance UAVs developed by Inte-grated Dynamics of Pakistan for border pa-trols because they are cheaper). Islamabad,however, is seeking support from othercountries as well, notably China and Turkeyin the development of combat grade UAVs.According to local news reports, Pakistan isfocussing its unmanned aircraft efforts onupgrading various older UAVs with Chinesehelp. Richard Fisher, a senior researcher atthe International Assessment and StrategyCentre in Washington, says that Pakistanmay choose to produce China’s new CH-3

unmanned attack aircraft. It is also believed that Pakistan may get

access to Israeli drone technologies viaTurkey. Turkey and Israel appear to be ontrack to finalise a long delayed multi-million-dollar deal for the delivery of 10drone aircraft for the Turkish air force. Sig-nificantly, Pakistan and Turkey have anagreement to cooperate on UAV develop-ment. Pakistani firms are also said to beworking closely with Chinese, Italian andTurkish firms who all are believed to beworking with Israeli technologies with alarge base of American components. Mean-while, Pakistan has also begun the produc-tion of Falco UAV in collaboration withSelex Galileo of Italy at Pakistan Aeronau-tical Complex (PAC), Kamra. Pakistan isalso close to producing its first unmannedcombat aerial vehicle Burraq, armed with anew laser-guided air-to-surface missile andlaser designator. Burraq is understood tohave undergone its flight testing in May2009. Further, Pakistan is also reportedlyseeking to upgrade its existing range of sur-veillance and reconnaissance capable UAVslike Mukhbir, Uqqab, Jasoos, Ubaabeel andothers with the help of Chinese technolo-gies.

Indian ReactionPakistan’s obsession with combat drones islikely to propel India into an unintendedarms race with its arch rival. The Indian mil-itary has already beefed up its inventorywith 100 more UAVs since the Kargil Warand is looking forward to induct IsraeliHarop ‘killer’ UAVs from 2011 onwards. Fol-lowing on the successes of Lakshya and Nis-hant drones, India’s premier defenceresearch establishment, DRDO, reportedly isworking on a new range of medium-alti-tude, long endurance UAVs named Rustom,of which the Army is keen to induct seventroops. India also has recently ordered an Is-raeli company—Israel Aerospace Industriesfor supply of Heron drones, a deal worth `700 crore. Clearly, India at present has adistinct edge over Pakistan in the deploy-ment of UAVs. However, with Pakistan acquiring killer drones—the likes of Preda-tor, the balance would tilt unpalatably infavour of Pakistan. But the real threat fromPakistan acquiring predator type drones isits likely misuse by the terrorists. The author is currently with the VivekanandaInternational Foundation.

Thirsting for Killer DronesPakistan laments that US drones have killed more civilians than terrorists, vociferously opposes targeting terrorist hideouts, and yet badgers the US for transfer of drone technology. Why?

Predator type UAVs are capable of taking out high value Indian military targets and critical civilian infrastructuresuch as power grids, communication networks, military’scommand & control centres and hardened military bunkers

PHOTOGRAPH: US Air Force

PredatorFeaturesl Solid-state digital avionicsl Remotely piloted or fully autonomousl SAR and EO/IR providing day/night and all-

weather operations in one-mission aircraftl GPS and INSl UHF/VHF voicel Extensive combat experience

Capabilitiesl Expanded EO/IR payloadl SAR all-weather capabilityl Satellite controll GPS and INSl Over 24 hr on-station at 400 nmil Deployed with the U.S. and Italian Air Forcel Operations to 25,000 ft (7620 m)l 450 lb (204 kg) payloadl Wingspan 48.7 ft (14.84 m), length 27 ft (8.23 m)Source: General Atomics Aeronautical


Pervez Musharraf plans gettingback home, launch his politicalparty and rule Pakistan again. Itcoincides with his protégé Aash-faq Parvez Kayani securing a sec-

ond term as Pakistan’s Army Chief. It wouldbe interesting to watch the two especiallyduring the next elections before the secondtenure of Kayani expires. Having nurturedKayani, Musharraf appears confident of asecond win. However, he would do well toread Pakistan’s history where loyalty gets re-placed by deceit and violence at opportunemoment; remember what Zia-ul-Haq did toZulfikar Bhutto, Pervez Musharraf himselfdid to Nawaz Sharif and orchestrating Be-nazir Bhutto’s assassination? Is Musharrafactually walking into the Line of Fire now orwill it be a Pervez-Parvez marriage of con-venience since managing Pakistan, keepingUS and China in tow and exporting terrorare difficult to be handled singly?

Commonality in Parvez-Pervez includeshatred for India and obsession thatAfghanistan is Pakistan’s strategic depth.Both were commissioned from Kakul swear-ing oaths to avenge loss of East Pakistan.Both have ‘ruled’ Pakistan (the Military-ISIcombine actually does) excelling in export-ing terror; hunting with hounds and run-ning with hares. WikiLeaks are not requiredto gauge their future intentions.

Military-ISI CombineThe Military-ISI has ruled Pakistan sincedecades. Zardari’s feeble effort to bring theISI under the Ministry of Interior was cutshort immediately by Kayani. US acquiesceto this power equation, no matter face savingchants of strengthening democracy. Wheninvading Afghanistan, US facilitated Pak-istani forces including ISI operating insideAfghanistan to be quietly flown out. Parvez-Pervez know US dependency on Pakistan forsafe exit from Afghanistan and for prevent-ing terror strikes on mainland US even afterUS pullout. Pakistan is the most importantstrategic partner in facilitating Chinesemarch to the Indian Ocean through Karako-ram Highway all the way to Gwadar Portwith a rail link following and keepingUighurs under check. The China-Pakistannexus will continue to concentrate on down-sizing India.

Pakistani politicians survive courtesyMilitary-ISI blessings. Benazir’s autobiogra-phy admits fighting ISI implies fighting Al-Qaeda. Shah Mehmood Qureshi’s irrationaloutburst equating our Home Secretary withHafiz Saeed and that infiltration is solelyIndia’s problem is on behest Military-ISI.When Gilani as Prime Minister takes hitherto unprecedented step of himself announcing second full term extension forKayani (four months before Kayani’s presentterm expires), no further proof of sub-servience is required.

Pervez Senior (Musharraf)Actions like fixing explosives in his collegeprefect’s mail box and running away fromduty without leave as commissioned officer,mentioned in his autobiography, indicateMusharraf ’s personal traits. As an SSG offi-cer in 1971, he was known to be trainingterrorists in Chittagong Hill Tracts. As aLieutenant General, he made a presentationto his MoD on the need to annex J&K citingreduction of per capita availability of waterfrom 6,000 to 1,000 cusecs since Partition.As Army Chief, he repeatedly exhorted

Benazir to let him annex J&K. His refusal tobe present at Lahore during the Prime Min-ister’s Vajpayee’s bus voyage and being mas-ter architect of the Kargil intrusions areestablished facts. During the Kargil War,Over 500 dead bodies of Pakistani soldierswere dumped unceremoniously in the deadof night at the doorsteps of their next of kinin POK just because Musharraf did not wantto acknowledge they were Northern Light Infantry. This is explicitly narrated in theHerald published from Karachi. Can there bea more demeaning example of insulting uniform and martyred soldiers and that tooby the head of an army?

During the Kargil War, Captain SaurabhKalia and five other soldiers captured byPakistani forces were brutally tortured for22 before being shot and their mutilatedcorpses delivered to India. Wikipedia says,“The postmortem revealed that Pakistanarmy had indulged in most heinous acts; ofburning their bodies with cigarettes, pierc-

ing ear-drums with hot rods, puncturingeyes before removing them, breaking mostof the teeth and bones, chopping off variouslimbs and private organs of these soldiersbesides inflicting all sorts of physical andmental tortures before shooting them dead,as evidenced by the bullet wound to the temple.” In another case, Squadron LeaderAjay Ahuja, whose MiG was shot down overIndian soil on May 27, 1999, was used fortarget practice by Pakistani soldiers after hebailed out and opened his parachute.Though India lodged strong protest withPakistan, forget prosecution, not one Pakistani soldier responsible for theseheinous acts were officially identified. Perhaps Musharraf quietly awarded medalsto the perpetrators.

During his presidency when a young

married lady doctor was raped by an armycaptain, instead of instituting an inquiryinto the incident he tells reporters thewoman has got herself raped in order to ob-tain a visa to US. His crowning act perhapswas telling global audiences through elec-tronic media, “There is not a single terroriston Pakistani soil.” Do you need further proofof hollowness? On numerous occasions hehas been described as “the best bet for India”.It indicates our coloured perceptions, lack ofintelligence and inability to read his charac-ter. As President, he was pointed in saying,“Even if the Kashmir problem is resolved,Jihad against India will continue.” In his au-tobiography authored as President of Pak-istan, he refers to India twice as “the mostdevious enemy.” Yet we tend to eulogize himand invite him to India. Full marks toMaulana Madani, who during the IndiaToday Conclave in 2009, gave Musharraf ashut up call; to mind his own business andleave Muslims of India alone.

Parvez Junior (Kayani)Kayani may not have factually hoodwinkedthe West but has prevented them from at-tacking Pakistan both physically and diplo-matically, don’t mind odd statements byObama, Hillary Clinton and David Cameron.Dubbed “soldier’s soldier” by US, this buddyof Mike Mullen on becoming army chief directed serving officers to stay away frompoliticking; winning for himself the title ofbeing ‘apolitical’; a master stroke in obfusca-tion. Every department and sector in Pak-istan has been infiltrated by Military-ISI overthe years by 2,000 to 3,000 ex-officers. Ask-ing serving officers to desist from politickingmakes little difference.

How ‘apolitical’ when he works withPrime Minister Benazir Bhutto as DeputyMilitary Secretary but ends up a protégé of

Musharraf whose personal animosity towards Benazir is well documented! As DGISI, Kayani was Musharraf ’s emissary to dis-cuss power sharing with Benazir in Dubaibefore her assassination. Next step of Pervez-Parvez after Benazir refused power sharingis obvious. As DG ISI, Kayani mastermindedmajor regrouping of Jihadis including con-solidation and expansion of LeT. It is impos-sible that A.Q. Khan undertook nuclearproliferation without knowledge of Military-ISI. Who approved it if not Pervez-Parvezwith Kayani as DG ISI. Kayani was presentwhen president Musharraf met Chief JusticeIftikar Chaudhary and suspended him. Heplayed power broker to help Musharraf inforcing Nawaz Sharif to call off the million-man march to Islamabad. Kayani has politi-cally managed to sideline Zardari playing offPPP’s Gilani against Zardari despite latterbeing President of the PPP.

As Army Chief, Kayani’s insisted Pakistanprotests UN Committee report on assassina-tion of Benazir indicating complicity of ISI.Should there be a doubt that Pakistan’s failureto bring perpetrators of Mumbai terroriststrikes of 26/11 is on behest Kayani. He engineered inaction against Al-Qaeda and itsassociates in North Waziristan while strikingagainst East Turkestan Islamic Movement(ETIM) that threatens China. Losing no opportunity to display his hatred for India, heobviously approved terror strike on the IndianMission in Kabul, which he now wants shutdown. Within four months of his becomingArmy Chief, the four-year-old ceasefire alongthe LoC was breached and continues to be violated and infiltration increased.

What Should Concern IndiaPakistan knows conventional war againstIndia is no go. Chou-en-Lai advised AyubKhan way back in the 1960s; desist fromconventional war and raise a militia to fightthe Indians in the rear (today’s terrorists/jihadis). It is this adventurism of Kayani thatIndia should be concerned with. Steppingup terrorism, inciting insurgencies, politicis-ing Islam in India, assist consolidation andregrouping of terrorists-insurgents includ-ing Maoists-Naxals for creating compactrevolutionary zones to balkanize India aresome examples.

Hafiz Saeed today operates openly fromPakistan. Kayani will continue nurturingAl-Qaeda as essential lever over the West anduse it for attacking India in conjunction LeTand others. WikiLeaks and US media pointto Pakistanisation of Al-Qaeda; more Pak-istanis joining and moving higher up in theorganization. Voids in Al-Qaeda due to US action have been filled up by LeT. Planting ofarmed modules in India had taken recognis-able shape in 1992-93. 17 to18 years havepassed since!

ConclusionThe Pervez-Parvez factor has major implica-tions for India’s national security. US-Pak mutual dependency will tilt more andmore in Pakistan’s favour as US exitsAfghanistan and the China-Pak alliance isstrengthened further. Military commandersin operational areas essentially study the opposing commander and assess his futureactions. As a country we must do likewise forthe Pervez-Parvez duo. The author is a retired Lt General of the IndianArmy. (The views expressed in this article are the personal views of the writer.)

Hatred for India and obsession that Afghanistan is Pakistan’s strategic depth


V I EWPO INT <<

The Pervez-Parvez FactorP.C. KATOCH

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n LT GENERAL (RETD) V.K. KAPOOR

The bloodletting by the Naxals(Maoists) is becoming more dan-gerous and threatening by the day.The state police and Central policeforces deployed in Naxal affected

states and districts barring Andhra Pradeshseem unable to deal with the violence.What is surprising is their inability to evendefend themselves. They seem helpless inthe face of surprise attacks leading to large-scale losses of men and weapons in almostevery encounter.

On June 29, less than three months afterthe Dantewada massacre in which 76 per-sons including a Deputy Commandant werekilled, the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF)suffered yet another blow in Bastar where 26of its men including an assistant comman-dant were gunned down by the Naxals whoambushed a road opening party of about 70personnel of 39th Battalion of CRPF inNarayanpur district. The attack took placejust three km from a CRPF camp in Dhaud-hai, on a road leading to the densely forestedNaxal-controlled Abhujhmad area.

Unanswered QuestionsIt has been reported that the CRPF group wason its way back from its mission when theMaoists fired at them from dominatingground on the flanks and in the rear. The lossof lives of CRPF men and others is indeed agrave tragedy. When seen in the larger con-text, the adversity becomes more crushing aseach soldier is often the bread earner of alarger family comprising at least 4-6 othermembers who are dependent on him.

Another equally tragic aspect of the cur-rent misfortune is the astonishing ease withwhich the massacres of CRPF men and otherpolice personnel are happening in Chhattis-garh. How could the Naxals dare to attack acompany strength of force if the latter hadtaken the necessary precautions while car-rying out road opening drills in hostile terri-tory and while moving back after completingthe mission?

The following questions would come tothe mind of any professional examining theactions of the CRPF company: l How is it that dominating places on the

flanks were not secured by patrols withlight machine guns?

l How did the Naxals spring the ambush ifthe company while moving had deployedearly warning elements in the front,flanks, and rear of the column?

l Who all in a CRPF unit are trained for re-connaissance and early warning?

l Till the regular CRPF units develop thisexpertise, why can’t CRPF’s special forces (COBRA) detachments be groupedwith units operating in critical areas forsuch tasks?

l What are the protective elements, whatweapons are deployed in a firm base onthe ground while tasks like “road open-ing” are performed?

l Why were such a large number of CRPFboys gathered in a small area and beinga lucrative target for the Naxals whomust have been following the movementof the company?

l Why was mortar fire not arranged with81mm mortars from the base campwhich was only 3 km away? The firecould have been kept “on call”.

l What is the type of leadership being exer-cised by the company commanders who

accompany the columns? What were theorders given by the DIGs and IGs in chargeof operations in that sector or are theymerely administrative adornments?

l Why have the senior officers in chargenot been held accountable for the lack ofleadership and training? What were theirroles in the entire operation?

l Why was no information available to thepolice about the movement of a largeforce of Naxals?

l Why is the intelligence not forthcoming?Surely, the police should know how tooperate a network of informers?

l Why are the locals not cooperating withthe police? Winning the hearts and mindsof the local population is one of the basictenets of counter-insurgency operations.The ineffectiveness of the state police and

Central forces shows the nation’s internal se-curity structure in poor light. What is thepoint of raising scores of such battalions ifthey are going to be unequal to the roles andtasks expected of them? Operationally, thefault lies squarely with the overly politicisedleadership of the police force. At the macrolevel, politicisation of police, lack of police re-forms, corruption and lack of modernisationhave brought about the current impasse.

Principles and Operating ProceduresCounter-insurgency environment requiresadoption of certain principles and operatingprocedures with “out of box” solutions.Hence, apart from good basic military train-ing and excellent physical fitness, it requiresa vibrant leadership which is constantlyfinding solutions for the missions at hand. Itrequires a type of leadership which winsover the locals, identifies itself with the sol-diery, and instills confidence in their heartsand minds, while simultaneously instillingfear in the hearts of the opponents. Some ofthe principles of this type of warfare are:l Fight the insurgent/guerrilla adopting

similar tactics. l Organise and train small teams to infil-

trate, reconnoiter, ambush, sabotage, ha-rass and kill the enemy and eliminatetheir leadership, their sympathisers andthose who provide them logistics.

l Physical fitness and familiarisation withthe terrain is essential.

l Deception and surprise are key elementsof success against insurgents/guerrillas.

l Learn to anticipate the future moves ofthe adversary through a detailed study ofhis modus operandi in order to read hismind and deceive him whenever possible.

l Win the confidence of the local popula-tion through developmental and otherwork done in the villages.

l Protect the locals from the insurgents.l Avoid collateral damage during opera-

tions.l Acquire language proficiency.l All movements must be tactically sound. l Movement on roads and prominent

tracks should be avoided.l Operate in small groups of trained men

led by experienced officers.l Use difficult terrain and night hours for

movement to catch the adversary bysurprise.

l Have a layered warning system, whetherstatic or mobile.

l Company commanders and junior leaders(police inspectors) must be capable of exe-

cuting all tactical movement better thanthe jawan in order to win his confidence.

l Follow a buddy system within the organ-isation.

l Some troops, in every unit, must be fa-miliar in handling of explosives, i.e. mak-ing IEDs or defusing them and use ofmines and grenades.

Areas Requiring Special AttentionForce levels: Prakash Singh, former DG, BSF,and DGP UP while speaking at a Centre forLand Warfare Studies (CLAWS) seminar onJune 27, 2010 said, “There are particularproblems with the way paramilitary forcesfunction. For almost 15-16 years, while theparamilitary forces have been expanding, theyhave remained ineffective in dealing with anyinternal threat.” Impulsive expansion of para-military forces without adequate resources orleadership is a futile exercise. Training, equip-ping the force and developing leadership mustbe done concurrently. We need to also pay at-tention to state police forces, the vanguard ofanti-Naxal operations.

Specialisation: If CRPF is to be thecounter-insurgency force of the IndianUnion in the long run, as accepted by theGroup of Ministers after the Kargil War, thenradical changes are needed to make it an ef-fective force. The force itself could be dividedinto two streams namely CRPF (law andorder- LO) units and CRPF (counter-insur-gency–CI) units. About 40-50 battalionsmay have to be earmarked for the latter rolefor which they should be specially trained,equipped and modernised regularly.

Training:l Sending in untrained policemen in a

counter-insurgency environment as inChattisgarh and elsewhere is an invita-tion to disaster. The policemen are likelyto lose their lives and weapons as hasbeen happening in the case of CRPF.Hence, no effort should be spared intraining the policemen together withtheir officers. Those who do not measureup must be released from service. Officers

Terror ReigningThe way forward to deal with the Maoists will require an enlightened and caring political leadership to institute land reforms, efficient administration, and effective police machinery

If no directive is issued,neither the states con-cerned nor the Centralpolice forces would beclear on what they arerequired to achieve andhow. Individual percep-tions would drive dis-jointed actions.

ILLUSTRATION: Anoop Kam

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must be as tough as the soldiery and incase weaknesses are observed in the offi-cers, men are unlikely to obey them.

l Army teams should train and retrain theCRPF units through orientation cadresalong with their officers. In the regularArmy, even the Special Forces are not al-lowed to enter operational sectors withoutbeing put through CI orientation cadres. Leadership

l CRPF is a large force and selectingyounger, tougher and motivated juniorleaders (sub-inspectors and inspectors)for operational units deployed in Naxal-infested areas and training them to therequired standard should not be such amajor problem. Tougher times requireimaginative and extraordinary solu-tions and there should be no hesitationin adopting unorthodox methods togain success.

l Senior leaders (commanding officers andabove) apart from being put through ori-entation courses must stay close to theircommands to instill confidence in themand to motivate them. They must learnhow to tactically plan CI operations andundertake operational responsibilities in-stead of shying away from them.

l Operating in small groups led by experi-enced junior leaders for offensive opera-tions mandates decentralisation ofcommand and leadership and missiontype orders for which both senior and thejunior leadership must be trained andthe junior leaders must be mentally pre-pared to take the initiative when action-able intelligence is obtained. Unified Commands: For better effi-

ciency, establishment of Unified Commands,on the pattern of Jammu and Kashmir,under the Chief Minister of the states con-cerned is recommended. All forces operatingwithin the state should come under thisheadquarters for better coordination of op-erations. At a meeting of Chief Ministers ofNaxal-hit states held on July 14, 2010,which was addressed by Prime MinisterManmohan Singh and Home Minister P. Chi-dambaram, the Centre asked four of thesestates to set up a unified command each forCentral and state police forces to ensure bet-ter coordination in anti-Naxal operations.Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Orissa and WestBengal have also been asked to include a re-tired Major General as a member of theseunified commands which are to be headedby the State Chief Secretaries. However,making the Chief Secretary of the respectivestate, the boss of the Unified Command, is aregressive step. Unlike the Chief Minister, hedoes not enjoy complete authority as bu-reaucrats by temperament, training andconduct are not known to be decisive.

Intelligence: The CRPF should developits own tactical intelligence organisation.These elements should be deployed in itsarea of operations which should be inde-pendent of the state police. This is becausethe state intelligence machinery would havebeen penetrated by sympathisers of theNaxal cause and all intelligence emanatingfrom the state may not be completely reli-able. Hence there should be at least three lay-ers of intelligence—state police, CRPFintelligence units and Central intelligenceagencies. A few CRPF battalions should beconverted for this task and the personnel willhave to be specially screened and selected. Ifa start is made now, they would be effectivein about two to three years time.

Weapons and Equipment: Some criti-cal weapons and equipment which should begiven to the CRPF (CI) units are as under:l 81mm mortars and medium machine

guns at unit levell 40mm grenade launchers at company

levell 84mm rocket launchers at platoon level

with high explosive and fragmentationammunition

l Sniper rifles at company levell Night vision goggles

l Bullet proof vestsl Mini unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)

for surveillance at unit level Use of Helicopters: Currently, the Cen-

tral government has agreed for the use ofIAF helicopters after they come back fromthe UN peacekeeping missions where theyare currently deployed. These would not,however, be used to conduct combat opera-tions against Naxals. They would be em-ployed for logistics, troop lifting, andcasualty evacuation duties.

Notwithstanding the above, it makes mil-itary sense to employ armed helicopters incritical situations when a large force is sur-prised by superior strength of the opponent.Naxals have already imposed heavy costs, interms of the lives lost and weapons looted.Even the credibility of the state to managethe internal security is at stake. If the fissi-parous groups in the nation perceive weak-nesses in the capability of the state tomanage things, more groups may resort toarmed struggles.

Budgets: The force which fights an in-surgency must be given adequate budget formodernisation of its equipment and trainingincluding procurement of force multiplierslike night fighting aids, surveillance devices,sniper equipment, bullet proof vest, etc.

Political Directive for Operations by Security ForcesInternal security operation by security forcesshould be always based on political directivesissued by the Home Ministry. It is believed thatthe Home Ministry has not given any directivespelling out the political aims and objectivesof the operations by the security forces. If nodirective is issued, neither the states con-cerned nor the Central police forces would beclear on what they are required to achieveand how. Individual perceptions would drivedisjointed actions. In an insurgency or warsituation, political aims and objectives formthe basis of military plans and hence the cur-rent confusion is an outcome of ignorance atall levels. How can a strategy be evolved andtactical operations designed in isolation, if thebasics are not clear? Force levels and deploy-ments always follow, in sequence, the plan-ning process of converting the political aim(s)to military strategic aim(s) and objectives totactical objectives which in turn are achievedthrough tactical plans designed as such. Thistype of planning leads to evolution of long-medium- and short-term plans which are es-sential in countering insurgencies whichhave a life span of a few decades.

Important Targets: Important targetsof the Naxals which need to be neutralised,through covert and overt operations, tobreak the back of the movement are:l Senior ideological leaders and hard core

military leadershipl People who provide logistics

l Sources of their arms and ammunitionl Hard core armed cadre

Decisions Given by Cabinet Committee on SecurityPolice reforms, training and modernisationmust be achieved at the earliest if the fighthas to be won. On July 14, the Home Minis-ter said that the states had unanimously ap-proved the eight items passed by the CabinetCommittee on Security earlier, including theCentral plan to induct over 20 helicopters foranti-Naxal duty. The Centre, it seems, willalso fund the establishment and strengthen-ing of 400 police stations in the affected dis-tricts at the rate of Rs 2 crore per policestation over a period of two years. The stateswould have to contribute one-fifth of theprojected cost of Rs 800 crore and ensurethat at least 40 police personnel are deployedat each such police station. Significant ex-pansion of the list of 35 districts that aretreated as high focus districts on account ofthe level of violence is also being contem-plated. These districts will qualify for addi-tional funding from the Centre.

Involvement of Indian Army: Duringa visit to the Naxal-affected areas on July 6,2010, the Union Home Secretary said thatat present there was no need to deploy theArmy. It is obvious that the deployment ofthe Army has other more serious repercus-sions which are currently, not politically, acceptable. Hence, the Army should only beused for training the CRPF soldiery and itsleadership. Meanwhile, a retired Major Gen-eral has been included as a member of theunified command structure as accepted bythe four states mentioned earlier.

Army intelligence teams must becomeoperational in all states affected by Naxal vi-olence and must continue to collate up to

date intelligence about the Naxals and theiractivities so that in case the Army is calledin, it does not require long time to establishits intelligence grid in the state concerned.

Governance and the Way ForwardMaoist insurgency is driven by political, eco-nomic and social causes. Corruption andhigh-handedness of the administration insnatching away the rights of the locals, giv-ing mining rights to multinationals, depriv-ing the tribals of their means of livelihood,and lack of land reforms are some of themajor reasons which have been exploited bythe Maoists in fuelling insurgency. Weak po-litical leadership, poor administration of thestates, politicisation of the police and para-military forces and the neglect by the Centralleadership are responsible for the presentstate of affairs. Hence, shedding crocodiletears or bickering at this juncture will not beof any help. Let the states and the Centresynthesise, institute police reforms and takepolitical, economic, and social initiatives todevelop the backward regions. The Naxalsare our own people and their grievances, ac-tual and perceived, have to be resolved. Thus,while developmental initiatives are being un-dertaken to remove the grievances, the po-lice forces should be trained, equippedsuitably, disciplined and made operationallyeffective to defeat those who insist on takingup arms against the State. The fear of the po-lice forces in the operational sphere must befelt by the Naxals to force them to negotiate.Let the authority and writ of the state beobeyed in letter and spirit, in an environmentof care and empathy for the locals and thetribals. The way forward will require an en-lightened and caring political leadership toinstitute land reforms, good administrationand effective police machinery.

Shedding crocodile tearsor bickering at this junc-ture will not be of anyhelp. Let the states andthe Centre synthesise,institute police reformsand take political, eco-nomic, and social initia-tives to develop thebackward regions. TheNaxals are our own peo-ple and their grievances,actual and perceived,have to be resolved.

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The need for products and systemsto secure the homeland fromarmed conflicts, internal and ex-ternal insurgencies and the chang-ing threats and operational skills

were well addressed at Eurosatory 2010,held at the Viparis Nord Villepinte ExhibitionCentre, Paris. From operational medicines to unmanned aerial and ground vehicles fordefence of the homeland, the 10th Eurosatory exhibition held from June 14-18had a diverse range of new products and systems for land and homeland security.

With more than 1,500 equipment andweapon systems on display and several indoorand outdoor demonstrations, the expositionbecame a prime place for world technologylaunches. While there were 1,210 exhibitorsin 2008, this year there were 1,331. The topfive countries with the maximum number ofexhibitors were France, the United States,Germany, the United Kingdom and Israel. Eu-rosatory showcased innovations and futuretechnologies. Of the 50 participant countries,there were eight new ones–Australia, China,Estonia, Hungary, Indonesia, Latvia, Portugaland Saudi Arabia.

A forum for meeting and interactingwith all defence players, Eurosatory helpeddecision-makers and industry players obtainall information about solutions for securityforces. Several seminars to prepare for to-morrow’s defence and security were heldduring the five-day event, wherein govern-ment representatives, regulation authorities,industrialists, defence and security expertsfrom across the world gathered. The businessmeetings served as a platform for access toworld markets.

In order to offer more business opportuni-ties to decision-makers, for the first time, ad-vanced business events (ABE) tied up withEurosatory to hold European Defence and Se-curity Meetings (EDSM) within the exhibition.

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Business RendezvousA forum for meeting and interacting with defence players from across the world, Eurosatory helpeddecision-makers and industry players obtain information about solutions for security forces

PHOTOGRAPHS: COGES


SHOW REPORT/EUROSATORY <<

Deals SignedIn the backdrop of the exposition, severalagreements were signed by major compa-nies. Nammo and Thales Australia signeda letter of intent (LoI) for a planned cooper-ation on the next generation aircraft ammu-nition. The agreement was driven byNorway and Australia’s involvement in theF-35 fighter programme and the need for anew ammunition round capable of meetingall requirements and ensuring lethalityagainst both soft and hard targets. The dealincluded cooperation on the Norwegian am-munition concept, APEX, and a specialtraining round as well as Thales’ frangibleammunition round called APFI.

Israel’s technology house Eltics signed adeal with Israel Military Industries (IMI)to combine the Black Fox active, adaptivemultispectral camouflage technology withIMI’s explosive reactive armour.

On DisplayGeneral Dynamics European Land Sys-tems Piranha Class 5 8x8 wheeled ar-moured vehicle made its debut at the expo.Although the Piranha Class 5 can be used indifferent roles, the one displayed at the showwas a typical infantry fighting vehicle (IFV)configuration. Also on display was GeneralDynamics’ next generation Eagle 4x4 lighttactical vehicle. The new generation Eagle issaid to provide greater levels of lethality witha Bofors Lemur remote weapon station.

Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) un-veiled a series of effective and affordableweapon systems at the Eurosatory. IAI show-cased the Strikes, a 122mm PrecisionRocket’ which can hit targets with a veryhigh rate of precision. Strikes is composed ofa 122mm rocket and a guidance kit, whichis installed between the head of the rocketand the motor.

Thales unveiled its new Cybels securitysystem, developed for detection of cyberthreats. The solution is based around high-security tools that feed directly into a cyber security operations centre when a threat isdetected. Thales Australia displayed a fullscale mock-up of its Hawkei 4x4 ProtectedLiht Mobility Vehicle (PLMV) for the first timeoutside Australia. Thales also launched Lynx,a lightweight surveillance radar which canoperate as a stand-alone system on a tripod oras a more permanent sensor on a mast, toweror vehicle.

Lockheed Martin showed its expertisein the armoured vehicle domain. The vehi-cles included two of the three variants beingoffered for the Spanish wheeled armouredvehicle programme to replace the existingBMR-600 fleet. The solution is based on

Patria’s 8x8 AMV.Elbit Systems introduced a new

dual remote weapon station (DRWS) at the expo. The DRWS is a derivative of Elbit Systems’ RCWS-M, a medium-sized remotely-controlled weapon station, in serialproduction and qualified for service in theAustrian Army.

BAE Systems launched its latest 8x8 addition to the battle-proven RG range of vehicles, known as RG41. As claimed by thecompany, the vehicle is cost effective andhighly versatile wheeled combat vehicle suit-able for multiple theatres.

Northrop Grumman highlighted itskey capabilities in the intelligence, surveil-lance, and reconnaissance (ISR) domain,command and control, and in tactical datalink technology. The company stall show-cased industry-leading capability in unmanned aerial vehicles including theGlobal Hawk-based solution for the NATOAlliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) require-ment and the fire scout, a multi-role verticalunmanned aircraft system (VUAS).

Singapore Technology Kinetics (STK)unveiled a fire support vehicle (FSV) variantof Bronco all-terrain tracked carrier (ATTC).Rafael’s Iron Dome air defence missile launcher was showcased for the firsttime outside Israel at the Eurosatory. Alongwith the Iron Dome were the company’sother layered air and missile defence solu-tions Spyder and David’s Sling systems.

Sagem (Safran group) announced thatit will be in charge of the development andproduction of the firing post and infraredseeker on the medium-range missile(MMP). For the purpose, the company haspartnered with missile manufacturerMBDA. This system is being offered withinthe scope of the planned replacement ofFrance’s Milan anti-tank missiles. The over-all contract would cover 500 systems and3,000 missiles, as well as significant poten-tial for export contracts. MBDA and Sagemhave chosen bi-mode technology for theseeker, with a daytime video channel and anon-cooled infrared channel, including inertial guidance capability to support fireand forget mode, as well as beyond visualrange firing capability.

The UVS Forum was dedicated to unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) and unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) systems,as well as sensors and other related sub-systems applicable to either type of system.

The eleventh Eurosatory will be held atthe same location during June 11-15, 2011and is expected to have many new products,launches and deals, and a lot more for thedefence industry and armed forces.

(Opposite page) Entrance to the expo; General Dynamics European Land Systems Piranha Class 5 8x8wheeled armoured vehicle making its debut. General Dynamics had a huge presence at the expo.

(Left top to bottom) Eurocopter’s Tiger grabs eyeballs; Rheinmetall's innovative LANCE turret system – firstunveiled at the last Eurosatory fair – features a highly modular design and ensuring maximum flexibility;Oshkosh Defense showcases a sampling of their vehicles; The Italian company OTO Melara showcases its unmanned ground vehicles.


www.sps

land

forces.net

The military may soon have an au-tonomous system to replace soldierson search-and-rescue missions in

dangerous areas. Development of a snake-like technology is under way for the pur-pose at the US Army Research Laboratory(ARL) which researchers call the RoboticTentacle Manipulator.

A developmental project that expandson snake robotics research introduced atCarnegie Mellon University’s Robotics Insti-tute, it is an ARL-funded effort through itsrobotics collaborative technology allianceinitiative. The bases of several snakes isbeing arranged in a circular array thatfunctions like a team using multiple partsof their bodies to manipulate an object,scan a room or handle improvised explosivedevices (IEDs).

The snake-robot is scalable and can be

built as a sub-system to a larger platformlike iRobot’s rugged system Warrior, whichtravels over rough terrain and climbsstairs. The number of tentacles or snakes

determines the breadth or scope of itssearch capabilities. The number of links oneach of those tentacles supports eachsnake’s length or reach into an area, aswell as its ability to crawl, swim, climb orshimmy through narrow spaces all whiletransmitting images to the soldier who isoperating the system. The sub-systemcomes equipped with sophisticated elec-tronic sensors, among them are laser de-tection and ranging (LADAR) to render3-D representations of object shapes andphysical properties like faces, mass, andcentre of mass.

Its touch sensitivity allows the snake-robot to balance objects and feel whereforces are being applied as it rotates devices. It can lift and reposition objects, including IEDs, for examination, and do soin a controlled fashion that is unlikely to

detonate any ordnance. Researchers predict the technology may

one day solve the “opening a door” problem,which has been a consistent obstacle in robotics. High levels of articulation in themanipulator could prove to be effective forgrasping and rotating different types of door handles using knobs, handles, leversand bars.

The developmental hardware includesa large screen laptop, which presents asimple user interface. Each 24-centimetretentacle is directed by a master controllersystem, which communicates with themotors that are embedded in each of thelinks found on the tentacles. The motorsessentially direct individual tentacle movement and the master controller directs the entire amalgamation of snakes,or tentacles.

Autonomous and Manoeuvrable

F I R S T

Stealth Overcoa tDeveloped by BAE Systems’ scientists and engineers, it makes militaryvehicles and equipment in the field harder to spot

BAE Systems has developed a revolu-tionary stealth overcoat, whichwould make military vehicles and

equipment in the field harder to spot. Thethree-way material covering is unique asit offers not only visual camouflage, butprotection against detection by radar andthermal imaging devices.

The stealthy fabric cover is a combi-nation of radar absorbent material andinfrared radiation dampening technologythat helps keep equipment hidden fromtraditional long- and medium-range detection techniques. The developmentcomes in response to the increased avail-

ability of detection sensors, especiallythose using infrared technology.

All vehicles give off a specific heatand radar signatures. By distorting thesesignatures vehicles can be made consid-erably more difficult to detect via the de-tection equipment available to a potentialadversary. Steve Elwell, Director, BusinessDevelopment and Strategy, BAE Systemssaid, “We believe that the stealth over-coat could dramatically reduce a vehi-cle’s infrared signature and significantlyreduce its radar footprint to a degree thatconfuses detection systems. Crucially forsoldiers in the field, the covering is light-

weight and ultra-thin and can be fitted toa vehicle in minutes.”

The stealth overcoat is simple to pro-duce and can be created in a range of cam-ouflage patterns to further help the vehicle

blend into its surroundings. The materialis also tough enough to withstand harshcombat conditions. To make life more com-fortable for operators, the material is alsoresistant to solar loading.

PHOTOGRAPH: T’Jae Gibson

Development of a snake-like technology is under way at the US Army Research Laboratory

T E C H W A T C H

PHOTOGRAPH: BAE System

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SAGEM CONDUCTS LATEST PATROLLER UAV FLIGHT TESTS

The Sagem-built Patroller medium-altitude,long-endurance (MALE) unmanned aerial ve-hicle (UAV) has successfully completed itsfourth series of flight tests at the Istres AirBase in south-west France. During the tests,the MALE UAV, deployed with a ground con-trol station, successfully demonstrated theperformance of its triplex avionics equipmentand its imaging system. The UAV enduranceexceeded 30 hours and it proved its ability tointegrate with air traffic around the base. The1t-class MALE UAV is specifically designed tomeet the long-endurance surveillance mission requirements of both armed forcesand joint-ministerial programmes.

RAYTHEON DEVELOPS ENHANCEDCOUNTER-SNIPER CAPABILITY

Raytheon has developed an enhancedcounter-sniper capability by linking itsBoomerang acoustic sensor and network-ready long-range advanced scout surveil-lance system (LRAS3). Raytheon CombatSystems Vice President Glynn Raymer saidthat connecting Boomerang and nettedLRAS3 was a plug-and-play operation that resulted in a powerful counter-snipercapability.

CHAIRMAN COSC, RELEASES JOINT DOCTRINES

Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee andChief of Air Staff (CAS) Air Chief Marshal P.V.Naik released two joint operational doctrines,namely Joint Doctrine for Perception Manage-ment and Psychological Operations and JointDoctrine for Air and Land Operations. Thedoctrines formulated by the Doctrine Direc-torate of Headquarters Integrated DefenceStaff (IDS) to create the requisite synergy be-tween the three Services in important mili-tary matters, will go a long way towardsenhancing joint fighting capabilities of IndianArmed Forces.

DRDO CONDUCTS INTERCEPTOR MISSILE TESTDefence Research and Development Organ-isation (DRDO) successfully conducted thefourth consecutive Interceptor Missile testin endo atmospheric regime at 15 km altitude off ITR, Chandipur, Orissa, on July26, 2010. The single stage interceptor mis-sile fitted with directional warhead and other advanced systems neutralised the target. The target ballistic enemy missilewas launched from Launch Complex – III,ITR, Chandipur.

ARMY CHIEF VISITS VIETNAMArmy Chief General V.K. Singh was on a tripto Vietnam from July 26 to 29, 2010. Duringthis trip, General V.K. Singh called on GeneralPhung Quang Thanh, Minister of NationalDefence of Vietnam, besides holding talkswith Chief of General Staff and Chief ofArmy of Vietnam. The Army Chief also vis-ited historically important cities of Hanoi andHo Chi Minh (erstwhile Saigon) and inter-acted with various commanders of military

regions, to boost the defence cooperation be-tween both countries.

INDIAN PARATROOPER ATTAINS MARTYRDOM IN CONGONaik Husan Lal attained martyrdom on May23, 2010, while on overseas duty in Congo.He was part of the Indian Peacekeeping Bat-talion. A stray bullet fired by the rebels hithim and while being airlifted to the hospitalat Goma after first aid, he succumbed to theinjuries. Paradoxically, there were no casu-alties to the Congolese patrol, due to Husan’sspeedy reaction. He is the 10th Indian peace-keeper to be killed, under enemy fire in theUN Mission in Congo since 1999, trying tobring peace and stability in eastern Congo.

FLASH FLOODS IN LEH

The Indian Army is busy with the relief oper-ations at Leh and adjoining areas. Besides deployment of 41 Columns, Army troops areassisting Border Roads Organisation in creat-ing diversions at several damaged bridge siteson NH-1D. Communication requirements of the district administration that were affected continue to be maintained by two INMARSATs provided by the Army.

NEW DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTILLERYLt General Vinod Nayanar took charge as Director General Artillery on August 1,2010, from Lt General K.R. Rao who super-annuated from service on July 31, 2010.


News in Brief Publisher and Editor-in-ChiefJayant Baranwal

Editor Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor

Executive EditorSubir Ghosh

Assistant Group EditorR. Chandrakanth

Senior Technical Group EditorLt General (Retd) Naresh Chand

Contributing EditorAir Marshal (Retd) V.K. Bhatia

Copy EditorSucheta Das Mohapatra

Assistant CorrespondentAbhay Singh Thapa

Assistant Photo EditorAbhishek Singh

ContributorsIndia

General (Retd) V.P. Malik, Lt General (Retd)Vijay Oberoi, Lt General (Retd) R.S. Nagra,

Lt General (Retd) S.R.R. Aiyengar, Air Marshal (Retd) Vinod Patney, Major General(Retd) Ashok Mehta, Major General (Retd)G.K. Nischol, Brigadier (Retd) Gurmeet Kanwal, Brigadier (Retd) S. Mishra,

Rohit Sharma

Chairman & Managing DirectorJayant Baranwal

Administration & CoordinationBharti Sharma, Survi Massey

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DesignVimlesh Kumar Yadav, Sonu Singh Bisht

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4-5 OctoberDefence Exports 2010Crowne Plaza Hotel - Le Palace, Brussels, Belgiumwww.smi-online.co.uk

>> SHOW CALENDAR

VOCATIONAL EDUCATION TO ARMY MENA function was organised at the RAJ RIF Regimental Centre to acknowledge the contri-bution made by various agencies towards Indian Army’s Project Samarth on August20. On the occasion, a satellite link from Indira Gandhi National Open University(IGNOU) to Leh was inaugurated. The link will extend the university’s distance educa-tion facility to Army troops deployed in remote areas. The Army also announced thesetting up of an IT Academy, in association with Microsoft India, for training Armypersonnel in IT courses of various levels.

The function was presided over by Chief of the Army Staff General V.K. Singh. ProfRajashekaran Pillai, Vice-Chancellor,IGNOU and Ravi Venkatesan, Chairman,Microsoft India, were also present.

To enhance the capacity and compe-tence of the soldiers, Indian Army has un-dertaken numerous initiatives aimed atempowering its soldiers. The initiativeshave been clubbed under Project Samarth,which also has a number of subsidiaryprojects under it. More than 68,000 sol-diers have been registered and 2,300awarded diplomas/degrees under Gyan-deep, a flagship initiative under Samarth.The programme recognises the in-service training done by soldiers and makes them eligible for the award of certification by IGNOU.

Likewise, the Army has tied up with Microsoft India for imparting specialised skillslike information technology and English to soldiers under Kshamta. The vocational train-ing is aimed at arming the soldiers with skills in demand by both the industrial and serv-ices sector, thereby equipping them with a viable chance for a second career. The trainingis backed by certification from reputed institutions. More than 1,0000 master trainershave been trained in the first phase of Kshamta.

SHOCK-PROOF. VIBRATION-PROOF.AND EVEN FUTURE-PROOF.

Over 115,000 DRS systems have been fielded for Blue Force Tracking and FBCB2. And thanks to a powerful Dual Core processor and flexible architecture, today’s JV-5 is ready for future applications. From the Joint Battle Command-Platform (JBC-P) and beyond. Which means U.S. joint forces will see returns on this hardware investment for years to come.

Capability For Today. And Tomorrow. That’s Go To.

JointForceSystems.com

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means U.S. joint forces will see returns on this hardware investment for years to come.

tacilppaerutufrofthanks to a powerful Dual Core processor and flexible architecture, today’s JV-5 is ready Over 115,000 DRS systems have been fielded for Blue Force Tracking and FBCB2. And


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oFytilibapaCmeans U.S. joint forces will see returns on this hardware investment for years to come.


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.oToGsmeans U.S. joint forces will see returns on this hardware investment for years to come.


sp's land forces august-september 2010

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armed forces specialpowers

insurgentsand terrorists

givenany police powers

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immediate repeal

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