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STANDARDS RELATED DOCUMENT

ATP-3.3.7.1

UAS TACTICAL POCKET GUIDE

Edition A Version 1

APRIL 2014

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

Published by the NATO STANDARDIZATION AGENCY (NSA)

© NATO/OTAN

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NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO)

NATO STANDARDIZATION AGENCY (NSA)

NATO LETTER OF PROMULGATION

22 April 2014

1. The enclosed Standards Related Document, ATP-3.3.7.1, Edition A, Version 1, UAS TACTICAL POCKET GUIDE, which has been approved in conjuction with ATP-3.3.7 (STANAG 4670) by the nations in the Military Committee Air Standardization Board (MCASB), is promulgated herewith.

2. ATP-3.3.7.1, Edition A, Version 1 is effective upon receipt.

3. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, used commercially, adapted, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photo-copying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher. With the exception of commercial sales, this does not apply to member nations and Partnership for Peace countries, or NATO commands and bodies.

4. This publication shall be handled in accordance with C-M(2002)60.

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SPINS

Acronyms Wide Area OSRVT/Rover Air Support CAS 9-Line ISR 8-Line Surveillance Video Scout Request Brief Brief

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Training Document Organic/Non-organic UAS

UAS Tactical Pocket

Guide

Organic/Non-organic Class II/III UAS

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UAS Planning

UAS Employment

UAS Command and Control

UAS Employment Maritime

UAS Comms and Brevity

Support Considerations for UAS

UAS Mission Planning Checklist

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April 2014 UAS

TACTICAL POCKET GUIDE

Organic/Non-organic Class II/III UAS

This publication is first in series. This document will be updated periodically and will be superseded at various times.

ORGANIC/NON-ORGANIC UAS TACTICAL POCKET GUIDE – NATO

THIS POCKET GUIDE PROVIDES INFORMATION USED BY BATTLE STAFFS INVOLVED IN PLANNING, COORDINATING, SYNCHRONIZING OR EXECUTING ACTIONS THAT SUPPORT THE EFFECTIVE EMPLOYMENT OF UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS (UAS) ON THE BATTLEFIELD. ALTHOUGH MUCH OF THIS POCKET GUIDE ADDRESSES NON-ORGANIC UAS, BOTH ORGANIC AND NON-ORGANIC UAS ARE STILL NEW TOOLS TO MOST UNITS. UNDERSTANDING THE CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS OF UAS CURRENTLY USED BY NATO FORCES WILL HELP STAFFS MORE EFFECTIVELY USE THESE KEY ASSETS TO THE FULLEST POTENTIAL IN SUPPORT OF OPERATIONS.

The information contained in this document shall not be released to a nation outside NATO without prior approval of the NATO nations as laid down in C-M(2002)49(Final) or MC 167 (latest edition) (as applicable).

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UAS Planning General

Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) currently bring numerous intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and tactical air support capabilities to NATO units, providing near real time reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA), and fires. They can be employed in a conventional operation on the forward line of own troops or far beyond it, on the flanks or in rear areas (see Fig. 1). They can be employed equally well in a non-contiguous battlefield, such as for counterinsurgency operations. Employed as a team, UAS and manned systems provide excellent reconnaissance and attack resolution, to include laser designation and some UAS that are armed. Other key capabilities include route, area, and zone reconnaissance, battle damage assessment (BDA), and communication relay. Planning for organic and non-organic unmanned aircraft (UA) as an integrated element within the combined arms team can be challenging but is essential.

Figure 1. UAS on the Battlefield

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Flight Planning Every UA flight requires some degree of flight planning, based on the size of the aircraft, operating altitude, speed, mission profile, and airspace usage. Different phases of the mission may be executed by different personnel/crewmembers (e.g., takeoff/landing crews and mission crews). Planners must ensure the mission briefs, goals, tasks, etc., are coordinated among all pertinent crew to ensure mission understanding and success, as well as all airspace management controls. Table 1 depicts NATO UAS Classifications and general UA operating characteristics.

Table 1. NATO UAS Classification

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Manned-Unmanned (MUM) Integration

Manned systems can leverage UAS capabilities, and vice versa. Currently many manned systems can receive direct data links from unmanned systems. This collaboration can provide increased situational awareness and extended sensor coverage over an area. MUM teaming can also include integration of UAS with unmanned ground vehicles, unmanned surface vehicles, and unmanned undersea vehicles. Proper planning and integration of the various system capabilities will greatly enhance mission effectiveness. These planning and employment issues are detailed throughout this guide and in appropriate allied publications.

Planning Considerations

Planning considerations for employing UAS are similar to those of ground units and are nearly identical to those of manned aviation assets. The UAS liaison officer (LNO) facilitates the flow of information between UAS operations and the supported unit and ensures the supported unit understands UAS capabilities and limitations. UAS may perform multiple roles during their long missions as some UA have multiple sensors and weapons. The following missions may be assigned:

• Reconnaissance – Near real-time combat information received. • Surveillance – Area surveillance in friendly or enemy territory. • Situational Awareness and Situational Understanding – Provide

commanders with battlefield posture. • Security – Reaction time and maneuver space for main body and

area security. • Targeting – Target detection and recognition, target designation and

illumination and battle damage assessment (BDA). • Communication Support – Voice and data retransmission. • Movement Support – Convoy security, mine/IED detection.

The missions of armed UAS generally include interdicting targets, to include time-sensitive target, in a hunter-killer role. Specific missions include:

• Air Interdiction – Armed UAS will exploit persistent loiter, sensor capabilities, and organic weapons.

• Close Air Support (CAS) – UAS can act as a weapons delivery platform and may be able to perform as a persistent forward air controller (FAC).

• Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) Support – Armed UAS can be employed to augment CSAR missions.

• Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD) – Armed UAS may be employed against high value and/or high risk air defence nodes.

• Joint Maritime Operations (JMO) – Armed UAS can be employed as any other manned aircraft of similar capability such maritime surveillance and reconnaissance, and interdiction.

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Terrain Consideration

Terrain plays a key role in both sensor effectiveness and C2.

Manmade – Cities, airfields, bridges, railroads, ports, power and telecom lines, and towers may impact sensor and C2 links of UAS, reducing effectiveness.

Natural – Desert terrain generally provides optimal conditions for UAS sensors and C2. Mountainous and heavily vegetated terrain can greatly reduces sensor effectiveness. Loss of signal is more likely in mountainous areas, potentially requiring multiple ground control station (GCS) sites, ground/airborne communication relays, or satellite links.

Weather

Weather conditions must be at or above those minimums prescribed for the specific area of responsibility. The appropriate authority in general can waive those requirements due to criticality of a specific combat mission. Table 2 describes typical UAS weather limitations. Smaller UAS are especially impacted by these conditions.

Table 2. UAS Weather Limitations

Precipitation, Wind, and Temperature – Precipitation, wind, and temperature can all degrade the operating parameters of UAS and its systems, particularly icing. Consider lowering altitude in icing conditions (temp below 0⁰C and visible moisture).

Weather UAS UAS Sensors Datalinks

Icing

Can create dangerous flying conditions if limited or no deicing capability installed

Ice may obscure sensors

May degrade reception

Crosswinds > 15 kts Often exceeds operational capabilities

N/A N/A

High winds > 50 kts Can creates dangerous flying conditions

N/A N/A

Light rain UAS generally can operate N/A N/A

Heavy rain: 5 cm or more per hour

UAS often cannot operate

Poor, unusable imagery

Degrades reception

Fog, low clouds, dust, sandstorm

Increases risk at takeoffs / landings; reduces payload effectiveness

Can penetrate light but not heavy fog/clouds

N/A

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Fog and Low Clouds – Generally reduces the effectiveness of the payloads and makes landing difficult. Infrared (IR) cameras can penetrate light fog, but not heavy fog or clouds. These conditions often require flying lower to receive exploitable imagery.

Sensor Considerations – UAS sensor/operator selects the type sensor that provides the best resolution and image for the mission. Table 3 describes sensor advantages and disadvantages.

Table 3. Sensor Matrix

Advantages Disadvantages Electro-Optical

Affords a familiar view of a scene. Employment of camouflage and concealment techniques can deceive the sensor.

Offers system resolution unachievable in other optical systems or in thermal images and radars.

Restricted by weather conditions; visible light cannot penetrate clouds or fog.

Preferred for detailed analysis and measurement.

Restricted by terrain and vegetation.

Can provide 3D imaging for better analysis.

Limited to lighted areas during nighttime.

Infrared

A passive sensor; not easy to jam. Not as effective during thermal crossover (1 to 1.5 hours after sunrise or sunset).

Offers camouflage penetration. Bad weather degrades quality.

Provides good resolution. Night imaging capability.

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Synthetic Aperture Radar

Near continuous situational awareness even in adverse weather.

Requires trained personnel to interpret.

Detailed imaging of large area. No video capability. Not supported by One System Remote Video Terminal (OSRVT) /Rover.

Photographic-like images. Extensive processing and distribution bandwidth.

Image latency based on bandwidth.

Can be jammed.

Ground Moving Target Indicator

Provides increased UA survivability through increased stand-off ranges.

Additional processing may be required.

Focuses attention on relevant movement/activity. Stationary targets not visualized.

Can be jammed.

Threat Considerations

UA generally are operated to avoid known heavy hostile areas that have anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) or surface to air missile (SAM) capability. Although it is often very difficult to shoot down a UA, route, altitude, and entry/exit points should be considered in pre-mission planning. Few UAS have systems to counter ground or air threats. As UA become larger, air-to-air threats must also be considered by planners.

Rules of Engagement (ROE)

ROE specify the circumstances and limitations under which forces initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. ROE govern all NATO Forces and operations, although aspects of individual nations’ ROE may differ.

UAS Request Procedures

Two types of UAS means of exploitation and utilization:

• Request UAS support – That is, use of UAS asset for mission. • Request physical control – That is, calling for C2 authority or

physical management of the UA, payload, and sensor, if capability exists.

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Three categories of UAS support: Preplanned, Immediate, Dynamic Re-tasking.

Preplanned – For theater-level, non-organic UAS controlled by the combined force air component commander (CFACC), requests for direct support of a preplanned mission must be submitted through:

• Air Support Request. (See Appendix D) • Air Reconnaissance Request/Task (See ATP-47, Annex A, Air

Reconnaissance Request/Task Form) • Other theater/platform-specific process

Timeline typically 12–72 hours prior to the new air tasking order (ATO) execution period are considered pre-planned. Notional ATO cycle timeline, see Figure 2.

Figure 2. Air Tasking Order Cycle Timeline (Notional)

Immediate – Requests are submitted outside ATO cycle and often expedited through internet relay chat (IRC), email, telephone, or radio, as required. For immediate mission, requests are sent directly to air support operations center using air support request message.

Dynamic Re-Tasking – This is a re-tasking of UA from an existing mission to a new target based on published priorities and criteria. Reasons for re-tasking include troops in contact, high priority target opportunity. Figure 3 depicts a notional battalion dynamic re-tasking request of an organic MQ-1C UAS to support troops in contact (TIC).

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Figure 3. Dynamic Re-Tasking of Organic UAS

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UAS Employment

Employment - Land Operations

Doctrinally, UAS can be treated similarly to manned systems in the application of established air and space principles. However, there are some unique issues for commanders and planners to consider when employing these systems.

In general, employment of UAS to support tactical land operations falls into two major categories: ISR and Tactical Air Support. Specific employment of UAS capabilities and platforms are a function of mission, enemy, terrain, weather, troop location, support, time availability, and civil considerations (METT-TC).

ISR Missions

ISR synchronizes and integrates the planning and operation of sensors, assets, and processing, exploitation, dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations. UAS ISR missions are broadly considered tactical air reconnaissance or surveillance.

Reconnaissance – Reconnaissance missions obtain combat information about enemy and indigenous population activities and resources through sensor payloads.

Route Reconnaissance – Is the directed effort to obtain detailed information of a specified route and all terrain from which the enemy could influence movement along that route. UAS, with multi-sensor capabilities, are well-suited to reconnoiter the front, flanks, and rear providing early warning, ambush detection, and over watch. Additional UAS support roles are ground element over watch, trafficability assessment, and landing site and hazard location, threat, and suspicious item identification. The best results occur when synchronized and commanded by ground elements.

Critical information needed from the unit commander:

• Start Point, Release Point and designated route time of mission, start to finish

• Critical Points identified • Intelligence Preparation • Any constraints or restrictions • Weather • Type of unit or vehicles expected to use the route, specify day/night • Detection concerns

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General schematic of a route reconnaissance overlay is depicted in Figure 4.

Figure 4. Route Reconnaissance

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Zone Reconnaissance – Is the directed effort to obtain information concerning all routes, obstacles, terrain, enemy forces within a zone defined by boundaries. Used when existing knowledge of terrain is limited, combat operations have altered the terrain, boundaries are restricted or when the enemy situation is vague. Often time consuming, and covering extensive distances ahead of ground forces in well-coordinated zones which dictates special considerations for air assets. Planning considerations are similar to route reconnaissance though multiple teams (manned and unmanned) operate abreast. Figure 5 illustrates the zone reconnaissance.

Figure 5. Zone Reconnaissance

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Area Reconnaissance – Primary difference between zone and area reconnaissance is the nature (restrictive versus permissive) of the boundaries. Flanks of the overall objective area are secured, then recon can be directed inward. Figure 6 depicts a typical area reconnaissance where the UAS has conducted an initial recon over the general area of operation (AO Leavenworth) followed by a route recon of the movement corridors, finishing with recon outside the AO after friendly forces advance.

Figure 6. Area Reconnaissance

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Aerial Surveillance – Is the systematic observation of aerospace, surface or subsurface areas, places, persons or things, by visual, aural, electronic, photographic or other means to collect information. UAS are ideal platforms as these missions are more passive, long duration, and persistent watch often requiring a low signature asset to avoid enemy detection.

Surveillance of a Specified Area – usually target area or buildings which are areas of interest to operational forces. UAS can send full-motion video (FMV) continuously to ground elements’ One System Remote Video Terminal (see Figure 7).

Figure 7. Surveillance of a Specified Area

Long Endurance Surveillance – enables continuous surveillance of avenues of approach, Named Areas of Interest, Target Areas of Interest, decision point and other mission critical areas (see Figure 8).

Figure 8. Long Endurance Surveillance

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Tactical Air Support

Tactical air support UAS missions are in direct support of ground forces and executed in direct assistance to land operations. Following categories support this mission: Security, Armed Reconnaissance, Strike, Strike Coordination and Reconnaissance (SCAR).

Security Operations – To orient on the force, area, or facility being protected, to include all measures taken by a command to protect itself from surprise, provocation, espionage, sabotage or observation by the threat. UAS support to security operations include:

• Contribute to and share the common operational picture (COP) • Provide early and accurate information (e.g., enemy approach) to

protected force • Maintain persistent surveillance on avenues of approach • Gain and maintain enemy contact to ensure continuous information

flow • Report enemy activity • Destroy, repel, or suppress enemy reconnaissance units without

decisive engagement • Impede and harass the enemy with indirect fires • Guide reaction forces

Some security missions terms and definitions include:

• Screen – Primary purpose of a screen is to provide early warning to the main body; defensive in nature with observation posts (OPs) and surveillance patrols. UAS superior mobility, day and night target acquisition (TA) capabilities, long-range digital or voice communication or RETRANS, and video sensors make them ideally suited for screen missions. UAS units may conduct screen operations independently, as part of a team, or as an integral part of a larger ground unit's task organization. UAS may be used as an extension of ground surveillance to see-over-the-next hill, or may be employed in support of a series of OPs by providing air patrols en route between OPs.

• Guard – Differs from screen in that a guard force has enough combat power to defeat, cause the withdrawal of, or fix the lead elements of an enemy ground force before it can engage the main body with direct fire. UAS may perform reconnaissance, maintain continuous surveillance of threat avenues of approach, maintain contact with threat forces, maintain contact with the lead combat element, destroy/repel threat reconnaissance, security or ground forces, and locate and cause the threat main body to deploy, determining its composition and direction of travel.

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• Cover – A covering force accomplishes all the tasks of screening and guard forces but is self-contained. UAS normally conduct screen or zone reconnaissance missions as part of a larger force.

• Area Security – Operations that may be offensive or defensive in nature. Recon and security for designated personnel, airfields, unit convoys, facilities, main supply routes, lines of communication, equipment, and critical points. UAS may maintain surveillance of avenues of approach into AO, maintain contact with threat or belligerent forces, defend the protected force or facility, deter/destroy enemy forces conducting mortar, rocket, or ambush attacks, protect main supply routes and convoys, prevent threat forces from acting against friendly forces in other AOs, support presence operations, and react to civil disturbances.

• Local Security – Includes any local measure taken by the units against enemy actions. Involves avoiding detection by the enemy or deceiving the enemy about friendly positions and intentions. UAS employed in support of local security missions would be best employed as reconnaissance and surveillance assets performing similar missions as described for area security.

Armed Reconnaissance – A mission with the primary purpose of locating and attacking targets of opportunity, i.e., enemy material, personnel, facilities in assigned general areas or assigned ground communications routes, not for the purpose of attacking specific briefed targets. Strike – A mission to attack or damage or destroy an objective or a capability. Strike missions include CAS. UAS integration into a CAS is done by a FAC. UAS video provides FAC situational awareness required to deploy weapons on target possibly using UAS weapons. Figure 9 depicts a strike profile.

Figure 9. Strike

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Strike Coordination and Reconnaissance – A SCAR mission is flown for the purposes of detecting targets and coordinating or performing attack or reconnaissance on those targets. UAS can provide SCAR tasks such as

locating, cross cueing, identify moving targets, passing target updates, sequencing other aircraft, buddy laze for other aircraft, kinetically engage targets with its own weapons, and conduct BDA. Two options are depicted below in Figure 10 and 11.

Figure 10. UAS Direct Engagement

Figure 11. UAS Cooperative Engagement - “Buddy Laze” between AH-64D and an MQ-1

Armed UAS Roles and Missions The primary mission of armed UAS will include interdicting time sensitive targets (TSTs) in a hunter-killer role. Specific missions will include:

• Interdiction – Armed UAS will exploit persistent loiter, sensor capabilities, and organic weapons to hunt and kill TSTs along lines of communication or in areas of known or suspected enemy activity.

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• CAS – UAS can act as weapons delivery platforms and may be

capable of performing as a persistent forward air controller-airborne (FAC[A]) to support ground force commanders, with a combination of organic and off-board sensors and precision ordnance.

• CSAR Support – Armed UAS can be employed to augment CSAR missions to provide constant survivor status and geo-location data through its extended loiter ability as well as detecting and identifying potential threats to the recovery assets and survivor, and provides a mechanism to neutralize threats whenever they appear.

• SEAD – Armed UAS may be employed against high value air defense nodes such as command and control (C2) facilities or radar sites to disrupt or destroy an adversary’s ability to perform air defense functions.

• JMO – Armed UAS can be employed to interdict waterborne targets for littoral sea control and to support ship to objective maneuver. Armed UAS can be employed to enforce a harbor blockade as well as provide security for ships in the harbor and harbor facilities. Additional information on JMO can be found in Sect 6 of this publication and AJP-3.1, Joint Maritime Operations.

Additional Roles and Missions

Armed UAS can support the JFC by providing near real-time battlespace situational awareness to potentially all echelons of command in the form of full motion video (EO and IR) and still imagery (EO, IR, and synthetic aperture radar [SAR]) over a common tactical data link. Other sensors employed as mission-specific payloads in a “plug-and-play” mission kit concept can permit other types of intelligence collection (e.g., signals intelligence, communications intelligence, weather data, etc.) on a non-interference basis while the aircraft performs its primary mission.

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UAS Command and Control

Command and Control (C2) Options

For the purposes of C2 support and integration, UAS are categorized as Class I, Class II, and Class III. All participants should understand the communication, chat, video, and data links, and how they support or interact in the mission. The best employment is usually achieved by pushing the UAS sensor data, such as video, to the lowest end user and not always via a C2 center, tactical operations center (TOC), or headquarters. This necessitates UAS familiarity, training, and proficiency of the end user(s) and the commander’s confidence in personnel proficiency and in UAS system utility.

Class I - Small/Mini/Micro UAS. Small, self-contained and generally man-portable. Usually operate below the coordination level. They typically support the small ground forces and are generally controlled by a single individual who also views the sensor images/FMV on a small laptop-type computer. Limited to line of sight (LOS). A generalized schematic for the C2 of Class I UAS is depicted in Figure 12.

Note: This publication focuses on Class II and III UAS.

Figure 12. Class I UAS C2

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Class II - Tactical UAS. Larger systems that support maneuver commanders at various tactical levels of command and can also support the small combat teams when so employed. Data products can expand beyond FMV and can be disseminated to combat teams real-time via OSRVT/Rover and/or distributed among supported tactical command elements. Data processing may occur within the UAS unit or be forwarded to an intelligence support unit. Communications may be limited to LOS or via communication relay, if capable. A generalized schematic for the C2 of Class II UAS is depicted in Figure 13.

Figure 13. Class II UAS C2

Class III - MALE/HALE/Strike UAS. These UAS are generally deployed to support theater-wide requirements. They permit varied and ranging support to combat team and subordinate tactical command levels depending on the type of UAS and capabilities.

Class III UAS characteristics include:

• Theater-ranging UAS design and robust C2 architecture permit split-site operations. Specifically, the UA can be deployed to theater while mission C2 and data collection, processing, and dissemination are conducted outside of theater of operations under "reach-back" conduits.

• More capable payloads permit more diverse data products that are generally produced in greater volume and scope.

• Data processing is supported by specialized intelligence units via "reach-back" connectivity and/or locally at the theater level.

• Data products are disseminated via direct links or supporting intelligence networks.

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• Communication architecture is the most robust and may include some or all of supported command elements, combat teams, UAS units, and intelligence units.

A general schematic for the C2 of Class III UAS is depicted in Figure 14.

Figure 14. Class III UAS C2 UAS Collaborative Environment – The effective employment of UAS in direct response to supported unit requirements is enhanced via a well-defined and constantly improving collaborative environment. The collaborative environment tools such as information workspace (IWS) and IRC coordinate the direct tasking and distribution of information of UAS assets. The creation and restriction of access to the collaborative “group” designated for tasking the actions of the UAS asset is directed by the controlling commander to ensure the orderly execution of the mission.

Airspace Command and Control

Airspace C2 balances various demands competing for airspace use without unnecessarily hindering the application of combat power. Planners must emphasize flexibility and simplicity to maximize the force effectiveness using the system. The established principles of airspace management used in manned flight operations will generally apply to UAS operations as well.

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Airspace Management – The Airspace Control Authority (ACA), appointed by the joint force commander (JFC), coordinates, integrates, and regulates the use of joint operating area (JOA) airspace, which increases force effectiveness and minimizes fratricide risk. Typically the JFC designates the CFACC as the ACA. Additional duties of the ACA include establishing broad policies and procedures for airspace control, establishing the airspace control system and integrating host nation and multinational forces, developing the airspace control plan, and implementing the airspace control plan (ACP) through the airspace control order (ACO).

UAS must be considered early in the development of the ACO, ATO, and special instructions (SPINS). UAS must follow all approved planning, guidance, and procedures, as applicable. Typically, it is not necessary to include Class I UAS on the ATO unless their planned operating altitude conflicts with other airborne operations. Class II UAS should be included on the ATO and Class III UAS must be included on the ATO for deconfliction. Inclusion of UAS in the ATO does not imply any change in command relationships or tasking authority. Compliance with the ACO is critical as UA generally cannot “see and avoid” other aircraft, and may not have identification, friend, or foe (IFF) capability. Adversaries are also developing and acquiring UAS, so it is imperative C2 nodes are able to differentiate between friendly and enemy UA and cruise missiles.

Tasking – Organic UAS generally remain under the direct control of the parent unit. UAS made available to the CFACC are allocated and tasked using the same process as with other manned aircraft. However, larger theater-capable UAS often have longer endurance than comparable manned systems, which may further allow transferring control of the aircraft and/or payloads to multiple users during a single mission. If a UAS or the payload is reallocated to support another commander’s objective during a mission, the supported commander should, to the maximum extent, use the established C2 architecture and procedures.

UA Emergency Planning – UA emergency response may be difficult because the UA operator is dependent on performance parameters transmitted via data link. Another factor is that the operator is interpreting UA data on a monitor and does not have the benefit of normal sensory inputs. Additionally, a major consideration for all UAS operations is the potential for losing the data link. As such, managing UA during an emergency may be more difficult than for manned platforms. Detailed planning for lost link, loss of positioning data, and other emergency procedures and recoveries is required due to their dependence on information and control data links. Another emergency planning factor is the potential for recovery of armed UA into an emergency divert base. This divert base may have to be within LOS of a compatible GCS or launch and recovery element (LRE) to ensure safe UA recovery.

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Airspace Control Documents

Airspace Control Plan – developed by the airspace control authority and approved by the JFC.

Airspace Control Order – Is developed from the airspace control plan. The ACO provides effective times, altitudes, distances and controlling agencies for airspace control measures. It directs the use of joint airspace and details the approved requests for airspace control measures.

Air Tasking Order – The ATO is a detailed order developed daily by the CFACC that describes and directs the overall air operation. This order provides the details for individual sorties to include targets, mission timing, weapons loads, air refueling data, call signs, and special instructions. The ATO directs tactical identification, friend or foe (IFF) use and assignments in each theater while projecting ground combat movements.

Air Defense Plan (ADP) – Air defense commander along with other Services develops, integrates, and distributes the JFC-approved air defense plan. The air defense plan includes sensor employment, identification procedures, engagement procedures, defensive airspace control procedures, weapon control procedures, early warning dissemination, location and type of enemy/friendly air and missile forces.

Types of Airspace C2 – Airspace Control Procedures and systems need to accommodate these methods based on component, joint, and national capabilities and requirements. Positive control, conducted by elements designated by the ACA, relies on radars, other sensors, IFF, digital data links, and other elements of the air defense system to positively identify, track, and direct air assets. Normally, the brigade does not have the capability to provide positive control unless augmented with an air traffic services (ATS) support package. Procedural control relies on previously agreed to and disseminated airspace control measures; these may include ROE, restricted operating zones (ROZ), standard use army aircraft flight route (SAAFR), aircraft identification maneuvers, fire support coordination measures (FSCM), minimum risk routes, high-density airspace control zones, and a coordination level.

Airspace Control Terms

Air Control Point – is a point easily identified on the terrain or an electronic navigation aid used to provide necessary control during air movement. It is a graphic control measure used to segment an air corridor similar to checkpoints on a ground route.

Air Corridor – an air corridor is a restricted air route of travel at or below the coordinating altitude specified for use by friendly aircraft to avoid friendly fire and de-conflict artillery-firing positions with aviation.

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Coordination Level – is a procedural means to separate fixed and rotary wing aircraft by determining an altitude below which fixed wing aircraft normally will not fly. The height will be published in the ACP and specify if it is advisory or mandatory. All airspace users should coordinate with the appropriate airspace coordinating entities when transitioning or firing through it.

Kill Boxes – is a three-dimensional FSCM used to facilitate the expeditious air-to-surface lethal attack of targets, which may be augmented by or integrated with surface-to-surface indirect fires.

Restricted operating zones/areas – is airspace of defined dimensions created in response to specific operational situations (e.g., UAS launch and recovery zone) or requirements within which the operation of one or more airspace users is restricted.

ROZs - can be established over areas where combat operations likely involve a mix of air vehicles to be employed (e.g., over urban operations areas) and are disseminated throughout theater using the ACO. Information about the ROZ includes contact frequency for the aircraft desiring to transition through the ROZ. The BRIGADE Fires Support Element coordinates and tracks all fires and aviation activity in the ROZ. Figure 15 is a representation of a ROZ.

Figure 15. Example ROZ Diagram

Zone Reference Systems – Ground units can develop a zone reference system, using security zones based on unit boundaries, population densities, geographical areas, or any system that facilitates airspace deconfliction for maneuver elements. Example of a zone is depicted in Figure 16.

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Figure 16. Example of a Security Zones

Common Reference Systems – Provide a universal perspective to define specific areas of the battle space, enabling commanders to efficiently coordinate, deconflict, and synchronize surface attacks. The Global Area Reference System (GARS) is the USA operational-level reference system. Figure 17 provides an example of the use of GARS. For position reference, such as describing exact geographic locations, or for precise positions for weapons employment, both USA and NATO use the Military Grid Reference System (MGRS) (although latitude/longitude is often used for aviation and maritime operations).

Figure 17. Global Area Reference System

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Types of Separation – There are three common means to keep separation between manned and unmanned aircraft: lateral, time, and vertical separation.

• Lateral separation spaces aircraft that may be operating at the same altitude by not having them operate in the same geographic space by using ROZ, flight corridors, unit boundaries, and phase lines.

• Time separation spaces aircraft (or fires) that may be operating in the same geographical area or at the same operating altitudes by not allowing them to operate at the same time.

• Vertical separation spaces aircraft based on operating altitude or by assigning different operating altitudes to other aircraft that may be working in the same area. Vertical separation may not be the preferred method for low-flying UAS, as rotary-wing aircraft normally operate from the surface to 500 ft above a ground level.

Ground Force Airspace Coordination

Battlefield Coordination Detachment (BCD) – Is the army forces (ARFOR) coordination detachment located at the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC). This detachment monitors and interprets the land battle for the CAOC and exchanges current and planned intelligence and operational information with ground units at wing operations centers, control and reporting centers, and airspace C2 (AC2) centers.

Corps Cell – Corps Cell has a dedicated element at the corps main and tactical command posts to deconflict airspace for tactical air support, ground force aviation, UAS, air defense artillery (ADA), field artillery (FA) and electronic warfare (EW) assets. Corps airspace issues are controlled by the corps G-3 and managed by the G-3 air. The corps ATS battalion commander and the corps ADA brigade commander serve as the corps commander’s airspace advisors. The corps AC2 cell focuses on the deep battles, rear battles, and future (72+ hours) operations and coordinates AC2 issues for deep operations through the deep operation coordination cell (when established). The AC2 Corps level cell is also the primary airspace point of contact for subordinate divisions and commands/ brigades under corps control.

Division Cell – The division AC2 element, located in the main command post (CP), is the G-3‘s principal organization for managing airspace use and is part of the movement and maneuver cell. The AC2 element includes representatives from the corps ATS battalion’s direct support company and other elements supporting the division maneuver elements, to include ADA, FA, and intelligence. The organization of the AC2 element at the division main CP resembles that of the corps level. However, the division focuses on conducting the battles and engagements in the forward portion of the combat zone. Therefore, airspace control tasks are primarily those required to support the close battle. The difference in geographical orientation (forward versus rear) results in minor differences in airspace control procedures and the degree of coordination required. In addition to supporting the airspace

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requirements of subordinate brigades, the cell also assists the G-3 by integrating the airspace use of other division functional cells.

Brigade – A formal and dedicated BRIGADE AC2 element does not exist, but an ad hoc element under the brigade S3 does resemble those at higher echelons. The BRIGADE AC2 team, comprised of the air defense airspace management/brigade aviation element (ADAM/BAE), effects cell, and ALO, provides planning and execution of brigade AC2. AC2 team elements develop and implement their portion of the plan for inclusion in the brigade’s scheme of maneuver, and members work as a team to deconflict and synchronize the plan for the best use of airspace while retaining flexibility for the commander to maximize lethality.

The ADAM/BAE is designed to work with a division or corps AC2 cell. However, it is capable of independent operations when the BRIGADE is employed independent of a higher headquarters. The ADAM/BAE is equipped to receive the joint air picture and coordinate digitally with the BCD, within the CAOC. The ADAM/BAE:

• Implements and disseminates the ACO for brigade and below. • Ensures the effects cell provides the same function for the ATO. • Develops and disseminates the air defense plan. • Provides the air picture and early warning functions. • Is the principle brigade staff element planning the use of NATO

aviation and UAS. • Submits Airspace Control Means Requests (ACMR) to the division

AC2 element for synchronization and deconfliction, and further processing for inclusion in the ACO.

Battalion and Below – Extensive aviation operations at battalion and below require AC2 coordination. Formal AC2 elements do not exist at this level; therefore, the BRIGADE ADAM/BAE absorbs many of the necessary functions to minimize the AC2 workload on battalion, company/platoon UAS operators. This does require that battalions actively coordinate with the BRIGADE ADAM/BAE to ensure mission requests are processed as efficiently and expeditiously as possible.

The battalion/company level does have some responsibilities in performing appropriate AC2 tasks to ensure successful UAS operations such as track/monitor aviation operations to determine and resolve conflicts, submit all airspace requests to the ADAM/BAE, manage separation and frequencies of battalion and below UAS operations, provide preplanned UAS flight schedules for ATO/ACO cycle, and inform airspace users at each echelon of any communication loss during operations.

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UAS Communications and Brevity

UAS Communications

Communications are one of the most important aspects of the tactical employment of UAS. Communications provide both capabilities and limitations to the UAS user, whether to control the UA, or to manage sensors and information flow. Users must be aware of enemy actions and environmental factors that can limit the effectiveness of UAS communications. For example, LOS ranges advertised for various UAS may not take into account LOS restrictions, environmental attenuation, or frequency congestion. Although UAS communication is near-real time, there are several factors that can induce substantial time errors between users and operators. For instance, every relay station that a signal passes through can cause up to a 1/2 second delay in reception that, across multiple nodes, may result in a several-seconds delay between the actual UA sensor action and what the end user might see.

Frequency Management – UAS operators/pilots should ensure they receive a brief from their communications officer specific to their JOA. The following should be briefed:

• Frequency management coordination and deconfliction issues, e.g., location of active IED jammers

• Means of communications/collaboration utilized in the JOA • Methods/means to access the collaborative tool(s) • Frequency/communications “card” for the JOA • Contact information for the communications section

UAS frequency requirements for some current systems are provided in Table 4 to support employment planning.

Table 4. UAS Frequency Bands Band Frequency Ranges

L Band 1000 – 2000 MHz S Band 2000 – 4000 MHz C Band 4000 – 8000 MHz X Band 8000 – 12000 MHz Ku Band 12000 – 18000 MHz Ka Band 27000 – 40000 MHz

UAS Operations Standards – Multiple levels of interoperability are feasible among different UA systems. The information provided in Table 5 provides levels of interoperability and thus control that may be exercised in the

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direction of UAS operations. What those levels mean in terms of practical use to the BRIGADE and battalion commander and staffs appears in Table 6.

Table 5. UAS Levels of Interoperability

Table 6. UAS Levels of Access and Control Attributes UAS Levels of Access and Control Attributes

Capability of Access and Control Comments

Level 1 User receives UAS data from GCS or intelligence sources.

Intelligence filtering or processing may delay delivery of imagery and data.

Level 2

User receives UAS data directly or imagery data via RVT, UAS video monitor.

Level 2 interaction involves the direct receipt and display of imagery and data from the UA or its supporting satellite through a user-located data link without filtering or processing at another location.

Level 3 User takes over control of UAS payload.

Level 3 interaction involves control of the UA payload separate from control of the UA. Some RVTs may permit this.

Level 4

User takes over control of UAS flight path control and payload control.

Generally not a common practice or a capability available to the end user.

UAS Levels of Interoperability

Level 1 Indirect receipt/transmission of UA related payload data (Provided by other standards in the NIIA. STANAG 4586 not required.)

Level 2

Direct receipt of ISR/other data where “direct” covers reception of the UA payload data by the RVT when it has direct communication with the UA. (Provided by other standards in the NIIA. STANAG 4586 not required.)

Level 3 Control and monitoring of the UA payload in addition to direct receipt of ISR/other data. (Handover of sensor control as defined in STANAG 4586.)

Level 4 Control and monitoring of the UA, less launch and recovery. (Handover of UA control as defined in STANAG 4586.)

Level 5 Control and monitoring of the UA (Level 4) plus launch and recovery functions

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UAS Levels of Access and Control Attributes

Capability of Access and Control Comments

Level 5

User takes over control of UAS launch/ recovery, flight path control and payload control.

Generally not a common practice or a capability available to the end user.

Communication Brevity Codes Although commonly used in the coordinated employment of other assets, communications brevity codes for UAS OSRVT/Rover have not yet been completely standardized across NATO. Many current communications brevity and aviation brevity codes apply to UA operations and should be used when applicable. A few of the most commonly used and important brevity codes for employing UAS are shown in Table 7. Table 7. Joint / Schoolhouse Brevity Words (APP-07)

Multi-Service and Schoolhouse Brevity Codes

Joint Brevity Word Definition ROVER A/G School Definition

CAPTURE(D) (USA)

Aircrew has identified and is able to track a specified A/G target with an onboard sensor.

A call from the UA sensor operator or the OSRVT/Rover operator that the target or point of interest is located and being tracked by the sensor. This is also used by manned aircraft with sensor pods such as LITENING or LANTIRN.

CHECK CAPTURE Target appears to be no longer tracked by sensor.

Informative call from the OSRVT/Rover operator to the RPA pilot/sensor operator that the sensor is no longer on the target or point of interest.

CHECK FOCUS Sensor image appears to be out of focus.

An informative call or a request from the OSRVT/Rover operator to the RPA pilot/sensor operator to focus the sensor.

CYCLOPS Unmanned aircraft N/A

DEADEYE Laser system is inoperative

Information call by an airborne laser designator indicating the laser system is inoperative.

DIRTY Link is not encrypted N/A

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Multi-Service and Schoolhouse Brevity Codes

EXPECT HOLLOW

A condition will likely exist momentarily that limits FMV reception (maneuvers, terrain, etc.).

Preparatory call from UA pilot/ sensor operator that a condition will likely exist or will happen that may disrupt the signal/data link between the OSRVT/Rover and the UA due to masking from terrain, building in an urban environment, or during maneuvering of the UA for a weapons launch or repositioning for other tasking.

FLASHLIGHT

Directive term for helicopter to turn on IR floodlight (pointed at ground to aid visual acquisition by escort aircraft).

N/A

HANDSHAKE

Link 16 Air Control NPG initiation between air control unit and controlled aircraft.

Full motion video signal and data operative to ROVER.

HOLLOW Unusable downlink to FMV.

Lost video signal/data link between UA and OSRVT/Rover.

LOOKING

Aircrew has not got the ground object, reference point, target in sight (opposite of CONTACT).

N/A

PLAYTIME

Amount of time aircraft can remain on station, given in hours plus minutes.

N/A

RIFLE (USA)

Friendly air-to-surface missile launch.

N/A

SAM (direction)

Visual acquisition of a SAM or SAM launch (should include position).

N/A

SCRAM

Friendly asset is in immediate danger. Withdraw clear in the direction indicated for survival. No further mission support from the friendly asset is expected.

Danger

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Multi-Service and Schoolhouse Brevity Codes

SET

Set (or have set) a particular speed. May be in knots/indicated or in Mach.

Informative/prep call from the UA pilot/sensor operator to the OSRVT/Rover operator indicating that the sensor is no longer slewing.

SHADOW Follow indicated target.

A request from the OSRVT/Rover operator to the RPA pilot/sensor operator to maintain a track on a specific target or point of interest. These may be moving targets

SHIFT (direction) Shift laser/IR/radar/ device energy. Change

SHOPPING An aircraft request to FAC/C2 platform for a target.

Same

SLEW (USA)

Move sensor in direction indicated (usually accompanied with a unit of measure).

Request from the OSRVT/Rover operator to the UA pilot/sensor operator to slew the sensors in a direction/ distance around the target/area of interest. The cursor or screen size can be used as a yardstick for the distance to move the sensor. Clock positions can also be used for direction.

SNAKE Oscillate an IR pointer about a target.

Same

SPARKLE Target marking by infrared pointer. N/A

SPOT Acquisition of laser designation. Same

STAKE

The nominated starting point for a talk on which is near the target.

A video system mark has been set and is used as a point of reference. Works the same as a target reference point (TRP) or anchor point.

STARE (USA)

Cue the laser spot search/tracker function on the specified laser code in relation to the specified reference point. Reference point may include the following: steerpoint, GEOREF, bearing and range, or data

Call to cue the targeting pod and enable the laser spot search (LSS) function on the specified laser code in relation to the specified reference point; reference point may include the following: INS steer point, GEOREF, bearing and range, data link point or laser mark.

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Multi-Service and Schoolhouse Brevity Codes link point.

SWITCH CAMERA Switch full-motion video to EO or IR.

Request to the sensor operator from the OSRVT/Rover operator to change cameras/sensor from one type to another. Example would be going from EO to IR or SAR.

SWITCH POLARITY Switch IR polarity to black hot or white hot.

Request from OSRVT/Rover operator to UA pilot/sensor operator to change the IR sensor from white hot to black hot or vice versa.

TALLY

Sighting of a target, nonfriendly aircraft, or enemy position. Opposite of NO JOY.

The enemy position/target is in sight.

ZOOM (IN/OUT)

Increase/decrease the sensor’s focal length. Note: “ZOOM IN/OUTt” is normally followed by “1, 2, 3, or 4” to indicate the number of fields of view to change,

Request from OSRVT/Rover operator to the sensor operator to change the field of view. The ZOOM command is given with a number, attached to it. The 1, 2, 3, or 4 indicates the FOV change the OSRVT/Rover operator wants. Note: It is recommended only one change at a time in or out be used for the FMV.

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Support Considerations for UAS

Special Operations Forces Mission Rehearsal

Mission rehearsal for all types of operations is the ideal. However, mission rehearsal for special operations is critical because of the inherent complexity and high risk associated with these missions. Often, repeated rehearsal of certain mission elements is necessary. This is because both personnel and essential tasks differ from mission to mission and because of the possible strategic implications of these missions. Because special operations are unique, each operation may bring together a group of specialists who have worked together infrequently or never at all. In addition, the specific tasks required for success may not have been practiced together or integrated in the required sequence. Through rehearsal, a plan’s flaws are discovered, and its options are tested. Rehearsals provide the forum to overcome potentially dangerous scenarios in the field.

Security

Operations security (OPSEC), communications security (COMSEC), and physical security are vitally important to NATO. From initial planning stages to the force recovery stages of a special operation, mission-critical information and OPSEC indicators should be tightly controlled to prevent the adversary from deriving or collecting information that would compromise the mission success. NATO habitually operates from secure sites and employment bases, in order to shield the small, tailored NATO from the attention of hostile intelligence collectors. Since NATO have little organic base defense capability, they depend almost exclusively on conventional units or sister Service support for perimeter security. Additionally, NATO pays particular attention to COMSEC, in order to control inadvertent release of mission critical information and OPSEC indicators. For example, NATO maximizes secure communications that ensure communication discipline (emissions control) and discretion (low probabilities of detection and intercept). Effective planning and coordinating can ensure information is adequately controlled, while ensuring access to information, equipment, and activities necessary for flexible yet compartmented operations. UAS operations generally require secure environment with little or no surface to air threat. Counter measures to UAS operations should be considered in all mission sets.

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Intelligence

NATO planning and execution are intelligence-intensive, and must be timely and detailed. Tailored, all-source intelligence is vital in support of NATO operations, and should be broad in scope, yet adequately detailed. Intelligence requirements for UAS are similar to those of other air components, though the degree of detail is frequently greater. Also, the nature of the objective may require different, tailored support. For instance, UAS may need intelligence to avoid enemy forces, where other forces may wish to engage those forces. UAS normally attempt to avoid detection to enhance mission security and as a method to avoid engagement by adversary forces. Therefore, detailed intelligence is key to UAS mission planning. Some of the products often associated with UAS mission planning are:

• Mission folders • Mission planning orders validated through rehearsal(s) • Threat intelligence for all mission phases • Combat tactics and concepts of employment based on expected

threat scenarios • Target materials • Annotated Imagery • Specialized Geospatial products

Release of post-mission reports with organically collected intelligence, target area analysis, and intelligence assessments may be constrained by the sensitivity of many types of UAS missions. Depending on the sensitivity of the mission, commanders should report data either through special access or routine intelligence reporting channels, as appropriate.

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UAS Employment – Maritime

This chapter provides information for UAS mission planning and employment in the maritime domain. The general planning and employment considerations previously developed for air-to-ground missions serve as the baseline for maritime mission planning.

Maritime UAS Planning

To maximize asset capability, naval force planners will have to account for many factors prior to UAS’s arrival in theater using a detailed planning process. Planning will include the expected operating environments, who the supported forces will be, who the controlling units for both payload and air vehicle are, and what communications methods will be employed to accomplish direct and indirect control of assets including air vehicle and payload tasking as well as payload products. Planning should cover mission areas including anti-submarine warfare (ASW), anti-surface warfare (ASUW), theater air and missile defense, naval mine warfare, and antiterrorism. Additional mission areas include strike, special operations, offensive information operations, and naval fire support (NFS). Planning resources include, but are not limited to, the ATO, ACO, and SPINS.

Airspace and Maritime Domain

National Airspace – National airspace extends to 12 nautical miles (nm) off the coast of the respective country, including any island or group of islands. Consent to fly into national airspace requires a diplomatic clearance. Diplomatic clearances can require full disclosure of aircraft contents and the purpose of the proposed overflight. While ships enjoy rights of innocent passage, there are no automatic rights of entry for aircraft.

International Airspace – Every country has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory and their domestic laws apply to activities in its territorial airspace. Any activities conducted in the airspace of another country require the approval of that country. Although several coastal nations have asserted claims intended to prohibit warships and military aircraft from operating in security zones extending beyond their territorial sea (12 nm from their coast), these claims have no basis in international law. International law does not recognize the right of any nation to restrict the navigation of foreign warships or flight of military aircraft beyond its territorial sea.

International Straits – Military aircraft are afforded the right of transit passage through international straits. While in the strait exercising this right, aircraft must proceed without delay and refrain from any threat or use of force against nations bordering the strait. Military aircraft will operate with due regard for safety of navigation and will monitor the appropriate international distress radio frequency (i.e., Guard).

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Law of the Sea Convention – Figure 18 depicts the divisions of the oceans and airspace per the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

Figure 18. 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

Note: In accordance with rights and jurisdictions recognized under international law, the preponderance of the sea and airspace above it remains essentially neutral and uninhabited. Maritime operations, therefore, contrast with land operations in that the sea cannot be possessed in the same way as land. Nations may have interpretations of international law that differ subtly or materially from those of other allies, partners or adversaries. The maritime force commander must be cognizant of national differences in interpretation and the impact that may have on operations.

Weather

Weather conditions may complicate employment of UAS in the maritime domain. Poor weather conditions affect target search/ID, targeting, and post mission assessment. See Table 8.

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Table 8. Weather Planning Rules of Thumb

Weather Planning Rules of Thumb

Good Weather > 8000 ft (2500 m) ceiling – 3 statute mile (sm) (5 km) visibility in most cases provides adequate target acquisition for EO-IR weapons

Poor Weather < 8000 ft (2500 m) ceiling – 3 sm (5 km) vis but > 300 ft (90 m) ceiling – 1 sm (1.5 km) vis may limit search and targeting capabilities

Adverse Weather < 300 ft (90 m) ceiling – 1 sm (1.5 km) vis limited to non-visual or stand-off attacks (fixed wing)

Winds – Strong surface winds can generate rough seas that complicate low-altitude acquisition of surface targets. Sea spray/salt can reduce/negate the capabilities of the electro-optical-infrared (EO-IR) systems for low-altitude operation.

Sea State – Ships in heavy seas can pitch vertically as much as 30 ft (10 m) or more in addition to having a roll component. This could significantly impact UAS launch and recovery operations.

Decreased impact angle and moving laser spot are potential factors that must be considered.

Water Temperature – Radical changes in water temperature (shallow versus deep water, gulf stream, etc.) will affect thermal imaging systems.

UAS Effectiveness

UAS must be able to effectively locate, positively identify, and engage target vessels in all environmental conditions. In almost all cases, target engagement will be against moving targets and standoff capability (detection, identification, and targeting) is essential against a defended target. Often, aircraft must be able to conduct missions at significant distances where fuel limits time on station. Typically, one type aircraft cannot conduct all of these mission requirements simultaneously. Clear, concise communication capability – both voice and tactical data link – is essential to mission success.

Additional Considerations:

• Altitude requirement for effective threat reaction/mission performance

• Airspace requirement based on number of aircraft in the AO • Weapons type and load.

o Targeting pods—laser target designator, laser spot tracker, IR pointers

o Target marks; e.g., rockets, gun, flares o Suitable munitions and fuses

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• Lack of terrain, ground references, navigational aids, and refueling/divert points

• C2 line of sight limitations and/or long range missions • Surface traffic density • Coordinated tactics • Threat contingencies • Airborne battlespace command and control contingencies • Communications:

o Secure communication capabilities. o Marine band capable very high frequency (VHF) – 156 MHz to

162.025 MHz. o Channel 16 (156.8 MHz) International Distress, Safety, and

Calling. All ships are required to monitor this frequency

UAS Collaborative Environment – The effective employment of UAS in direct response to supported unit requirements is enhanced via a well-defined and constantly improving collaborative environment. The collaborative environment tools such as IWS and IRC coordinate the direct tasking and distribution of information of UAS assets. The creation and restriction of access to the collaborative “group” designated for tasking the actions of the UAS asset is directed by the controlling commander to ensure the orderly execution of the mission.

UAS Maritime Operations Employment

Specific employment of UAS capabilities and platforms are a function of METT-TC.

Antisubmarine Warfare

To achieve ASW mission success, the opposing submarine force must be rendered incapable of interfering with the mission accomplishment of friendly maritime forces. UAS are highly adept to support the ASW mission.

• UAS operations from ships in Open Ocean Maneuver Area Clearance operations and Chokepoint Surveillance can rapidly detect, track, and localize enemy submarines. Locating data on enemy submarines will be relayed for further prosecution and to effectively neutralize threat.

• UAS may provide data relay capability to extend the range of the ship’s off board unmanned vehicles, enabling ships to remain a safer distance from threat water space. This capability will be networked worldwide via satellite and other relay sensors and will provide a means for data relay from future Underwater Detection and Distributed ASW Systems.

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• UAS can function as an enabling force to the Fleet commander. It will act as an information hub and operate in direct collaboration with other manned and unmanned airborne assets to provide persistent ISR to enhance battle space awareness through imagery, SAR/Inverse SAR, and strip mapping. The Fleet commander will have full perspective of the entire Battle Space through the fusion of data, thereby enabling execution of offensive full-spectrum ASW threads.

Figure 19. UAS Supporting ASW

Surface Warfare

UAS assets can assist ASUW operations by providing self-defense against surface threats:

• UAS can be employed from ships in defense of the fast attack craft/fast inshore attack aircraft threat by providing location and classification/identification and targeting data via its laser designator/range finder or other onboard sensors.

• Neutralization of surface threats will be possible via UAS employment of air-to-surface type weapons. UAS can designate targets for non-LOS engagement by both surface combatants and aircraft.

• UAS deployed aboard surface ships can provide locating and classification/identification capabilities to be networked and available to all warfare commanders.

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• Other, longer range, on-station time capable UAS such as the Broad Area Maritime Surveillance can provide extended range Recognized Maritime Picture, targeting for HARPOON, HARPOON BLK 3, and next generation anti-ship cruise missiles. See Figure 20.

Figure 20. UAS Supporting ASUW for a non-LOS engagement

• UAS have been used in maritime interdiction operations (MIO) and anti-piracy missions by providing extended range surveillance and imagery on possible suspect vessels and commercial shipping that have been taken by pirates. The UAS can continue to be used in this role, and its employment will be expanded as commanders become more familiar with capabilities of these systems. See Figure 21.

Figure 21. UAS Supporting MIO

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Amphibious Operations

An amphibious operation is a military operation launched from the sea by a naval and landing force embarked with the principal purpose of projecting the landing force ashore into an environment ranging from permissive to hostile. It will involve an amphibious task force seeking to maneuver into a position of advantage in the littoral with respect to the enemy, from which force can be threatened or applied ashore.

A variety of UAS can support maneuver decisions and provide force protection to the naval and landing force during amphibious operations. UAS can provide small, organic tactical ISR/TA capability as well as operational theater surveillance to enable enhanced decision making and improved integration with the maritime and ground schemes of maneuver. In the near future, they may also provide cargo movement to support projection of force into the amphibious objective area.

Naval Fire Support

NFS includes providing precise, high volume, and extended range fires. UAS provide support to the naval fire support mission through their ability to provide persistent and survivable ISR and TA capabilities over the shore in the presence of enemy threats that make the use of close-proximity manned spotting assets unfeasible. The ability of the UAS to provide targeting quality data to the firing unit is the key to facilitating effective naval fires that minimize the risk to friendly forces that are in close contact with the enemy. See Figure 22.

Figure 22. UAS Supporting Amphibious Ops and NFS

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Maritime/Joint Airspace Command and Control

Maritime airspace control – Nearly every naval surface combatant has a powerful radar sensor/weapons system; as a result, maritime airspace control tends to be more positive vice procedural. This emphasis on positive control involves more controlling agencies within the maritime domain.

Just as for air operations over land, naval aircraft, to include UAS, are governed by airspace C2 planning and execution documents, to include the ACO, ATO, and ADP. Refer to descriptions of these airspace C2 documents in Sect 3 of this guide. Unique maritime constructs and terms are described next.

A general schematic for the C2 of theater/battle group level UAS is depicted in Figure 23.

Figure 23. Theater/Battle Group UAS C2

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Maritime Airspace Control Terms

Figure 24 depicts an operational area with a defined surveillance area, vital areas, and classification, identification, and engagement areas. Descriptions of these areas follow.

Figure 24. Maritime Operational Area

Vital Area – is defined by the expected weapons release range of the threat and is centered on the high value unit. It is possible to have more than one vital area.

Classification, Identification, and Engagement Area – is the area outside the vital area but inside the surveillance area in which all contacts detected must be classified, identified, and monitored. The ability to escort, cover, or engage must be maintained. Any potential threat must be monitored prior to entering the vital area.

Surveillance Area – The area determined by the strike group commander where organic and inorganic sensors keep track of activity to prevent surprise contacts from entering the classification, identification, and engagement area.

UAS Airspace Control Limitations

UAS capability varies greatly among UAS types and assigned UAS missions. UAS typically lack the ability to see and avoid manned aircraft, but they may contain other onboard systems (radio, tactical data links, IFF) which allow the

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them to use standard deconfliction (altitude, lateral, timing) measures. Due to the limited performance of UAS, it may take several minutes to have a UAS laterally deconflict to a specific sector or change altitude. Controlling agencies should consider deconflicting UAS early to avoid slow execution later. Another major consideration when working with UAS is the lost link plan. The controlling agency and UA operator must develop the lost link plan to ensure proper deconfliction.

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UAS Mission Planning Checklist Duty assignments: Critical skill specialties identified and on-hand

Additional personnel necessary for 24-hour operations (if commander directed)

Enemy situation: Unit/order of battle/uniforms Battalion/company locations plotted on map Strengths/weaknesses Most probable COA Most dangerous COA ADA threat (for each weapon system)

System Location plotted on map Maximum/minimum range (threat rings plotted on map) Minimum engagement altitude Strengths Weaknesses How to defeat

Night vision capability EW threat

Meaconing, interference, jamming, and intrusion (MIJI) of UAS uplink/downlink

CBRN threat

UA should avoid CBRN presence Place M9 paper on UA

Friendly situation: Brigade mission/intent Battalion mission/intent Maps or imagery of operating area Friendly unit location (brigade headquarters plotted on map) Friendly graphics posted on map UAS readiness status Supported unit task/purpose Adjacent unit task/purpose Abort criteria Other UAS units task/purpose Other UAS units graphics posted on map NATO aviation/friendly scheme of maneuver ROE GCS/GCU and L/R site security

Additional UAS equipment necessary for 24-hour operations (if commander directed)

Evaluate all specified tasks from: OPORD WARNOs FRAGOs Verify ACO, ATO, SPINS requirements

ROZ locations/dimensions/frequency/call signs Artillery position area locations plotted

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Active routes/airspace control points (ACPs) plotted Verify method of airspace control

Positive control measures Procedural control measures

Verify H-hour time Spare UA procedures Emergency procedures Downed UA recovery plan Weather decision time Mission planning: Sensor selection (if not dual selectable)

EO and IR imagery payload for day/night operations Other sensors

Map reconnaissance of mission area Identify terrain that will interfere with LOS data link NAIs

Grids defining NAIs Heading and distance to NAI from launch point Heading and distance between NAIs

Identify/mark natural and manmade hazards to flight

Local hazards Sectionals

Alternate route (ingress and egress) Threat plotted along route Weather

Clouds Precipitation Wind Visibility Temperature Illumination

Flight route outside threat engagement rings Route time Loiter time Verify grids Check all altitudes, azimuths, and distances Times submitted to higher headquarters Waypoint card printed Air control points plotted on map Primary/alternate routes plotted on map Contingency actions Fuel planning: Availability and on-hand stock age of AVGAS/MOGAS Availability and on-hand stock age of batteries Availability and on-hand stock age of ammunition Estimated fuel burn rate Estimated battery usage rate Minimum fuel at departure Bingo fuel Communication plan: Flight operations TOCs, command nets

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Air battle net Fire support coordinator net Administrative and Logistics Operations Center net ATC (airfields, approach, and others) ROZ

LOS characteristics of terrain (UA limits of operation based on LOS data link)

Contingency actions Frequency compromise COMSEC compromise Emergency procedures for loss of signal Communication frequency bandwidth of UAS operation Frequency management OPSEC requirements EW considerations to include friendly communication interference Packet/card/map preparation Enemy graphics Friendly graphics ROZ graphics Flight routes Crew card Time flow Mission sequence Waypoint card Rehearsal setup

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Acronyms

Acronyms AAA anti-aircraft artillery AC2 airspace command and control ACA airspace control authority ACM airspace control measures ACMR airspace control means request ACO airspace control order ACP airspace control plan ACP air control point AD air defense ADA air defense artillery ADAM air defense and airspace management ADP air defense plane ALO air liaison officer AO area of operations ARFOR army forces ASUW antisurface warfare ASW antisubmarine warfare ATC air traffic control ATO air tasking order ATP allied tactical publication ATS air traffic services BAE brigade aviation element BCD battlefield coordination detachment BDA battle damage assessment BLOS beyond line of sight C2 command and control CAOC combined air operations center CAS close air support CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear CFACC combined force air component commander CGRS common geographic reference system COA course of action COMSEC communications security COP common operational picture CP command post CSAR combat search and rescue EO electro-optical EW electronic warfare FA field artillery FAC forward air controller FAC(A) forward air controller airborne

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Acronyms

FRAGO fragmentary order FMV full motion video FOV field of view FSCM fire support coordination measure G-3 assistant chief of staff-operations GARS global area reference system GCS ground control station GS general support IED improvised explosive device IFF identification, friend or foe IP ingress point IPB intelligence preparation of the battlespace IR infrared IRC internet relay chat ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance IWS information workspace JFC joint force commander JMO joint maritime operations JOA joint operations area L/R launch and recovery LD laser designator LNO liaison officer LOS line of sight LRE launch and recovery element LRF/D laser rangefinder/designator MDAS Mobile Directional Antenna System

METT-TC mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations

MIO maritime interdiction operation MUM manned-unmanned NAI named area of interest NFS naval fire support NLOA non-line of sight NRT near real time OPORD operation order OPSEC operations security OSRVT One System Remote Video Terminal ROE rules of engagement ROVER remotely operated video enhanced receiver ROZ restricted operations zone RSTA reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition RVT remote video terminal S3 operations staff officer SAAFR standard use army aircraft flight route SAM surface to air missile SAR synthetic aperture radar SATCOM satellite communications

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Acronyms

SCAR strike coordination and reconnaissance SEAD suppression of enemy air defense SPINS special instructions STOM ship to objective maneuver TA target acquisition TIC troops in contact TOC tactical operations center TOT time on target UA unmanned aircraft UAS unmanned aircraft system VS/MC2 Video Scout/MC2 WARNO warning order WAS wide area surveillance

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Wide Area Surveillance (WAS)

Select manned and unmanned platforms and sensors are being developed to provide motion imagery coverage of a wide area. The image quality of existing WAS sensors does not have the resolution or frame speed of current full motion video (FMV) sensors; current UAS WAS sensors are designed almost solely for forensic collection and analysis. Future planned systems will have greater resolution to provide higher fidelity motion imagery. Platforms configured with WAS systems dwell over one area for times much longer than traditional FMV assets allowing for long-term forensic collection for a specific target area. Ultimately, the mission of WAS is to provide broad area motion imagery enabling analysts and operators to find, fix, and track vehicles and groups within an area of interest, day or night, for persistent surveillance and concurrent near real time (NRT) situational awareness, forensic analysis, fusion, and cross-cueing with other ISR sensors. End users of a UAS WAS system must understand that WAS is not necessarily FMV and should not be employed as such.

Mission Employment Considerations

Planning considerations for employment of UAS WAS sensors are similar to those of ground units, other UAS, and manned aviation assets. The UAS LNO (or designated subject matter expert) facilitates the flow of information between UAS/WAS operations and the supported unit and ensures the supported unit understands both the capabilities and limitations of the UAS or WAS sensor. Potential missions include:

• Reconnaissance – Near real time imagery • Surveillance – Area surveillance in friendly or enemy territory • Situational Awareness and Situational Understanding – Provide

commanders with battlefield posture and patterns of life • Security (limited) – Reaction time and maneuver space for main

body and area security • Communication Support – Voice and data communications

retransmission (through the GCS) • Movement Support (limited) – Convoy security, mine/improvised

explosive device (IED) detection • Intelligence Preparation of the Environment – provide patterns of life

within the COP; provides contextual information for an area • Forensic Support – Following a significant event, provide information

leading up to an event if the event occurred within the COP; Significant Action – Reaction

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Threat Considerations

Avoid known heavy hostile areas that have AAA or surface to SAM capability. Although it is very difficult to shoot down a UAS, the route, altitude, and enter/exit points should be considered in pre-mission planning.

UAS WAS Request Procedures

The procedures for requesting WAS sensors are initially anticipated to be very similar to the procedures that currently exist.

Request for WAS support will initially be done using Air Support Request Message. However, as previously stated, a new request procedure will be developed because the Air Support Request Message does not provide the necessary fidelity regarding WAS mission requirements and is geared more towards the execution of CAS.

There are three categories of UAS support: preplanned, immediate, and dynamic re-tasking.

Preplanned – For theater-level, non-organic UAS controlled by CFACC, request for direct support of a preplanned mission must be submitted through use of a Joint Tactical Air Strike Request (Air Support Request Message) or a Air Support Request process or other theater/platform specific process. Timeline typically 12–72 hours prior to the new ATO execution period are considered pre-planned.

Immediate – Requests are submitted outside ATO cycle and expedited through IRC, email, telephone or radio, as required, using Air Support Request Message. General support (GS) can be requested outside the ATO cycle (through mission tasking order – MTO). However, the benefit of GS is lost if the system is continually moved to different COPs in a short period of time.

Dynamic Re-Tasking – This is a re-tasking of an UAS from an existing mission to a new target based on published priorities and criteria. Reasons for re-tasking include troops in contact or a high priority target opportunity. It is highly recommended that a WAS platform not be dynamically retasked.

NRT, SIGACT React, and Forensic Analysis – Typical forensic analyses include:

• CIED Study • Target Development • Smuggling Routes and Border Incursions • IPB • Pattern of Life • Indirect Fire (Point of Origin) Study

Products are disseminated either via e-mail or are posted on various intelligence SharePoint sites on SIPRNET. Products may also include overlay information such as collateral intelligence and/or SIGACTs. Product

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production time depends on the type of data or study requested. A video clip may be created within minutes and posted or e-mailed; an annotated product from a longer duration study can take much longer depending on the RFI.

Fused products, which include multiple intelligence disciplines, files, target folders, compiled multi-Intelligence reports) will also reside on the intelligence Sharepoint websites; they may also be emailed over SIPRNET directly to the customer.

Figure 25. Example UAS WAS Architecture

SAREO/IR

All weather SAR imagery and change detection GMTI and EO/IR cross cueing EO/IR

GMTI

Figure 26. Multi-sensor UAS WAS Systems Provide Forensic ISR

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One System Remote Video Terminal

OSRVT is a kit integrated with the ROVER systems that provides enhanced situational awareness with near Real-time Video and Telemetry Data from multiple manned and unmanned platforms: Raven, Shadow, Pioneer, IGNAT, Hunter, Warrior A, Predator, and other UAS. Current software supports decoding Telemetry and METADATA from multiple UAS, links data onto Falcon View maps, and supports off target calculations.

• Range – 10km and ~50 km w/ extended range antenna (Mobile Directional Antenna System – MDAS)

• Weight - 22-60 lbs base system with case • RF – C-band, L-band, KU bands, S band, UHF • Power - AC, DC and battery (4-12 hrs based on configuration)

System Capability Notes

• DVR, TIVO like capability – 10 hours of recording video • Telemetry Data Linked to FalconView with 2525 Symbology • JPEG Files With Embedded Metadata • Off Target Calculations • Tri-Band (C/L/Ku) Extended Range Antenna, up to 50km (Optional)

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VideoScout-MC2 (VS/MC2) Videoscout-MC2 is a portable remote video exploitation and management system with fully integrated Ku, C, L and S band receivers that provides enhanced situational awareness with near Real-time Video and Telemetry Data from multiple manned and unmanned platforms: Raven, Shadow, Pioneer, Scan Eagle, Hunter, Fire Scout, Predator, and other UAS. Current software supports decoding Telemetry and METADATA from multiple UAS, links data onto Falcon View maps.

• Range – 115km • Weight - 11-47 lbs base system with case • RF – C-band, L-band, S-band, KU bands • Power - AC, DC and battery (1-2 hrs based on configuration)

System Capability Notes

• DVR, TIVO like capability – 10 hours of recording video • Telemetry Data Linked to FalconView with 2525 Symbology • Create video clips and snapshots • Stream video over the network • Directional Ku antenna

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Air Support Request Ref: ATP-3.3.2.1, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for NATO Close Air Support and Air Interdiction

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CAS 9-Line Brief

CAS Check In CAS Check In Situation Update

C/S C/S Target/Situation

1. Msn # Msn # Threat Activity

2. # / Type # / Type Friendly Situation

3. Pos / Alt Pos / Alt Artillery Activity

4. Ordnance Ordnance Clearance Authority

5. Time On Station Time On Station Ordnance Requested

6. *Abort Code *Abort Code Remarks/Restrictions

CAS (9 Line) Briefing

1. IP

2. Hdg

3. Dist

4.*Elev

5. Description

6.*Coords (TGT Location)

G/N G/N G/N

W W W

7. Mark

8. Friendlies

9. Egress Remarks (*Restrictions)

Do not transmit line numbers. Units of measures are standard unless otherwise specified. Lines 4, 6, and any restrictions are mandatory read-back items. FAC may request read-back of any additional items required.

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ISR 8-Line Brief

Dynamic/Immediate ISR Request (8 Line)

1. Desired ISR support or effect (full motion video, positive ID, EO, IR, MIT)

2. Target Name

3. Target Location

4. Essential Elements of Information (EEI’s)

5. Latest Time Information of Value (LTIOV)

6. Reporting instructions (IRC, IPL, Classification)

7. ISR asset detection concern (low, medium or high)

8. Airspace deconfliction information if you need to stay clear of an area for deconfliction.

Remarks: Lines 1-6 are mandatory, 7 and 8 are optional.

F

ATP-3.3.7.1(A)(1)