state of the world 2005

THE WORLDWATCH INSTITUTE

2oO5STATE OF TH E WOR LD

R E D E F I N I N G G L O B A L S E C U R I T YSTATE OF TH E WOR LD

Erik Assadourian Lori Brown Alexander Carius Richard Cincotta Ken Conca Geoffrey Dabelko Christopher Flavin Hilary French

Gary Gardner Brian Halweil Annika Kramer Lisa Mastny Danielle Nierenberg Dennis Pirages Thomas Prugh Michael Renner

Janet Sawin Linda Starke Aaron Wolf

with a Foreword by Mikhail Gorbachev

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Stanley Crawford, a former mayordomo(ditch manager) of an acequia (irrigationditch) in New Mexico, writes of two neigh-bors who “have never been on goodterms…the lower neighbor commonly accus-ing the upper of never letting any water passdownstream to his place and then of dump-ing trash into it whenever he rarely does.”Such rivalries over water have been thesource of disputes since the Neolithic revo-lution, when humans settled down to culti-vate food between 8000 and 6000 BC. Ourlanguage reflects these ancient roots:“rivalry” comes from the Latin rivalis, or“one using the same river as another.” Ripar-ians—countries or provinces bordering thesame river—are often rivals for the waterthey share. Today the downstream neigh-bor’s complaint about the upstream riparianis echoed by Syria about Turkey, Pakistan

about India, and Egypt about Ethiopia.1

Regardless of the geographic scale or theriparians’ relative level of economic devel-opment, the conflicts they face are remark-ably similar. Sandra Postel, director of theGlobal Water Policy Project, describes theproblem in Pillars of Sand: Water, unlikeother scarce, consumable resources, is usedto fuel all facets of society, from biology andeconomy to aesthetics and spiritual practice.Water is an integral part of ecosystems, inter-woven with the soil, air, flora, and fauna.Since water flows, use of a river or aquifer inone place will affect (and be affected by) itsuse in another, possibly distant, place. Withinwatersheds, everything is connected: surfacewater and groundwater, quality and quantity.Water fluctuates wildly in space and time,further complicating its management, whichis usually fragmented and subject to vague,

Aaron T. Wolf, Annika Kramer, Alexander Carius, and Geoffrey D. Dabelko

C H A P T E R 5

Managing Water Conflictand Cooperation

Aaron T. Wolf is Associate Professor of Geography in the Department of Geosciences at Oregon StateUniversity and Director of the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database. Annika Kramer isResearch Fellow and Alexander Carius is Director of Adelphi Research in Berlin. Geoffrey D. Dabelkois the Director of the Environmental Change and Security Project at the Woodrow Wilson Interna-tional Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C.

arcane, or contradictory legal principles.2Water cannot be managed for a single pur-

pose: all water management serves multipleobjectives and navigates among competinginterests. Within a nation, these interests—domestic users, farmers, hydropower genera-tors, recreational users, ecosystems—are oftenat odds, and the probability of a mutuallyacceptable solution falls exponentially in pro-portion to the number of stakeholders. Addinternational boundaries, and the chancesdrop yet again. Without a mutual solution,these parties can find themselves in dispute,and even violent conflict, with each other orwith state authorities. Still, water-related dis-putes must be considered in the broader polit-ical, ethnic, and religious context. Water isnever the single—and hardly ever the major—cause of conflict. But it can exacerbate exist-ing tensions and therefore must be consideredwithin the larger context of conflict and peace.

From the Middle East to New Mexico, theproblems remain the same. So, however, domany of the solutions. Human ingenuity hasdeveloped ways to address water shortagesand cooperate in managing water resources.In fact, cooperative events between riparianstates outnumbered conflicts by more thantwo to one between 1945 and 1999. In addi-tion, water has also been a productive path-way for building confidence, developingcooperation, and preventing conflict, evenin particularly contentious basins. In somecases, water provides one of the few paths fordialogue in otherwise heated bilateral con-flicts. In politically unsettled regions, water isan essential part of regional developmentnegotiations, which serve as de facto con-flict-prevention strategies.3

Key Issues While the underlying reasons for water-relatedcontroversy can be numerous, such as power

struggles and competing development inter-ests, all water disputes can be attributed to oneor more of three issues: quantity, quality, andtiming. (See Table 5–1.)4

Competing claims for a limited quantity ofwater are the most obvious reason for water-related conflict. The potential for tensionsover allocation increases when the resource isscarce. But even when pressure on theresource is limited, its allocation to differentuses and users can be highly contested. Aspeople become more aware of environmen-tal issues and the economic value of ecosys-tems, they also claim water to support theenvironment and the livelihoods it sustains.

Another contentious issue is water qual-ity. Low quality—whether caused by pollu-tion from wastewater and pesticides orexcessive levels of salt, nutrients, or sus-pended solids—makes water inappropriatefor drinking, industry, and sometimes evenagriculture. Unclean water can pose seriousthreats to human and ecosystem health.Water quality degradation can thereforebecome a source of dispute between thosewho cause it and those affected by it. Further,water quality issues can lead to public protestsif they affect livelihoods and the environ-ment. Water quality is closely linked to quan-tity: decreasing water quantity concentratespollution, while excessive water quantity,such as flooding, can lead to contaminationfrom overflowing sewage.

Third, the timing of water flow is impor-tant in many ways. Thus the operational pat-terns of dams are often contested. Upstreamusers, for example, might release water fromreservoirs in the winter for hydropower pro-duction, while downstream users might needit for irrigation in the summer. In addition,water flow patterns are crucial to maintain-ing freshwater ecosystems that depend onseasonal flooding.

Conflicting interests concerning water

State of theWorld 2005

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WATER CONFLICT AND COOPERATION



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conflicts can be found in the institutionsestablished to manage water resources.

International BasinsInternational basins that include politicalboundaries of two or more countries cover45.3 percent of Earth’s land surface, host

quality, quantity, and timing can occur onmany geographic scales, but the dynamics ofconflict play out differently at international,national, and local levels. (See Table 5–2.)Whether the dispute is over quality, quantity,and timing, or at the international, national,or local level, however, the key to under-standing—and preventing—water-related

Table 5–1. Selected Examples of Water-related Disputes

Location Main Issue Observation

Cauvery River Quantity The dispute on India’s Cauvery River sprung from the allocation of waterbetween the downstream state of Tamil Nadu, which had been using theriver’s water for irrigation, and upstream Karnataka, which wanted toincrease irrigated agriculture.The parties did not accept a tribunal’s adjudica-tion of the water dispute, leading to violence and death along the river.

Okavango River Quantity In the Okavango River basin, Botswana’s claims for water to sustain thedelta and its lucrative ecotourism industry contribute to a dispute withupstream Namibia, which wants to pipe water passing through the CapriviStrip to supply its capital city with drinking water.

Mekong River Quantity Following construction of Thailand’s Pak Mun Dam, more than 25,000 peoplebasin were affected by drastic reductions in upstream fisheries and other

livelihood problems. Affected communities have struggled for reparationssince the dam was completed in 1994.

Incomati River Quality Dams in the South African part of the Incomati River basin reduced and freshwater flows and increased salt levels in Mozambique’s Incomati estuary.quantity This altered the estuary’s ecosystem and led to the disappearance of salt-

intolerant plants and animals that are important for people’s livelihoods.

Rhine River Quality Rotterdam’s harbor had to be dredged frequently to remove contaminatedsludge deposited by the Rhine River. The cost was enormous andconsequently led to controversy over compensation and responsibilityamong Rhine users. While in this case negotiations led to a peacefulsolution, in areas that lack the Rhine’s dispute resolution framework,siltation problems could lead to upstream/downstream disputes, such asthose in Central America’s Lempa River basin.

Syr Darya Timing Relations between Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan—all riparians ofthe Syr Darya, a major tributary of the disappearing Aral Sea—exemplify theproblems caused by water flow timing. Under the Soviet Union’s centralmanagement, spring and summer irrigation in downstream Uzbekistan andKazakhstan balanced upstream Kyrgyzstan’s use of hydropower to generateheat in the winter. But the parties are barely adhering to recent agreementsthat exchange upstream flows of alternate heating sources (natural gas, coal,and fuel oil) for downstream irrigation, sporadically breaching the agreements.

SOURCE: See endnote 4.


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Table 5–2. Conflict Dynamics on Different Spatial Levels

Geographic Scale Characteristics

International Disputes can arise between riparian countries on transboundary waters

Very little violence, but existing tensions between parties are pervasive and difficult toovercome, resulting in degraded political relations, inefficient water management, andecosystem neglect

Long, rich record of conflict resolution and development of resilient institutions

National Disputes can arise between subnational political units, including provinces, ethnic or religious groups, or economic sectors

Higher potential for violence than at international level

Rationale for international involvement is more difficult, given national sovereignty concerns

Local (indirect) Loss of water-based livelihoods (due to loss of irrigation water or freshwater eco-systems) can lead to politically destabilizing migrations to cities or neighboring countries

Local instability can destabilize regions Poverty alleviation is implicitly tied to ameliorating security concerns

about 40 percent of the world’s population,and account for approximately 60 percent ofglobal river flow. And the number is growing:in 1978 the United Nations listed 214 inter-national basins (in the last official count).Today there are 263, largely due to the “inter-nationalization” of basins through politicalchanges like the breakup of the Soviet Unionand the Balkan states, as well as access toimproved mapping technology.5

Strikingly, territory in 145 nations fallswithin international basins, and 33 countriesare located almost entirely within these basins.The high level of interdependence is illus-trated by the number of countries sharingeach international basin (see Table 5–3); thedilemmas posed by basins like the Danube(shared by 17 countries) or the Nile (10countries) can be easily imagined.6

The high number of shared rivers, com-bined with increasing water scarcity for grow-ing populations, leads many politicians andheadlines to trumpet coming “water wars.”In 1995, for example, World Bank vice pres-ident Ismail Serageldin claimed that “the

wars of the next century will be about water.”Invariably, these warnings point to the aridand hostile Middle East, where armies havemobilized and fired shots over this scarceand precious resource. Elaborate—if mis-named—“hydraulic imperative” theories citewater as the prime motivation for militarystrategies and territorial conquests, particu-larly in the ongoing conflicts between Arabsand Israelis.7

The only problem with this scenario is alack of evidence. In 1951–53 and again in1964–66, Israel and Syria exchanged fire overthe latter’s project to divert the Jordan River,but the final exchange—featuring assaults byboth tanks and aircraft—stopped constructionand effectively ended water-related hostili-ties between the two states. Nevertheless,the 1967 war broke out almost a year later.Water had little—if any—impact on the mil-itary’s strategic thinking in subsequent Israeli-Arab violence (including the 1967, 1973,and 1982 wars). Yet water was an underlyingsource of political stress and one of the mostdifficult topics in subsequent negotiations.


In other words, even though the wars werenot fought over water, allocation disagree-ments were an impediment to peace.8

While water supplies and infrastructurehave often served as military tools or targets,no states have gone to war specifically overwater resources since the city-states of Lagashand Umma fought each other in the Tigris-Euphrates basin in 2500 BC. Instead, accord-ing to the U.N. Food and AgricultureOrganization, more than 3,600 water treatieswere signed from AD 805 to 1984. Whilemost were related to navigation, over time agrowing number addressed water manage-ment, including flood control, hydropowerprojects, or allocations in international basins.Since 1820, more than 400 water treatiesand other water-related agreements have beensigned, with more than half of these con-cluded in the past 50 years.9

Researchers at Oregon State Universityhave compiled a dataset of every reportedinteraction—conflictive or cooperative—between two or more nations that was drivenby water. Their analysis highlighted four keyfindings.10

First, despite the potential for dispute ininternational basins, the incidence of acuteconflict over international water resources isoverwhelmed by the rate of cooperation. Thelast 50 years have seen only 37 acute dis-putes (those involving violence), and 30 ofthose occurred between Israel and one of itsneighbors. Non-Mideast cases account foronly 5 acute events, while during the sameperiod 157 treaties were negotiated andsigned. The total number of water-relatedevents between nations is also weightedtoward cooperation: 507 conflict-relatedevents versus 1,228 cooperative, implying


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Table 5–3. Number of Countries Sharing a Basin

Number of Countries International Basins

3 Asi (Orontes), Awash, Cavally, Cestos, Chiloango, Dnieper, Dniester, Drin, Ebro, Essequibo,Gambia, Garonne, Gash, Geba, Har Us Nur, Hari (Harirud), Helmand, Hondo, Ili (Kunes He),Incomati, Irrawaddy, Juba-Shibeli, Kemi, Lake Prespa, Lake Titicaca-Poopo System, Lempa,Maputo, Maritsa, Maroni, Moa, Neretva, Ntem, Ob, Oueme, Pasvik, Red (Song Hong), Rhone,Ruvuma, Salween, Schelde, Seine, St. John, Sulak,Torne (Tornealven),Tumen, Umbeluzi,Vardar,Volga, and Zapaleri

4 Amur, Daugava, Elbe, Indus, Komoe, Lake Turkana, Limpopo, Lotagipi Swamp, Narva, Oder(Odra), Ogooue, Okavango, Orange, Po, Pu-Lun-T’o, Senegal, and Struma

5 La Plata, Neman, and Vistula (Wista)

6 Aral Sea, Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna, Jordan, Kura-Araks, Mekong,Tarim,Tigris andEuphrates (Shatt al Arab), and Volta

8 Amazon and Lake Chad

9 Rhine and Zambezi

10 Nile

11 Congo and Niger

17 Danube


that violence over water is neither strategicallyrational, hydrographically effective, nor eco-nomically viable.11

Second, despite the fiery rhetoric of politi-cians—aimed more often at their own con-stituencies than at the enemy—most actionstaken over water are mild. Of all the events,some 43 percent fall between mild verbalsupport and mild verbal hostility. If the nextlevels—official verbal support and official ver-bal hostility—are added in, verbal eventsaccount for 62 percent of the total. Thusalmost two thirds of all events are only ver-bal and more than two thirds of these had noofficial sanction.12

Third, there are more examples of coop-eration than of conflict. The distribution ofcooperative events covers a broad spectrum,including water quantity, quality, economicdevelopment, hydropower, and joint man-agement. In contrast, almost 90 percent of theconflict-laden events relate to quantity andinfrastructure. Furthermore, almost all exten-sive military acts (the most extreme cases ofconflict) fall within these two categories.13

Fourth, despite the lack of violence, wateracts as both an irritant and a unifier. As anirritant, water can make good relations badand bad relations worse. Despite the com-plexity, however, international waters canact as a unifier in basins with relatively stronginstitutions.

This historical record proves that interna-tional water disputes do get resolved, evenamong enemies, and even as conflicts eruptover other issues. Some of the world’s mostvociferous enemies have negotiated wateragreements or are in the process of doingso, and the institutions they have createdoften prove to be resilient, even when rela-tions are strained.

The Mekong Committee, for example,established by the governments of Cambodia,Laos, Thailand, and Viet Nam as an inter-

governmental agency in 1957, exchangeddata and information on water resourcesdevelopment throughout the Viet Nam War.Israel and Jordan have held secret “picnictable” talks on managing the Jordan Riversince the unsuccessful Johnston negotiationsof 1953–55, even though they were at warfrom Israel’s independence in 1948 until the1994 treaty. (See Box 5–1.) The Indus RiverCommission survived two major warsbetween India and Pakistan. And all 10 NileBasin riparian countries are currently involvedin senior government–level negotiations todevelop the basin cooperatively, despite fiery“water wars” rhetoric between upstream anddownstream states.14

In southern Africa, a number of river basinagreements were signed when the regionwas embroiled in a series of local wars in the1970s and 1980s (including the “people’swar” in South Africa and civil wars inMozambique and Angola). Although nego-tiations were complex, the agreements wererare moments of peaceful cooperation amongmany of the countries. Now that most ofthe wars and the apartheid era have ended,water is one of the foundations for cooper-ation in the region. In fact, the 1995 Protocolon Shared Watercourse Systems was the firstprotocol signed within the Southern AfricanDevelopment Community. Riparians will gothrough tough, protracted negotiations inorder to gain benefits from joint waterresources development. Some researchershave therefore identified cooperation overwater resources as a particularly fruitful entry


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The historical record proves thatinternational water disputes do get resolved, even among enemies, and even as conflicts erupt over other issues.



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The most severe water scarcity in the world isin the Middle East.The deficit is particularlyalarming in the Jordan River basin and the adja-cent West Bank aquifers, where Israeli, Palestin-ian, and Jordanian water claims intersect. InGaza and the West Bank, the annual availabilityof water is well below 100 cubic meters ofrenewable water per person, while Israel hasless than 300 and Jordan around 100 cubicmeters. A country is generally characterized as water-scarce if the availability falls below1,000 cubic meters.

Population growth, a result both of highbirth rates among Palestinians and Jordaniansand of immigration to Israel, puts increasinglysevere pressure on the already scarce waterresources and raises the risk of water-relatedconflicts. Israeli settlers in the West Bank andGaza receive a larger share of the availablewater than the Palestinians, further complicat-ing the situation.

Despite fears of water-related violence,Israel has maintained basic cooperation withJordan and the Palestinians over their sharedwaters.This was true even after the secondintifada began in September 2000. Low-levelwater cooperation between Israel andJordan—under U.N. auspices—extends back to the early 1950s, even though both countrieswere formally at war.This interaction helpedbuild trust and a shared set of rules and norms,which were later formalized within the peaceagreement between Israel and Jordan in 1994.As stipulated in that agreement, a Joint WaterCommittee for coordination and problem solving was established that helped resolve disagreements over allocations.

A 1995 interim agreement regulates Israeli-Palestinian water issues such as protection ofwater and sewage systems.The Joint WaterCommittee and its subcommittees have con-tinued to meet despite the violence of the last years. For the Palestinians, the existingagreement is unsatisfactory from both a rightsand an availability perspective.Talks aimed at a

final agreement are part of the overall negotiat-ing process and, given the political stalemate andongoing violence, are not likely to be completedany time soon. Nevertheless, there is agreementbetween Israel and the Palestinians that cooper-ation over their shared water is indispensable.

Two main policy recommendations can bedrawn from this case. First, water cooperationis intimately linked to politics—a highlycomplex process influenced by both domesticand international considerations. If donors failto thoroughly analyze the political context, theyare unlikely to understand how water is some-times subordinate to more important politicalpriorities and used as a political tool.

Second, donor agencies and internationalorganizations can play an important role if theyare prepared to provide long-term support forestablishing cooperation over shared water.Donors typically want to see tangible resultswithin a short time frame.Yet it is essential tounderstand that risks are involved, occasionalsetbacks will occur, and rewards are unlikely tomaterialize quickly. Donors will need to engagein “process financing” that supports not anordinary development project with a cycle of2–4 years but rather a process that can span10–25 years. In the Israeli–Jordanian case, theU.N.Truce Supervision Organization, whichworked as an “umbrella” for discussions onwater coordination in spite of the absence of a peace agreement, played a critical role.

Although more conflicts of interest arelikely to arise in the future over the waters inthe Jordan River basin, water management—properly supported—offers a window ofopportunity for broader cooperation in thistroubled part of the world.

—Anders JägerskogExpert Group on Development Issues

Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Sweden

SOURCE: See endnote 14. The views expressedare those of the author and not the SwedishMinistry for Foreign Affairs.

Box 5–1. Water Sharing Between Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinians

point for building peace. (See Chapter 8.)15

So, if shared water does not lead to vio-lence between nations, what is the problem?In fact, complicating factors, such as the timelag between the start of water disputes andfinal agreements, can cause water issues toexacerbate tensions. Riparians often developprojects unilaterally within their own territo-ries in an attempt to avoid the political intri-cacies posed by sharing resources. At somepoint, one of the riparians (usually the mostpowerful one) will begin a project that affectsat least one of its neighbors.

Without relations or institutions con-ducive to conflict resolution, unilateral actioncan heighten tensions and regional instabil-ity, requiring years or decades to resolve: theIndus treaty took 10 years of negotiations;the Ganges, 30; and the Jordan, 40. Waterwas the last—and most contentious—issuenegotiated in a 1994 peace treaty betweenIsrael and Jordan, and was relegated to “finalstatus” negotiations between Israel and thePalestinians, along with difficult issues likerefugees and the status of Jerusalem. Duringthis long process, water quality and quantitycan degrade until the health of dependentpopulations and ecosystems is damaged ordestroyed. The problem worsens as the dis-pute intensifies; the ecosystems of the lowerNile, the lower Jordan, and the tributaries ofthe Aral Sea have effectively been writtenoff by some as unfortunate products ofhuman intractability.16

When unilateral development initiativesproduce international tensions, it becomesmore difficult to support cooperative behav-ior. As mistrust between riparians grows,threats and disputes rage across boundaries,as seen in India and Pakistan or Canada andthe United States. Mistrust and tensions(even if they do not lead to open conflict) canhamper regional development by impedingjoint projects and mutually beneficial infra-


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structure. One of the most important sourcesof water for both Israelis and Palestinians, theMountain Aquifer, is threatened by pollutionfrom untreated sewage. The existing con-flict has impeded donor initiatives to buildwastewater treatment plants in Palestine, set-ting the stage for a vicious circle as ground-water pollution increases regional waterscarcity and, in turn, exacerbates the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.17

Disputes within NationsThe literature on transboundary waters oftentreats political entities as homogeneous mono-liths: “Canada feels…” or “Jordan wants….”Recently, analysts have identified the pitfallsof this approach, showing how subsets ofnational actors have different values and pri-orities for water management. In fact, thehistory of water-related violence includes inci-dents between tribes, water use sectors, ruraland urban populations, and states orprovinces. Some research even suggests thatas the geographic scale drops, the likelihoodand intensity of violence increases. Through-out the world, local water issues revolvearound core values that often date back gen-erations. Irrigators, indigenous populations,and environmentalists, for example, all mayview water as tied to their way of life, whichis increasingly threatened by new demands forcities and hydropower.18

Internal water conflicts have led to fight-ing between downstream and upstream usersalong the Cauvery River in India andbetween Native Americans and Europeansettlers. In 1934, the landlocked state of

Unilateral action can heighten tensions and regional instability, requiring years ordecades to resolve.


Arizona commissioned a navy (it consistedof one ferryboat) and sent its state militia tostop a dam and diversion project on theColorado River. Water-related disputes canalso engender civil disobedience, acts of sab-otage, and violent protest. In the Chineseprovince of Shandong, thousands of farmersclashed with police in July 2000 becausethe government planned to divert agricul-tural irrigation water to cities and indus-tries. Several people died in the riots. Andfrom 1907 to 1913 in California’s OwensValley, farmers repeatedly bombed a pipelinediverting water to Los Angeles.19

National instability can also be provokedby poor or inequitable water services man-agement. Disputes arise over system con-nections for suburban or rural areas, serviceliability, and especially prices. In most coun-tries, the state is responsible for providingdrinking water; even if concessions are trans-ferred to private companies, the state usuallyremains responsible for service. Disputesover water supply management thereforeusually arise between communities and stateauthorities. (See Box 5–2.) Protests are par-ticularly likely when the public suspects thatwater services are managed in a corrupt man-ner or that public resources are diverted forprivate gain.20

Local ImpactsAs water quality degrades or quantity dimin-ishes, it can affect people’s health and destroylivelihoods that depend on water. Agricul-ture uses two thirds of the world’s water andis the greatest source of livelihoods, espe-cially in developing countries, where a largeportion of the population depends on sub-sistence farming. Sandra Postel’s list of coun-tries that rely heavily on declining watersupplies for irrigation includes eight that cur-rently concern the security community:

Bangladesh, China, Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq,Pakistan, and Uzbekistan. When access toirrigation water is cut off, groups of unem-ployed, disgruntled men may be forced outof the countryside and into the city—anestablished contributor to political instability.Migration can cause tensions between com-munities, especially when it increases pressureon already scarce resources, and cross-bound-ary migration can contribute to interstatetensions. (See Chapter 2.)21

Thus, water problems can contribute tolocal instability, which in turn can destabilizea nation or an entire region. In this indirectway, water contributes to international andnational disputes, even though the parties arenot fighting explicitly about water. Duringthe 30 years that Israel occupied the GazaStrip, for example, water quality deterioratedsteadily, saltwater intruded into local wells, andwater-related diseases took a toll on the resi-dents. In 1987, the second intifada began inthe Gaza Strip, and the uprising quickly spreadthroughout the West Bank. While it would besimplistic to claim that deteriorating waterquality caused the violence, it undoubtedlyexacerbated an already tenuous situation bydamaging health and livelihoods.22

An examination of relations between Indiaand Bangladesh demonstrates that local insta-bilities can spring from international water dis-putes and exacerbate international tensions.In the 1960s, India built a dam at Farakka,diverting a portion of the Ganges fromBangladesh to flush silt from Calcutta’s sea-port, some 100 miles to the south. InBangladesh, the reduced flow depleted surfacewater and groundwater, impeded navigation,increased salinity, degraded fisheries, andendangered water supplies and public health,leading some Bangladeshis to migrate—many,ironically, to India.23

So, while no “water wars” have occurred,the lack of clean fresh water or the competi-


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tion over access to water resources has occa-sionally led to intense political instability thatresulted in acute violence, albeit on a smallscale. Insufficient access to water is a majorcause of lost livelihoods and thus fuels liveli-hood-related conflicts. Environmental pro-tection, peace, and stability are unlikely to berealized in a world in which so many sufferfrom poverty.24

Institutional Capacity:The Heart of Water Conflict

and Cooperation

Many analysts who write about water politics,especially those who explicitly address theissue of water conflicts, assume that scarcityof such a critical resource drives people to


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Issues of water supply management can lead to violent conflict, as demonstrated by the confrontations that erupted in 2000 inCochabamba, Bolivia’s third largest city, follow-ing the privatization of the city’s water utility.Cochabamba had long suffered from waterscarcity and insufficient, irregular provision ofwater services. Hoping for improved servicesand higher connection rates, in September1999 the Bolivian government signed a 40-yearconcession contract with the international pri-vate water consortium Aguas del Tunari (AdT).

By January 2000, drinking water tariffsincreased sharply; some households had to paya significant share of their monthly income forwater services. Consumers felt they were sim-ply paying more for the same poor services andresponded with strikes, roadblocks, and otherforms of civil protest that shut the city downfor four days in February 2000.

While increased water bills triggered theprotests, some people also opposed a lawthreatening public control of rural watersystems. Long-standing water scarcity hadencouraged the development of well-established alternative sources of supply. Inrural municipalities surrounding Cochabamba,farmer cooperatives drilled their own wells and used an informal market for water basedon an ancient system of property rights.Under the concession contract, AdT wasgranted the exclusive use of water resources in Cochabamba, as well as any future sourcesneeded to supply city consumers. It was also

granted the exclusive right to provide waterservices and to require potential consumers to connect to its system.The rural populationfeared they would lose their traditional waterrights and AdT would charge them for waterfrom their own wells.

Farmers from surrounding municipalitiesjoined the protest in Cochabamba, whichspread to other parts of Bolivia. Months of civil unrest came to a head in April 2000, whenthe government declared a state of siege forthe whole country and sent soldiers intoCochabamba. Several days of violence leftmore than a hundred people injured and oneperson dead.The protests eased only after the government agreed to revoke AdT’s con-cession and return the utility’s management to the municipality.

Performance continues to be unsatisfactory,however. Many neighborhoods have only occa-sional service, and the valley’s groundwatertable continues to sink.Although many view the concession’s cancellation as a victory forthe people, it did not solve their water prob-lems. Meanwhile,AdT filed a complaint againstthe Bolivian government in the World Bank’strade court, the International Centre for Settle-ment of Investment Disputes, in Washington,D.C.According to the San Francisco Chronicle,the consortium is demanding $25 million incompensation for the canceled contract.Thecase is still pending.


Box 5–2. Conflict over Water Services Management:The Case of Cochabamba


conflict. It seems intuitive: the less waterthere is, the more dearly it is held and themore likely it is that people will fight over it.Recent research on indicators for trans-boundary water conflict, however, did notfind any statistically significant physical para-meters—arid climates were no more con-flict-prone than humid ones, andinternational cooperation actually increasedduring droughts. In fact, no single variableproved causal: democracies were as suscep-tible to conflict as autocracies, rich coun-tries as poor ones, densely populatedcountries as sparsely populated ones, andlarge countries as small ones.25

When Oregon State University research-ers looked closely at water managementpractices in arid countries, they found insti-tutional capacity was the key to success. Nat-urally arid countries cooperate on water: tolive in a water-scarce environment, peopledevelop institutional strategies—formaltreaties, informal working groups, or gen-erally warm relations—for adapting to it.The researchers also found that the likeli-hood of conflict increases significantly if twofactors come into play. First, conflict is morelikely if the basin’s physical or political set-ting undergoes a large or rapid change, suchas the construction of a dam, an irrigationscheme, or territorial realignment. Second,conflict is more likely if existing institutionsare unable to absorb and effectively managethat change.26

Water resource management institutionshave to be strong to balance competing inter-ests and to manage water scarcity (which isoften the result of previous mismanagement),and they can even become a matter of disputethemselves. In international river basins,water management institutions typically failto manage conflicts when there is no treatyspelling out each nation’s rights and respon-sibilities nor any implicit agreements or coop-

erative arrangements.27

Similarly, at the national and local level itis not the lack of water that leads to conflictbut the way it is governed and managed.Many countries need stronger policies toregulate water use and enable equitable andsustainable management. Especially in devel-oping countries, water management insti-tutions often lack the human, technical,and financial resources to develop compre-hensive management plans and ensure theirimplementation.

Moreover, in many countries decision-making authority is spread among differentinstitutions responsible for agriculture, fish-eries, water supply, regional development,tourism, transport, or conservation and envi-ronment, so that different managementapproaches serve contradictory objectives.Formal and customary management prac-tices can also be contradictory, as demon-strated in Cochabamba, where formalprovisions of the 1999 Bolivian Water ServicesLaw conflicted with customary groundwa-ter use by farmers’ associations.28

In countries without a formal system ofwater use permits or adequate enforcementand monitoring, more powerful water userscan override the customary rights of localcommunities. If institutions allocate waterinequitably between social groups, the risk ofpublic protest and conflict increases. In SouthAfrica, the apartheid regime allocated waterto favor the white minority. This “ecologicalmarginalization” heightened the black pop-ulation’s grievances and contributed to socialinstability, which ultimately led to the end ofthe regime.29

Institutions can also distribute costs andbenefits unequally: revenues from majorwater infrastructure projects, such as largedams or irrigation schemes, usually benefitonly a small elite, leaving local communitiesto cope with the resulting environmental


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and social impacts, often with little com-pensation. (See Box 5–3.)30

The various parties to water conflicts oftenhave differing perceptions of legal rights, thetechnical nature of the problem, the cost ofsolving it, and the allocation of costs amongstakeholders. Reliable sources of informationacceptable to all stakeholders are thereforeessential for any joint efforts. This not onlyenables water-sharing parties to make deci-sions based on a shared understanding, italso helps build trust.31

A reliable database, including meteoro-logical, hydrological, and socioeconomic data,is a fundamental tool for deliberate and far-sighted water management. Hydrologicaland meteorological data collected upstreamare crucial for decisionmaking downstream.And in emergencies such as floods, this infor-mation is required to protect human andenvironmental health. Tensions between dif-ferent water users can emerge when infor-mation is not exchanged. Disparities instakeholders’ capacity to generate, interpret,and legitimize data can lead to mistrust ofthose with better information and support sys-tems. In the Incomati and Maputo Riverbasins, the South African monopoly over datageneration created such discomfort in down-stream Mozambique that the basins’ PiggsPeak Agreement broke down, and Mozam-bique used this negotiation impasse to startdeveloping its own data.32

Moving Toward CooperativeWater Management

Although there are many links between waterand conflict, and competing interests areinherent to water management, most dis-putes are resolved peacefully and coopera-tively, even if the negotiation process islengthy. Cooperative water managementmechanisms—probably the most advanced

approach—can anticipate conflict and solvesmoldering disputes, provided that all stake-holders are included in the decisionmakingprocess and given the means (information,trained staff, and financial support) to act asequal partners. Cooperative managementmechanisms can reduce conflict potential by: • providing a forum for joint negotiations,

thus ensuring that all existing and poten-tially conflicting interests are taken intoaccount during decisionmaking;

• considering different perspectives and inter-ests to reveal new management optionsand offer win-win solutions;

• building trust and confidence through col-laboration and joint fact-finding; and

• making decisions that are much more likelyto be accepted by all stakeholders, even ifconsensus cannot be reached.33

On the local level, traditional community-based mechanisms are already well suited tospecific local conditions and are thus moreeasily adopted by the community. Examplesinclude the chaffa committee, a traditionalwater management institution of the Boranpeople in the Horn of Africa, or the ArvariParliament, an informal decisionmaking andconflict-resolution body based on traditionalcustoms of the small Arvari River in Rajasthan,India. On the international level, river basincommissions with representatives from allriparian states have been successfully involvedin joint riparian water resources management.Especially in transboundary basins, achieving


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In international river basins, water management institutions typically fail to manage conflicts when there is no treaty spelling out each nation’s rights and responsibilities nor any implicit agreements.



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Since World War II, some 45, 000 large damshave been built, generating an estimated 20 per-cent of the world’s electricity and providingirrigation to fields that produce some 10 per-cent of the world’s food.Yet for the 40–80 mil-lion people whose lives and livelihoods wererooted in the banks and valleys of wild rivers,dam development has profoundly altered thehealth, economy, and culture of communitiesand entire nations.

Because dams are generally situated nearthe ancient homes of indigenous nations, it is ultimately rural and ethnic minorities far from the central corridors of power who aretypically forced to pay the price. Ill-considereddevelopment plans, forced evictions, and reset-tlement with inadequate compensation gener-ate conditions and conflicts that threaten the security of individual and group rights to culture, self-determination, livelihood, andlife itself.

These dynamics are illustrated in the case of the Chixoy Dam in Guatemala, whichprovides 80 percent of that nation’s electricity.It was planned and developed by INDE (theNational Institute for Electrification) and largelyfinanced with loans from the Inter-AmericanDevelopment Bank and the World Bank.Designs were approved and construction wasbegun without notifying the local population,conducting a comprehensive survey of affectedvillages, or addressing compensation and reset-tlement for the 3,400 mostly Mayan residents.The military dictatorship of Lucas Garciadeclared the Chixoy Dam site and surroundingregion a militarized zone in 1978.

Some villagers accepted resettlement offersbut found poorer quality housing, smalleracreage, and infertile land. Others refused to move and instead attempted to negotiatemore equitable terms.Tensions escalated as the government declared remaining villagerssubversive, seized community records of reset-tlement promises and land documents, andkilled community leaders. Following a second

military coup in March 1982, General RiosMontt initiated a “scorched earth” policyagainst Guatemala’s Mayan population.As con-struction on the dam was completed andfloodwaters began to rise, villages wereemptied at gunpoint and homes and fieldsburned. Massacres ensued, including in villagesthat provided refuge to survivors. In the villageof Rio Negro, for instance, 487 people—halfthe population—had been murdered bySeptember 1982.

Following the 1994 Oslo Peace Accordsending Guatemala’s civil war, a series of investi-gations broke the silence over the massacres. In1999 a United Nations–sponsored commissionconcluded that more than 200,000 Mayan civil-ians had been killed, that acts of genocide werecommitted against specific Mayan communities,and that the government of Guatemala wasresponsible for 93 percent of the human rightsviolations and acts of violence against civilians.

Today, the issue is far from settled.The fail-ure to provide farm and household land ofequivalent size and quality for those resettledhas produced severe poverty, widespreadhunger, and high malnutrition rates. Communi-ties that were excluded from the resettlementprogram also struggle with an array ofproblems. Dam releases occur with no warning,and the ensuing flashfloods destroy crops,drown livestock, and sometimes kill people.Most inhabitants of former fishing villages, theirlivelihoods destroyed, have turned to migrantlabor. Upstream communities saw part of theiragricultural land flooded, and access to land,roads, and regional markets was cut off. Nomechanism exists for affected people to com-plain or negotiate assistance.

Chixoy Dam–affected communities havemet to discuss common problems and strate-gies, testified before truth commissions, and,with help from national and international advo-cates, are working to document the dam’simpact. In September 2004, some 500 Mayanfarmers seized the dam, threatening to cut

Box 5–3. Harnessing Wild Rivers: Who Pays the Price?

cooperation has been a drawn-out and costlyprocess. Recognizing this, the World Bankagreed to facilitate the Nile Basin Initiativenegotiation process for 20 years.34

Capacity building—to generate and ana-lyze data, develop sustainable water man-agement plans, use conflict resolutiontechniques, or encourage stakeholder partic-ipation—should target water managementinstitutions, local nongovernmental organi-zations, water users’ associations, or religiousgroups. On the international level, strength-ening less powerful riparians’ negotiatingskills can help prevent conflict. On the locallevel, strengthening the capacity of excluded,marginalized, or weaker groups to articulate

and negotiate their interests helps involvethem in cooperative water management. TheEvery River Has Its People Project in theOkavango River basin, for instance, aims toincrease participation by communities andother local stakeholders in decisionmakingand basin management through educationaland training activities.35

Preventing severe conflicts requires inform-ing or explicitly consulting all stakeholders,such as downstream states or societies, beforemaking management decisions. The processof identifying all relevant stakeholders andtheir positions is crucial to estimating, andconsequently managing, the risks of conflict.Without extensive and regular public partic-


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power supplies unless they were compensatedfor land and lives lost.

In a growing number of instances, theefforts by dam-affected peoples to documentexperiences and protest injury, damage, andloss have succeeded in producing somemeasure of remedy. In Thailand, where the Pak Mun Dam destroyed fisheries and the livelihood of tens of thousands, a decade ofprotests prompted the government to decom-mission the dam temporarily. Affected villagersconducted research on the impact of the damon their lives and the Mun River ecosystem,documenting the return of 156 fish species tothe river after floodgates were opened and the subsequent revitalization of the fishingeconomy and village life.These assessmentsplayed a key role in the decision to operate the dam on a seasonal basis.

At a second dam on the Mun River, the RasiSalai, displaced people established a protest vil-lage in 1999, refusing to leave while the reser-voir waters submerged their encampment.Their nonviolent protest and their willingnessto face imminent drowning struck a chord inthe nation. In July 2000, the Rasi Salai floodgates

were opened to allow environmental recoveryand impact assessments, and they remain opento this day.

In documenting the many failures to addressrights and resources properly, dam-affectedcommunities have taken the lead in challengingthe assumptions that drive development deci-sionmaking and in demanding institutionalaccountability.Their demands for “reparations”are much more than cries for compensation.They are demands for meaningful remedy,which means that free, prior, and informed con-sent of residents is obtained before financing isapproved and dam construction initiated, thatscientific assessments and plans are developedwith the equitable participation of members ofthe affected community, that governments andfinanciers respect the rights of indigenous peo-ples to self-determination—including the rightto say no, and that new projects are not fundeduntil any remaining problems from past projectsare addressed.

—Barbara Rose Johnston,Center for Political Ecology, Santa Cruz, California


Box 5–3. (continued)


ipation, the general public might reject infra-structure project proposals. For example, thedecision to build the Hainburg Dam on theDanube River was announced in 1983 afteronly limited public participation. Environ-mental groups and other civil society orga-nizations, supported by the general public,occupied the project site and managed tostop the dam’s construction. Subsequently,the site became a national park.36

Cooperative water management is a chal-lenging issue that requires time and commit-ment. Extensive stakeholder participationmight not always be feasible; in some cases, itmay not even be advisable. On any scale ofwater management, if the level of dispute istoo high and the disparities are too great,conflicting parties are not likely to reach con-sensus and might even refuse to participate incooperative management activities. In suchcases, confidence and consensus-building mea-sures, such as joint training or joint fact-find-ing, will support cooperative decisionmaking.

Conflict transformation measures involv-ing a neutral third party, such as mediation,facilitation, or arbitration, are helpful in caseswith open disputes over water resources man-agement. Related parties, such as elders,women, or water experts, have successfully ini-tiated cooperation when the conflictinggroups could not meet. The women-led WajirPeace Initiative, for example, helped reduceviolent conflict between pastoralists in Kenya,where access to water was one issue in theconflict. In certain highly contentious cases,such as the Nile Basin, an “elite model” thatseeks consensus between high-level repre-

sentatives before encouraging broader par-ticipation has enjoyed some success in devel-oping a shared vision for basin management.Effectively integrating public participation isnow the key challenge for long-term imple-mentation of elite-negotiated efforts.37

Water management is, by definition, con-flict management. For all the twenty-firstcentury wizardry—dynamic modeling,remote sensing, geographic information sys-tems, desalination, biotechnology, or demandmanagement—and the new-found concernwith globalization and privatization, the cruxof water disputes is still about little morethan opening a diversion gate or garbagefloating downstream. Yet anyone attemptingto manage water-related conflicts must keepin mind that rather than being simply anotherenvironmental input, water is regularly treatedas a security issue, a gift of nature, or a focalpoint for local society. Disputes, therefore, aremore than “simply” fights over a quantity ofa resource; they are arguments over conflict-ing attitudes, meanings, and contexts.

Obviously, there are no guarantees thatthe future will look like the past; the worldsof water and conflict are undergoing slowbut steady changes. An unprecedented num-ber of people lack access to a safe, stable sup-ply of water. As exploitation of the world’swater supplies increases, quality is becominga more serious problem than quantity, andwater use is shifting to less traditional sourceslike deep fossil aquifers, wastewater reclama-tion, and interbasin transfers. Conflict, too,is becoming less traditional, driven increas-ingly by internal or local pressures or, moresubtly, by poverty and instability. Thesechanges suggest that tomorrow’s water dis-putes may look very different from today’s.

On the other hand, water is a productivepathway for confidence building, coopera-tion, and arguably conflict prevention, evenin particularly contentious basins. In some


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The crux of water disputes is still about little more than opening a diversion gate or garbage floating downstream.

cases, water offers one of the few paths for dia-logue to navigate an otherwise heated bilat-eral conflict. In politically unsettled regions,water is often essential to regional develop-ment negotiations that serve as de facto con-flict-prevention strategies. Environmentalcooperation—especially cooperation in waterresources management—has been identifiedas a potential catalyst for peacemaking. (SeeChapter 8.)38

So far, attempts to translate the findingsfrom the environment and conflict debateinto a positive, practical policy frameworkfor environmental cooperation and sustain-

able peace show some signs of promise buthave not been widely discussed or practiced.More research could elucidate how water—being international, indispensible, and emo-tional—can serve as a cornerstone forconfidence building and a potential entrypoint for peace. Once the conditions deter-mining whether water contributes to conflictor to cooperation are better understood,mutually beneficial integration and cooper-ation around water resources could be usedmore effectively to head off conflict and tosupport sustainable peace among states andgroups within societies.


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Abundant natural resources—such as oil, minerals, metals, diamonds, timber, and agricultural commodities, including drugcrops—have fueled a large number of violentconflicts. Resource exploitation played a rolein about a quarter of the roughly 50 wars andarmed conflicts of recent years. More than 5million people were killed in resource-relatedconflicts during the 1990s. Close to 6 millionfled to neighboring countries, and anywherefrom 11–15 million people were displacedinside their own countries.1

The money derived from the often illicitresource exploitation in war zones has securedan ample supply of arms for various armed factions and enriched a handful of people—warlords, corrupt government officials, andunscrupulous corporate leaders. But for thevast majority of the local people, theseconflicts have brought a torrent of humanrights violations, humanitarian disasters, andenvironmental destruction, helping to pushthese countries to the bottom of mostmeasures of human development.2

In places like Afghanistan, Angola, Cambo-dia, Colombia, and Sudan, the pillaging ofresources allowed violent conflicts to continuethat were initially driven by grievances orsecessionist and ideological struggles.Revenues from resource exploitation replacedthe support extended to governments andrebel groups by superpower patrons thatlargely evaporated with the cold war’s end.Elsewhere, such as in Sierra Leone or theDemocratic Republic of the Congo, predatorygroups initiated violence not necessarily togain control of government, but as a way toseize control of a coveted resource.3

Commercial resource extraction can also bea source of conflict where governance is unde-mocratic and corrupt. The economic benefitsaccrue only to a small domestic elite and to

multinational companies, while the local pop-ulation shoulders an array of social, health,and environmental burdens. All over theworld, indigenous communities confront oil,mining, and logging firms. Violent conflicthas occurred in places like Nigeria (more than1,000 people were killed there in 2004),Colombia, Papua New Guinea’s Bougainvilleisland, and Indonesia’s Aceh province.4

Finally, tensions and disputes arise as majorconsumers of natural resources jockey foraccess and control. The history of oil, in par-ticular, is one of military interventions andother forms of foreign meddling, of which the Iraq invasion is but the latest chapter. Asdemand for oil becomes more intense, a newset of big-power rivalries is now emerging.5

The United States, Russia, and China arebacking competing pipeline plans for Caspianresources, and China and Japan are pushingmutually exclusive export routes in theirstruggle for access to Siberian oil. In Africa,France and the United States are maneuveringfor influence by deepening military ties withundemocratic regimes in Congo-Brazzaville,Gabon, and Angola. China is seeking a greaterrole for its oil companies, particularly inSudan, and working to increase its politicalclout in Africa and the Middle East. U.S. sol-diers patrol the oil-rich, violence-soaked NigerDelta with their Nigerian counterparts andhelp protect a Colombian export pipelineagainst rebel attacks.6

Resource-rich countries often fail to investadequately in critical social areas or publicinfrastructure. But resource royalties helptheir leaders maintain power even in theabsence of popular legitimacy—by funding a system of patronage and by beefing up aninternal security apparatus to suppresschallenges to their power.7

A number of conflicts—in Sierra Leone,

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Liberia, andAngola—havefinally come to anend, but othersburn on. In theDemocraticRepublic of theCongo, foreignforces that invadedin 1998 have with-drawn, yet fighting among various domesticarmed factions continues, and elaborate illegalnetworks and proxy forces have been set upthat continue to exploit natural resources.8

The enormous expansion of global tradeand financial networks has made access to keymarkets relatively easy for warring groups.They have little difficulty in establishing inter-national smuggling networks and sidesteppinginternational embargoes, given a degree ofcomplicity among certain companies and oftenlax customs controls in importing nations.9

Over the past five years or so, awareness of the close links between resource extraction,underdevelopment, and armed conflict hasgrown rapidly. Campaigns by civil societygroups and investigative reports by U.N.expert panels have shed light on these con-nections, making it at least somewhat moredifficult for “conflict resources,” such as dia-monds, to be sold on world markets. To dis-courage illicit deals, revenue flows associatedwith resource extraction need to becomemore transparent, but governments,companies, and financial institutions often still shirk their responsibilities.10

Commodity-tracking regimes are equallyimportant. In the diamond industry, nationalcertification schemes and a standardizedglobal certification scheme have beenestablished. But the resulting set of rules stillsuffers from a lack of independent monitoring

and too muchreliance on vol-untary measures.Efforts are alsounder way by theEuropean Unionto establish a cer-tification systemfor its tropicaltimber imports—

up to half of which are connected to armedconflict or organized crime.11

Natural resources will continue to fueldeadly conflicts as long as consumer societiesimport materials with little regard for theirorigin or the conditions under which theywere produced. Some civil society groupshave sought to increase consumer awarenessand to compel companies to do business moreethically through investigative reports and by“naming and shaming” specific corporations.Consumer electronics companies, for instance,were pressured to scrutinize their supplies of coltan, a key ingredient of circuit boards,and to ask processing firms to stop purchasingillegally mined coltan.12

Promoting democratization, justice, andgreater respect for human rights are key tasks,along with efforts to reduce the impunity withwhich some governments and rebel groupsengage in extreme violence. Another goal is to facilitate the diversification of the economyaway from a strong dependence on primarycommodities to a broader mix of activities. A more diversified economy, greater invest-ments in human development, and help for local communities to become strongguardians of the natural resource base wouldlessen the likelihood that commoditiesbecome pawns in a struggle among ruthlesscontenders for wealth and power.

—Michael Renner

L. Lartigue/USAID

Diamond miners, Sierra Leone

SECURITY LINK: RESOURCE WEALTH AND CONFLICT

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In an address to the United Nations SecurityCouncil in April 2004, U.N. Secretary-Gen-eral Kofi Annan highlighted the importantrole that private companies can play—goodor bad—in the world’s most conflict-pronecountries: “Their decisions—on investmentand employment, on relations with localcommunities, on protection for local environ-ments, on their own security arrangements—can help a country turn its back on conflict,or exacerbate the tensions that fuelled theconflict in the first place.”1

In recent years, grassroots campaignersand U.N. panels have documented thealleged complicity of multinational companiesin a wide range of conflict situations—fromhuman rights abuses in oil-rich Sudan andNigeria, to the trafficking of diamonds andtimber from the Congo and Sierra Leone, tothe misuse of financial services for arms pur-chases and terrorist acts. In light of thesereports, corporations are increasingly aware that in addition to fueling violence,investments in a conflict situation canseriously taint a company’s reputation, andmay even become a legal liability.2

In one prominent case, the Canadianpetroleum company Talisman Energy wasforced to sell its oil interests in Sudan follow-ing accusations that it had contributed to the20-year-long civil war. Beginning with thecompletion of an export pipeline in 1999,crude oil produced by the Talisman-led con-sortium contributed as much as $500 milliona year to government revenues. Thesepayments were alleged to have contributedto a doubling of the government’s defensebudget in the same period and thus to the“scorched earth” campaign to clear peopleout of the country’s oil fields. In at least onereported instance, helicopter gunships andother military aircraft used the consortium’s

landing strip as a staging point for attacks on civilians.3

In March 2003, having been targeted in aclass action suit in New York, Talisman soldits share in the oil consortium to the Indianenergy firm ONGC Videsh. Yet even as thisinitiated a boom in Talisman’s share value,the company’s retreat from Sudan posed acomplex dilemma. On the one hand, itdemonstrated to the oil industry that ques-tionable investments or activities could affecta company’s reputation and lower its stockvalue (by up to 15 percent in Talisman’scase). On the other hand, the withdrawal oftop multinational investments from unstablecountries could ultimately reduce interna-tional scrutiny of these places, lessening pres-sure on remaining firms to adhere to minimumsocial and environmental standards.4

There are also instances where the privatesector has been instrumental in helping bringhostilities to a close. In Sri Lanka, an attackon the international airport in July 2001marked a turning point in the decades-longconflict between the Sinhalese majority andseparatist Tamils. Prominent business leadersfrom both sides formed Sri Lanka First tobuild grassroots support against the war. Thegroup helped coordinate a million-persondemonstration in September, and during thesubsequent election it campaigned on behalfof legislators who favored a negotiated settle-ment. These actions helped move the Tamilseparatists and the government toward acease-fire in early 2002.5

Companies should play a role in reducingconflict rather than contributing to it. To do so, however, they will need to developguidelines for managing social risks,strengthening transparency and accountabil-ity, and forging collaborative relationships—thus enabling managers to navigate difficult

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situations more responsibly.

First and fore-most, the conse-quences ofbusiness and devel-opment projectsmust be betterunderstood. Byanalyzing the likelyimpacts of conflict on company operations, aswell as the impacts of corporate activities onlocal communities and the broader social fab-ric, companies would have the opportunity torefocus their core business operations, socialinvestment activities, and public policy strate-gies on the goal of minimizing harm. To spurtheir adoption, governments could requireexport credit agencies (ECAs) and otherlenders to conflict-prone areas to make suchassessments a condition for preferential accessto finance. Similarly, the World Bank’s private-sector lending arms and the ECAs couldestablish guidelines for the assessments, similarto those they use for the environment.6

Increasing the transparency of corporateactions will also be essential. The nongovern-mental Publish What You Pay initiative seeksto ensure transparency of extractive projectroyalties and other payments to governments.And the U.K. government–led ExtractiveIndustries Transparency Initiative calls onhost governments to be more transparentabout the use of these revenue streams.Boosting the capacity of civil society in hostcountries to hold governments accountablefor how these funds are spent is the othernecessary building block.7

Clear and internationally agreed norms oflegal accountability for corporate complicityin gross human rights violations, war crimes,and violations of U.N. sanctions are needed.

Corporateaccountabilitycould be upheldthrough theInternationalCriminal Courtor throughdomestic civilcourts usingmechanisms like

the Alien Tort Claims Act in the UnitedStates. While voluntary codes of conduct thataddress human rights and corruption—suchas the U.N. Global Compact—are valuablestarting points, a degree of enforceabilitybased on internationally agreed minimumstandards is critical.8

Private-sector actors can also formvaluable partnerships with governments,development agencies, and civil society orga-nizations in areas of ongoing or potentialconflict. These can enhance corporate sensi-tivity and legitimacy while reducing risk, thusincreasing overall investment. Multistake-holder assurance groups set up under thesupervision of the World Bank, for example,have strengthened the accountability ofgovernments and project operators for deliv-ery of social programs and mitigation of pro-ject impacts in the case of the Chad-Cameroonand Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan pipelines.9

The price of getting private-sector invest-ments wrong has reached unprecedentedheights. Corruption, patronage, and warprofiteering are destabilizing countries andcausing unjustified human suffering. But ifethics, regulation, and incentives support theshift, responsible business can become a lead-ing force for peace.

—Jason Switzer, International Institute for Sustainable Development

Esso Photo

Building the Chad-Cameroon pipeline

SECURITY LINK:THE PRIVATE SECTOR

NOTES,TOXIC CHEMICALS AND CHAPTER 5

Chemical Products Sustainably,” EnvironmentalScience & Technology, 1 September 2002, pp.347A–53A.

10. Edward Cohen-Rosenthal and Thomas N.McGalliard, “Eco-Industrial Development: TheCase of the United States,” The IPTS Report(European Commission), September 1998.

Chapter 5.Managing Water Conflict and Cooperation

1. Stanley Crawford, Mayordomo: Chronicle ofan Acequia in Northern New Mexico (Albu-querque: University of New Mexico Press, 1988);Asit K. Biswas, “Indus Water Treaty: The Nego-tiation Process,” Water International, vol. 17(1992), p. 202; Dale Whittington, John Water-bury, and Elizabeth McClelland, “Toward a NewNile Waters Agreement,” in Ariel Dinar and EdnaTusak Loehman, eds., Water Quantity/QualityManagement and Conflict Resolution: Institutions,Processes, and Economic Analyses (Westport, CT:Praeger, 1995).

2. Sandra Postel, Pillar of Sand (New York:W.W. Norton & Company, 1999).

3. Aaron T. Wolf, Shira B. Yoffe, and MarkGiordano, “International Waters: IdentifyingBasins at Risk,” Water Policy, February 2003, pp.29–60; Alexander Carius, Geoffrey D. Dabelko,and Aaron T. Wolf, “Water, Conflict, and Coop-eration,” Policy Briefing Paper for United Nations& Global Security Initiative (Washington, DC:United Nations Foundation, 2004).

4. Table 5–1 from the following: Cauvery Riverfrom Ramaswamy Iyer, “Water-Related Conflicts:Factors, Aspects, Issues,” in Monique Mekenkamp,Paul van Tongeren, and Hans van de Veen, eds.,Searching for Peace in Central and South Asia(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002),and from Aaron T. Wolf, “Water and HumanSecurity,” AVISO Bulletin (Global EnvironmentalChange and Human Security Project, Canada),June 1999; Okavango River basin from AnthonyR. Turton, Peter Ashton, and Eugene Cloete,“An Introduction to the Hydropolitical Drivers inthe Okavango River Basin,” in idem, eds., Trans-

boundary Rivers, Sovereignty and Development—Hydropolitical Drivers in the Okavango River Basin(Pretoria, South Africa: African Water IssuesResearch Unit and Green Cross International,2003), pp. 9–30; Mekong River basin from “PakMun Communities Ripe for Reparations,” WorldRivers Review, December 2000, p. 13; IncomatiRiver from Annika Kramer, Managing FreshwaterEcosystems of International Water Resources—TheCase of the Maputo River in Mozambique, Work-ing Paper on Management in Environmental Plan-ning (Berlin, Germany: Technische Universität,2003); Rhine River from Rainer Durth, Gren-züberschreitende Umweltprobleme und regionaleIntegration (Baden Baden, Germany: Nomos Ver-lagsgesellschaft, 1996), and from Alexander López,Environmental Conflicts and Regional Cooperationin the Lempa River Basin: The Role of the TrifinioPlan as a Regional Institution (San José, CostaRica: Environment, Development, and SustainablePeace Initiative, 2004); Syr Darya from VictorDukhovny and Vadim Sokolov, Lessons on Coop-eration Building to Manage Water Conflicts in theAral Sea Basin (Paris: UNESCO, InternationalHydrological Programme (IHP), 2003).

5. Aaron T. Wolf et al., “International RiverBasins of the World,” International Journal ofWater Resources Development, vol. 15, no. 4(1999), pp. 387–427; United Nations, Register ofInternational Rivers (New York: Pergamon Press,1978).

6. Data and Table 5–3 from Wolf et al., op.cit. note 5.

7. Serageldin quoted in Barbara Crossette,“Severe Water Crisis Ahead for Poorest Nations inNext Two Decades,” New York Times, 10 August1995.

8. Aaron T. Wolf, “‘Hydrostrategic’ Territory inthe Jordan Basin: Water, War, and Arab-IsraeliPeace Negotiations,” in Hussein A. Amery andAaron T. Wolf, eds., Water in the Middle East: AGeography of Peace (Austin: University of TexasPress, 2000).

9. For a historical list of events related to waterand conflict, see Peter H. Gleick, Water Conflict


203

NOTES, CHAPTER 5

Chronology, at www.worldwater.org/conflict.htm;U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization, Sys-tematic Index of International Water ResourcesTreaties, Declarations, Acts and Cases, by Basin, Vol.I and Vol. II (Rome: 1978 and 1984); number oftreaties from the Transboundary Freshwater Dis-pute Database maintained at Oregon State Uni-versity, which is available at www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu.

10. Excluded are events where water is inciden-tal to a dispute, such as those concerning fishingrights or access to ports, transportation, or riverboundaries, as well as events where water is not thedriver, such as those where water is a tool, target,or victim of armed conflict; Wolf, Yoffe, and Gior-dano, op. cit. note 3.

11. Wolf, Yoffe, and Giordano, op. cit. note 3.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

14. Mekong Committee from Ti Le-Huu andLien Nguyen-Duc, Mekong Case Study (Paris:UNESCO, IHP, 2003); Indus River Commissionfrom Wolf, op. cit. note 4; Nile Basin talks fromAlan Nicol, The Nile: Moving Beyond Cooperation(Paris: UNESCO, IHP, 2003). Box 5–1 from thefollowing: Anders Jägerskog, Why States Cooper-ate Over Shared Water: The Water Negotiationsin the Jordan River Basin (Linköping, Sweden:Linköping University, 2003); Israeli-Jordanianpeace treaty at www.israel-mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH00pa0; Israeli-Palestinian interimagreement at www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH00qd0#app-40, and at www.nad-plo.org/fact/annex3.pdf; Tony Allan, The Middle East WaterQuestion: Hydropolitics and the Global Economy(New York: I. B. Tauris, 2001); Arun P. Elhance,Hydropolitics in the 3rd World: Conflict and Coop-eration in International River Basins (Washington,DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999);fears of water wars from Joyce R. Starr, “WaterWars,” Foreign Policy, spring 1991, pp. 17–36,and from John Bulloch and Adel Darwish, WaterWars: Coming Conflicts in the Middle East (Lon-don: Victor Gollancz, 1993).

15. Anthony R. Turton, “The Evolution of WaterManagement Institutions in Select SouthernAfrican International River Basins,” in C. Torta-jada, O. Unver, and A. K. Biswas, eds., Water asa Focus for Regional Development (London: OxfordUniversity Press, 2004); Ken Conca and GeoffreyD. Dabelko, eds., Environmental Peacemaking(Washington, DC, and Baltimore, MD: WoodrowWilson Center Press and Johns Hopkins Univer-sity Press, 2002).

16. Aaron T. Wolf, “Water, Conflict, and Coop-eration,” in Ruth S. Meinzen-Dick and Mark W.Rosegrant, Overcoming Water Scarcity and Qual-ity Constraints (Washington, DC: InternationalFood Policy Research Institute, 2001).

17. Zecharya Tagar, Tamar Keinan, and GidonBromberg, A Seeping Time Bomb: Pollution of theMountain Aquifer by Sewage, Investigative ReportSeries on Water Issues No. 1 (Tel Aviv andAmman: Friends of the Earth Middle East, 2004).

18. Meredith A. Giordano, Mark Giordano, andAaron T. Wolf, “The Geography of Water Conflictand Cooperation: Internal Pressures and Inter-national Manifestations,” in Meredith A. Gior-dano, International River Basin Management:Global Principles and Basin Practice, dissertationsubmitted to Oregon State University, 2002.

19. Arizona and Shandong from Sandra L. Pos-tel and Aaron T. Wolf, “Dehydrating Conflict,”Foreign Policy, September/October 2001, pp.60–67; Gleick, op. cit. note 9.

20. Box 5–2 from the following: “Bolivia WaterManagement: A Tale of Three Cities,” Précis(Operations Evaluation Department, World Bank),spring 2002; Emanuel Lobina, “Cochabamba—Water War,” Focus (PSI Magazine, Public ServicesInternational, France), vol. 7, no. 2 (2000);William Finnegan, “Letter from Bolivia: Leasingthe Rain,” The New Yorker, 8 April 2002; AndrewNickson and Claudia Vargas, “The Limitations ofWater Regulation: The Failure of the CochabambaConcession in Bolivia,” Bulletin of Latin Ameri-can Research, January 2002, pp. 128–49; Posteland Wolf, op. cit. note 19; Jimmy Langmann,“Bechtel Battles Against Dirt-Poor Bolivia,” San


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Francisco Chronicle, 2 February 2002. For moreon the case, see Bechtel Corporation,“Cochabamba and the Aguas del Tunari Consor-tium,” fact sheet (San Francisco: Bechtel Corpo-ration, 2002), and Public Citizen, WaterPrivatization Case Study: Cochabamba, Bolivia(Washington, DC: 2001).

21. Postel, op. cit. note 2; Richard Cincotta,Robert Engelman, and Daniele Anastasion, TheSecurity Demographic: Population and Civil Con-flict After the Cold War (Washington, DC: Popu-lation Action International, 2003).

22. Wolf, op. cit. note 4.

23. Asit K. Biswas and Tsuyoshi Hashimoto,Asian International Waters: From Ganges–Brah-maputra to Mekong (New Delhi, India: OxfordUniversity Press, 1996).

24. Leif Ohlsson, Livelihood Conflicts: LinkingPoverty and Environment as Causes of Conflict(Stockholm, Sweden: Swedish International Devel-opment Agency, 2000).

25. Wolf, Yoffe, and Giordano, op. cit. note 3.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

28. Nickson and Vargas, op. cit. note 20.

29. Anthony R. Turton, “Water Wars in South-ern Africa: Challenging Conventional Wisdom,”in Green Cross International, Water for Peace inthe Middle East and Southern Africa (Geneva:2000), pp. 112–30; Victoria Percival and ThomasHomer-Dixon, “Environmental Scarcity and Vio-lent Conflict: The Case of South Africa,” Journalof Peace Research, vol. 35, no. 3 (1998), pp.279–98.

30. Box 5–3 from the following: environmentaland social impact from Patrick McCully, SilencedRivers (London: Zed Books, 2003), and fromWorld Commission on Dams, Dams and Devel-opment (London: Earthscan, 2001); marginality ofindigenous groups from Thayer Scudder, The

Future of Large Dams: Dealing with Social, Envi-ronmental, Institutional and Political Costs (Lon-don: Earthscan, 2004), and from Barbara RoseJohnston, ed., Life and Death Matters: HumanRights and the Environment at the End of the Mil-lennium (Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press,1997); Chixoy Dam development history fromWilliam L. Partridge, Comparative Analysis ofBID Experience with Resettlement Based on Eval-uations of the Arenal and Chixoy Projects, Con-sultant Report (Washington, DC: Inter-AmericanDevelopment Bank, 1983), from Barbara RoseJohnston, “Reparations for Dam-Displaced Com-munities?” Capitalism Nature Socialism, March2004, pp. 113–19, and from Paula Goldman,Casey Kelso, and Monika Parikh, “The ChixoyDam and the Massacres at Rio Negro, Agua Friaand Los Encuentros: A Report on MultilateralFinancial Institution Accountability,” submitted tothe U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rightsby the Working Group on Multilateral Institu-tion Accountability, Graduate Policy Workshop:Human Rights and Non-State Actors, WoodrowWilson School, Princeton University, December2000; Chixoy Dam–related violence and its effecton local people from Jesus Tecu Osorio, The RioNegro Massacres, translated from the Spanish orig-inal Memoria de las Masacres de Rio Negro (Wash-ington, DC: Rights Action, 2003); U.N. reportand other findings from American Association forthe Advancement of Science, “Guatemala: Mem-ory of Silence,” English version of the report of the Historical Clarification Commission, atshr.aaas.org/guatemala/ceh; Human RightsOffice, Archdiocese of Guatemala, Guatemala:Never Again! Recovery of Historical Memory Pro-ject (New York: Maryknoll Press, 1998); Witnessfor Peace, A People Dammed (Washington, DC:1996); Jaroslave Colajacomo, “The Chixoy Dam:The Maya Achi’ Genocide. The Story of ForcedResettlement,” Contributing Paper, World Com-mission on Dams (Cape Town, South Africa:1999); dam seizure from Frank Jack Daniels,“Mayan Indians Seize Disputed GuatemalanDam,” Reuters, 9 September 2004; Pak Mun andRasi Salai from “Rivers for Life: Inspirations andInsights from the 2nd International Meeting ofDam-Affected People and Their Allies,” Interna-tional Rivers Network and Environmental Lead-ership Program, 2004; reparations in the context


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of development legacy issues from Barbara RoseJohnston, “Reparations and the Right to Remedy,”Contributing Paper, World Commission on Dams(Cape Town, South Africa: 2000).

31. B. Colby and T. P. d’Estree, “EconomicEvaluation of Mechanisms to Resolve Water Con-flicts,” International Journal of Water ResourcesDevelopment, vol. 16, no. 2 (2000), pp. 239–51;Anthony R. Turton, “A Southern African Per-spective on Transboundary Water Resources Man-agement: Challenging Conventional Wisdom,”Environmental Change and Security Project Report,Issue 9 (2003), pp. 75–87.

32. Incomati and Maputo Rivers from Turton,op. cit. note 31.

33. This list is derived from Annika Kramer,Water and Conflict, Draft Policy Briefing Paperprepared for U.S. Agency for International Devel-opment, Office of Conflict Management and Mit-igation (Berlin, Bogor, and Washington, DC:Adelphi Research, Center for InternationalForestry Research, and Woodrow Wilson Inter-national Center for Scholars, 2004).

34. Ibid.; for Boran people, see www.bothends.org/encycl/cases/viewcase.php?cat=2&id=13&id_language=1; Arvari River from Iyer, op. cit.note 4; James D. Wolfensohn, “A Vision of Peaceand Development on the Nile,” Keynote Addressat launch of the International Consortium forCooperation on the Nile, Geneva, 26 June 2001.

35. For more information on the Every River HasIts People Project, see www.everyriver.net.

36. World Commission on Dams, op. cit. note30, p. 177.

37. Fitzroy Nation, “Wajir Peace Initiative—Kenya: Back to Future Dialogue and Coopera-tion,” Conflict Prevention Newsletter, January1999, pp. 4–5; for more information on the Nile Basin Initiative negotiations, see the Secre-tariat’s Web site, at www.nilebasin.org, or theWorld Bank’s Nile Basin Initiative Web site, atwww.worldbank.org/afr/nilebasin.

38. Carius, Dabelko, and Wolf, op. cit. note 3.

Resource Wealth and Conflict

1. One-quarter share from Michael Renner,The Anatomy of Resource Wars, Worldwatch Paper162 (Washington, DC: Worldwatch Institute,2002); number of deaths estimated from data inMilton Leitenberg, Deaths in Wars and ConflictsBetween 1945 and 2000 (College Park, MD: Cen-ter for International and Security Studies, Uni-versity of Maryland, 2001); refugee numbersderived from U.N. High Commissioner forRefugees, at www.unhcr.ch, viewed 25 August2002; internally displaced persons derived fromU.S. Committee for Refugees, at www.refugees.org, viewed 25 August 2002.

2. Renner, op. cit. note 1; U.N. DevelopmentProgramme, Human Development Report 2004(New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).

3. Renner, op. cit. note 1.

4. Ibid.; for an overview of cases in whichindigenous peoples confront resource companies,see International Forum on Globalization, “Glob-alization: Effects on Indigenous Peoples” wallchart, at www.ifg.org/programs/indig.htm#map;Dulue Mbachu, “Villagers Flee Troops, MilitiaFighting Near Nigerian Oil City,” Associated Press,10 September 2004.

5. Michael T. Klare, Resource Wars: The NewLandscape of Global Conflict (New York: Metro-politan Books, 2001); Michael Renner, “Post-Saddam Iraq: Linchpin of a New Oil Order,”Foreign Policy in Focus, January 2003; ChalmersJohnson, “America’s Empire of Bases,” TomDis-patch.com, January 2004, at www.tomdispatch.com/index.mhtml?pid=1181; Matthew Yeomans,“Oil, Guns and Money,” 2 September 2004,Global Policy Forum, at www.globalpolicy.org/empire/analysis/2004/0902yeomans.htm.

6. Caspian from Lutz Kleveman, “Oil and theNew ‘Great Game’,” The Nation, 16 February2004, pp. 12–13; Ayako Doi, “Asian Enmities—China and Japan Revert to Hostility, and Hope forReconciliation Fades,” Washington Post, 29 August


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2004; James Brooke, “The Asian Battle for Rus-sia’s Oil and Gas,” New York Times, 3 January2004; Julio Godoy, “U.S. and France Begin aGreat Game in Africa,” allAfrica.com, 11 August2004; Eric Schmitt, “Pentagon Seeking NewAccess Pacts for African Bases,” New York Times,5 July 2003; Gerald Butt, “Thirst for CrudePulling China Into Sudan,” The Daily Star (Beirut,Lebanon), 17 August 2004; Felix Onua, “Nige-ria and United States Agree on Military Exercisesin Oil Delta,” Reuters, 13 August 2004; Alexan-dra Guáqueta, “The Colombian Conflict: Politi-cal and Economic Dimensions,” in KarenBallentine and Jake Sherman, eds., The PoliticalEconomy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed andGrievance (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Pub-lishers, 2003), pp. 73–106.

7. Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew M. Warner,“Natural Resource Abundance and EconomicGrowth,” Development Discussion Paper (Cam-bridge, MA: Harvard Institute for InternationalDevelopment, 1995).

8. Marc Lacey, “War Is Still a Way of Life forCongo Rebels,” New York Times, 21 November2002; Finbarr O’Reilly, “Rush for NaturalResources Still Fuels War in Congo,” Reuters, 10August 2004; illegal networks from UnitedNations Security Council, Final Report of thePanel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Nat-ural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of theDemocratic Republic of the Congo (New York:2002).

9. Renner, op. cit. note 1.

10. For transparency codes and other efforts,see Ian Bannon and Paul Collier, eds., NaturalResources and Violent Conflict: Options and Actions(Washington, DC: World Bank, 2003).

11. Ibid.; Ian Smillie, Conflict Diamonds: Unfin-ished Business (Ottawa, ON, Canada: InternationalDevelopment Research Centre, 2002); U.S. Gov-ernment Accounting Office, Critical Issues Remainin Deterring Conflict Diamond Trade (Washing-ton, DC: 2002), pp. 17–21; Jeremy Smith, “E.U.Aims to Stem Illegal Rainforest Timber Trade,”Reuters, 14 October 2003.

12. See, for example, the Campaign to EliminateConflict Diamonds at www.phrusa.org/campaigns/sierra_leone/conflict_diamonds.html, theFatal Transactions Campaign at www.niza.nl/fataltransactions/partner.html, Global Witness atwww.globalwitness.org, Christian Aid atwww.christian-aid.org.uk, and Project Under-ground at www.moles.org.

The Private Sector

1. United Nations, “Role of Business in ArmedConflict Can Be Crucial—‘For Good and For Ill’Secretary-General Tells Security Council OpenDebate on Issue,” press release (New York: 15April 2004).

2. Human Rights Watch, Sudan, Oil, andHuman Rights (New York: 2003); EssentialAction/Global Exchange, Oil for Nothing—Multi-national Corporations, Environmental Destruc-tion, Death and Impunity in the Niger Delta (SanFrancisco and Washington, DC: 1999); UnitedNations, Sierra Leone: Report of the Panel of ExpertsAppointed Pursuant to UN Security Council Res-olution 1306 (New York: 2000); Global Witness,All the Presidents’ Men—The Devastating Story ofOil and Banking in Angola’s Privatised War (Lon-don: 2002); U.S. Senate Committee on Banking,Housing, and Urban Affairs, The Financial Waron Terrorism and the Administration’s Implemen-tation of Title III of The USA Patriot Act (Wash-ington, DC: 29 January 2002).

3. Karl Vick, “Oil Money is Fueling Sudan’sWar: New Arms Used to Drive Southerners fromLand,” Washington Post, 11 June 2001; ChristianAid, The Scorched Earth: Oil and War in Sudan(London: 2001); correlation between oil revenuesand defense spending from Dita Smith and LarisKarklis, “Graphic: Fuelling War,” Washington Post,11 June 2001; use of landing strip from JohnHarker, Human Security in the Sudan: The Reportof a Canadian Assessment Mission (Ottawa, ON,Canada: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade,2000), p. 15.

4. Alison Azer, “Talismanized—Talisman’s Exit,Sudan’s Legacy,” Corporate Knights, 25 March2004.


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5. Feizal Samath, “Sri Lankans Make PeaceTheir Business,” Asia Times, 6 September 2002;idem, “Sri Lanka: Amid Peace, Business Turns toEducation, Health,” Interpress Service, 5 Decem-ber 2002; Women Waging Peace, “Spotlight onNeela Marikkar, Sri Lanka,” at www.womenwagingpeace.net/content/articles/0222a.html.

6. Rachel Goldwyn and Jason Switzer, Assess-ments, Communities and Peace—A Critique ofExtractive Sector Assessment Tools from a ConflictSensitive Perspective (Winnipeg, MB, Canada:IISD/International Alert, 2003); Jessica Banfield,Virginia Haufler, and Damian Lilly, TransnationalCorporations in Conflict Prone Zones: Public Pol-icy Responses and a Framework for Action (London:International Alert, 2003); International FinanceCorporation, Safeguard Policy for EnvironmentalAssessment (currently under review) (Washington,DC: 1998).

7. Publish What You Pay campaign, atwww.publishwhatyoupay.org; Extractive Indus-tries Transparency Initiative, at www2.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/eitinewslettermarch04.pdf.

8. Georgette Gagnon, Audrey Macklin, andPenelope Simons, Deconstructing Engagement:Corporate Self-Regulation in Conflict Zones—Implications for Human Rights and CanadianPublic Policy (Ottawa, ON, Canada: SSHRC/LawCommission of Canada, 2003); Philippe Le Billon,Getting It Done: Instruments of Enforcement, inPaul Collier and Ian Bannon, eds., NaturalResources and Violent Conflict: Options and Actions(Washington, DC: World Bank, 2003).

9. For more on Afghanistan and other pilotefforts at business investment in post-conflictzones, see Business Humanitarian Forum, atwww.bhforum.ch; for more on tri-sector partner-ships in the extractives sector, see the NaturalResource Cluster of the Business Partners forDevelopment initiative, at www.bpd-naturalresources.org; for multistakeholder groups, see, forexample, the Chad-Cameroon Independent Assur-ance Group, at www.gic-aig.org.

Chapter 6. Changing the Oil Economy

1. Products made with petroleum fromwww.anwr.org/features/oiluses.htm, viewed 1August 2004.

2. Amory Lovins, Energy Security Facts: Detailsand Documentation, 2nd ed. (Snowmass, CO:Rocky Mountain Institute, 2003), p. 8; Figure6–1 adapted from U.S. Department of Energy(DOE), Energy Information Administration (EIA),Energy in the United States, 1635–2000, atwww.eia.doe.gov/emeu/aer/eh/frame.html.

3. Vaclav Smil, Energy in World History (Boul-der, CO: Westview Press, 1994), p. 187; sourceand emissions data from International EnergyAgency (IEA), Key World Energy Statistics 2003(Paris: 2003); oil share of transportation sectorenergy consumption from DOE, EIA, AnnualEnergy Review 2003 (Washington, DC: 2004), p.42. Box 6–1 from the following: top corporationsfrom “Forbes 500s,”Forbes Magazine Online,viewed 4 August 2004; revenues from Oil and GasJournal, 15 September 2003, p. 46; 10 largest cor-porations worldwide from Sarah Anderson andJohn Cavanaugh, Top 200: The Rise of CorporateGlobal Power (Washington, DC: Institute for Pol-icy Studies, 2000); automobile production andfleet data from Worldwatch Institute, “WorldAutomobile Production, 1950–2003” and “WorldPassenger Car Fleet, 1950–2003, in Signposts2004, CD-ROM (Washington, DC: 2004); Chi-nese auto data from Peter S. Goodman, “Car Cul-ture Captivates China,” Washington Post, 8 March2004; air travel from Worldwatch Institute, “WorldAir Travel, 1950–2002,” in Signposts 2004, op.cit. this note.

4. Culture of energy consumption from PaulRoberts, The End of Oil: On the Edge of a PerilousNew World (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2004), p.31.

5. IEA, Analysis of the Impact of High Oil Priceson the Global Economy (Paris: 2004); Robert D.McTeer, “The Gas in Our Tanks” (op-ed), WallStreet Journal, 11 May 2004.

6. DOE, op. cit. note 3, p. 9; British Petroleum


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