STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION REVIEWER

A. Concept and Definition of Statutory Construction

1. Caltex v. PalomarConstruction is the art or process of discovering and

expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law. In the present case, the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law inescapably require an inquiry into the intended meaning of the words used therein. This is as much a question of construction or interpretation as any other. The Court is tasked to look beyond the fair exterior, to the substance, in order to unmask the real element and pernicious tendencies that the law is seeking to prevent.

The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed judgment, without costs.

2. Daoang v. Municipal Judge of San NicolasThe words used in paragraph (1) of Article 335 of

the Civil Code, in enumerating the persons who cannot adopt, are clear and unambiguous. When the New Civil Code was adopted, it changed the word “descendant,” found in the Spanish Civil Code to which the New Civil Code was patterned, to “children.” The children thus mentioned have a clearly defined meaning in law and do not include grandchildren. Well known is the rule of statutory construction to the effect that a statute clear and unambiguous on its face need not be interpreted. The rule is that only statutes with an ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be the subjects of statutory construction. In the present case, Roderick and Rommel Daoang, the grandchildren of Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos-Agonoy, cannot assail the adoption of Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos by the Agonoys.

The Supreme Court denied the petition, and affirmed the judgment of the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte (Special Proceedings 37), wthout pronouncement as to costs.

B. Statutory Construction Essentially Judicial

1. Endencia v. DavidThe Legislature cannot lawfully declare the

collection of income tax on the salary of a public official, specially a judicial officer, not a decrease of his salary, after the Supreme Court has found and decided otherwise. The interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes is within the exclusive province and jurisdiction of the judicial department, and that in enacting a law, the Legislature

may not legally provide therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the courts in their task of later interpreting said statute, specially when the interpretation sought and provided in said statute runs counter to a previous interpretation already given in a case by the highest court of the land. In the case at bar, Section 13 of Republic Act 590 interpreted or ascertained the meaning of the phrase “which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office,” found in section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, referring to the salaries of judicial officers. This act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature is an invasion of the well-defined and established province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary. The Legislature under our form of government is assigned the task and the power to make and enact laws, but not to interpret them. This is more true with regard to the interpretation of the basic law, the Constitution, which is not within the sphere of the Legislative department. Allowing the legislature to interpret the law would bring confusion and instability in judicial processes and court decisions.

Further, under the Philippine system of constitutional government, the Legislative department is assigned the power to make and enact laws. The Executive department is charged with the execution or carrying out of the provisions of said laws. But the interpretation and application of said laws belong exclusively to the Judicial department. And this authority to interpret and apply the laws extends to the Constitution. Before the courts can determine whether a law is constitutional or not, it will have to interpret and ascertain the meaning not only of said law, but also of the pertinent portion of the Constitution in order to decide whether there is a conflict between the two, because if there is, then the law will have to give way and has to be declared invalid and unconstitutional. Therefore, the doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer to the effect that the collection of income tax on the salary of a judicial officer is a diminution thereof and so violates the Constitution, is reiterated.

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision, affirming the ruling in Perferto v. Meer and holding the interpretation and application of laws belong to the Judiciary.

C. Effectivity of Laws

1. Tanada v. TuveraPublication in the Official Gazette is necessary in

those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date — for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication — but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect. This is correct insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of publication. Article 2 however, considered in the light of other

statutes applicable to the issue does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of the such provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim “ignorantia legis non excusat.” It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. Further, publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. In the present case, Presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall have no force and effect. The implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is an operative fact, which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.

The Supreme Court ordered the respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and that unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.

2. RESOULUTIONThe clause “unless it is otherwise provided,” in

Article 2 of the Civil Code, refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication. The legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. Publication requirements applies to (1) all statutes, including those of local application and private laws; (2) presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or directly conferred by the Constitution; (3) Administrative rules and regulations for the purpose of enforcing or implementing existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation; (4) Charter of a city notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place; (5) Monetary Board circulars to “fill in the details” of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce. Further, publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws.

The Supreme Court declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately upon their approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official

Gazette, to become effective only after 15 days from their publication, or on another date specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.

3. ALFREDO M. DE LEON, ANGEL S. SALAMAT, MARIO C. STA. ANA, JOSE C. TOLENTINO, ROGELIO J. DE LA ROSA and JOSE M. RESURRECCION, petitioners, vs.HON. BENJAMIN B. ESGUERRA, in his capacity as OIC Governor of the Province of Rizal, HON. ROMEO C. DE LEON, in his capacity as OIC Mayor of the Municipality of Taytay, Rizal, FLORENTINO G. MAGNO, REMIGIO M. TIGAS, RICARDO Z. LACANIENTA, TEODORO V. MEDINA, ROSENDO S. PAZ, and TERESITA L. TOLENTINO, respondents.

The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date, therefore, the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been superseded. Having become inoperative, respondent OIC Governor could no longer rely on Section 2, Article III, thereof to designate respondents to the elective positions occupied by petitioners.

Petitioners must now be held to have acquired security of tenure specially considering that the Barangay Election Act of 1982 declares it "a policy of the State to guarantee and promote the autonomy of the barangays to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities. 2 Similarly, the 1987 Constitution ensures the autonomy of local governments and of political subdivisions of which the barangays form a part, 3 and limits the President's power to "general supervision" over local governments. 4 Relevantly, Section 8, Article X of the same 1987 Constitution further provides in part:

Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years ...

Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by law, therefore, the term of office of six (6) years provided for in the Barangay Election Act of 1982 5 should still govern.

Contrary to the stand of respondents, we find nothing inconsistent between the term of six (6) years for elective Barangay officials and the 1987 Constitution, and the same should, therefore, be considered as still operative, pursuant to Section 3, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, reading:

Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations letters of instructions, and other executive

issuances not inconsistent, with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked.

WHEREFORE, (1) The Memoranda issued by respondent OIC Governor on February 8, 1987 designating respondents as the Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen, respectively, of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal, are both declared to be of no legal force and effect; and (2) the Writ of Prohibition is granted enjoining respondents perpetually from proceeding with the ouster/take-over of petitioners' positions subject of this Petition.

D. Court’s Primary Duty to Apply the Law

1. ELISEO SILVA, petitioner, vs.BELEN CABRERA, respondent.We realize that our present ruling will greatly

handicap the Public Service Commission and slow down its tempo in the disposal of contested cases and cases involving the fixing of rates, especially where the witnesses reside in the provinces; but where the law is clear, neither this court nor the commission may on grounds of convenience, expediency or prompt dispatch of cases, disregard the law or circumvent the same. The remedy lies with the Legislature if it could be convinced of the necessity of amending the law, and persuaded to approve a suitable amendment.

2. People v. MapaThe law is explicit that it is unlawful for any person

to possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition except when such firearms are in possession of such public officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official duties; as those firearms and ammunitions which are regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors or marines, the Philippines Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails. It is the first and fundamental duty of courts to apply the law; Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them. The law cannot be any clearer, there being no provision made for a secret agent.

Reliance in the decision in People v. Macarandang is misplaced, and the case no longer speaks with authority to the extent that the present decision conflicts with. It may be note that in People v. Macarandang, a secret agent was acquitted on appeal on the assumption that the appointment of the accused as a secret agent to assist in the maintenance of

peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently put him within the category of a ‘peace officer’ equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by section 879, Thus, in the present case, therefore, the conviction must stand.

The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed judgment.

3. CEBU PORTLAND CEMENT COMPANY, plaintiff-appellant, vs.MUNICIPALITY OF NAGA, CEBU, ET AL., defendants-appellees.The clear and explicit language of the law leaves no

room for doubt. The municipal treasurer "may seize and distrain any personal property" of the individual or entity subject to the tax upon failure "to pay the same, at the time required ..." There was such a failure on the part of plaintiff-appellant to pay the municipal tax at the time required. The power of the municipal treasurer in accordance with the above provision therefore came into play.

Whatever might have been set forth in the letter of the municipal treasurer could not change or amend the law it has to be enforced as written. That was what the lower court did. What was done then cannot be rightfully looked upon as a failure to abide by what the statutory provision requires. Time and time again, it has been repeatedly declared by this Court that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation. There is only room for application. That was what occurred in this case.

The decision of the lower court is affirmed in toto. With costs against plaintiff-appellant.

4. UNITED CHRISTIAN MISSIONARY SOCIETY, UNITED CHURCH BOARD FOR WORLD MINISTERS, BOARD OF FOREIGN MISSION OF THE REFORMED CHURCH IN AMERICA, BOARD OF MISSION OF THE EVANGELICAL UNITED PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH, COMMISSION OF ECUMENICAL MISSION ON RELATIONS OF THE UNITED PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH, petitioners, vs.SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION and SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, respondents.Where the language of the law is clear and the intent

of the legislature is equally plain, there is no room for interpretation and construction of the statute. The Court is therefore bound to uphold respondent Commission's refusal to arrogate unto itself the authority to condone penalties for late payment of social security premiums, for otherwise we would be sanctioning the Commission's reading into the law discretionary powers that are not actually provided therein,

and hindering and defeating the plain purpose and intent of the legislature.

The order appealed from is affirmed.

5. GEDEON G. QUIJANO and EUGENIA T. QUIJANO, petitioners-appellants, vs.THE DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE EX-OFICIO SHERIFF OF MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL, respondents-appellees.On the other hand, however, We cannot see any

room for interpretation or construction in the clear and unambiguous language of the above-quoted provision of law. This Court has steadfastly adhered to the doctrine that its first and fundamental duty is the application of the law according to its express terms, interpretation being called for only when such literal application is impossible.5 No process of interpretation or construction need be resorted to here a provision of law peremptorily calls for application. Where a requirement or condition is made in explicit and unambiguous terms, no discretion is left to the judiciary. It must see to it that its mandate is obeyed.6 Thus, even before the amendment of the Back Pay Law, when said law limited the applicability of back pay certificates to "obligations subsisting at the time of the approval of this Act," this Court has ruled that obligations contracted after its enactment on June 18, 1948 cannot come within its purview.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

6. REPUBLIC FLOUR MILLS, INC., petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS, respondents.It is true that in the construction of tax statutes tax

exemptions (and deductions are of this nature) are not favored in the law, and are construed strictissimi juris against the taxpayer.5 However, it is equally a recognized principle that where the provision of the law is clear and unambiguous, so that there is no occasion for the court's seeking the legislative intent, the law must be taken as it is, devoid of judicial addition or subtraction.6 In this case, we find the provision of Section 186-A — "whenever a tax free product is utilized, etc." — all encompassing to comprehend tax-free raw materials, even if imported. Where the law provided no qualification for the granting of the privilege, the court is not at liberty to supply any.

The decision appealed from is reversed and set aside, and, in accordance with the stipulation of the parties, petitioner is hereby ordered to pay to respondent Commissioner the sum of P3,288.16 as deficiency tax, with legal interest thereon from the date the tax became due.

7. National Federation of Labor (NFL) v. EismaThe first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply

the law. Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court; and it is given only by law. Jurisdiction is never presumed; it must be conferred by law in words that do not admit of doubt. Since the jurisdiction of courts and judicial tribunals is derived exclusively from the statutes of the forum, the issue should be resolved on the basis of the law or statute in force. Therefore, since (1) the original wording of Article 217 vested the labor arbiters with jurisdiction; since (2) Presidential Decree 1691 reverted the jurisdiction with respect to money claims of workers or claims for damages arising from employer-employee relations to the labor arbiters after Presidential Decree 1367 transferred such jurisdiction to the ordinary courts, and since (3) Batas Pambansa 130 made no change with respect to the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters with respect to money claims of workers or claims for damages arising from employer-employee relations; Article 217 is to be applied the way it is worded. The exclusive original jurisdiction of a labor arbiter is therein provided for explicitly. It means, it can only mean, that a court of first instance judge then, a regional trial court judge now, certainly acts beyond the scope of the authority conferred on him by law when he entertained the suit for damages, arising from picketing that accompanied a strike.

The Supreme Court, thus, granted the writ of certiorari, and nullified and set aside the 20 July 1982 order issued by the court a quo. It granted the writ of prohibition, and enjoined the Judge of said court, or whoever acts in his behalf in the RTC to which this case is assigned, from taking any further action on the civil case (Civil Case 716 [2751]), except for the purpose of dismissing it. It also made permanent the restraining order issued on 5 August 1982.

8. Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa v. Manila Railroad CompanyWhere the statutory norm speaks unequivocally,

there is nothing for the courts to do except to apply it. The law, leaving no doubt as to the scope of its operation, must be obeyed. The express provisions of the New Civil Code, Articles 2241, 2242 and 2244 show the legislative intent on preference of credits. In the present case, the applicable provision of Republic Act 2023 speaks for itself; there being no ambiguity, it is to be applied. If the legislative intent in enacting paragraphs 1 and 2 of Section 62 of RA 2023 were to give first priority in the matter of payments to the obligations of employees in favor of their credit unions, then, the law would have so expressly declared. There is nothing in the provision of Republic Act 2023 which provides that

obligation of laborers and employees payable to credit unions shall enjoy first priority in the deduction from the employees’ wages and salaries.

The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed decision, without pronouncement as to costs.

9. RCPI v. NTC

E. Courts Have No Power to Change the Law

10. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, petitioner vs.JUDGE JAIME SALAZAR (Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City [Br. 103], SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR AURELIO TRAMPE, PROSECUTOR FERDINAND R. ABESAMIS, AND CITY ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR EULOGIO MANANQUIL, NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION DIRECTOR ALFREDO LIM, BRIG. GEN. EDGAR DULA TORRES (Superintendent of the Northern Police District) AND/ OR ANY AND ALL PERSONS WHO MAY HAVE ACTUAL CUSTODY OVER THE PERSON OF JUAN PONCE ENRILE, respondents. It is enough to give anyone pause-and the Court is

no exception-that not even the crowded streets of our capital City seem safe from such unsettling violence that is disruptive of the public peace and stymies every effort at national economic recovery. There is an apparent need to restructure the law on rebellion, either to raise the penalty therefor or to clearly define and delimit the other offenses to be considered as absorbed thereby, so that it cannot be conveniently utilized as the umbrella for every sort of illegal activity undertaken in its name. The Court has no power to effect such change, for it can only interpret the law as it stands at any given time, and what is needed lies beyond interpretation. Hopefully, Congress will perceive the need for promptly seizing the initiative in this matter, which is properly within its province.

The Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs. Hernandez, the questioned information filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging simple rebellion only, hence said petitioners are entitled to bail, before final conviction, as a matter of right. The Court's earlier grant of bail to petitioners being merely provisional in character, the proceedings in both cases are ordered REMANDED to the respondent Judge to fix the amount of bail to be posted by the petitioners. Once bail is

fixed by said respondent for any of the petitioners, the corresponding bail bond flied with this Court shall become functus oficio. No pronouncement as to costs.

11. Floresca v. Philex MiningThe Court, through its majority, defended itself by holding that the Court does not legislate but merely applies and gives effect to the constitutional guarantees of social justice then secured by Section 5 of Article II and Section 6 of Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution, and later by Sections 6, 7, and 9 of Article II of the Declaration of Principles and State Policies of the 1973 Constitution, as amended, and as implemented by Articles 2176, 2177, 2178, 1173, 2201, 2216, 2231 and 2232 of the New Civil Code of 1950. Further, it reiterated its ruling in People vs. Licera: that judicial decisions of the Supreme Court assume the same authority as the statute itself, pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which decrees that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of this jurisdiction’s legal system. It argues that the application or interpretation placed by the Court upon a law is part of the law as of the date of the enactment of the said law since the Court’s application or interpretation merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed law purports to carry into effect. Yet, the Court argues that the Court can legislate, pursuant to Article 9 of the New Civil Code, which provides that “No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws.” Thus, even the legislator himself recognizes that in certain instances, the court “do and must legislate” to fill in the gaps in the law; because the mind of the legislator, like all human beings, is finite and therefore cannot envisage all possible cases to which the law may apply.

F. Courts Must Not Distinguish When The Law Does Not Distinguish

12. Phil. British Association v. IACIt is well recognized rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. Ubi lex non distinguish nec nos distinguere debemos. 13 "The rule, founded on logic, is a corollary of the principle that general words and phrases in a statute should ordinarily be accorded their natural and general significance. 14 The rule requires that a general term or phrase should not be reduced into parts and one part distinguished from the other so as to justify its exclusion from the operation of the law. 15 In other words, there should be no distinction in the application of a statute where none is indicated.16 For courts are not authorized to distinguish where the law makes no distinction. They should instead administer the law not as they think it ought to be but as they find it and without regard to consequences.

A corollary of the principle is the rule that where the law does not make any exception, courts may not except something therefrom, unless there is compelling reason apparent in the law to justify it.18 Thus where a statute grants a person against whom possession of "any land" is unlawfully withheld the right to bring an action for unlawful detainer, this Court held that the phrase "any land" includes all kinds of land, whether agricultural, residential, or mineral.19 Since the law in this case does not make any distinction nor intended to make any exception, when it speaks of "any judgment" which maybe charged against the counterbond, it should be interpreted to refer not only to a final and executory judgment in the case but also a judgment pending appeal.

The petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the restraining order issued on September 25, 1985 is hereby dissolved with costs against petitioner.

13. BANCO DE ORO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK, petitioner, vs.EQUITABLE BANKING CORPORATION, PHILIPPINE CLEARING HOUSE CORPORATION, AND REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH XCII (92), respondents.The rule, founded on logic is a corollary of the

principle that general words and phrases in a statute should ordinarily be accorded their natural and general significance. In other words, there should be no distinction in the application of a statute where none is indicated.

There should be no distinction in the application of a statute where none is indicated for courts are not authorized to distinguish where the law makes no distinction. They should instead administer the law not as they think it ought to be but as they find it and without regard to consequences.

The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit without pronouncement as to costs. The decision of the respondent court of 24 March 1986 and its order of 3 June 1986 are hereby declared to be immediately executory.

14. ELENA SALENILLAS AND BERNARDINO SALENILLAS, petitioners, vs.HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and HONORABLE RAYMUNDO SEVA, JUDGE OF BRANCH 38 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CAMARINES NORTE and WILLIAM GUERRA, respondents.From the foregoing legal provision, it is explicit that

only three classes of persons are bestowed the right to repurchase — the applicant-patentee, his widow, or other legal heirs. Consequently, the contention of the private respondent sustained by the respondent appellate court that

the petitioners do not belong to any of those classes of repurchasers because they acquired the property not through inheritance but by sale, has no legal basis. The petitioners-spouses are the daughter and son-in-law of the Encisos, patentees of the contested property. At the very least, petitioner Elena Salenillas, being a child of the Encisos, is a "legal heir" of the latter. As such, and even on this score alone, she may therefore validly repurchase. This must be so because Section 119 of the Public Land Act, in speaking of "legal heirs," makes no distinction. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos.

The petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution if the Court of Appeals and the Orders of the RTC were Reversed and Set Aside, and another one ENTERED directing the private respondent to reconvey the subject property and to execute the corresponding deed of reconveyance therefor in favor of the petitioners upon the return to him by the latter of the purchase price and the amounts, if any, of assessments or taxes he paid plus interest of one (1%) per centum per month on both amounts up to November 17, 1983.

G. Duty of the Court Effectuate Policy or Purpose

15. Vda. De Macabenta v. Davao Stevedores

H. Legislative Findings of Facts Binds Courts

16. People v. FerrerA conventional formulation is that legislative facts — those facts which are relevant to the legislative judgment — will not be canvassed save to determine whether there is a rational basis for believing that they exist, while adjudicative facts — those which tie the legislative enactment to the litigant — are to be demonstrated and found according to the ordinary standards prevailing for judicial trials. 36

The test formulated in Nebbia vs. new York, 37 and adopted by this Court in Lansang vs. Garcia, 38 is that 'if laws are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial determination to that effect renders a court functus officio." The recital of legislative findings implements this test.

With respect to a similar statement of legislative findings in the U.S. Federal Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950 (that "Communist-action organizations" are controlled by the foreign government controlling the world Communist movement and that they operate primarily to "advance the

objectives of such world Communist movement"),the U.S. Supreme Court said:

It is not for the courts to re examine the validity of these legislative findings and reject them....They are the product of extensive investigation by Committees of Congress over more than a decade and a half. Cf. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S.502, 516, 530. We certainly cannot dismiss them as unfounded irrational imaginings. ... And if we accept them, as we must as a not unentertainable appraisal by Congress of the threat which Communist organizations pose not only to existing government in the United States, but to the United States as a sovereign, independent Nation. ...we must recognize that the power of Congress to regulate Communist organizations of this nature is extensive. 39

This statement, mutatis mutandis, may be said of the legislative findings articulated in the Anti-Subversion Act.

The questioned resolution of September15, 1970 is set aside, and these two cases are hereby remanded to the court a quo for trial on the merits. Costs de oficio.

SECOND ASSIGNMENT

A. Presumption to aid construction

1. Paras vs. COMELEC, 264 SCRA 49It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. 4 The evident intent of Section 74 is to subject an elective local official to recall election once during his term of office. Paragraph (b) construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates the period when such elective local official may be subject of a recall election, that is, during the second year of his term of office. Thus, subscribing to petitioner's interpretation of the phrase regular local election to include the SK election will unduly circumscribe the novel provision of the Local Government Code on recall, a mode of removal of public officers by initiation of the people before the end of his term. And if the SK election which is set by R.A No. 7808 to be held every three years from May 1996 were to be deemed within the purview of the phrase "regular local election", as erroneously insisted by petitioner, then no recall election can be conducted rendering inutile the recall provision of the Local Government Code.

In the interpretation of a statute, the Court should start with the assumption that the legislature intended to enact an effective law, and the legislature is not presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute. 5 An interpretation should, if possible, be avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative or nugatory. 6

It is likewise a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be interpreted in harmony with the Constitution. 7 Thus, the interpretation of Section 74 of the Local Government Code, specifically paragraph (b) thereof, should not be in conflict with the Constitutional mandate of Section 3 of Article X of the Constitution to "enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanism of recall, initiative, and referendum . . . ."

Moreover, petitioner's too literal interpretation of the law leads to absurdity which we cannot countenance. Thus, in a case, the Court made the following admonition:

We admonish against a too-literal reading of the law as this is apt to constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and defeat the

intention of its authors. That intention is usually found not in "the letter that killeth but in the spirit that vivifieth". . . 8

The spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its construction; hence, a statute, as in this case, must be read according to its spirit and intent.

The petition is dismissed for having become moot and academic. The temporary restraining order issued by the Court, enjoining the recall election should be made permanent.

B. Intention of Legislature

2. People vs.. Concepcion 44 Phil. 126In the interpretation and construction of statutes, the primary rule is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature. In this instance, the purpose of the Legislature is plainly to erect a wall of safety against temptation for a director of the bank. The prohibition against indirect loans is a recognition of the familiar maxim that no man may serve two masters — that where personal interest clashes with fidelity to duty the latter almost always suffers. If, therefore, it is shown that the husband is financially interested in the success or failure of his wife's business venture, a loan to partnership of which the wife of a director is a member, falls within the prohibition.

That it was the intention of the Legislature to prohibit exactly such an occurrence is shown by the acknowledged fact that in this instance the defendant was tempted to mingle his personal and family affairs with his official duties, and to permit the loan P300,000 to a partnership of no established reputation and without asking for collateral security.

Judgment is affirmed.

3. Alonzo vs.. IAC 150 SCRA 259But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render justice.

Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. In

such a situation, we are not bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a balance between the word and the will, that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.

As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded, yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where these words import a policy that goes beyond them." 13 While we admittedly may not legislate, we nevertheless have the power to interpret the law in such a way as to reflect the will of the legislature. While we may not read into the law a purpose that is not there, we nevertheless have the right to read out of it the reason for its enactment. In doing so, we defer not to "the letter that killeth" but to "the spirit that vivifieth," to give effect to the law maker's will.

The spirit, rather than the letter of a statute determines its construction, hence, a statute must be read according to its spirit or intent. For what is within the spirit is within the letter but although it is not within the letter thereof, and that which is within the letter but not within the spirit is not within the statute. Stated differently, a thing which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as much within the statute as if within the letter; and a thing which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless within the intent of the lawmakers.

The petition is granted. The decision of the respondent court is REVERSED and that of the trial court is reinstated.

C. Unambiguous language

4. Luzon Brokerage vs. PSC 57 Phil. 536It is of special significance that notwithstanding the changes in the wording of the definition of the term "public service" introduced by Act No. 3316, there were no alterations whatever made in the basic provisions of sections 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 of Act No. 3108. The fact that these basic provisions were drafted with relation to common carriers and that no amendment of them was made to adapt them to private carriers like the petitioner clearly indicates that the Legislature, in the verbal amendments made by Act No. 3316 in section 13, did not contemplate the radical change which would discard the element of public use as an essential feature of every public service. Had the Legislature intended to bring under the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission enterprises not operated for public use, it would not have left these enterprises to guess their way through a statute applicable to public utilities, at their peril and with "no standard of conduct that it was possible to know". Indeed, a

serious doubt would arise whether we should not be obliged to hold a statute void pro tanto for uncertainty, which attempted to subject private carriers to the identical requirements and penalties to which the statute and the commission's regulations subject common carriers; and we cannot assume that the Legislature intended to leave such a cloud upon the statute. (Cf. Smith vs. Cahoon, 238 U. S., 553, 564; and Continental Baking Company vs. Woodring, 76 L. ed., 816, 822.)

In arriving at the conclusion that it was not the intention of the Legislature, in making the verbal changes in section 13 of Act No. 3108 above indicated, to enlarge the supervision, regulation and control of the Public Service Commission so as to include businesses like that described in the agreed statement of facts, we do not mean to intimate that it would be beyond the power of the Legislature to do so by appropriate language. Our view of the case renders unnecessary the consideration of the constitutional questions presented at great length in the memoranda of the petitioner and the respondents.

The writ of prohibition will be granted as prayed for, each party to bear its own costs. So ordered.

5. Tanada vs.. Yulo 61 Phil. 515In substantiation of what has just been said, it is of course fundamental that the determination of the legislative intent is the primary consideration. However, it is equally fundamental that that legislative intent must be determined from the language of the statute itself. This principle must be adhered to even though the court be convinced by extraneous circumstances that the Legislature intended to enact something very different from that which it did enact. An obscurity cannot be created to be cleared up by construction and hidden meanings at variance with the language used cannot be sought out. To attempt to do so is a perilous undertaking, and is quite apt to lead to an amendment of a law by judicial construction. To depart from the meaning expressed by the words is to alter the statute, is to legislate not to interpret.

The conclusion that the special defenses interposed by the Solicitor-General must be overruled. Accordingly, the writ will be granted and the petitioner Juan Tañada will be placed in possession of the office of justice of the peace of Perez, Tayabas.

6. Commissioner of Customs vs. Phil. Acetelyn 39 SCRA 70The following observations in the brief for the petitioner are apropos:

... in the exempting provisions of Republic Act No. 1394, the exempted items are divided into separate and specific

enumerations. The term 'industries' is used in two distinct groups. The first group of exempted industries refers exclusively to those falling under the new and necessary industries as defined in Republic Act No. 901. In the second, the term "industries" is classed together with the terms miners, mining enterprises, planters and farmers. ... If Congress really intended to give the term "industries" its ordinary and general meaning and thus grant tax exemption to all ventures and trades falling under the said ordinary and general definition, it should have eliminated the words "new and necessary industries' and 'mining enterprises" since these two ventures are already covered by the term "industries" in its ordinary and general meaning. On the other hand, the fact that the language of the law specifically segregates new and necessary industries under Republic Act No. 901 among those entitled to the tax exemption, in effect, restricts the meaning and scope of the word "industries."

The argument appears logical and reasonable. Since the term "industries" as used in the law for the second time is classified together with the terms "miners, mining enterprises, planters and farmers", the obvious legislative intent is to confine the meaning of the term to activities that tend to produce or create or manufacture, such as those of miners, mining enterprises, ]planters and farmers. The Tax Court's interpretation would lead to a Patent inconsistency, in that while the first part of the law confines the exemption to new and necessary industries, another part would extend the exemption to all other industries, regardless of their nature, as long as they employ labor and capital for profit-making purposes. In granting the exemption, it would have been illogical for Congress to specify importations needed by new and necessary industries -- as the term is defined by law and in the same breath allow a similar exemption to all other industries in general.

The phrasing of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 1394, to be sure, is rather vague and infelicitious, particularly in the repetition of the word "industries." It is such lack of precision in the law that gives rise to litigious controversies concerning its proper application. One of the established rules of statutory construction, however, is that tax exemptions are held strictly against the taxpayer, and if not expressly mentioned in the law must be within its purview by clear legislative intent. In the present case the construction adhered to by the respondents in reference to the scope of the term "industries" as employed for the second time in Section 6 of Republic Act No. 1394 is contrary to such rule. For if the term were all inclusive, and meant industries in general, that is, those which involve relatively large amounts of capital and/or labor regardless of their productive or non-productive nature, there would be no point in making a separate classification with respect to "new and necessary industries" for purposes of the tax exemption.

The decision of the Court of Tax Appeals is reversed and that of the Collector of Customs of Manila and the Commissioner of Customs upheld.

7. Davao Light vs. Commissioner 44 SCRA 122Similarly, petitioner can not lay claim to the enjoyment of the tax exemption benefits given to NPC because said corporation happened to be operating a power plant in the same locality where petitioner has a franchise. The legal principle on the matter is firmly established and well-observed: exemption from taxation is never presumed; 5 for tax exemption to be recognized, the grant must be clear and expressed; it cannot be made to rest on vague implications. 6 The possession by petitioner of a permit to operate an electric plant in Davao City does not entitle it to the same exemption privileges enjoyed by another operator without an express provision of the law to that effect.

The decision of the Court of Tax Appeals is hereby affirmed.

8. Republic vs. WCC 44 SCRA 191The use of the words "gratuity" and "disability" in Republic Act No. 610 does not in the least detract from its character as a compensation law, for, regardless of its phraseology, the said law is clearly intended to compensate an army officer or enlisted man or his beneficiaries under the circumstances contemplated therein. It will be noted that Republic Act No. 610 and the Workmen's Compensation Act prescribe more or less similar grounds, although worded differently, to entitle one to benefits. Thus, for benefits to accrue under Republic Act No. 610, death or disability must be the "proximate result of wounds or injuries received or sickness or disease incurred in the active service and in line of duty." (Sections 3 and 5.) And under the Workmen's Compensation Act, the employer is required to pay compensation to an employee who "suffers personal injury from any accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, or contracts tuberculosis or other illness directly caused by such employment, or either aggravated by or the result of the nature of such employment." (Section 2.)

The decision and resolution of the Workmen's Compensation Commission appealed from are modified in the sense that the sum of P3,000.00 received by the heirs of Cpl. Ludovico Doyon under Republic Act No. 610 should be, as the same is hereby, ordered deducted from the award of P4,449.12 to respondent Erlinda L. Doyon.

9. Ramos vs. CA 108 SCRA 728Where language is plain, subtle refinements which tinge words so as to give them the color of a particular judicial theory are not only unnecessary but decidedly harmful. That which has caused so much confusion in the law, which has made it so difficult for the public to understand and know

what the law is with respect to a given matter, is in considerable measure the unwarranted interference by judicial tribunals with the English language as found in statutes and contracts, cutting out words here and inserting them there, making them fit personal Ideas of what the legislature ought to have done or what parties should have agreed upon, giving them meanings which they do not ordinarily have, cutting, trimming, fitting, changing and coloring until lawyers themselves are unable to advise their clients as to the meaning of a given statute or contract until it has been submitted to some court for its 'interpretation and construction (Yangco vs. Court of First Instance of Manila, 29 Phil. 183,188).

Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them. They are the very last functions which a court should exercise. The majority of the laws need no interpretation or construction. They require only application, and if there were more application and less construction, there would be more stability in the law, and more people would know what the law is. (Lizarraga Hermanos vs. Yap Tico, 24 Phil. 504, 513).

The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside. We hereby declare that the appearance in the aforementioned case of Cruz Durian Agabin Atienza & Alday as counsel for the municipality of Hagonoy is contrary to law. The municipality should be represented by its municipal attorney and by the provincial fiscal of Bulacan. The restraining order is lifted.

10. Globe-Mackay vs. NLRC 206 SCRA 701In the case at bar, the law is on the side of private respondent. In the first place the wording of the Labor Code is clear and unambiguous: "An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement. . . . and to his full backwages. . . ." 25 Under the principlesof statutory construction, if a statute is clears plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This plain-meaning rule or verba legis derived from the maxim index animi sermo est (speech is the index of intention) rests on the valid presumption that the words employed by, the legislature in a statute correctly express its intent or will and preclude the court from construing it differently. 26 The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to:have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute. 27 Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure. Neither does the provision admit of any qualification. If in the wisdom of the Court, there may be a ground or grounds for non-application of the above-cited provision, this should be by way of exception, such as when

the reinstatement may be inadmissible due to ensuing strained relations between the employer and the employee.

The assailed resolution of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission dated December 29, 1987 is hereby AFFIRMED. Petitioner GMCR is ordered to REINSTATE private respondent Imelda Salazar and to pay her backwages equivalent to her salary for a period of two (2) years only.

Pascual vs. Pascual-Bautista 207 SCRA 561Verily, the interpretation of the law desired by the petitioner may be more humane but it is also an elementary rule in statutory construction that when the words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what is says. (Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 758-759 [1988]). The courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words (Aparri v. CA, 127 SCRA 233 [1984]). When the law is clear, it is not susceptible of interpretation. It must be applied regardless of who may be affected, even if the law may be harsh or onerous. (Nepomuceno, et al. v. FC, 110 Phil. 42). And even granting that exceptions may be conceded, the same as a general rule, should be strictly but reasonably construed; they extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the exception. Thus, where a general rule is established by statute, the court will not curtail the former nor add to the latter by implication (Samson v. C.A., 145 SCRA 654 [1986]).

The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the assailed decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated April 29, 1988 is AFFIRMED.

D. Ambiguities

11. People vs. Nazario 165 SCRA 186As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men "of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." 11 It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targetted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.

But the act must be utterly vague on its face, that is to say, it cannot be clarified by either a saving clause or by construction. Thus, in Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 12 the U.S. Supreme Court struck down an ordinance that had made it illegal for "three or more persons to assemble on any

sidewalk and there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by." 13 Clearly, the ordinance imposed no standard at all "because one may never know in advance what 'annoys some people but does not annoy others.' " 14

Coates highlights what has been referred to as a "perfectly vague" 15 act whose obscurity is evident on its face. It is to be distinguished, however, from legislation couched in imprecise language — but which nonetheless specifies a standard though defectively phrased — in which case, it may be "saved" by proper construction.

The appeal is DISMISSED.

12. Commissioner vs. TMX 205 SCRA 184Section 292 (now Section 230) of the National Internal Revenue Code should be interpreted in relation to the other provisions of the Tax Code in order to give effect to legislative intent and to avoid an application of the law which may lead to inconvenience and absurdity. In the case of People vs. Rivera (59 Phil 236 [1933]), this Court stated that statutes should receive a sensible construction, such as will give effect to the legislative intention and so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion. INTERPRETATIO TALIS IN AMBIGUIS SEMPER FRIENDA EST, UT EVITATUR INCONVENIENS ET ABSURDUM. Where there is ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be adopted. Furthermore, courts must give effect to the general legislative intent that can be discovered from or is unraveled by the four corners of the statute, and in order to discover said intent, the whole statute, and not only a particular provision thereof, should be considered. (Manila Lodge No. 761, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., 73 SCRA 162 [1976]) Every section, provision or clause of the statute must be expounded by reference to each other in order to arrive at the effect contemplated by the legislature. The intention of the legislator must be ascertained from the whole text of the law and every part of the act is to be taken into view. (Chartered Bank v. Imperial, 48 Phil. 931 [1921]; Lopez v. El Hogar Filipino, 47 Phil. 249, cited in Aboitiz Shipping Corporation v. City of Cebu, 13 SCRA 449 [1965]).

The petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of Tax Appeals dated April 29, 1988 is AFFIRMED.

E. Intent ascertained from unifrom trend

13. Director of Lands vs. Abaja 63 Phil. 559In determining the intention of the lawmaker, we are permitted to look to prior laws on the same subject and to investigate the antecedents or the legislative history of the statute involved.

It is obvious that the intention of the framers of House Bill No. 949 was to alter the language and the meaning of the previous Acts of the Legislature on the same subject. The Legislature, however, thought it proper not to make such alteration and as finally approved, Act No. 4043 adopts the language used in Acts Nos. 3059 and 3672 and refers to the institution of judicial proceedings instead of the decision as proposed by the authors of the bill. In enacting the bill into law, however, the corresponding change in the title was not made. It is pertinent to observe in this connection that the title of Act No. 4043, hereinbefore quoted, is a verbatim copy of the title of House Bill No. 949. When Act No. 4195 was passed, the title of Act No. 4043 was almost literally retained.

It will also be observed that the body of Act No. 4043, like those of Acts Nos. 3059, 3672 and 4195, employ the phrase "are about to be, declared land of public domain". This phrase would be meaningless if we construe the Act to refer to the rendition of judicial decisions in cadastral cases. A judicial decision may declare lands to be of the public domain but to say that a decision is about to declare it so would be absurd. The fact that the construction placed upon the statute by the appellants would lead to an absurdity is another argument for rejecting it.

The judgment of the lower court is affirmed.

F.Construction to effect legislative purpose

14. Araneta vs. Dinglasan 84 Phil. 368It is generally agreed that the maxim that the legislature may not delegate its powers signifies at the very least that the legislature may not abdicate its powers: Yet how, in view of the scope that legislative delegations take nowadays, is the line between delegation and abdication to be maintained? Only, I urge, by rendering the delegated powers recoverable without the consent of the delegate; . . . .

The clear tenor of this provision is that there was to be only one meeting of Congress at which the President was to give an account of his trusteeship. The section did not say each meeting, which it could very well have said if that had been the intention. If the National Assembly did not think that the report in section 3 was to be the first and last Congress Act No. 671 would lapsed, what reason could there be for its failure to provide in appropriate and clear terms for the filing of subsequent reports? Such reports, if the President was expected to continue making laws in the forms of rules, regulations and executive orders, were as important, of as unimportant, as the initial one.

As a contemporary construction, President Quezon's statement regarding the duration of Act No. 671 is enlightening and

should carry much weight, considering his part in the passage and in the carrying out of the law. Mr. Quezon, who called the National Assembly to a special session, who recommended the enactment of the Emergency Powers Act, if indeed he was not its author, and who was the very President to be entrusted with its execution, stated in his autobiography, "The Good Fight," that Act No. 671 was only "for a certain period" and "would become invalid unless reenacted." These phrases connote automatical extinction of the law upon the conclusion of a certain period. Together they denote that a new legislation was necessary to keep alive (not to repeal) the law after the expiration of that period. They signify that the same law, not a different one, had to be repassed if the grant should be prolonged.

The petitions will be granted.

15. Litex Employees vs. Eduvala 79 SCRA 89Article 226 of the New Labor Code cannot be misread to signify that the authority conferred on the Secretary of labor and the officials of the Department is limited in character. On the contrary, even a cursory reading thereof readily yields the conclusion that in the interest of industrial peace and for the promotion of the salutary constitutional objectives of social justice and protection to labor, the competence of the governmental entrusted with supervision over disputes involving employers and employees as well as "inter-union and intra-union conflicts," is broad and expensive. Thereby its purpose becomes crystal-clear. As is quite readily discernible where it concerns the promotion of social and economy rights, the active participation in the implementation of the codal objective is entrusted to the executive department. There is no support for any allegation of jurisdictional infirmity, considering that the language employed is well-nigh inclusive with the stress on its "and exclusive authority to act." If it were otherwise, its policy might be rendered futile. That is to run counter to a basic postulate in the canons of statutory interpretation. Learned Hand referred to it as the proliferation of purpose. As was emphatecally asserted by Justice Frankfurter: "The generating consideration is that legislation is more than composition. It is an active instrument of government which, for purposes of interpretation, means that laws have ends to be achieved. It is in this connection that Holmes said, 'words are flexible.' Again it was Holmes, the last judge to give quarter to loose thinking or vague yearning, who said that 'the general purpose is a more is a more important aid to the meaning than any rule which grammar or formal logic may lay down.' And it was Holmes who chided courts for being apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law when those words import a policy that goes beyond them." 3 What is intended by the framers of code or statute is not to be frustrated. Even on the assumption that by some strained or literal reading of the employed, a doubt can be raised as to its scope, the 'immitation should not be at war

with the end sought to be attained. It cannot be denied that if through an ingenious argumentation, limits may be set on a statutory power which should not be there, there would be a failure to effectuate the statutory purpose and policy. That kind of approach in statutory construction has never recommended itself.

The petition for certiorari is dismissed. This decision is immediately executory.

16. FFW vs. Inciong 161 SCRA 295Whether the word "may", a statute is to be construed as mandatory and imposing a duty, or merely as permissive and conferring discretion, is to be determined in each case from the apparent intention of the statute as gathered from the context, as well as from the language of the particular provision. The question in each case is whether, taken as a whole and viewed in the light of surrounding circumstances, it can be said that a purpose existed on the part of the legislator to enact a law mandatory in his character. If it can, then it should be given a mandatory effect; if not, then it should be given its ordinary permissive effect. ....

While the ostensible purpose behind Presidential Decree No. 1123 is to protect wages, incomes and employment, 11 the law also takes into consideration the possibility that some private employers may not be in a financial position to pay an increase in the monetary benefits of their employees. Thus, the Decree allows distressed employers to seek exemptions while in such condition and the Secretary of Labor has been mandated to issue the pertinent rules governing the procedure by which distressed employers can seek such exemption. The standard set by the law to guide the Secretary in determining which employer should be so entitled is "the interest of development and employment. 12 The Decree, therefore, seeks a balancing of the interests of" both employer and employee as regards the matter of exemption, i.e., the business ought to remain viable for the benefit of the private employer without prejudice to the pecuniary rights of the employee.

The petition is Dismissed for lack of merit.

17. Ursua vs.. CA 256 SCRA 147Time and again we have decreed that statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. Thus in construing a statute the reason for its enactment should be kept in mind and the statute should be construed with reference to the intended scope and purpose. 6 The court may consider the spirit and reason of the statute, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers.

Clearly therefore an alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by a competent authority. A man's name is simply the sound or sounds by which he is commonly designated by his fellows and by which they distinguish him but sometimes a man is known by several different names and these are known as aliases. 11 Hence, the use of a fictitious name or a different name belonging to another person in a single instance without any sign or indication that the user intends to be known by this name in addition to his real name from that day forth does not fall within the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended. This is so in the case at bench.

The questioned decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and petitioner CESARIO URSUA is ACQUITTED of the crime charged.

F. Spirit or Letter

18. Casela vs. CA 35 SCRA 279Conscience and equity should always be considered in the construction of statutes. The courts are not to be hedged in by the literal meaning of the language of the statute; the spirit and intendment thereof must prevail over its letter. This rule of construction is especially applicable where adherence to the letter of the statute would result in absurdity and injustice.

The judgment of tile Court of Appeals of August 31, 1966, which upheld the order of the Court of Agrarian Relations of October 1, 1964, is affirmed, at petitioner's cost.

19. mATABUENA VS. cERVANTES 38 scra 284Spirit of the lawWhatever omission may be apparent in an interpretation purely literal of the language used must be remedied by an adherence to its avowed objective. “El espiritu que informa la ley debe ser la luz que ha de guiar a los tribunales en la aplicación de sus disposiciones.'’ It is a principle of statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as much a part of it as what is written. Otherwise the basic purpose discernible in such codal provision would not be attained.

The Supreme Court (1) reversed the 23 November 1965 decision of the lower court; (2) declared the questioned donation void and recognized the rights of plaintiff and defendant as pro indiviso heirs to the property; and (3) remanded the case to the lower court for its appropriate

disposition in accordance with the current decision; without pronouncement as to costs.

20. Villanueva vs. COMELEC 140 SCRA 352The fact that Mendoza's withdrawal was not sworn is but a technicality which should not be used to frustrate the people's will in favor of petitioner as the substitute candidate. In Guzman us, Board of Canvassers, 48 Phil. 211, clearly applicable, mutatis mutandis this Court held that "(T)he will of the people cannot be frustrated by a technicality that the certificate of candidacy had not been properly sworn to, This legal provision is mandatory and non-compliance therewith before the election would be fatal to the status of the candidate before the electorate, but after the people have expressed their will, the result of the election cannot be defeated by the fact that the candidate has not sworn to his certificate or candidacy." (See also Gundan vs. Court of First Instance, 66 Phil. 125). As likewise ruled by this Court in Canceran vs. Comelec, 107 Phil. 607, the legal requirement that a withdrawal be under oath will be held to be merely directory and Mendoza's failure to observe the requirement should be "considered a harmless irregularity."

The Comelec's post-election act of denying petitioner's substitute candidacy certainly does not seem to be in consonance with the substance and spirit of the law. Section 28 of the 1978 Election Code provides for such substitute candidates in case of death. withdrawal or disqualification up to mid-day of the very day of the elections. Mendoza's withdrawal was filed on the last hour of the last day for regular filing of candidacies on January 4, 1980, which he had filed earlier that same day. For all intents and purposes, such withdrawal should therefore be considered as having been made substantially and in truth after the last day, even going by the literal reading of the provision by the Comelec. Indeed, the statement of former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando in his dissent that "the bona fides of petitioner Crisologo Villanueva y Paredes as a substitute candidate cannot, (in his opinion), be successfully assailed. It follows that the votes cast in his favor must be counted. Such being the case, there is more than sufficient justification for his proclamation as Vice Mayor...

The Court SETS ASIDE the questioned Resolutions of respondent Comelec and annuls the proclamation of respondent Lirio as elected vice-mayor of Dolores, Quezon and instead declares petitioner as the duly elected vice-mayor of said municipality and entitled forthwith to assume said office, take the oath of office and discharge its functions. This resolution is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.

21. Melchor vs. COA 200 SCRA 704It is a rule of statutory construction that the court may consider the spirit and reason of a statute where a literal

meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice or would defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers. (People v. Manantan 5 SCRA 684 [1962]) For this Court to draw a narrow and stringent application of LOI 968 would be to lose sight of the purpose behind its enactment. The rationale for LOI 968, which is to ensure that there are available funds to finance a proposed project, was already served by the chief accountant's issuance of a certificate of fund availability.

The petition is GRANTED.

G. Effect and consequences

22. Commissioner vs. Esso Standard 172 SCRA 364The fact is that, as respondent Court of Tax Appeals has stressed, as early as July 15, 1960, the Government already had in its hands the sum of P221,033.00 representing excess payment. Having been paid and received by mistake, as petitioner Commissioner subsequently acknowledged, that sum unquestionably belonged to ESSO, and the Government had the obligation to return it to ESSO That acknowledgment of the erroneous payment came some four (4) years afterwards in nowise negates or detracts from its actuality. The obligation to return money mistakenly paid arises from the moment that payment is made, and not from the time that the payee admits the obligation to reimburse. The obligation of the payee to reimburse an amount paid to him results from the mistake, not from the payee's confession of the mistake or recognition of the obligation to reimburse. In other words, since the amount of P221,033.00 belonging to ESSO was already in the hands of the Government as of July, 1960, although the latter had no right whatever to the amount and indeed was bound to return it to ESSO, it was neither legally nor logically possible for ESSO thereafter to be considered a debtor of the Government in that amount of P221,033.00; and whatever other obligation ESSO might subsequently incur in favor of the Government would have to be reduced by that sum, in respect of which no interest could be charged. To interpret the words of the statute in such a manner as to subvert these truisms simply can not and should not be countenanced. "Nothing is better settled than that courts are not to give words a meaning which would lead to absurd or unreasonable consequences. That is a principle that goes back to In re Allen (2 Phil. 630) decided on October 29, 1903, where it was held that a literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd results." 6 "Statutes should receive a sensible construction, such as will give effect to the legislative intention and so as to avoid an unjust or absurd conclusion."

The petition for review is DENIED, and the Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals dated October 28, 1967 subject of the petition is AFFIRMED

H. Implication and inferences

23. Chua vs. CSC 206 SCRA 65No statute can be enacted that can provide all the details involved in its application. There is always an omission that may not meet a particular situation. What is thought, at the time of enactment, to be an all-embracing legislation may be inadequate to provide for the unfolding events of the future. So-called gaps in the law develop as the law is enforced. One of the rules of statutory construction used to fill in the gap is the doctrine of necessary implication. The doctrine states that what is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed. Every statute is understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from its terms. Ex necessitate legis. And every statutory grant of power, right or privilege is deemed to include all incidental power, right or privilege. This is so because the greater includes the lesser, expressed in the Maxim, in eo plus sit, simper inest et minus.

The petition is GRANTED.

I. Natural and commonly understood meaning

24. Alfon vs.. Republic 97 SCRA 858The only reason why the lower court denied the petitioner's prayer to change her surname is that as legitimate child of Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Alfon she should principally use the surname of her father invoking Art. 364 of the Civil Code. But the word "principally" as used in the codal provision is not equivalent to "exclusively" so that there is no legal obstacle if a legitimate or legitimated child should choose to use the surname of its mother to which it is equally entitled. Moreover, this Court in Haw Liong vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-21194. April 29, 1966, 16 SCRA 677, 679, said: têñ.£îhqwâ£

The following may be considered, among others, as proper or reasonable causes that may warrant the grant of a petitioner for change of name; (1) when the name is ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or is extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (2) when the request for change is a consequence of a change of' status, such as when a natural child is acknowledged or legitimated; and (3) when the change is necessary to avoid confusion Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1953 ed., Vol. 1, p. 660).

In the case at bar, it has been shown that petitioner has, since childhood, borne the name Estrella S. Alfon although her birth records and baptismal certificate show otherwise; she was enrolled in the schools from the grades up to college under the name Estrella S. Alfon; all her friends call her by this name; she finished her course in Nursing in college and was graduated and given a diploma under this name; and she exercised the right of suffrage likewise under this name. There is therefore ample justification to grant fully her petition which is not whimsical but on the contrary is based on a solid and reasonable ground, i.e. to avoid confusion.

WHEREFORE, the Order appealed from is hereby modified in that, the petitioner is allowed to change not only her first name but also her surname so as to be known as ESTRELLA S. ALFON.

25. cAPATI VS. oCAMPO 113 scra 200“May” only permissiveThe word “may” is merely permissive and operates to confer discretion upon a party. Under ordinary circumstances, the term “may be” connotes possibility; it does not connote certainty. “May” is an auxillary verb indicating liberty, opportunity, permission or possibility. In the case at bar, the stipulation as to venue in the contract in question is simply permissive. By the said stipulation, the parties did not agree to file their suits solely and exclusively with the CFI Naga. They merely agreed to submit their disputes to the said court, without waiving their right to seek recourse in the court specifically indicated in Section 2(b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court (See related case in Nicolas v. Reparations Commission: “May” is not mandatory). Since the complaint has been filed in the CFI Pampanga, where the plaintiff resides, the venue of action is properly laid in accordance with Section 2(b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court.

Where personal actions may be filedThe rule on venue of personal actions cognizable by the CFI is found in Section 2(b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, which provides that such actions may be commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff. Said section is qualified by Section 3 of the same rule, providing that by written agreement of the parties the venue of an action may be changed or transferred from one province to another.

The Supreme Court set aside the appealed order, and ordered the return of the records to the court of origin for further proceedings, with costs against defendant-appellee Ocampo.

26. NHA vs. Juco 134 SCRA 172

Section I of Article XII-B, Constitution uses the word "every" to modify the phrase "government-owned or controlled corporation."

"Every" means each one of a group, without exception It means all possible and all taken one by one. Of course, our decision in this case refers to a corporation created as a government-owned or controlled entity. It does not cover cases involving private firms taken over by the government in foreclosure or similar proceedings. We reserve judgment on these latter cases when the appropriate controversy is brought to this Court.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned decision of the respondent National Labor Relations Commission is SET ASIDE. The decision of the Labor Arbiter dismissing the case before it for lack of jurisdiction is REINSTATED.

27. Rura vs. Lopena 137 SCRA 121Previous conviction, we submit, presupposes that there is a prior sentence or that there was already a decision rendered which convicted the accused. In this instant cases, however, there is only one decision rendered on the five (5) counts of Estafa which was promulgated on the same date. In other words the effects of conviction does not retract to the date of the commission of the offense as the trial court held. (Id., pp, 8-9.)

We hold for the petitioner. When he applied for probation he had no previous conviction by final judgment. When he applied for probation the only conviction against him was the judgment which was the subject of his application. The statute relates "previous" to the date of conviction, not to the date of the commission of the crime.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the respondent judge is directed to give due course to the petitioner's application for probation.

28. Baranda vs. Gustillo 165 SCRA 757The elementary rule in statutory construction is that when the words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says. (Aparri v. Court of Appeals, 127 SCRA 231; Insular Bank of Asia and America Employees' Union [IBAAEU] v. Inciong, 132 SCRA 663) The statute concerning the function of the Register of Deeds to register instruments in a torrens certificate of title is clear and leaves no room for construction. According to Webster's Third International Dictionary of the English Language — the word shall means "ought to, must, ...obligation used to express a command or exhortation, used in laws, regulations or directives to express what is

mandatory." Hence, the function of a Register of Deeds with reference to the registration of deeds encumbrances, instruments and the like is ministerial in nature. The respondent Acting Register of Deeds did not have any legal standing to file a motion for reconsideration of the respondent Judge's Order directing him to cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated in the certificates of titles of the petitioners over the subject parcel of land. In case of doubt as to the proper step to be taken in pursuance of any deed ... or other instrument presented to him, he should have asked the opinion of the Commissioner of Land Registration now, the Administrator of the National Land Title and Deeds Registration Administration in accordance with Section 117 of Presidential Decree No. 1529.

In the ultimate analysis, however, the responsibility for the delays in the full implementation of this Court's already final resolutions in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432 which includes the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens annotated in the certificates of titles of the petitioners over Lot No. 4517 of the Sta. Barbara Cadastre falls on the respondent Judge. He should never have allowed himself to become part of dilatory tactics, giving as excuse the wrong impression that Civil Case No. 15871 filed by the private respondents involves another set of parties claiming Lot No. 4517 under their own Torrens Certificate of Title.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The February 12, 1987 order of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23 is REINSTATED. All subsequent orders issued by the trial court which annulled the February 12, 1987 order are SET ASIDE. Costs against the private respondents.

J. Right to vary meaning of words

29. Diokno vs. RFC 91 Phil. 608In common or ordinary parlance, and in its ordinary signification, the term "shall" is a word of command, and one which has always or which must be given compulsory meaning; as denoting obligation. It has a preemptory meaning, and it is generally imperative or mandatory. It has the invariable significance of operating to impose a duty which may be enforced, particularly if public policy is in favor of this meaning or when addressed to public officials, or where a public interest is involved, or where the public or persons have rights which ought to be exercised or enforced, unless a contrary intent appears. People vs. O'Rourke, 13 P. 2d. 989, 992, 124 Cal. App. 752. (39 Words and Phrases, Permanent Ed., p. 90.)

The presumption is that the word "shall" in a statute is used is an imperative, and not in a directory, sense. If a different interpretation is sought, it must rest upon something in the

character of the legislation or in the context which will justify a different meaning. Haythorn vs. Van Keuren & Son, 74 A. 502, 504, 79 N. J. L. 101; Board of Finance of School City of Aurora vs. People's Nat. Bank of Lawrenceburg, 89 N. E. 904, 905 44 Ind. App. 578. (39 Words and Phrases, Permanent Ed., p. 93.)

However, the rule is not absolute; it may be construed as "many", when so required by the context or by the intention of the statute.

In the ordinary signification, "shall" is imperative, and not permissive, though it may have the latter meaning when required by the context. Town of Milton vs. Cook, 138 N.E. 589, 590, 244 Mass. 93. (39 Words and Phrases, Permanent Ed., p. 89.)

"Must" or "shall" in a statute is not always imperative, but may be consistent with an exercise of discretion. In re O'Hara, 82 N.Y.S. 293, 296, 40 Misc. 355, citing In re Thurber's Estate, 162 N.Y. 244, 252, 56 N.E. 638, 639. (Ibid. p. 92.)

The word "shall" is generally regarded as imperative, but in some context it is given a permissive meaning, the intended meaning being determined by what is intended by the statute. National Transit Corporation Co. vs. Boardman, 197 A. 239, 241, 328, Pa. 450.

The word "shall" is to be construed as merely permissive, where no public benefit or private right requires it to be given an imperative meaning Sheldon vs. Sheldon, 134 A. 904, 905, 100 N.J. Ex. 24.

Presumption is that word "shall" in ordinance, is mandatory; but, where it is necessary to give effect to legislative intent, the word will be construed as "may." City of Colorado Springs vs. Street, 254 p. 440, 441, 81 Colo. 181.

The word "shall" does not necessarily indicate a mandatory behest. Grimsrud vs. Johnson, 202 N. W. 72, 73, 162 Minn. 98.

Words like "may," "must," "shall" etc., are constantly used in statutes without intending that they shall be taken literally, and in their construction the object evidently designed to be reached limits and controls the literal import of the terms and phrases employed. Fields vs. United States, 27 App. D. C. 433, 440. (39 Words and Phrases, Permanent Ed., 89, 92).

In this jurisdiction the tendency has been to interpret the word "shall" as the context or a reasonable construction of the statute in which it is used demands or requires. Thus the provision of section 11 of Rule 4 of the Rules requiring a municipal judge or a justice of the peace to render judgment

of the conclusion of the trial has been held in the directory. (Alejandro vs. Judge of First Instance1 40 Off. Gaz., 9th Supp., 261). In like manner section 178 of the Election Law, in so far a it requires that appeals shall be decided in three months, has been to the directory for the Court of Appeals. (Querubin vs. The Court of Appeals,2 46 Off. Gaz., 155).

In the provision subject controversy, it is to be noted that the verb-phrase "shall accept or discount" has two modifiers, namely, "subject to availability of loanable funds" and "at not more that two per centum per annum for ten years." As to the second modifier, the interest to be charged, there seems to be no question that the verb phrase is mandatory, because not only does the law use "at not more" but the legislative purpose and intent, to conserve the value of the backpay certificate for the benefit of the holders, for whose benefit the same have been issued, can be carried out by fixing a maximum limit for discounts. But as to when the discounting or acceptance shall be made, the context and the sense demand a contrary interpretation. The phrase "subject" means "being under the contingency of" (Webster's Int. Dict.) a condition. If the acceptance or discount of the certificates to be "subject" to the condition of the availability of a loanable funds, it is evident that the Legislature intended that the acceptance shall be allowed on the condition that there are "available loanable funds." In other words, acceptance or discount is to be permitted only if there are loanable funds.

For all the foregoing considerations, we are constrained to dismiss the appeal, with coasts against the appellant.

30. Manikad vs. Tanodbayan 127 SCRA 724walang case no.30