MAINESUPREMEJUDICIALCOURT ReporterofDecisionsDecision: 2016ME126Docket: Ken-15-519Argued: June8,2016 Decided: August11,2016Panel: SAUFLEY,C.J.,andALEXANDER,MEAD,GORMAN,JABAR,HJELM,andHUMPHREY,JJ.

STATEOFMAINEv.

FRANKLINF.ARBOURJR.HUMPHREY,J.

[¶1] Franklin Arbour Jr. appeals from a judgment of conviction for

multiple drug offenses entered by the Superior Court (Kennebec County,

E.Walker, J.) following a jury trial. He contends that (1) the court erredby

denyinghismotiontosuppressevidenceseizedpursuanttoasearchwarrant;

(2)thecourterredbydenyinghismotiontosuppressastatementhemadeto

a police officer before receivingMiranda warnings; and (3) the evidence of

drugquantityattrialwasinsufficienttosupporthisconvictionforaggravated

traffickingofheroin.1Weaffirmthejudgment.

1Weareunpersuadedby,anddonotdiscussfurther,Arbour’sclaimsthattheevidenceattrial

wasotherwiseinsufficienttosupporthisconvictions,thatthecourterroneouslyinstructedthejury,andthatheisentitledtoanewtrialduetoprosecutorialmisconduct.

2

I.BACKGROUND

A. SearchWarrant

[¶2]OnSeptember17,2014,Augustapolicesoughtasearchwarrantto

conductasearchatanapartmentlocatedat58RiverStreetinAugusta.Inthe

affidavit accompanying the request for a searchwarrant,DetectiveEricDos

Santosofferedthefollowingfacts. HehadrecentlyarrestedJohnHowardon

outstanding warrants and for a probation violation. While Howard was

detainedatthecountyjailonaprobationviolationhold,heagreedtoprovide

information regarding stolen tools found in his vehicle and other criminal

activity;thedetectivearrangedtohavetheprobationholdliftedandHoward

released.HowardtoldthedetectivethathehadsoldstolentoolsforArbour;

thatArboursoldstolenmerchandiseoutofhis residenceon the top floorof

58River Street; that Howard had made multiple trips for Arbour from the

apartment to sell or pawn stolen tools in Maine, New Hampshire, and

Massachusetts;andthathewouldreceivegasmoneyandheroinfromArbour

inexchangeforsellingthetoolsforhim.Howardalsotoldthedetectivethat

hewould buyheroin fromArbour for his ownuse, and thatArbour usually

had“acoupleofbundles”ofheroin—meaningatleasttwentybagsofheroin—

inhisapartmentatanygiventime.Howardalsodescribedanaircompressor

3

that he had seen at Arbour’s apartment on his most recent visit, which

DetectiveDosSantosnotedmatchedthedescriptionofacompressorthatwas

recentlyreportedstoleninAugusta.Finally,Howardprovidedahand-drawn

mapofArbour’sapartmentandindicatedthatnotonlyweretherestolentools

in the apartment, but there was also a marijuana grow operation in the

adjoining attic. The detective confirmed through a police database that

Howard had sold tools to pawn shops in Maine, New Hampshire, and

Massachusetts. The court (Augusta, E. Walker, J.) issued a search warrant

authorizing, inter alia, a search of the apartment and the seizure of heroin,

marijuana,otherscheduleddrugs,andtools.2

B. ExecutionoftheSearchWarrantandArbour’sArrest

[¶3] Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, the

evidenceattrialestablishesthefollowingfacts.Statev.Robinson,2016ME24,

¶2,134A.3d828. OnSeptember17,2014,officerswiththeAugustaPolice

Department and the Maine Drug Enforcement Agency executed the search

warrant at the top floor apartment at58River Street,whichwasknownby

policetobetheresidenceofArbourandhisgirlfriend,AngieSousa.Whenlaw

enforcement arrived to execute the warrant, Sousa was the only person

2Theatticwasnotspecificallydescribedinthewarrant,butthisissuewasnotraisedbeforethesuppressioncourtoronappeal.

4

presentintheapartment.Atsomepoint,Arbourshowedupattheapartment

withoutbeingcontactedbylawenforcement3andspokewithDetectiveJason

Cote,whowas in theapartment’sentryarea. ArbourtoldCoteto“goahead

andarrestmenow”andstated thathisgirlfriend,Sousa, “hadnothing todo

withit.”4 CoteplacedArbourunderarrestandnotifiedDosSantos,whowas

searching the attic at the time. Both detectives transported Arbour to the

Augusta Police Department. At the police department and before receiving

Miranda warnings, Arbour made an incriminating statement, which was

recordedbyaninterviewroomcamera.

[¶4] During the search, the police found 114 marijuana plants and

approximately twenty-five pounds of processedmarijuana in the apartment

andtheadjoiningattic.Intheonlyroombeingusedasabedroom,thepolice

foundseveralitemsthatwouldlikelybeusedbyaman,aswellasadebitcard

inArbour’sname, in thenightstandon the left-hand sideof thebed. In the

samearea,thepolicealsofoundathermos,whichcontained,relevanttothis

3EvidencepresentedatthehearingonArbour’smotiontosuppressastatementhelatermade

at thepolicedepartmentestablished that thepoliceallowedSousa to leave theapartmentbeforeArbourshowedup.Sousawaslaterarrestedandchargedwithadrugoffense.

4AtthehearingonArbour’smotiontosuppresshislaterstatement,Cotetestifiedthat,withoutprompting, Arbour told him to “go ahead and arrest me now” and stated, “[my] girlfriend hadnothingtodowiththis.”

5

appeal,1,252packetsofwhatthepolicebelievedtobeheroinandasandwich

bagcontainingwhatappearedtobecocainebase.5

C. Charges

[¶5] On November 14, 2014, a grand jury returned an eight-count

indictmentchargingArbourwiththefollowing:

• Aggravated trafficking of scheduled drugs (heroin) (Class A),17-AM.R.S.§1105-A(1)(H)(2015);

• Aggravatedtraffickingofscheduleddrugs(heroin)withapriorconviction(ClassA),17-AM.R.S.§1105-A(1)(B)(1)(2015);

• Aggravated trafficking of scheduled drugs (cocaine/cocainebase) with a prior conviction (Class A), 17-A M.R.S.§1105-A(1)(B)(1);

• Unlawfultraffickinginscheduleddrugs(cocaine/cocainebase)(ClassB),17-AM.R.S.§1103(1-A)(A)(2015);

• Unlawful trafficking inscheduleddrugs(marijuana)(ClassC),17-AM.R.S.§1103(1-A)(F)(2015);

• Aggravated cultivating of marijuana (Class B), 17-A M.R.S.§1105-D(1)(A)(2)(2015);

• Unlawful possession of scheduled drugs (cocaine base)(ClassB),17-AM.R.S.§1107-A(1)(A)(2)(2014);6and

• Unlawful possession of scheduled drugs (heroin) (Class C),17-AM.R.S.§1107-A(1)(B)(1)(2014).

Arbour pleaded not guilty to all charges at his arraignment on

November25,2014.

5 The thermos also contained approximately 11.7 grams of bk-MDEA (“bath salts”), and the

policefoundstolentoolsthroughouttheapartment.

6 Subsections1107-A(1)(A)and(B)havesincebeenamended. SeeP.L.2015,ch.308,§§1,2;P.L.2015,ch.346,§6(effectiveOct.15,2015).

6

D. MotiontoSuppressEvidenceSeizedfromApartment

[¶6]Arbourmovedtosuppressallevidenceseizedfromtheapartment,

andhelaterfiledasupplementalmotionforaFrankshearingpertainingtothe

searchwarrantaffidavit.SeeFranksv.Delaware,438U.S.154,155-56(1978).

A hearing was held on May 26, 2015, and the court (KennebecCounty,

Murphy,J.)deniedbothmotions.7Initsruling,thecourtfoundthattherewas

a substantialbasis for the findingofprobable cause supporting thewarrant

because (1) the information provided byHoward as related in the affidavit

was very specific; (2) Howard demonstrated a base of knowledge from his

criminalexploitswithArbour;(3)Howard’scredibilitywassupportedbyhis

statementsagainstpenalinterestregardinghisuseandpossessionofheroin;

and(4)hiscredibilitywasfurtherbolsteredbythecorroboratinginformation

regardinghissellingof toolsandhisdescriptionofanaircompressor in the

apartment.

7ThecourtdeniedthemotionforaFrankshearingbecauseitfoundthatthesearchwarrantwas

supported by probable cause evenwithout considering the statement in the affidavit thatwouldhave been the subject of theFranks hearing. See State v. Torrey, 1998ME5, ¶ 4, 704A.2d 397.Arbourdoesnotchallengethisaspectofthecourt’sdecisiononthisappeal.

7

E. MotiontoSuppressStatementatPoliceDepartment

[¶7] Arbour also moved to suppress a statement he made in the

interviewroomatthepolicedepartmentbeforereceivingMirandawarnings.

On July 23, 2015, the court held a testimonial hearing on the motion.

DetectivesCoteandDosSantostestified,andthecourtwatchedtheinterview

room video. In an order dated July 24, 2015, the court (Augusta,Fowle, J.)

deniedArbour’smotion.

[¶8]Thecourtfoundthefollowingfacts,whicharesupportedbyrecord

evidence. SeeStatev.Lovett,2015ME7,¶3,109A.3d1135. Atsomepoint

between the timewhenArbourwasarrestedat theapartmentandwhenhe

made the statement in question at the police department, Dos Santos was

informed that Arbour had asked to be arrested upon his arrival at the

apartment.AfterArbourwastakentothepolicedepartment,hewasputinan

interview room. Hewas alone in the room for approximately twominutes,

handcuffedbehindhisback.DetectiveDosSantosenteredtheroomandspent

lessthantwominutes“describingwhathadoccurredthatday,”includingthat

Sousa,Arbour’sgirlfriend,hadbeenarrestedandchargedwithdrugoffenses.

8

Arbourthenstated,“Shehadnothingtodowithit.It’sallme.”8Atthatpoint,

thedetectiveinstructedArbourtonotmakeanyfurtherstatements, finished

explaining what had occurred that day, and then provided him with the

warningsrequiredbyMirandav.Arizona,384U.S.436(1966). AfterArbour

invokedhisrighttoremainsilent,thedetectiveterminatedtheinteraction.

[¶9] Based on its findings, the court concluded that Arbour was not

subjected to custodial interrogation at the time he made his incriminating

statementbecause“theactionsofDetectiveDosSantosinproviding[Arbour]

withasummaryoftheevidenceagainsthim,andinformationastothestatus

ofMs.Sousa,[doesnot]constitut[e]astatementreasonablylikelytoelicitan

incriminatingresponse,norwassuchastatementcalculatedtodoso.”

F. Trial

[¶10]Atwo-daytrialcommencedonAugust24,2015.Thejuryviewed

therelevantportionoftheinterviewroomvideo.Arbourpresentedevidence

tosuggestthatheandSousaweremerelyhousesittingattheapartmentforan

incarceratedfriend,thatmultiplepeoplehadaccesstotheapartment,andthat

hewasnotresponsible for thedrugs. Hemoved fora judgmentofacquittal

8AlthoughthecourtfoundthatArbourhadstated,“Shehadnothingtodowithit,”or“Shehad

nothingtodowiththis,”thevideoappearstoshowthatArbouractuallysaid,“Shehadnothingtodowithanyofit.”Foraccuracy,weusethelatterversionintheremainderofthisopinion.

9

basedoninsufficiencyoftheevidenceatthecloseoftheState’scase-in-chief

and again at the close of trial. The court (Kennebec County, E. Walker,J.)

denied both motions. Six counts went to the jury,9 and the jury returned

verdictsofguiltyonallcounts.Arbourmovedforajudgmentofacquittalora

new trial, and the court denied the motion after a hearing on

October14,2015.ThecourtsentencedArbourtotwenty-fiveyearsinjailon

Count 1, with all but eighteen years suspended, and four years’ probation,

withconcurrentsentencesonallothercharges.Arbourtimelyappealedtous

fromboththeconvictionandhissentence.10

II.DISCUSSION

A. MotiontoSuppressEvidenceSeizedfromApartment

[¶11]Arbourfirstcontendsthatthecourterredbydenyinghismotion

to suppress evidencebecause the affidavit in support of the searchwarrant

did not establish probable cause. Specifically, he argues that the affidavit

“fail[ed]tosetforthsufficientinformationestablishing[Howard]’sveracityor

reliability.”

9 Arbour stipulated to the prior conviction alleged in Counts 2 and3 of the indictment. The

court,withagreementof theparties, consolidatedCounts1 and2of the indictment intoa singlecountandCounts3and4intoasecondcounttosubmittothejury.

10 The Sentence Review Panel denied Arbour’s request for leave to appeal his sentence onDecember17,2015.

10

[¶12] We “reviewdirectly the findingof probable causemadeby the

[judge] who issued the warrant, affording great deference to the issuing

[judge],” State v.Wright, 2006ME 13, ¶ 8, 890 A.2d 703, andwe “draw all

reasonable inferences from the affidavit to support the finding of probable

cause. . .limit[ing]ourinquirytowhetherthereisasubstantialbasisforthe

findingofprobablecauseunderthetotalityofthecircumstancestest,”Statev.

Estabrook,2007ME130,¶5,932A.2d549.Pursuanttothattest,“[p]robable

causeisestablishedwhen,givenallthecircumstancessetforthintheaffidavit

before [the judge], including theveracityandbasisofknowledgeofpersons

supplyinghearsay information, there isa fairprobability thatcontrabandor

evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” State v. Rabon,

2007ME 113, ¶ 22, 930 A.2d 268 (quotation marks omitted). “When a

warrant affidavit reports information provided by an informant . . . the

totality-of-the-circumstancesapproachpermitsabalancedassessmentof the

relative weights of all the various indicia of reliability (and unreliability)

attending[the]informant’stip.”Id.¶23(quotationmarksomitted).

[¶13] Aninformant’sassertions,ontheirown,mayestablishprobable

cause if the affidavit demonstrates the informant’s reliability or basis of

knowledge,suchasfirsthandobservationofcontrabandorillegalactivity.See

11

id.¶24;seealsoUnitedStatesv.Taylor,985F.2d3,6(1stCir.1993)(“[T]he

affidavit may disclose an adequate basis for evaluating the informant’s

veracity through the very specificity and detail with which it relates the

informant’s first-handdescriptionoftheplacetobesearchedortheitemsto

beseized.”).Inaddition,aninformant’scredibilityisbolsterediftheaffidavit

containsstatementsagainsthisorherpenalinterest,eveniftheinformantis

from the “criminal milieu.” See Rabon, 2007ME113, ¶28, 930 A.2d 268

(quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Appleton, 297 A.2d 363, 369

(Me.1972). Even without sufficient information about the informant, an

informant’sassertionscanstillsupportprobablecauseiftheaffidavitcontains

“something more,” such as corroboration by outside sources. Rabon,

2007ME113,¶¶29-30,930A.2d268(quotationmarksomitted).

[¶14]Inthiscase,theaffidavit(1)provideddetailedinformationabout

the named informant, Howard, and explained how he had come to directly

observe contraband in the apartment; and (2) noted that Howard had

provided highly specific information, including a hand-drawn map of the

apartment. The affidavit also contained statements by Howard against his

penal interest. Furthermore, the police corroborated Howard’s assertions

thathehadpawnedorsoldtoolsashedescribedandthathehadobserveda

12

possibly stolen air compressor in the apartment. In these ways, this case

differs from Rabon, in which we concluded that the affidavit provided

insufficient information about the informant and that the police had only

corroborated “readily available information” that did not “show that the

tipster has knowledge of concealed criminal activity,” 2007 ME 113, ¶ 34,

930A.2d 268 (quotation marks omitted); unlike the informant in Rabon,

Howardprovided“insideinformation”aboutcriminalactivityandcontraband

intheapartment.Seeid.(quotationmarksomitted).

[¶15] The fact that the affidavit contains information that Howard’s

criminal history involves convictions for crimes of dishonesty, and that the

policearrangedforHowardtobereleasedfromincarcerationonaprobation

hold before he provided them with information, may be considered when

conducting the “balanced assessment” of the factors supporting or

undercutting the informant’s tip. See id. ¶ 23 (quotation marks omitted).

However, given the information in the affidavit unrelated to Howard,11 and

thedeference thatmust be shown to the judgewho issued thewarrant, see

11 InadditiontorecountingtheinformationprovidedbyHoward,theaffidavitstatedthatDos

SantoshadlookedupArbour’scriminalrecordandfoundthathehadpreviouslybeenconvictedofdrugcrimesanddealing instolenproperty,amongotheroffenses. “Anaffiant’sknowledgeof thetarget’spriorcriminalactivityor recordclearly ismaterial to theprobablecausedetermination.”UnitedStatesv.Taylor,985F.2d3,6(1stCir.1993);seealsoStatev.Gallant,531A.2d1282,1284(Me.1987)(consideringatarget’spriorconvictionfordrugtraffickinginassessingwhethertherewasprobablecauseforasearchwarrant).

13

Wright, 2006ME 13, ¶ 8, 890 A.2d 703, Howard’s criminal history and the

benefithereceivedfromthepolicedonotnegateprobablecause.

[¶16]Weconcludethattherewasasubstantialbasisforthefindingof

probablecausetoissuethesearchwarrantandthatthesuppressioncourtdid

noterrbydenyingArbour’smotiontosuppresstheevidenceseizedfromthe

apartment.12

B. MotiontoSuppressStatementatPoliceDepartment

[¶17]Arbournextcontendsthatthecourterredbydenyinghismotion

tosuppresshisstatementthatSousa“hadnothingtodowithanyofit,it’sall

me,”whichhemade toDosSantosat theAugustaPoliceDepartmentbefore

receiving Miranda warnings. He argues in part that he was subjected to

interrogationatthetimehemadethestatementbecausethedetectiveknew

that, by providing Arbourwith information about the evidence against him

and the charges against Sousa, he was likely to elicit an incriminating

response based on the fact that Arbour had alreadymade an incriminating

statementattheapartment.13

12 Becauseweconcludethattherewasasubstantialbasis forthefindingofprobablecauseto

issuethesearchwarrant,wedonotconsidertheState’salternative“goodfaith”argument.13 ArbourdoesnotdirectlyarguethatthedetectivewastryingtoplayuponArbour’spersonal

relationship with Sousa. Arbour’s contention that the “highly custodial environment” of theinterview roomshould factor intoour analysis in this case isnot supported. SeeRhode Island v.

14

[¶18] We review the court’s factual findings for clear error and “the

ultimate determination ofwhether the statement should be suppressed” de

novo. State v. Bragg, 2012 ME 102, ¶ 8, 48 A.3d 769 (quotation marks

omitted).TheStateconcedesthatArbourwasincustodyatthetimehemade

thestatement,andthebasicfactsarenotindispute.Therefore,wemustonly

considerwhetherthecourterredbyconcludingthatArbourwasnotsubject

tointerrogationatthetimehemadethestatementatissue.

[¶19] “Apersonsubject to interrogationwhile inpolicecustodymust

firstbegivenaMirandawarning,otherwisestatementsmadeinthecourseof

the interrogation will not be admissible against that person.” State v.

Holloway, 2000ME 172, ¶ 13, 760 A.2d 223. Interrogation, in this context,

“refersnotonly to expressquestioning,but also to anywordsor actionson

the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and

custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an

incriminatingresponsefromthesuspect.”RhodeIslandv.Innis,446U.S.291,

301(1980).14“Thetestfordeterminingwhetherapoliceofficer’sstatementis

Innis, 446U.S. 291, 300 (1980) (“‘Interrogation,’ as conceptualized in theMiranda opinion,mustreflectameasureofcompulsionaboveandbeyondthatinherentincustodyitself.”).

14 AlthoughDosSantos testifiedat thesuppressionhearingthat it ishispractice to informanarresteeofthechargesandevidenceagainsthimorher,hisstatementstoArbourlikelywerenotcommunications “normally attendant to arrest and custody,” which always fall outside thedefinitionof“interrogation”forpurposesofMiranda,Innis,446U.S.at301,suchas“[b]rief,routine

15

the functional equivalent of interrogation reasonably likely to elicit an

incriminatingresponseisanobjectiveone.”Statev.Smith,612A.2d231,233

(Me.1992). “Officersdonot interrogatea suspect simplybyhoping thathe

will incriminate himself,” and ordinarily, there is no interrogation in the

absenceofdirectquestioningunlessthedefendantissubjectedto“compelling

influences [or] psychological ploys.” Arizona v. Mauro, 481U.S.520, 529

(1987).Theoverridingconsideration“[i]ndecidingwhetherparticularpolice

conduct is interrogation [is] preventing government officials fromusing the

coercivenatureofconfinementtoextractconfessionsthatwouldnotbegiven

inanunrestrainedenvironment.”Id.at529-30.

[¶20] We have specifically recognized that the “Innis definition of

interrogation is not so broad as to capture within Miranda’s reach all

declaratorystatementsbypoliceofficersconcerningthenatureofthecharges

againstthesuspectandtheevidencerelatingtothosecharges.” Bragg,2012

ME102,¶16,48A.3d769(quotationmarksomitted). InBragg,aftertaking

an intoxilyzer test and being informed that her results were over the legal

limit, the defendant “responded [to the police officer] that she had thought

whensheorderedthesecondmargaritaatdinneritwasprobablyabadidea.” questionsposedtoasuspectduring‘booking’procedures,”Statev.Estes,418A.2d1108,1111(Me.1980)(alterationinoriginal)(quotationmarksomitted).

16

Id.¶6. Weconcludedthattheofficerhadmerelyprovided“amatter-of-fact

communication of the evidence” and that this communication was not the

functional equivalent of interrogation. Id. ¶ 16 (quotationmarks omitted).

Althoughwesuggestedthatourconclusionwasbasedtosomeextentonthe

factthatthedefendantwasentitledtotheintoxilyzertestinformationunder

state law, we also cited with approval other cases reaching broader

conclusions.Id.

[¶21] Forexample,wecitedCaputov.Nelson,455F.3d45,50-51(1st

Cir. 2006), inwhich the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

determinedthatapoliceofficerhadnotengagedinthefunctionalequivalent

of interrogation by using the defendant’s phone in his presence “to relay

informationaboutwhat theofficers foundat [thedefendant]’s residence” to

other officers. Bragg, 2012ME 102, ¶ 16, 48 A.3d 769. In discussing the

limits of Innis’s conception of “interrogation,” the Caputo court approvingly

citedPlazinichv.Lynaugh,843F.2d836,837,839(5thCir.1988),inwhichthe

Fifth Circuit concluded that an officer did not interrogate a defendant by

informinghimthathisco-defendanthadattemptedsuicide.Caputo,455F.3d

at51.InBragg,wealsocitedEasleyv.Frey,433F.3d969,971,974(7thCir.

2006), in which the Seventh Circuit held that an investigator had not

17

“interrogated” a defendant when he told the defendant about evidence

implicatinghiminaprisonmurderandinformedhimthathecouldbesubject

tothedeathpenaltyifconvicted.Bragg,2012ME102,¶16,48A.3d769.The

Easley court noted that there was no evidence that the investigator’s

statementswere“anythingmorethanamatter-of-factcommunicationof the

evidenceagainst[thedefendant]andthepotentialpunishmenthefaced”and

stated, “[W]e do not believe that the provision of information, even if its

weight might move a suspect to speak, amounts to an impermissible

‘psychologicalploy.’”Easley,433F.3dat974(quotationmarksomitted).

[¶22] Taken together, our opinion in Bragg and the cases we cited

approvinglystandforthepropositionthatinformingapersonoftheevidence

againsthim,andofaco-defendant’sstatus,doesnotconstituteinterrogation

in the absence of evidence that the person was subjected to “compelling

influences,”orthatthecommunicationwasa“psychologicalploy,”seeMauro,

481U.S.at529,toelicitanincriminatingresponse.SeeInnis,446U.S.at299

(describing “psychological ploys” as including positing the subject’s guilt,

minimizing the moral seriousness of the crime, and casting blame on the

victimorothers).Inthiscase,thereisnoevidenceofcompellinginfluencesor

that the detective was engaging in a “psychological ploy” to elicit an

18

incriminating statement from Arbour. Rather, the evidence supports the

court’sfindingsthatthedetectivecouldrecallknowingonlythatArbourhad

previouslyaskedtobearrested—notthathehadpreviouslymadeastatement

deflectingresponsibilityfromSousa;thatthedetectiveprovidedArbouronly

“withabriefsummaryastowhathadoccurredandwhatevidencehadbeen

seized”; thatArbour“wasnot invitedtoorencouragedtorespond”; that the

detective stopped Arbour frommaking any further statements; and that he

“quicklyendedanycommunication”withArbouronceheinvokedhisMiranda

rights.WeconcludethatArbourwasnotsubjecttointerrogationatthetime

hemadehisstatementandthereforethatthecourtdidnoterrbydenyinghis

motiontosuppress.15

C. HeroinQuantity

[¶23]Finally,Arbourchallengesthesufficiencyoftheevidenceofdrug

quantity supporting his conviction for aggravated trafficking of heroin.

BecauseArbourstipulatedtoapriordrugconviction, theStatehadtoprove

beyond a reasonable doubt that he intentionally or knowingly possessed

15Wenotethat“[a]nyknowledgethepolicemayhavehadconcerningtheunusualsusceptibilityof a defendant to a particular form of persuasion might be an important factor in determiningwhetherthepoliceshouldhaveknownthattheirwordsoractionswerereasonablylikelytoelicitan incriminating response from the suspect.” Innis, 446 U.S. at 302 n.8 (emphasis added).However, it would be difficult to conclude that the detective was aware of any “unusualsusceptibility” ofArbour to incriminate himselfmerely basedon the knowledge thatArbourhadaskedtobearrestedattheapartment.

19

“6gramsormoreor270ormoreindividualbags, folds,packages,envelopes

or containers of any kind containing heroin.” 17-A M.R.S. §1105-A(1)(H),

(1)(B)(1);seealso17-AM.R.S.§1103(1-A)(2015)(providingthat“apersonis

guiltyofunlawfultraffickinginascheduleddrugifthepersonintentionallyor

knowingly trafficks inwhat thepersonknowsorbelieves tobea scheduled

drug,which is in fact a scheduled drug”); 17-AM.R.S. §1101(17)(E) (2015)

(defining“traffick”toinclude“possess[ing]2gramsormoreofheroinor90or

more individual bags, folds, packages, envelopes or containers of any kind

containingheroin”).

[¶24] At trial, theStatepresentedevidence that1,252packets seized

from the apartment had the characteristics of heroin packaging and that a

certified chemist confirmed that five randomly chosen packets contained

heroin. The chemist further testified he could make the “common sense

inference” that theotherpacketsalsocontainedheroin,even ifhecouldnot

make a “scientific inference” to that effect. We conclude that this evidence

wassufficientforthejurytofindbeyondareasonabledoubtthat270ormore

of the packets seized from the apartment contained heroin. See State v.

Barnard,2001ME80,¶12,772A.2d852(holdingthateven“[i]ntheabsence

of a chemical analysis, other direct and circumstantial evidence,” including

20

testimonybyanexperienceddrugagent as to theappearanceof substances

believedtobedrugs,“canestablishbeyondareasonabledoubttheidentityof

drugs”).

[¶25]Arbour’ssuggestionthatourrecentdecisioninStatev.Pinkham,

2016ME59,137A.3d203,affectshisconvictionisincorrect.InPinkham,we

vacatedaherointraffickingconvictionwherethedefendantpleadedguiltyto

trafficking“2gramsormoreofheroin”buttheStatedidnotpresentevidence

sufficienttoshowthatthedefendanttrafficked“pure”heroininthatamount.

Pinkham, 2016ME 59, ¶¶ 3, 8, 23, 137A.3d 203. In this case, by contrast,

Arbourwasconvictedoftraffickingheroininaquantityof“6gramsormore

or270ormoreindividualbags,folds,packages,envelopesorcontainersofany

kindcontainingheroin.”BecausetheStatewasnotrequiredtoprovethatthe

packetscontainedacertainamountofpureheroin,Pinkhamdoesnotapply.

Seeid.¶15.

D. Conclusion

[¶26]Fortheforegoingreasons,weaffirmthejudgment.

Theentryis:

Judgmentaffirmed.

21

Onthebriefs:

Luann L. Calcagni, Esq., Augusta, for appellant Franklin F.Arbour,Jr.JanetT.Mills,AttorneyGeneral,andKatieSibley,Asst.Atty.Gen., Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appelleeStateofMaine

Atoralargument:

LuannL.Calcagni,Esq.,forappellantFranklinF.Arbour,Jr.KatieSibley,Asst.Atty.Gen.,forappelleeStateofMaine

KennebecCountySuperiorCourtdocketnumberCR-2014-958FORCLERKREFERENCEONLY