statcons cases 2

8/11/2019 Statcons Cases 2

1/47

11. Where a statute is ambiguous, courts may examine both the printed pages of the published Act as wellas those extrinsic matters that may aid in construing the meaning of the statute, such as the history of itsenactment, the reasons for the passage of the bill and the purposes to be accomplished by the measure .G.R. No. L !"#!$ August 1%, 1$%&'())*++*(N R (- ' +/()+, petitioner,0s.

++( +/AN AR A+/ RN, *N'., 2-ormerly3 +tandard 4acuum Re5ning 'orp. 26hil.7, respondent. Appeal from the decision of the 'ourt of /ax Appeals re0ersing the 'ommissioner of 'ustoms8 decisionholding respondent ++( +tandard astern, *nc., 2formerly the +tandard 4acuum Re5ning 'orporation26hil.7 and hereinafter referred to as ++(7 liable in the total sum of 6%%&.9! as special import tax oncertain articles imported by the latter under Republic Act No. #"%, otherwise :nown as the 6etroleum Act of 1$;$.Respondent ++( is the holder of Re5ning 'oncession No. !, issued by the +ecretary of Agriculture andNatural Resources on ecember $, 1$&%, and operates a petroleum re5ning plant in Limay *NAR/*'L 1=# (- R 6


2/47

subDect thereto, for the phrase >import tax on all goods, articles or products imported orbrought into the 6hilippines> in explicit and unambiguous terms simply means customsduties. *t is hardly necessary to add that >customs duties> are simply taxes assessed onmerchandise imported from, or exported to a foreign country.And being a charge upon importation, the special import tax is essentially a customs duty, orat least parta:es of the character thereof.

'iting numerous American decisions and de5nitions of terms >customs duties,> >duties,> >imposts,>>le0ies,> >tax,> and >tolls,> and their distinctions, including some pronouncements of this 'ourt on thesubDect, the 'ourt of /ax Appeals in its decision, went to great lengths to show that the term >specialimport tax> as used in R.A. No. 1#$; includes customs duties. *t sees the special import tax as nothing butan impost or a charge on the importation or bringing into the 6hilippines of goods, articles or products. %

/o clinch its theory the 'ourt of /ax Appeals cited the similarity in the basis of computation of the customsduty as well as the similarity in the phraseology of +ection # of Republic Act No. 1#$; 2which establishedthe special import tax7 and +ection $ =1 of the /ari @ 'ustoms code 2the basic law pro0iding for andregulating the imposition of customs duties and imposts on importations7. " -or its part, pri0ate respondent, ++(, in its answer to the petition, leaned hea0ily on the same argumentsas those gi0en by the /ax 'ourt, the burden of which is that the special import tax law is a customs law. $*t is clear that the only issue in0ol0ed in this case is whether or not the exemption enDoyed by hereinpri0ate respondent ++( +tandard astern, *nc. from customs duties granted by Republic Act No. #"%, orthe 6etroleum Act of 1$;$, should embrace or include the special import tax imposed by R.A. No. 1#$;, orthe +pecial *mport /ax Law.We ha0e examined the records of this case thoroughly and carefully considered the arguments presentedby both parties and We are con0inced that the only thing left to this 'ourt to do is to determine theintention of the legislature through interpretation of the two statutes in0ol0ed, i.e., Republic Act No. 1#$;and Republic Act No. #"%.*t is a well accepted principle that where a statute is ambiguous, as Republic Act No. 1#$; appears to be,courts may examine both the printed pages of the published Act as well as those extrinsic matters thatmay aid in construing the meaning of the statute, such as the history of its enactment, the reasons for thepassage of the bill and purposes to be accomplished by the measure. 1= 6etitioner in the 5rst assignment of error too: exception to the 5nding of the 'ourt of /ax Appeals that>/he language of Republic Act No. 1#$; seems to lea0e no room for doubt that the law intends that thephrase 8+pecial import tax8 is ta:en to include customs duties> and countered with the argument that >Anexamination of the pro0isions of Republic Act No. 1#$; will indubitably re0eal that 'ongress considered thespecial import tax as a tax di erent from customs duties, as may be seen from the fact that +ection !2a7 of said law made separate mention of customs duties and special import tax ...> /hus3

... if as a result of the application of the schedule therein the total re0enue deri0ed from thecustoms duties and from the special import tax on goods, ... imported from the nited +tatesis less in any calendar year than the proceeds from the exchange tax imposed underRepublic Act Numbered +ix Hundred and (ne, as amended, on such goods, articles orproducts during the calendar year 1$&&, the 6resident may, by proclamation, suspend thereduction of the special import tax for the next succeeding calendar year ...

6etitioner further argues3'ustoms duties are prescribed by the /ari and 'ustoms 'ode, while the special import taxis pro0ided for by Republic Act No. 1#$;. *f our legislature had intended to classify thespecial import tax as customs duty, the said Art would not ha0e expressly exempted frompayment of the special *mport tax importations of machinery, e?uipment, accessories, andspare parts for use of industries, without distinguishing whether the industries referred toare the industries exempt from the payment of 'ustoms duties or the non exempt ones 2+ec.97. *t is suEcient that the imported machinery, etc., is for the use of any industry. 11

A study of petitioner8s two assignments of errors shows that one is anchored on practically the sameground as the other3 both in0ol0e the interpretation of R.A. No. #"% 2/he 6etroleum Act of 1$;$7 in relationwith R.A. No. 1#$; 2/he +pecial *mport /ax Law7.While the petitioner harps on particular clauses and phrases found in the two cited laws, which in a waywas li:ewise resorted to by the respondent ++(, it would do s well to restate the fundamental rule in theconstruction of a statute.*n order to determine the true intent of the legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the statuteshould not be ta:en as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and e0ery part thereof must beconsidered in 5xing the meaning of any of its parts. *n fact e0ery statute should recei0e such constructionas will ma:e it harmoniJe with the pre existing body of laws. Antagonism between the Act to be interpretedand existing or pre0ious laws is to be a0oided, unless it was clearly the intention of the legislature thatsuch antagonism should arise and one amends or repeals the other, either expressly or by implication.Another rule applied by this 'ourt is that the courts may ta:e Dudicial notice of the origin and history of thestatutes which they are called upon to construe and administer, and of facts which a ect their deri0ation,0alidity and operation. 1! Applying the abo0e stated rules and principles, let us consider the history, the purpose and obDecti0es ofRepublic Act No. #"% as it relates to Republic Act No. 1#$; and other laws passed by the 'ongress of the6hilippines insofar as they relate to each other.Republic Act No. #"%, the 6etroleum Act of 1$;$, has this for its title, to wit3

AN A'/ /( 6R()(/ /H C6L(RA/*(N, 4 L(6) N/, C6L(*/A/*(N, AN /*L*KA/*(N(- /H 6 /R(L ) R +( R' + (- /H 6H*L*66*N + /( N'( RAG /H '(N+ R4A/*(N(- + 'H 6 /R(L ) R +( R' + /( A /H(R*K /H + 'R /ARI (- AGR*' L/ R ANNA/ RAL R +( R' + /( 'R A/ AN A )*N*+/RA/*(N N*/ AN A / 'HN*'AL


3/47

AR/. 1=#. Customs duties . uring the 50e years following the granting of any concessions,the concessionaire may import free of customs duty, all e?uipment, machinery, material,instruments, supplies and accessories.

Art. 1=! of the +ame law insofar as pertinent, pro0ides3AR/. 1=!. Work obligations, taxes, royalties not to be charged . ... nor shall any otherspecial taxes or le0ies be applied to such concessions, nor shall concessionaires under thisAct be subDected to any pro0incial, municipal, or other local taxes or le0ies nor shall anysales tax be charged on any petroleum produced from the concession or portion thereof,manufactured by the concessionaire and used in the wor:ing of his concession. ....

Art. 1=;, still of the same Act, reads3AR/. 1=;. No export to be imposed . No export tax shall be le0ied upon petroleumproduced from concessions granted under this Act.

/he title of Republic Act No. #"% and the pro0isions of its three articles Dust cited gi0e a clue to the intent of the 6hilippine legislature, which is to encourage the exploitation and de0elopment of the petroleumresources of the country. /hrough the instrumentality of said law, it declared in no uncertain terms that theintensi5cation of the exploration for petroleum must be carried on unMinchingly e0en if, for the time being,no taxes, both national and local, may be collected from the industry. /his is the une?ui0ocal intention ofthe 6hilippine 'ongress when the language of the 6etroleum Act is examined. ntil this law or anysubstantial portion thereof is clearly amended or repealed by subse?uent statutes, the intention of thelegislature must be upheld.Against this unambiguous language of R.A. No. #"%, there is the subse?uent legislation, R.A. No. 1#$;, the+pecial *mport /ax Law, which, according to the herein petitioner, shows that the legislature considered thespecial import tax as a tax distinct from customs duties.Republic Act No. 1#$;, otherwise :nown as the +pecial *mport /ax Law, is entitled as follows3

AN A'/ /( *)6(+ A +6 '*AL *)6(R/ /AC (N ALL G(( +, AR/*'L + (R 6R( '/+*)6(R/ (R


4/47

by exempting agricultural products from this tax the farming industry would be fa0ored andthe de0elopment of the resources of the country encouraged. .... 1#

Ha0ing this in mind, particularly the manner in which extrinsic aids the history of the enactment of thestatute and purpose of the legislature in employing a clause or pro0ision in the law had been applied indetermining the true intent of the lawma:ing body, We are con0inced that R.A. No. #"%, /he 6etroleum Actof 1$;$, was intended to encourage the exploitation, exploration and de0elopment of the petroleumresources of the country by gi0ing it the necessary incenti0e in the form of tax exemptions. /his is theraison d etre for the generous grant of tax exemptions to those who would in0est their 5nancial resourcestowards the achie0ement of this national economic goal.(n the contention of herein petitioner that the exemptions enDoyed by respondent ++( under R.A. No.#"% ha0e been abrogated by R.A. No. 1#$;, We hold that repeal by implication is not fa0ored unless it ismanifest that the legislature so intended. As laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation and withfull :nowledge of all existing ones on the subDect, it is logical to conclude that in passing a statute it wasnot intended to interfere with or abrogate any former law relating to the same matter, unless therepugnancy between the two is not only irreconcilable but also clear and con0incing as a result of thelanguage used, or unless the latter act fully embraces the subDect matter of the earlier. 1; As obser0ed earlier, 'ongress lined up for re0ocation by Republic Act No. 1#$; six statutes dealing with theimposition of special imposts or le0ies or the granting of exemptions from special import taxes. Iet,considering the tremendous amount of re0enues it was losing under the 6etroleum Law of 1$;$, it failed toinclude the latter statute among those it chose to bury by the +pecial *mport /aw Law. /he reason for thisis 0ery clear3 /he legislature wanted to continue the incenti0es for the continuing de0elopment of thepetroleum industry. *t is not amiss to mention herein passing that contrary to the theory of the hereinpetitioner, R.A. No. #"% had not been repealed by R.A. No. !#&! which expressly abrogated +ection 9 ofR.A. No. 1#$; but did not repeal any part of R.A. No. #"%. /herefore, the exemption granted by RepublicAct No. #"% still stands.WH R -(R , ta:ing into consideration the weight gi0en by this 'ourt to the 5ndings and conclusions ofthe 'ourt of /ax Appeals on a matter it is well e?uipped to handle, which 5ndings and conclusions We 5ndno reason to o0erturn, the petition of the 'ommissioner of 'ustoms to re0erse the decision of the 'ourt of

/ax Appeals should be, as it is hereby, denied.+( (R R .

1!. (pinions and rulings of oEcials of the go0ernment called upon to execute or implement administrati0elaws command much respect and weight .G.R. No. L ##9$# $; )ay #1, 1$%$)*+A L 6. 4 RA, as 'ommissioner of *nternal Re0enue, and /H -A*R /RA and those of pri0ate respondent,)il: *ndustries *nc., under the brand > utch 6ri0ate respondent, *nstitute of 0aporated -illed )il:)anufacturers of the 6hilippines, is a corporation organiJed for the principal purpose of upholding andmaintaining at its highest the standards of local 5lled mil: industry, of which all the other pri0aterespondents are members.'i0il 'ase No. &!!%9 is an action for declaratory relief with ex parte petition for preliminary inDunctionwherein plainti s pray for an adDudication of their respecti0e rights and obligations in relation to theenforcement of +ection 19$ of the /ax 'ode against their 5lled mil: products.

/he contro0ersy arose from the order of defendant, 'ommissioner of *nternal Re0enue now petitionerherein, re?uiring plainti s pri0ate respondents to withdraw from the mar:et all of their 5lled mil: productswhich do not bear the inscription re?uired by +ection 19$ of the /ax 'ode within 5fteen 21&7 days fromreceipt of the order with the explicit warning that failure of plainti s8 pri0ate respondents to comply withsaid order will result in the institution of the necessary action against any 0iolation of the aforesaid order.+ection 19$ of the /ax 'ode reads as follows3

+ection 19$. )nscription to be placed on skimmed milk. * All condensed s:immed mil: andall mil: in whate0er form, from which the fatty part has been remo0ed totally or in part, soldor put on sale in the 6hilippines shall be clearly and legibly mar:ed on its immediatecontainers, and in all the language in which such containers are mar:ed, with the words,>/his mil: is not suitable for nourishment for infants less than one year of age,> or with othere?ui0alent words.

/he 'ourt issued a writ of preliminary inDunction dated -ebruary 19, 1$9# restraining the 'ommissioner of*nternal Re0enue from re?uiring plainti s8 pri0ate respondents to print on the labels of their riMed mil:products the words, >/his mil: is not suitable for nourishment for infants less than one year of age or wordsof similar import, > as directed by the abo0e ?uoted pro0ision of Law, and from ta:ing any action to enforcethe abo0e legal pro0ision against the plainti s8 pri0ate respondents in connection with their riMed mil:products, pending the 5nal determination of the case, 'i0il 'ase No. &!!%9, on the merits.


5/47

(n Fuly !&, 1$9$, howe0er, the (Ece of the +olicitor General brought an appeal from the said order by wayof certiorari to the +upreme 'ourt. 1 *n 0iew thereof, the respondent court in the meantime suspendeddisposition of these cases but in 0iew of the absence of any inDunction or restraining order from the+upreme 'ourt, it resumed action on them until their 5nal disposition therein.+pecial 'i0il Action No. &!#"#, on the other hand, is an action for prohibition and inDunction with a petitionfor preliminary inDunction. 6etitioners therein pray that the respondent -air /rade Antonio R. de Foya 0s. *nstitute of 0aporated )il: )anufacturers of the 6hilippines, etc.> pending 5nal determination of 'i0il 'ase No. &!!%9. /he facts of this special ci0ilaction show that on ecember %, 1$9!, Antonio R. de Foya and +ufronio 'arrasco, both in their indi0idualcapacities and in their capacities as 6ublic Relations 'ounsel and 6resident of the 6hilippine Association ofNutrition, respecti0ely, 5led -/< *.+. No. 1 with -air /rade imitation mil:> or as an imitation ofgenuine cows mil:. and omitting to mar: the immediate containers of their 5lled mil: products with thewords3 >/his mil: is not suitable for nourishment for infants less than one year of age or with othere?ui0alent words as re?uired under +ection 19$ of the /ax 'ode. /he s:immed mil:> in the headnote and >condensed s:immed mil:> in the text of the cited section, would restrict the scope of the general clause >all mil:, in whate0er form, from which thefatty pat has been remo0ed totally or in part.> *n other words, the general clause is restricted by thespeci5c term >s:immed mil:> under the familiar rule of e-usdem generis that general and unlimited termsare restrained and limited by the particular terms they follow in the statute.+:immed mil: is di erent from 5lled mil:. According to the > e5nitions, +tandards of 6urity, Rules andRegulations of the s:immed mil: is mil: in whate0er form from which the fattypart has been remo0ed. -illed mil:, on the other hand, is any mil:, whether or not condensed, e0aporatedconcentrated, powdered, dried, dessicated, to which has been added or which has been blended orcompounded with any fat or oil other than mil: fat so that the resulting product is an imitation orsemblance of mil: cream or s:im mil:.> /he di erence, therefore, between s:immed mil: and 5lled mil: isthat in the former, the fatty part has been remo0ed while in the latter, the fatty part is li:ewise remo0edbut is substituted with re5ned coconut oil or corn oil or both. *t cannot then be readily or safely assumedthat +ection 19$ applies both to s:immed mil: and 5lled mil:.


6/47

/he is untenable. /he collection of all national internal re0enue taxes, fees and charges, and theenforcement of all forfeitures, penalties and 5nes connected therewith.> /he enforcement of +ection 19$entails the promotion of the health of the nation and is thus unconnected with any tax purpose. /his is theexclusi0e function of the -ood and rug Administration of the epartment of Health as pro0ided for inRepublic Act No. #%!=. *n particular, Republic Act No. #%!= pro0ides3

+ection $. ... *t shall be the duty of the


7/47

petitioners ha0e also Durisdiction as would be the result were their instant petition granted, would onlycause o0erlapping of powers and functions li:ely to produce confusion and conMict of oEcial action whichis neither practical nor desirable.WH R -(R , the decision appealed from is hereby aErmed en toto . No costs.+( (R R .

1#. *n case of doubt as to what a pro0ision of a statute means, the meaning put to the pro0ision during thelegislati0e deliberations may be adopted .G.R. No. 1=9%!; -ebruary $, 1$$;

/H NA/*(NAL 6(L*' '())*++*(N, represented by its Acting 'hairman, 'esar +arino, /eodolo '.Nati0idad, 4ice 'hairman and xecuti0e (Ecer, *N6> in +ection "$ of the 6N6 Lawincludes all members of the present 6hilippine National 6olice, irrespecti0e of the originalstatus of the present members of the 6hilippine National 6olice before its creation andestablishment, and that +ection #$ thereof shall become operati0e after the lapse of thefour year transition period.

/he preliminary inDunction issued is made permanent.+( (R R . 2 Rollo , pp. !$ #=76etitioners 5led the instant petition on (ctober ", 1$$! see:ing the re0ersal of the abo0e Dudgment. (n

Fanuary 1!, 1$$#, the 'ourt resol0ed to treat the respondents8 'omment as Answer and ga0e due courseto the petition.*n ruling in fa0or of pri0ate respondents, respondent Dudge obser0ed, among others, that3

)t may ha+e been the intention of Congress to refer to the local police forces as the >)N > but the N /a0 failed to de ne 0ho or 0hat constituted the )N . /he natural recourse of thecourt is to trace the source of the >*N6> as courts are permitted to loo: to prior laws on thesame subDect and to in0estigate the antecedents in0ol0ed. /here is nothing extant in thestatute boo:s except that which was created and established under6 %9& pursuant to the mandate of Article C4 of the 1$%# 'onstitution pro0iding that the>+tate shall establish and maintain an integrated national police force whose organiJation,


8/47

administration and operation shall be pro0ided by law.> Heretofore, *N6 was un:nown. Andthe said law categorically declared the 6' >as the principal component of the *ntegratedNational 6olice> 2+ec. &, 6 %9&7.

he court 0as supplied by respondents 3petitioners herein4 0ith excerpts taken from thediscussion amongst the members of Congress concerning the particular pro+ision of ection#' . he court is not persuaded by said discussion it was a simple matter for the members of the legislature to state precisely in clear and une?ui0ocal terms their meaning, such as>integrated police> as used in 6 %9&. *nstead, they employed >*N6>, a generic term thatincludes the 6' as the principal component of the *N6, supra . )n failing to categoricallyrestrict the application of ection #' as the members of legislature are said to ha+eintended, it ga+e rise to the presumption that it has not limited nor intended to limit themeaning of the 0ord 0hen the bill 0as nally passed into la0 . *t is not diEcult for the courtto also presume that in drafting the wording of the 6N6 Law, the legislators were aware ofthe historical legislati0e origin of the >*N6>.

xxx xxx xxx /he court ta:es particular note of the fact that +ection "$ is found in the /ransitory6ro0isions of the law which do not pro0ide for any distinction between the former 6' oEcersand those belonging to the ci0ilian police forces. /hese pro0ision are speci5cally enacted toregulate the period co0ering the dissolution of the 6' and the creation of the 6N6, a periodthat necessarily would be attended by imbalances and or confusion occasioned by thewholesale and mass integration. *n fact, the retirement payment scheme of the *N6 is still tobe formulated, lea0ing the impression that nothing is really settled until after the transitionof four years has lapsed. +ection "$ therefore pre0ails o0er +ection #$ up to the year 1$$&when the retirement age for the members of the 6N6 shall then be age &9 after the year1$$&, +ection #$ shall then be the applicable law on retirement of 6N6 members. 2 Rollo , pp.!% !" emphasis supplied7

6etitioners disagree and claim that the use of the term *N6 in +ec. "$ does not imply the same meaningcontemplated under 6 %9& wherein it is pro0ided3

+ec. 1. Constitution of the )ntegrated National olice . /here is hereby established andconstituted the *ntegrated National 6olice 2*N67 which shall be composed of the 6hilippine'onstabulary as the nucleus, and the integrated police forces as established by 6residential

ecreesNos. ;!1, ;"!, , &"& and 9;1, as components, under the epartment of National

efense.(n the other hand, pri0ate respondents assert that being the nucleus of the *ntegrated National 6olice2*N67 under 6 %9&, former members of the 6hilippine 'onstabulary 26'7 should not be discriminatedagainst from the co0erage of the term >*N6> in +ec. "$, RA 9$%&. 'learly, it is argued, the term >*N6> foundin +ection "$ of RA 9$%& refers to the *N6 in 6 %9&. /hus, where the law does not distinguish, the courtsshould not distinguish.

oes the law, RA 9$%&, distinguish *N6 from the 6'Q 6etitioners submit that it does and cite +ections !#and "& to stress the point, +i5 .3

+ec. !#. Composition . +ubDect to the limitations pro0ided for in this Act, the 6hilippineNational 6olice, hereinafter referred to as the 6N6, is hereby established, initially consistingof the members of the police forces who were integrated into the *ntegrated National 6olice2*N67 pursuant to 6residential ecree No. %9&, and the oEcers and enlisted personnel of the6hilippine 'onstabulary 26'7. . .

/he permanent ci0ilian employees of the present 6', *N6, Narcotics 'ommand, '*+ and thetechnical command of the A-6 assigned with the 6', including NA6(L'() hearing oEcersholding regular items as such, shall be absorbed by the epartment as employees thereof,subDect to existing laws and regulations.+ec. "&. hase of )mplementation . /he implementation of this Act shall be underta:en inthree 2#7 phases, to wit36hase * xercise of option by the uniformed members of the 6hilippine 'onstabulary, the6' elements assigned with the Narcotics 'ommand, '*+, and the personnel of the technicalser0ices of the A-6 assigned with the 6' to include the regular '*+ in0estigating agents andthe operati0es and agents of the NA6(L'() *nspection, *n0estigation and *ntelligence


9/47

law itself distinguishes *N6 from the 6' and it cannot be construed that >*N6> as used in +ec. "$ includesthe members of the 6'.And contrary to the pronouncement of respondent Dudge that the law failed to de5ne who constitutes the*N6, +ec. $= of RA 9$%& has in fact de5ned the same. /hus,

+ec. $=. tatus of resent N 7/C78, C9)N . pon the e ecti0ity of this Act, the presentNational 6olice 'ommission and the 6hilippine 'onstabulary *ntegrated National 6olice shallcease to exist. /he 6hilippine 'onstabulary, which is the nucleus of the 6hilippine'onstabulary *ntegrated National 6olice shall cease to be a maDor ser0ice of the Armed-orces of the 6hilippines. he )ntegrated National olice, 0hich is the ci+ilian component ofthe hilippine Constabulary9)ntegrated National olice , shall cease to be the national policeforce and lieu thereof, a new police force shall be established and constituted pursuant tothis Act. 2emphasis supplied7

*t is not altogether correct to state, therefore, that the legislature failed to de5ne who the members of the*N6 are. *n this regard, it is of no moment that the legislature failed to categorically restrict the applicationof the transition period in +ec. "$ speci5cally in fa0or of the local police forces for it would be a meresuperMuity as the 6' component of the *N6 was already retirable at age 5fty six 2&97.Ha0ing de5ned the meaning of *N6, the trial court need not ha0e belabored on the supposed dubiousmeaning of the term. Nonetheless, if confronted with such a situation, courts are not without recourse indetermining the construction of the statute with doubtful meaning for they may a0ail themsel0es of theactual proceedings of the legislati0e body. *n case of doubt as to what a pro0ision of a statute means, themeaning put to the pro0ision during the legislati0e deliberations may be adopted 2 e 4illa 0. 'ourt ofAppeals,1$& +'RA %!! 1$$1S citing 6alanca 0. 'ity of )anila, ;1 6hil. 1!& 1$!=S Arenas 0. 'ity of +an 'arlos, "!+'RA #1" 1$%"S7.'ourts should not gi0e a literal interpretation to the letter of the law if it runs counter to the legislati0eintent 2Iellow /axi and 6asay /ransportation Wor:ers8 Association 0. )anila Iellow /axi 'ab. 'o., "= 6hil. "#

1$;"S7.xamining the records of the


10/47

existing conditions only 2;7 *t must apply e?ually to all members of the same class 26eople 0s. 'ayat, 9"6hil. 1! 1$#$S7.

/he classi5cation is based upon substantial distinctions. /he 6', before the e ecti0ity of the law 2RA 9$%&7,were already retirable at age &9 while the local police force were retirable at 9=, and go0erned by di erentlaws26. . 11";, +ec. ## and +ec. &=7. /he distinction is rele0ant for the purpose of the statute, which is toenable the local police force to plan for their retirement which would be earlier than usual because of thenew law. +ection "$ is merely transitory, remedial in nature, and loses its force and e ect once the fouryear transitory period has elapsed. -inally, it applies not only to some but to all local police oEcers.*t may be appropriate to state at this point that it seems absurd that a law will grant an extension to 6'oEcers8 retirable age from &9 to 9= and then gradually lower it bac: to &9 without any cogent reason atall. Why should the retirement age of 6' oEcers be increased during the transitory period to the exclusionof other 6' oEcers who would retire at age &9 after such periodQ +uch absurdity was ne0er contemplatedby the law and would defeat its purpose of pro0iding a uniform retirement age for 6N6 members.WH R -(R , the petition is GRAN/ . /he writ of inDunction issued on Fanuary ", 1$$! is hereby L*-/and the assailed decision of respondent Dudge is R 4 R+ and + / A+* .+( (R R .

1;. 6enal laws are to be construed strictly against the state and in fa0our of the accused .G.R. No. 11#=$! +eptember 1, 1$$;)AR/*N ' N/ N(, etitioner , 0s. H(N. 4*'/(R*A 4*LLAL(N 6(RN*LL(+, 6residing Fudge of the Regional

/rial 'ourt of )alolos, religious purpose> is not expresslyincluded in the pro0isions of the statute, hence what the law does not include, it excludes2!7 penal laws are to be construed strictly against the +tate and liberally in fa0or of the accused and 2#7 tosubDect to +tate regulation solicitations made for a religious purpose would constitute an abridgment of theright to freedom of religion guaranteed under the 'onstitution.6residential ecree No. 1&9; 2which amended Act No. ;=%&, otherwise :nown as the +olicitation 6ermitLaw7, pro0ides as follows3

+ec. !. Any person, corporation, organiJation, or association desiring to solicit or recei0econtributions for charitable or public welfare purposes shall 5rst secure a permit from theRegional (Eces of the epartment of +ocial +er0ices and e0elopment as pro0ided in the*ntegrated ReorganiJation 6lan. pon the 5ling of a written application for a permit in theform prescribed by the Regional (Eces of the epartment of +ocial +er0ices and

e0elopment, the Regional irector or his duly authoriJed representati0e may, in his


11/47

discretion, issue a permanent or temporary permit or disappro0e the application. *n theinterest of the public, he may in his discretion renew or re0o:e any permit issued under Act;=%&.

/he main issue to be resol0ed here is whether the phrase >charitable purposes> should be construed in itsbroadest sense so as to include a religious purpose. We hold in the negati0e.*. *ndeed, it is an elementary rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing,act, or conse?uence excludes all others. /his rule is expressed in the familiar maxim > expressio unius estexclusio alterius .> Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, byinterpretation or construction, be extended to others. /he rule proceeds from the premise that thelegislature would not ha0e made speci5ed enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to restrictits meaning and to con5ne its terms to those expressly mentioned. % *t will be obser0ed that the 1$"% 'onstitution, as well as se0eral other statutes, treat the words>charitable> and >religious> separately and independently of each other. /hus, the word >charitable> is onlyone of three descripti0e words used in +ection !" 2#7, Article 4* of the 'onstitution which pro0ides that>charitable institutions, churches and personages . . ., and all lands, buildings, and impro0ements, actually,directly, and exclusi0ely used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt fromtaxation.> /here are certain pro0isions in statutes wherein these two terms are li:ewise dissociated andindi0idually mentioned, as for instance, +ections !9 2e7 2corporations exempt from income tax7 and !" 2"72 7 2exclusions from gross income7 of the National *nternal Re0enue 'ode +ection "" 2purposes for theorganiJation of non stoc: corporations7 of the 'orporation 'ode and+ection !#; 2b7 2exemptions from real property tax7 of the Local Go0ernment 'ode.

/hat these legislati0e enactments speci5cally spelled out >charitable> and >religious> in an enumeration,whereas 6residential ecree No. 1&9; merely stated >charitable or public welfare purposes,> only goes toshow that the framers of the law in ?uestion ne0er intended to include solicitations for religious purposeswithin its co0erage. (therwise, there is no reason why it would not ha0e so stated expressly.All contributions designed to promote the wor: of the church are >charitable> in nature, since religiousacti0ities depend for their support on 0oluntary contributions. " Howe0er, >religious purpose> is notinterchangeable with the expression >charitable purpose.> While it is true that there is no religious purposewhich is not also a charitable purpose, yet the con0erse is not e?ually true, for there may be a >charitable>purpose which is not >religious> in the legal sense of the term. $ Although the term >charitable> mayinclude matters which are >religious,> it is a broader term and includes matters which are not >religious,>and, accordingly, there is a distinction between >charitable purpose> and >religious purpose,> except wherethe two terms are ob0iously used synonymously, or where the distinction has been done away with bystatute. 1= /he word >charitable,> therefore, li:e most other words, is capable of di erent signi5cations. -orexample, in the law, exempting charitable uses from taxation, it has a 0ery wide meaning, but under6residential ecree No. 1&9; which is a penal law, it cannot be gi0en such a broad application since itwould be preDudicial to petitioners.

/o illustrate, the rule is that tax exemptions are generally construed strictly against the taxpayer. Howe0er,there are cases wherein claims for exemption from tax for >religious purposes> ha0e been liberallyconstrued as co0ered in the law granting tax exemptions for >charitable purposes.> /hus, the term>charitable purposes,> within the meaning of a statute pro0iding that the succession of any propertypassing to or for the use of any institution for purposes only of public charity shall not be subDect tosuccession tax, is deemed to include religious purposes. 11 A gift for >religious purposes> was considered asa be?uest for >charitable use> as regards exemption from inheritance tax. (n the other hand, to subsume the >religious> purpose of the solicitation within the concept of >charitable>purpose which under 6residential ecreeNo. 1&9; re?uires a prior permit from the epartment of +ocial +er0ices and e0elopment, under paid ofpenal liability in the absence thereof, would be preDudicial to petitioner. Accordingly, the term >charitable>should be strictly construed so as to exclude solicitations for >religious> purposes. /hereby, we adhere tothe fundamental doctrine underlying 0irtually all penal legislations that such interpretation should beadopted as would fa0or the accused.-or, it is a well entrenched rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly against the +tate and liberallyin fa0or of the accused. /hey are not to be extended or enlarged by implications, intendments, analogiesor e?uitable considerations. /hey are not to be strained by construction to spell out a new o ense, enlargethe 5eld of crime or multiply felonies. Hence, in the interpretation of a penal statute, the tendency is tosubDect it to careful scrutiny and to construe it with such strictness as to safeguard the rights of theaccused. *f the statute is ambiguous and admits of two reasonable but contradictory constructions, thatwhich operates in fa0or of a party accused under its pro0isions is to be preferred. /he principle is that actsin and of themsel0es innocent and lawful cannot be held to be criminal unless there is a clear andune?ui0ocal expression of the legislati0e intent to ma:e them such. Whate0er is not plainly within thepro0isions of a penal statute should be regarded as without its intendment.

/he purpose of strict construction is not to enable a guilty person to escape punishment through atechnicality but to pro0ide a precise de5nition of forbidden acts. 1; /he word >charitable> is a matter ofdescription rather than of precise de5nition, and each case in0ol0ing a determination of that which ischaritable must be decided on its own particular facts and circumstances. 1& /he law does not operate in+acuo nor should its applicability be determined by circumstances in the abstract.-urthermore, in the pro0isions of the 'onstitution and the statutes mentioned abo0e, the enumerationstherein gi0en which include the words >charitable> and >religious> ma:e use of the disDuncti0e >or.> *n itselementary sense, >or> as used in a statute is a disDuncti0e article indicating an alternati0e. *t oftenconnects a series of words or propositions indicating a choice of either. When >or> is used, the 0ariousmembers of the enumeration are to be ta:en separately. 19 Accordingly, >charitable> and >religious,> whichare integral parts of an enumeration using the disDuncti0e >or> should be gi0en di erent, distinct, anddisparate meanings. /here is no compelling consideration why the same treatment or usage of thesewords cannot be made applicable to the ?uestioned pro0isions of 6residential ecree No. 1&9;.


12/47

**. 6etitioner next a0ers that solicitations for religious purposes cannot be penaliJed under the law for,otherwise, it will constitute an abridgment or restriction on the free exercise clause guaranteed under the'onstitution.*t may be conceded that the construction of a church is a social concern of the people and, conse?uently,solicitations appurtenant thereto would necessarily in0ol0e public welfare. 6refatorily, it is not implausiblethat the regulatory powers of the +tate may, to a certain degree, extend to solicitations of this nature.'onsidering, howe0er, that such an acti0ity is within the cloa: of the free exercise clause under the right tofreedom of religion guaranteed by the 'onstitution, it becomes imperati0e to del0e into the eEcaciousnessof a statutory grant of the power to regulate the exercise of this constitutional right and the allowablerestrictions which may possibly be imposed thereon.

/he constitutional inhibition of legislation on the subDect of religion has a double aspect. (n the one hand,it forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship.-reedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious organiJation or form of worship as theindi0idual may choose cannot be restricted by law. (n the other hand, it safeguards the free exercise ofthe chosen form of religion. /hus, the constitution embraces two concepts, that is, freedom to belie0e andfreedom to act. /he 5rst is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be. 'onduct remainssubDect to regulation for the protection of society. /he freedom to act must ha0e appropriate de5nitions topreser0e the enforcement of that protection. *n e0ery case, the power to regulate must be so exercised, inattaining a permissible end, as not to unduly infringe on the protectedfreedom.Whence, e0en the exercise of religion may be regulated, at some slight incon0enience, in order that the+tate may protect its citiJens from inDury. Without doubt, a +tate may protect its citiJens from fraudulentsolicitation by re?uiring a stranger in the community, before permitting him publicly to solicit funds for anypurpose, to establish his identity and his authority to act for the cause which he purports to represent. /he+tate is li:ewise free to regulate the time and manner of solicitation generally, in the interest of publicsafety, peace, comfort, or con0enience.*t does not follow, therefore, from the constitutional guaranties of the free exercise of religion thate0erything which may be so called can be tolerated. 1$ *t has been said that a law ad0ancing a legitimatego0ernmental interest is not necessarily in0alid as one interfering with the >free exercise> of religionmerely because it also incidentally has a detrimental e ect on the adherents of one or more religion. !=

/hus, the general regulation, in the public interest, of solicitation, which does not in0ol0e any religious testand does not unreasonably obstruct or delay the collection of funds, is not open to any constitutionalobDection, e0en though the collection be for a religious purpose. +uch regulation would not constitute aprohibited pre0ious restraint on the free exercise of religion or interpose an inadmissible obstacle to itsexercise.

0en with numerous regulati0e laws in existence, it is surprising how many operations are carried on bypersons and associations who, secreting their acti0ities under the guise of bene0olent purposes, succeedin cheating and defrauding a generous public. *t is in fact amaJing how pro5table the fraudulent schemesand practices are to people who manipulate them. /he +tate has authority under the exercise of its policepower to determine whether or not there shall be restrictions on soliciting by unscrupulous persons or forunworthy causes or for fraudulent purposes. /hat solicitation of contributions under the guise of charitableand bene0olent purposes is grossly abused is a matter of common :nowledge. 'ertainly the solicitation ofcontributions in good faith for worthy purposes should not be denied, but somewhere should be lodged thepower to determine within reasonable limits the worthy from the unworthy. !! /he obDectionable practicesof unscrupulous persons are preDudicial to worthy and proper charities which naturally su er when thecon5dence of the public in campaigns for the raising of money for charity is lessened or destroyed. !# +omeregulation of public solicitation is, therefore, in the public interest.

/o conclude, solicitation for religious purposes may be subDect to proper regulation by the +tate in theexercise of police power. Howe0er, in the case at bar, considering that solicitations intended for a religiouspurpose are not within the co0erage of 6residential ecree No. 1&9;, as earlier demonstrated, petitionercannot be held criminally liable therefor.As a 5nal note, we reDect the reason ad0anced by respondent Dudge for increasing the penalty imposed bythe trial court, premised on the supposed per0ersity of petitioner8s act which thereby caused damage tothe complainant. *t must be here emphasiJed that the trial court, in the dispositi0e portion of its decision,e0en recommended executi0e clemency in fa0or of petitioner and the other accused after 5nding that thelatter acted in good faith in ma:ing the solicitation from the complainant, an obser0ation with which wefully agree. After all, mista:e upon a doubtful and diEcult ?uestion of law can be the basis of good faith,especially for a layman.

/here is li:ewise nothing in the 5ndings of respondent Dudge which would indicate, impliedly or otherwise,that petitioner and his co accused acted abusi0ely or male0olently. /his could be reMecti0e upon herobDecti0ity, considering that the complainant in this case is herself a Dudge of the Regional /rial 'ourt atPaloo:an 'ity. *t bears stressing at this point that a Dudge is re?uired to so beha0e at all times as topromote public con5dence in the integrity and impartiality of the Dudiciary, !& should be 0igilant against anyattempt to sub0ert its independence, and must resist any pressure from whate0er source. WH R -(R , the decision appealed from is hereby R 4 R+ and + / A+* , and petitioner )artin'enteno is A'T *// of the o ense charged, with costs de o cio .+( (R R .

1&. 6enal laws are to be construed strictly against the state and in fa0our of the accused.G.R. No. 11!1%= April 1=, 1$$9' +AR*( R+ A, petitioner,0s.'( R/ (- A66 AL+ AN 6 (6L (- /H 6H*L*66*N +, respondents.


13/47

< LL(+*LL(, .:p

/his is a petition for re0iew of the decision of the 'ourt of Appeals which aErmed the con0iction ofpetitioner by the Regional /rial 'ourt of a0ao 'ity for 0iolation of +ec. 1 of '.A. No. 1;!, as amended byR.A. No. 9="&, otherwise :nown as > n ct to Regulate the . 16etitioner 'esario rsua was a 'ommunity n0ironment and Natural Resources (Ecer assigned inPidapawan, 'otabato. (n $ )ay 1$"$ the 6ro0incial Go0ernor of 'otabato re?uested the (Ece of the(mbudsman in )anila to conduct an in0estigation on a complaint for bribery, dishonesty, abuse ofauthority and gi0ing of unwarranted bene5ts by petitioner and other oEcials of the epartment of

n0ironment and Natural Resources. /he complaint was initiated by the +angguniang 6anlalawigan of'otabato through a resolution ad0ising the Go0ernor to report the in0ol0ement of petitioner and others inthe illegal cutting of mahogany trees and hauling of illegally cut logs in the area. !(n 1 August 1$"$ Atty. -rancis 6almones, counsel for petitioner, wrote the (Ece of the (mbudsman in

a0ao 'ity re?uesting that he be furnished copy of the complaint against petitioner. Atty. 6almones thenas:ed his client rsua to ta:e his letter re?uest to the (Ece of the (mbudsman because his law 5rm8smessenger, (scar 6ereJ, had to attend to some personal matters. (scar 6ereJ.> ;(scar 6ereJ> was actually petitioner 'esario rsua, a customer of FosefaAmparo in her gasoline station, Loida reported the matter to the eputy (mbudsman who recommendedthat petitioner be accordingly charged.(n 1" ecember 1$$=, after the prosecution had completed the presentation of its e0idence, petitionerwithout lea0e of court 5led a demurrer to e0idence alleging that the failure of the prosecution to pro0e thathis supposed alias was di erent from his registered name in the local ci0il registry was fatal to its cause.6etitioner argued that no document from the local ci0il registry was presented to show the registered nameof accused which according to him was a condition sine =ua non for the 0alidity of his con0iction.

/he trial court reDected his contentions and found him guilty of 0iolating +ec. 1 of '.A. No. 1;! as amendedby R.A. No. 9="&. He was sentenced to su er a prison term of one 217 year and one 217 day of prisioncorreccional minimum as minimum, to four 2;7 years of prision correccional medium as maximum, with allthe accessory penalties pro0ided for by law, and to pay a 5ne of 6;,===.== plus costs.6etitioner appealed to the 'ourt of Appeals.(n #1 )ay 1$$# the 'ourt of Appeals aErmed the con0iction of petitioner but modi5ed the penalty byimposing an indeterminate term of one 217 year as minimum to three 2#7 years as maximum and a 5ne of6&,===.==.6etitioner now comes to us for re0iew of his con0iction as he reasserts his innocence. He contends that hehas not 0iolated '.A. No. 1;! as amended by R.A. No. 9="& as he ne0er used any alias name neither is>(scar 6ereJ> his alias . An alias , according to him, is a term which connotes the habitual use of anothername by which a person is also :nown. He claims that he has ne0er been :nown as >(scar 6ereJ> and thathe only used such name on one occasion and it was with the express consent of (scar 6ereJ himself. *t ishis position that an essential re?uirement for a con0iction under '.A. No. 1;! as amended by R.A. No. 9="&has not been complied with when the prosecution failed to pro0e that his supposed alias was di erent fromhis registered name in the Registry of


14/47

/he abo0e law was subse?uently amended by R.A. No. 9="&, appro0ed on ; August 1$9$. As amended,'.A. No. 1;! now reads3

+ec. 1. xcept as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, tele0ision, radio or otherentertainment purposes and in athletic e0ents where the use of pseudonym is a normallyaccepted practice, no person shall use any name di erent from the one with which he wasregistered at birth in the oEce of the local ci0il registry or with which he was baptiJed for the5rst time, or in case of all alien, with which he was registered in the bureau of immigrationupon entry or such substitute name as may ha0e been authoriJed by a competent court3

ro+ided , /hat persons whose births ha0e not been registered in any local ci0il registry andwho ha0e not been baptiJed, ha0e one year from the appro0al of this act within which toregister their names in the ci0il registry of their residence. /he name shall comprise thepatronymic name and one or two surnames.+ec. !. Any person desiring to use an alias shall apply for authority therefor in proceedingsli:e those legally pro0ided to obtain Dudicial authority for a change of name and no personshall be allowed to secure such Dudicial authority for more than one alias . /he petition for analias shall set forth the person8s baptismal and family name and the name recorded in theci0il registry, if di erent, his immigrant8s name, if an alien, and his pseudonym, if he hassuch names other than his original or real name, specifying the reason or reasons for thedesired alias . /he Dudicial authority for the use of alias , the 'hristian name and the alienimmigrant8s name shall be recorded in the proper local ci0il registry, and no person shall useany name or names other than his original or real name unless the same is or are dulyrecorded in the proper local ci0il registry.

/he obDecti0e and purpose of '.A. No. 1;! ha0e their origin and basis in Act No. #""#, n ct to Regulatethe usiness ransactions of Names other than rue Names, rescribing the ?uties of the ?irectorof the >ureau of Commerce and )ndustry in its @nforcement , ro+iding enalties for Aiolations thereof, andfor other purposes, which was appro0ed on 1; No0ember 1$#1 and amended by Act No. ;1;%, appro0edon !" No0ember 1$#;. " /he pertinent pro0isions of Act No. #""# as amended follow

+ec. 1. *t shall be unlawful for any person to use or sign, on any written or printed receiptincluding receipt for tax or business or any written or printed contract not 0eri5ed by anotary public or on any written or printed e0idence of any agreement or businesstransactions, any name used in connection with his business other than his true name, or:eep conspicuously exhibited in plain 0iew in or at the place where his business isconducted, if he is engaged in a business, any sign announcing a 5rm name or businessname or style without 5rst registering such other name, or such 5rm name, or businessname or style in the in additionto his real name >Iu 'heng 'hiau> would add to more confusion. /hat he is :nown in hisbusiness, as manager of the Robert Reid, *nc., by the former name, is not suEcient reason toallow him its use. After all, petitioner admitted that he is :nown to his associates by bothnames. *n fact, the Anselmo /rinidad, *nc., of which he is a customer, :nows him by his realname. Neither would the fact that he had encountered certain diEculties in his transactionswith go0ernment oEces which re?uired him to explain why he bore two names, Dustify thegrant of his petition, for petitioner could easily a0oid said diEculties by simply using andstic:ing only to his real name >Iu Pheng 'hiau.>

/he fact that petitioner intends to reside permanently in the 6hilippines, as shown by hisha0ing 5led a petition for naturaliJation in he can easily 5le a petition for change of name, so that in lieu of the name >IuPheng 'hian,> he can, abandoning the same, as: for authority to adopt the name Pheng'hiau Ioung.>All things considered, we are of the opinion and so hold, that petitioner has not shownsatisfactory proper and reasonable grounds under the afore?uoted pro0isions of'ommonwealth Act No. 1;! and the Rules of 'ourt, to warrant the grant of his petition forthe use of an alias name.

'learly therefore an alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly andhabitually usually in business transactions in addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth orbaptiJed the 5rst time or substitute name authoriJed by a competent authority. A man8s name is simplythe sound or sounds by which he is commonly designated by his fellows and by which they distinguish himbut sometimes a man is :nown by se0eral di erent names and these are :nown as aliases . 11 Hence, the


15/47

use of a 5ctitious name or a di erent name belonging to another person in a single instance without anysign or indication that the user intends to be :nown by this name in addition to his real name from that dayforth does not fall within the prohibition contained in '.A. No. 1;! as amended. /his is so in the case atbench.*t is not disputed that petitioner introduced himself in the (Ece of the (mbudsman as >(scar 6ereJ,>which was the name of the messenger of his lawyer who should ha0e brought the letter to that oEce in the5rst place instead of petitioner. He did so while merely ser0ing the re?uest of his lawyer to obtain a copy of the complaint in which petitioner was a respondent. /here is no ?uestion then that >(scar 6ereJ> is not analias name of petitioner. /here is no e0idence showing that he had used or was intending to use that nameas his second name in addition to his real name. /he use of the name >(scar 6ereJ> was made bypetitioner in an isolated transaction where he was not e0en legally re?uired to expose his real identity. -or,e0en if he had identi5ed himself properly at the (Ece of the (mbudsman, petitioner would still be able toget a copy of the complaint as a matter of right, and the (Ece of the (mbudsman could not refuse himbecause the complaint was part of public records hence open to inspection and examination by anyoneunder the proper circumstances.While the act of petitioner may be co0ered by other pro0isions of law, such does not constitute an o ensewithin the concept of '.A. No. 1;! as amended under which he is prosecuted. /he confusion and fraud inbusiness transactions which the anti9alias la0 and its related statutes see: to pre0ent are not present hereas the circumstances are peculiar and distinct from those contemplated by the legislature in enacting '.A.No. 1;! as amended. /here exists a 0alid presumption that undesirable conse?uences were ne0erintended by a legislati0e measure and that a construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible isfa0ored, which will a0oid all obDectionable, mischie0ous, indefensible, wrongful, e0il and inDuriousconse?uences. 1! )oreo0er, as '.A. No. 1;! is a penal statute, it should be construed strictly against the+tate and in fa0or of the accused. 1# /he reason for this principle is the tenderness of the law for the rightsof indi0iduals and the obDect is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which man:ind would be safe,and the discretion of the court limited. 1; *ndeed, our mind cannot rest easy on the proposition thatpetitioner should be con0icted on a law that does not clearly penaliJe the act done by him.WH R -(R , the ?uestioned decision of the 'ourt of Appeals aErming that of the Regional /rial 'ourt of

a0ao 'ity is R 4 R+ and + / A+* and petitioner ' +AR*( R+ A is A'T *// of the crimecharged.+( (R R .

19. 6enal laws are construed liberally in fa0our of the accused.G.R. Nos. 1#91;$ &1. +eptember 1$, !===S6 (6L (- /H 6H*L*66*N +, appellee, +s. WAL6AN LA FAALA) y )*HAF*L alias WAR6AN,appellant.

Republic Act No. "!$; penaliJes simple illegal possession of 5rearms, pro0ided that the person arrestedcommitted no other crime. -urthermore, if the person is held liable for murder or homicide, illegalpossession of 5rearms is an aggra0ating circumstance, but not a separate o ense. Hence, where anaccused was con0icted of direct assault with multiple attempted homicide for 5ring an unlicensed ) 1;riMe at se0eral policemen who were about to ser0e a search warrant, he cannot be held guilty of theseparate o ense of illegal possession of 5rearms. Neither can such unlawful act be considered to ha0eaggra0ated the direct assault.Walpan LadDaalam y )ihaDil, also :nown as Warpan, appeals before us the +eptember 1%, 1$$" ecision 1S of the Regional /rial 'ourt 2R/'7 of Kamboanga 'ity 2


16/47

unlawfully and feloniously try and attempt to :ill +6(1 W*LL*A)


17/47

members of the raiding team to arrest appellant. Lacastesantos went to the second Moor and shouted tothe policemen outside not to 5re in the direction of the second Moor because there were children. )irasoland +6(1 'esar Rabuya arrested appellant at the bac: of his house after a brief chase 2*bid., pp. !1 !#7.At the second Moor, Lacastesantos saw an )1; riMe 2 xh. < #7 with magaJine on top of the sofa at the salaon the second Moor 2*bid., 6. !%7. /he riMe bore +erial No. 1&&&!!&. He remo0ed the magaJine from the riMeand the bullet inside the chamber of the riMe. He counted se0enteen 21%7 li0e ammunition inside themagaJine. He saw two 2!7 more )1; riMe magaJines on the sofa, one with twenty 2!=7 li0e ammunition2 xh. G #7 and another with twenty one 2!17 li0e ammunition 2 xh. G ;7. He li:ewise saw three 2#7 )19 riMemagaJines 2 xh. G !7 in a corner at the second Moor 2/+N, )arch &, 1$$", pp. !# #!, &%7After Lacastesantos and )irasol entered appellants house, Ri0era, ela 6ea, Gregorio and (but followedand entered the house. After identifying themsel0es as members of the 6N6 Anti 4ice Narcotics nit, (butpresented to the old women a copy of the search warrant. ela 6ea and Ri0era then searched appellantsroom on the ground Moor in the presence of 6unong


18/47

does not ha+e nameplate . He was arrested by four 2;7 persons. Not one of those who arrested him testi5edin 'ourt. He was handcu ed and placed inside a Deep par:ed at Rio Hondo lementary +chool. According tohim, he did not 5re a gun at the policemen from tShe second Moor of his house. He said the policemen

wereSthe one sD 0ho re dD at us 2tsn, p. &, id.7. *f he 5red a gun at the policemen for sure they wouldSdie because the door is +ery near x x x the +icinity of my house . He does not own the )1; riMe 2 xh. < #7which according to policemen, he used in 5ring at them. /he gun does not belong to him. He does notha0e a gun li:e that 2tsn, p. 1&, id.7. A policeman also owns an )1; riMe but he does not :now thepoliceman 2tsn, pp. 19 1%, id7. He said that the )%$ riMe 2 xh. < ;7, the three 2#7 empty )19 riMemagaJines 2 xh. G G 1 to G !7, the two 2!7 )1; magaJines with li0e ammunition 2 xh. G # G ;7 the two2!7 caliber .#" re0ol0ers 2 xhs. < 1 < !7, the 5fty 2&=7 aluminum foils each containing shabu 2 xhs. F 1 to F&=7 placed inside a pencil case 2 xh. F, the assorted coins placed inside a blue bag 2 xh. W7 and the whitecrystalline stone 2 xh. P7 all do not belong to him. He said that the policemen Dust produced those thingsas their e0idence. /he 5rearms do not belong to him. /hey were brought by the policemen 2tsn, p. ;#, )ay;, 1$$"7. Regarding the blue bag containing assorted coins, he said3 that is not ours, ) think this 3is4 theirs,

xxx they -ust brought that as their e+idence 2tsn, pp. 1& !;, id.7Walpan LadDaalam declared there were occupants who were renting his extension house. He aErmed thathe owns that house. -our 2;7 persons were staying in the extension house. He could only recogniJe thehusband whose name is )omoy. /hey are from Folo. /hey left the place already because they were afraidwhen the police raided the place. 2tsn, pp. " 1=, )ay ;, 1$$"7. He does not :now prosecution witness RinoLocson y


19/47

handcu ed. Walpan called him but the police ad0ised him not to approach Walpan. /he search was alreadyo0er and things were already ta:en inside the house. When he went inside the house, he saw the thingsthat they 3policemen4 searched, the rearms and the shabu 2tsn, p. 1%. )ay ", 1$$"7. He did not see the+earch Warrant. What was shown to him were the things reco0ered during the search which were beinglisted. /hey were being counted and placed on a table.


20/47

between the positi0e declaration of the prosecution witnesses and the negati0e statements of the accused,the former deser0e more credence. !$S *n conclusion, the trial court explained appellants liability in this manner3x x x. /he act of the accused in 5ring an )1; riMe to the policemen who were about to enter his house toser0e a search warrant constitutes the crime of direct assault with multiple attempted homicide ,S notmultiple attempted murder with direct assault ,S considering that no policeman was hit and inDured by theaccused and no circumstance was pro0ed to ?ualify the attempted :illing to attempted murder

/he accused Walpan LadDaalam a.:.a. Warpan cannot be held liable forS the crime of 4iolation of +ection19, Article ***, in relation to +ection !1, Article *4, of Republic Act 9;!& otherwise :nown as the angerous

rugs Act of 1$$!, as amended, because the 5fty 2&=7 pieces of folded aluminum foils ha0ing a totalweight of 1.%;!9 grams all containing methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu allegedly found in hishouse are inadmissible as e0idence against him considering that they were seiJed after aS searchconducted by 0irtue of +earch Warrant No. != which is totally null and 0oid as it was issued for more thanone o ense, and were not found in plain +ie0 of the police oEcers who seiJed them. Neither could theaccused be held liable for illegal possession of 5rearms and ammunition except for the 217 )1; riMe with+erial Number 1&&&!!& and with magaJine containing 5fteen 21&7 li0e ammunition and two more )1; riMemagaJines with twenty 2!=7 and twenty one 2!17 li0e ammunition respecti0ely considering that thepolicemen who reco0ered or seiJed the other 5rearms and ammunition did not testify in court. /he bluebag containing assorted coins cannot be returned to the accused Walpan LadDaalam a.:.a. Warpan becauseaccording to the accused the blue bag and assorted coins do not belong to him S instead the said assortedcoins should be turned o0er to the National /reasury. #=S

/he *ssues

*n his


21/47

A3 *, together with +6(1 Ricardo Lacastesantos, entered the main door of the house of Walfran sicSLadDaalam at the ground Moor. We went inside the sala on the ground Moor of his house S * saw two oldwoman.6R(+ ' /(R N 4AL3T3 Now, what did you do with these two old womenQA3 * did not mind those two old women because those two women were sitting on the ground Moor. * wasconcentrating on the second Moor because LadDaalam was 5ring towards our group so, *, together withRicardo Lacastesantos, went upstairs to the second Moor of the house.T3 Were you able to go to the second Moor of the houseQA3 Ies. t happened when you were already on the second MoorQA3 While we were proceeding to the second Moor, Walfan sicS LadDaalam, noticed our presence andimmediately went inside the bedroom oSn the second Moor and he went immediately and Dumped from thewindow of his house x x x leading to the roof of the neighbors house.'( R/3Reform. /hat is leadingT3 What happened when you entered and he Dumped to the roo5ng of the neighbors houseQA3 *mmediately, * myself, we immediately went downstairs and as:ed the assistance of the members of theraiding team to arrest Walfan LadDaalam.6R(+ ' /(R N 4AL3T3 Were you able to go downQA3 Ies.T3 What happened when you were thereQA3 We immediately went out and * as:ed the assistance of the members of the raiding team and thein0estigator of the unit especially +6(1 'esar Rabuya. * was able to manage to arrest Walfan LadDaalam.

;!S What happened thereafter was narrated by +enior 6olice (Ecer Ricardo Lacastesantos, ;#S as follows3T3 What did you notice oSn the second MoorQA3 * went where the 5ring came from, so, * saw anS )1; riMe and * shouted from the outside, do not 5re atthe second Moor because there areS a lot of children here.T3 Now, that riMe you said was anS )1;, where did you 5nd thisQA3 At the sala set.T3 /his sala set where is this locatedQA3 Located onS the second Moor of the house.T3 *s there a sala oSn the second MoorQA3 Ies.T3 'an you still identify that )1; riMe which you said you reco0ered from the sale setQA3 Ies.T3 Why can you identify thatQA3 /he +erial No. of )1; is 1&&&!!& and * mar:ed it with my initial.T3 Now, * ha0e here )1; riMe S will you please tell us where is the +erial No. of thisQA3 1&&&!!& and * put my initial, RFL-*+'AL N 4AL3

/his is already mar:ed as our xhibit < # with magaJine, one magaJine and se0en round ammunitionS.T3 After reco0ering this, what did you do with this 5rearmQcA3 When * reco0ered it * remo0ed the bullets inside the chamber .S * remo0ed the magaJine and * turned ito0er to the in0estigator.T3 Where did you turn it o0erQA3 At the crime scene.T3 Now, that magaJine, can you still identify thisQA3 Ies.T3 WhyQA3 * put x x x mar:ings.'( R/3+o, aside from the magaJine attached to the )1; riMe you found six more magaJinesQA3 Ies, so, all in all six magaJines, three empty )19 riMe magaJines and three )1;.T3 /he )19 magaJines wereS emptyQA3 mpty.T3 How about the )1;QA3 -ound with ammunitionS.T3 +o, where are the three )19 magaJinesQA3 *n the corner.T3 What did you do with theseS three magaJines of )19QA3 * turned themS o0er to the in0estigator.T3 'an you identify themQA3 Ies, because of my initials .T3 Where are your initialsQA3 (n the magaJines.T3 RFLQA3 RFL.;;S

/hese were con5rmed by the results of the paraEn tests conducted on appellant and on the weaponsseiJed during the raid.


22/47

A3 /he result of the examination wasS that both hands of the subDect person, ha dS presence of gunpowder nitrates.T3 What do you mean )adam Witness, what does that indicateQA3 *t indicates there is presence of powder nitrates.J: Can 0e conclude that he red a gunK

: ) cannot conclude that he red a gun because there are so many circumstances 0hyD a person 0ouldbeD positi+e on his hands for gun po0der nitrates. T3


23/47

T +o, your statement particularly paragraph 9 of your 'ounter AEda0it that you were at home in yourShouse at Aplaya Riohondo


24/47

We cannot accept either of these interpretations because they ignore the plain language of the statute. Asimple reading thereof shows that if an unlicensed 5rearm is used in the commission of any crime, therecan be no separate o ense of simple illegal possession of 5rearms. Hence, if the other crime is murder orhomicide, illegal possession of 5rearms becomes merely an aggra0ating circumstance, not a separateo ense. +ince direct assault with multiple attempted homicide was committed in this case, appellant canno longer be held liable for illegal possession of 5rearms.)oreo0er, penal laws are construed liberally in fa0or of the accused. 9!S *n this case, the plain meaning ofRA "!$;s simple language is most fa0orable to herein appellant. 4erily, no other interpretation is Dusti5ed,for the language of the new law demonstrates the legislati0e intent to fa0or the accused. 9#S Accordingly,appellant cannot be con0icted of two separate o enses of illegal possession of 5rearms and direct assaultwith attempted homicide. )oreo0er, since the crime committed was direct assault and not homicide ormurder, illegal possession of 5rearms cannot be deemed an aggra0ating circumstance.We reDect the (+Gs contention that 6 1"99, as worded prior to its amendment by RA "!$;, should beapplied in this case. When the crime was committed on +eptember !;, 1$$%, the original language of 61"99 had already been expressly superseded by RA "!$; which too: e ect on Fuly 9, 1$$%. 9;S *n otherwords, no longer in existence was the earlier pro0ision of 6 1"99, which Dusti5ed a con0iction for illegalpossession of 5rearms separate from any other crime. *t was replaced by RA "!$; which, among otheramendments to 6 1"99, contained the speci5c pro+iso that no other crime was committed.-urthermore, the (+Gs reliance on eople +. ayson 9&S is misplaced. /rue, this 'ourt sustained thecon0iction of appellant for illegal possession of 5rearms, although he had also committed homicide. Weexplained, howe0er, that the criminal case for homicide wasS not before us for consideration.

Fust as unacceptable is the interpretation of the trial court. We 5nd no Dusti5cation for limiting the pro+iso in the second paragraph to murder and homicide. /he law is clear3 the accused can be con0icted of simpleillegal possession of 5rearms, pro0ided that no other crime was committed by the person arrested. *f theintention of the law in the second paragraph were to refer only to homicide and murder, it should ha0eexpressly said so, as it did in the third paragraph. 4erily, where the law does not distinguish, neither shouldwe.

/he 'ourt is aware that this ruling e ecti0ely exonerates appellant of illegal possession of an ) 1; riMe, ano ense which normally carries a penalty hea0ier than that for direct assault. While the penalty for the 5rstis prision mayor , for the second it is only prision correccional . *ndeed, the accused may e0ade con0ictionfor illegal possession of 5rearms by using such weapons in committing an e0en lighter o ense, 99S li:ealarm and scandal 9%S or slight physical inDuries, 9"S both of which are punishable by arresto menor . 9$S

/his conse?uence, howe0er, necessarily arises from the language of RA "!$;, whose wisdom is not subDectto the 'ourts re0iew. Any perception that the result reached here appears unwise should be addressed to'ongress. *ndeed, the 'ourt has no discretion to gi0e statutes a new meaning detached from the manifestintendment and language of the legislature. (ur tas: is constitutionally con5ned only to applying the lawand Durisprudence %=S to the pro0en facts, and we ha0e done so in this case.WH R -(R , the appealed ecision is hereby 66)R8@? with the 87?)6)C )7N that appellant is foundguilty only of two o enses3 217 direct assault and multiple attempted homicide with the use of a weapon,for which he is sentenced to ! years and ; months to 9 years of prision correccional and 2!7 maintaining adrug den, for which he was correctly sentenced by the trial court to reclusion perpetua . 'osts againstappellant.Let a copy of this ecision be furnished the 'ongress of the 6hilippines for a possible re0iew, at its sounddiscretion, of RA "!$;.chanrobles0irtuallawlibrary+( (R R .

1%. *n case of doubt, tax statutes are to be construed strictly against the go0ernment and liberally in fa0orof the taxpayer, for taxes, being burdens, are not to be presumed beyond what the applicable statuteexpressly and clearly declares.G.R. No. L 9$#;; April !9, 1$$1R 6


25/47

di0est the Go0ernment of the right to further reco0er from the taxpayer, e0en if there was an existingassessment against the latter at the time he paid the amnesty tax.*t is not disputed that as a result of an in0estigation made by the tax exemptionsshould be interpreted strictissimi -uris against the taxpayer.>

/he respondent spouses, on the other hand, alleged that 6. . !1# contains no exemptions from itsco0erage and that, under Letter of *nstruction L(* 1!$ dated +eptember 1", 1$%#, the immunities grantedby 6. . !1# include3

** *mmunities Granted.pon payment of the amounts speci5ed in the ecree, the following shall be obser0ed3

1. . . . .!. /he taxpayer shall not be sub-ect to any in+estigation, 0hether ci+il, criminal oradministrati+e, insofar as his declarations in the income tax returns are concerned nor shallthe same be used as e0idence against, or to the preDudice of the declarant in any proceedingbefore any court of law or body, whether Dudicial, ?uasi Dudicial or administrati0e, in which heis a defendant or respondent, and he shall be exempt from any liability arising from orincident to his failure to le his income tax return and to pay the tax due thereon , as well asto any liability for any other tax that may be due as a result of business transactions fromwhich such income, now 0oluntarily declared may ha0e been deri0ed.

/here is nothing in the L(* which can be construed as authority for the


26/47

re0enue or tax law, parta:es of an absolute forgi0eness or wai0er by the Go0ernment of itsright to collect what otherwise would be due it, and in this sense, preDudicial thereto,particularly to gi0e tax e0aders, who wish to relent and are willing to reform a chance to doso and thereby become a part of the new society with a clean slate 2'ommission of *nternalRe0enue 0s. # and petitioner admittedly did import urea and formaldehyde separately, its plea could be granted only ifwe could construe the abo0e pro0ision of law to read >urea and formaldehyde.> *n the abo0e Casco decision, we could not see our way clear to doing so. We still cannot see it that way. Hence, this petitionmust fail.(ur inability to indulge petitioner in the aforecited Casco petition was made clear by the present 'hief

Fustice. /hus3 >Hence, 8urea formaldehyde8 is clearly a 5nished product, which is patently distinct anddi erent from 8urea8 and 8formaldehyde8, as separate articles used in the manufacture of the syntheticresins :nown as 8urea formaldehyde8. 6etitioner contends, howe0er, that the bill appro0ed in 'ongresscontained the copulati0e conDunction 8and8 between the terms 8urea8 and 8formaldehyde8, and that themembers of 'ongress intended to exempt 8urea8 and 8formaldehyde8 separately as essential elements inthe manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called 8urea. fomaldehyde8 not the latter as a 5nished product,citing in support of this 0iew the statements made on the Moor of the +enate, during the consideration ofthe bill before said House, by members thereof.

/o which we can only add that deference to the scope and implication of the function entrusted by the'onstitution to the Dudiciary lea0es us no other alternati0e. -or nothing is better settled than that the 5rstand fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law as they 5nd it, not as they would li:e it to be. -idelity tosuch a tas: precludes construction or interpretation, unless application is impossible or inade?uate withoutit. ; +uch is not the case in the situation presented here. +o we ha0e held in Casco hilippine Chemical Co.,)nc. +. Limene5 . We do so again. /hen, again, there is merit in the contention of the +olicitor General, as counsel for respondent 'entral-rom 1$=9, in Catholic Church +s. Fastings to 1$99, in@sso tandard @astern, )nc. +s. cting Commissioner of Customs , it has been the constant and uniformholding that exemption from taxation is not fa0ored and is ne0er presumed, so that if granted it must bestrictly construed against the taxpayer. AErmati0ely put, the law frowns on exemption from taxation,hence, an exempting pro0ision should be construed strictissimi -uris .> 'ertainly, whate0er may be said ofthe statutory language found in Republic Act !9=$, it would be going too far to assert that there was sucha clear and manifest intention of legislati0e will as to compel such a refund.


27/47


28/47

(n Fuly 11, 1$$1, the appellate court aErmed said decision.Hence, petitioner 5led this petition alleging gro0e abuse of discretion on the part of the appellate court inapplying the principle of > expresso unius exclusio alterius > in a personal accident insurance policy sincedeath resulting from murder and or assault are impliedly excluded in said insurance policy considering thatthe cause of death of the insured was not accidental but rather a deliberate and intentional act of theassailant in :illing the former as indicated by the location of the lone stab wound on the insured. /herefore,said death was committed with deliberate intent which, by the 0ery nature of a personal accidentinsurance policy, cannot be indemni5ed.We do not agree.

/he terms >accident> and >accidental> as used in insurance contracts ha0e not ac?uired anytechnical meaning, and are construed by the courts in their ordinary and commonacceptation. /hus, the terms ha0e been ta:en to mean that which happen by chance orfortuitously, without intention and design, and which is unexpected, unusual, andunforeseen. An accident is an e0ent that ta:es place without one8s foresight or expectation

an e0ent that proceeds from an un:nown cause, or is an unusual e ect of a :nown causeand, therefore, not expected.. . . /he generally accepted rule is that, death or inDury does not result from accident oraccidental means within the terms of an accident policy if it is the natural result of theinsured8s 0oluntary act, unaccompanied by anything unforeseen except the death or inDury.

/here is no accident when a deliberate act is performed unless some additional, unexpected,independent, and unforeseen happening occurs which produces or brings about the result of inDury or death. *n other words, where the death or inDury is not the natural or probable resultof the insured8s 0oluntary act, or if something unforeseen occurs in the doing of the actwhich produces the inDury, the resulting death is within the protection of the policies insuringagainst death or inDury from accident. &

As correctly pointed out by the respondent appellate court in its decision3*n the case at bar, it cannot be pretended that 'arlie +urposa died in the course of anassault or murder as a result of his 0oluntary act considering the 0ery nature of thesecrimes. *n the 5rst place, the insured and his companion were on their way home fromattending a festi0al. /hey were confronted by unidenti5ed persons. /he record is barren ofany circumstance showing how the stab wound was inMicted. Nor can it be pretended thatthe malefactor aimed at the insured precisely because the :iller wanted to ta:e his life. *nany e0ent, while the act may not exempt the un:nown perpetrator from criminal liability, thefact remains that the happening was a pure accident on the part of the 0ictim. /he insureddied from an e0ent that too: place without his foresight or expectation, an e0ent thatproceeded from an unusual e ect of a :nown cause and, therefore, not expected. Neithercan it be said that where was a capricious desire on the part of the accused to expose his lifeto danger considering that he was Dust going home after attending a festi0al. 9

-urthermore, the personal accident insurance policy in0ol0ed herein speci5cally enumerated only ten 21=7circumstances wherein no liability attaches to petitioner insurance company for any inDury, disability orloss su ered by the insured as a result of any of the stimulated causes. /he principle of > expresso uniusexclusio alterius > the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another thing is thereforeapplicable in the instant case since murder and assault, not ha0ing been expressly included in theenumeration of the circumstances that would negate liability in said insurance policy cannot be consideredby implication to discharge the petitioner insurance company from liability for, any inDury, disability or losssu ered by the insured. /hus, the failure of the petitioner insurance company to include death resultingfrom murder or assault among the prohibited ris:s leads ine0itably to the conclusion that it did not intendto limit or exempt itself from liability for such death.Article 1#%% of the 'i0il 'ode of the 6hilippines pro0ides that3

/he interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a contract shall not fa0or the party whocaused the obscurity.

)oreo0er,it is well settled that contracts of insurance are to be construed liberally in fa0or of theinsured and strictly against the insurer. /hus ambiguity in the words of an insurance contractshould be interpreted in fa0or of its bene5ciary. %

WH R -(R , 5nding no irre0ersible error in the decision of the respondent 'ourt of Appeals, the petitionfor certiorari with restraining order and preliminary inDunction is hereby N* for lac: of merit.+( (R R .

!=. Labor and social welfare legislation should be liberally construed in fa0or of the applicant.G.R. No. "9=!= August &, 1$$;RA)(N '(R6(RAL, petitioner,0s.

)6L(I +8 '()6 N+A/*(N '())*++*(N and G(4 RN) N/ + R4*' *N+ RAN' +I+/ ), respondents.ublic ttorneyIs 7Hce for petitioner.

T *A+(N, .:

/his is a petition for certiorari ?uestioning the decision of the mployees8 'ompensation 'ommission whichdenied petitioner8s claim for death bene5ts under 6residential ecree No. 9!9, as amended.

*Norma 6eralta 'orporal was employed as a public school teacher with assignment in Fuban, +orsogon. (nNo0ember !" to No0ember #=, 1$%%, she was con5ned at the ste0es )emorial Hospital for acutecoronary insuEciency and premature 0entricular contractions.


29/47

(n Fune #=, 1$"#, she was assigned to the hilot.> An hour later, she was rushed tothe *mmaculate 'onception Hospital due to profuse 0aginal bleeding. +he underwent a hysterectomy butunfortunately, she died on the same day due to >shoc:, se0ere hemorrhage> resulting from a >prolapse2d7uterus post partum.> Norma was ;= years old when she died.Her husband, Ramon 'orporal, petitioner herein, 5led a claim for compensation bene5t with theGo0ernment +er0ice *nsurance +ystem 2G+*+7. /he G+*+ denied petitioner8s claim thus3

6lease be ad0ised that on the basis of the proofs and e0idences 2sic7 submitted to the+ystem, the cause of death of your wife, +hoc: secondary to +e0ere Hemorrhage, terine6R(LA6+ is not considered an occupational disease as contemplated under the abo0ementioned law 26. . No. 9!97. Neither was there any showing that her position as /eacher,) '+, Albay had increased the ris: of contracting her ailment 2 Rollo , p. !#7.

6etitioner 5led se0eral motions for the reconsideration of the denial of his claim to no a0ail, because a ree0aluation of the claim by the )edical 0aluation and nderwriting Group of the G+*+ showed that therewas >no basis to alter its pre0ious action of denial for the same reason . . . that her cause of death is nonwor: connected as contemplated under the law> and neither did her Dob as a teacher increase the ris: ofcontracting her ailment 2 Rollo , p. !&7.6etitioner appealed to the mployees8 'ompensation 'ommission 2 ''7. /he '' re?uested the G+*+ tore e0aluate petitioner8s claim and to 5nally determine compensability, with instruction that in case theclaim is denied once more by the +ystem, the entire record of the case be ele0ated to the ''. /he G+*+reiterated its denial of petitioner8s claim.(n +eptember %, 1$"", the '' rendered a decision also denying petitioner8s claim. *t said3

)edical studies show that 6rolapsed terus may occur in infants and nulliparous women aswell as multiparas. efects in inner0ation and in the basic integrity of the supportingstructures account2s7 for prolapse2d7 in the 5rst two and childbirth trauma for the latter. /hecer0ix usually elongates because the weight of the nagging 0aginal tissues pulls itdownward, whereas the attached but wea: cardinal ligaments tend2s7 to support it. *n thirddegree or complete prolapse2d7 both the cer0ix and the body of the uterus ha0e passedthrough the introitus and the entire 0aginal canal is in0erted. 2(bstetrics and Gynecology,Wilson,


30/47

+ince petitioner admits that his wife died of an ailment which is not listed as compensable by the '' andhe merely anchors his claim on the second rule, he must positi0ely show that the ris: of contractingNorma8s illness was increased by her wor:ing conditions. 6etitioner failed to satisfactorily discharge theonus imposed by law.

/he fact that Norma had to wal: six :ilometers e0eryday and thereafter, a shorter distance of more thanone :ilometer Dust to reach her place of wor:, was not suEcient to establish that such condition caused herto de0elop prolapse of the uterus. 6etitioner did not e0en present medical 5ndings on the 0eracity of hisclaim that Norma had a tomato li:e spherical tissue protruding from her 0agina and rectum.Norma de0eloped prolapse of the uterus because she was multiparas, or one who had more than one child,and ?uite beyond the safe child bearing age when she ga0e birth to her 5fth child she was already fortyyears old. No+akIs extbook on Lynecology describes prolapse of the uterus 2descensus uteri7 as follows3

n extremely common condition, being far more fre=uent in elderly than in young patients . /his is explained by the increasing laxity and atony of the muscular and fascial structures inlater life. /he e ects of childbirth inDuries may thus ma:e themsel0es e0ident, in the form ofuterine prolapse, many years after the last pregnancy. 6regnancies in a prolapsed uterusmay lead to numerous complications, as noted by 6i0er and +peJia.

he important factor in the mechanism of the prolapse is undoubtedly in-ury oro+erstretching of the pel+ic Moor, and especially of the cardinal ligaments 38ackenrodt4 inthe bases of the broad ligaments. 'ombined with this there is usually extensi0e inDury to theperineal structures, producing mar:ed 0aginal relaxation and also fre?uent inDury to thefascia or the anterior or posterior 0aginal walls, with the production of cystocele or rectocele.

sually, 0arious combinations of these conditions are seen, although at times little or nocystocele or rectocele is associated with the prolapse. 7ccasional cases are seen for thatmatter, in 0omen 0ho ha+e ne+er borne children, and in these the prolapse apparentlyrepresents a hernia of the uterus through a defect in the pel+ic fascial Moor 2 mphasissupplied7.

/he 1'#! Current 8edical ?iagnosis reatment also describes the condition as follows3terine prolapse most commonly occurs as a delayed result of childbirth inDury to the pel0ic

Moor 2particularly the trans0erse cer0ical and uterosacral ligaments7. nrepaired obstetriclacerations of the le0ator musculature and perineal body augment the wea:ness.Attenuation of the pel0ic structures with aging and congenital wea:ness can accelerate thede0elopment of prolapse.

/he determination of whether the prolapse of Norma8s uterus de0eloped before or after her 5fth pregnancyis therefore immaterial since this illness is the result of the physiological structure and changes in the bodyon pregnancy and childbirth.With the e0idence presented in support of the claim, petitioner8s prayer cannot be granted. While as a rulelabor and social welfare legislation should be liberally construed in fa0or of the applicant, 2/ria 0.

mployees8 'ompensation 'ommission, !=" +'RA "#; 1$$!S7, there is also the rule that such liberalconstruction and interpretation of labor laws may not be applied where the pertinent pro0isions of theLabor 'ode and 6. . No. 9!9, as amended, are clear and lea0e no room for interpretation.

/he 'ourt commiserates with the petitioner and his children for the loss of a lo0ed one. We also recogniJethe importance of the ser0ices rendered by public elementary school teachers inspite of their meagersalaries which are not proportionate to their immense responsibility in molding the 0alues and character of the youth in this country 2 e 4era 0. mployees8 'ompensation 'ommission, 1## +'RA 9"& 1$";S7.


31/47

/he petitioner appealed to the mployees8 'ompensation 'ommission which aErmed the decision of theGo0ernment +er0ice *nsurance +ystem on a 5nding that the ailment of the deceased, enteric fe0er, wasnot induced by or aggra0ated by the nature of the duties of NaJario )anahan, Fr. as a teacher. !

/o support her theory that the disease of NaJario )anahan, Fr., enteric fe0er, resulted from his employmentas classroom teacher of the Las 6i as )unicipal High +chool, the petitioner cites the following authority3@ )?@87/7LB N? F7/7LB76 @N @R)C 6@A@R

/H +( R' (- *N- '/*(N is feces or urine from patients and carriers. -amily contacts maybe transient carriers and ! to &O of patients become chronic carriers. *n poorly sanitiJedcommunities, water is the most fre?uent 0ehicle of transmission food, especially mil:, is thenext most important. *n modern urban areas, food, contaminated by healthy carrier

statcons cases 2

Documents