state of women in pakistan
TRANSCRIPT
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State of Women in Pakistan
Introduction:
Woman is one of the best creatures of the universe. She has been equally endowed with in
terms of intellect, prudence and rights as man has been.The state of woman in Pakistan as
compared to man are awfully miserable. She is badly victim of domestic violence and sexual
assaults at working places. She is indeed meted out with massive atrocity and injustice. Sheis being denied her due social, economic, political and financial rights. She suffers badly in
pursuit of her fundamental rights.
Surprisingly enough, she has been deprived of her basic birth right of education which is the
best source of women empowerment. It is only education that can empower her not only
socially but also financially and professionally. It will be because of education that helps her
widen the mental horizon. Thus, it is an undeniable fact that provision of education to every
ordinary woman on the basis of equality can considerably change her fate. Undoubtedly,
education plays a role of backbone in the development of woman at every level.
The state of rural women as compared to urban ones needs urgent attention. The rural
women are undergoing worst experiences at the hands of feudal lards. The have been kept
vastly ignorant of their fundamental rights such as education, health, participation inpolitics, professional and financial liberty. They being illiterate and uneducated can not fight
for their basic rights. This gruesome state of woman is just because of lack of education.
Inevitably enough, poor economic condition of woman has badly told upon state of woman.
She has no say in any domestic affairs of life. She has been victim of male dominance. It is
only male, who is to wield power in both domestic and private affairs of life. Whether it be
choice of marriage, casting votes and some other financial and professional matters.
There is another social evil of our society which is feudalism. It wipes out the entire factors
which help woman to be empowered. It has really become a stumbling block in woman
Empowerment. This social evil urgently needs to be addressed so that the chances of
woman empowerment can became possible in the near future.
Truly speaking, the poor state of woman can only be improved by promoting educationranging from primary to higher level and opening up the doors of opportunity for jobs in
different departments. So that they can become socially, economically, politically and
professionally strong.
Factors which mar state of women in Pakistan
Illiteracy
Poverty
Feudalism
Weak institution
Judiciary
Parliament Executive
Lack of Political awareness
Cultural barriers
Misinterpretation of Islam in terms of woman empowerment
Corrupt media
Illiteracy:
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Illiteracy indeed is a big obstacle to the social, economic and political development of
woman. It has rendered common woman the helpless, voiceless and ignorant of their basic
privileges. They being illiterate and under privileged cannot voice against the atrocities
meted out to them. They have been reduced to extreme voracity and hunger. The
developed nations of the world are encouraging woman empowerment by promoting
standard education to women. Thus, they become strong not only socially and economicallybut also politically and professionally while the less developed countries are questing for
foreign aid in terms of female education and spends a negligible amount of education and
the rest of the amount is to be swallowed by the corrupt people and overlooking the
standard of female education. As a result, most of the women remain illiterate and become
unaware about their birth rights of education.
Finally, if education is given to women, they can easily become able to snatch their
fundamental rights. They can also become capable of doing profession and thus avoiding
the pangs of hunger and voracity.
Truly speaking, promotion of education among women can enable them to be economically
and politically strong. Thus, they will stop depending upon their parents in terms of financial
support.
Poverty:
It is well said that poverty is the mother of crime or revolution. So far it has not brought
about revolution in society but it has surely raised the ratio of crime in society. Poverty and
illiteracy are inextricably interwoven with each other. Illiteracy breeds poverty and poverty
creates crime and crime disrupts the whole social economic. As a result, not only the
women but also the entire society suffers at the hands of poverty. There is no doubt about it
that poverty has rendered common women unable to attain even primary education. Thus
many a woman falls prey to it becoming helpless and fed up. It is only because of poverty
that woman is socially, economically and politically weak. If all women were rich enough to
deal with all affairs of life, they could exercise enormous influence in every spheres of life.They usually depend on their male members in terms of economic and social security.
Resultantly, they turn, to be enormously weak and fragile. Poverty has really affected on
the creative ability of women. It has bred numerous hindrances in the way of womens
intellectual development. As it is rightly said that hungry man is angry man. It means when
you are hungry, you are not in a position to do any work effectively. Thus it can safely be
said that if poverty remains intact then there is a greater unlikelihood of women
empowerment and the state of poor woman cannot improve in near future.
Feudalism:
Feudalism is a greater impediment to social, economic and political development of women.
It has utterly damaged the state of women in Pakistan. Feudalistic attitude in any society is
not a good omen. It often discourages national development of a country.Regrettably enough, the state of women in Pakistan has been reduced to the beasts and
animals. It is only feudal who exercise absolute power over women and their male member
are at their call and back. They dare not voice against their opinions or views. They are their
slaves and nothing more. The poor farmers whether male or female heavily depend on them
for their livelihood. They have no any source of income except harboring the fields of
landlords. Moreover, feudalism is a huge hindrance to educational development whether it is
for girls or boys. They dont allow the government to build schools in their premises. If
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warrior. Bibi Aysha Prophets wife a war against Hazrat Ali. It means that she can wage a
war participate in it. Thus it is proven from the facts of Islam that women are free to be
professionals and adopt any way that can protect her basic rights of liberty. But regrettably
the ulema of Islam are not discussing these basic issues of women empowerment in open
public. They can address these issues at the occasion of Juma prayer frequently and this
frequent discussion can remove rigid and narrow minded approach toward women. ReqularJuma prayer address regarding the state of women in Pakistan can mould the opinion of
common men in favour of women. In this way every ordinary man will be vastly aware of
the rights of women. As a result, of all these repeated address, as about women
empowerment can help the masses to care for the privileges of women. But what happens
here that every ulema belonging to the lower category who are virtually hailing from
villages admit in madressa for the purpose of gaining religious knowledge. Now how can
man hailing from village can easily understand the multi dimensional modern scientific
trends and requirements of the globe. This seems quite impossible that this kind of man
may represent true Islam. He cannot fathom out the various global phenomena such as
woman empowerment, rise of democracy, professional and personal liberty, religious
tolerance.Finally, the role of ulema can play an effective role in bringing about the improvement in the
state of women and it can further develop the state of women in better condition.
Corrupt media:
Corrupt media men have played havoc with socio-economic and political development of
women. It has not yielded positive result yet. It has failed to protect the real state of
women of Pakistan at international level. Majority of the poor women being victim of
domestic or professional violence cannot cast their viewpoints before any authorized
organization of the state. The reason as to why the media has not reached them is lack of
access to the far flung areas of the country. Most of the media men demand for certain
amount of rupees for projecting their issue at national as well as international level. These
are number of women who die of hunger daily. They cannot eke out their living comfortably.The media persons are absolutely reluctant to spread the news at a considerable level. But
on the contrary they make fun of their misery and plight. In this way one can find such
examples in our society on daily basis.
Now it is our responsibility being citizens of the country that we should exercise enormous
pressure on the media men to end this brutal trend of women harassment which bitterly
mass the state of women.
The factors that can foster women development are as under:
Promotion of education among women.
Reduction of poverty.
Abolition of feudalism. Strong institution ensuring women empowerment.
Social, political, cultural financial and professional liberty among women.
Positive role f religions in terms of women empowerment.
Job opportunities for women.
Legislation on honor-killing, child marriage and vatta-satta system of marriage.
Promotion of education among women:
Promotion of education among women at primary and secondary level can greatly improve
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the state of women in Pakistan. Indeed it is education that renders common women socially
politically and economically strong. When they become strong, they stop being dependent
on their parents in terms of support. Thus the state of women can highly be improved by
the incredible enhancement of education among them.
Reduction of poverty:
This is an undeniable fact that poverty has wreaked havoc with socio-economic and politicaldevelopment of women. It is poverty that has made them unable to get standard education.
It is because of lack of education less access to wealth that women face sheer injustice and
torture at the hands of cruel and barbaric people. They bear that torture and persecution in
ignorance. As a result, most women fall succumb to depression and dejection. If the
government of Pakistan and other several NGOs working for the reduction of the poverty
take it serious and start pondering over the plight of woman that she suffers because of
abject poverty can easily be managed so as to make the state of women better and worth
living.
Abolition of Feudalism:
Truly speaking, it is feudalism that has brought common woman to the verge of destruction
and devastation. It has become a great hurdle in improving the state of Pakistan woman. Ithas incredibly discouraged promotion of education of both male and female in rural areas in
particular and common in urban areas. It means it has utterly damaged the state of women
in Pakistan. Now it is the crying need of the hour that it must be wiped out of the face of the
globe so that the state of woman and colossal development at national level can be ensured
for the better future of the country. Because developed countries of the world see the
development of women in different sphere of life. Later they call the developed countries
the developed ones. If the state of women is not plausible then they do not call it a
developed country.
Strong institutions:
Strong institutions play a vital role in developing socio-economic and political condition of
women. Undoubtedly, strong institutions can certainly provide for speedy justice and viableimplementations of different laws passed by the assembly. If these institutions start working
effectively and honestly, nothing can do wrong in the country. All the developed countries, it
is just because of their strong institutions that they face no pangs of torture and persecution
at the hands of the institutions.
Again it is institutions that can help improve not only the oppressed women but also every
segment of society, victim of any oppression and brutality. Social, political, cultural,
financial and professional liberty can massively improve the state of women in Pakistan.
Social and political development of women can help them to be socially and politically active
and enabling them to participate in social-politico activities of life. This will enhance their
intellectual and personal qualities. On the other hand, financial and professional liberty of
women can also make them self reliant and self dependent. They will deal their matters oflife on their won. They being professionally liberal begin their independent life depending on
no body in terms of economy. Thus, socio-economic and political liberty of women can
enormously add to the development of women in every walk of life.
Positive role of religious scholars in terms of womens empowerment:
Religious scholars can play a positive role in bringing about improvement in the state of
women. Ours is a highly religious society. It greatly influences their socio-economic spheres
of life. It is religious scholars who can easily mould the opinions of various persons in terms
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of developing the social, economic and political development of women. Islam is also in
favour of women empowerment. It was Islam which gave her due socio-economic rights. It
never discouraged their professional and personal liberty. But here the ulemas of our
country are not addressing there sensitive issues so as to develop their role in every walk of
life. Last but not the least, the state of women can massively be improved if the role of our
religious scholars remains positive and satisfactory.Job opportunities for women:
Indubitably enough, job opportunities for women in different departments are very scanty.
This has badly discouraged women from applying for the jobs. They have least means to
scraps by. As a result, most of them get fed with seeking for something than can meet their
incomes. Thus it is inevitably necessary that our government should open the doors of
opportunities for their jobs in various departments so that they can make the best of their
abilities in earning certain amount of sum and lead an easy and comfortable life. This will
further encourages the women empowerment and make them excited for applying next
time for the jobs.
Legislation on honour, killing, child marriage of girls and system of vatta-satta marriage:
Traditional honour-killing, child marriage of girls and system of vatta-satta marriage hasawfully maligned the state of women in Pakistan. These hateful traditional practices are
extremely obnoxious for women development. If the present phenomenon remains intact,
the development of women at socio-economic and political level might be least possible. It
is now crying need of the hour that government of Pakistan, should legislate on these
sensitive issues which halt women empowerment at a large scale parliament, judiciary and
executive may take strong measures in order to tackle these in for moldable problems
which are extremely injurious to the social, economic, political professional progress of
women. If these institutions are failed to cope with these issues then surely the state of
women in Pakistan is in great jeopardy.
Conclusion:
Finally, the state of women can only be improved on the basis of promotion of education,greater participation in politics and widespread awareness about social, economic and
political issues. Professional and financial liberty can further improve the state of women.
Reduction of poverty and feudalism can open numerous chances for the improvement of the
state of woman in Pakistan. Positive role of religious scholars and media can hopefully
ameliorate the miserable state of women in to a pleasant one. Last but not the least, the
role of strong and cogent institutions can also heighten the state of women of Pakistan.
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Economic Problems
EVER since its birth almost 60 years ago, Pakistans economy has been on a roller-
coaster. It does well when foreign capital flows become available to the country.
This happened in the first seven years of President Ayub Khans tenure whenAmerica poured in economic and military assistance into the country. The
consequence was a pick up in growth with the rate of increase in GDP improving
to more than 6.5 per cent a year.
In the first post-independence decade, the GDP had increased by only 2.7 per cent
a year. The American flow of money was in return for Pakistans participation in
the defence pacts sponsored by the US to contain the spread of communism to
Asia. Americas help stopped after Pakistan went to war with India. It resumed
again but at a much reduced level.
In the 1970s, Pakistan isolated itself from the West first by initiating militaryaction against the secessionist forces in East Pakistan and then by opting for an
independent foreign policy. Under Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Pakistan built
strong relations with China, a country that was out of favour with the United
States.
Accordingly, Bhuttos Pakistan was not a favoured destination for foreign
assistance. His socialist policies which led to the nationalisation of large scale
industries and commercial banks were not popular with such development
institutions as the World Bank and Asian Development Bank. They also reduced
the amount of assistance provided to the country. There were other reasons for
the economys poor performance during the Bhutto period, but fall in foreign flowsplayed an important role. The rate of growth in GDP declined to only 3.9 per cent
in 1971-77.
Pakistan did not immediately return to favour following the demise of Bhuttos
regime. That happened in 1980 following the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet
Union. Once Pakistan signed on as a very active partner in the American effort to
force Moscow out of Afghanistan, foreign flows started in large quantities once
again. That led to a pick-up in GDP growth; it increased to 6.5 per cent a year. But
the flow of American money began to dry up again once Pakistans job was done
and the Soviet Union vacated Afghanistan. In 1989, President George H.W. Bush
failed to certify that Pakistan was not engaged in developing a nuclear bomb. Thatcertificate was a condition of continuous American support. In its absence, US aid
stopped flowing.
In terms of foreign capital flows, the 1990s were a difficult period. The decision by
the government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to follow India and carry out
nuclear tests in May 1998 resulted in western sanctions being imposed on both
countries. Once again, there were other reasons for the slowdown in economic
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growth but a decline in the availability of foreign capital was an important
contributing factor. The rate of GDP increase declined to 4.7 per cent a year in
1988-99.
The military government that took office in October 1999 had to wait for two years
before Pakistan gained favour once again with the West, in particular with theUnited States. That happened immediately after the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001, on the United States. Large amounts of foreign assistance began to flow
into the country after General Pervez Musharraf pledged his full support for the
American war against terrorism.The economy benefited from the opening up of the
aid tap. America also helped by easing Pakistans debt burden. The rate of GDP
increase began to pick up in 2003. For the 1999-2006 period, I estimate GDP
growth at 5.7 per cent a year. The conclusion from this quick overview of the
performance of the economy over the last 60 years is obvious: there is a direct
relationship between Pakistans economic performance and its foreign policy.
Pakistan is about to hit a rough spot again. What happened in 1965 when thecountry fought a sharp and brief war with India and what happened again in 1989
when Pakistan, working with the United States, was able to force the Soviet Union
out of Afghanistan, is going to occur again. History will repeat itself, perhaps not
this year, perhaps not also in 2008, but most likely in 2009 when the reins of the
American government will change hands in Washington.
What I am referring to is the likelihood of the withdrawal of American assistance
to Pakistan. This will happen as the situation worsens both in Iraq and
Afghanistan and Washington, under a new set of leaders, begins the process of
pulling out of these two countries.
Two, not so subtle changes are afoot in Washington. The first is a growing belief
that it was wrong for America to attack Iraq and, once having attacked that
country, not plan properly to occupy it. For the moment, the critics of the Iraq war
and they are growing by the day as the number of American casualties mount
and the Sunni-Shia conflict takes on a sharper edge are of the view that instead
of spending more human and financial resources in that losing endeavour,
Washington should concentrate on Afghanistan.
The American invasion of Afghanistan and the defeat of the Taliban are generally
considered to be justified moves. It troubles many people that by going into Iraq,
Washington allowed itself to be distracted from what should have been its mainaim: to destroy for good the bases from which terrorists could attack America and
its interests, and to create an environment that would not produce movements
such as Al Qaeda.
The second change in thinking is equally important. For instance a recently
published book by a highly respected scholar, John Mueller, presents a case to the
American public that it did not adopt the right set of policies after the terrorist
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attacks on its territory. Titled Overblown, the book argues that the United States
response to 9/11 not just the war in Iraq but the entire war on terror was an
overreaction. The response was overblown.
In his words: Which is the greater threat: terrorism, or our reaction against it? . .
. A threat that is real but likely to prove to be of limited scope has been massively,perhaps even fancifully, inflated to produce widespread and unjustified anxiety.
This process has then led to wasteful expenditures and policy overreactions.
The stage, therefore, is being set for America to pull back from some of the
forward positions it has taken since 9/11. There are many moments in the
countrys history when, after a military effort that produced unhappy results,
America withdrew into itself, leaving the world to take care of itself. Such a
moment arrived more than a century ago when its military involvement in the
Philippines became unpopular at home. The result was a period of isolationism
broken only by the First World War. America was reluctant to enter the Second
World War. It was drawn into it by the successful machinations of WinstonChurchill and the ill-advised Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour.
If the successor to President George W. Bush in the White House decides to
rewrite American strategy in the world he (or she) is very likely to abandon the
pre-emptive strike option that became the Bush doctrine. There is great likelihood
that the next US administration will leave the world more or less on its own.
If that happens, what will be the consequences for Pakistan? What I have said
above about the possible change in thinking by the American policy elite was by
way of a prelude to the suggestion that Pakistan is once again headed towards
difficult times. Contrary to what the countrys leaders have repeatedly said andpossibly believe in Pakistan has not prepared itself for the day when it will have
to stand on its own feet.
The economy has done well in the last three years for the simple reason that it has
received large amounts of external capital flows to produce savings for
investment. These flows have come from five sources: American assistance,
assistance provided by other donors, remittances by the members of the Pakistani
diaspora, investments by foreigners and foreign entities and capital raised in
international financial markets.
Four out of these five sources are likely to reduce the amounts they are preparedto direct towards Pakistan if political instability returns to the country and if
Islamic radicals gain further ground. If that were to happen, even the fifth source
the Pakistani diaspora may have serious misgivings about its continuing
involvement.
While the large amount of American assistance to Pakistan since 9/11 was the
product of that countrys preoccupation with terrorism, other donors, and foreign
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investors were putting money into the country out of a conviction that Pakistan
needed to be helped or had some attractive opportunities available for making a
reasonable amount of profit for the willing investor.
These perceptions have also begun to change. Islamic militants are becoming
more assertive in the country lending to the increasing belief that Pakistan is not asafe place to do business in. The western press has also begun to project its belief
that Pakistan is getting involved in activities that are deeply resented by its
neighbours. On two days, February 19 and 20, 2007, The New York Times
published three stories that portrayed Pakistan in an unfavourable light. In one,
the paper detailed how North Waziristan had become the new base for Al Qaedas
operations.
Then there was the accusation by a senior Iranian official according to which a
Sunni group was using western Balochistan as a sanctuary and training ground for
mounting attacks on the countrys Revolutionary Guards. And, finally, there was a
story that militants operating out of Pakistan may be responsible for blowing up aPakistan bound train north of New Delhi. Nearly 70 people were killed in that
incident.
With likely reduction in American assistance, with the shying away of foreign
investors and with exports not increasing at the rate at which they can adequately
finance critical imports, Pakistan will have to rely almost totally on the amounts
sent from abroad by the members of the expatriate community. There are two
parts to this particular flow. One part constitutes the money sent in to support
families and friends. The other part represents investments made in the homeland
by the members of the diaspora. The second part will be in jeopardy if the
international community loses confidence in Pakistans economic future.
It is unfortunate and it is a consequence of the failure of public policy that
Pakistan is once again heading towards difficult times. It has made little effort to
provide a domestic base for the growth of the economy. Without such an effort in
place, Pakistan seems poised to take another plunge down the economic roller-
coaster.
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High cost of the conflict
ECONOMIC costs associated with the pestering Kashmir conflict and the resultant
slowdown in the rate of economic growth can be estimated by using
counterfactual analyses of the type described in a previous article. This can bedone by estimating the cost of the conflict and likely benefits that would have
resulted had relations between the two countries been more amicable.
We can distinguish among four different costs of the conflict and than estimate the
benefits that would have accrued to the economy and to the society had India and
Pakistan been on better terms with each other. The four areas of likely benefit
include reduced military expenditures; increase in intra-regional trade, in
particular trade between India and Pakistan; a larger flow of foreign direct
investment; and an investor-friendly domestic environment.
There is no doubt that in the absence of the Kashmir dispute, military expenditureas a proportion of GDP would have been lower in the case of Pakistan than for
India. Small countries in the neighbourhood of large states tend to spend less on
defence if relations among them are cordial. In 2002, Argentina, for instance,
spent only 1.1 per cent of its GDP on defence compared to 1.6 per cent for Brazil.
For Canada, the proportion was only 1.1 per cent compared to 3.4 per cent for the
United States.
Even Bangladesh, that now has uneasy relations with India, the countrys much
larger neighbour, spent only 1.1 per cent on defence. If Pakistan had spent 2.5 per
cent on defence a proportion roughly equivalent to that of India it could have
saved as much as three per cent of GDP a year. Compounded over this period, theamount saved is equivalent to four times the countrys gross domestic product.
What would have been the consequence if this entire amount had been invested in
the economy? Assuming that the rate of return would have been the same as that
realized from investments in the past, additional capital flows into the economy
would have significantly added to the rate of growth of the economy. Put another
way, military expenditure maintained at a level of 2.5 per cent a year with savings
utilized at an incremental capital ratio of four which means that investment
equal to four per cent of GDP raises the rate of GDP growth by one per cent
would have increased the long-term GDP growth rate by as much as 0.75 per cent
a year. This addition to the rate of GDP growth compounded over a period of 55years would have meant an increase of more than 50 per cent in the size of the
gross domestic product.
While a smaller amount committed to military expenditure would have directly
contributed to increasing GDP growth, conflict with India also hurt Pakistan by
reducing trade as a proportion of its economy. Indias initial antipathy towards
Pakistan was not the result of the Kashmir dispute. The first generation of Indian
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leaders in particular Jawaharlal Nehru, the countrys prime minister and Sardar
Vallahbhai Patel, the powerful interior minister in the first Indian cabinet were
angry at Mohammad Ali Jinnah, and his political associates.
Jinnah and his colleagues stood in the way of the realization of the Hindu
leaderships dream of a united India. The Indian leaders were also convinced thatthey could get Pakistan to return to the Indian fold by increasing the economic
cost of separation. It was this reason and not because of Kashmir that India
launched its first trade war against Pakistan. However, Kashmir later worsened
relations between the two countries and progressively loosened the strong
economic links that had existed between the two parts of British India before they
became independent states.
Had the two countries continued to trade at the level of the exchanges that
occurred before independence, the rate of increase in international trade in the
case of Pakistan would have been of the order of eight to 10 per cent a year,
rather than the average six per cent achieved over the last quarter of a century.This, too, would have contributed to increasing the growth in GDP.
The World Bank maintains that growth in trade leads to an increase in GDP by a
perceptible amount. It is not an exaggeration to suggest that by maintaining trade
with India at the levels of the late 1940s Pakistan would have added another one-
third to half a percentage point to its GDP increase. This would have meant an
additional one-third increase in the current level of GDP.
The other important outcome of good relations with India would have been
greater flow of foreign direct investment into the country. The contribution large
FDI flows have made to the development and modernization of the economies ofEast Asia is now well recognized. South Asia has not benefited from the increased
availability of these flows in large part because of the security problems
associated with the Kashmir conflict.
There were other reasons as well, among them the less open economic policies
followed by the countries in South Asia for nearly four decades. However, even
when these policies were abandoned in favour of greater openness and they
were in the early 1990s foreign capital still did not become an important
component of investment for the South Asian region. This was particularly the
case for Pakistan. Better relations with India and greater amounts of intra-
regional trade would have brought in additional foreign direct investment into thecountry, adding significantly to the relatively low level of domestic savings and
domestic investments. In 2002, Pakistan received $823 million FDI compared to
$3 billion for India. Both countries did poorly in that area compared to those in
East Asia. For instance, Malaysia received $3.2 billion, Thailand $2.4 billion, South
Korea $2.0 billion, and the Philippines $1.1 billion.
Foreign investors stayed away partly because of the less open economies of the
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region but also because of the virtual absence of intra-regional trade and a deep
concern about security. If these concerns were not there, both India and Pakistan
would have attracted amounts of capital on the order of perhaps $10 billion for the
former and $2 billion a year for the latter. Two billion dollars of foreign flows
would be equivalent to three per cent of Pakistans GDP.
Pakistan has had a long history of poor domestic savings rates which translate
into low rates of investment unless foreign capital is available. In the 1990s while
domestic savings increased from 11 to 13 per cent from 1990 to 2002 gross
capital formation declined by four percentage points, from 19 to 15 per cent of
gross domestic product. The eight per cent savings-investment gap was covered
by foreign flows in 1990; the decline in foreign flows brought investment closer to
domestic savings by 2002.
Had foreign private capital been available in 2002 to the extent suggested above
in the neighbourhood of $2 billion a year this would have brought investment
back to the levels of the late 1980s. Foreign flows amounting to about three percent of GDP would have added about 0.75 per cent to the rate of economic growth.
A serious investment gap emerged between Pakistan and India in the 1990s at the
height of the insurgency in Kashmir. According to a study carried out by Ijaz Nabi
and his associates at the World Bank, private investment in India and Pakistan
was about the same in 1982-1991. However in 1992-2001, private investment in
Pakistan was six percentage points lower than in India. A part of this gap say
about 75 per cent can be attributed to the deterioration of the investment
climate in Pakistan caused by the rise of Islamic militancy in the country which in
turn was associated with the Kashmir problem.
These factors lowered investment rates in Pakistan by 4.5 percentage points
compared to that in India. This implies loss in growth of at least one percentage
point of GDP. Stable relations with India would have brought economic and
perhaps also economic stability to Pakistan. This would have produced better
investment climate in the country and contributed to higher levels of domestic
savings and investment. This would have also contributed to increasing the rate of
GDP growth.
By aggregating the four positive consequences for the Pakistani economy if the
country had not gotten embroiled in the Kashmir dispute, it would appear that the
countrys long-term growth rate could have been some two to two and a halfpercentage points higher than that actually achieved. A higher rate of growth of
this magnitude, sustained over a period of half a century, would have increased
the gross product by a factor of between 3.4 and 4.4. Pakistans gross domestic
product could have been three and a half times larger than that in 2003-04 $330
billion rather than $95 billion and its income per capita would have been $2200
rather than $630 had the country been at peace with India.
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This estimate, of course, is a very rough order of magnitude. It is based on a
series of heroic assumptions about the efficient use of resources diverted from
military to development expenditure; about a significant increase in trade with
India and higher level of trade contributing to economic growth; about Pakistan
becoming an attractive area for foreign direct investment; and about domestic
savings and investment increasing with the presence of tranquillity in the region.Even if half of the benefits estimated above had been actually realized, they are
sizable and they would have changed the economic, political and social
complexion of Pakistan.
In sum a good case can be made that Pakistan, in particular, has paid a very heavy
economic, social and political cost for continuing to keep the Kashmir case on the
front burner. This is a good time to take a very hard look at the cost-benefit
calculus of the position the country has adopted in the past over the dispute in
Kashmir. The situation has begun to change largely because of the promise of
peace between India and Pakistan. New investments have begun to flow into the
country in particular from the Arab world; Pakistans own private sector hasbecome active; the rate of economic growth has picked up perceptibly; the
incidence of poverty has begun to decline; Pakistan now seems ready to join other
fast growing Asian economies. It would be a pity if Kashmir is allowed to
intervene once again in the form of a dispute that attracts extremist elements in
both countries. They will try to derail the process on which India and Pakistan are
currently engaged. Both Delhi and Islamabad must resist these attempts.
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Security Implications for Pakistan
A nation's foreign and security policy formulation and execution rests on the
quality of its domestic polity. The quality of domestic polity, in turn, is based upon
the nature and type of its civil-military relations. Huntington argues, "Nations
which develop a properly balanced pattern of civil-military relations have a greatadvantage in the search for security...[and] nations which fail to develop a
balanced pattern of civil-military relations squander their resources and run
uncalculated risk." [40]
Having discussed the causes of intervention we now come to the ramifications of
the intervention. What are the imperatives of the military regime for Pakistan's
security? In the first instance, has security under the military regime improved or
been undermined? How is security defined and interpreted under the military,
internally or externally? What view of security prevails and remains predominant
under the current regime? And more specifically, how does the present, overtly
military rule impact Pakistan's foreign security relations, especially vis--vis theUnited States, India, and Afghanistan? Is there any substantial foreign policy shift
in relation to these countries?
Today the concept of "security" can primarily be defined along two broad
dimensions: internal and external. Traditionally, this distinction was based upon
the assumptions that threats to a state's security arise from outside its borders
and that these threats are primarily, if not exclusively, military in nature and
usually require a military response if the security of the target state is to be
preserved. [41] In other words, a state's level of security and insecurity is defined
in relation to vulnerabilitiesboth internal and externalthat threaten to have the
potential to bring down or weaken state structures, both territorial andinstitutional, and governing regimes. [42] Therefore, as Caroline Thomas explains,
in the context of developing states, "Security does not simply refer to the military
dimension, as is often assumed in Western discussions of the concept...[but also
to] the search for internal security of the state through nation-building, the search
for a secure system of food, health, money and trade, as well as the search for
security through nuclear weapons." [43] Thus, to ensure a state's security, a
delicate balance must be preserved and reconciled between the military and civil
society. The dilemma this relationship poses for a developing country is in the
question, "What if the two are mutually exclusive?" Or, "What if there exists an
inverse or a trade-off relation between the two?" In the context of developing
countries, promoting and strengthening one may weaken the other, since thebalance is so delicate and precarious to preserve either by civil or military regimes
in developing countries. For military regimes, achieving this balance tends to be
more difficult because of the fact that military regimes, more often than not, are
favorably disposed towards an economic-military view of national securitywhich
usually translates into forming an alliance relationship with external (super or
great) powers. Given this security paradigm, the questions arise as to how military
regimes in Pakistan conceive of national security, and how the present regime
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contemplates the reconciliation between internal and external components of
national security?
Internal Security
The regime's primary stated objectives on the eve of the takeover were internal in
nature. These objectives included "putting the house in order," so to speak, bycreating a basis for economic development, building institutions, restructuring,
and establishing accountability. At the same time, the regime had also promised to
initiate the process of democratization at the grassroots level, and had given a
specific timeframe in which it expected to bring the plan to fruition. As such, the
drive for legitimacy was motivated internally. The regime has met with some
degree of success, in the eyes of some (this success appears marginal to others)
in its movement for accountability and collecting more revenue. It is interesting to
observe that, unlike the Ayub and Zia regimes, the present regime has not faced
significant political opposition. Rather, the main opposition comes from two other
sources. The first is the business classowing to the government's attempt to
impose tax reforms resulting in new taxes. The other set of people who couldconceivably defy the military regime are religious groups. Religious political
parties rose to the fore in response to the governments' proposed procedural
amendments to blasphemy law, which they found unacceptable. As a result of the
opposition from the business class and religious parties, the government had to
withdraw on both of these accounts. Despite the significant opposition from these
quarters, however, the corresponding political parties were unable to take
advantage politically on a national scale on the strength of these issues. Rather,
the politicians and political parties have responded in an opportunistic way to the
idea of local body elections (at the district level), and in a way have politically
accepted and facilitated the legitimization of military rule. This also suggests that
the military's success in intervening and maintaining its hold in Pakistan owes agreat deal to the gross inability of political parties to organize and align
themselves.
The Socio-economic View of Security
A cursory glance at the history of democratization in Pakistan reveals the trend
that the end of one economically progressive authoritarian regime marked the
beginning of an economically regressive civilian regime, and vice versa. For
instance, Ayub's eraknown as progressive in economic termswas followed by
the secession of East Pakistan (a political failure) and Bhutto's regime, whereby
industry received a setback as a result of nationalization policies. Similarly, during
the Zia era in the 1980s, Pakistan's economic performance was far better thanthat of most of the developing countries in the world. This period was followed by
the brief regimes of Nawaz Sharif and Benazir in the 1990s, during which time
economic activity and performance was at its lowest ebb, despite the opening-up
of the economy through measures like trade liberalization, privatization, and
deregulation.
Therefore, because of this pattern some economists are of the view that the
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economic aspect of security improves during the reign of military regimes, while
the rule of political-constitutional governments produces economic chaos.
According to Shahid Javed Burki, "The type of democracy we had practiced under
two of our three constitutionsthe constitutions of 1956 and 1973had not been
good for economic development. These two constitutionsunlike the constitution
of 1962were given by civilian rather than military leaders. The first of these twoconstitutions had produced economic chaos. The secondthe Constitution of
1973was really operative in two periods. During both1973-77 as well as 1988-
99it had seen a dramatic slowdown in the rate of economic growth and a sharp
increase in the incidence of poverty." [44]
Nonetheless, what is significant and necessary is to quantify how much of the
economic development can be attributed to the good governance and managerial
performance of the military regime, and to what extent it is just a function of
foreign policy compliance resulting in the easy flow of international capital.
Second, economic benefits alone never present the full picture, unless we also
calculate the socio-political and economic costs (in the form of the deepening ofdebt crises for generations to come) associated with the decisions. While the
military regimes in Pakistan have been successful in negotiating and achieving
foreign policy objectives, their performance in the domestic theater has been
abysmal. It is quite obvious that the internal component of security weakens
during military regimes. For instance, both Ayub and Zia successfully concluded
separate economic and military package deals with the United States and
enhanced the economic-military view of security, but had severely negative fall-
outs in the area of internal security. The regimes of Ayub and Yahya Khan
culminated in the separation of East Pakistan. Zia's ten years of rule saw the rise
and upsurge of ethno-linguistic factions, the extreme polarization of society and
militarization of religious groups, along with an increase in the spread of guns,drugs, and social violence. The present regime again follows the trend of past
regimes in securing aid and loans from abroad, as comprehensive economic
packages are reportedly being worked out in Washington, the European Union,
and international financial institutions out of its foreign and security policy
compliances. [45]
The Impact of the Events of September 11
The events of September 11 have further complicated the issues of military
intervention and democratization of society and the polity in Pakistan. First, the
aftermath has given the military regime an international legitimacy, as Pakistan's
support and participation was critical to the United States in its fight againstAfghanistan. This may hamper and delay the process of democratization, owing to
the kind of legitimacy and financial support the regime enjoys from international
quarters. In other words, these circumstances may prove to be a replay of the sort
of situation present under the Ayub and Zia regimes. Second, the serious
ramifications of September 11 in terms of Pakistan's military regime are that in
drawing attention to its foreign policy-making role, it has also highlighted its
sensitivity to internal security policies. Though civilians and military may never
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differ substantially on foreign policy choices, the military's explicit rule means
facing the wrath of the public. As the events following September 11 have shown,
the military's popularity and internal legitimacy have been eroded drastically.
Therefore, there is a shift in the regime's drive for legitimacy: from internally
driven to an externally or internationally oriented one. This may also mean a
greater compliance at the international level with the United States and the Westat the security policy level, translating into a more repressive regime internally.
Institutional Fall-outs
September 11 carries the most serious policy repercussions for national security
related organizations. In early October, General Pervez Musharraf moved swiftly
against military commanders who resisted his support for the United States,
forcing many to the sidelines or into retirement. Now, men who owe their jobs to
him personally fill all of the top army posts. Analysts of the Pakistani military say
that it amounts to a coup within a coup, and the most important change in twenty
years. [46] The dismissal and reshuffling of the top brass within the army can be
interpreted in two ways. It signals the friction or tension concerning theorganizational integrity of the armysomething never exposed before in such
clear terms. At the same time, it reflects the army's ability to resolve and
overcome national security policy-making dilemmas. This friction is natural once
the army evolves into an agent for security policy-making, rather than policy-
implementing,which is inherently riskier and dangerous. One analyst suggests,
"The friction itself may have been caused by certain structural imbalances that are
the product not so much of the military's internal working but its interaction with
civilian governments and the rise in its stature from implementers of policy to
makers of policy." [47]
In a move similar to this purging of military commanders, three top nuclearscientists were detained for questioning about their links and alleged sympathies
toward the Taliban. A more grave concern is not that the top brass generals and
scientists were dismissed over the perceived policy differences from within, but
for the extraneous reasons of their alleged allegiance and sympathies toward the
Taliban. These acts indicate a disturbing eagerness to acquiesce and accept the
influence of the United States and its interpretations of the security structure of
Pakistan.
The External Security Economic Front
As referred to above, the military regime has shown a somewhat better
performance on the external economic front by securing fresh loans and therescheduling of debt payments from international sources like the Asian
Development Bank (ADB), International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World
Bank. A profile of the government's cabinet also reveals a strategy of pursuing
economic management. These developments resulted in steady cash inflows and
debt restructuring by the new economic managers, even before September 11,
2001.
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Nonetheless, complying with IMF reforms and adjustments means negating and
going against local and national industry and business, in the form of the
imposition of new taxes, price hikes in utilities and food, and taking away
subsidies. These policies created an environment discouraging investments by
domestic investors who become alienated and frustrated with the present regime.
This is a situation again quite unlike that of the Ayub and Zia regimes. The Ayubregime not only made foreign capital inflow available, but also augmented local
industry through financial incentives and reforms. Similarly, Zia also made
reversals on Bhutto's decision to nationalize and won the confidence of
local/national business and industry people. Meanwhile, the present regime seems
to be at odds with local business and investors and relies heavily on foreign
goodwill. The problem with foreign inflow is that it is highly volatile, inconsistent,
unreliable, and strategic in nature (since it depends heavily on the state of
international politics). Hence, too much reliance on foreign sources of financing
makes the regime more vulnerableand weakens national security in the long-
term perspective.
The scenario also implies, if a trade-off between internal security and international
security exists, that the present military regime is certainly disposed towards
achieving national security through strategies involving international security,
rather than through internal policy.
The United States
One of the common features that invariably all military regimes in Pakistan
emphasize is extremely good relations with the United States. This may be
because of a strange coincidence whereby military takeovers in Pakistan have
accompanied a resurgence in its geo-political significance in world politicsthus
making Pakistan a "frontline" state, and hence explaining the convergence of itsinterests and security policies vis--vis the United States.
Nevertheless, unlike previous military regimes in Pakistan who had other options
for conflict resolution (rapprochement with the Soviet Union, for example, during
the Zia regime)the present regime seems to be under intense pressure to
cooperate with the United States. [48] It may very well be that the regime was
already inclined to cooperate, but in any case for all practical purposes it had no
option other than to do so. Pakistan, upon resisting American wishes, would have
been perceived as harboring terrorists and hence considered equally responsible
for the events of September 11. In addition, India's readiness to join the American
coalition against Afghanistan generated greater impetus for Pakistan to join theUnited States as well. The gravity of the situation was reflected in General
Musharraf's statements that an alliance with the United States was a dire
necessity and Pakistan chose this option in order to save its strategic interests and
assets. At the same time, Pakistan is in pursuit of its legitimate concerns vis--vis
Afghanistan; that is, not to have an unfriendly and pro-Indian regime in post-
Taliban Afghanistan. The United States at the moment seems to take note of this
concern. However, the question arises, what if the Talibanpredominantly a
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Pashtun entity that Pakistan has now antagonizedremains in one form or
another? What if the United States pulls out abruptly (as happened in 1990) and
leaves Pakistan once again to face the wrath of Afghan turmoil or civil war? What
if the United States stays for longer than required? What if the United States
becomes unable to set up a broad-based government in Afghanistan? What if the
Northern Alliance and other groups vying for power refuse to accept the Americanversion of peace? What if civil war persists?
The more pertinent issue here is to look for the degree of U.S. interests and hence
America's commitment to Afghanistan and the region. This would be a
determinant for explaining its security relations with Pakistan. At a very broad
level, U.S. interests seem to be a mixture of short and long-term objectives: from
the capture of Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda forces, to the destruction of terrorist
camps, to routing out the Taliban, to oil pipeline and geo-strategic interests. These
do not relate to September 11 only, but instead date back even before that. [49]
Though the idea of the pipeline and geo-strategic interests are more often than
not denied by the representatives of the U.S. State Department, [50] nevertheless,they do talk of its viability indirectly, and the opinion that the economic benefits of
an oil pipeline will have a stabilizing impact for all states in the region, including
fostering a strategic stability in post-Taliban Afghanistan.
Accordingly, the U.S. concern for Pakistan's strategic stability has increased
manifold owing to the following:
i) Pakistan's geo-strategic centrality for providing a foothold in Central Asia and
Afghanistan.
ii) The fact that most of the strategic analysts in Washington envisage the possiblescenario (although this currently has a remote chance of coming true) that
Pakistan, a country with nuclear capabilities, risks being taken over by radical
Islamists. Hence, the United States wants to reduce such a possibility either by
helping the regime in politico-economic terms or by evolving means to ensure the
safety of Pakistan's nuclear weapons.
iii) The perceived need for greater control of fissile materials and its possible
leakage into "the wrong hands" through personnel working in Pakistani nuclear
installations.
iv) The desire to avoid nuclear war in the region. The India-Pakistan conflict andits escalation to an exchange of nuclear weapons is perhaps the more real and
probable threat than any of the above.
Hence, American interest in the stability of the present military regime is not
simply something related to the phenomenon of September 11 and its aftermath.
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Right on the eve of the takeover, General Anthony C. Zinni, Commander-in-Chief of
the U.S. Central Command, said, "If Pakistan fails, we have major problems. If
[military strongman, Pervez] Musharraf fails, hard liners could take over, or
fundamentalists, or chaos. We cannot let Musharraf fail." [51] This was clearly
pointed out in a report published in the Washington Post, that it was Zinni who
"pushed the Clinton administration to open the diplomatic door with Musharrafwhen many demanded it be slammed shut. Convinced that Pakistan should be a
regional stabilizing force, he helped persuade Clinton to visit Musharraf in March."
[52]
It is equally important to recognize how Musharraf responded to the United States
on the eve of the takeover. "When the general finally placed his call it was not to
President Clinton, Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, Defense Secretary
William S. Cohen or the U.S. ambassador in Islamabad. Instead Musharraf
telephoned Marine Corps General Anthony C. Zinni, who happened to be sitting
with Cohen at an airfield in Egypt. 'Tony,' Musharraf began, 'I want to tell you
what I am doing...'" [53] This suggests the usefulness of further study, beyondthe scope of this paper, on the deeper institutional links between Pakistan and the
United States, especially as to how military-to-military relations impact
democratization and polity in Pakistan. Some experts are of the view that
institutional linkages of this sort may be the cause of democratization in Pakistan,
as the U.S. military has become more sensitized over a period of time to the
promotion in an effective way of democracy in developing countries. [54] Such
linkages may act as an inhibiting factor preventing the military from intervening in
a given country. Similarly, the U.S. military can effectively exert pressure for a
return to democracy once a coup has taken place. Nonetheless, it can have the
opposite impact as well, as happened in the case of Pakistan in past decades. With
the realization of Pakistan's enhanced geo-strategic significance and Americanconcern for regional stability, the military's presence in the polity is bound to
prolong itself, as happened in the cases of Ayub and Zia. General Musharraf has
already indicated that he intends to remain as President and Chief of Army Staff
(COAS) even after holding the elections in 2002.
An issue related to the stability of the military regime is the nuclear program and
policy of Pakistan. Seymour Hersh, famous investigative journalist on nuclear
affairs, articulates this American concern: "The Bush administration's hunt for
Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaeda network has evolved into a regional crisis that
has put Pakistan's nuclear arsenal at risk, exacerbated the instability of the
government of General Pervez Musharraf, and raised the possibility of a nuclearconflict between Pakistan and India." [55]
The scenario envisioned by Hersh and a consequent contingency plan for
Washington as to what happens to Pakistan's nuclear weapons in the case of any
instability for the regime concerns taking care that those nuclear weapons do not
fall into the hands of religious extremists, with the possible involvement of not
only the Pentagon, but also the special-operations unit 262 of Israel. [56] This
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presents a very bleak security scenario for Pakistan, implying that nothing is
secret and secured from Israel and the United States (and also suggests the
potential for the involvement of India, given its level of cooperation with the two).
Dr. Hasan Askari Rizvi responded to the article in a very comprehensive manner,
asserting that the Pakistani army has established an elaborate and effective
command and control authority over nuclear weapons, ever since 1977. Inaddition, he also showed that over a period of time various forces have attempted
to defame Pakistan's efforts to become a nuclear state in the wake of Indian
nuclearization, by terming it as an "Islamic bomb" and speculating about a
possible attack on nuclear installations in Pakistan. [57] Though Dr. Rizvi has
emphasized that this is a speculative scenario, it is not inconceivable, given that
the American forces are already stationed in Pakistan, and considering the
historical level of distrust and the fact that despite the on-going cooperation
between the United States and Pakistan, American authorities, media, and think
tanks [58] continue to differentiate between the military and Pakistan's main
intelligence service, Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI) and subsequently
end up blaming ISI for non-cooperation with the Musharraf regime and the UnitedStates. Therefore, any change in government regimes in Pakistan (though the
chances are very remote, since it ignores the current institutional and societal
dynamics) is bound to be interpreted as a result of religious extremism.
At this point, it is equally important to recognize that the opposition and
resentment to the United States, and hence with the Musharraf regime, are of two
types: one which is obviously manifested in the streets of Pakistan is religious-
based activism; the second can be termed as a secular, genuinely nationalistic and
patriotic onepassive and institutional in nature. The problem with American
government, think tanks and media is that they are overwhelmed with radical
Islam and hence unable to make distinctions between these two types ofopposition, and increasingly the latter gets mixed up with the former one. This
could prove fatal for the United States in the long-term, where America sees states
like Pakistan either as blind and faithful allies or as religious extremists. In other
words, people and institutions with genuine patriotic concerns are likely to be
dubbed as radicals, and hence treated likewise. Therefore, the very rationale for
going all-out along with the United States, perceptibly in order to enhance stability
and security for Pakistan by the military regime, is not free from challenge and
criticism.
Afghanistan
Historically, U.S. policy towards Afghanistan had always been shared by andconverged with that of Pakistan. Contrary to popular belief, Pakistan never
followed an independent path divergent of U.S. interests and policies vis--vis
Afghanistan. The Taliban has been attributed as a creation of both the ISI (though
not acting alone) and the CIA, since both wanted strategic stability in the region.
[59] In fact, what happened after the Taliban established power was that the
Taliban's extremism, ties with Osama bin Laden, and refusal to cooperate with
Unocal (who had proposed the construction of a Central Asia Gas pipeline between
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Turkmenistan and Pakistan that would have crossed western Afghanistan) made
the United States anti-Taliban. The U.S. bombing of Afghanistan in 1998, seen in
the context and events of September 11, represented a hardened and entrenched
U.S. position to do away with the Taliban.
It is generally believed that Pakistan has completely reversed its Afghan policyunder the military regime. However, this is not the case. Like other nations of the
world, Pakistan also felt alienated by the Taliban and considered the Taliban
government a liability due to its extremist policies and harsh treatment of women,
young Afghans, and western aid workers. [60] There was a series of events from
which Pakistan received diplomatic setbacks, such as the destruction of the
Buddha statues in Bamiyan in February 2001, sectarian criminals hiding in
Afghanistan, and the Taliban's inflexibility in dealing with United Nations workers.
In actual fact, Sharif pursued a policy towards the Taliban similar to that of the
current government. Recently it came out that Sharif's regime gave clearance to
U.S. military operations in Afghanistan. This was further supported by the
military's monitoring of religious institutionsthe maddrassasthat acted as asocial and financial support base for the Taliban. This leads to the fact that foreign
policy in regards to Afghanistan remains the same and in continuity under civilian
and military regimes in Pakistan. The events of September 11 increased the pace
at once of the United States as well as Pakistan to adopt anti-Taliban policies. Like
the United States, Pakistan is also in a quagmire regarding the possibilities for the
post-Taliban settlement in Afghanistan. Deposed King Zahir Shah and the Northern
Alliance are not attractive options for Pakistan. Pakistan has already annoyed the
Taliban and the Pashtuns, the ethnic group that makes up almost 40-45 percent of
the Afghan population. Similarly, the United States is also quite skeptical of the
predominant role the Northern Alliance could potentially play after the fall of the
Taliban. Both Pakistan and the United States are vying for a broad-basedrepresentative government in Afghanistan.
India
India's initial reaction to the change in government in Pakistan was not to
recognize the military regime. It was widely believed in India that General
Musharraf was the one responsible for the Kargil crisis and hence the exit of
Nawaz Sharif, and that peace and negotiations (the Lahore Declaration) were
something not acceptable to the Pakistani army. Nevertheless, owing to
Musharraf's peace initiative, force reduction at the Line of Control in Kashmir, and
U.S. pressure, India changed its stance. Subsequently, the Agra summit was
convened. Later, the ascension of the military regime was considered andinterpreted as an opportunity to settle down Kashmir, as the military was
considered to be the real entity with which to talk and strike a deal (and this was
the case even in times when a civilian regime was in power). It was also believed
that the military enjoys greater popularity than political regimes. The Indus
Waters Treaty signed by the Ayub regime was most widely cited as an agreement
that stood the test of time.
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The events of September 11 had a de-legitimizing effect on Kashmir, from the
perspective of Pakistan. India quickly moved back to square onethat is, of
confrontation and denialfrom the position of continuing dialogue and diplomacy.
India is now bent on cashing in upon the new atmosphere condemning global
terrorism. India wants to make Kashmir militant groups into objects of the U.S.
anti-terrorism campaign. [61] The United States has succumbed considerably toIndia's pressure, as the initial list of organizations whose assets were frozen by
the United states included two (and later, a third one, Jaish-e-Mohammad) with
extensive activities in Kashmir. India sees the build-up of relations between
Pakistan and the United States as zero-sum in nature, and wants to prevent
Pakistan from again becoming the driving force behind U.S. regional policy. [62]
India has been playing off of and sensationalizing the U.S. concern for the stability
of Pakistan and the region by threatening Pakistan with war. The recent massive
firing on the international border, let alone on the Line of Control, upon the visit of
U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld,
constitutes a message not to ignore India. Hence, it is imperative that U.S. policy
officials engage with India at the same time that they do so with Pakistan, so as toreduce the risk of an India-Pakistan war and further instability in the region.
For Pakistan, raising its voice at diplomatic and political levels has and will
become even more difficult as India (through its powerful lobbying) is bent on
establishing linkages between Afghans and the situation in Kashmir, thereby
ignoring Pakistan's legitimate concerns and the historical context of the Kashmir
dispute. India also intends to heighten its threat perception from Pakistan for its
alleged support to Kashmir, and to legitimize hot pursuit across the border,
possibly leading to war in the wake of the war of the United States against
Afghanistan over terrorism. [63] From the American perspective, "an India-
Pakistan crisis at this time would be most unwelcome to U.S. policy makers, andwould strain relations with both India and Pakistan." [64]
Therefore, one can observe that with the arrival of the military regime, there has
been no substantial shift in security policies of Pakistan towards the United States,
Afghanistan, and India. The events of September 11 impacted in facilitating and
enhancing the building of bridges in Pak-US relations, which even the erstwhile
civilians wanted. In the wake of such a priority policy and as has been
demonstrated above, Pakistan's policy towards Afghanistan should not be viewed
as a reversal. Nonetheless, Pakistan-India relations suffered a severe setback, not
because of regime change from civilian to military, but in the context of the post-
September 11 world.
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Politics and economics interplay
DR Shahid Javed Burki (article, April 11) is right in emphasising the interplay
between politics and economics. However, in treating the history of Pakistan, heseems to have inverted cause and effect. He asserts that political instability was
due to repeated economic crises when the fact is that it was the other way round.
It was mostly the frequent martial laws and other negative political developments
that aggravated economic difficulties, which a developing country inevitably faces.
Of course, this is an oversimplification, since history is a far more complex affair,
but to reinforce my view, l give four instances where political mistakes or political
events caused a major national setback, with adverse economic, political and
social consequences. These were the 1965 war, the separation of East Pakistan,
the encouragement of Islamic fundamentalism in Afghanistan and the atomic
explosion in 1998.
The Third Five-Year Plan for 1965-1970 envisaged a massive transfer of resources
to East Pakistan intended to alleviate the problem of growing economic disparity
between the two wings. The Third Plan and the underlying strategy were aborted
by the 1965 war. What was the economic compulsion for this misadventure? None.
We are too deferential to the military to attempt an assessment of the economic
loss sustained by the country because of the 1965 war. In my view, Dr Burki is not
right in asserting that disillusionment with economic policies was the main cause
of President Ayubs overthrow. He was forced to abdicate for largely political
reasons (Tashkent, denial of democracy, censorship, corruption, loss of confidence
of the military brass)
The greatest disaster in Pakistans history, the civil war in 1971 and the violent
separation of East Pakistan, was entirely a political failure. Even though East
Pakistan had many economic grievances, the critical cause of separation was that
the rightful share of political power was continuously withheld from the people of
that wing because of the repeated promulgations of martial law by which a non-
Bengali army was seen as dominating the political processes.
Dr Burki has stated that in 1977 Mr Bhutto ran into difficulties because his
economic policy failed to end poverty and various regions were unhappy at the
way Islamabad was treating them. It is true of course that big business andpersons adversely affected by nationalisation were unhappy about economic
policies but the public agitation against the PPP government was based mainly on
political demands, i.e, free election and the establishment of Nizam-i-Mustafa.
Economics did not figure prominently either in the themes pursued by the
combined opposition parties or in the US displeasure, expressed by Dr Henry
Kissinger.
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The encouragement of Islamic extremism in Afghanistan, for the political purpose
of acquiring strategic depth, was initiated and maintained by the military though
the democratic governments acquiesced in it. The damage done by this policy to
the political and social infrastructure and economy of the country has been
enormous and continues to this day.
Lastly, the crisis of 1998 was due to the explosion of the atomic bomb and the
consequent imposition of international sanctions. The country was in economic
difficulties but nowhere near a breakdown. The problem was due to a political
decision to explode the bomb and the adverse international reaction that followed.
Dr Burkis article, unintentionally I am sure, helps the propaganda line of the
present military government that martial law is essential for salvaging the
economy. The government has undertaken a systematic campaign to demonise
democracy by exaggerating its economic failures and often falsifying the record.
I hope Dr Burki will forgive me for recalling that when Mr Bhutto came to power atthe end of 1971, Dr Burki had greeted him with an article in The Pakistan Times
titled GDP dethroned. This posed a difficulty for some of us who were trying to
convince our new socialist bosses that while pursuit of equity was very important,
it could not be achieved without growth. It did not help that an eminent economist
was stating that GDP (or growth) was a tyrant that was best removed from the
economic scene. Since then Dr Burki has had a distinguished career in the World
Bank and must have modified his views on growth. This illustrates the interplay
between economic postures and political circumstances