state of the state in post-communist latvia: state ......state capacity and government effectiveness...
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State of the State in post-communist Latvia: State Capacity and Government Effectiveness in
a newly Independent Country
Ole Nørgaard, Ilze Ostrovska and Ole Hersted Hansen
Department of Political Science University of Aarhus
Paper prepared for the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops Copenhagen, 14 – 19 April 2000
Workshop on The Management of Decision-making in the Centre of Government in Eastern Europe and the CIS
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State of the State in post-communist Latvia: State capacity and Government Effectiveness in a newly
Independent Country1
'Increasing a government's capabilities involves finding the best fit among three factors: the nature of its policy changes, its institutional arrangements, and the conditions that facilitate and limits institutional effects' (Weaver and Rockman, 1993).
When Latvia regained her independence in early September 1991 after the failed coup d’état in Moscow, the Latvians inherited the same politico-administrative legacy that characterized other post-communist systems, a state and a system of government designed to serve the overall developmental and strategic objectives embedded in the Soviet mode of governance.
The principles for the socialist mode of governance and development had a complicated relationship to reality. Practical politics were kept separate from ideology, each representing alternative value systems, codes of conduct, or 'logics of appropriateness' in the language of institutional theory (March and Olson, 1985, 1989, 1996). Although a large section of the relatively small elite nomenclature initially believed in the prospective success of the socialist economic and political experiment, particularistic group interests and rent seeking came to play an increasingly central role in decision making over time. These bureaucratic rent-seeking groups became enmeshed in the shadow (or black) economy that transcended regional and republic borders and affected decision-making and state capacities at central, regional, and local levels of government. In addition, the extreme reliance on central (Moscow) decision-making produced a ‘learned helplessness’, in local and regional administrations, who were used to receiving very detailed guidelines for any sort of decision.
Further, and in contrast to the ideological image, the institutions of the Communist Party were far from the insulated and benevolent elite depicted in official propaganda. It bore greater resemblance to the political broker of the American party machine type the official version and the version advocated by Jerry Hough, (1969) in the West, or a Mafia-like structure serving the interests of the few (the realistic version described in post-change literature (Schleifer, Vishny, 1998; Solnick,1999). So, whereas the Party Institutions obviously solved collective action problems (co-ordination of utility maximizing groups and individuals) there were strong indications that the concrete set up of the informal institutions did have distributive consequences (Knight, 1991). The structural properties of bureaucratic rent seeking in conjunction with semi-legal (or illegal) groups and ‘learned helplessness’ are legacies of the incumbent socialist systems.
This situation was changed with the triple transition that followed Latvian independence. Independence itself landed political decision-making squarely on the institutions of the emerging Latvian democracy – themselves part of the transformation – while the transition to market economy entailed a transformation of social structures and the eventual appearance of new political interests. In all three spheres of transformation the state - institutions of decision-making and implementation - became core parameters,
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reflecting the burden of the past as well as the opportunities and contingent strategies that accompanied the change. But while the ambitions for change have been clear, we still know disturbingly little about the present 'state of the state' in Latvia and other post-communist governments. When the communist regimes collapsed, so too did the centralized decision-making apparatus epitomized by the party institutions that - for better or worse – had previously coordinated the activities of ministries and departments. As summarized by the Wold Bank the result was 'confused and overlapping responsibilities and multiple rather than collective accountability […] a sure-fire formula for policy disaster' (World Bank, 1997, p. 85). Such policy disasters occurred in varying magnitue, implying that also the ability to adapt to new demands was different (deficient?). Although answering the question of what produce adaptability and rigidity is a comparative enterprise, the present paper focus on the Latvian experience, as one case of a newly independent post-communist state and government. What are the Latvian state’s capacities for handling the tasks of social, economic, and political reconstruction? To what extent is the state, the institutions of government decision making and implementation, still hampered by the burden of the totalitarian past? And what are the obstacles to government effectiveness and efficiency? These are the questions addressed in this paper. Section one discusses the concepts of state capacity and government effectiveness, and sets up a typology of state types and modes and forms of democratic government that will guide the subsequent inquiry. Section two reports a preliminary inquiry into the capacities of the Latvian State in a comparative context. Section three examines the strengths and weaknesses of the policy makinginstitutions2 as they have evolved since independence. The picture presented is based partly on selected aggregate indicators of state capacities, partly on a recent survey of 51 former ministers and state ministers on the inner workings of the governments and the Latvian central administration since independence.3 Section four introduces a causal model for explaining state capacity and the capabilities of government institutions in Latvia. One of the core arguments of the paper is that state capacity and efficiency in decision-making reflect the same underlying patterns of political interests, confirming the insight that institutions at any level reflect underlying structures of power and distribution.
1. State types and Governments: Capacities and Capabilities.
For the sake of simplicity the following inquiry will use the terminology applied by the World Bank (1997, p. 3) in its report on 'the state in a changing world'. Capability and efficiency (at the levels of state and government) thus refer to the ability to undertake and promote collective actions, whatever their nature and consequences. By capacity and effectiveness (at the level of state and government) we refer to the ability to use available capability to meet the concerns and objectives of society. These distinctions are summarized in table 1.
This paper deals with the capacities of state and the capabilities of government. Our expectation, however, is that capacities (effectiveness) on state and government levels are correlated and express the same underlying causal mechanisms (interests and power in society). This does does not necessarily imply that capacities and capabilities are positively correlated. It is perfectly feasible to imagine (as we know from history) efficient and capable governments that pursue objectives which are detrimental to the long-term goals of society - and vice versa. The definition of what represents 'the genuine needs and concerns
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of society' must obviously be stipulated exogenously to these definitions. In this context the closest we can get to a practical definition of what constitutes these needs and concerns are the development goals formulated in the application for EU membership and in the EU assessment reports on Latvia.4
Table 1. Properties of policy-making
Working from this (admittedly) vague conceptualization of capacity (effectiveness) and capability (efficiency), a next step is to categorize and rank the different factors that we assume to have an impact. We propose four analytical levels: state type, mode of democratic government, government type, and contextual factors. The four levels of analysis imply a contrasting decrease in conceptual complexity (and parsimony of modeling), and an increasing number and variation of causal factors (but also ability to establish testable hypotheses). The argument is summarized in fig. 1.
Figure 1. Government capabilities and effectiveness: levels of explanation.5
Contextual factorsSecondary institutional factors; elite cohesiveness; cleavage structures;
Socio-economic development; Leadership; International context
State typeTotalitarian, liberal,
developmental
Modes of democratic governmentPresidential versus Parliamentary
system
Types of governmentMajoritarian versus concensual government
Policy type \ Actor The state The government
Policy meets the concerns and objectives of society
Capacity
Effectiveness
Capacity
Effectiveness
Policy do not meet the concerns and objectives of society
Capability
Efficiency
Capability
Efficiency
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State type offers explanations at the most general level. It is based on the historically (and ideologically) founded conceptof the role of the state as an institution has played and should play in economic and political development. In relation to the other levels of explanation, the state type level defines the substantive (and normative) standards in relation to which assessment of government capabilities and effectiveness are to be made. We distinguish between three types of state, each representing alternative perceptions of the character and role of the state in economic and political development. The liberal state is the insulated ideal type Anglo-American minimal state, as envisaged in neo-liberal economic theory. Here state-society interaction is conceptualized though the interest groups trying to convey their demands to the insulated institutions of state. The totalitarian state represents the Leninist state whose institutions are designed to promote ideologically defined policy goals, and where civil society institutions are conceived of as transmission belts rather than political actors. Finally, the developmental state is calibrated to foster specific policy goals (very much like the Leninist state), but selected structures of society (business organizations) are assigned independent tasks in the design and implementation of policies. 'Embeddedness', however, may also be negative and reflect the capture of the state and government by particularistic interests (elites or societal groups). Finally, we also argue that governmental integration or embeddedness ('international embeddedness') in the
international system offers a parallel range of prospects and dangers.6 On the one hand, can ‘international embeddedness’ provide the informational, political and financial resources that are necessary for the government if it is to perform adequately under the new conditions. On the other hand, does international integration or embeddedness entail the risk of international ‘clientistic capture’ or 'elite capture' (World bank, 1997, p. 80ff), if the domestic policy process becomes subjugated by the agendas of international organizations or foreign powers that do not reflect local concerns. Section two will make a preliminary attempt to classify the Latvian State within this taxonomy.
Mode of democratic government represents the constitutional framework that constrains or empowers political actors. The classical distinction between parliamentary and presidential systems has been accompanied by a voluminous literature discussing the relative advantages of the two modes of government in various contexts. It is debatable, however, if the arguments on the relative advantages of parliamentarism and presidentialism in developed and developing countries can be transferred to post-communist transitional countries. Our research has revealed a clear positive correlation between level of parliamentarism, economic development, and democracy.7 But the superior performance of parliamentary systems was very highly negatively correlated with elite continuity and indicators of rent seeking. This most likely implies that the major explanation why the performance of parliamentary systems is superior to that of presidential systems under post-communism should first of all be assigned to their control function vis-a-vis the incumbent nomenclature elite.
The regime type differentiates between parliamentary systems in accordance with the number of parties that form governments. The regime type tends to be stable over time, as it reflects the combined effect of cleavage structures and electoral rules. This also implies that, although imbued with certain amount of continuity, regime types (single party, single party dominant, or multiparty) are not immutable. Again, it is debatable what can be learned from the general literature on regime types and government effectiveness. Regime
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types (and electoral systems) in post-communist systems very much seem to exhibit the same divides as the modes of government. In systems with high elite continuity party pluralism is usually low, reflecting a preference for single-member-constituencies. In contrast, where elite continuity is low, political (and governmental) plurality is greater and proportionality in the electoral system higher. (Johannsen, 2000).
We do not want to inter into a lengthy exposé on taxonomies of modes of governments and regime types in the present context, but rather apply the typology proposed by Blondel and Golosov (1999), that combines the two dimensions.
Table 2. Classification of post-communist governments.
Parliamentary system with strong parties
Parliamentary system with weak parties
Presidential system
Centralized 1 2 3
Decentralized 4 5 6
In section three we will try to locate and explain the position of the Latvian government in the categories described in table 2.
Contextual factors, what Weaver and Rockman (1993, p. 30) refer to as 'Third tier' influences on government capabilities and policies (their model does not include state type), include all factors that may help us understand the variation in state capacities and government capabilities across countries. Weaver and Rockman distinguish between 5 broad categories, including the broader framework of political institutions, the organization of legislatures, the general political framework, socioeconomic conditions, and past policy choices. Although developed to group causal factors in comparative analyses, we will use these categories to help structure a causal model explaining state capacity and government capability in Latvia in section four.
2. State type and state capacity in Latvia.
During the early phase of transition the majority of local political actors in post-communist countries wanted to drastically limit the role of the state and state institutions in the transformation process, as reported for the Baltic states in Steen's early survey of elites (Steen, 1996). In reaction to the predominant role of the state in the incumbent system, the realization that the administrative apparatus was unable to perform under the new circumstances, and the prospects for personal profits from liberalization and privatization made local reformers easy targets for neo-liberal policy advisors. In a more positive vein, the expectation was that the market would generate not only efficient allocation of resources and carve out an international economic position based on comparative advantages, but also the structural preconditions for a liberal, pluralist democracy. In this understanding of what drives social and political change, there was little room for state intervention. The state was to provide the legal and institutional framework and leave the rest to the political and economic market. State failure was the problem of primary concern in the collapsed system, and a reduced (minimal) state a precondition for future success. In an awkward irony of history the expectation was that the market could succeed where Soviet Marxism had so dramatically failed: to foster the withering away of the state.
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It is now broadly acknowledged that this market utopia is as incapable of generating development as was the incumbent system. Associated social and political costs soon forced politicians to intervene in order to ameliorate the disruptive effects of the free market focus. By the mid-1990s practical experience, manifestos from international financial institutions (World Bank 1997), and the functional need to adapt to the predominating regional form of democratic capitalism (Nørgaard, 2000b) had led to the realization that the state and state institutions had important roles to play. First of all, an effective state and government was needed to secure the social and political coherence of the domestic social fabric and to provide for an economic strategy that would be able to carve out a place in the international economy. In the version advanced by the European community, the strategy that was prescribed for Central and Eastern Europe came to resemble the ideal vision of the developmental states in East Asia, most recently elaborated by Peter Evans (1996; Evans and Rauch, 1995), Linda Weiss (1998), or West European Social Democratic states (Leftwich, 1995: 403). Hence in the present phase of development, rather than diminishing the state the question has become the extent to which state institutions possess the resources and capacities that are required for performing these new functions.
Does the current Latvian State have political capacity in the sense that it is positively embedded in society? Or has it been captured by strong interest groups or elites? These were the first questions we sought to answer through structured interviews with 51 former ministries and state ministers of Latvian governments around and after independence.8 It was our expectation that by focusing on ministers in the core ministries we would be able to: a) obtain factual information from people who had worked at the apex of administrative hierarchies on the efficiency of government decision-making, and b) obtain information about the state-society relationship role models that guide a significant subset of the political elite in Latvia after independence. The interviews were focused on three groups of ministries: ministries with general (domestic) responsibilities - finance and economics, b) those with more specific (but central) domestic tasks - welfare and the interior (there are, of course, other ministries in this category), and c) oreign affairs.9 We also distinguish between pre and post 1995 ministers in order to capture the developmental aspect. We begin by looking into perceptions of government interaction with outside actors and the nature of such relations. Then we try to describe how the ministers assess this interaction. Finally, we attempt to picture the roles and attitudes concerning foreign involvement. The information gathered in each interview is obviously filtered through the political lenses of the minister being interviewed, and confidentiality relates negatively to the time that has lapsed since the interviewee held office. Still, we believe that the method provided a picture that would not be available from other sources.10
State-society interaction: pluralist or corporatist?
The prime characteristic of the totalitarian state was the top-down approach of the state and its servants vis-a-vis society. As everybody who has worked in these countries know, this mentality is still an integral part of the mentalities of many civil servants, who continue to see society as an annoyance in daily work, rather than a resource that can enhance the quality of decision-making and ease implementation. Are the tops of Latvian administrative hierarchies also infected with this mental legacy of the past? First, 70 per cent of the
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interviewees saw lobbying as a positive phenomenon, both because of the informational advantages and because it generates legitimacy in the eyes of the interests involved (see appendix 1). There was also a surpassingly high level of support for active popular participation in government.11 Skepticism increases, however, when the question is given a more corporatist twist and we ask if it was considered positive when private business organizations participated in the process of implementation (Appendix 2). Only 50 per cent considered this a positive element in governance.
Turning to the ministers’ perception of how things are (or were) - and not what they should be - the data demonstrate what we already suspected, namely that civil society is beginning to stir, and that the number initiatives arising from society vis-a-vis the government and its administration is growing. They also show that patterned interrelations are growing over time (table 3).
Table 3. Ministries' relations to non-state organizations (%).12
Ministerial field of responsibility
Working relationship with significant organization in field
of ministry Minister
before 1995 Ministers after 1995 Total
Yes 69 (9) 72 (5) 70 (14) Finance – Economics
No 31 (4) 28 (2) 30 (6)
Yes 92 (11) 89 (8) 90 (19) Interior – Welfare
No 8 (1) 11 (1) 10 (2)
Foreign Affairs
Yes No
100 (4) 0 (0)
60 (3) 40 (2)
78 (7) 22 (2)
Responses to the question: in your own ministry was it common practice that ministerial officials have a close working relationship with the significant organizations (business, NGO, or state) in the field of the ministry?
As seen from the table, the perception is that during both periods a majority of ministries work with relevant organizations. Whereas the linkages are (obviously) high in the ministries of the Interior and Welfare, the frequency of relations in the ministries of Finance and Economy are also high.
An identical picture emerged when we asked more specifically about relations with peak business organizations (Table 4).
While the two previous tables indicate the scope of more or less permanent relationships, the extent of institutionalization remains doubtful. Going through individual ministers' comments on this subject, it becomes clear that this is a very recent development. For example, as one minister comments,
Civil servants isolate themselves. Exceptions are rare. We must invent a mechanism of additional demands that they do it, otherwise nothing will happen (Former Prime Minister).
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Table 4. Ministries’ relations to peak business organizations (per cent, n in parentheses).
Ministerial resort
Working relationship with peak business organization in field of ministry
Minister before 1995
Ministers after 1995 Total
Yes 67 (8) 72 (5) 68 (13) Finance – Economics
No 33 (4) 28 (2) 32 (6)
Yes 58 (7) 56 (5) 57 (12) Interior - Welfare
No 42 (5) 44 (4) 43 (9)
Foreign Affairs
Yes No
50 (2) 50 (2)
80 (4) 20 (1)
67 (6) 33 (3)
Response to the statement 'In my time as minister my civil servants had a close working relationship with peak business organizations of the ministry's resort'.
From the ministers’ points of view, it appears that the impediments to establishing institutionalized relations with significant non-state organization are related to the nature of civil servants, as indicated by the following two statements:
It makes public servants’ lives more complicated. Public servants employ a self-defense function in their work: if relations exist it means a greater number of alternatives, which again means that the public servant has to defend his project (Former Prime Minister).
Relations become more active, sometimes even institutionalized. But civil servants consider it additional work (Foreign Minister).
So there are apparently administrative obstacles to constructing these ties, because civil servants do not consider such work as part of their jobs. On top level the attitude is more positive towards further integration of societal interests in the policy-making process. More than 80 per cent of the ministers believe that decisions are actually improved when concerned interests are involved in the policy-making process. A closer inspection of some of the comments to this question nevertheless reveals that there are different motivations for including interests, as observed by one recent minister of finance:
The information in the ministries is sufficient, but, for the sake of keeping the peace, one can hear out all sides too.
And in the eyes of a recent minister of state income:
There are no decisions that are acceptable to all parts. If the decision is of little importance, the parts could be involved.
Whereas others embrace the value of dialogue:
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It is a great sin that the relevant part is so often ignored. We’d have less trouble and the ratings of politicians would go up if dialogue were maintained. The more sides that participate in discussing a decision, the more democratic and useful for the society it will be. Often the range of problems that can be affected by the document, is not examined. For example regulation of trade, etc. (Former Minister of Industry).
This statement indicates that dialogue and consultation with concerned interests are quite infrequent activities in Latvian politics.
On the subject of interactions with society we also wanted to ascertain the extent to which the ministers saw themselves as subject to pressure from external actors when initiating new legislation, (following the pluralist leaning version of democratic interaction between state and society, table 5)).
Table 5. Outside pressure when initiating legislation
Ministries Experienced pressure
Often or sometimes
Rarely or never
Ministers before 1995
Finance – Economics 77 (10) 23 (3)
Interior – Welfare 56 (5) 44 (4)
Foreign Affairs 25 (1) 75 (3)
Total 62 (16) 38 (10)
Ministers after 1995
Finance – Economics 100 (7) 0 (0)
Interior – Welfare 33 (3) 67 (6)
Foreign Affairs 100 (5) 0 (0)
Total 71 (15) 29 (6)
Responses to the question 'Have you ever felt a pressure from outside actors (non-state organizations, peak level business etc.) to initiate new legislation?
Table 5 illustrates that the perceived outside pressure on legislation is particularly manifest in the ministries of finance and economy, and in the foreign affairs ministries, the latter probably reflecting the increased salience of EU issues as they interconnect with traditionally domestic areas.
In addition to the scope of external pressure on governments we can ask: who are the most important extra-governmental actors. Table 6 shows whom the ministers consider the most important local political players after independence.
Business and business-related politicians and parties (Latvian Way) are considered the most important political players. The respondents named five persons who were identified as the most influential politicians during the 1990s. Four of them, Aivars Lembergs, Ivars Godmanis, Ojars Kehris, and Anatolijs Gorbunovs, played prominent parts in the Popular
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Front movement in the late 1980s. They were elected deputies to the Supreme Council of the Republic of Latvia, and all voted in favor of breaking away from the USSR in the referendum held on May 4, 1990. Lembergs, Kehris, and Gorbunovs came from the communist nomenclatura and worked in the CPSU apparatus till the end of the 1980s. During the first half of the 1990s, all four (Aivars Lemberts, Ivars Godmanis, Ojars Kehris, and Anatolijs Gorbunovs) were influential political actors in different institutions. Gorbunovs was chaiman of parliament and functioned as interim president. The other three were influential members of parliament.
Table 6: Perception of most important political actors
Institutions Frequency
Banks and Business structures 10
Parliament 7
Government 4
Parties
Latvian Way 19
Latvian Popular Front 11
Actors
Aivars Lembergs 12
Andris Skele 11
Ivars Godmanis 5
Ojars Kehris 4
Anatolijs Gorbunovs 3
Responses to the question 'Name the three most influential local political players (organizations and/or persons) in Latvia after independence in general (1st choices).
Skele and Lembergs also became important players in local governments. In addition, some of them occupied important executive functions: Godmanis as Prime Minister, Kehris as minister of finance, and Skele as deputy minister of agriculture. They were also among the founding members of the 'Latvian Way' party (founded 1992), but only Gorbunovs remained in parliament as a 'Latvian' way deputy of the 6th Saeima (elected in 1995) and the 7th Saeima (elected in 1998). He simultaneously occupied several governmental posts, first as minister of the Environment, and later as minister of regional development, minister of traffic and as minister of Finances in 1998. Lembergs left parliamentary politics in 1993 and Kehris in 1995. Lembergs, however, remained politically active as Mayor of Ventspils (the main city for transit trade, elected for a political party founded by himself).
Four of the people identified as most influential in Latvian politics had twinbackgrounds as communist nomenclature and activists in the movement that helped bring about independence. They were also very active in politics during the first years of independence. From the mid-1990s, however, they began to transform their political positions into commercial activities, moves that were closely related to the privatization of state enterprises, which accelerated at that time. Those who had occupied executive
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positions (Godmanis, Kehris, Lembergs, Gorbunovs) turned to business careers associated with the booming banking sector and joint stock companies that profited from the booming transit business. It is therefore understandable that Lembergs, who combines political and economic power in Ventspils, the major port channeling most of Latvia's transit trade, is regarded as one of the most influential persons in Latvia.
Skele’s way to power was somewhat different. He began his business career already in the first half of the 1990s, concurrently with holding a position as state executive in agribusiness, as he was deputy minister of agriculture untill 1993. In 1993 he became acting director of the newly established Privatization Agency, but his position was never confirmed because of objections from 'Latvian Way'. Using his position in the state administration as a platform for his private enterprises, he eventually became one of Latvia's richest men, and in 1999 single-handedly acquired a major conglomerate in the agribusiness, the 'AveLat Group'. His way into politics was thus more 'accidental’. The 1995 negotiations over a new government ended in a deadlock, and Skele was introduced as a compromise candidate, bringing with him the aura of the successful businessman. Once he had entered high politics, and representing the sector of the Latvian business community not associated with the transit trade, he was in and out of government in the second half of the 1990s. He is thus upposite number to Lembergs, whose fortune is associated with the transit trade. He was originally manager of Ventspils Nafta, which was later privatized and became the private transport company ‘LatRosTrans’. These two people, who are among the richest in Latvia, in effect represent two conflicting factions of the emerging Latvian business class, and different backgrounds therefore necessarily give rise to conflicting policies. These conflicts of interest have gained great prominence in the Latvian media. We will return to this issue below in our discussion of elite structures as an explanation for state capacities and government capabilities.
Positive or negative embeddedness?
The nature of the links that are evolving between the state and societal groups is a separate question: are they of the positive 'political embeddedness type', or do they reflect elite or clientistic captures, rent seeking and/or corrupt practices. In a previous section we observed that the ministers had a rather positive attitude to lobbying (although slightly declining over the years), but were more hesitant towards a closer embeddedness. Does this reflect the recognition that, under present circumstances, too close ties with societal interests may easily fuel corrupt practices?
As any statement on negative embeddedness and the danger of corrupt practices must be judged in the proper comparative context, we begin by placing the result of our survey in a broader comparative perspective. A number of aggregate indicators on perceived corruption and rent seeking, which have recently become available, indicate that in this area the Latvian performance is worse than what is seen in comparable countries.
Transparency International has estimated corruption in 99 countries around the world. Level of corruption appears to be a reasonable proxy for state capacities. In relation to political capacity, state corruption implies that political decisions are affected by the interests and privileges of outside groups rather than the collective goals of society. When it comes to the efficiency of policy making, corruption entails that the design and
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implementation of policies are based not on standards of technical quality, but on the interests of the privileged, thus deminishing capabilities.
Proceeding from these observations, an inspection of the transparency data demonstrates that corruption and state capacities in Latvia are on a par with countries such as Belarus, Bulgaria, and Moldova, but remains significantly lower than what is observed in other former Soviet republics. For Latvian aspirations for EU membership, it is more reasonable to comparare with the Central European and Baltic countries that are in the first or second echelon of candidates. Latvia clearly stands out as the most corrupt/the country with the least state capacity.
These data are further substantiated by the WDR Private Sector Survey (1997), where Latvia stands out as a country where the bribing of state officials is most common among the same subset of countries.
The 'Diagnostic corruption survey' carried out by the World Bank and Latvia Facts in June and July 1998 further confirms the impression that corruption represents a real problem in Latvia (see appendix 3). Although comparable data are available for only Albania and Georgia (to whom Latvia fortunately compares positively) there is widespread recognition among the respondents of the survey (households, companies and officials)that the interaction between state institutions and society is very compromized by corrupt practices.
Finally, our own survey of 51 ministers in post-independent Latvia provides a similar picture (figure 4).
Figure 4. Perceived misuse of status among Latvian ministers.
26,0% (13)
74,0% (37)
Disagree
Agree
Source: Own data. The statement was phrased: 'The misuse of status positions in order to serve own or other particular interests is common in Latvian politics'.
Figure 4 shows that in the top of the administrative hierarchies, the general perception is,
that misuse of status position is a common phenomenon. 13
14
Figures 5 and 6 show the developmental aspect of the same issue. During the 1990s the perception is that illegal means - whether bribe or threats - have become more widespread in Latvian politics.
Figure 5. Knowledge of illegal activities in own or other ministries by ministerial resort and period of ministerial duty (fractions).
Minister before 1995
Minister after 1995
Direct knowlegde of illegal activities in government (Mean of answers)
.7.6.5.4.3.2.10.0
Finance - Economics
Other ministries
.2
.1
.6
.3
Source: Own data. The question was phrased: 'Did you in your time as minister receive any knowledge about people engaged in such activities {misuse of perception] on governmental level.
Figure 6. Experience of threats by ministerial resort and period of ministerial duty (fractions).
Minister before 1995
Minister after 1995
Has experienced threaths (Mean of answers)
.7.6.5.4.3.2.1
Finance - Economics
Other ministries
.3
.6
.5
.2
Source: Own data. The question was phrased: 'during your time as minister did you receive any threats from non-state actors (peak level business, interest groups, etc?).
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The role of foreign actors.
If we look at the role of the international system and international actors in connection with domestic developments in Latvia, the perception is almost unanimously positive (Appendix 4). Only in a few instances were there critical comments, for instance that the lack of local knowledge at times produced solutions that are unsuited to Latvian circumstances. A few noted that concerning especially the citizenship issue, foreign institutions (and countries) had imposed policies that were at odds with the wishes of the Latvian population. Others sometimes saw themselves as guinea pigs for theoretical models. But on the whole, there are few indications that the influence of foreign actors is frowned upon. This observation is also reinforced by the concrete foreign actors selected by our respondents when asked to name the three most important actors.14 As expected, the ministers of finance and economy named the major international organizations that are active in Latvia: the EBRD, the IMF, and the EU (and its sub units), while only a few named the major bilateral actors: the USA, Russia, and Germany. The ministers of the Interior and Welfare also identified the Scandinavian countries and more specialized international agencies (WTO, WHO, UNDP), and the specialized agencies of bilateral actors (i.e. city department of Moscow, Danish Ministry of Agriculture, Swedish healthcare companies). The ministers of Foreign Affairs predictably identified all the major international institutions and bilateral actors (the USA, Germany, and Russia). Hence, to the extent that international actors have captured the domestic agenda in Latvia, the major bilateral actors (USA and Germany) in conjunction with international organizations set the general political and the economic agenda. The smaller neighboring countries (in particular Scandinavia) are identified as playing noteworthy roles only on softer policy areas.
State type and state capacities.
How do we characterize the current Latvian state type? Does it have inclinations towards the insulated pluralist state? Is it embedded in society in the positive developmental sense? Or is the state embedded in the negative sense, being the capture of particular interests or foreign agendas? The picture that emerges from our interviews showsa bit of everything. First, the survey documented what we already knew more or less intuitively , that the number of interests that try to influence decision-making grew during the 1990s. There was greater awareness of this issue among 'new ministers' (after 1995) than among 'older ministers' (before 1995), that they were subject to pressure and lobbying form organized interests in society. Secondly, the crystallization of interests was paralleled by the large majority of ministers who were in favor of close interaction with societal interests. Concurring with the visions of the developmental state they favored such contact and interaction, both because of the informational benefits for the decision-making phase and because of the advantages this provides during implementation. Also the almost unanimous support for a participatory version of democracy reflect an awareness that participation is beneficial to decision-making. Third, ministers were also subject to pure lobbying, and pressure (even threats) from organized interests, which caused some of them to lean towards the insulated, liberal state. This concern was also expressed in the lower level of support for involving private interests in the implementation of policies. Based on currently available information, it is impossible to determine the extent to which this reflects a
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capture of the state by particular interests. Fourth, foreign actors were not generally seen as having captured the domestic agenda. Only in relation to the citizenship issues did we find indications of a conflict between the (liberal) agenda of the international community, and the community based values of the Latvians. A response which may be interpreted either as a genuine appreciation of a positive influence or as a legacy of the 'learned helplessness'. Reactions to external pressure from more or less legitimate domestic interests were probably also directed agains the widespread misuse of office and plain corruption revealed by this survey and the other data presented.
3. Mode of government and regime type.
The mode of government in Latvia is a parliamentarian variant of democracy. Based on the re-introduction of the 1922 constitution, constitutional power is firmly in the hands of parliament and the government elected by parliament, leaving the president with a largely
ceremonial role.15 Only in a few instances has the president taken an independent political position based on his right to suspensive veto.16 Like other post-communist countries Latvia inherited an extremely complex government structure, reflecting the very specialized Soviet type centralized government.
Establishing a government in Latvia has always been a complicated business, often requiring lengthy negotiations. The complexity partly reflects a cleavage structure that remains permeated by the citizenship issue, partly a largely proportional electoral system that allows many parties to surpass the 5 per cent threshold limit and gain parliamentary representaion.17 Since independence Latvia has had 8 governments including a total of 13 parties. The governments and parties are outlined in table 7.
Throughout the 1990s Latvian governments have been characterized by five features. First, Latvian politics never really saw a real left-wing renaissance. Because of the citizenship issue which caused the majority of the Russian immigrant population to become disenfranchised, the electoral basis for such a reversal was absent. All governments have therefore primarily concentrated on various degrees of neo-liberal economic policies and intensification of the state building process. Second, all governments have been center-right coalitions divided by varying degrees of radicalism in relation to the citizenship issue, and by association with different factions of the emerging business community. Third, The 'Latvian Way' party has been the leading force throughout the 1990s. It has delivered five out of 8 eight prime ministers and been represented in all governments. All foreign ministers have 'Latvian Way' members. The party was and is an elite coalition that brings together previous communist nomenclature politicians, intellectuals, professionals of the Soviet type middle class, and representatives of the Latvian diaspora. Fourth, all governments have been coalitions, which has at times brought the number of ministers to Soviet era levels. The fifth and sixth governments, both headed by A. Skele, consisted of of six parties and came to include 29 ministers and state ministers.
The frequent government changes, however, concealed a quite remarkable continuity of elites. Of sixty-three ministers and state ministers included in our survey, 25% have been cabinet members in several governments. If we exclude the first Popular Front government all governments after 1993 have been controlled by three political forces: Latvian Way, Fraternity and Freedom /Latvian Independence Movement (T&B/LNNK), and a third formed by different parties that appeared on the political scene for "one season" and then -
17
when new cabinets were formed or after the next elections - disappeared (Democratic party "Saimnieks", New Party, Latvian Peasants Union.) Out of 63 ministers included in our survey, about 50 per cent were affiliated with the ’Latvian way‘ and about 23% with T&B/LNNM.
Table 7. Governments in Latvia since independence.
Period Leading Party Prime Minister Parties in Coalition Number of ministries (ministers + state ministers) Except PM and their deputies
May 1990 – July 1993
Popular Front Ivars Godmanis Popular Front Non – party
24+1
July 1993 – Sep. 1994
Latvian Way Valdis Birkavs Latvian Way Latvian Peasants Union
13+9
Sep. 1994 – Dec. 1995
Latvian Way Mãris Gailis Latvian Way Political Union of Economists
13+13
Dec. 1995 –Feb. 1997
Latvian Way Andris Skele Latvian Way Democratic Party “Saimnieks” Union “Fraternity and Freedom” Latvian National Independence Movement Latvian Greens Latvian Unity Party
16+13
Feb. 1997 – Aug. 1997
Latvian Way Andris Skele Latvian Way Democratic Party “Saimnieks” Union “Fraternity and Freedom” Latvian National Independence Movement Latvian Greens Latvian Unity Party
13+4
Aug. 1997 – Nov. 1998
Fraternity and Freedom
Guntars Krasts Latvian Way Democratic Party “Saimnieks” Union “Fraternity and Freedom” Latvian National Independence Movement Latvian Peasants Union Union of Christian Democrats
12+4
Nov. 1998 – July 1999
Latvian Way Vilis Kristopans Latvian Way Fraternity and Freedom/ Latvian National Independece Union New Party Additionally special agreement with Latvian Socialdemocratic Party to support the ruling coalition in exchange for two ministerial posts
13+6
July 1999 - People’s Party Andris Skele People’s Party Latvian Way Fraternity and Freedom/Latvian National Independence Movement
12+2 ministers without portfolio
18
Elites, parties and decision making18.
The volatility and complexity of Latvian politics was initially related to the absence of any dominant political force or party. In addition, a complex cleavage structure that combined the citizenship issue with regional, center-periphery and economic cleavages produced a very complex party system and approximately 20 parties that all compete at elections, 6-9 of them surmounting the 5 per cent entrance threshold. This resulted in unstable governments with an average duration of less than one year, and consequently inefficient decision-making. The inefficiency has been conspicuous especially on core issues like citizenship, language laws, and in the privatization of state enterprises.
It is therefore understandable that our respondents found that decision-making increasingly took place outside state and government institutions (see figure 8).19
Figure 8. : Most important informal decision making fora by period of ministerial duty (in % of respondents).
Most important informal fora for decisionmaking
Inside the stateOutside the state
Perc
ent
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Ministers before 95
Ministers after 95
33
67
43
57
The obvisous explanation for the increased importance of informal decision-fora outside government is the change in elite cleavages. During the first half of the 1990s the political landscape was still dominated by the totalitarian/libertarian conflict, most manifest in the conflicts over the citizenship and democratizatin issues. This process gave rise to much popular engagement and mobilization for elections and various referenda. Decision-making about privatization issues was stalled in that period because of the economic issues associated with the citizenship question.
The citizenship issue was solved in the mid-1990s, and the privatization of the state enterprises began. This political change of focus intensified the contest over the spoils of privatization, and the mutual distrust between the political parties in the Parliament became so great that no party win the support from other parties needed to get its Prime Minister elected. After lengthy debates and two unsuccessful attempts to create a cabinet, the parties headed by the "Latvian Way" agreed to accept the "outsider" A. Skele as the Prime
19
Minister. In this situation a temporary alliance between major politicians, financiers, representatives of the local capital and representatives of the transit capital was reinforced. "Latvian Way" leaders retained substantial power although the party as such began to lose legitimacy among the broad population, and consequently also political influence.
This alliance came apart after the national elections in 1998. "Latvian Way", although number two in the elections, won the post as Prime Minister. However, the conflicts between the two major financial-industrial groupings, local capital (food refinery, forestry, light industry – led by A. Skele), and transitional capital (Ventspils group– led by A. Lembergs) became more explicit. "Latvian Way" with Prime Minister V. Krishtopans tried to maneuver between the two groups that were trying to position themselves in the privatization race. He failed and the government was forced to resign. In turn, A. Skele and his People's Party made a new coalition and government in July 1999, implying that local capital had added to its financial resources the potential of political power. "Latvian Way" was once again one of the ruling coalition parties, although its position was dictated by the ministries it controlled, in this case the softer ones: Ministry of Culture, Ministry of Justice, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Control over the ministry of Ministry of Transportation is now what provides it with a certain amount of leverage in government.
The increasing importance of elite politics is also demonstrated in figure 9, which shows how our respondents assessed the importance of parties in decision-making.
Figure 9. Importance of parties in decision-making
Importance of Party
ImportantNon-important
Perc
ent
80
60
40
20
0
Minister before 1995
Minister after 1995
55
45
71
29
While the importance of parties in decision-making is considered to have faded20 in the second half of the 1990s, figures 10 and 11 indicate that the role of leadership within parties has increased in the same period, a tendency that confirms the impression that, as the focus of political conflicts turned from the citizenship issues to privatization, decision-making power became increasingly concentrated in the hands of those elites that had battled over the spoils of privatization of state assets.
20
Figure 10. Important party structures/actors, ministers before 1995.
19%
50%
31%
Donors
Party org.
Leaders
Figure 11. Important party structures/actors, ministers after 1995.
8%
8%
42%
42%
Donors
Rank & File
Party org.
Leaders
Decision making in Latvian Governments.
While the nature of Latvian politics and the making of governments indicate that there may be risks of ending up with fragmented governments, the central roles played by parties in government seems to indicate that the centrifugal forces of coalitions are counterweighted by a relatively cohesive elite which solves conflicts behind closed doors. This is also reflected in the ministers’ perceptions of decision-making, as seen in tables 13 and 14.
21
Table 13.
Important formal actors Ministers before 1995
Ministers after 1995
Total
Minister 59 (17) 68 (15) 63 (32)
Prime Minister 24 (7) 27 (6) 28 (13)
Ministerial advisers 3 (1) 2 (1)
Parliment Chairmen 3 (1) 2 (1)
Parliament 3 (1) 2 (1)
Top level offcials 7 (2) 5 (1) 6 (3)
The respondents were asked to rank the most important formal decision-makers affecting decisions in their ministry: The minister, the president, the prime minister, formal ministerial advisers, chairmen of parliamentary committees, individual members of parliament (N in parentheses).
Table 14 indicates an increase of the decision-making power invested in individual ministers (and the cabinet as a whole), at the expense of parliament and advisers.
Table 14. Ranking of decision-making fora.
Ministries Important fora
Cabinet Committees of cabinet
Commissions of parliament
Other
Ministers before 1995
Finance – Economics
77 (10) 23 (3) - -
Interior - Welfare 33 (4) 25 (3) 17 (2) 25 (3)
Foreign Affairs 75 (3) 25 (1) - -
Total 59 (17) 24 (7) 7 (2) 10 (3)
Ministers after 1995
Finance – Economics
100 (8) - - -
Interior - Welfare 67 (6) 11 (1) - 22 (2)
Foreign Affairs 80 (4) - - 20 (1)
Total 82 (18) 5 (1) - 14 (3)
The respondents were asked to rank the following fora with regard to decision-making with relevance for their ministry: the cabinet, council of ministers, committees of the cabinet, parliamentary commissions, courts.
However, the devolution of powers to individual ministers has been accompanied by an greater coordinating role for the cabinet of ministers, as seen from table 14. In this process, cabinet and parliamentary committees have ceased to play a role. Whether this development signifies a centralization or decentralization of decision-making probably depends on
22
contexts and issues. As noted by one of our respondents: 'the overall objective [of the policy] is the most important factor for the policy process. Everything that does not match this objective is pushed aside. […] The supreme objectives are what form the policy process.'
Where does this picture leave us in terms of the categories of governments outlined in table 2? The previous discussion shows that there is no clear-cut answer. Our responses indicate that ministers have gained more prominance in the decision-making process, but at the expense of parliament, not the Prime Minister whose importance could have increased because of the greater importance ascribed to the coordinating functions of the cabinet. At the same time the role of parties in decision-making are said to have decreased while the importance of party leadership has grown. In the context of decision-making efficiency this does, however, increase the possibility that parties begin to function as the 'cement' in an otherwise fragmented government. With all this reservations in mind, we could therefore hypothesize that Latvian governments are evolving towards a decentralized parliamentary system with increasingly strong (though elite guided) parties (category 4 in the classification of table 2).
4. Conclusion: Searching for Causal models.
In this paper we have described the evolution of state capacities (effectiveness) and government capabilities (efficiency) in one newly independent post-communist state. We have shown that both items (as indicated by the comparative level of corruption) and government effectiveness (as perceived by previous ministers) have been in relatively low supply. Furthermore, state capacities (the ability to solve society's problem) seem to decline in the second half of the 1990, as the perceived level of corruption has increased and an increasing share of decisions are moved outside state institutions. In contrast, government capabilities (the efficiency of decision-making) has increased, as indicated by the streamlining of the ministerial structure, the more active role of the cabinet in decision-making, and correspondingly, the declining importance of committees, whether governmental or parliamentarian.
How do we explain this development? Our present data are obviously too few to permitsolid conclusions, and the following picture should thus be seen as a first attempt to model the causes linking developments in the broader domestic and international contexts, in politics, and other issues that are critical to state capacity and government capabilities. The hypothetical causal model is outline in figure 12.
Following the logic of figure 12, our data tell the following story. Basically, state capacity and government capabilities have developed in response to the broader Latvian and international context. Both reflect the struggle for power, influence, and resources in the specific context of the Latvian triple transition - democratization, marketisation, and state building, thus confirming the insight that the formation of any institution is a political process that will have distributional consequences. In the first half of the 1990s, when political mobilization remained relatively high and the citizenship issue was still central on the political agenda, government capabilities were low because competing parties in the successive coalition governments blocked decision-making. Yet, it was a time when inefficiency was matched by a relatively high level of transparency and popular participation, as reflected in the greater parliamentary involvement in decision-making.
23
Elites were still a product of the Soviet era, first of all preoccupied with the anti-totalitarian and state building process.
Figure 12. Explaining state capacity and government capability.
Legend:
Context: Demographic situation, international demands, cleavage structures, and 2nd order institutions (electoral system, mode and type of government), issue salience. This is what Weaver and Rockman termed third level causation.
Elite acc.: Elite accountability. The extent to which elites are accountable to broader groups in society, rank and file party members, etc.
Character of elite conflicts: The issues that dominate elite conflicts.
Structure of decision-making institutions: The real (and not merely formal) institutions that guide decision-making.
However, from the mid-1990s, when the citizenship issue was solved, privatization of state enterprises became the most prominent issue on the political agenda. In that process, a large number of former politicians (with roots in the independence movement and in the communist nomenclature) exchanged their political positions into business careers, using their political (or administrative) platforms to position themselves to benefit from the spoils of privatization. The specific historical legacies of the Latvian economy combined with the politics of privatization produced two competing factions of domestic business interests. One faction based its economic position on the transit trade, as personalized in the mayor of Vetspils (and chairman of Ventspils Nafta). Another faction was based in the viable parts of the domestic industry, primarily agribusiness. The competition between these two factions produced the institutional evolution in the second half of the 1990s.
The institutional evolution had three aspects. Firstly, it was characterized by growing mistrust between different groups of society - horizontally and vertically. The broad popular perception that state corruption is increasing, and the mistrust that our respondent ministers revealed to others in government indicated both real development and popular alienation from a political scene increasingly hidden from the public eye. Secondly, the perception that an increasing part of core decisions are taken outside the state underlines the same point. It is in this context that the third development, the streamlining of government decision-making procedures in the second half of the 1990s, should be understood. The attempts to limit the number of ministries and concentrating decision-making in smaller and more manageable bodies helped to insulate the elite to fight its battles outside the public eye.
Context Character of Elite conflicts
State capacity
Gov. capability Elit
e A
cc. Structure
of decision making institutions
24
In that perspective it is possible, and even probable, that government decision-making efficiency increased in Latvia in the second half of the 1990s. This increased capability, however, was followed by a corresponding decline in state capacity. To understand the mechanisms that produce state capacities and government capabilities, we have to reveal the causal mechanisms that link them to the broader societal and political context, as indicated in figure 12. An analysis of government efficiency alone does not tell us anything about the outcomes of these decisions. Efficient (or increasing efficiency) decision-making institutions may serve a purpose that is detrimental to state capacity and the goals of society, as indicated in this paper about the Latvian case.
Hence, the basic lesson to be drawn from this paper is that in order to understand government capability and decision-making efficiency, we must identify the interests and power relations that create the decision-making institutions.
Appendix 1. : Attitudes to lobbying (fraction positive)
Minister before 1995
Minister after 1995
Attitude to lobbying (Mean of answers 1: Pos. 0: Neg.)
.7.6.5.4.3
Responses to statements: Lobbying is positive because it provides information or because it gets support from concerned groups; Lobbying negative because you receive biased information or it erodes the impartiality of the ministry.
Appendix 2: Attitudes to private participation in implementation.
Attitude to private participation in implementation
Positive Negative
Ministers before 1995 64 (18) 36 (10)
Ministers after 1995 57 (12) 43 (9)
Responses to the statement: 'It is positive when private business organizations participate actively in the process of implementation of decisions'.
25
2.5 2.7 2.9 3.1 3.3 3.5 3.7 3.9 4.1 4.3
bribery to speed service regarding electricity, water,telephone, etc.
public officials hiring people in exchange for money, ratherthan based on merit
bribery in order to win tenders by state institutions
bribery to avoid trouble from sanitary/fire inspectors
bribery to improve quality of educational or medicaltreatment
bribery to gain rights to publicly-owned lands or building
bribery to manipulate the judicial system
politicians accepting political contributions in exchange forinfluence over policies
public officials stealing or using state assets for their ownuse
bribery to avoid regulations
bribery to avoid trouble from tax inspectors/auditors
bribery for preferential decisions in privatization
bribery to get licenses and permits
politicians accepting bribes in exchange for influence overpolicies
bribery to avoid trouble from traffic police
1=never happens in Latvia 5=always happens in Latvia
Households Enterprises Public Officials
based on World Bank - Latvia Facts surveys of 1,100 households, 438 enterprises, and 218 public officials in June and July of 1998.
Appendix 3: Corruption in Latvia.
Source: http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/tools.htm
26
Appendix 4. Attitude to foreign influence on Latvian politics
Ministries V22 Effect of foreign influence
Always positive
Most cases positive
Seldom positive
Ministers before 1995 Finance – Economics - 100 (11) -
Interior – Welfare 17 (2) 75 (9) 8 (1)
Foreign Affairs 25 (1) 75 (3) -
Total 11 (3) 85 (23) 4 (1)
Ministers after 1995
Finance - Economics
14 (1)
71 (5)
14 (1)
Interior - Welfare 14 (1) 86 (6) -
Foreign Affairs - 100 (4) -
Total 11 (2) 83 (15) 6 (1)
Appendix 5. Importance of party by party membership of respondent (in %).
Importance of party Party membership Total
Latvian Way Other Party
Party Important 81 (13) 53 (16) 63 (29)
Party Non-important 19 (3) 47 (14) 37 (17)
Note: Responses to the question: In your time as Minister, how important were your party (party leaders meetings, party organizations, party donors) for government decision-making? (N in parenthesis).
Appendix 6. Importance of party by ministerial field of responsibility (in %).
Ministerial field of responsibility
Importance of party Period of ministerial duty
Before 1995 After 1995
Finance – Economics Important 82 (9) 25 (2)
Non-important 18 (2) 75 (6)
Other ministries
Important 62 (8) 71 (10)
Non-important 38 (5) 29 (4)
Note: Responses to the question: In your time as Minister, how important was your party (party leaders’ meetings, party organizations, party donors) to government decision-making? (N in parentheses).
27
Notes
1. This paper is part of the DEMSTAR-program (Democracy, the State and Administrative Reforms), funded by the Danish Social Science Research Council and University of Aarhus Research Foundation. For further information, see www.demstar.dk.
2. In this context we do not want to delve into more or less advanced definitions of what constitutes an institution. For the present purpose we perceive institutions as the observed patterns of interaction between political actors that affect political decision-making and implementation. For introductions to and surveys of alternative definitions in the context of alternate 'institutionalisms', see for example Hall and Taylor(1996); Immergut(1998); Peters (1999). 3. See section three.
4. In trying to move beyond the rather arbitrary list of outcomes against which government effectiveness has been measured, Weaver and Rockman (1993, p. 6) instead propose a list of capacities that they consider fundamental to the effectiveness of governments across policy areas: ability to set and maintain priorities, to innovate, to co-ordinate conflicting objectives, to impose losses on powerful groups; to represent diffused, unorganized interests (i.e. the collective good), ensure effective implementation, ensure policy stability, to make and meet international commitments (esp. In trade and defense), to manage political cleavages. As seen, the indicators are not observable (and measurable), but can only be estimated through their effects in selected policy areas. 5. The figure is an elaborated version of the ‘tiers of explanations’ provided by Rockman and Weaver (1993, p. 10). 6. We have made an attempt to estimate 'international embeddedness' in alternative modes by constructing an International Integration Index (Triple I), measuring the extent to which newly independent states manage to integrate into the international system. See Ole Nørgaard and Lars Johannsen, The Baltic States after independence, 2nd Edition, Edwin Elgar, Cheltenham, 1999, Ch.1. 7. In this work, we coded all post-communist constitutions on the relative authority placed with the president and with parliament. On this basis we constructed an Index of Presidential Authority that was correlated with various measures of political performance. See Nørgaard (2000a and 2000b).
8. The interviews were conducted in February 2000. The target group included a total of 63 present and previous ministers, of whom we managed to interview 51. The interviews were based on a questionnaire translated from English into Latvian. Both questionnaires are posted on the project homepage www.demstar.dk. The team of Latvian interviewers consisted of Eriks Jekabsons, Dagmare Beitnere, Igors Kudrjavcevs, Uldis Galdins, Ilze Ostrovska, Sarmite Dukate, Andris Spruds, Mareks Krakops, Armands Gutmanis, Tana Lace, Ritma Rungule, and Irina Rezepina.
9. Because of a pledge of confidentiality we do not enclose the list of respondents. The list can be obtained from the authors. 10. The structured interviews should preferably be supplemented by deep interviews of selected actors and on specific topics. This is the next phase in the present research project.
28
The questionnaire also included questions about administrative capabilities, which is outside the scope of this paper. 11. Surprisingly, because in other new democracies, for example in Latin America, we find a deep skepticism towards popular mobilization and a preference for purely representational types of democracy. 12. When comparing the difference between groups in the present survey the question of significance is problematic. Such tests are not included, first of all because our sample is unique and we cover 51 out of 63 possible respondents bringing, us close to the total population. As tests of significance rest upon the assumption that all unexplained variance between groups consists of systematic errors they are very conservative measures, which in our case means that half of our comparisons are insignificant, not proving that the relation is non-existent, only that it is not statistically proved. By using tests of significance we actually risk neglecting important differences. Obviously, when no tests are used, all differences between groups have to be interpreted carefully. See Risbjerg (1997), for further discussions of the use of tests of significance in non-sample situations. 13- Out of 51 respondents only one declined to answer. 14. The question was: 'Name the three most important actors (governments, international organizations) that during your time in government tried to influence policy and regulation in your ministry. 15. In our Index of Presidential Authority (IPA) Latvia has the lowest score among all post-communist system. The IPA measures the formal constitutional powers of a president by a summation and weighted average of his symbolic, appointive, and political powers. The higher the score, the higher the formal powers of a presidential institution. For an in-troduction to the Latvian constitutional structure, see Nørgaard and Johannsen (1999, Ch. 3). 16. The president has used his suspensive veto 7 times in relation with the legislation on the citizenship issue. In these cases he has responded to strong international criticism. 17. For an introduction to cleavage structures and the electoral system, see Nørgaard and Johannsen (1999, Ch. 3).
18. By focusing on elites in Latvian politics we follow the ideas developed in Steen’s (1996, Ch. 14) original study, although our dependent variables are different from Steen’s. 19. One foreign minister even said that the most important decision-making fora were informal dinners between selected members of the cabinet and special invitees, indicating a deliberate informal structure. 20. However, it seems that there are differences between parties on this question.. 82 per cent of the ministers that are members of Latvian Way say that the party is important, while only 53 per cent of the ministers from other parties believe that the party is important. This indicates the centrality of the “Latvian Way” as the leading party in Latvian politics. Further analyses of the data indicate that the decrease in importance is seen only in the ministries of finance and economics, whereas the importance of parties among other ministries remains unchanged before and after 1995. Hence, it seems a reasonable hypothesis that elites in these policy areas are becoming more autonomous.
29
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