Updated 2015

STATE OF CONNECTICUT

COMPENDIUM OF LAW

Prepared by Noble F. Allen

William H. Champlin, III Jared Cohane

Timothy T. Corey Peter J. Martin Alexa Millinger Nick R. Valenta

Hinckley, Allen & Snyder LLP

20 Church Street Hartford, CT 06103

860-725-6200 www.hinckleyallen.com

1

THE FOLLOWING IS A SYNOPSIS OF CERTAIN AREAS OF CONNECTICUT

LAW. IT IS DESIGNED TO PROVIDE A BRIEF REFERENCE OF SOME

BASIC LEGAL PRINCIPLES AND FOR USE AS A STARTING POINT FOR

FURTHER RESEARCH. IT IS NOT INTENDED TO AND DOES NOT

PROVIDE A COMPLETE OR COMPREHENSIVE DESCRIPTION AND

SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED AS PROVIDING LEGAL ADVICE TO THE

READER. FURTHER, AS THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE IN CONNECTICUT

CHANGES OFTEN, THE CITATIONS CONTAINED IN THIS COMPENDIUM

WILL COMMAND FURTHER RESEARCH FROM TIME TO TIME.

2

PRE-SUIT AND INITIAL CONSIDERATIONS

Pre-Suit Notice Requirements/Prerequisites to Suit

Must give the State of Connecticut notice of any claim pursuant to CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 4-

146, -147 (2014). Must be done within one year after accrual pursuant to § 4-148.

Any person, firm or corporation which has entered into a contract with the state, acting

through any of its departments, commissions or other agencies, for the design, construction,

construction management, repair or alteration of any highway, bridge, building or other

public works of the state or any political subdivision of the state must provide written notice

pursuant to CONN. GEN. STAT. § 4-61 to the agency head of the department administering

the contract as a condition precedent to instituting an action in the superior court or

arbitration under the American Arbitration Association’s Construction Industry rules. This

limited waiver of sovereign immunity commences with the execution of the contract or the

authorized commencement of work on the contract project, whichever is earlier, and which

ends three years after the acceptance of the work by the agency head of the department

administering the contract evidenced by a certificate of acceptance issued to the contractor

or three years after the termination of the contract, whichever is earlier pursuant to CONN.

GEN. STAT. § 4-61. See also Bacon Constr. Co. v. Dep’t of Pub. Works, 294 Conn. 695

(2010).

Relationship to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

Connecticut has its own Code of Civil Procedure, which is markedly different from the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Connecticut Practice Book is divided into 84

chapters that articulate the rules of practice and procedure in the superior court in all civil

and family actions whether at law, in equity or otherwise, in all criminal proceedings,

juvenile matters and appellate proceedings. Connecticut, unlike the Federal Rules, is a

fact pleading state, requiring a plain and concise statement of the material facts on which

the pleader relies.

Description of the Organization of the State Court System

A) Connecticut has a merit plan for selecting judges. The judicial selection

commission recommends qualified candidates to the governor for nomination. The

governor’s nominee must then be appointed by the general assembly. Judges serve

eight-year terms and must be re-nominated and reappointed. The judicial selection

commission also evaluates incumbent judges who seek reappointment. Judges in

the Probate system, however, are elected.

B) The Connecticut court system consists of four courts: the Supreme Court, the

Appellate Court, the Superior Court, and the Probate Court. The Superior Court is

divided into thirteen judicial districts, twenty geographical areas and thirteen

juvenile districts. The Superior Court also has housing courts in six of the judicial

districts (Hartford, New Britain, Bridgeport, Norwalk and Waterbury) dedicated to

3

residential and commercial landlord-tenant disputes. Connecticut also has a

Complex Litigation Docket in Stamford, Hartford and Waterbury. The Complex

Litigation Docket is generally comprised of complex civil litigation involving

multiple litigants and legally intricate issues. An individual judge presides over all

aspects of the litigation, including trial. In 2012, Connecticut also introduced a

dedicated land use docket for all administrative appeals concerning land use matters

such as zoning, wetlands and historic districts.

C) Connecticut does not have a comprehensive statewide statute for all methods of

alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”). In general, state statutes and Connecticut

Rules of Civil Procedure make ADR optional for civil cases pending in the Superior

Court.

1) Arbitration is available for any civil case where the judgment is

expected to be less than $50,000 and a claim for a trial by jury and a

certificate of closed pleadings has been filed. Arbitration is authorized

pursuant to CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 52-549u to 52-549aa (2014) and the

parties have a right to a trial de novo.

2) Judicial Alternative Dispute Resolution (J-ADR), pursuant to CONN.

GEN. STAT. § 51-5a (2012) is available to civil and family cases which

will require more than a half-day pretrial conference to settle. Referral

may be made by a judge or by request of the parties at any time, subject

to the approval of the Presiding Judge or his or her designee. Family

service mediation to address dissolution cases on the limited contested

and contested case lists may address child custody, visitation, property

and financial issues.

D) The Judicial Branch offers electronic filing in civil and small claims matters. The

e-services include electronic short calendar markings entry and docket history.

Attorneys or firms who have appeared in a matter can access all documents that

have been filed electronically. The e-services also include online attorney

registration.

Service of Summons

A) Service of Summons upon a person is governed by CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-57(a)

(2014). Service on a person includes: (1) personal service; and (2) leaving a copy

of the summons at the defendant’s usual place of abode.

B) Service of a Summons upon public entities is governed by CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-

57(b) (2014). Thereunder, the following-described classes of defendants must be

served as follows: (1) against a town, upon its clerk, assistant clerk, manager or one

of its selectmen; (2) against a city, upon its clerk or assistant clerk or upon its mayor

or manager; (3) against a borough, upon its manager, clerk or assistant clerk or upon

the warden or one of its burgesses; (4) against a school district, upon its clerk or

4

one of its committee; (5) against a board, commission, department or agency of a

town, city or borough, notwithstanding any provision of law, upon the clerk of the

town, city or borough, provided two copies of such process shall be served upon

the clerk and the clerk shall retain one copy and forward the second copy to the

board, commission, department or agency; (6) against any other municipal or quasi-

municipal corporation, upon its clerk or upon its chief presiding officer or managing

agent; and (7) against an employee of a town, city or borough in a cause of action

arising from the employee’s duties or employment, upon the clerk of the town, city

or borough, provided two copies of such process shall be served upon the clerk and

the clerk shall retain one copy and forward the second copy to the employee.

C) Service of a Summons upon a private corporation is governed by CONN. GEN. STAT.

§ 52-57(c) (2014). A private corporation may be served by leaving a copy of the

process with its registered agent or any officer agent of the corporation in the town

in which the business is located. If no agent or officer can be located, a private

corporation may be served through the Connecticut Secretary of State.

D) Waiver of Service can occur if a party fails to raise waiver as an issue and

participates in the lawsuit.

E) CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-59b (2014) provides the following basis for jurisdiction

over nonresidents: (1) Transacts any business within the state; (2) commits a

tortious act within the state, except as to a cause of action for defamation of

character arising from the act; (3) commits a tortious act outside the state causing

injury to person or property within the state, except as to a cause of action for

defamation of character arising from the act, if such person or agent (A) regularly

does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or

derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in

the state, or (B) expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences

in the state and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international

commerce; (4) owns, uses or possesses any real property situated within the state;

or (5) uses a computer, as defined in subdivision (1) of subsection (a) of Section

53-451, or a computer network, as defined in subdivision (3) of subsection (a) of

said section, located within the state.

Statutes of Limitations

A) The statute of limitations for a personal injury action is governed by CONN. GEN.

STAT. § 52-584 (2014). Actions for damages for an injury to the person must be

commenced within two (2) years from the date when the injury is first sustained,

discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered, and

except that no such action may be brought more than three years from the date of

the act or omission complained of, except that a counterclaim may be interposed in

any such action any time before the pleadings in such action are finally closed.

5

B) A plaintiff’s claim for wrongful death is governed by CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-

555(a) (2014). It must be brought within two (2) years from the date of death.

C) If a plaintiff dies the action can be continued by the representative within six (6)

months of the plaintiff’s death or at any time before trial. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-

599 (2014).

D) The statute of limitations for a property damage action is two (2) years from the

date when the injury is first sustained, discovered or in the exercise of reasonable

care should have been discovered and except that no such action may be brought

more than three (3) years from the date of the act or omission complained of, except

that a counterclaim may be interposed in any such action any time before the

pleadings in such action are finally closed. The property damage statute of

limitations is governed by CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-584 (2014).

E) The statute of repose for construction actions and for actions based on

improvements to realty is seven (7) years after substantial completion of such

improvement and is governed by CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-584a (2014).

F) The statute of limitations for a contract action based on an oral contract is three (3)

years and is governed by CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-581 (2014).

G) The statute of limitations for a contract action based on a written contract is six (6)

years and is governed by CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-576 (2014).

H) There are several statutes with tolling provisions applicable to minors and/or those

under a legal disability. These include CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-576(b) and 52-579

(2014). In addition, a claim for fraudulent concealment tolls until the time when

the person entitled to sue on the cause of action first discovers its existence under

CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-595 (2014).

I) The statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions is governed by CONN.

GEN. STAT. § 52-584 (2014) and is two (2) years from the date of injury occurs or

is discovered or in the exercise of reasonable case should have been discovered,

and except that no such action may be brought more than three (3) years from the

date of the act or omission complained of, except that a counterclaim may be

interposed in any such action any time before the pleadings in such action are

finally closed.

J) The statute of limitations for legal malpractice actions is governed by CONN. GEN.

STAT. § 52-577 (2014) and is three (3) years from the date of the act or omission

complained of. Accordingly, the date when the plaintiff first discovers an injury,

or in the exercise of reasonable care should have discovered the injury, is irrelevant.

K) The statute of limitations for employment claims related to pay is two (2) years and

is governed by CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-596 (2014) and for any other tort the statute

6

of limitations is three years from the act or omission complained of as required

under CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-577 (2014).

L) The statute of limitations for indemnification claims is three (3) years from the date

of the determination of the action against the party that is seeking indemnification

by either judgment or settlement and is governed by CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-598a

(2014).

M) The statue of limitations for claims against the State of Connecticut arising out of

or relating to a construction contract with the State of Connecticut acting through

one of its agencies commences with the execution of the contract or the authorized

commencement of work on the contract project, whichever is earlier, and which

ends three years after the acceptance of the work by the agency head of the

department administering the contract evidenced by a certificate of acceptance

issued to the contractor or three years after the termination of the contract,

whichever is earlier pursuant to CONN. GEN. STAT. § 4-61 (2014). See also Bacon

Constr. Co. v. Dep’t of Pub. Works, 294 Conn. 695 (2010).

Venue Rules

If all parties reside outside the state, venue lies in the judicial district where (1) injury

occurred; (2) transaction occurred; and (3) the property is located or lawfully attached. If

either the plaintiffs or defendants or both, are residents of this state, generally bring to the

judicial district where either party resides. Actions involving land should be brought in the

district where the land is located. Actions by corporations that are domestic corporations

or a U.S. corporation and defendant is a resident suit is brought (1) where plaintiff has an

office or place of business and (2) in the district where the defendant resides. Actions

involving consumer transactions bring suit in district where consumer resides. See § 51-

345(a)-(g) (2014).

NEGLIGENCE

Assumption of the Risk

Pursuant to CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572h(l) (2014), the doctrine of assumption of risk was

abolished in negligence actions.

Comparative Fault/Contributory Negligence

Connecticut is a comparative fault state. As such, contributory negligence is not a bar to

recovery. If the plaintiff’s negligence is not greater than the combined negligence of all

the defendants, he or she will not be barred from recovery; rather, the damages will be

diminished in proportion to the percentage of the plaintiff’s negligence. CONN. GEN. STAT.

§ 52-572h (2014).

7

Misuse

Connecticut recognizes a defense of misuse under the common law in product liability

cases. Misuse under the common law occurs when a product is not used in a manner which

should have been foreseen by the defendant. See, e.g., Elliot v. Sears, Roebuck and Co.,

229 Conn. 500, 507 (1994) (quoting Norrie v. Heil Co., 203 Conn. 594, 600 (1987)).

Connecticut also has a statutorily-created defense of misuse available to product sellers

when their product was altered or modified by third party. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-

572p (2014). That statutory section provides, in pertinent part, as follows: “(a) A product

seller shall not be liable for harm that would not have occurred but for the fact that his

product was altered or modified by a third party unless: (1) the alteration or modification

was in accordance with the instructions or specifications of the product seller; (2) the

alteration or modification was made with the consent of the product seller; or (3) the

alteration or modification was the result of conduct that reasonably should have been

anticipated by the product seller; (b) for the purpose of this section, alteration or

modification includes changes in the design, formula, function or use of the product from

that originally designed, tested or intended by the product seller.” Id. (emphasis added).

Sole Proximate Cause

In refuting that the defendant’s conduct was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries,

the defendant in a negligence action may introduce evidence that the conduct of another,

even if not a party in the case, was the sole proximate cause of the injury. See, e.g., Wagner

v. Clark Equip. Co., 243 Conn. 168, 177-84 (1997).

Set off

A legal set-off in Connecticut is governed by CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-139 (2014), which

provides:

(a) In any action brought for the recovery of a debt, if there are mutual debts between the

plaintiff or plaintiffs, or any of them, and the defendant or defendants, or any of them, one

debt may be set off against the other.

(b) No debt claimed by assignment may be set off unless the plaintiff had notice, at the

commencement of the action that the debt was due the defendant.

(c) If it appears upon the trial that the plaintiff is indebted to the defendant, the court shall

give judgment for the defendant to recover the balance due of the plaintiff with his costs,

except that no judgment may be given against the plaintiff to recover the balance of a debt

due, only a part of the defendant’s.

A “mutual debt,” for purposes of Sec. 52-139, has been defined as “cross-debts in the same

capacity and right and of the same kind and quality.” Shippee v. Pallotti, Andretta & Co.,

Inc., 114 Conn. 560, 564 (1932). A set-off may be based on either law or equity. Savings

8

Bank of New London v. Santaniello, 130 Conn. 206 (1943). An equitable set-off exists

where the nature of the claim or the situation of the parties is such that justice cannot be

obtained by a separate action. Peter Cascio, Inc. v. Green Acres, Inc., 3 Conn. Cir. Ct.

424, 428 (App. Div. 1965).

Contribution

There is no common law right of contribution among joint tortfeasors in Connecticut.

There are, however, certain exceptions. One of the exceptions is provided by CONN.

GEN. STAT. § 52-572h (2014). In actions based on negligence, § 52-572h(g) (2014)

provides for a right of contribution but only after a judgment has been rendered. The

right of contribution arises only after (1) the claimant has gone to final judgment, (2) the

claimant has failed to collect from one or more liable defendants after making good faith

efforts to do so, (3) the claimant has moved to open the judgment within one year after it

becomes final for purposes of reallocation, (4) a reallocation is made by the court, and (5)

a defendant is actually required to pay an amount in excess of his share of the original

judgment. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572h(g) (2014) indicates that a right of contribution

does not arise until a party pays more than its proportionate share of a judgment. The

right of action for contribution, which is equitable in origin, arises when, as between

multiple parties jointly bound to pay a sum of money, one party is compelled to pay the

entire sum. That party may then assert a right of contribution against the others for their

proportionate share of the common obligation.

9

Employer as a Defendant -- Exclusive Remedy - Workers’ Compensation

Protections

Connecticut’s Workers’ Compensation Act, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-275 et seq. (2014), is

the exclusive remedy for an employee’s personal injury claim arising out of and in the

course of employment or account of death resulting from personal injury so sustained. See

CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-284(a) (2014). Worker’s Compensation exclusivity must be

alleged as a special defense. Sivilla v. Philips Medical Sys. of N. Am., 46 Conn. App. 699,

704 (1997).

Indemnification

Connecticut allows one party to seek indemnification from another where the other is

substantially more negligent. Although there is ordinarily no right of indemnification

between joint tortfeasors, where one is in control of the situation and his negligence alone

is the direct, immediate cause of the injury, and the other defendant is not aware of the

fault, has no reason to anticipate it, and may reasonably rely upon the former not to commit

a wrong, the former may be forced to bear the burden of damages. See, e.g., Kyrtatas v.

Stop & Shop, Inc., 205 Conn. 694, 697-98 (1988).

Joint and Several Liability

The common law rule of joint and several liability among joint tortfeasors was abolished

by statute. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572h (2014). Consequently, a defendant is liable

only for the portion of damages for which he is responsible. See, e.g., Collins v. Colonial

Penn. Ins. Co., 257 Conn. 718, 730 (2001). CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572h, however,

proceeds on the premise that the defendants, between or among any of whom liability is

apportioned, are at least potentially liable in differing proportions. Gazo v. City of

Stamford, 255 Conn. 245, 258 (2001).

Negligence Per Se

Connecticut recognizes the doctrine of negligence per se. “Negligence per se operates to

engraft a particular legislative standard onto the general standard of care imposed by

traditional tort law principles, i.e., that standard of care to which an ordinarily prudent

person would conform his conduct. To establish negligence, the jury in a negligence per

se case need not decide whether the defendant acted as an ordinarily prudent person

would have acted under the circumstances. They merely decide whether the relevant

statute or regulation has been violated. If it has, the defendant was negligent as a matter

of law.” Gore v. People’s Savings Bank, 235 Conn. 360, 376 (1995) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

Strict Liability

A product liability action may be brought under a strict liability theory. See, e.g., Gerrity

v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 263 Conn. 120, 126 (2003). This theory of recovery is

10

available only where the condition of the product makes it unreasonably dangerous to the

user or consumer. The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would

be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge

common to the community as to its characteristics. See, e.g., Vitanza v. Upjohn Co., 257

Conn. 365, 374 (2001).

A) Standard: A product liability action may be brought under a strict liability theory.

Gerrity v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 263 Conn. 120, 126 (2003). This theory of

recovery is available only where the condition of the product makes it unreasonably

dangerous to the user or consumer. The article sold must be dangerous to an extent

beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases

it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics.

Vitanza v. Upjohn Co., 257 Conn. 365, 374 (2001).

B) Learned Intermediary Doctrine: The learned intermediary doctrine provides that

adequate warnings to prescribing physicians obviate the need for manufacturers of

prescription products to warn ultimate consumers directly. The doctrine is based

on the principle that prescribing physicians act as “learned intermediaries” between

a manufacturer and consumer and, therefore, stand in the best position to evaluate

a patient’s needs and assess the risks and benefits of a particular course of treatment.

The Connecticut Supreme Court has adopted the doctrine into Connecticut common

law. Vitanza v. Upjohn Co., 257 Conn. 365 (2001).

Willful and Wanton Conduct

Additional factual allegations must be pleaded to distinguish an action in negligence from

an action for willful and wanton conduct. If a plaintiff merely reiterates facts from a

negligence count and inserts the word “reckless,” the count can be stricken. If, however,

the factual allegations in a negligence count are detailed and specific enough to support a

claim of recklessness, a motion to strike may be denied. To state a claim of recklessness

the plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating both egregious conduct and the requisite state

of mind. See, e.g., Webster v. Bell, CV065000865, 2006 Conn. Super. Lexis 2888, *7-8

(2006).

TYPES OF ACTIONS

Breach of Contract

The elements of a breach of contract are: (1) the formation of an agreement; (2)

performance by one party; (3) a breach by the other party; and (4) damages suffered or

incurred as a direct result of that breach. FCM Group, Inc. v. Miller, 300 Conn. 774, 798

(2011). The award for the breach should place the injured party in the same position as

he or she would have been had the breach not occurred. Hess v. Burke Constr., Inc., 290

Conn. 1, 7-8 (2009).

11

(a) Written Contract

An action based on a written contract must be brought within six years of

when such breach occurred. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-576 (2014).

(b) Oral Contract

An oral contract will be enforced if it is for a term of one year or less and

would not be subject to Connecticut’s Statute of Frauds. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-

550 (2014). An oral agreement “shall be brought but within three years after the

right of action accrues.” CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-581 (2014).

Class Action

Class certification will be granted by the Court only if the following standard is met: the

representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Practice

Book § 9-7(4); Practice Book § 9-8; FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4) (2014). Additional factors

considered for certification are: (1) the nonexistence of conflict; and (2) assurance of

vigorous prosecution by competent counsel. Collins v. Anthem Health Plans, Inc., 275

Conn. 309, 326 (2005).

Dram Shop Liability

Connecticut’s Dram Shop Act is covered under CONN. GEN. STAT. § 30-102 et seq.

(2014). The provisions under this Act are strictly construed and are mandatorily rather

than discretionally applied. The statute requires a notice condition precedent: the

aggrieved party must provide “written notice to such seller (of alcoholic liquor) within

sixty days of the occurrence of such injury to persons or property of . . . intention to bring

an action under this section. [Further] such notice shall specify the time, date and person

to whom such sale was made, the name and address of the person injured or whose

property was damaged and the time, date and place where the injury to person or property

occurred.” However, the statute does not provide a course of action premised on

negligence against a seller if the sale of alcohol was to “a person twenty-one years of age

or older.”

Economic Loss Doctrine

The economic loss doctrine is a judicially created doctrine which prohibits recovery in

tort if the basis for the tort claim arises out of a contractual violation and damages are

solely limited to economic losses, as opposed to property damage or personal injury.

Heibeck v. Chrysler, LLC, CV075006908, 2008 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2429 (Conn. Sup.

Ct. Sept. 23, 2008). “Until November 12, 2013, there had been no appellate decisions

concerning the economic loss doctrine in Connecticut since [Flagg Energy Development

Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 244 Conn. 126 (1988). On that date the Supreme Court

released its decision in Ulbrich v. Groth, 310 Conn. 375 (2013), clarifying that its

12

decision in Flagg Energy Development Corp. was not limited only to sales covered by

article 2 of the UCC.” Country Squire I, Inc. v. RAW Constr., LLC, CV126008392, 2014

Conn. Super. LEXIS 475, *6, 2014 WL 1283046 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 4, 2014). The

court reasoned that, “[t]he overriding rationale for the economic loss doctrine is that

imposing tort remedies on commercial contracts improperly and unnecessarily interferes

with the legitimate expectations and powers of the parties to allocate their risks.” Id.,

*11.

Emotional Distress

(a) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

A claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress must establish the following

elements: (1) the defendant intended to inflict emotional distress or should have

known that such was likely to result; (2) the defendant’s conduct was extreme and

outrageous; (3) the plaintiff’s emotion distress was a direct result of the defendant’s

conduct; and (4) the emotion distress was severe. Carrol v. Allstate Ins. Co., 262

Conn. 433, 442-43 (2003).

(b) Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

To prevail on a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress, “the plaintiff

must prove that the defendant shall have realized that its conduct involved an

unreasonable risk of causing emotional distress and that the distress, if it were caused,

might result in illness or bodily harm” Scanlon v. Conn. Light & Power Co., 258

Conn. 436, 446 (2001).

(c) Bystander Emotional Distress

The emotional anguish experienced by a person who witnessed a parent, child or

sibling being seriously injured as a result of an accident caused by another is

compensable under Connecticut law. Clohessy v. Bachelor, 237 Conn. 31 (1996).

However, Connecticut does not recognize a cause of action for loss of parental

consortium brought by a minor child. Mendillo v. Bd. of Educ., 246 Conn. 456

(1998).

In order to recover from bystander emotion distress, these four elements must be

established: (1) the bystander must be closely related to the victim; (2) the

bystander’s emotional injury must be caused by “contemporaneous sensory

perception of the event”; (3) the injury suffered by the victim must be

“substantial” – death or serious personal injury; and (4) the bystander must have

suffered serious emotional injury. Clohessy v. Bachelor, 237 Conn. 31, 52-55

(1996).

Tortious Indemnification

13

This action generally arises between two tortfeasors: one tortfeasor’s passive negligence

results in a monetary recovery by a plaintiff as the other tortfeasor’s active negligence

renders him liable for reimbursement to the passive tortfeasor. Smith v. New Haven, 258

Conn. 56, 66 (2001). In order to assert an actionable claim for tortious indemnification,

the passive tortfeasor must prove that the other tortfeasor’s “active negligence, rather

than the first tortfeasor’s own passive negligence, was the direct, immediate cause of the

harm in question.” ATP P’ship v. Coats N. Am. Consol., Inc., 284 Conn. 537, 551-52

(Conn. 2007).

Injunctive Relief and Temporary/Preliminary Injunction

The requirements for filing an injunction are covered under CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-471

et seq. (2014). Under Connecticut law, in order to prevail on an application for a

preliminary injunction, four elements must be established: (1) plaintiff must not have had

any adequate remedy at law; (2) plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm if an injunction is

not granted; (3) plaintiff will likely prevail on the merits; and (4) a balancing of equities

favors the plaintiff. Waterbury Teachers Ass’n. v. Freedom of Info. Comm’n., 230 Conn.

441, 446 (1994). The purpose of a temporary injunction is to preserve the status quo until

a court has the opportunity to grant full relief at a subsequent hearing to determine

whether a permanent injunction is warranted. City of Stamford v. Kovac, 228 Conn. 95,

101 (1993); Clinton v. Middlesex Mut. Assurance Co., 37 Conn. App. 269, 270 (1995).

Intervening Complaints

An employer may file an intervening complainant to secure its statutory rights of

reimbursement of worker’s compensation benefits paid to an injured employee. CONN.

GEN. STAT. § 31-293 (2014). However, the employer’s negligence cannot bar or limit the

employer’s recovery. Archambault v. Soneco/Ne., Inc., 287 Conn. 20, 35-38 (2008).

Loss of Consortium

Connecticut recognizes a common law claim for loss of spousal consortium. Hopson v.

St. Mary’s Hosp., 176 Conn. 485, 487 (1979). Under Connecticut law, a loss for

consortium is defined as “encompassing the services of the injured spouse, the financial

support of the injured spouse, and the variety of intangible relations which exist between

spouses living together in marriage.” Jacoby v. Brinckerhoff, 250 Conn. 86, 90 (1999);

PROSSER TORTS § 124 (4th ed. 1971). Although an action for loss of consortium is an

independent cause of action, it is nonetheless derivative of the spouse’s cause of action.

Hopson, supra, 176 Conn. at 494. A loss of consortium is barred if the spouse does not

have a cognizable tort claim. Voris v. Molinaro, 302 Conn. 791, 794 (2011).

Premises Liability

Premises liability claims arising out of personal injuries to individuals are governed by

the negligence statutes of limitation under CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-584 (2014): the action

14

shall be brought within two years from the date the injury is first sustained or discovered

or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered, excepting no such

action may be brought more than three years from the date of the act or omission

complained of.

Connecticut generally recognizes various categories of invitees: (1) public invitee – one

invited to enter or remain on the premises as a member of the public for public purposes;

(2) business/social invitee – one who is invited onto a property for the direct or indirect

purpose of a business or social dealing with the possessor of the land. Sevigny v. Dibble

Hollow Condo Ass’n, 76 Conn. App. 306, 320 (2003). Under CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-

557a (2014), “the standard of care owed to a social invitee shall be the same as the

standard of care owed to a business invitee.” The possessor of land owes an invitee the

duty to inspect the premises and install safeguards to render the premises “reasonably

safe.” Warren v. Stancliff, 157 Conn. 216, 218 (1968). A property owner will be held

liable for defects which should have been discovered through reasonable inspection, that

is, it will be imputed with constructive notice. Sokolowski v. Medi-Mart, Inc., 24 Conn.

App. 276, 287 (1991).

Replevin

In Connecticut, a replevin action is governed by statute rather than by common law.

Cornelio v. Stamford Hosp., 246 Conn. 45, 49 (1998). CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-515

(2014) states: “The action of replevin may be maintained to recover any goods or

chattels in which the plaintiff has a general or special property interest with a right to

immediate possession and which are wrongfully detained from him in any manner,

together with damages for wrongful detention.” The statute of limitation for a replevin

claim is governed by the three-year statute of limitation for tort claims. See CONN. GEN.

STAT. § 52-577 (2012); Nickerson v. Martin, 34 Conn. Supp. 22, 30 (Conn. Super. Ct.

1976).

Requirements for Maintaining an Action for Professional Malpractice

[See Professional Liability Section, Subsection C, infra]

15

Spoliation

In order for the tort of intentional spoliation of evidence to be actionable, the following

elements must exist: (1) defendant’s knowledge of a pending or inchoate civil action

pertaining to the plaintiff; (2) the claim that the defendant destroyed the evidence; (3)

such action was carried out in bad faith with the intent to deprive the plaintiff of his cause

of action; (4) plaintiff’s inability to establish a prima facie case with that spoliated

evidence; and (5) damages suffered by plaintiff as a result. Rizzuto v. Davidson Ladders,

Inc., 280 Conn. 225, 244-45 (2006).

The tort of intentional spoliation is governed by the three-year statute of limitations under

CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-577 (2014). However, there is no Supreme Court or Appellate

Court authority in the State of Connecticut to support a cause of action for “negligent

spoliation”. See Lage v. Stop & Shop Supermarket Co. LLC, CV106012081, 2011 Conn.

Super. LEXIS 2907, *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 6, 2011).

Wrongful Death and Survival Actions

Connecticut’s Wrongful Death Statute is governed by CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-555

(2014). A wrongful death claim shall be brought within two years from the date of death,

“but no more than five years from the date of the act or omission complained of.” This

statutory right belongs to the decedent alone and damages are recoverable “for the death

… as for one of the consequences of the wrong inflicted upon the decedent.” Foran v.

Carangelo, 153 Conn. 356, 360 (1966).

Connecticut’s “Survival Statute” is codified in CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-599 (2014), which

essentially prevents a cause of action from being lost by the death of the possessor.

Foran, surpa, 153 Conn. at 360. Under the Survival Statute, a cause of action “shall

survive in favor of or against the executor or administrator of the deceased person.”

CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-599(a) (2014).

16

DISCOVERY

Electronic Discovery Rules

Connecticut adopted new electronic discovery rules effective January 2, 2012. The rules

regarding the production of electronically stored information are found in Connecticut

Practice Book § 13-9(d), which provides that if there exists electronically stored

information and a request for production does not specify a form for producing the type

of electronically stored information, the responding party may produce the information in

a form in which it is ordinarily maintained or in a form that is reasonably usable.

Electronically stored information means “information that is stored in an electronic

medium and is retrievable in perceivable form.” Practice Book § 13-1(a)(5). Under

Practice Book § 13-5(9), a party may move for a protective order to determine the terms

and conditions of electronic discovery and the allocation of costs between the parties.

Practice Book § 13-14(d) provides safe harbor for the loss of information resulting from

routine, good faith operations of systems or processes “in the absence of a showing of

intentional actions designed to avoid known preservation obligations.” Also, Practice

Book § 13-33 provides a procedure for a party to assert a claim of privilege or trial-

preparation material protection after information is produced in discovery, and, if the

claim is contested, permits any party that received that information to present the matter

to the court for resolution.

Expert Witnesses

A) Expert disclosures are governed by Practice Book § 13-4. A party “shall disclose

each person who may be called by that party to testify as an expert witness at trial,

and all documents that may be offered in evidence in lieu of such expert testimony.”

Practice Book § 13-4(a). While a formal report is not required, the disclosure must

include the name, address, employer, field of expertise, subject matter about which

the expert will is expected to testify, and the substance of the grounds for each

opinion. Practice Book §§ 13-4(b) – (b)(1). Unless the judge orders or the parties

agree otherwise, the party disclosing the expert witness must, upon the request of

the opposing party, produce to all other parties all materials obtained, created,

and/or relied upon by the expert in connection with his/her opinions within 14 days

before the expert’s deposition. Practice Book § 13-4(b)(3). Each party must be

afforded an opportunity to depose the expert. Practice Book § 13-4(c)(1). Unless

otherwise ordered by the judge for good cause, or agreed on by the parties, the

expert’s fees and expenses for the deposition, excluding preparation time, must be

paid by the party taking the deposition. Practice Book § 13-4(c)(2). Sanctions for

failing to make the required disclosures include preclusion of the expert’s

testimony. Practice Book § 13-4(h).

B) Unless otherwise ordered or agreed to by the parties, the parties must submit within

120 days from the return date a proposed Schedule for Expert Discovery. Practice

Book § 13-4(g)(1).

17

C) A party is under no obligation to disclose expert witnesses whom it does not intend

to call at trial, unless the other party can make a “showing of exceptional

circumstances under which it is impracticable for the party seeking discovery to

obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other means.” Practice Book § 13-

4(f). Consequently, a party is generally free to consult with experts for the purpose

of garnering an opinion without having to disclose the expert, so long as it does not

intend to call the expert at trial.

Non Party Discovery

A) A non-party may be subpoenaed in Connecticut pursuant to Practice Book § 13-28.

See also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-143 (2014). A witness may be subpoenaed by a

judge, clerk, notary public, attorney, or any other commissioner of the superior

court. Further, a subpoenaed witness may be asked to not only appear, but also, to

produce and permit the inspection of books, papers, documents or tangible things

relevant to the scope of the examination.

B) A subpoena requesting the production of documents must be issued fifteen days

before the witness is compelled to make such productions. Connecticut Practice

Book § 13-28(c). Similarly, the witness has fifteen days from issuance of the

subpoena to object in writing to the inspection or copying of the designated

materials.

Privileges

A) The attorney client privilege, which is a legal concept that protects communications

between a client and his or her attorney and keeps those communications

confidential, is recognized in Connecticut. See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Farm Family

Cas. Ins. Co., 273 Conn. 33, 38 (2005). This privilege encourages open and honest

communication between clients and attorneys.

B) As defined by the Connecticut Practice Book § 13-1, a statement is “(A) a written

statement in the handwriting of the person making it, or signed, initialed, or

otherwise in writing adopted or approved by the person making it; or (B) a

stenographic, mechanical, electrical or other recording or a transcription thereof,

which is a substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement by the person making

it and which is contemporaneously recorded.” Statements are discoverable, unless

they are privileged (such as the attorney-client privilege).

C) The work-product doctrine, as recognized in Connecticut, protects materials

prepared in anticipation of litigation from discovery by opposing counsel. Practice

Book § 13-3(a) allows a party to obtain discovery of documents and tangible things

prepared in anticipation of litigation only upon a showing that the party seeking

discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of the case and is

18

unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials

by other means. This doctrine does not generally protect communications with

testifying experts. See Practice Book § 13-4(b)(3).

D) There is no authority recognizing the self critical analysis privilege in Connecticut.

Indeed, only two Connecticut Superior Courts have addressed the privilege. One

court held that Connecticut law does not recognize the qualified privilege against

discovery of “self-critical” analysis under the facts of the case. Office of Consumer

Counsel v. Dep’t of Pub. Util. Control, 44 Conn. Supp. 21, 33 (1994). The other

court did not accept the existence of a self-critical analysis privilege in the

circumstances of the case. Caccavale v. Ne. Utils., CV900377190, 1994 Conn.

Super. LEXIS 1956, *8 (1994).

E) Evidentiary privileges in Connecticut are governed by the Connecticut Code of

Evidence § 5-1, which dictates that Connecticut recognizes both privileges created

by statute and common law. There are numerous privileges created by statute. A

few examples of statutorily created privileges in Connecticut include

communications made to a clergyman in his professional capacity (CONN. GEN.

STAT. § 52-146b (2014)), those between a psychologist and patient (CONN. GEN.

STAT. § 52-146c (2014)), and communications made to a social worker in his

professional capacity (CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-146q (2014)). For additional

statutorily created privileges, please speak with Connecticut counsel.

Requests to Admit

A) Practice Book § 13-22 through § 13-25 govern requests for the admission of facts

for purposes of the pending action only. Under the rules, a party may serve written

requests for the admission of the truth of any matters relevant to the subject matter

of the pending action as they relate to statements or opinions of fact or of the

application of law to fact, including the existence, due execution and genuineness

of any documents described in the request.

B) Each matter of which an admission is requested is admitted unless, within 30 days

after the filing of the notice, the party to whom the request is directed files and

serves upon the party requesting the admission a written answer or objection.

Documents sought to be admitted by the request shall be filed with the response by

the responding party only if they are the subject of an answer or objection. If

objection is made, the reasons therefore shall be stated. The answer shall

specifically deny the matter or set forth in detail the reasons why the answering

party cannot truthfully admit or deny the matter. A denial shall fairly meet the

substance of the requested admission, and when good faith requires that a party

qualify his or her answer or deny only a part of the matter of which an admission is

requested, such party shall specify so much of it as is true and qualify or deny the

remainder. An answering party may not give lack of information or knowledge as

a reason for failure to admit or deny unless such party states that he or she has made

reasonable inquiry and that the information known or readily obtainable by him or

19

her is insufficient to enable an admission or denial. A party who considers that a

matter of which an admission has been requested presents a genuine issue for trial

may not, on that ground alone, object to the request; the party may deny the matter

or set forth reasons why he or she cannot admit or deny it. Practice Book § 13-

23(a).

C) The party who has requested the admission may move to determine the sufficiency

of the answer or objection. Practice Book § 13-23(b).

D) Any matter admitted under this section is conclusively established unless the

judicial authority on motion permits withdrawal or amendment of the admission.

Any admission made by a party under this section is for the purpose of the pending

action only and is not an admission by him or her for any other purpose nor may it

be used against him or her in any other proceeding. Practice Book § 13-24(a).

E) The admission of any matter under this section shall not be deemed to waive any

objections to its competency or relevancy. An admission of the existence and due

execution of a document, unless otherwise expressed, shall be deemed to include

an admission of its delivery, and that it has not since been altered. Practice Book

§ 13-24(b).

F) If a party fails to admit the genuineness of any document or the truth of any matter

as requested herein, and if the party requesting the admissions thereafter proves the

genuineness of the document or the truth of the matter, such party may apply to the

court for an order requiring the other party to pay the reasonable expenses incurred

in making that proof, including reasonable attorney’s fees. The judicial authority

shall make the order unless it finds that such failure to admit was reasonable.

Practice Book § 13-25.

20

EVIDENCE AND PROOFS

Accident Reconstruction

The Connecticut Supreme Court adopted the standard established in Daubert v. Merrell

Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), for determining the admissibility of scientific

evidence. State v. Porter, 241 Conn. 57, 68 (1997). Under that standard, the first question

goes to reliability: Is the evidence scientifically valid? The second question goes to

relevance: Can the reasoning be applied to the facts of the present case? Other things

considered include: (1) whether the methodology can be and has been tested; (2) whether

it has been subject to peer review and publication; and (3) the known or potential rate of

error. See COLIN C. TAIT & ELIOT D. PRESCOTT, TAIT’S HANDBOOK OF CONNECTICUT

EVIDENCE § 7.7.1. (4th ed. 2008).

Connecticut courts permit expert testimony on accident reconstruction. Lutkus v. Kelly,

170 Conn. 252, 254-57 (1976); Floyd v. Fruit Indus., Inc., 144 Conn. 659, 664-65 (1957).

For example, an expert may testify as to the speed of a motor vehicle based on skid marks

and other physical factors. Thomas v. Commerford, 168 Conn. 64, 69 (1975).

Biochemical Testimony

A witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, education or

otherwise may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise concerning scientific,

technical or other specialized knowledge, if the testimony will assist the trier of fact in

understanding the evidence or in determining a fact in issue. See CONN. CODE EVID. § 7-

2. Biochemical testimony and evidence is admissible in Connecticut. See, e.g., State v.

Corrigan, 40 Conn. App. 359, 364 (1996).

Collateral Source Rule

The collateral source rule provides that a defendant is not entitled to be relived from paying

any part of the compensation due for injuries proximately resulting from his act where

payment for such injuries or damages comes from a collateral source, wholly independent

of him. The basis of this rule is that a wrongdoer shall not benefit from a windfall from an

outside source. That rule is applicable in any tort case. See Env’t Express, Inc. v. AIU Ins.

Co., 279 Conn. 194, 203 n.9 (2006). Connecticut has codified the collateral source rule at

CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-225a (2014).

Convictions

For the purpose of impeaching the credibility of a witness, evidence that a witness has

been convicted of a crime is admissible of the crime was punishable by imprisonment for

more than one year. CONN. CODE EVID. § 6-7(a). In determining whether to admit such

evidence, the court shall consider: (1) extent of prejudice likely to arise; (2) the

significance of the particular crime in indicating untruthfulness; and (3) the remoteness in

time of the conviction. Id. Evidence that a witness has been convicted of a crime may be

21

introduced by examination of the witness or by introduction of a certified copy of the

record of conviction. CONN. CODE EVID. § 6-7(b); see COLIN C. TAIT & ELIOT D.

PRESCOTT, TAIT’S HANDBOOK OF CONNECTICUT EVIDENCE § 6.33.1 (4th ed. 2008).

Dead Man’s Statute

Connecticut’s so-called “dead man’s statute” is codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-172

(2014) and applies to actions by or against representatives or beneficiaries of deceased

persons. The dead man’s statute is a long recognized exception to the hearsay rule. Dinan

v. Marchand, 279 Conn. 558, 573-74 (2006).

Medical Bills

Connecticut courts have upheld the admission of medical bills, even though the doctor has

not appeared and testified, where the plaintiffs testify that the bills have been incurred as a

result of the injuries received. Rhode v. Milla, 287 Conn. 731, 745 (2008). As a condition

precedent, there must be some corroborating evidence connecting a bill to the injury. See

COLIN C. TAIT & ELIOT D. PRESCOTT, TAIT’S HANDBOOK OF CONNECTICUT EVIDENCE

§ 1.29.4 (4th ed. 2008).

Offers of Proof

This is an acceptable procedure to preserve the record for appeal when evidence is

excluded. Doyle v. Kamm, 133 Conn. App. 25, 36 n.7 (2012). The Connecticut Supreme

Court has recognized the propriety and usefulness of a more or less formal offer of proof

as an aid to the judge. See COLIN C. TAIT & ELIOT D. PRESCOTT, TAIT’S HANDBOOK OF

CONNECTICUT EVIDENCE § 1.29.4 (4th ed. 2008).

Relationship to the Federal Rules of Evidence

The Connecticut Rules of Evidence are largely similar to the Federal Rules of Evidence,

but there are many differences which need to be taken into account. State v. Aaron L., 272

Conn. 798, 824-25 (2005) (acknowledging that there may be substantive differences

between the Connecticut and federal rules of evidence, but there was no such difference

with respect to the pertinent evidentiary issue in this particular matter).

Spoliation

In civil cases, the intentional destruction of evidence allows a trier to draw an inference

that destroyed evidence would have been unfavorable to the party that destroyed it. Metro.

Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Deere & Co., 302 Conn. 123, 132 n.3 (2011). In criminal cases,

if the police have lost or destroyed evidence it is a denial of due process. See COLIN C.

TAIT & ELIOT D. PRESCOTT, TAIT’S HANDBOOK OF CONNECTICUT EVIDENCE § 8.16.12(f)

(4th ed. 2008).

22

Subsequent Remedial Measures

Evidence of measures taken after an event is inadmissible to prove negligence or culpable

conduct in connection with an event. CONN. CODE EVID. § 4-7; see also Duncan v. Mill

Mgmt. Co. of Greenwich, Inc., 308 Conn. 1, 13-20 (2013).. It is admissible to show

ownership, control or feasibility of a precautionary measure if those are in issue. See COLIN

C. TAIT & ELIOT D. PRESCOTT, TAIT’S HANDBOOK OF CONNECTICUT EVIDENCE § 4.24 (4th

ed. 2008).

23

RESOLUTION ISSUES

A) Enforcing Settlement Agreements

In Connecticut, a settlement agreement, including an oral agreement reached on the

eve of trial will be enforced if sufficiently clear and unambiguous. Trial courts have

declared repeatedly that valid settlement agreements need not be in writing and oral

settlement agreements are enforceable. See Rena Sobol Ackerman, et al. v. Sobol Family

P’ship, 298 Conn. 495 (2010). The Superior Court will conduct a hearing pursuant to

Audubon Parking Associated Ltd. P’ship v. Barclay & Stubbs, Inc., 225 Conn. 804, 811-

12 626 A.2d 729 (1993) to decide the issue of enforcement of a settlement agreement. One

issue is whether the attorney had apparent authority to bind the client. The case of

Tomlinson v. Bd. of Educ., 226 Conn. 704, 734, 629 A.2d 333 (1993) established a two part

analysis regarding apparent authority – (1) has the principal held out the agent as

possessing sufficient authority to embrace the act in question and knowingly permitted the

agent to act as having such authority and (2) did the other party reasonably, in good faith,

believe the agent had the necessary authority. As to attorneys as agents, the Connecticut

Supreme Court recognizes 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS and

1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) AGENCY as authoritative support for its holdings concerning

settlement authority.

B) Mandatory ADR

i. Arbitration. A party may enforce a written agreement to arbitrate under

Connecticut General Statutes Section 52-410 by filing an action in Superior

Court. The matter is fast tracked with a shortened pleading schedule and

immediate assignment for hearing. Connecticut courts favor enforcement

of arbitration agreements.

ii. Without a written agreement to arbitrate a dispute, a Superior Court judge

may by statute, 52-549u, order cases with a reasonable expectation of a

judgment of less than $50,000 to arbitration with an absolute right to trial

de novo under Sect. 52-549z if a demand for trial is filed within 20 days of

the arbitrator’s decision. The arbitrator’s decision is not admissible in a

subsequent proceeding. The court in which the award is filed, upon proof

the arbitrator acted arbitrarily or capriciously or that the award was procured

by corruption or undue means, may order a trial de novo.

C) Mediation

A Connecticut Superior Court has authority to enter a stay in a litigation

matter under 52-409 until an arbitration has been had in compliance with an

agreement to arbitrate provided the person applying for the stay is ready and

willing to proceed with arbitration. A similar authority based on equitable

powers applies to an order for stay and an order for parties to mediate where

24

the parties contractually agreed to mediation. See Turn of River Fire Dep’t,

Inc. v. Stamford, Superior Court, 2008 Conn. Super. Lexis 1152 (May 2,

2008, Tierney J.); LeClair v. Scholastic Mortgage, LLC, 2010 Conn. Super.

Lexis 32 (Jan. 13, 2010) (Rodriguez, J.).

D) Offers of Judgment/Offer of Compromise

Connecticut Statute Section 52-192a, effective October 1, 2011, provides that

plaintiff may serve an Offer of Compromise upon a defendant. The former language, Offer

of Judgment, is no longer used in Connecticut state court but may be used in federal court

litigation.

The defendant, (except a health care provider) has thirty days within which to

accept the offer and the plaintiff shall then withdraw the action if the offer is accepted. If

the offer is not accepted, it is considered rejected. After trial, if the plaintiff recovers an

amount equal to or greater than the offer of compromise, the court shall add to the entire

amount recovered 8% annual interest from the date of the complaint or from the offer in

compromise if the offer is filed late. An offer may be filed up to thirty days before trial.

Interest is calculated as provided by the statute either from the date of the complaint or

from the date of the offer.

An offer of compromise may be filed regarding a counterclaim; the interest award

is on the difference between the amount recovered and the amount of the offer.

Under Sec. 52-192(b) a special procedure applies to actions for damages for

personal injury or wrongful death whether in tort or in contract on a claim of negligence of

a health care provider. In this section, the plaintiff must wait 365 days after service of

process to file the offer and the defendant has sixty days to accept the award. The provision

provides the defendant with time to engage in discovery to determine the plaintiff’s injury

and damages. Interest is added to the amount recovered if the verdict is equal to or greater

than the offer.

E) Releases and Settlement Agreements

For discussion of authority of an agent or attorney for settlement agreements, see

Resolution Issues, Sec. A. A release or settlement agreement is a contract subject to the

rules governing the construction of contracts. The intention of the parties controls the

scope and effect of the release as determined from the language used and the circumstances

of the transaction. Muldoon v. Homestead Insulation Co., 231 Conn. 469, 482 650 A.2d

1240 (1994). Connecticut courts will enforce settlement agreements relating to resolution

of claims relating to conduct prior to the settlement.

25

DAMAGES

Caps on Damages

In law, damages refer to the money paid or awarded to a plaintiff following a successful

claim in a civil action. In Connecticut, there is no statutory or common law cap on

damages. Thorsen v. Durkin Dev., LLC, 129 Conn. App. 68, 74 (2011) (quoting Mahon

v. B.V. Unitron Mfg., Inc., 284 Conn. 645, 661-62, 935 A.2d 1004 (2007)) (“[T]he

amount of an award [of damages] is a matter peculiarly within the province of the trier of

facts . . . the ultimate test which must be applied to the verdict by the trial court is

whether the jury’s award falls somewhere within the necessarily uncertain limits of just

damages or whether the size of the verdict so shocks the sense of justice as to compel the

conclusion that the jury [was] influenced by partiality, prejudice, mistake or

corruption.”). However, pursuant to CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-225a (2014), the economic

loss portion of a jury damage award can be reduced by the amount of collateral source

payments received by the injured plaintiff less amounts paid to secure the collateral

benefits.1 Cruz v. Montanez, 294 Conn. 357, 369-70 (2009) (citing CONN. GEN. STAT.

§ 52-225a en route to affirming that the legislature can limit the apportionment of

damages).

Calculation of Damages

There is no specific formula to calculate damages in Connecticut and it varies depending

on the type of case. Am. Diamond Exch., Inc. v. Alpert, 302 Conn. 494, 510-11 (2011)

(internal citation omitted) (stating that “mathematical exactitude is [not] a precondition to

an award of damages but . . . evidence, with such certainty as the nature of the particular

case may permit, lay a foundation [that] will enable the trier to make a fair and

reasonable estimate”). In a personal injury claim, compensatory damages may include,

inter alia, all economic losses caused by the injury, including past and probable future

medical expenses, loss of the earnings that would have been earned “but for” the injury,

and, if the injury resulted in a disability and the disability is permanent, the loss of future

earnings through retirement. In addition to economic loss, an award may also include

non-economic losses, such as pain and suffering, emotional anguish, and loss of

enjoyment of life. Punitive damages and attorney’s fees may also be calculated under

certain circumstances.

Available Items of Personal Injury Damages

Among other things, a plaintiff may be entitled to recover damages in a personal injury

action for the following items: (1) Past and Future Medical Bills; (2) Disfigurement /

Scarring; (3) Disability; (4) Loss of Enjoyment of Life; (5) Pain and Suffering; (6) Lost

Income, Wages and Earnings. Hamernick v. Bach, 64 Conn. App. 160, 163 n.3 (2001).

1 Economic damages means compensation for pecuniary losses including, but not limited to, the cost of

reasonable and necessary medical care, rehabilitative services, custodial care and loss of earnings or earning

capacity. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572h (2014).

26

Lost Opportunity Doctrine

Damages for loss opportunity are available in Connecticut but the circumstances in which

such damages are available greatly vary and have included, inter alia, lost business

opportunity, lost opportunity from the sell or purchase of real estate, and lost opportunity

for further compensation. Savvidis v. City of Norwalk, 129 Conn. App. 406, 413 (2011).

Mitigation

A plaintiff who has been injured by the negligence of another must act in good faith and

use reasonable care to minimize the resulting losses and damages and to prevent any

aggravation or increase of the injuries. See, e.g., Burns v. Hanson, 249 Conn. 809, 831

(Conn. 1999). A failure of a plaintiff to mitigate his or her damages results in a reduction

of damages accordingly.

Punitive Damages

A) Punitive damages are damages not awarded in order to compensate the plaintiff,

but in order to punish, reform or deter the defendant for the conduct that damaged

the plaintiff. Common law punitive damages in Connecticut are limited to the

plaintiff’s attorney’s fees and nontaxable costs, and thus serve a function that is

both compensatory and punitive. Bodner v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 222 Conn.

480, 492 (Conn. 1992). Because they usually compensate the plaintiff in excess of

the plaintiff’s provable injuries, punitive damages are awarded only in special cases

or if allowed pursuant to statute.

B) With respect to common law claims, for a plaintiff to received an award of rights

of others or an intentional and wanton violation of those rights. Venturi v. Savitt,

Inc., 191 Conn. 588, 593 (Conn. 1983). The basic requirement to justify an award

of punitive damages is described in terms of wanton and malicious injury, evil

motive and violence. Damages may not exceed the amount of the expenses of

litigation in the suit, less taxable costs and it is essential to the award of punitive

damages for the plaintiff to offer evidence of what those damages are.

C) Similar to a claim for common law punitive damages, most statutes that allow a

claim for statutory punitive damages likewise require some evidence of reckless

or wanton conduct on the part of a tortfeasor to justify an award of damages. See,

e.g., Bridgeport Harbour Place I, LLC v. Ganim, 131 Conn. App. 99, 139-40

(Conn. App. Ct. 2011) (example of a statute of which punitive damages are

awarded for wanton behavior). The specific statutes that allow claims for

punitive damages are too numerous to list. Please speak with your Connecticut

counsel.

27

D) Awards of punitive damages for common law claims are normally not insurable.

Awards of punitive damages pursuant to statute may be insurable if the liability for

punitive damages is specifically assigned by statutory fiat rather than as punishment

for the tortfeasor’s wrongdoing. See Bodner v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 222

Conn. 480, 498 (Conn. 1992).

Recovery and Pre and Post Judgment Interest

A) Prejudgment interest may be awarded if the trier of fact determines that past due

amounts are payable and wrongfully withheld. See Blakeslee Arpaia Chapman,

Inc. v. DOT, 273 Conn. 746, 752 (2005). CONN. GEN. STAT. § 37-3a (2014) governs

the award of prejudgment interest and provides that interest at the rate of ten percent

a year may be recovered and allowed in civil actions, including actions to recover

money loaned at a greater rate, as damages for the detention of money after it

becomes payable.

B) In a negligence action, a plaintiff’s entitlement to post-judgment interest is

governed by CONN. GEN. STAT. § 37-3b (2014), which allows interest at the rate of

ten percent a year to be recovered “in any action to recover damages for injury to

the person, or to real or personal property, caused by negligence, computed from

the date that is twenty days after the date of judgment or the date that is ninety days

after the date of verdict, whichever is earlier, upon the amount of the judgment.”

Recovery of Attorney’s Fees

The general rule of law followed in Connecticut, known as the “American rule,” is that

attorney’s fees and ordinary expenses and burdens of litigation are not allowed to the

successful party absent a contractual or statutory exception. See, e.g., Brookfield v.

Candlewood Shores Estates, Inc., 201 Conn. 1, 14, 513 A.2d 1218 (1986); Gino’s Pizza of

E. Hartford, Inc. v. Kaplan, 193 Conn. 135, 140, 475 A.2d 305 (1984); Gionfriddo v. Avis

Rent A Car System, Inc., 192 Conn. 280, 297, 472 A.2d 306 (1984); Litton Indus. Credit

Corp. v. Catanuto, 175 Conn. 69, 75, 394 A.2d 191 (1978); Central New Haven Dev. Corp.

v. Potpourri, Inc., 39 Conn. Supp. 132, 134, 471 A.2d 681 (1983). There are few

exceptions, such as where a specific contractual term provides for the recovery of

attorney’s fees and costs or where a statute controls. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-

240a (2014) (attorney’s fees may be awarded in products liability action). Also, an

indemnitee is entitled to recover from an indemnitor, as part of its damages, attorney’s fees,

costs and expenses. 24 Leggett St. Ltd. P’ship. v. Beacon Indus., 239 Conn. 284, 311

(1996). An additional exception, as outlined above, is when the successful party is awarded

punitive damages, which in Connecticut, includes an award of attorney’s fees.

Settlement Involving Minors

Under Connecticut law, a parent can settle a post-injury claim by a minor without Probate

Court approval if the amount of the settlement is less than ten thousand dollars. See CONN.

28

GEN. STAT. § 45a-631(b) (2014) (“A release given by both parents or by the parent who

has legal custody of a minor or by the guardian or spouse shall, if the amount does not

exceed ten thousand dollars in value, be valid and binding upon the minor.”). For amounts

over $10,000, a parent or guardian must obtain Probate Court approval. See CONN. GEN.

STAT. § 45a-631(a) (2014).

Taxation of Costs

An award of costs in a civil action is governed by CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-257 (2014).

Taxation of costs is regulated by Connecticut Practice Book § 18-5. It allows the clerk to

tax costs in civil cases fourteen days after the filing of a written bill of costs provided that

no objection is filed.

Unique Damages Issues

Too many to summarize. Please contact Connecticut counsel.

29

MISCELLANEOUS

State Court

The appeals process in Connecticut’s state court system is governed by

Connecticut’s Rules of Appellate Procedure, which is a component of the Connecticut

Practice Book. Connecticut’s Rules of Appellate Procedure may be accessed online at

www.jud.ct.gov., and should be carefully reviewed before undertaking an appeal. The

first step in the appeal process is knowing what decisions can be appealed to either the

Appellate Court or the Supreme Court. With one exception, only decisions of the

Superior Court can be appealed. The exception is in workers’ compensation cases where

appeals bypass the Superior Court and go directly to the Appellate Court. See CONN.

GEN. STAT. § 31-301b (2014); Practice Book § 76-1. Other administrative decisions, as

well as Probate Court decisions, must first be appealed to the Superior Court.

In general, you have twenty (20) days from the date that notice of the judgment or

decision is issued by the judge or clerk (not when it is received by the lawyer or litigant).

Practice Book § 63-1 (a).

Federal Court

Appeals from judgments or decisions rendered in the United States District Court,

District of Connecticut, are governed by Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and by the

Local Rules of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The time for filing a notice

of appeal is addressed in FRAP 49(a) generally, must be filed with the district clerk

within thirty days after and judgment or order appealed from is entered.

30

Description of the Organization of the Connecticut State Court System

Appointments to the Bench

Connecticut’s method of appointment of judges to the Superior Court is through

nomination by the governor from a list compiled by the Judicial Selection Commission.

Nominees must be approved and appointed by the General Assembly, and serve a term of

eight years. Appointment to Connecticut’s appellate courts is also by means of

gubernatorial appointment, and every judge of the Superior Court, by virtue of

appointment to the Superior Court, is qualified to serve on the Connecticut Appellate

Court or the Connecticut Supreme Court.

Trial Court

The Connecticut Superior Court is the trial court and hears civil, criminal, family

and juvenile matters. The Civil Division of the Superior Court is divided into five parts

or types:

Administrative Appeals;

Civil Jury;

Civil Non-Jury;

Landlord-Tenant, including evictions (called summary process); and

Small claims

Appellate Courts

Connecticut has two appellate courts: Connecticut Appellate Court and

Connecticut Supreme Court. Both appellate courts hear oral arguments on pending cases

between September and June of each year. The Supreme Court consists of seven justices

and the Connecticut Appellate Court, which serves as the intermediate appellate court,

consists of nine judges.

Description of the Organization of the Federal Court System

Federal Court Locations

The District of Connecticut has eight active judges, six senior judges and five

magistrate judges. Court proceedings take place in Federal courthouses located in

Bridgeport, Hartford and New Haven.

Local Practice Nuances

31

State Court

State Court proceedings are governed by the Connecticut Practice Book. Local

State Court practice nuances include, e-filing and a short calendar process for the hearing

and adjudication of motions.

Federal Court

Each District Court Judge in Connecticut has his or her own Chambers Practices,

which vary from judge to judge. Chambers Practices are available online at

www.ctd.uscourts.gov.

Reconsideration

State Court

In state court, a motion to reargue is governed by Connecticut Practice Book

Section 11-12 and must be filed within twenty days from the issuance of notice of the

rendition of the decision or order.

Federal Court

In federal court, a motion to reargue or a motion for reconsideration falls under

the purview of Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and “must be made within

a reasonable time.” FED. R. CIV. P. 60(c)(1) (2014).

Rules Governing Timing of Motions

State Court

In state court, the time to plead is governed by Connecticut Practice Book Section

10-8, which provides that pleadings shall advance within thirty days of the return date

and subsequent pleading or motions shall advance at least one step within each

successive period of thirty days from the preceding pleadings.

Federal Court

In federal court, pleadings and motions are governed by Rule 7 of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure. Pursuant to Connecticut’s Local Rules, unless otherwise

ordered by the court, all memoranda in opposition to any motion shall be filed within

twenty-one days of the filing of the motion, and shall indicate in the lower margin of the

first page of such memorandum whether oral argument is requested. L. CIV. R. 7(a).

32

33

PRODUCT LIABILITY

Alternative Design

Product liability claims are governed by the Connecticut Product Liability Act.

CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572m et seq. (2014). A “product liability claim” includes all

claims against a product seller for personal injury, death or property damage caused by

the manufacture, design, formula, preparation, assembly, installation, testing, warning,

instructions, marketing, packaging, or labeling of any product. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-

572m(b) (2014). A product liability claim under the Product Liability Act is the

exclusive remedy against product sellers for damage to property, including the product

itself, and personal injury or wrongful death caused by a product. CONN. GEN. STAT.

§ 52-572n (2014). As between commercial parties, a claim for commercial loss is outside

the scope of the Product Liability Act. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572m(d) (2014). A

product liability claim under the act includes all actions based on the following legal

theories: strict liability in tort; negligence; breach of warranty; express or implied; breach

of or failure to discharge a duty to warn or instruct; and misrepresentation or

nondisclosure. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572m(b) (2014).

A “product seller” subject to liability under the Product Liability Act includes

“any person or entity, including a manufacturer, wholesaler, distributor or retailer who is

engaged in the business of selling such products whether the sale is for resale or for use

or consumption.” CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572m(a) (2014). A manufacturer includes

“product sellers who design, assemble, fabricate, construct, process, package or otherwise

prepare a product or component part of a product prior to its sale to a user or consumer.”

CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572m(e) (2014). The term “manufacturer” also includes lessors

or bailors of products who are engaged in the business of leasing or bailment of products.

Id.

A product seller may be held liable under the Connecticut Product Liability for a

defectively designed product that causes harm to the end user. In order to establish

liability under the Act based on a design defect, the plaintiff must prove that the design of

the product made the product unreasonably dangerous, i.e. the product is “dangerous to

an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who

purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its

characteristics." Potter v. Chi. Pneumatic Tool Co., 241 Conn. 199, 214-15, 694 A.2d

1319 (1997). A plaintiff need not establish the existence of a reasonable alternative

design in order to prevail on a design defect claim under the Connecticut Product

Liability Act. Id. When determining whether a product is unreasonably dangerous based

on the reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer, the trier of fact may, but is not

required to, consider “the usefulness of the product, the likelihood and severity of the

danger posed by the design, the feasibility of an alternative design, the financial cost of

an improved design, the ability to reduce the product's danger without impairing its

34

usefulness or making it too expensive, and the feasibility of spreading the loss by

increasing the product's price.” Potter, 241 Conn. at 221. The availability of a feasible

alternative design is a factor that the plaintiff may, rather than must, prove in order to

establish that a product's risks outweigh its utility. Id. Under Connecticut law, “the

ordinary consumer expectation test is appropriate when the everyday experience of the

particular product's users permits the inference that the product did not meet minimum

safety expectations.” Id. at 222. When the facts of a particular case do not reasonably

permit the inference that a product did not meet the safety expectations of the ordinary

consumer, however, the trier of fact should engage in the risk-utility balancing analysis.

No appellate authority exists in Connecticut as to whether a claim that a

prescription drug was defectively designed is a viable claim under the Connecticut

Product Liability Act. One federal court has held, however, that the Connecticut

Supreme Court would permit recovery for a design defect in prescriptions drugs. Moss v.

Wyeth, No. 3:04cv1511, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72569 (D. Conn. May 24, 2012).

Component Part Doctrine

The seller of a component part may be held liable for personal injury, property

damage or wrongful death under the Product Liability Act. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 52-

527n(a), 52-572m(a), 52-572m(e) (2014). The manufacturer of a component part is not

liable for a defect in the completed product into which the component part is incorporated

unless the manufacturer played a substantial role in the integration of the component into

the final product and the integration of the component causes the product to be defective.

Fallon v. The Matworks, 50 Conn. Supp. 207, 220-21 (2007). A component part

manufacturer may also be held liable for any defects in the component part it

manufactures. Id.

Learned Intermediary/Sophisticated User

Connecticut law recognizes the learned intermediary and sophisticated user

doctrines. The sophisticated user doctrine "protects a manufacturer from liability only if

the chain of distribution is such that the duty to warn ultimate users should fall on an

intermediary in that chain, rather than on the manufacturer." The sophisticated user

doctrine may be applied to any type of product, not just those that are unavoidably

unsafe. Vitanza v. Upjohn Co., 257 Conn. 365, 390-91, 778 A.2d 829 (2001).

The learned intermediary doctrine is an exception to the general rule requiring a

manufacturer to warn users or consumers of its products of dangers associated with

known dangers of its products. Hurley v. The Heart Physicians, 278 Conn. 305, 316, 898

A.2d 777 (2006); Vitanza, 257 Conn. at 375. The learned intermediary doctrine applies

in the context of prescription drugs and prescription implantable medical devices.

Hurley, 278 Conn. at 317. It is based on the common law, under which the manufacturer

of a prescription drug owed a duty to warn of the dangers associated with use of the drug

only to the prescribing physician. Vitanza, 257 Conn. at 389. The doctrine applies

particularly to the medical field and generally involves unavoidably unsafe products. Id.

35

at 390. Under the learned intermediary doctrine, “adequate warnings to prescribing

physicians obviate the need for manufacturers of prescription products to warn ultimate

consumers directly” of the dangerous propensities of a particular drug. Id. The learned

intermediary doctrine is an absolute defense to a product defect claim based on

inadequate warnings under the Connecticut Product Liability Act when adequate

warnings are given to the prescribing physician. Id. at 388. Whether or not the learned

intermediary doctrine may serve as an affirmative defense to a claim that a prescription

drug was defectively designed must be determined on a case by case basis. Moss v.

Wyeth, Inc., No. 3:04cv1511, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72569 at *18 (D. Conn. May 24,

2012).

Misuse and Alteration

A manufacturer of a product is not liable for harm that would not have occurred

but for a third party’s alteration or modification of the product in question. CONN. GEN.

STAT. § 52-572p (2014). The defense does not apply when the alteration or modification:

(1) was in accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions or specifications; (2) was

made with the manufacturer’s consent; or (3) was the result of conduct that the

manufacturer reasonably should have anticipated. Id.; Potter v. Chi. Pneumatic Tool Co.,

241 Conn. 199, 229, 694 A.2d 1319 (1997). The misuse and alteration defense is not an

absolute defense to a plaintiff’s claim under the Product Liability Act, but it is part of the

plaintiff’s prima facie case of proving that a particular product reached the consumer or

user without substantial change in the condition in which it was sold. Potter, 241 Conn.

at 230. A manufacturer of a defective product is relieved of liability under the Product

Liability Act based on misuse or alternation only if the misuse or alteration was the sole

proximate cause of the claimant’s harm. Id.

It is incumbent on a product seller to invoke the defense of misuse or alteration

and to produce evidence that such misuse or alteration was the sole proximate cause of

the harm suffered. If the defendant does so, then the plaintiff must disprove the alleged

substantial change. If the plaintiff is able to establish that the harm for which recovery is

sought would have occurred notwithstanding the alteration or misuse, recovery is still

permitted under the Product Liability Act. Potter, 241 Conn. at 237. Alternatively, the

plaintiff must establish that the alteration or modification: (1) was in accordance with the

manufacturer's instructions or specifications; (2) was made with the manufacturer's

consent; or (3) was the result of conduct that the manufacturer reasonably should have

anticipated. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572p (2014); Potter 241 Conn. at 237.

Post-Accident Improvements v. Subsequent Remedial Measures

In general, “evidence of measures taken after an event, which if taken before the

event would have made injury or damage less likely to result, is inadmissible to prove

negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the event. Evidence of those measures

is admissible when offered to prove controverted issues such as ownership, control or

feasibility or precautionary measures.” CONN. CODE EVID. § 4-7(a). An exception exists,

however, in product liability actions. In a strict product liability action, evidence of

36

subsequent remedial measures is admissible. Id. at § 4-7(b); Wagner v. Clark Equip. Co.,

243 Conn. 168, 194-95, 700 A.2d 38 (1997). “Subsequent change evidence may be

highly probative of defectiveness because it provides a safer alternative against which to

compare the allegedly defective product.” Wagner, 243 Conn. at 195. Evidence of post-

accident modifications to a product by a third-party employer of an injured claimant may

be relevant to the issue of feasibility in a product liability defective design case. Potter v.

Chi. Pneumatic Tool Co., 241 Conn. 199, 220-21, 694 A.2d 1319 (1997); Wagner, 243

Conn. at 198-99.

Preemption

A product liability defendant may assert that a cause of action under the

Connecticut Product Liability Act is preempted by federal legislation. See Mullin v.

Guidant Corp., 114 Conn. App. 279, 970 A.2d 733 (2009) (holding that plaintiff’s claim

under the Connecticut Product Liability Act was preempted by the Medical Device

Amendments Act of 1976, 21 U.S.C.A. § 360c et seq.).

State of the Art Defenses

A state of the art defense is properly recognized when the alleged defect in a

product arises from a failure to warn. Wegryn v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., CV075013243S,

2008 Conn. Super. LEXIS 587, *14 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2008). A product manufacturer’s

duty to warn of the alleged dangerous propensities of its product is dependent upon the

state of the knowledge concerning the product at the time that the breach of duty is

alleged to have occurred. Tomer v. Am. Home Products Corp., 170 Conn. 681, 687, 368

A.2d 35 (1976). A product manufacturer cannot be held to standards which exceed the

limits of scientific advances at the time of the allegedly tortious conduct.

Id. at 687.

Warnings and Labels/Post-Sale Duty

The Connecticut Product Liability Act provides that a product seller may be liable

under the Act if the injured claimant proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the

product was defective in that adequate warnings or instructions were not provided.

CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572q(a) (2014). “In determining whether instructions or

warnings were required and, if required, whether they were adequate, the trier of fact may

consider: (1) the likelihood that the product would cause the harm suffered by the

claimant; (2) the ability of the product seller to anticipate at the time of manufacture that

the expected product user would be aware of the product risk, and the nature of the

potential harm; and (3) the technological feasibility and cost of warnings and

instructions.” CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572q(b) (2014). A product seller is subject to

liability under the Act for a product that may be defective because the manufacturer or

seller failed to warn of the product’s unreasonably dangerous propensities. Under such

circumstances, the failure to warn, by itself, constitutes the defect. Moran v. E. Equip.

Sales, Inc., 76 Conn. App. 137, 148, 818 A.2d 848 (2003). The term "unreasonably

dangerous" with respect to a product liability claim means that the product "sold must be

37

dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the

ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the

community as to its [characteristics]." Potter v. Chi. Pneumatic Tool Co., 241 Conn. 199,

214-15, 694 A.2d 1319 (1997). If a supplier is aware of its purchaser’s knowledge and

sophistication with respect to the product, the supplier reasonably may choose not to

issue warnings. Sharp v. Wyatt, Inc., 31 Conn. App. 824, 848, 627 A.2d 1347 (1993).

Warranty

The Connecticut Product Liability Act provides the exclusive remedy against a

product seller for harm caused by a defective product, including any claim of breach of

express warranty or implied warranty. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572n (2014). A product

liability claim is defined broadly to include, but not be limited to, all actions based breach

of warranty, express or implied. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572m(b) (2014). A plaintiff need

not establish privity with the product seller in order to recover in warranty under the

Product Liability Act. Rosenthal v. Ford Motor Co., 462 F. Supp. 2d 296, 308 (D. Conn.

2006); Potter v. Chi. Pneumatic Tool Co., 241 Conn. 199, 211 (1997); Moran v. E. Equip.

Sales, Inc., 76 Conn. App. 137, 144, 818 A.2d 848 (2003). If a particular injury is not

caused by a defective product or a party is not pursuing a claim for personal injury, property

damage or wrongful death, then the product liability act does not bar such claim. The

product liability act does not cover damages for commercial loss between commercial

parties. If a claim involves commercial loss between commercial parties that is not covered

by the product liability act, a separate action for breach of express or implied warranty is

permitted.

38

PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY

A) Admissibility of Administrative Agency Investigations

A trial court may admit administrative agency findings within the court’s

discretion, although subject to objections re: hearsay, undue prejudice and invasion of

exclusive province of the jury. Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)-(c) provide an exception

to the hearsay rule for government reports. The Connecticut Code of Evidence used in

State Court provides similar authority in Rule 8-3(7) for admission of public records and

reports – with three distinct requirements for admissibility: (a) a record made by a public

official under a duty to make it, (b) the report or record was made in the course of his

official duties, and (c) the official or person with a duty to transmit information had

personal knowledge of the matter contained in the report.

B) Applicability of Statutorily Based Fraud Claims

Fraud – Unfair Trade Practices

Generally a claim against an attorney for an unfair trade practice in violation of the

Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA) Sec. 42-110a, et seq. (2014) must be

based only on the entrepreneurial aspects of the practice of law. Malpractice does not fall

under CUTPA. Entrepreneurial aspects of a law practice involve solicitation of business

and billing practices as opposed to representational aspects of legal procedure. See

Anderson v. Schoenhorn, 89 Conn. App. 666, 674, 874 A.2d 798 (2005).

Misrepresentations about the intention to represent the client or about a firm’s size or

expertise support a CUTPA claim. Stevenson v. McMillan, 38 Conn. L. Rptr. 788, 2005

Conn. Super, Lexis 500; Nosik v. Bowman, CV000379089, 2002 Conn. Super. Lexis 2301

(July 12, 2002).

Fraud Cases

Connecticut law provides relief to a creditor under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer

Act (UFTA), Sec. 52-552a-5521 and CUTPA. An attorney may not be held liable under

CUTPA even for intentional conduct provided the attorney was representing his client.

Suffield Dev. Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Nat’l Loan Investors L.P., 260 Conn. 766, 784, 802

A.2d 44 (2002). Similarly, a district court has held there is no Connecticut authority for a

cause of action against an attorney for aiding a fraudulent transfer. Nastro v. D’Onofrio,

263 F. Supp. 2d 446 (D. Conn. 2003).

C) Conditions Precedent to Malpractice Actions

In an attorney malpractice action, the plaintiff must establish (1) the existence of

an attorney client relationship, (2) the attorney’s wrongful act or omission, (3) causation,

and (4) damages. Mayer v. Biafore Floreto & O’Neill, 245 Conn. 88, 92 (1998). A plaintiff

may plead both negligence and contract claims but contract claims may not simply repeat

39

negligence claims by “talismanically invoking contract language in a complaint.” Gazo v.

Stamford, 255 Conn. 245, 262 (2001). A contract claim should allege specific actions a

lawyer promised to take and did not complete.

To prevail, the plaintiff, as a general rule in a malpractice action, must present

expert testimony to establish the standard of professional care or skill. Davis v. Margolis,

215 Conn. 408, 416, 576 A.2d 489 (1990). An expert on the standard of care is also

required on a malpractice claim styled as a claim of breach of fiduciary duty against an

attorney. Marciano v. Kraner, 126 Conn. App. 171, appeal denied, 300 Conn. 922 (2011).

An exception to the rule applies when the failure or neglect is clear even to a lay person,

such as failing to do anything to represent a client’s interest. See Paul v. Gordon, 58 Conn.

App. 724, 727, 754 A.2d 851 (2000); Pagan v. Gonzalez, 113 Conn. App. 135, 141, 965

A.2d 582 (2009). In a non-jury case tried by a judge, an expert may not be required because

a judge knows generally about the practice of law before the court. Dubreuil v. Witt, 80

Conn. App. 410-421-422, affirmed, 271 Conn. 782 (2004).

By statute, § 52-190(a), a medical malpractice complaint must include a certificate

of merit/good faith opinion letter signed by a similar health care provider. The standard of

detail of the good faith opinion is set forth in Wilcox v. Schwartz, 303 Conn. 630 (2012).

D) Emotional Distress Recovery in Legal Malpractice Claims

Connecticut recognizes two forms of claims relating to emotional distress: (1)

negligent infliction of emotional distress; and (2) intentional infliction of emotional

distress.

Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

To prevail on a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff must

prove (1) the defendant’s conduct created an unreasonable risk of emotional distress; (2)

the distress was foreseeable; (3) the distress was severe enough that it might result in illness

or bodily harm; and (4) the defendant’s conduct was the cause of plaintiff’s distress.

Claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress have been allowed against attorneys

by prior clients and in one case even against opposing counsel. Stone v. Pattis, et al., No.

FST CV09-5011515-S, 2010 Conn. Super Lexis 991 (April 21, 2010). The court in each

case will generally decide on a motion to strike whether the elements of the cause of action

have been plead.

Intentional infliction of emotional distress requires (1) the intention to inflict

emotional distress or that the defendant knew or should have known that emotional distress

was the likely result of his conduct; (2) that the conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3)

causation; and (4) that the distress sustained was severe. The test for whether an act is

extreme and outrageous is initially for the court to decide. The conduct must be so

outrageous in character and so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of

40

decency and be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.

Carroll v. Allstate Ins. Co., 262 Conn. 433, 443, 815 A.2d 119 (2003).

A majority of superior court decisions hold that the allegations of a cause of action

for legal malpractice are not extreme and outrageous. See Corley v. Watstein, et al., No.

CV106009242, 2012 Conn. Super. Lexis 909 (2012) for discussion of state court decisions.

Since this is a case by case analysis if extreme and outrageous conduct intended to cause

harm and resulting in extreme or severe injury is alleged, the claim may survive initial

motion practice. See Peebles v. Ayres, No. CV-10-6006879-S, Conn. Super. Lexis 3299

(December 29, 2011).

E) Judicial Immunity Doctrine and Litigation Privilege

The doctrine of absolute immunity is also known in Connecticut as the litigation

privilege. As set forth in Petyan v. Ellis, 200 Conn. 243, 245, 510 A.2d 1337 (1986) the

law of lawyer immunity from civil process is essentially absolute. The immunity from

liability applies to allegedly defamatory communications in the course of the judicial

proceeding. Mazzochi v. Beck, 204 Conn. 490, 497, 529 A.2d 171 (1987). The rule has

been applied to claims of fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress against

counsel. See Simmons v. Seaman, et al., 129 Conn. App. 651(2011), aff’d 308 Conn. 523

(2013).

The absolute immunity does not attach to pleadings that form the basis for the tort

of vexatious litigation.

F) Malicious Prosecution Claims and Vexatious Suit Actions

In Connecticut, the causes of action for malicious prosecution and vexatious suit

are essentially identical with reference to claims arising from prior civil lawsuits. The

essential elements of the common law tort are (1) want of probable cause, (2) malice, and

(3) a termination of the suit in the new plaintiff’s favor. OSP, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Surety

Co., 256 Conn. 343, 361, 773 A.2d 906 (2001). A withdrawal of the prior action without

consideration or settlement is a termination in favor of the new plaintiff. DeLaurentis v.

New Haven, 220 Conn. 225, 250, 597 A.2d 807 (1991).

The statutory claim for vexatious litigation is set forth in § 52-568 and provides for

double damages if the prior action was without probable cause or treble damages if also

with malicious intent to unjustly vex and trouble another person. Accordingly, the

elements of common law claims of vexatious suit and statutory actions are nearly identical.

An action for vexatious suit may be based on a prior administrative action or complaint

terminated in favor of the new plaintiff. A separate statute, § 52-568a allows an action for

damages for a groundless suit against an owner or operator of a pick or cut-your-own

agricultural operation.

41

An action for malicious prosecution ordinarily implies a prior criminal complaint

and requires proof of want of probable cause, malice and termination of the underlying

matter in plaintiff’s favor. A plea or agreement to a program of pretrial relief, such as

accelerated rehabilitation, is not a termination in favor of the new plaintiff.

Actions for vexatious suit or malicious prosecution may be brought against an

attorney. The same requirements re want of probable cause apply to such an action. Suits

which all reasonable lawyers agree totally lack merit – that is those which lack probable

cause – are the least meritorious of all meritless suits. Only this subgroup of meritless suits

presents no probable cause. Falls Church Group v. Tyler Cooper & Alcorn, 89 Conn. App.

459, 473-74 (2005), aff’d, 281 Conn. 84, 912 A.2d 1019 (2007).

G) Abuse of Process Claim

It is an abuse of process when a lawyer or person uses a legal process in an improper

manner or to accomplish a purpose for which it was not designed. The use must be

primarily to accomplish a purpose for which it is not designed. Suffield Dev. Assocs. Ltd.

v. Nat’l Loan Investors L.P., 260 Conn. 766, 772-73, 802 A.2d 44 (2002).

An attorney who uses the legal system for an improper purpose may be liable for

damages under this cause of action.

H) Recourse Available to Professionals Wrongly Accused of Malpractice Claim

The professional wrongly accused of malpractice such as a physician, attorney or

other professional has the remedies for vexatious suit under the common law for damages

or under the statute for double or treble damages (§ 52-568) and possibly an action for

abuse of process. See Section (F) and (G) above. An action for defamation or if an untrue

statement is made in writing, a claim for libel, may be available for statements made by a

claimant outside of the litigation and not in the context of administrative complaints or

grievance claims which are protected by privilege.

I) Use of Expert Testimony

Opinions and expert testimony under the Connecticut Code of Evidence are

controlled by Rule 7-2, 7-3 and 7-4. A witness is qualified as an expert by knowledge,

skill, experience, training, education or otherwise concerning scientific, technical or other

specialized knowledge (7-2). The testimony must assist the trier of fact on a matter at

issue. The trier of fact must first determine that the evidence is reliable. State v. Porter,

241 Conn. 57, cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1058, 118 S. Ct. 1384, 140 L.Ed 2d 645 (1998).

Porter applies a similar approach to the Daubert case law federal approach. The

Connecticut Code of Evidence took no position on the Kumho Tire federal policy regarding

the expansion of the trial court gatekeeping function.

42

Rule 7-3 deals with the offer of an opinion on the ultimate issue and Rule 7-4

provide for testimony in the form of an opinion after a proper factual foundation. The use

of hypothetical questions is permitted under 7-4(c) if the question presents essential facts

relating to the case.

J) Third Party Liability for Legal Malpractice

Connecticut law severely limits claims by non-clients for legal malpractice against

an attorney who represented another party. See Krawczyk v. Stingle, 208 Conn. 239 (1988).

There the Supreme Court rejected a claim against an attorney by likely beneficiaries of an

unexecuted will because liability would “not comport with a lawyer’s duty of undivided

liability to the client.” See also Gould v. Mellick & Sexton, 263 Conn. 140, 819 A.2d 216

(2003) – limited partners could not sue law firm representing the limited partnership. The

claim may exist in certain limited circumstances based on a theory of third party

beneficiaries of legal services in the practice area of estate planning in the case of an

executed will. Connecticut law requires all of the following factors to be considered: (1)

whether the primary or direct purpose of the transaction was to benefit a third party, (2)

foreseeability of harm, (3) the proximity of the injury to the conduct complained of, (4) the

policy of preventing future harm, and (5) the burden on the legal profession from the

imposition of liability. The last factor is the most difficult for a third party beneficiary

plaintiff to overcome. See Krawczyk, 208 Conn. at 239.

In a case involving a will already executed, the Connecticut Supreme Court held a

lawyer could be liable to an intended beneficiary of the will. Stowe v. Smith, 184 Conn.

194 (1981). The case law following the Connecticut Supreme Court decision in Krawczyk

v. Stingle, has repeatedly rejected claims of malpractice liability by third party beneficiaries

of transactions handled by attorneys for specific clients.

This Compendium outline contains a brief overview of certain laws concerning

various litigation and legal topics. The compendium provides a simple synopsis of

current law and is not intended to explore lengthy analysis of legal issues. This

compendium is provided for general information and educational purposes only. It

does not solicit, establish, or continue an attorney-client relationship with any

attorney or law firm identified as an author, editor or contributor. The contents

should not be construed as legal advice or opinion. While every effort has been made

to be accurate, the contents should not be relied upon in any specific factual situation.

These materials are not intended to provide legal advice or to cover all laws or

regulations that may be applicable to a specific factual situation. If you have matters

or questions to be resolved for which legal advice may be indicated, you are

encouraged to contact a lawyer authorized to practice law in the state for which you

are investigating and/or seeking legal advice.