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Development and Disorder:Striking a Balance

Feature: Selection of

!e Sokolkovo Project: From the Mire of Corruption to the Freedom of Technology Alexandra Cox Reagan !ompson

School Feeding Programs in Kenya: Transitioning to a Homegrown Approach Nica Langinger

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Cover Photo: iStockPhoto

3e Stanford Journal of International Relations, an a4liate of the Department of International Relations at Stanford University, is published twice yearly.

Copyright © 2011. No material may be reproduced without the consent of the Journal.

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E2./&+.!" B&!+2Editors in ChiefAmanda McFarlaneMitul Bhat

Layout DirectorAlison Ge

Financial DirectorBenjamin Lei

Managing DirectorDiana Chou

Section EditorsAriella AxlerIsabella Yunfei Fu

3is Journal could not have been published without the support of the Department of International Relations, and the Publications Board of the Associated Students of Stanford University. 3e Journal would like to thank Professor Judith Goldstein for her guidance and assistance.

Mauricio GrandeSanjana ParikhSophie Wiepking-Brown

Associate EditorsAlexander BinnieAlex Holtzman Ben GrafentinCharles SchroederChris KremerDerrick StatenElizabeth FairKelly DingMarcheta MarshallMark Johnson-HammerMarshall Watkins

Melissa HesselgraveNica LangingerPatrick CirenzaRaiyan KhanSamra AdeniStacey WongSukrit NarulaTim NortonTony LiuUttara Sivaram

Layout EditorAlex Holtzman

3e Fall issue of the Stanford Journal of International Relations, Development and Disorder: Striking a Balance, examines a wide range of issues in the arena of international politics. From the political developments surrounding the Iranian nuclear program to the public-private partnership attempting to spur innovation in Russia, the articles and columns tackle the attempts to balance a variety of con5icting issues and interests in the pursuit of development.

First, Reagan 3ompson presents her paper, entitled “3e E6ectiveness of the Fourth Round of Sanctions against Iran,” which examines the impact of the various US and EU unilateral sanctions against Iran. 3ompson 7nds that the sanctions have interfered with the country’s economic growth but fail to actually cease Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons.

Next, Alexandra Cox’s paper, “3e Skolkovo Project: From the Mire of Corruption to the Freedom of Technology,” discusses the reasons that prevent Russia’s emergence as a global business power. Cox examines the e6ectiveness of the proposed “Silicon Valley” project in Russia, as the latest initiative to transition the country into the competitive global business market.

Lastly, Nica Langinger’s paper, “School Feeding Programs in Kenya: Transitioning to a homegrown approach,” reveals the ine4ciencies in Kenya’s agricultural sector even though the country possesses a sizeable sector. Langinger investigates the food-de7cit the country is experiencing by providing reasons for Kenya’s failing food economy. She then introduces an approach to mitigate the e6ects of this problem on the group most heavily impacted, school children, by focusing on school-feeding programs.

3e Journal launches a new feature with this issue, columns by sta6 on relevant international issues. 3ese columns begin with a timely column by Elizabeth Fair on the recent elections in Tunisia and the country’s transition to becoming the 7rst truly democratic Arab nation. Remaining within the sphere of the Middle East, Marshall Watkins argues that the United States should overcome its di6erences with Turkey and build stronger ties with the democratic Muslim nation, one that has been an increasingly important player in the region. Ariella Axler discusses the energy needs of the US in the context of the ongoing turmoil in the Middle East and argues for greater diversity in energy sources and working towards energy independence. Further east, Raiyan Khan assesses the United States’ e6orts in Pakistan, speci7cally the increased use of drone strikes in the “Afpak” theater. Lastly, Chris Kremer looks at the historic relationship between Malaysia and Indonesia, two countries closely related ethnically and linguistically but with divergent colonial and recent histories. His look at the dynamics of that relationship is interesting and 7ts smoothly with the overall theme of balance amidst competing international pressures.

It is our hope that these papers and columns provide thought-provoking fodder for discussion and debate. Happy reading and do write to us with feedback. Also, be sure to visit us on the web at http://sjir.stanford.edu/.

Mitul Bhat and Amanda McFarlaneEditors in Chief

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16

School Feeding Programs in Kenya:Transitioning to a Homegrown Approach

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26

Drone Strikes in Pakistan: MitigatingBloodshed or Amplifying it?

183e Sokolkovo Project: From the Mire of Corruption to the Freedom of Technology

By Alexandra Cox

28

3e Politics, Economics, and Security ofMiddle Eastern Oil Supplies: A Callfor American Energy Independence

By Ariella Axler

63e E6ectiveness of the Fourth Round of Sanctions against Iran

30

Malaysia and Nusantara Heritage inthe Adik-Abang Relationship

By Christopher Kremer

3e Election of Ennahda and the Future of Tunisian Democracy

By Elizabeth Fair

Where West meets East: the Case for a Special US-Turkish Relationship

By Marshall Watkins

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{ }by Reagan !ompson

!e E"ectiveness of the

In June 2010, the United Nations Security Council adopted its fourth round of sanctions against Iran. !ere have been further US and EU unilateral sanctions against Iran and a large private sector voluntary pullout from the country. But are these three approaches successful in slowing and ultimately ending Iran’s nuclear program? A closer look reveals that these e"orts are helping to strangle the Iranian economy, but have not led to an end of the Iranian regime’s pursuit of a nuclear weapon. Until Russia, Germany, and China limit their trade with Iran, or until the world is ready to enact sanctions against the country’s oil sector, Iran will continue to work toward a nuclear weapon.

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Reagan #ompson is a senior studying International Relations with a concentration in Comparative and Historical Analysis and a minor in Chinese. She is interested in US foreign policy and has interned the last three summers at the State Department. She will be completing a thesis next year on the Chinese in$uence in Africa through the Center for International Security and Cooperation’s (CISAC) Honors Program. She wrote this paper as a student in Dr. Abbas Milani’s Political Science class on Iranian politics.

This summer, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1929 (UNSCR 1929) as the %rst part of the international community’s

three-pronged response to Iran. Following this resolution, the United States and other nations enacted the second prong: unilateral sanctions against Iran. #e third prong is the withdrawal of private industry from Iran. As it is essential that the international community prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons, it is important that the sanctioning nations are able to gauge the e&ectiveness of their responses. While this recent round of sanctions has imposed a signi%cant burden on the Iranian regime, it has not led to any signi%cant changes in its behavior. Because other methods of pressuring Iran, such as oil sanctions, a military strike, containment, and engagement, are currently unfeasible, the international community is forced into an uneasy stalemate while Iran continues to develop its nuclear program. #is paper will broadly review sanctions against Iran and show that the three-pronged approach of the United Nations (UN) sanctions, unilateral sanctions, and private pullout has slowed Iran’s nuclear program. However, tougher measures such as sanctions against Iran’s oil sector are still necessary to force the regime into irreversibly dismantling its nuclear weapons program. I will begin with a background of the previous rounds of sanctions against Iran before turning to a discussion on the international community’s three-pronged approach to Iran’s nuclear program. I will also analyze the international and Iranian responses to these sanctions. Next, I will examine the e&ects of these sanctions, in light of their e&ect on the economy, pressure on the regime, and ability to achieve their objectives. I will conclude by explaining that while sanctions have ultimately failed in achieving their goals, they are the only realistic option currently available to

the international community. Iran has a dubious history of adhering to its international obligations and cooperating with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). As a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran is allowed to engage in the peaceful production and use of nuclear energy. However, its secret development of nuclear sites within its borders has caused the world to doubt the peaceful intentions of the country’s nuclear program. Tensions between Iran and the IAEA reached a head in 2006 when Iran failed to comply with IAEA requests and inspections. When Iran announced that it had successfully enriched uranium, the Security Council was forced to respond. On July 31, 2006, the UN Security Council passed UNSCR 1696, demanding that Iran suspend all enrichment and reprocessing, as well as research and development, for its nuclear program. When Iran failed to comply, the UN unanimously approved UNSCR 1737 on December 23, 2006, calling on states to impose a freeze on the %nancial assets of persons and entities involved in Iran’s nuclear activities and to block Iran’s import and export of nuclear material. Following further Iranian recalcitrance, the Security Council unanimously voted in favor of UNSCR 1747 on March 24, 2007. Resolution 1747 imposed an embargo on all Iranian arms exports and extended the asset freeze and travel ban to members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). On March 3, 2008, the Security Council unanimously approved another resolution, UNSCR 1803, which extended %nancial and trade restrictions against Iran.1 A'er further resistance from Iran, the Security Council moved forward with sanctions once more and adopted UNSCR 1929 on June 9, 2010. #e United States helped organize votes for this resolution, and the Obama administration made signi%cant concessions to ensure international solidarity. For example, in order to obtain Russian support for enhanced sanctions, President Obama agreed to move a planned US missile defense shield from Poland and the Czech Republic to the Mediterranean.2 Brazil and Turkey voted against the resolution because of a deal they made with Iran in May 2010. #e agreement stipulated that Iran would ship 1,200 kilograms of low enriched uranium to Turkey and then receive nuclear fuel for supposed use in its medical research reactor. Turkey and Brazil claimed the deal would be more e&ective than sanctions

{ }

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in getting Iran to cease its enrichment activities.3 Because Lebanon was the only Arab state on the Security Council, it handled its delicate situation by abstaining from voting to save face among its Western allies while appeasing Hezbollah.4 UNSCR 1929 is the strictest round of sanctions against Iran yet.5 It expanded upon previous rounds of UN sanctions and added further restrictions on Iranian trade. First, 1929 subjects additional individuals and entities, including IRGC a(liates, to an asset freeze and travel ban. Second, the Resolution bans the provision of %nancial services and insurance to Iran. #ird, if shipments are suspected of carrying prohibited material, 1929 gives countries authority to inspect the shipments, and dispose of cargo. Fourth, the resolution bars Iran from investing in uranium mining and other nuclear activities in other countries. Finally, the resolution requires countries to insist that companies in their country, including banks, refrain from doing business with Iran if there is reason to believe that such business could further Iran’s nuclear program. To monitor compliance with this Resolution, the Security Council established a panel of eight experts to collect and review reports with information on how countries have implemented the resolution. Despite these provisions, there are several loopholes in the resolution. For example, although the resolution bans the sale of most categories of heavy arms to Iran, it only requests restraint in the sales of light arms and does not bar sales of missiles (that are not on the UN Registry of Conventional Arms). Furthermore, although countries have the legal right to inspect shipments to and from Iran, the inspecting country must %rst receive concurrence from the country that owns that ship. Unilateral sanctions are the second prong of measures against Iran. #e US is by far the most active participant, though the European Union (EU) and other nations have followed suit. #e US has been sanctioning Iran since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. US e&orts to curb international investment in Iran’s energy sector began in 1996 with the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA). #e ISA mandates US penalties on foreign companies that maintain business dealings with Iran’s energy sector. A'er the passage of 1929, President Obama approved the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act (CISADA), which expanded ISA. #e CISADA attempts to restrict Iran’s ability to make or import gasoline. Executive Orders 12959, 13324, 13553, and 13382 similarly attempt to encircle Iran by

enacting US sanctions on Iranian o(cials and freezing assets of those supporting terrorism and proliferation. To enforce these sanctions, the US can impose multi-million dollar %nes on businesses found to be in violation of the law. US sanctions, while strict, have not been able to totally shut o& US trade with Iran. #e Treasury Department has allowed around 10,000 exceptions to US sanctions to companies like Kra' and Pepsi for humanitarian or other reasons. A State Department o(cial defended these exceptions by noting that “the legal export of popcorn, chewing gum, cake sprinkles and hot sauce is not propping up the Iranian government.”6 Others acclaim, however, that favoritism has allowed Iran economic freedom. #e US has led the way in encouraging other countries to enact nation-speci%c regulations to further isolate Iran. #e EU, Australia, Canada, India, Japan, Norway, and South Korea all have imposed restrictions against Iran with varying levels of intensity. #e EU has somewhat aligned itself with the US by prohibiting EU involvement in Iran’s energy and %nance sectors. Within the EU, however, there are varying levels of cooperation, as I will outline later. Russia and China have not enacted their own unilateral sanctions against Iran. As noted above, both these countries support the %rst pronged attack against Iran, UN sanctions, but are much less enthusiastic about the second and third prongs. Consequently, Russian and Chinese trade with Iran is a signi%cant reason why the regime is still %nancially a$oat. #e third prong is private sector voluntary pullout from Iran. #is response is motivated by the UN sanctions, but is not required by law. Financial institutions, energy companies, and businesses make choices based on cost/bene%t analysis and their strategy thus far seems to be to prevent Iran, a country reliant on global trade, from being able to do business outside its borders. #e US Treasury Department began by blacklisting the largest Iranian %nancial institutions and banks in other nations such as Britain, France, Germany, Japan, China, Malaysia, Bahrain, and Italy followed suit. #e withdrawal of more than 80 large %nancial institutions such as UBS, HSBC, and AG has begun to wreck havoc on Iran’s fragile %nancial situation. Former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice noted that while these actions were not sanctions in the traditional sense, they were having similar e&ects and working towards the same goals.7

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#e e&ect of private pullout is evident in the major industries, including the energy sector. Major gasoline suppliers such as BP, Glencore, Lukoil, Reliance Industries, Royal Dutch Shell, Total, Tra%gura, and Vitol have stopped dealing with Iran. Among many others, Halliburton, GE, Huntsman Chemicals, Kia, Siemens AG, Mercedes Benz, Toyota, and #yssen-Krupphave o(cially ceased doing business in Iran.8 However, because there are few enforcement mechanisms, it is di(cult to determine the e&ectiveness of this third. #ere have been several accusations that these companies are making statements against Iran, while still engaging in clandestine trade with the country. #e ultimate purpose of the three-pronged approach of UN sanctions, unilateral sanctions, and private pullout is to ensure that Iran does not develop a nuclear weapon. #e hope is that by making it more expensive

portray the international community as a weak force that desires to unfairly discriminate against Iran and hurt its people. In contrast to Ahmadinejad, other Iranian leaders understand the gravity of the sanctions. Former President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani warned the regime “to take the sanctions seriously and not as a joke,” recognizing the strictness of the world’s response to Iran.11  Former Prime Minister and leader of the Green Movement, Mir-Hossein Mousavi similarly agree with Rafsanjani on the severity of these sanctions. One of his senior advisors said that the sanctions would have a “clear e&ect on the day to day lives of the people.”12 With a grasp of the response to Iran, I now turn to examine the sanctions’ e&ectiveness based on their impact on the economy, pressure on the regime, and

and di(cult for Iran to obtain industrial equipment and nuclear supplies, the country’s nuclear program will be substantially slowed and the regime will be forced to abandon its nuclear weapon ambitions. #us, the sanctions hope to change the regime’s cost-bene%t calculus of its nuclear program. #e international community would also like to see the Iranian public voice their dissatisfaction with the Iranian regime and state of the economy, which would push the regime towards compromise. Further, the international community wants to ensure the integrity of the international treaty system and is thus punishing Iran for its decision to ignore its NPT obligations. Now with an understanding of the three-pronged approach to Iran, we can examine how Iran has responded. Statements by Iranian leaders generally fall into two categories: those that recognize the impact of the sanctions, and those that refuse to acknowledge their in$uence. A'er passage of UNSCR 1929, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei stated that sanctions have “no e&ect on the people’s livelihood.”9 President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said the sanctions “are annoying $ies, like a used tissue.”10 While there is some truth in his statement that sanctions have been tried in the past and have failed, his overly colorful language points to his refusal to acknowledge the real pain sanctions are in$icting on Iran. Ahmadinejad further stated that sanctions actually make Iran stronger by encouraging self-su(ciency and technical progress. #e Iranian regime is attempting to

completion of stated objectives. When evaluating whether or not sanctions have accomplished their goals, it is important to remember that it takes years for sanctions to a&ect a nation. #e cumulative e&ect of years of sanctions is only starting to have a strong negative impact on the Iranian economy. It is di(cult to determine direct causality, but it is safe to assume that sanctions have exacerbated the problems from economic and political mismanagement of the regime. Analysis is also made di(cult by the fact that the regime has not released up-to-date numbers on economic data such as gross domestic product (GDP) or household expenditures. By looking at economic data such as consumer prices, export prices, oil exports and imports, the subsidy program, and GDP, it is clear that the sanctions are having a strangling e&ect on Iran’s economy. Iran’s economy is a mess. #e regime claims that unemployment is 13.2 percent13 but opposition

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leaders insist that it is more likely around 20 percent.14 Similarly, the Central Bank says that in$ation is at 14 percent,15 but some economic data indicates the rate could be twice as high.16 #e Iranian consumer price index (CPI), which measures the changes in the price level of consumer goods and services, has skyrocketed in the past years. #is means that consumer prices are soaring and businesses are %nding it increasingly di(cult to make ends meet. According to the Iranian Central Bank, the general CPI for urban Iranians has jumped 12.9 percent from 2009-2010. In comparison, the US CPI increased 1.4 percent for this same time period.17 #e cost of food and beverages in Iran rose almost 20 percent from 2009-2010. As Figure 1 shows, since about March 2002 until March 2011, Iran’s CPI has been on a rapid rise.18 As the cost of living in Iran increases, there is also greater chance for domestic unrest. For the international strategy to be successful, it is essential that the Iranian people see the regime, not sanctioning nations as the reason for these economic problems. The world hopes that as Iranian citizens find it increasingly difficult to afford food, clothing, water, and other basic necessities, they will turn against the regime. If a backlash occurs, and Iranians begin to blame other nations for their economic malaise, the purpose behind much of the sanctions will no longer be valid. Currently, it seems that the Iranian public rightly blames their government for the economic management. The sanctions are working to economically isolate Iran and squeeze it from the global market. High levels of economic distress stoke existing levels of social unrest. With about 60 percent of the

that the adverse business environment due to sanctions contributed to the event. The economic disturbance caused by the sanctions is also causing internal political disturbance. There have been several arrests of supposed “nuclear spies” and President Ahmadinejad fired Foreign Minister Mannouchehr Mottaki for failing to prevent the imposition of sanctions, though this move was also politically motivated. In response to the economy’s poor performance, the Iranian Finance Minister also fired six cabinet ministers and two Central Bank governors. Iran is increasingly dependent on oil exports for its economic livelihood, but sanctions are working to curtail Tehran’s revenues. As a result of mismanagement and the inability to procure Western technology, Iran’s oil production has fallen from about 4.1 million barrels a day in the mid-2000s to only 3.8 million barrels a day in 2010. The graph on the right shows this precipitous drop. Figure 2 shows that while Iran’s oil production has been cyclical since sanctions

Iranian population under 30, high unemployment means that many young adults are willing to participate in opposition movements and advocate change. Although the regime attempts to suppress

any uprisings, there is evidence of increasing domestic and political unrest. In July 2010, one month after the passage of UNSCR 1929, there was a two-week strike in Tehran by bazaar merchants. Ostensibly it was a protest against an increase in taxation, but it is likely

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were first imposed in 2006, there has been a general decrease in the total production. Figure 3 shows that Iran’s oil-pumping capacity is expected to decline about 18 percent from current levels of 3.8 million barrels a day to 3.3 million barrels a day in 2015. This decrease in production translates into fewer exports as countries attempt to diversify their oil supply and turn away from Iran and less revenue for the regime. These economic pressures are forcing changes in the way the Iranian government is run. In order to get basic goods, the government must pay bribes, middlemen, and black market fees. At the end of 2010, the regime began to phase out its substantial subsidy program. It is likely that the government was forced to end these subsidies due to declining oil revenues and the increasing cost of doing business in the international market. The government began with a reduction in subsidies on gas and bread. Immediately, the price of bread spiked from 15 cents to 40 cents. The biggest cuts and jumps in prices are likely yet to come. This huge increase has the potential to turn the Iranian people against the regime, though there has

900,000 a day. Further, investment in Iran’s energy sector has decreased dramatically. All foreign firms have pulled out of the South Pars Gas Field Project, which had the potential to greatly grow Iran’s natural gas production. Increases in consumer prices and decline in oil production and exports all point to a declining gross domestic product (GDP). Although the numbers are difficult to determine, it is clear that each successive round of sanctions lowers Iran’s GDP. Figure 4 shows Iran’s GDP growth from 1980 to the present. Each dotted vertical line indicates new international or US sanctions against Iran. Although GDP growth has been fairly stable over the past decade, predictions for the present and future do not look promising. In addition to the economic problems above, the Iranian regime faces further commerce issues. Tehran is unable to attract desperately needed foreign investment. It is estimated that sanctions have deterred about $50 billion in investment in Iran’s energy sector. Soon after the passage of 1929, Lloyd’s of Britain announced that it would cease to insure Iranian ships and gasoline. This makes international trade substantially more difficult as firms are increasingly wary of the risks associated with doing business with Iran. The US Treasury Department’s sanction of Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), the regime’s shipping company of choice, is harming Iran’s ability to ship goods. * There is unrest among merchants whose trouble obtaining financing, insurance, and shipping is driving up their costs by an estimated 40 percent. As the cost of doing business in Iran increases substantially, it becomes increasingly difficult to provide employment and goods for a country of almost 73 million. Undersecretary of Treasury Stuart Levey noted, “Iran is effectively unable to access financial services from reputable banks and is increasingly unable to conduct major transactions in dollars or Euros.” In addition to the withdrawal of large banks noted above, there seems to be a regional movement against Iran as well. For example, out of the 48 banks in Dubai, all but a few have cut off new business with Iranian banks cited in UN resolutions. These decisions have wide reaching effects on the Iranian economy. When the United Arab Emirates, a major Iranian financial hub, began restricting transactions with Iranian banks in September 2010, the value of the rial, Iran’s currency, fell by about 15 percent.

been little public unrest as of yet. International sanctions are forcing the regime to make tough economic decisions that further erode its domestic standing. Although the government has offered payments to the lower classes, it is only small amount that few Iranians have actually received. Although Iran is home to the world’s third largest oil reserves, it does not have the refinement capacity to produce its own fuel and thus it imports a sizeable amount of gasoline. As many major oil companies have refused to do business with Iran, it has faced difficulty in procuring enough fuel to run the country. It is estimated that since the imposition of the US Comprehensive Iran Sanctions Act in 2010, gas deliveries to Iran have fallen 75 percent, from about 3.5 million barrels a day to about

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To review, increases in consumer prices point to the cultivation of a difficult business environment in Iran, which is stoking domestic unrest. Decreases in oil production and exports as well as declining GDP have meant a drop in government revenue, prompting the end of the subsidy program. Fewer oil imports and other commercial strains are further indicators of the tangible impacts sanctions are having on the Iranian economy and regime. Despite this progress, there is evidence that subversion and illegal activity are allowing Iran to continue to function economically and to expand its nuclear program. For example, a wide range of US military and dual-use goods are illegally transshipped to Iran through the UAE, Malaysia, and Singapore. There have been several international cases of this subversion. In a case in 2009, a well-connected Indian businessman secretly provided cladding, thermal insulation, and ancillary equipment to Iran in a variety of shipments. Frighteningly, all of those materials can be used in the construction of a nuclear reactor. Further evidence indicates that many Iranians in Azerbaijan are involved in Iranian regime-related profit making, sanctions busting, and money laundering. The practice of establishing front companies and reshipping materials to Iran also allows the regime to circumvent sanctions. In 2008, it is estimated that

tell another story. The UAE is not the only culprit however. Several other nations have been increasing their trade with Iran even while the UN and many other countries seek to economically isolate Iran as a way to encourage non-proliferation. According to Karim Sadjadpour, an associate at the Carnegie Endowment, as trade between

to 2.5 billion Euros in less than a year from January-August 2010. The German-Iranian Chamber of Industry and Commerce in Tehran lists 200 German firms in Iran that are “making a major contribution to sustaining the present Iranian regime.” While evidence clearly suggests that sanctions are negatively affecting the Iranian economy and are pressuring the regime to change, there are substantial and successful efforts to evade sanctions. In order

to judge the true effectiveness of the sanctions, one must look at the original intentions of the sanctions. From the beginning of this paper, I noted that the primary international objective was to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. Sanctions are a way to slow its development and ultimately lead to its end. Has the three-pronged approach of UN sanctions, unilateral sanctions, and private pullout slowed Iran’s nuclear program? Based on preliminary analysis, yes,

80 percent of the trade between the UAE and Iran was made up of goods that were re-exported from the UAE. By shipping goods to the UAE and then shipping them to Iran, the regime is able to evade sanctions. Thousands of front-companies in Dubai exist solely to get contraband materials into Iran. To some, Dubai is known as “Iran’s backdoor to the West” and provides Iran with everything from household goods to military equipment. While the UAE officially supports the sanctions, its porous borders

Iran and the EU has declined for the past years Iranian trade with China has increased substantially. China is very dependent on Iranian oil and it is predicted that trade between Iran and China will hit $50 billion by 2015. Figure 5 shows how trade between Iran and other nations has changed since 2003. China, India, South Korea and the UAE show huge increases. In order for sanctions to be truly effective, every nation needs to be cutting back on its trade with Iran, not increasing it. There have been further changes since Figure 5’s publication in 2009. Although it shows that German trade with Iran decreased from 2003-2009, there is evidence to suggest that there has actually been an increase in trade since 2009. The German newspaper Handelsblatt reported that exports from Germany to Iran increased 11.6 percent

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the sanctions have slowed the program, but not to a satisfactory level. On one hand, sanctions have made it increasingly difficult for Iran to acquire critical inputs for uranium enrichment, such as carbon fiber and a type of high-strength steel. On the other, each day that passes is another opportunity for Iran to develop its nuclear weapons program and figure out ways to circumvent sanctions. Figure 6 shows that in February 2008, Iran produced about 43 kilograms of low-enriched uranium and that the amount jumped to almost 120 kilograms in April 2010. Despite all the sanctions, Iran has continued to enrich uranium and its nuclear stockpile is increasing rapidly. With regards to converting its nuclear materials into weapons, Iranian missile capacity has been increasing as well. Further more, since 1985, Iranian missile range has also been steadily improving, despite frequent sanctions. As of yet, sanctions have failed to curtail the regime’s nuclear program. Tehran seems as obstinate as ever in its pursuit of a nuclear weapon. Public outcry has also failed to develop to a point where it can force the regime to change directions on this issue. Fortunately, sanctions do not seem to be unfairly targeting the civilian population and Iranian citizens still blame the regime for their economic situation. Sanctions have helped show the Iranian regime the pain of isolation. As private companies and countries refuse to do business with Iran, it is becoming clearer that Tehran’s list of friends is quickly shortening. It is evident also that by punishing Iran the international community has helped ensure the integrity of the international treaty system, even while nations such as China and Germany continually undermine that offer. Nevertheless, the offer of engagement still stands and there is hope that Iran may one day reintegrate into the international community if it fulfills its international obligations. Despite these positive results, however, significant loopholes remain. Subversion tactics are hard to suppress and Iranian oil continues to flow amidst private withdrawal and a suffering economy. Ultimately, there is inadequate international commitment to truly isolate Iran. While there are estimates that Iran will not have a nuclear weapon until 2015, it is entirely undesirable for Iran to ever have such a weapon. Two things are needed for international sanctions to effectively stop Iran’s nuclear program. First, there must be real international unity and solidarity of mission in isolating Iran. Russia, Germany,

and China need to move to limit their trade with Iran. Each nation needs to enact its own strict sanctions against Iran. Countries such as the UAE should not tolerate the subversion of sanctions. Second, the Iranian people must demand change. Recent uprisings in the Middle East provide a glimmer of hope that domestic unrest can be a powerful tool against dictators. Sanctions against Iran’s oil industry might be the next step the international community is forced to take against Iran. Iran currently exports about 2.5 million barrels of oil a day, and the loss of this supply would send global prices skyrocketing. In reality, however, the world lacks preference and money for this type of action. Additionally, because oil revenues make up about 80 percent of the government’s budget, a true embargo on Iranian oil would certainly harm the civilian population. The sanctioning nations would have to be sure to prevent any domestic blowback against the sanctions because sanctions are never intended to target innocent civilians. Although sanctions against Iran’s energy sector are currently unfeasible, it is plausible to enforce sanctions that hinder the regime’s ability to act. For example, the U.N could sanction monitoring technology that the regime uses to spy on its people. Firms should be barred from making trades like Nokia did in 2008, which provided the regime with the technology needed to monitor and control telephone calls. The international community’s three-pronged approach to Iran’s nuclear program consisting of UNSCR 1929, unilateral sanctions, and the private pullout have slowed Iran’s nuclear program. Increases in consumer prices, decreases in oil production and exports, the end of the subsidy program, decreasing oil imports, declining GDP and other commercial strains show that the sanctions are strangling Iran’s economy. However, while sanctions have kept Tehran weak, they have not forced a fundamental change in the country’s policies. Sanctions are the only realistic option currently available to the international community but currently unsuccessful due to significant loopholes. Sanctions against Iran’s oil sector have the potential to bring the regime to its knees but are currently infeasible. Iran’s nuclear program has proceeded due to a lack of international unity. Countries such as Russia, Germany, and China need to take their own independent steps to ensure Iran does not develop the bomb.

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E#$#%&'(1Smith, “Iran’s Nuclear Program” 2Philip “Russia Says It Will Join Sanctions” 3BBC “Iran Signs Nuclear Deal” 4Kollock “Lebanon Cautions on Iran Sanctions” 5Warner “Examining the E&ects” 6Johnson, “Treasury Defends 10,000 Exceptions” 7Wright “Stuart Levey’s War”8Katzman “Iran Sanctions” pg. 329Erdbrink, “Iran’s Khamenei Says” 10A.P. “UN Approves New Sanctions” Levey “Remarks”11#e Green Voice of Freedom “Mousavi Advisor” 12Freedom Messenger “Real Unemployment Level”13Inside of Iran “Con$icting Reports on Iran’s Unemployment”14Daily Star “Iran Central Bank Governor Says In$ation Rate Rose”15Newsweek “In Iran, In$ation Could #reaten Regime” 16Bureau of Labor Statistics “Consumer Price Index”17Central Bank “Consumer Price Index” 18Sadjadpour Lecture 19Katzman “Iran Sanctions” pg. 5020Katzman “Iran Sanctions” pg. 49 21Wright “Stuart Levey’s War”22Blas “Sanctions Put Choker on Iran Oil Exports”23Blas “Sanctions Put Choker on Iran Oil Exports”24Katzman “Iran Sanctions” pg. 5125Katzman “Iran Sanctions” pg. 1426BBC “Squeezing Iran” (For an interactive version of the graphic, go to

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-10727616) 27Katzman “Iran Sanctions” pg. 5128Katzman “Iran Sanctions” pg. 34 * For a short video on this topic, see http://www.nytimes.

com/2010/06/08/world/middleeast/08sanctions.html.29Murphy, “Iran’s Getaway” 30Levey “Remarks”31Wright “Stuart Levey’s War”32Katzman “Iran Sanctions” pg. 49 33GAO “Complete and Timely Licensing Data Needed” 34Institute for Science and International Security, “State Department

Cables” 35Pan Armenian Net, “Iranians in Baku Involved in Money Laundering

Activities”36DiPaola, “Iran May Invade UN Sanctions” Foroohar “Dubai Helps Iran Evade Sanctions” 37Tehran Times, “Iran-China Trade” 38Blas “Sanctions Put Choker on Iran Oil”39Tehran Times, “Iran-Germany Trade” 40Kuntzel “Who Is Who in German Trade”41Levinson, “Sanctions Slow Iran’s Warhead Capacity”42Financial Times “Are Iran Nuclear Sanctions Working?”43Katzman “Iran Sanctions” pg. 2 44Cellan-Jones “Hi-Tech Helps Iran”

W!"#$ C%&'(America.gov “Clinton: Iran Sanctions Working, Need to be Maintained”

US Department of State, January 10, 2010 http://www.america.gov/st/peacesec-english/2011/January/20110110120608nehpets4.630679e-02.html.

Anton, Michael “Iran and the Costs of Containment” National Review, May 3, 2010. http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/229663/iran-and-costs-containment-michael-anton.

Armagost, Jason “Iran and the Use of Force” Lecture to PS114S, January 12, 2010.

Associated Press “UN Approves New Sanctions Against Iran” Fox News. June 9, 2010. http://www.foxnews.com/world/2010/06/09/diplomats-say-russia-france-dismiss-turkish-brazilian-proposal-iranian-nuclear/.

BBC “Iran Signs Nuclear Fuel Deal with Iran” May 17, 2010. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8685846.stm.

BBC “Squeezing Iran: Oil and Sanctions” July 26, 2010. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-10727616.

BBC “Timeline: Iran-US Ties” January 16, 2009 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3362443.stm.

Blas, Javier “Sanctions Put Choker on Iran Oil Exports” #e Financial Times, September 13, 2010. http://www.'.com/cms/s/0/8efd517e-bf5d-11df-965a-00144feab49a.html##axzz1GYK6dIln.

Bureau of Labor Statistics, Department of Labor “Consumer Price Index” News Release, January 2011 www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/cpi.pdf.

Bruno, Greg “#e Lengthening List of Iran Sanctions”, Council on Foreign Relations, June 28, 2010, http://www.cfr.org/iran/lengthening-list-iran-sanctions/p20258.

Byman, Daniel; Indyk, Martin; Maloney, Suzanne; O’Hanlon, Michael; Riedel, Bruce “Which Path to Persia” #e Brookings Institution, June 2009.

Cellan-Jones, Rory “Hi-Tech Helps Iran Monitoring” BBC News. June 22, 2009. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/8112550.stm.

Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran “Consumer Price Index for All Urban Customers Azar 1389” January 2011 http://www.cbi.ir/category/1624.aspx.

Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran “Export Price Index in Iran” February 2011, http://www.cbi.ir/category/1618.aspx.

Daily Star “Iran Central Bank Governor Says In$ation Rate Rose to 14 Percent: IRNA”, April 30, 2011.

http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Apr/30/Iran-central-bank-governor-says-in$ation-rate-rose-to-14-percent-IRNA.ashx#axzz1Kxf9qXax.

Dareini, Ali Akbar “Ahmadinejad: Sanctions Make Iran Stronger” #e Hu(ngton Post, April 3, 2010, http://www.hu(ngtonpost.com/2010/04/03/ahmadinejad-sanctions-mak_n_524425.html.

DiPaola, Anthony; Meyer, Henry “Iran May Evade UN Sanctions as UAE Delivers Fuel” Bloomberg News, October 29, 2009 http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=axOOTd6n4eBw.

Erdbrink, #omas “Iran’s Khamenei Says Sanctions Appear Aimed at Creating Division” #e Washington Post, October 19, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/10/19/AR2010101904749.html.

Faucon, Benoit; Swartz, Spencer “Iran’s Falling Oil Output Means Less Revenue, Clout” June 26, 2010 http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704569204575328851816763476.html.

Financial Times “Are Iran Nuclear Sanctions Working?” July 12, 2010. www.'.com/cms/s/0/994a262a-8dc6-11df-9153-00144feab49a.html.

Foroohar, Kambiz “Dubai Helps Iran Evade Sanctions as Smugglers Ignore US Laws” Bloomberg News, January 25, 2010

http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=av5smtYe_DDA.

Freedom Messenger, “Real Unemployment Level in Iran Is Higher than O(cial Data” April 22, 2011.

http://www.freedomessenger.com/real-unemployment-level-in-iran-higher-than-o(cial-data/.

Government Accountability O(ce “Complete and Timely Licensing Data Needed to Strengthen Enforcement of Export Restrictions” March 2010 www.gao.gov/new.items/d10375.pdf.

Inside of Iran “Con$icting Reports on Iran’s Unemployment Rate” April 7, 2011. http://www.insideo%ran.org/en/cultureaart/629-con$icting-reports-on-irans-unemployment-rate.html.

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Institute for Science and International Security, “State Department Cables: Stopping Iran’s and North Korea’s Illicit Procurement for their Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Programs” December 10, 2010,

http://www.isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/state-department-cables-stopping-irans-and-north-koreas-illicit-procurement/.

Johnson, Bridget “Treasury Defends 10,000 Exceptions to Iran” !e Hill, December 24, 2010. http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-brie"ng-room/news/135045-treasury-defends-10000-exceptions-to-iran-other-sanctions.

Katzman, Kenneth “Iran Sanctions” Congressional Research Service, February 3, 2011, www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS20871.pdf.

Kollock, Paige “Lebanon Cautions on Iran Sanctions” Lebanon Now. February 23, 2010. http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArchiveDetails.aspx?ID=148659.

Kuntzel, Matthias “Who Is Who in German Trade with Iran” February 4, 2010. http://www.matthiaskuentzel.de/contents/who-is-who-in-german-trade-with-iran.

Gottemoeller, Rose “!e Evolution of Sanctions in Practice and !eory” Survival Vol. 29 No. 4, Winter 2007-8.

!e Green Voice of Freedom “Mousavi Advisor: Ahmadinejad Does Not Represent Iranian People” October 12, 2010. http://en.irangreenvoice.com/article/2010/oct/12/2392.

Levey, Stuart “Remarks at the Center for Strategic and International Studies” September 20, 2010. http://useu.usmission.gov/levey_092010.html.

Levinson, Charles; Solomon, Jay “Sanctions Slow Iran’s Warhead Capacity” !e Wall Street Journal, January 8, 2011. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704739504576067911497955494.html.

MacFarquhar, Neil “UN Approves New Sanctions to Deter Iran” !e New York Times, June 9, 2010. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/10/world/middleeast/10sanctions.html.

Murphy, Brian “Iran’s Gateway in Dubai Highlights Sanctions’ Bite” Associated Press, Yahoo News, February 1, 2011 http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20110201/ap_on_bi_ge/ml_iran_sanctions_gateway_dubai.

Newsweek “In Iran, In#ation Could !reaten Regime” February 5, 2010. http://www.newsweek.com/blogs/wealth-of-nations/2010/02/05/in-iran-in#ation-could-threaten-regime.html.

Pan Armenian Net, “Iranians in Baku Involved in Money Laundering Activities” November 29, 2010, http://www.panarmenian.net/eng/world/news/57586/Iranians_in_Baku_involved_in_money_laundering_activities.

Philip, Catherine “Russia Says It Will Join Sanctions against Iran” !e Sunday Times, September 24, 2009. http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us_and_americas/article6846837.ece.

Sadjadpour, Karim, Lecture delivered on March 8, 2010, Stanford University.

Sanger, David “Debate Grows on Nuclear Containment of Iran” !e New York Times, March 13, 2010. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/14/weekinreview/14sanger.html.

Smith, Ben “Iran’s Nuclear Program, and Sanctions” International A$airs and Defense Section, Library of the House of Commons, October 13, 2010, www.nti.org/e_research/source_docs/uk/docs/03.pdf.

Tehran Times, “Iran-China Trade to Hit $50 Billion” June 12, 2010, http://www.tehrantimes.com/index_View.asp?code=221174.

Tehran Times, “Iran-Germany Trade Prospering” November 4, 2010, http://www.tehrantimes.com/index_View.asp?code=229816.

Wall, Christopher “Weak Tea” Foreign Policy. June 8, 2010, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/08/weak_tea.

Warner, Margaret “Examining the E$ects of Economic Sanctions on Iran” PBS News Hour broadcast. September 21, 2010. http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle_east/july-dec10/iran_09-21.html.

Wikileaks, “Iranian Source Names U.K.-Registered Company as Iran Sanctions-Buster Possibly Supporting Busheir Project” 09BAKU179, March 6, 2009. http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/03/09BAKU179.html.

Wikileaks, “Iran’s Money Launderers, Sanctions-Busters, and Revolutionary Guard Money Makers: A Baku Sampler” 09BAKU175, March 6, 2009. http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/03/09BAKU175.html.

Wright, Robin “Stuart Levey’s War” !e New York Times Magazine, October 31, 2008. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/02/magazine/02IRAN-t.html?pagewanted=all.

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US-Pakistan relations can worsen if drone strikes continue to harm civiliansPhoto courtesy of Flikr Creative Commons user Travlr

by Raiyan Khan

D!"#$ S%!&'$(

Tariq Aziz and his cousin Waheed Khan died in a Hell!re missile attack launched by the CIA, bringing their aunt back to their native Pakistani

village last Monday. Tariq was 16 years old. His cousin was only 12.1 "eir deaths spurred 2,000 Pakistanis to stage a protest outside of the parliament building on November 42 and shed light on the fading e#cacy of drone tactics in United States foreign policy. In the past three years, dronology in the US has undergone signi!cant changes in funding and application. Under Obama’s presidency, the use of drone strikes has escalated, in conjunction with an alarming number of civilian casualties. Yet many individuals cannot accept this to be true, as thus far, US policy has been to err on the side of secrecy, leaving the public in the dark regarding the details of the use of these drone strikes. "is leaves the media to !ll in the blanks, and as a result various news sources o$er a wide spectrum of statistics in terms of the e$ectiveness of drone attacks – numbers ranging anywhere from a 98% civilian casualty rate to a 10% civilian casualty rate.3

Lack of o#cial statements coupled with disingenuous reporting has led to a warped understanding of the current situation. "is creates tension on all sides of the situation, from the US public to the Pakistani civilians. In an attempt to construct an accurate portrayal of drone e$ectiveness, Peter Bergen, a national security analyst at CNN and Katherine Tiedemann, policy analyst at the New America Foundation analyzed the reporting of civilian deaths from multiple media organizations to predict the true civilian fatality rate as 32%, or around a third of deaths resulting from drone attacks.4 "is number, while on the lower end of the spectrum, is still a gruesome statistic. At what civilian fatality rate will the US government rethink their drone strike strategy – 50%? 60%? 75%? An aggressive drone campaign was developed with good intentions, including the protection of US lives and the mitigation of damages to innocent people. Drone strikes have been used to assassinate militants who have been responsible for the murder of over 4,000 Pakistani people.5 As seen in Tariq and Waheed’s case however, this campaign is not only inconsistent but also actually produces counterproductive e$ects, creating a pernicious cycle of civilian harm and consequently inspiring more hatred toward the US. "e worsening conditions in US-Pakistan relations since the assassination of Osama Bin

Laden signals the ine$ectiveness of Barack Obama’s problematic stance on aerial drone strikes.6 If the US is to foster sustainable friendships with the Pakistani populace, then it needs to restructure their drone use policy. Ultimately, if it is to foster bene!cial discourse between both nations, then separate tactics must be adopted by United States g o v e r n m e n t a g e n c i e s . Attempting to

conduct negotiations in an emotionally charged atmosphere only provokes further disagreement and triggers irrational demands by both parties. Instead, adopting a policy of greater transparency regarding drone strike information may provide feasible bene!ts in allowing all sides to reach an accurate understanding of the situation at hand. Drone strikes may be a situational necessity due to lack of alternatives, or may be considered unwarranted. However, without a complete picture, especially one for the Pakistani people, drone attacks will continue to be met with criticism and protest.

R!"!#!$%!&1 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/04/opinion/in-pakistan-

drones-kill-our-innocent-allies.html?_r=1

2 http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia/2011/10/201110307584794254.html

3 http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/!les/policydocs/bergentiedemann2.pdf

4 Ibid.

5 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/12/21/the_hidden_war?page=0,5

6 http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/u/unmanned_aerial_vehicles/index.html

US drone strikes have escalated in the past few years

Photo courtesy of Flickr Creative Commons user

james_gordon_los_angeles

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!e newly built Skolkovo-Moscow School of Management

Sourced from Flickr Creative Commons user Cea

" #by Alexandra Cox

!e global "nancial crisis of the past two years exposed Russia’s economy as dependent on oil, gas, and metallurgy, and devoid of the innovative advances that have come to de"ne successful western nations. To promote research and development in the spheres of alternative energy sources and technology, Russia is attempting to create a “Silicon Valley” in Skolkovo, a city west of Moscow. However, the legacy of corruption and bribery remains an impediment to Russia’s reemergence as a superpower in the modern business world. Only by combating corruption and cultivating an open political and business environment can Russia hope to develop an atmosphere in which a Skolkovo project can succeed.

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Alexandra Cox is a sophomore studying Economics with a minor in international relations. She is interested in United States Foreign Policy, particularly with regards to Russia. She has researched and produced documentary $lms about the Cold War and hopes to continue researching Russia's emergence from Communism. Alexandra wrote this paper for her freshman year Program in Writing and Rhetoric course.

Russia knows that it needs business. If it wishes to remain competitive in the international economy Russia must develop business in the

sectors of technology and innovation (Laquer 155). However, it must $rst address a legacy of corruption. As Robert K. Massie notes in his biography of Peter the Great, “Bribery and embezzlement were traditional in Russian public life, and public service was routinely looked upon as a means of gaining private pro$t” (Massie 781). Although Massie’s statement describes the country as it was three centuries ago, it could just as easily portray the Russia of today. In October 2010, the current President of Russia, Dmitri Medvedev, announced that one trillion rubles, or roughly thirty-three billion U.S. dollars, disappear annually on government contracts (Andersen par. 5). !is sum amounts to three percent of Russia’s GDP (Iofee par. 2). Despite the great %uctuations in Russia’s history since the days of Peter the Great, the legacy of bribery and corruption remains a powerful impediment to Russia’s reemergence as a superpower in the modern business world. Russia’s latest initiative to create a “Silicon Valley” of sorts in Skolkovo, a city twelve miles west of Moscow, has the potential to provide the impetus for Russia to transition into the digital age. !e global $nancial crisis of the past two years exposed Russia’s dependence on oil, gas, and metallurgy, and its lack of innovative advancements when compared to successful western nations (155). In a world increasingly looking toward “green” initiatives, Russia’s dependence on its limited natural resources places its economy in a precarious situation (!ornock and Whitaker par. 13). By acknowledging his country’s need to promote research in technology and alternative energy sources in order to keep up with other nations, President Dmitri Medvedev hopes to fundamentally alter the foundation of the Russian economy. He stated, “During the next decade, Russia should become a country in which the welfare and the good quality of life is ensured by its intellectual rather than natural resources, its innovative economy” (Medvedev, Solash

par. 16). Initiated by the government, the Skolkovo project attempts to diversify Russia’s homogenous economy and launch Russia into the modern business world. Nonetheless, questions remain as to the legitimacy of such an endeavor within the Russian political system. When Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in March 1985, he brought with him a plea for a restructuring of the Soviet system, called perestroika (Gorbachev 1). “Perestroika is an urgent necessity arising from the profound processes of development in our socialist society” (1). For nearly a century leading up to Gorbachev’s perestroika reforms, all private enterprise within Russia was banned or centralized under state ownership (!ornock and Whitaker par. 9). Entrepreneurship and private enterprise were virtually nonexistent in Soviet Russia. !ough the Soviet Union had attained superpower status as a military force, become the foremost producer of steel and oil, and led the world in space exploration, its economy was stagnant as a result of Communist collectivization e&orts (Jones and Mosko& 1). With perestroika, Russia witnessed a loosening of its strict communistic practices. One of the foundations of the perestroika reforms was a legalized private economy, which Gorbachev introduced through cooperatives, permitting private ownership of businesses for the $rst time in nearly half a century. Gorbachev recognized that private enterprise could meet needs not being met by the state (Jones and Mosko& 12). Yet private enterprise meant private gain, and private gain was directly related to capitalism and exploitation (12). A'er the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Russian government began to pass legislation to transition from the centralized Soviet economy to a free-market system. !e 1995 law entitled “On State Support for Small Business in the Russian Federation” called for government “assistance with modern equipment and technologies including the creation of a network of business technoparks and business incubators” to stimulate the newly formed small-business sector of the economy. !ough corruption in the early years of the Russian Federation and the $nancial crisis of 1998 prevented these reforms from inducing signi$cant change, the reforms laid the foundation for the concept of Skolkovo (!ornock and Whitaker par. 9). Following the election of President Vladimir Putin in 1999, Russia continued an ideological movement

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away from its Soviet system. In his introductory speech, Putin stated, “It needs to be recognized that without the development of [the small business] sector in the country, there will neither be a steady improvement in economic growth, nor an improvement in people’s lives. !e more people are involved in small business, the more stable and healthy is the Russian economy.” In adherence to Putin’s emphasis on the necessity of small business development, current President Dmitri Medvedev states that he hopes the Skolkovo project will foster an environment of technological innovation and imagination in Russia that will promote research in the spheres of alternative energy sources, information technology, communication, biomedical research, and nuclear technology (Razumovskaya par. 22). Skolkovo, President Medvedev says, will try to replicate Silicon Valley’s success while “paving its own way to completion” (!ornock and Whitaker par. 20). Currently, two major projects are underway in Skolkovo. !e $rst is Innograd, or “innovation city,” which will be composed of various technological companies assembled in one geographic area. !e second is the Skolkovo-Moscow School of Management, which is already open and training a new generation of Russian innovators (!ornock and Whitaker par. 8). In order to determine whether Russia will be able to cultivate the right environment for the success of the Skolkovo project, it is important to analyze the major factors that have led to the growth of Silicon Valley from

its beginnings in the 1930s to its current prominence in the worldwide innovation industry. “It seems remarkable to me,” re%ected William Eitel, one of the $rst radio hobbyists to come to the Silicon Valley, “that on the San Francisco Peninsula, o& the beaten paths of commerce, grew so many independent new industries, all now of national and international importance.” From just a small group of $rms employing a few hundred radio amateurs, Silicon Valley has become the main center for electronic component manufacturing in the United States and serves as the headquarters for major technological $rms such as Apple and Cisco (Lecuyer 295). Silicon Valley rose to its current prominence in the international economy due to a combination of skilled graduates from nearby Stanford University and the University of California, Berkeley and patronage from the US Department of Defense. Recognizing the signi$cance of university ties and government sponsorship, Russia is attempting to draw from the history of the development of Silicon Valley as it fashions Skolkovo and Innograd. Former Stanford University Provost Frederick Terman is largely credited with establishing the long-standing relationship between Stanford University and Silicon Valley (“!e Rise of Silicon Valley” par. 1). In 1925, he returned from his graduate career to pursue his doctorate at Stanford University (Leslie 76). At Stanford, he launched a commercially-oriented program in radio electronics and encouraged collaboration between his students and local electronics companies (Leslie 76). Under Terman’s guidance, Stanford students David Packard and William Hewlett established an electronics company in their Palo Alto garage that would grow into today’s Hewlett-Packard Company thus forming the long-standing relationship between Stanford University and Silicon Valley (“!e Rise of Silicon Valley” par. 1). !e partnership between Stanford and Silicon Valley continues today with strong ties between university a(liates and companies such as Google, Cisco Systems, Intuit, Silicon Graphics, and Sun Microsystems (par. 6). In a similar vein, President Medvedev hopes to foster a relationship between Innograd and the Skolkovo-Moscow School of Management. For Innograd to succeed, Russia will need motivated entrepreneurs and engineers knowledgeable about trends in emerging markets (Yana). In a speech at Stanford University during his June 2010 visit to Silicon Valley, President Medvedev addressed the “brain drain”

Russian President Medvedev, the driving force behind the Skolkovo project, speaking at Stanford University about the need for more technological innovation in Russia.

Sourced from Flickr Creative Commons user jurvetson

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that has a&ected Russia since the days of the Cold War. He stated, “We want our talented people, and Russia has always had a reputation for its talented people, to have every opportunity to ful$ll their potential. In order to achieve that we need to reform our education system and create an opportunity for each talented individual to be reached by the people who support his or her ideas” (Medvedev). President Medvedev hopes that the Skolkovo-Moscow School of Management will attract future business leaders who wish to remain in Russia and pioneer new technology-based businesses, just as Stanford University graduates continue to pioneer the growth of Silicon Valley (Kamyshev par. 8). In the spirit of embracing innovation, the Moscow-Skolkovo School of Management o&ers students a novel approach to graduate business programs. Students spend only four out of the twenty-month program on campus in Skolkovo. !e remainder of the program is spent working o&-campus on consulting jobs located in China, India, and the US (“Skolkovo MBA” par. 1). Should the school succeed in attracting potential students, Russian o(cials hope it will become the new standard for business education and succeed in training “leaders who will set up and run their own businesses and lead the development of the Russian economy” (!ornock and Whitaker par. 26, “Mission” par. 2). !e global approach of the Moscow-Skolkovo School of Management MBA program may, however, have an opposite e&ect on the “brain drain” than that which President Medvedev desires. With students spending over three-fourths of their education abroad and as a result establishing connections in countries outside of Russia, they may $nd greater opportunities during their terms overseas (Kamyshev par. 15). Russian trade union o(cials estimate that more than one-half million scientists and computer programmers have le' the country since 1991 to $nd well-paying jobs elsewhere in Europe and in the US (“Building a Silicon Valley in Russia” 3, Yana par. 4). As Vladimir Babkin, an advisor to the Russian State Duma’s Committee for Science and Technology noted, “!ose who are successful overseas will not return” (“Building a Silicon Valley in Russia” 3). While the interactions between local universities and innovation centers like Silicon Valley provide the thought power to sustain continued growth, the history of Silicon Valley reveals the importance of military and government patronage that may be key to Russia’s development of Innograd. In a sense, the US

par. 7). During World War II, the Korean War, and the Cold War, Silicon Valley companies were able to capitalize on the military’s demand for microprocessors, vacuum tubes, and semiconductors, which were crucial in the manufacture of intercontinental ballistic missiles, reconnaissance satellites, and other high-tech weapons and weapon systems (Heinrich 247, Lecuyer 7). With the launch of Sputnik in 1957, fears regarding Russia’s scienti$c prowess abounded and the US government “kicked investment into a higher gear” (O’Mara par. 7). By the end of the Cold War, the nine largest contractors in Santa Clara County, California, which included Lockheed Missile and Space, Ford Aerospace, Westinghouse, and United Technologies, among others, reported more than $11 billion in military defense contracts (U.S. Department of Defense). Stuart W. Leslie re%ects on the importance of “the assumptions and priorities of Cold War defense policy” to the development of Silicon Valley. He states that Silicon Valley was “created and sustained in the name of national security” (Leslie 75). While the military and the Department of Defense sustained the formation and growth of Silicon Valley, it also forced local $rms to open up new markets for their products in the civilian sector (O’Mara par. 7). !e Department of Defense sought access to the manufacturing and accounting processes of the Silicon Valley $rms in order to reduce their bargaining powers (Lecuyer 207). Additionally, the military’s inconsistent volume requirements made it an unreliable customer for innovative $rms. Because of this, many $rms

government was Silicon Valley’s $rst venture capitalist (O’Mara 5); it promoted innovation through research grants and defense contracts (Heinrich 251, O’Mara

!e recent rapid growth of Russia's economy has depended largely on natural resource wealth, although projects like Skolkovo are attempting to diversify the economy

Sourced from Flickr Creative Commons user akk_rus

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moved into commercial markets by expanding their businesses into the public sector (Lecuyer 207). !is not only spurred business growth, but also inspired the invention of new technology as capitalism and supply and demand generated competition. !e Russian government’s close involvement in the Skolkovo project emulates the US government’s participation in Silicon Valley’s history, with one crucial di&erence. !ough the US government was largely responsible for the creation of Silicon Valley, America’s free market economy promoted growth outside of the governmental sector (O’Mara par. 9). !e Russian economy, however, remains unstable even twenty years a'er the fall of Communism. Investors hold reservations about the bureaucracy, red tape, and expensive capital that still plague the Russian economic system (Andersen par. 19, “Building a Silicon Valley in Russia” 1). As President Medvedev himself noted, “Everything in Russia is a scheme; everything eventually turns into massive, legalized the'” (!ornock and Whitaker par. 19). !e commonplace corruption that pervades every sector of public life, all the way to the Kremlin, could prevent the Skolkovo project from achieving successes on par with those that President Medvedev sees in Silicon Valley. Russia’s reputation for corruption has become a cliché. In Transparency International’s annual rankings, Russia is one of the few countries to consistently fall in the rankings year a'er year. !e 2010 survey ranks Russia 154th out of the 179 countries surveyed, a position it shares with Cambodia, Guinea-Bissau, and the Central African Republic (Transparency International). Corruption has reached such an extreme level that corporations involved in preparing for the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi have reported paying kickbacks of more than $'y percent (Io&e par. 2). One road in Sochi cost so much that it could have been paved in three and one-half inches of Louis Vuitton handbags (par. 2). In an e&ort to dispel negative views of Russia and encourage venture capitalists to invest in Skolkovo, President Medvedev declared a war on corruption (Andersen par. 5). During his visit to Silicon Valley in June 2010, he stated, “Russia is committed to becoming an open country, open to cooperation with everyone who is interested in working with us, open to investments, to trade, to joint projects in any area of public life and, of course, in the economy” (Medvedev). Nevertheless, Russia has a long way to go before its corruption falls to an acceptable level and creates an

ease of entrepreneurship on par with that of its western counterparts. Since President Medvedev’s election, the size of the average bribe has quadrupled, according to estimates from the Interior Ministry’s Department of Economic Security (Io&e par.11). Many state projects are undertaken for the sole purpose of creating a pool of money that can be siphoned o& by interested parties. Corruption is so entrenched in the Russian public life that the government’s e&orts have actually had a reverse e&ect on bribery. When bribery becomes more risky, prices go up, making the bribes larger and more detrimental to society. An extreme example of the escalating extent of Russia’s corruption took place in August 2004, when two passenger planes fell out of the sky within three minutes of each other (Dougherty par. 3). Eighty-nine people were killed (par. 1). Two suicide bombers had hijacked the planes a'er bribing an airport security o(cer with $ve thousand rubles, the equivalent of one hundred seventy dollars (Io&e par. 10). !ese instances of corruption taint the world’s perception of Russia and call into question the future success of the Skolkovo project. Nevertheless, Russia is trying to escape the seemingly unremitting cycle of corruption. Both the Russian people and the government are making e&orts to end endemic corruption in their country. In 2008, President Medvedev began an initiative to make all government requests for tender available online. From this initiative emerged Alexey Navalny’s website entitled RosPil. In 2008, Alexey Navalny read that the Ministry of Health and Social Development was inviting bids to construct a two million dollar network that would connect doctors with their patients (Io&e par. 32). !e sixteen-day period that was designated for the development of the site tipped Navalny o& to the potential corruption within the project (par. 32). He wrote that “without a doubt” the site had already been developed for a much lower sum. A'er igniting a campaign that resulted in two thousand complaint letters to the Federal Anti-Monopoly Agency, the Health Ministry annulled the contract (par. 32). Navalny’s success with the campaign led to an in%ux of email messages with links to similar contracts. But, Navalny realized, “I can’t, by myself, replace the Anti-Monopoly Agency and the state prosecutor’s o(ce. And so the idea was born to make a site were the people could do it themselves” (par. 33). Any visitor to the RosPil website can submit a government request for tender to public scrutiny (RosPil). If the document

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is deemed suspicious, it is posted to the main page, where registered members discuss the complaint. Experts associated with the site evaluate the price of the project, the parameters, and the schedule to determine if it is reasonable (Io&e par. 33). If not, Navalny declares the project a fraud on his blog, which o'en causes the agency who submitted the request for tender to be inundated with hostile messages, enough so that in many cases the agency annuls its contracts or shuts the

triumphant future for the Skolkovo project (Laquer 160). As Russian politician Victor Chernomyrdin famously quipped in 1993, “We intended for something better, but it turned out just as it always does” (“Building a Silicon Valley in Russia 3). !is quote has become a catchphrase in post-Soviet Russia and one that has the potential to de$ne the Skolkovo project. Despite its comparisons to Silicon Valley, Skolkovo will never enjoy the unparalleled success of its

project down completely (Io&e par. 33). In a tally maintained on the site, RosPil has caused requests for tender worth $337,540,000 to be annulled (“Results”). If President Medvedev’s e&orts and the crusades of the Russian people against corruption prove to be more than unattainable examples of idealism, the Skolkovo project could establish Russia as a

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participant in the international innovation economy. Innograd o&ers investors a chance to establish a foothold in an emerging BRIC country. In the past decade, the BRIC countries accounted for 27.8 percent of global GDP growth in US dollars (Ahmed, Kelston, and Wilson par. 5). Prominent investment banks such as Goldman Sachs anticipate that these countries will be wealthier than most current economic powers by the year 2050 (par. 1). Whether or not these countries represent the future of the business world will ultimately be determined by investors themselves and their willingness to take a risk in a developing economy. Capitalizing on the world’s current interest in emerging markets, the Russian government is o&ering investors and foreign companies access to tax breaks and lessened regulations if they invest in Skolkovo (“Building a Silicon Valley in Russia 2). Already, Russia o&ers a corporate tax rate of 20 percent, nearly 15 percent lower than the rates found in the US (!ornock and Whitaker par. 17). “… Special tax rules for Skolkovo, as well as preferential treatment and special registration procedures, special oversight and even special jurisdiction regime,” will, President Medvedev hopes, protect investors from “o(cials, from criminals, from some obstacles on their way…If all these rules are introduced,” he said to a crowd assembled in Stanford University’s Dinkelspiel Auditorium, “I am sure the project will succeed” (Medvedev). Despite President Medvedev’s optimistic rhetoric, history points towards a decidedly less

US archetype. !e perfect storm of elements that led to the development of Silicon Valley, including the radio entrepreneurs, government wartime spending, and university relationships, is nearly impossible to recreate. But, more so than the impossibility of imitating in perfect proportion these elements, the Russian government’s approach and involvement with the Skolkovo

project will destabilize and perhaps destroy the grand dream of a “Russian Silicon Valley” (Kamyshev par. 20).!e Skolkovo project is a top-down approach to business development, one driven by the government to the extent that it excludes the Russian people (Kamyshev par. 13, Yana). !e Russian government hopes to, in a sense, command a technology center into existence. !ough government involvement was an essential component of the development of Silicon Valley, the innovation sector in California was largely driven by the excitement and entrepreneurial spirit of the Bay Area residents (O’Mara par. 16). !e Skolkovo project, however, will be a place apart for scientists. During the Cold War era, the Soviet Union isolated scientists in scienti$c centers located in Siberia (Ho&man 13). !ere, scientists were immune from the problems of starvation that plagued the general population of the Soviet Union and were able to focus exclusively on developing the Soviet nuclear weapons and space programs (15). !e Skolkovo project poses alarming similarities to these Siberian scienti$c enclaves. “[Scientists] should be isolated from our reality,” says Andrey Shtorkh, a former guard inside Sverdlovsk-45, one of the Soviet Union’s secret scienti$c cities. Skolkovo will be made up of $ve villages, each corresponding to one of $ve areas of innovative development of the Russian economy (Razumovskaya par. 22). Combined with the corruption already present in the country, the isolation of scientists in technology

Pervasive corruption has become a major problem for the Russian people

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centers does not embody the openness that President Medvedev has said is essential to advancing Russian society. For business to succeed, the people must be excited and involved in the technology development process, not isolated from it. Silicon Valley was not commanded into existence; rather the innovation sector developed in California from the bottom up and was ensured continued growth by the American economic system, which values entrepreneurship and its protection (O’Mara par. 17). President Medvedev’s words, his declarations of openness, his promises of an end to Russian corruption, need to become reality rather than slogans that mask the stagnation and corruption of Russia’s democratic progress (Laquer 157, Yana). Before investing in a project like Skolkovo, Russia needs to cultivate an environment in which it can succeed; it needs a better business climate (“Building a Silicon Valley in Russia" 1). A better business climate is created by enforcing stronger rule of law, by supporting entrepreneurship, and by making investors feel secure in their investments (Laquer 158). If Russia can truly open itself to competition in a free market system, then perhaps a project like Skolkovo would be a feasible endeavor. For now, however, Russia should focus on creating the open society President Medvedev so earnestly proclaims. Otherwise, investing in the Skolkovo project would merely be another disappointment, reminiscent of the numerous fully-funded yet abandoned endeavors that litter the expanse of Russian history. !e Skolkovo project was forced into existence by the government in an attempt to stimulate growth. Two decades have passed since the fall of communism, yet Russia still does not embrace the competition that makes Silicon Valley successful or the transparency that creates a stable business environment. !ough the Skolkovo project is developing at a time in which the reality of Russia cannot sustain the grandeur of Skolkovo’s idealism, the e&orts of those striving to end the corruption point towards a future in which Russia may be able to cultivate an open political and business environment. As a result of the Skolkovo project, Russia has taken great strides towards ending the corruption that has been entrenched in Russian society for so long. Websites such as Alexey Navalny’s RosPil ensure the continued empowerment of the Russian public as they confront questionable government and business practices. Technology, the foundation of the Skolkovo project, o&ers the people of Russia a means to

end the corruption that has plagued Russia’s economic development.

Swarnali Ahmed, Alex Kelston, Dominic Wilson. “Is this the ‘BRICs Decade’?” BRICs Monthly. 10/03 (20 May 2010). Web.

!is article from Goldman-Sachs discusses the emergence of the BRIC countries as major players in the international economic system.

Derek Andersen. “What Lies Ahead a'er a Year of !ieving.” !e St. Petersburg Times 21 Dec. 2010. Print.

!is article discusses the corruption that pervaded Russian in the year 2010 as well as the implications it has had on discouraging foreign investments.

“Building a Silicon Valley in Russia: An Ill-Fated Kremlin Experiment?” Ergo Nov. 2010. Web.

!is article addresses the fundamental issues of Russia’s attempt to recreate Silicon Valley. It plays particular attention to Russia’s need to create an environment that is attractive for $nanciers.

Jill Dougherty. “’Bribe Got Bomber on Russian Jet.” CNN International 15 Sept. 2004: n. pag. Web.

!is article discusses the bribery involved in the 2004 Russian airline bombings.

William Eitel. “Electronics Considered Pace-Setter in Region’s Development.” Redwood City Tribune. 27 Dec. 1962. Print.

!is document discussed the important role the electronics industry played in the development of Silicon Valley. It o&ered a historical take over the years of development from the early 1900s to 1960.

Mikhail Gorbachev. Perestroika: New !inking for Our Country and the World. San Francisco: Perennial Library, 1988.

!is text details Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika plans, his aspirations for the future of the Soviet Union, and his realizations of its current problems.

!omas Heinrich. “Cold War Armory: Military Contracting in Silicon Valley.” Enterprise & Society 3. June (2002): 247-248. Web.

!is article argues that military funding for research established the foundation for a new generation of startups that was necessary for the development of Silicon Valley.

David E. Ho&man. !e Dead Hand: !e Untold Story of the Cold War Arms Race and Its Dangerous Legacy. New York: Doubleday, 2009.

!is text discusses the development of the nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. It also asserts that the legacy of the Cold War is not over as thousands of nuclear and biological weapons remain in vulnerable positions.

Julia Io&e. “Net Impact.” !e New Yorker 4 Apr. 2011. Web. !is article discusses Alexey Navalny’s campaign to end the

corruption that is so prevalent in Russian society.Anthony Jones and William Mosko&. Ko-ops: !e Rebirth of

Entrepreneurship In the Soviet Union. Bloomington: Indiana U. Press, 1991.

!is book discussed Gorbachev’s attempts at reforming the Soviet economy through the use of cooperatives.

Vitaly Kamyshev. “Can a Russian Silicon Valley Rise from the Dust?” Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty 23 June 2010. Web.

!is text discusses the concerns surrounding Skolkovo, including the possibility that it may not achieve all that President Medvedev hopes. It also acknowledges the opinions of Muscovites about the Skolkovo project, which provides interesting insight into the local mentality.

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Walter Laquer. “Moscow’s Modernization Dilemma: Is Russia Charting a New Foreign Policy?” Foreign A&airs November/December 2010: 153-160. Print.

!is article discusses Russia’s foreign policy as it relates to its recognition of the necessity for economic development within the technology sectors of the economy.

Christophe Lecuyer. Making Silicon Valley: Innovation and the Growth of High Tech, 1930-1970. Cambridge, MA: !e MIT Press, 2006.

!is book discusses the growth of Silicon Valley and asserts that a large portion of the development of the area was due to the presence of radio entrepreneurs, government involvement, and interactions between businesses and local universities.

Stuart W. Leslie. “How the West was Won: !e Military and the Making of Silicon Valley.” Technological Competitiveness: Contemporary and Historical Perspectives on the Electrical, Electronics, and Computer Industries. Ed. William Aspray. New York: !e Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc., 1993. 75-89. Print.

In this document Stuart W. Leslie asserted that the growth of Silicon Valley was largely attributed to federal subsidy.

Robert K. Massie. Peter the Great, His Life and World. New York: Knopf, 1980.

!ough this book discusses Tsar Peter the Great, who lived nearly three centuries before the Skolkovo project was even conceived, the tales of corruption that surrounded the bureaucratic dealings of the era were relevant to my argument that bribery and corruption are inherent aspects of the Russian way of life.

Dmitri Medvedev. Meeting with Representatives of US Public, Academic, and Business Communities. 24 June 2010, Palo Alto, CA. O(cial Site of the President of Russia. Web.

!is is a transcript of President Medvedev’s speech and question and answer session that he presented at Stanford University during his visit in June. It discusses his goals for the future of Russia’s innovative economic sector.

“Mission.” Skolkovo-Moscow School of Management. Accessed 9 May 2011. http://www.skolkovo.ru/public/en/about.

!is text describes the mission of the Skolkovo-Moscow School of Management as the education center for future Russian business leaders.

Margaret Pugh O’Mara. Cities of Knowledge: Cold War Science and the Search for the Next Silicon Valley. Princeton: Princeton U Press, 2005.

!ough this text did not discuss Skolkovo explicitly, it outlined many of the key components that led to the development of the Silicon Valley and asserted that they may be di(cult to replicate elsewhere.

Margaret Pugh O’Mara. “Don’t Try this at Home.” Foreign Policy Sept/Oct 2010: 149-151. Print.

!is article discusses the business and technological innovation originating in Silicon Valley. O’Mara re%ects on international attempts to duplicate the innovative atmosphere.

Olga Razumovskaya. “Medvedev Hopes to Teach at Skolkovo One Day.” !e Moscow Times 26 April 2011. Web.

!is text discusses Medvedev’s hopes for Skolkovo as well as his frustrations with its development, speci$cally the lack of global recognition surrounding the project.

“Results.” RosPil.info. A. Bulk, Alexey Navalny, 2 June 2011. Web. 2 June 2011.

!is page features the “Amount of questionable / corrupt procurement” stopped by the e&orts of those associated with RosPil.

“!e Rise of Silicon Valley.” History of Stanford. Stanford University. Web.

!is article features an overview of the interweaving of history between Stanford University and the Silicon Valley. It argues that the development of Silicon Valley was largely due to the in%ux of talented students from Stanford University.

RosPil. A. Bulk, Alexey Navalny. Web. 2 June 2011. !is is Alexey Navalny’s website, RosPil, which features updates on

the e&orts of those in Russia working to end corruption.“Skolkovo MBA.” Skolkovo-Moscow School of Management. Accessed 9

May 2011. http://www.skolkovo.ru/public/en/mba. Contained within this webpage is a detailed account of the Skolkovo-

Moscow School of Management MBA program, which includes the corporate projects that take place in India, China, Russia, and the United States.

Richard Solash. “In Silicon Valley, Medvedev Looks for Investment Possibilities.” Radio Free Europe. 24 Apr. 2010. Web.

!is article discussed Medvedev’s visit to the Silicon Valley and the hopes he expressed to American businesses about the future of the Skolkovo project.

Robert !ornock and Wesley Whitaker. “Skolkovo: Russia’s Emerging Silicon Valley.” Knowledge@Wharton. 2011. Web.

!is text addresses the development of Skolkovo as a parallel to that of Silicon Valley. It addresses the history of the Silicon Valley and compares it to Skolkovo.

Transparency International. “Corruption Perceptions Index 2010 Results.” Ed. Transparency International. Web. 2010.

!is table features the results of the thirteen surveys conducted by the Transparency International. It shows how Russia is perceived as one of the most corrupt countries in the world.

U.S. Department of Defense. “Largest Defense Contractors in Santa Clara County, 1990.” Eagle Eye Publishers, 1991. Web.

!is table shows the companies in Santa Clara County and their defense sales at the end of the Cold War. It was crucial for my argument that the government involvement was necessary for the development of Silicon Valley.

Alekseenko Yana. Interview with Ben Judah. Can Russian Government Stop Brain Drain? 27 April 2011. Web.

!is interview with Policy Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, Ben Judah, discusses Russia’s brain drain and how Medvedev hopes to combat it.

Mikael Berstein, Chris Clark, Anda Gansca, and Pawel Waluszko. “For Entrepreneurs.” Recreating Silicon Valley. Accessed 10 May 2011. http://www.recreatingsiliconvalley.com.

Gregory Feifer. “Russia’s Silicon Valley Dreams May !reaten Cybersecurity.” Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty 14 Nov. 2010. Web.

Gail Lapidus. Personal Interview. 18 May 2011.A. Michal McMahon. !e Making of a Profession: A Century of

Electrical Engineering in America. New York: IEEE Press, 1984.Iliya Pitalev. “Innovations lay foundation for Russia’s Power –

Condoleezza Rice.” Ria Novosti 25 March 2011. Web.“Resetting the Stage.” !e Economist 23 April 2011: 53-54. Print.“Russian Hi-Tech Hub to Run Joint Projects with Stanford.” Ria Novosti

25 March 2011. Web.Barack Obama. 8 Apr. 2010. [Transcript]. Retrieved from C-SPAN

Video Library. Web.Robert Wessling. Personal Interview. 11 May 2011.

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Modern era globalization has endowed power in resource-rich countries, enabling them to derive in!uence from the control

of vital commodities. Oil, one of the most crucial goods, has therefore been used as a lethal weapon, sparking harsh repercussions on the global economy and political dynamic. "e most recognized usage of the “oil weapon” was the 1973 oil embargo. In response to US military assistance to Israel during the 6-day war, the Organization of Petroleum

Exporting Countries (OPEC) sought to exert political pressure by declaring an oil embargo, raising the price of a barrel by 70 percent and cutting production in increments of 5 percent. Oil price shocks had immediate economic e#ects, as the quadrupled price of fuel led to recession, in!ation, reduced productivity and economic stagnation. "e crises of the past serve as testimony to the power of geopolicity, and must prompt caution in the eyes of the international community about the future of energy security.

by Ariella Axler

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As civil unrest spreads throughout the Middle East, fear of a new oil crisis has arisen. Beginning on February 15, 2011, with protests in Benghazi, the world witnessed the unfolding of the Libyan revolution. "e ensuing civil war between Qadda$ loyalists and the “rebels” le% the country ablaze- a haze of blood and ash with over 25,000 buried in the remnants and 4,000 refugees who !ed the bloody civil war. In the midst of the anarchic insurgency, Libya’s 1.6 million barrels per day of supply were taken o# the market. Since Libya is the globe’s 18th top petroleum exporter, providing premium quality, low sulfur oil, Libya’s immobilization had tangible impacts on the international oil market. "is global shortfall will not see immediate compensation; “OPEC o&cials, oil analysts, and Libya’s former oil minister, Shokri Ganem, all agree that restoring production to its previous levels will take years- until 2013 or 2014 at the earliest.”1 Along with Libyan turmoil, there are concerns that an incident could unfold with Al Qaeda terrorists roaming near Yemen’s Aden coast, where 40 percent of the world’s oil supplies pass through. Any occurrence of an attack on an oil tanker or disruption to the transit of fuel in the region would result in devastating consequences.

"e volatility of oil supplies reinforces the need for energy independence. In order to reduce severe market !uctuation, building up a stockpile reserve is a necessity. A%er the OPEC embargo, in 1975, the US established the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. Yet, this reserve is only a short-term solution; oil is a limited resource, and cannot serve as a sustainable option for the future. Seeking energy outside fossil fuels is the most feasible means to absolute energy security. US investment in alternative, renewable energy is the $rst step to achieving a fruitful energy economy. "e bene$ts of investing in renewable energy sources are manifold—spanning from increased global political in!uence to job creation, and to cheaper energy prices. A self-su&cient US energy sector would be advantageous in relation to national security, and would be a lucrative asset to revitalize the economy.

1 Lindsay, Greg. “How "e Arab Spring Paved "e Way For A Double-Dip Recession, And Why It Might Prevent "e Next One .” Mon, 11/21/2011 | Co.Exist: World Changing Ideas and Innovation. Codesign.com. Web. 21 Nov. 2011. <http://www.fastcoexist.com/1678446/how-the-arab-spring-paved-the-way-for-a-double-dip-recession-and-why-it-might-prevent-the-ne>.

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Sourced from Nations Online Project

by Christopher Kremer

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Indonesia and Malaysia, which occupy the same archipelago and have overlapping history and language, have !ercely disputed the ownership

of Nusantara (“Archipelago”) culture. Indonesia and Malaysia are both members of ASEAN, but, since they gained independence from Britain and the Netherlands, which originally created their arti!cial borders, they have been locked in a contentious adik-abang (“younger brother-older brother”) relationship. "e !rst assumption that underlies the notion of the adik-abang relationship between Malaysia and Indonesia is that one is superior to the other, and the second is that the two countries are closely related. While the paradigm of the modern nation-state has led Malaysia to view itself as superior within the adik-abang relationship, it acknowledges Nusantara as being common to both countries because many Nusantara practices can ultimately be traced back to islands in Indonesia’s territory. Since Malaysia has become the so-called older brother of the adik-abang relationship, it has adopted the stance that Malaysian and Indonesian cultures are separate, implicitly asserting that Malaysian culture is superior. Malaysia’s use of the notion of a distinct Malaysian culture as a way to assert its dominance over Indonesia is shown by its shi#ing stance on immigration from when it was the “younger brother” to when it became the “older brother.” In the years a#er its independence, Malaysia welcomed the $ow of immigrants from Indonesia and the Philippines as a way to keep its Malay majority, a policy that “became obsolete when the birth rates of non-Malays and Malays turned very much in favor of the latter”1. "e fact that Malaysia shi#ed from a policy of cultural inclusiveness to one of cultural separateness shows that, as the country began to secure a sense of national identity, it no longer needed to rely on an identity common across the pre-colonial Malay Archipelago to give itself a sense of unity and history. Today, Malaysia is able to claim a di%erence between Indonesian and Malaysian cultures because it has succeeded in distinguishing itself from Indonesia and does so in order to further the notion of their distinctness and to reinforce the notion common to both that it is the stronger of the two countries. "is attempt to distinguish between cultures was evident when the Malaysian Family and Community minister announced plans to perform a study on the e%ects of

Indonesian immigrant maids on the “cultural values” of the Malaysian children for whom they cared. Such plans not only demonstrated a perception among Malaysian o&cials that the two countries have separate cultural values but also hinted that Malaysian cultural values are desirable and superior to Indonesian ones. While Malaysia’s claim to Nusantara heritage has been partly shaped by the juxtaposition of superiority and inferiority in the adik-abang relationship, it has also been shaped by Indonesia’s possession of the islands where many aspects of Nusantara originated. In order for Malaysia to reinforce its position as “older brother” it must not only accept that aspects of its culture originated on islands currently under the jurisdiction of Indonesia but also demonstrate that its culture is not derivative but is rather a distinct form of the same heritage. One Malaysian o&cial stated, “It [Rasa Sayang] is a folk song from the Nusantara and we are part of the Nusantara”2. "is statement is compatible with the Malaysian notion that Malaysian culture, however it may be related to Indonesian culture, is distinct. Rasa Sayang, for example, originated on Maluku, an island now part of Indonesia. As well, Gamelan and Batik, which have local variants throughout Nusantara countries, both have their origins in Java. While the majority of ethnic Malays of Malaysia and the Indonesians are culturally and ethnically quite similar, the governments of both countries have used Nusantara heritage as a way to compete with each other. Both countries have asserted themselves in accordance to their sense of superiority or inferiority as a nation-state and have had to shape their claims to correspond to the geography of the origins of Nusantara. "e fact that Malaysia and Indonesia compete so !ercely over Nusantara heritage attests to how closely related the two major countries of the Malay Archipelago are and to how divisive the idea of the modern nation-state can be for two countries whose lands were united for centuries.

1 Holst, Frederik. “(Dis-)Connected History: The Indonesia-Malaysia Relationship.”Indonesia - the Presence of the Past: a Festschrift in Honour of Ingrid Wessel. Ed. Antje Missbach and Eva Streifeneder. Berlin: Regiospectra, 2007. 327-40. Print.

2 Loudres, Marc. “Rasa Sayang ‘ours Too...we Have Right to Sing It’” New Straits Times. 3 Oct. 2007. Web. 9 Nov. 2011.

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! "by Nica Langinger

School feeding programs have been implemented in Kenya since the 1980’s with varying degrees of success. Used primarily to incentivize the enrollment and retention of rural children and girls, subsidized meal programs have played an integral part in realizing the country’s goal of universal primary education. Historically, the involvement of large foreign players has greatly limited the Kenyan government's role in the direction and stewardship of these programs. Heavy reliance on foreign aid and management has subjected the programs to !uctuating, and o"en conditional, international support. In an e#ort to transition toward a more sustainable and nationally integrated alternative, the Kenyan government introduced the Homegrown School Feeding Program (HGSFP) in 2009. $ough %nancial strains and infrastructural challenges have called into question Kenya’s ability to successfully fund and operate its own school feeding program, the country’s renewed commitment to education,

agriculture, and rural development shows great promise.

Children in a rural Kenyan school returning from recess Photo courtesy of Flikr user computerwhiz417

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Nica Langinger is a senior majoring in International Relations, minoring in Spanish and Portuguese, and co-terming in Latin American Studies. During her time at Stanford, she has developed a strong interest in Brazilian culture, history, and politics. A#er graduation, Nica hopes to work in Brazil to improve educational and employment opportunities for historically disenfranchised groups.On the topic of educational quality and accessibility, Nica found many similarities between rural communities in Kenya and favelas in Brazil. In writing this paper for Professor Joel Samo$ 's course on education policy in Africa, she learned a lot about e$ective policymaking amidst extreme social inequity.

Agriculture seek to limit the role of external players in order to transform the program into a more sustainable and independent national enterprise. %ough much has already been done to boost rural attendance, more e$ort and coordination will be required to obviate many of the current impediments to School Feeding Programs. To fully realize the enormous humanitarian potential of the HGSFP, special attention must be given to improving the quality of rural infrastructure, investing in human capital, increasing local stewardship of feeding programs, and supporting economic opportunities for small-scale food producers. Without these critical developments, the goals of the HGSFP will fail to serve the long-term interests of ASAL inhabitants and will instead contribute to a continued cycle of foreign dependency and educational inequity in Kenya.

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Kenya’s school feeding program has experienced continued expansion and re&nement, especially during the past decade. Since the introduction of free compulsory primary education for all Kenyan children in 2003, the WFP-assisted feeding program has developed alongside national policies of increased

Roughly 80 percent of Kenyans live in rural areas and eke out a living as

farmers, and poor land quality and chronic water shortages have put the country in a constant state of food insecurity (UNESCO 2005). Although its economy boasts a sizeable agricultural sector (mainly focused on exports of &rst-world luxuries like 'owers, tea, and co$ee), Kenya is a food-de&cit country with less than 20 percent of its land suitable for successful cultivation. Compounding these di(culties, frequent and severe droughts in the historically precarious Arid and Semi Arid Lands (ASAL)

land and scarce water (MoA 2010). %e ASAL, home to roughly 30 percent of the Kenyan population, has su$ered through the crippling social e$ects of recently intensifying droughts and food shortages. Kenya’s school-aged population is among the groups most negatively impacted. To alleviate the health and developmental consequences of childhood malnutrition, increase primary school enrollment, and combat social pressures that limit educational opportunities for girls, the Kenyan government began a school-feeding program in 1980 (Regnault De La Mothe 2008). %e initiative, signi&cantly backed by World Food Program (WFP) funds and management, is one of the largest and longest-standing school feeding partnerships of its kind. In 2008, the program served

1.2 million children in 3,600 schools—nearly 21.3 percent of all primary school students in Kenya (USDA 2010). Recently, in accordance with “Education for All” developmental targets, the Kenyan government decided to expand its role in the implementation of school feeding programs nationwide (MoE 2003). %rough the introduction of the Homegrown School Feeding Program, Kenyan policymakers are looking for ways to better integrate and promote goals in education, agriculture, and rural development through inter-sectoral cooperation and

progressive policy changes. Over time, the Kenyan ministries of Education and

have contributed to high rates of crop loss, malnutrition, and violence over limited arable " Child obtaining water, a scarce resource in Kenya

Photo courtesy of Flikr user angela7dreams

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student health, attendance, and performance (MoE 2003). From its inception, it has targeted food inequality in the most vulnerable areas of Kenya, including school districts in the ASAL and the informal urban slums of large cities such as Nairobi and Mombasa (Espejo 2009). To address historical primary school absenteeism among Kenya’s most impoverished and traditional communities, free meals are used as an incentive to attract school-aged children to class. Within rural communities in which food is scarce, this daily meal provision relieves much of the burden of childrearing. %e bene&ciaries of the program are extremely poor families that are largely unable to provide the minimum recommended daily allowances (RDA) of calories, protein, and essential micronutrients to their children. %ese poor conditions may irreversibly stunt the mental and physical development of young children, resulting in wasted potentials and lifelong di(culties (Galal 200). %e nutritional importance of the school meal (usually around 700kcal) is immense, representing more than half of the consumed RDA values for 40 percent of the participating students (Finan 2010). According to &eld studies, the “magnet e$ect” of the meal programs has greatly increased school attendance rates especially among young children. Rural schools that provide meals show higher attendance rates and lower initial dropout rates than schools that do not (Espejo 2009). %e immediate &nancial and nutritional bene&ts provided by schooling attract parents struggling to support their children on low-yielding subsistence farming. On average, participating families save between four and nine percent of their annual income by taking advantage of school meals and avoiding added food expenditures (Finan 2010).

Additionally, many rural parents have been able to utilize schooling as a form of subsidized childcare, which gives them more time to engage in household chores, farming, or other income-generating activities. %e short and long-term bene&ts to the child are even more pronounced. Studies tracking the impact of school feeding have shown improvements in IQ, immunity to illness, height, and weight among participating children (Galal 2005). Micronutrient forti&cation, malaria treatment, and annual de-worming initiatives have been implemented alongside school meal programs and have had considerable e$ect on increasing overall student health (Galloway 2009). No longer distracted by hunger and the crippling e$ects of extreme malnutrition, the students are better able to concentrate, understand new material, and socialize with both teachers and peers. According to &rsthand teacher accounts, children who receive meals are generally healthier, more receptive, energetic, and easier to teach (Galal 2005). Following WFP recommendations, some ASAL school districts have begun providing forti&ed morning biscuits to get a jumpstart on the cognitive and nutritional bene&ts of feeding (Finan 2010; Galal 2005).

%ough signi&cant gains have been achieved throughout the country in terms of educational expansion and accessibility, rural Kenyans continue to lag far behind their urban counterparts. Between the years 2002 and 2007, although Kenya’s net primary school enrollment increased from 77 percent to 92 percent, enrollment in the ASAL increased from 17 percent to 29 percent (Finan 2010). %ough school-feeding programs have increased student enrollment rates, attendance,

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to secondary school (Finan 2010). With average completion rates hovering at around 34 percent in arid and 57 percent in semi-arid districts, it is clear that even with the presence of school meals, regional disparities in education persist. Especially among poor children and girls, these numbers are far below the standards Kenya must meet in order to achieve Millennium Development Goals 1-3 (poverty reduction, universal primary education, gender equality) by 2015 (MoE 2004). Unfortunately, the meal program’s positive impact on school attendance appears to weaken with age. Within traditional rural communities, as children get older they become valuable economic resources to their families, and the pressure to contribute to household chores and earnings steadily mounts. Between seventh and eighth grade, the appeal of a school meal is suddenly much less signi&cant and dropout rates increase with the rising opportunity costs of staying in school (Finan 2010). As they reach adolescence, boys are expected to start work as farmhands or manual laborers and girls are groomed for early marriage in order to fetch a higher bride price (Bogonko 1992). If a rural child’s primary schooling experience has not instilled the merits of an education (the “catalyst e$ect”), cultural and economic pressures thwart primary completion and progression to secondary school (Njeru 2005). Furthermore, due to a general scarcity of secondary schools in the ASAL, many bright and otherwise willing rural children are forced to prematurely end their schooling a#er

standard 8 (UNESCO 2005). Other factors such as water scarcity and inadequate infrastructure continue to impede full realization of the central goals of Kenya’s school meal program. Certain &nancially strapped schools require families to contribute money, labor, water, and &rewood to receive the daily meal allowance, compromising the full e$ect of the meal incentive (Finan 2010). Rural schools, widely without &rewood to fuel kitchen stoves, clean water, and money to pay cooks, &nd it di(cult to provide daily meal services without burdening parents for missing inputs (Bwonda 2005). Additionally, schools are not always equipped with suitable bathrooms and kitchens to ensure that food is prepared in a hygienic and safe environment. %ese factors undermine the quality and e$ectiveness of the feeding program in many districts in rural Kenya. Another large obstacle for Kenyan schools to overcome is related to the poor quality of instruction. Due in part to FPE initiatives and the popularity of free school meals, hungry students seeking food aid have overrun many schoolhouses in the ASAL regions. According to WFP &ndings, the average enrollment of schools that o$er meals is 28 percent higher than schools that do not, and the average student-teacher ratio is a staggering 11 points higher than the national average (Finan 2010). %us, although the goal of increased attendance has been somewhat met, little has been done to help schools cope with recently in'ated student bodies and declining teacher incentives. %e many challenges inherent to the ASAL have made it increasingly di(cult to recruit willing and quali&ed teachers to school districts. Kenyan educators have largely avoided rural schools hundreds of miles from city centers with few roads, resources,

and exam scores, rural districts have exhibited only modest gains in completion rates and advancement

Farmer attempting to water cropsPhoto courtesy of Food Ethics Council

Lack of resources for schoolchildrenPhoto courtesy of USAID

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and networks of support. High student-teacher ratios, cramped and dilapidated schoolhouses, poor infrastructure, and a lack of necessary school supplies threaten to undo many of the notable gains associated with increased primary school enrollment (Bwonda 2005; UNESCO 2005).

In an e$ort to transition away from WFP assistance and create a more sustainable and locally integrated program, the Ministry of Education began implementing a Homegrown School Feeding Program (HGSFP) in July of 2009 (Espejo 2009). %is is not the &rst time the government of Kenya has attempted to institute a federally funded school meals program through multi-sectoral cooperation. A short-lived school milk program was introduced in 1980 under former President Moi in order to simultaneously increase primary school enrollment and ensure a stable market for Kenyan dairy producers. %e ambitious initiative that provided free milk to 4.3 million primary school students failed shortly a#er its launch due to high costs, low accountability, and poor road infrastructure

(Bogonko 1992). To ensure that the new program does not meet a similar end, Kenyan policymakers are working closely with WFP and United Nations representatives to facilitate a gradual shi# of &nancial responsibility. Beginning in 2009, the Kenyan government transferred over 500,000 primary school children from WFP programs (mostly from Semi-Arid districts) to HGSFP, and promised to add 50,000 students each year until reaching full coverage (Finan 2010). Prior to this transfer, 71 percent of associated program costs were provided by WFP, 15 percent were borne by local communities, and only 14 percent came from the Kenyan government (Galloway 2009). To guarantee the success of this new program, the Kenyan government allocated $5.3 million (along with an additional $2 million from the Japanese government counterpart fund) in 2009 to subsidize the costs of expansion (USDA 2009). Even so, with combined annual costs of the previous program estimated at around $20 million a year (Galloway 2009), the Kenyan Ministry of Finance must be ready to commit itself to even greater investment if the government intends to replace WFP as the main benefactor of school meals in Kenya. Rather than continuing to rely on WFP agents to procure foodstu$s and distribute meals, the new program transfers cash stipends directly into the bank accounts of participating schools to be applied to the program (Finan 2010). %e government makes these cash payments twice a year at the beginning of each three-month term, with aid amounts determined by net student enrollment. %e government-subsidized program sets funding levels at nine cents per student meal, approximately half of what WFP sponsored programs spend per meal (USDA 2009). Kenyan policymakers from the ministries of Education, Finance, and Agriculture, have expressed con&dence that local procurement e$orts and increased community support will allow school-feeding programs to survive despite tighter resources (USDA 2009). To avoid additional overhead costs associated with management and distribution expenses, the government of Kenya has transferred the logistics of implementation to local School Management Committees (made up of parents, teachers, and community members) who are placed in charge of purchasing food from local farmers, cooperatives, and traders. Based on &eld research, it was observed that: Community participation and involvement was strong at every school visited. Each household is asked to

Map of food regions -- Finan (2010)

Legend: Orange=Arid, Yellow=Semi-Arid, Stripes=HGSFP, Dots=WFP

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contribute to the [School Feeding Program], and typical contributions include &rewood, water, cash for cooks’ salaries, and salt. When households cannot contribute, the SMC makes alternative arrangements

purchase of key “orphan crops” like sorghum, millet, and cowpeas due to their drought-resistance and ASAL suitability (MoA 2010). Currently, due to present system weaknesses, maize still constitutes a majority of

with the family (USDA 2009).

In these ways, the Kenyan government hopes to integrate schools more fully into rural communities, provide an economic stimulus for impoverished villages, boost local agricultural productivity, and establish a sustainable school meals program independent from heavy foreign subsidization.

Critics of the new program cite the fact that most rural communities in the ASAL do not have the production supply capability to support a potentially overwhelming demand for food. According to research untaken by the USDA with funds provided by the Gates Foundation: “Without projects or collaboration with other partners to bolster the supply side of HGSF Program, the project as currently implemented is a

local procurement project, and not a local production project. %e project schools are in ASALs with limited production capacity, with 60-70 percent of the food imported from outside the district.” (USDA 2009). Rural farmers are usually located far away from key agricultural inputs such as water, fertilizer, pesticides, and seed, lack adequate large-scale storage facilities, have little access to a$ordable bank credit, and are unable to e(ciently transport bulk harvests (MoA 2010). As a result, instead of funneling money into local communities, many claim that the main bene&ciaries of HGSFP are non-local commercial food traders. O#en, this is not a concern for policymakers who tend to de&ne “local” in more national and even regional terms (USDA 2009). To protect and foster the safety net bene&ts associated with small-scale local agriculture, the Government of Kenya needs to &nd ways to increase the production capabilities of rural farmers. To address this problem, the Ministry of Agriculture needs to provide more support in the form of rural farming grants, infrastructure (roads, storage facilities, accessible inputs), encouragement of indigenous plant and animal husbandry, and sustainability reeducation (Finan 2010). %e HGSFP currently encourages the

the food purchased for school meal programs (USDA 2009). Another point of contention surrounding HGSFP in rural Kenya is the cost-motivated prohibition of the purchase of fruit, horticulture, and livestock products for use within the school feeding programs. Local communities are currently pushing for the inclusion of meat in the meal budget to involve pastoralists who comprise the bulk of the economic activity in the ASAL (USDA 2009). Incorporating meat and other livestock products in the school meals program would go a long way in appeasing pastoralist groups that may feel marginalized and excluded from social planning and development initiatives that seem tailored to exclusively bene&t agriculturalists (MoA 2010). Since the ASAL is home to a limited number of productive farmers, more inclusive measures would certainly serve to increase the food procurement rates from within vulnerable herding communities. Additionally, to better support ASAL interests, policymakers ought to implement a scaled stipend system that adjusts for regional food scarcity and price disparities, rather than the current 'at allowance (USDA 2009). Under the current system, droughts and ever rising food costs have threatened the viability of school meals programs in food-scarce school districts. A &nal point of debate is founded on the fear that

Government school-feeding programs aim to improve conditions for Kenyan schoolchildren

Photo courtesy of Flikr user angela7dreams

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direct money transfers to poor schools to be managed by civilian committees could expose the program to various strains of ine(ciency and corruption. Within the impoverished communities of the ASAL, potential failures could arise from schools reporting arti&cially in'ated enrollment numbers, succumbing to bribery and seller favoritism, and using government funds for non-meal related ends (Finan 2010). Without proper training and oversight, some fear that the HGSFP runs a high risk of falling short of intended goals. However, SMC’s have been in charge of administrational duties within the Kenyan educational system for decades (Bogonko 1992). Since the government has historically only provided funding for teachers’ salaries and few other basic expenses, communities have taken the essential role of raising funds and budgeting for new textbooks, supplies, and school beauti&cation projects (Bwonda 2005). In this respect, local communities have extensive experience in the administrational duties that would be required from them under HGSFP.

%e e$ects of the school meal program on the wellbeing of rural Kenyans cannot be overstated. %rough providing daily meals, schools are able to meet immediate food needs, provide future safety nets, and o$er long-term assistance and empowerment to children, families, and communities. As the WFP prepares its exit strategy from the region as the main agent of school feeding, much care should be undertaken in ensuring that the transitional period be free of potential crises. If HGSP has a secure foundation within Kenya with both funds and management sourced internally, the program will no longer need to rely on 'uctuating and o#en conditional donor support (Espejo 2009). In addition, a successful transfer of the food provision program to the Kenyan government would foster inter-ministerial cooperation and involvement and better integrate the program with a wide range of national and economic goals. In order to e$ect lasting positive change in the lives of Kenyan children, the government must instate policies that work toward achievable goals. If the Kenyan government hopes to ensure the success of Free Primary Education, there must be considerable and consistent investment in programs that increase educational access, participation, and quality,

especially among the most vulnerable and historically marginalized social groups (Vos 2004). In addition to supporting programs like HGSFP, the ministries of Education and Agriculture must also invest in rural infrastructure by building roads and schools, improve agricultural capabilities by improving irrigation systems, farming technologies, and indigenous plant knowledge, and allocate more funds for basic school supplies and new teachers (UNESCO 2005). Without these necessary additions to the current system, the rewards of FPE will remain elusive for a large and promising segment of the Kenyan population.

Bogonko, Sorobea N. A History of Modern Education in Kenya (1895-1991). Nairobi, Kenya: Evans Brothers (Kenya), 1992.

Bwonda, Eldah N., and Enos H. Njeru. Primary Education in Kenya: Access and Policy Implications, 1989-2002. Working paper no. 62. Nairobi: Institute of Policy Analysis and Research, 2005.

Espejo, Francisco. Home-grown School Feeding: A Framework to Link School Feeding with Local Agricultural Production. Rome: World Food Programme, 2009.

Finan, Timothy. Impact Evaluation of WFP School Feeding Programmes in Kenya (1999-2008): A Mixed-Methods Approach. Rome: World Food Programme, 2010.

Galal, Osman, ed. Proceedings of the International Workshop on Articulating the Impact of Nutritional De&cits on the Education for All Agenda. 2nd ed. Vol. 26. Tokyo: International Nutrition Foundation for the United Nations University, 2005.

Galloway, Rae. School Feeding: Outcomes and Costs. Food and Nutrition Bulletin, 2009.

Ministry of Agriculture. Agricultural Sector Development Strategy, 2009-2020. Nairobi: Government of Kenya, 2010.

Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology. Report of the Task Force on Implementation of Free Primary Education. Nairobi: Government of Kenya, 2003.

Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology. A Policy Framework for Education, Training, and Research. Nairobi: Government of Kenya, 2004.

Njeru, Enos H., and John A. Orodho. Access and Participation in Secondary School Education in Kenya. Working paper no. 37. Nairobi: Institute of Policy Analysis and Research, 2003.

Regnault De La Mothe, Marc. "Kenya Case Study." Learning from Experience: Good Practices from 45 Years of School Feeding. World Food Programme, 2008. 45-47.

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UNESCO Nairobi O(ce. Challenges of Implementing Free Primary Education in Kenya: Assessment Report. Nairobi, 2005

USDA Foreign Agricultural Service. Assessment of Local Production for School Feeding

in Kenya. O(ce of Capacity Building and Development, 2009.

Vos, Rob, and Arjun Bedi. Achieving Universal Primary School Education in Kenya.

Working paper no. 46. Nairobi: Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis, 2004.

Arid conditions pose problems for agriculturePhoto courtesy of Flickr Creative Commons user Carostan

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Turkey’s armed incursion into northern Iraq in October 2011, mounted in response to deadly attacks by Kurdish rebels based in semi-

autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan, was the latest indication of an emerging regional power increasingly con!dent of its capacities and sure of its interests. As American forces withdraw from Iraq and !scal constraints compel a more restrained and less interventionist foreign policy, the importance of stronger relations with Middle Eastern partners becomes apparent. Relations between Washington and Ankara, strengthened by the existence of a common enemy during the Cold War, have begun to fray over political di"erences

and recognition of the changing power dynamics of the Middle East. #e “model relationship” touted by President Obama with regards to Turkey, however, has more relevance than ever in an increasingly multipolar region. Finding common ground with Ankara, and developing a willingness to address Turkish concerns and accommodate Turkish interests in the ultimate pursuit of American foreign policy goals, will be critical to the success of US-led initiatives in the region, and would indicate a desire on the part of Washington to forge new relationships to deal with the challenges of the 21st century.

by Marshall Watkins

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Stronger relations with Ankara could help answer some of the most pressing dilemmas confronting Washington with regards to the Middle East. As American troops depart from Iraq, the potentially destabilizing power vacuum, the threat of increased Iranian in$uence in Baghdad runs directly contrary to Turkish interests. As shown by last the October 2011 incursion into Iraqi Kurdistan, border security has remained a priority for the Sunni Muslim Ankara regime; the prospect of an Iraqi Shia government supporting the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and other insurgent groups that might destabilize the frontier would likely be unacceptable. Although Turkey’s willingness to confront an increasingly assertive Iran is less out of concern for the intentions of nuclear-armed Iran than for the rami!cations of a regional arms race that would likely ensue, Turkey’s position on Iran is su%ciently aligned with American interests. Similarly, even if Turkey does not support United States led sanctions against Iran, demonstrated by opposition to an American measure at the UN, the ultimate objective of a regime change in Tehran remains a common goalTurkey could serve as a model in the Middle East of a secular, stable government that respects Islam, but is not ruled by it. As shown by the rapturous welcomes a"orded Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan in his post-Arab Spring regional trips, there is hope for Washington that the Turkish model will indeed prevail as more Middle Eastern nations gain the chance for self-determination. #e support provided by Turkey to rebels in the ongoing Syrian rebellions also enjoys a degree of legitimacy among the rebels and Arab observers that the US could currently never hope to replicate. However, substantial obstacles could hurt the United States’ pursuit of closer relations with Turkey. Ankara’s increasingly antagonistic relationship with Israel and the United States’ Congressional attempts to pass a resolution of the Armenian genocide could cause a deterioration in relations. Even as both parties seek to develop a comprehensive Middle Eastern peace settlement, Turkey’s insistence on the inclusion of Hamas, a group identi!ed as a terrorist organization

by both the United States and the European Union, is an impediment to co-operation. Moreover, the increasingly autocratic nature of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) which has substantially curtailed individual freedoms, may seem unappealing to support, especially considering the US’ historical links to the secular Turkish military and liberal elites. Nevertheless, the upcoming years o"er an unusual convergence of interests between Turkey and the US not only in the Middle East but within Europe as well. As the Libyan intervention highlighted NATO’s material shortcomings and the US turns away from unilateral interventions, Turkey’s status as possessing Europe’s largest military power becomes increasingly important. Turkey’s ongoing desire for closer a%liation with Europe, historically thwarted by Germany and France, is a subject the US should seek to advance whenever possible. #e alternative would be an increasingly isolated and alienated Turkey lacking incentives for future co-operation with the West.Turkey and the US, while united on broader policy objectives, diverge on the minutiae and methods in many cases. Nevertheless, for both nations closer ties o"er means of safeguarding and advancing their interests in a manner stemming far more from pragmatism than ideology. #e relationship that emerges in the upcoming years thus has the potential to be far more enduring and substantial than regional dynamics might otherwise suggest. #e Middle East remains, and will remain, an area critical to American interests. #us, a re-allocation of resources to a “special relationship” with Ankara could e"ectively serves American policy goals in the decades to come.

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People gather in Tunis to protest electoral fraud.

by Elizabeth Fair

http://www.upi.com/News_Photos/News/Protests-against-electoral-fraud-in-Tunisia/5812/12/?ref=ma

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On October 24, Tunisia held its !rst free election since the Revolution. Demonstrations in Tunisia began the Arab Spring, and the

country has been a focal point of global attention as it creates a new government with dignity, enthusiasm, correctness, and little outside assistance. Described as a day of festivities and equality, voters waited in

Ennahda has already expressed that women can choose to wear the veil or not (it had previous been prohibited in Tunisia). "e party will conform to Tunisian visions of democracy, not the other way around. More generally liberal political parties ran a close second in the election, confounding commentators and challenging them to make sense of votes for both

line for their turn to cast a ballot. More than 90 percent of registered voters (about 55 percent of the population) came out on Election Day. Apart from a few small protests concerning election fraud, the results were issued without incident. "e Ennahda Party won 41 percent of the vote, or 90 of the 217 seats in the Constituent Assembly, and was charged with the responsibility of creating a new constitution. Congress for the Republic

Islamists and secular liberals. Tunisian unity came !rst for voters, and parties that sought to distance themselves from Ennahda or discounted sharing power with the group su#ered at the ballot box. Such parties were accused of not creating a strong platform of their own and attempting to tap into fears of a hard-line Islamist state. A few hundred people did protest against what they saw as Ennahda’s election fraud, but most Tunisians

received the next highest number of votes, gaining 30 of the 217 seats. What do these parties and seat allocation mean for Tunisia’s future? "e Ennahda Party, which won the vast majority of seats, is a moderate Islamist group, sparking fears among commentators that their in$uence will sti$e secular liberal freedoms. Many Tunisians, however, saw their vote for the Ennahda Party as a vote for honesty and morality, not necessarily for Islamic reasons. "e Islamist party enlisted support from the more conservative, working class sectors of the country. "e party was banned by the previous regime, but continued to work with its working class support base. Islamist parties represent organized opposition, giving them an immediate advantage in the !rst elections. "ey have brand recognition, but that does not necessarily mean that have an irrevocable mandate from the people. "eir governance of the country will count for more than their Islamist tendencies. More female candidates ran in this party than in any of the others. Following the spirit of the parity law instituted for this election, every slate was required to be made up half by females. "e spokeswoman for the party is the Western-educated daughter of the party leader, and

saw this as an opportunity for cooperation in politics, if not compromise in civil and human rights. "e question remains of how the new Constituent Assembly will handle the next few steps into democracy. Tunisians feel a sense of ownership for their country and will peacefully defend their freedoms, and the success of this election stands as an inspiration to the rest of the world. Nevertheless, the triumph of Ennahda and the parties that chose not to bring up religion as an issue for the campaign, raises a troubling issue that the role of religion will remain a silent deal-breaker, instead of something de!ned openly in Tunisia’s forthcoming constitution. Tunisia grapples with the legacy of French-inspired civil rights and more conservative Islamic views that led to widespread protests of the recent TV showing of the !lm Persepolis. Free religious expression is a priority, but if it is not acknowledged as an open right instead of an assumed one, assumptions about morals could become codi!ed. Turkey has been cited thus far as a good example of a secular country ruled by an Islamist party; let us hope that Tunisia takes this example and fashions it as their own.

Rachid Ghannouch, leader of the Ennahda party which won Tunisia’s first free election.

http://blogs.reuters.com/faithworld/tag/tunisia-ghannouchi-islamist-ennahda-salafist-saudi-wahhabi-election/

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References

i. Cammett, Melani. “"e Limits of Anti-Islamism in Tunisia.” 31 October 2011. Accessed 6 November 2011. http://mideast. foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/10/31/will_an_islamist_victory_translate_to_democracy

ii. “"e Carter Center Answers Your Questions About the Historic Oct. 23 Tunisia Elections.” Oct. 21, 2011. Accessed 6 November 2011. http://www.cartercenter.org/news/features/p/elections/tunisia/questions.html

iii. Lewis, Aidan. "Pro!le: Tunisia's Ennahda Party." 25 October 2011. Accessed 5 November 2011. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15442859

iv. Muasher, Marwan. “Opinion: "e Overblown Islamist "reat.” 2 November 2011. Accessed 6 November 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/03/opinion/the-overblown-islamist-threat.html?_r=1&ref=tunisia

v. “Tunisia.” 28 October 2011. Accessed 5 November 2011. http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/tunisia/index.html?scp=1-spot&sq=tunisia&st=cse

vi. “Tunisian Election ‘Extraordinary Achievement,’ NDI Mission Finds.” 24 October 2011. Accessed 6 November 2011. http://www.ndi.org/tunisia-election-extraordinary-achievement

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