Policy Paper

The UNCBD and the Argument in Favour of Solar Radiation Management Experiments

April 13th, 2015

Prepared by:

Lucas DottoBalsillie School of International Affairs

Introduction

High up in the Cabusilan Mountains on the island of Luzon in the Philippines is Mount Pinatubo. In 1991 Pinatubo catastrophically erupted. It would be the largest eruption of the 20th century to impact a local population but the impact of Pinatubo is far greater than its impacts on the densely populated region.

When Pinatubo erupted it released over 20,000,000 tonnes of sulphur dioxide into the atmosphere. Much of these sulphur particulates remained in the stratosphere in the following years. The effect on the global climate of these particulates was approximately a 10 C drop in global temperatures. Pinatubo was a naturally occurring phenomenon but it was also a scientific proof of concept; spreading sulphur particulates into the upper stratosphere can cool the planet.

In 2006, 15 years after Pinatubo erupted, Paul Crutzen penned an editorial essay in Climatic Change that argued that the same science that cooled the planet in 1991 could be harnessed in the future to cool the planet to combat the impacts of global warming; a deliberate intervention in the climate system – geoengineering.

Geoengineering is an umbrella term and three distinct types of geoengineering can be articulated. Carbon geoengineering is typified by Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR) proposals that seek to pull carbon dioxide out of the air using outdoor arrays; the carbon would then be turned into solid form and sequestered. Marine geoengineering is typified by Ocean Iron Fertilisation (OIF) that seeks to also sequester carbon but achieves this by dumping iron into the ocean to spur algae blooms, a natural carbon sink, which absorb carbon as it falls into the ocean and is then sequestered when the algae dies and sinks to the ocean floor.

Solar geoengineering is the topic of this brief and is typified by Solar Radiation Management (SRM) proposals which do not seek to sequester carbon but seek to counteract it’s warming affect on the climate. SRM would see the deployment of aerosolized sulphur particulates into the upper stratosphere, delivered by planes or balloons, which would enhance the albedo (reflective) properties of the layer of the atmosphere. The result would be more solar radiation would be reflected back into space and thus less radiation would be trapped in the atmosphere warming the planet due to the greenhouse effect.

Following Crutzens piece there was a noted and rapid proliferation of literature and interest in geoengineering. Much of the debate in the past decade has been whether to legitimize geoengineering as a practice rather than how geoengineering would be practiced. The most vocal opponent of geoengineering has been the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity (UNCBD) that has instituted a moratorium on geoengineering. While not legally binding the moratorium is normatively powerful and if geoengineering is to advance beyond the literature and into the lab then the UNCBD must be convinced to reverse its stance on geoengineering. This is the purpose of this policy brief.

What follows is a literature review of the most relevant and prominent research on geoengineering and SRM as a practice and as a concept. Following the literature review is a delineation of the relationship the UNCBD has with geoengineering. Finally, are Principles, Critiques, and Recommendations. The Principles are the underpinning of the argument in favour of SRM governance, research, and experiments; they provide the rationale. The Critiques are articulations of opposition to SRM experiments; to make the case for SRM experiments the case against SRM experiments must be confronted. The Recommendations are suggested policy prescriptions to achieve an SRM governance, research, and experimentation programme.

Literature Review

At the end of the summary for policymakers of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s Fifth Assessment Report comes the one and only mention of geoengineering in the document. It is in the very last paragraph by design; the merits of geoengineering are called into question and it’s consequences

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highlighted. However, the summary acknowledges that “limited evidence precludes a comprehensive quantitative assessment” (IPCC, 2013, p. 29) of geoengineering and that only models, and not experiments, have been operationalized. Thus, progress in the geoengineering field will be incremental; indeed, even the standard bearer of geoengineering, David Keith, does not advocate for a “quick-and-dirty start to climate engineering” (Keith, 2013) citing it’s currently unknown and unequal impacts. Nevertheless, Keith advocates for the beginnings of a scientific and governance framework for small-scale solar geoengineering experiments to advance knowledge and improve future proposals. Despite advocating for small-scale experiments, proponents of solar geoengineering are the targets of large-scale dissent from within political and scientific communities. Much of the friction between opponents and proponents of solar geoengineering specifically has come in the discourse in an attempt to either legitimize or delegitimize geoengineering as a concept. However, with a recent report from the National Research Council, an arm of the National Academy of Sciences, legitimizing solar geoengineering, the debate is likely to pivot and centre instead on governance and experimentation considerations.

The release of Climate Intervention: Reflecting Sunlight to Cool Earth represents the most significant scholarly report on solar geoengineering yet. The resumes of the contributors and the reputation of the National Research Council, and by extension the National Academy of Sciences, are unimpeachable. The report has legitimized solar geoengineering as a concept by creating a consensus that solar geoengineering is both feasible and affordable and would have a tangible cooling effect on the climate. However, legitimacy is but the first step to deployment, the issue now is acceptability and the Royal Society, one of the earliest to debate solar geoengineering at a high level, observes that “the acceptability of geoengineering will be determined as much by social legal, and political issues as scientific and technical factors” (Shepherd, 2012, p. 4167). The scientific knowledge of solar geoengineering will continue growing and the acceptability of solar geoengineering will grow with the creation of robust governance frameworks that can mitigate risks. This governance structure will result from a complex interplay of the social, legal, political, and technical factors the Royal Society alluded to. Therefore the prevailing concern for advocates of solar geoengineering experiments ought to be governance concerns, as research and science must follow governance in order to be accepted.

Inherent in the literature is that the creation of a governance structure for solar geoengineering experiments must be a deliberatively public process (Scheer & Renn, 2014, Macnaghten & Szerszynski, 2013, Carr et al. 2013 & Kearns et al. 2013). This is critical to overcoming the “low levels of awareness and lack of knowledge” (Scheer & Renn, 2014, p. 305) amongst the public regarding geoengineering. This is both worrisome and encouraging. It is worrisome because much time and effort and resources will need to be mobilized to overcome the knowledge gap, however, it is encouraging because it allows for opportunities to produce objective knowledge which public opinion can be mobilized around; few in the public sphere have yet to form a definitive position on geoengineering. As a result, public participation in the creation of governance structures for solar geoengineering experiments is a two-stage process; first the public must be informed and then the public will be able to inform the creation of such structures (Carr et al. 2013, p. 568). Scheer and Renn, aggregating the body of quantitative and qualitative research of public perceptions of geoengineering, advocate for plebiscitary elements, hybrid processes of engagement, stakeholder debates, and feedback loops to inform this circular flow of participatory processes (Scheer & Renn, 2014). Deliberative public participation is necessary for solar geoengineering governance because a broad consensus is of paramount import. The nature of geoengineering experiments is that any one

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country can conduct an experiment to the detriment of all countries; therefore, broad consensus in the creation of and support for governance structures is critical.

In response to the Royal Society’s seminal 2009 report, Geoengineering the Climate: Science, Governance and Uncertainty, the Solar Radiation Management Governance Initiative was founded to provide the rationale for solar geoengineering governance and research. The SRMGI’s 2011 report, Solar Radiation Management: The Governance of Research, makes the case that solar geoengineering cannot be governed by existing governance structures and it will require special consideration from the international community. The SRMGI advocated for an adaptive approach to governance that is typified by flexibility. The SRMGI advocated for an approach that regulates solar geoengineering research commensurate to the level of risk associated with the experiment at hand (SRMGI, 2011, p. 55). They called for an international registry of research and experiments to facilitate information sharing but the report acknowledges, “there were divergent views on how best to agree on what is and is not technically safe” (SRMGI, 2011, p. 55). The SRMGI report agrees that inclusiveness in the process is critical as governance arrangements will be more legitimate with more countries involved.

Dovetailing off of the same Royal Society report, in 2010 the International Risk Governance Council released a report specifically on governance of solar geoengineering. The IRGC’s contribution to the topic is their proposal of the creation of an ‘allowed zone’ for an modest, international, transparent research programme (IRGC, 2010, p. 18). In this the IRGC agrees with the SRMGI that international cooperation and transparency (the SRMGI proposal of a registry) is required for any governance structure. This zone is not a geographical zone but a regulatory zone; parameters within which research can be conducted. However, the IRGC proposes that considerations are made for the inclusion of private enterprises within any governance structure (2010, p. 19), which is not a consideration many other authors have yet made.

While the IRGC and SRMGI reports helped to lay the foundation for the next five years of debate following the Royal Society’s report, the legitimacy that the National Academy of Sciences has afforded solar geoengineering research is the most significant development in the field in a decade. The fourth recommendation in the NRC report states than an “albedo modification research program be developed and implemented that emphasizes multiple benefit research” (NRC, 2015, p. 9). Other reports have advocated for similar arrangements but the NRC represents something closer to a critical mass of academic and scientific opinion than the other research bodies referenced herein. The NRC reiterates the need to understand both technical and social dimensions of geoengineering and that a comprehensive environmental assessment, as a function of transparency, would be required. Both of these recommendations are contained within nearly all the literature on the topic.

Additionally significant is the endorsement of “small-scale field experiments with controlled emissions…[which] may be helpful in reducing model uncertainties, validating theory, and verifying model simulations in different condition” (NRC, 2015, p. 9). The NRC then outlines their recommendation for the governance considerations of solar geoengineering experiments; that a serious deliberative process must be established to create new governance structures for research and to decide what research requires governance (2015, p. 10). The NRC report is the most comprehensive report on solar geoengineering yet released. It supports geoengineering experiments at the small-scale without advocating for a large-scale

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deployment and sets forth very particular and very amenable policy prescriptions for the research and governance of solar geoengineering experiments.

The United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity and Geoengineering

At the 10th meeting of the Conference of Parties to the UNCBD in Nagoya, Japan a non-binding agreement was adopted which included the following language:

“Ensure…in the absence of science based, global, transparent and effective control and regulatory mechanisms for geo-engineering…that no climate-related geo-engineering activities that may affect biodiversity take place, until there is an adequate scientific basis on which to justify such activities and appropriate consideration of the associated risks…with the exception of small scale scientific research studies that would be conducted in a controlled setting…and only if they are justified by the need to gather specific scientific data and are subject to a thorough prior assessment of the potential impacts on the environment.” (UNCBD, 2010)

While not legally binding the UNCBD moratorium on geoengineering is normatively powerful as it is the strongest formal stance against geoengineering that any international organization has yet to make. The international character of the UNCBD as an organization is a particularly sentient point, as the trans boundary nature of geoengineering experiments will require international cooperation and governance making the UNCBD an interested stakeholder in the debate. Additionally the UNCBD has a mandate to minimize environmental damages that only further deepens their connection to the topic.

UNCBD opposition to geoengineering is an international signal that only serves to slow or stall progress towards experimentation and development. While the UNCBD does allow for an exception of small-scale research the scale and nature of the research is not clearly defined. Without clear definitions of what experimentation is allowed the moratorium has the effect on disallowing all experimentation. What abounds is uncertainty and uncertainty is a sufficient barrier to experimentation; will a developing country or a private actor be willing to begin conducting small-scale scientific research when neither the scale nor the research has been clearly defined? The repercussions are likely greater than the benefits in this situation and this dissuades experimentation and research.

Opposition to experimentation is critically important to overcome because the complex interactions between geoengineering and the climate must be more fully understood. Climate models have provided a tremendously important baseline for data and projections but only real-world experiments can provide the information required to potentially deploy SRM technology. Climate change is such a severe issue that no proposal should be dismissed out of hand that can have a tangible and measurable benefit. Preventing SRM experimentation is concomitant to tying our hands behind our back; it prevents potential solutions from being developed.

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Principles

Principle One: Global anthropogenic climate change requires innovative solutions.

The prospects for a global agreement to massively curb greenhouse gas emissions are bleak. The global economy is not structured to be able to absorb such a large shock to its system. As a result, political will withers. Any solution to solving global anthropogenic climate change therefore will need to include innovative proposals. Wind and solar energy are the two most prominent technological solutions as they do not require political will or leadership to be purchased, installed, and operationalized and investments in both have risen dramatically. Carbon taxes are the most prominent economic solution; in British Columbia for instance fuel usage has dropped 16% since a carbon tax was introduced (Globe and Mail, 2014). Geoengineering may yet provide the most prominent scientific solution as the eruption at Mount Pinatubo in 1991 resulted in a peak cooling of 0.9O F and had a measurable cooling impact over a period of 3 years (NRC, 2015).

Principle Two: Solar Radiation Management is both affordable, feasible, and can reduce global temperatures.

Many innovative proposals to combat climate change will ultimately fail because they are either too expensive, infeasible, or simply do not work. Solar Radiation Management is underpinned by relatively simple science that has been proven, as in the case of Pinatubo, but also through models, to successfully cool the planet. Additionally, SRM is up to 100 times cheaper than any other comparable emissions reduction program and a cooling of 2O C could be achieved for less than $10 billion a year and this estimate is from 2009, prices have likely come down since then (IRGC, 2009). The technology is almost confounding simple; a few passenger airplanes outfitted with particle aerosol delivery systems flying once a day could achieve a global cooling in as little as a few days. Just one gram of sulphur in the stratosphere can counteract the warming from one tonne of carbon in the atmosphere and one tonne of sulphur would cost as little as $1,000 (Keith, 2010).

Principle Three: Solar Radiation Management and all geoengineering proposals need to be included in a portfolio of climate change solutions.

There will not be any single climate miracle; no one policy or technology will solve the climate change problem. Therefore, it stands to reason that if a solution is found it will include a wide array of policies and technologies, all underpinned by sound science, good governance, and sustainable growth. Solar Radiation Management, if adopted globally, would only be one technology in a portfolio of solutions. While it can successfully cool the planet it does not take the existing or future carbon out of the atmosphere; it only counteracts the warming effects of the carbon. While Ken Caldeira has found model results that SRM would actually improve the uptake of natural carbon sinks there will still be a need for a diverse and comprehensive plan for dealing with all the negative externalities which climate change creates.

Principle Four: Governance, research, and experimentation comes before deployment.

Deployment of SRM technology would be a large-scale, possibly global, long-term use of aerosols to cool the planet. It would be a deliberate decision to lock-in to SRM technology and this decision would require some sort of governance, either a regulatory framework or a binding international treaty. If governance for SRM technology is developed before deployment it gives the best chance to mitigate any potential impacts. Governance can help to account for regional disparities, can provide a risk assessment framework, can

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amalgamate national-level bodies and aggregate research, and provide a forum for dispute settlement. Governance ensures that if SRM is deployed that it is deployed in the right way, in no way does governance mean that SRM deployment is foregone only that if it is deployed it is done so in a safe manner precipitated by global agreement.

Principle Five: Experimentation has to follow from governance.

If a governance framework is adopted then experimentation of SRM must begin immediately. The longer the delay in conducting experiments the greater the moral hazard and the greater the warming effect which SRM must then counteract. Governance is only one side of the two-sided geoengineering coin and neither governance nor experimentation is mutually exclusive; both require the other. The end goal of SRM is not deployment but rather a consensus on whether it is a viable response to global anthropogenic climate change. Experiments are the only way the necessary data can be collected and impacts measured to provide the requisite scientific basis for making such a decision.

Critiques

Critique One: Solar Radiation Management will discourage other efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

This is the ‘moral hazard’ argument; experimenting with and eventual deployment of SRM technology will result in a social and political apathy towards other methods of combating global anthropogenic climate change. This is the most frequent line of attack for SRM opponents but there is little evidence to suggest that a cooler planet will result in an apathetic planet. By its very design SRM does not remove carbon from the atmosphere so carbon capture and storage technology will require continued research and investment; SRM experiments do not detract from this. SRM will not stop people from wanting to drive electric cars or to put up solar panels because high costs of gas and energy will continue to spur consumption decisions and purchasing decisions. The social, economic, and environmental impacts of climate change are not all ameliorated with SRM deployment and experimentation so there is little reason to believe that efforts to mitigate and adapt in other ways will cease.

Critique Two: Any one nation could begin deploying large-scale Solar Radiation Management experiments to the detriment of all nations.

This is the ‘rogue engineer’ argument; SRM experiments should not begin because the potential for any one nation or private actor can go rogue and begin deploying the technology, unilaterally and outside of any formal regulatory framework, is too great. China and Russia are the two nations frequently conflated with this argument however certain wealthy individuals could also finance deployment. The momentum now being generated behind SRM will not be easy to slow so it is unlikely that no experiments will ever take place. Therefore, if experiments are going to take place they must be done safely which requires international consensus. We should not maintain a moratorium on geoengineering if we fear a rogue engineer, we should agree on how best to experiment instead so that no nation can be a rogue engineer. The very risk of a nation or an actor unilaterally conducting SRM experiments or deployment is the exact reason why governance and research is needed; it provides insulation rather than isolation.

Critique Three: There will be disastrous and unequal consequences to having such high concentrations of sulphur in the atmosphere.

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This is the ‘sulphur rain’ argument; if large quantities of aerosolized sulphur particulates are put into the stratosphere there will be serious environmental impacts and health impacts once those particulates fall into the lower reaches of the atmosphere. While true that SRM is likely to increase ocean acidification and could potentially have agricultural or health impacts, those impacts are much less disastrous than the impacts on oceans and human health of a planet that becomes exponentially warmer. This critique is the prevailing concern expressed by the UNCBD but potential exists to create a financing system through SRM services to fund biodiversity protection. Additionally the industrial sector has had success mitigating the impacts of sulphur dioxide emissions through flue gas and dry sorbent scrubbers. Sulphur in the atmosphere is a problem which science can deal with; how it deals with it is all that remains. Additionally there exists the possibility that the sulphates can be engineered in such a way that their elevation and location can be controlled for through charging them with a magnetic field, drawing them towards the poles instead of over populated continents (Keith, 2010c).

Critique Four: Solar Radiation Management technology will require a lock-in period that could last for millennia.

This is the “SRM junkie” argument; once we begin deploying SRM we can never stop and we become SRM junkies caught in a vicious cycle. This stems from the nature of SRM that is that it does not remove carbon from the atmosphere but only counteracts the warming effect of carbon in the atmosphere. The result is that if SRM deployment were scaled back the cumulative carbon emitted since deployment began would them warm the planet at a rapid rate. Additionally proponents of this critique believe that since humans have never maintained a highly sophisticated technological enterprise for centuries or millennia that humans are thus incapable of doing so (Pierrehumbert, 2015). In this sense the time-scale requirements of SRM is being mischaracterised because SRM is not intended to be perpetual but rather a temporary solution which may buy the time required to develop robust CDR technology. The highly sophisticated technological enterprise might also eventually consist of nothing more than a handful of passenger airplanes outfitted with an aerosol delivery system thus the deployment would be coupled with the airline undustry; an existing industry that has operated without interruption for 105 years.

Critique Five: Solar Radiation Management technologies could be harnessed by terrorist organizations.

This is the ‘fear monger’ argument: if SRM experiments and deployment continue then the technology will be vulnerable to being acquired by terrorist organizations who could then control the global temperature and hold the planet ransom. The terrorist argument is a pitiable one that relies on exploiting fear to elicit an emotional revulsion to SRM. This critique is not dissimilar to those levied on nuclear weapons upon their development thus a role for the military may be required to safeguard SRM technology. However, any dangerous deployment of SRM that either reduces or increases concentrations of sulphur could be easily countered over time to maintain an appropriate and safe temperature balance. The technology for significant oversight and monitoring also already exists within the military and the airline industry to safely track all planes and routes.

Recommendations

Recommendation One: Parties to the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity should develop, sign, and ratify a United Nations Convention on Geoengineering.

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A UNCoG is required because of the trans boundary nature of geoengineering. Geoengineering does not observe borders in that both its impacts and benefits can affect any country even if that country does not involve itself with experimentation or deployment. Additionally an international governance system will be able to mobilise the most significant amount of resources, both financially and operationally, to conduct experiments. This resource mobilisation is required to gather as much information as possible and to create as close to an international and scientific consensus on the benefits and costs of geoengineering as possible. A UNCoG would incorporate the five Oxford Principles; the representation of geoengineering as a public good, significant public participation, public disclosure of experimentation results, independent assessment of experimentation results, and the principle that governance is required before experimentation and deployment. Additionally the UNCoG should incorporate a climate risk assessment system to be able to sufficiently measure the environmental impacts of SRM experiments. The UNCoG should incorporate a dispute settlement system to allow for the peaceful resolution of differences when impacts are disproportionately affecting one nation or one region worse than any other. Finally, the principal actors and agents within the UNCoG should be national-level scientific and regulatory bodies in order to keep the governance of geoengineering within as scientific a sphere as possible that relies on facts and not politics.

Recommendation Two: The UNCBD should rescind their moratorium on geoengineering.

The UNCBD needs to rescind their moratorium on geoengineering once a governance framework has been created. It acts only as an impediment to allowing geoengineering to be accepted as a norm of the international response to climate change. The moratorium acts as a type of ‘negative governance’ rather than a function of ‘positive governance’. The former believes that the best way to govern geoengineering is by prevention while the latter believes the best way to govern geoengineering is through containment. Only positive governance allows for the development of geoengineering. Positive governance does not preclude the international community from ceasing experimentation in the future it only ensures that more information can be collected before such a decision is made. No potential solution to climate change should be dismissed out of hand or subject to negative governance. Each proposal and each idea, given the scale of the problem we are faced with, deserves a fair chance to prove its worth and value. Geoengineering cannot prove anything without positive governance.

Recommendation Three: A Geoengineering Index should be created for measurable metrics.

Throughout the geoengineering literature and research are references to terminology that has not been clearly defined or assigned measurable metrics;

Scale: What constitutes small and large scale has not been defined anywhere, does scale refer to the intensity of the cooling of a particular experiment? Does scale refer to the geographically affected area of the experiment? Is that size measured in square kilometres or metres? Will there be ranges of size and categories of scale?

Experimentation: What constitutes an experiment? Is an experiment only something which has a mandate to produce scientific information? Or can an experiment have a mandate to test technology rather than gather data?

Deployment: Does deployment have to be deliberate? What scale is deployment? How does deployment differ from experimentation? Does deployment have to cross a greater threshold of support than experiments?

Safety: What exactly constitutes a safe experiment? Does safe mean that there will be no adverse impacts on human health? A acceptable degree of impacts on human health? Does safe mean that cooling benefits outweigh biodiversity damage?

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Legitimate: What constitutes legitimate experiments and legitimate research? What standards must an experiment assume to be considered legitimate?

None of these terms are defined in any document nor are they assigned measurable statistical metrics or indicators. This makes it very difficult to move forward with experiments because no targets and no baselines can be set, nor can results be interpreted. Therefore an Index needs to be created which provides clear terms of reference for these and similar terms

Recommendation Four: Conversion units need to be developed for biodiversity and cooling metrics.

Similar to the concerns regarding a lack of agreed-upon metrics and indicators for key terms there also exists a lack of conversion units between the service SRM provides (cooling) and the damage SRM produces (biodiversity loss). Therefore a conversion unit must be developed which can associate a certain level of cooling with a comparable level of damage. Conversion units are needed to know when damages are greater than benefits and when benefits outweigh damages. Without conversion units the intentions and results of experiments will be hollow as it will not be definitive whether the benefits were greater than the associated damages. The entire underpinning of SRM is that the damages associated with a status quo warmer planet are far greater than a geoengineered cooler planet and conversion units are needed to either prove or disprove this.

Recommendation Five: An Integrated Assessment Model should be developed as part of the UNCoG to produce a value for the Social Cost of Sulphur. Integrated Assessment Models such as DICE and FUND are currently used to produce a value for the Social Cost of Carbon. This is an estimate of all the economic damages associated with an increase in carbon dioxide emissions in a given year. This metric allows policymakers and regulatory agencies to put a price on damages and benefits of carbon emissions and carbon reductions respectively. If a Social Cost of Sulphur can be developed for SRM experiments it will achieve the same. Both the SCC and the SCS put a price on an externality and a service, for SCS the externality, or cost, would be a complex calculation including biodiversity loss, ocean acidification, agriculture impacts, human health, and precipitation changes. Following from that the value would also, implicitly, provide the cost for providing the service of a temperature cooling. The UNCBD will not support a geoengineering governance and experimentation framework without a commensurate plan to protect biodiversity and mitigate damages. By developing a value of the SCS the damages and benefits will be monetized which will then create a funding stream to finance biodiversity protection. If a country wants to begin SRM experiments then the metrics that have previously been developed under these recommendations will provide information for how large the experiment will be and what the targets are. The SCS will then be charged to the country, the SCS will provide the cost of increased sulphur dioxide concentrations for a given cooling target; they will be paying for the cooling service while also financing a fund which would then be used to mitigate the impacts of the increase sulphur dioxide concentration in that area, and others. The country gets the benefits of the cooling and the UNCoG gets the funding to mitigate the impacts of that cooling.

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