State Power, Representative Government, and the Canadian Political System

By Oleg Nekrassovski

What is the essence of politics? What is the key variable of political science? Common

sense gives us a clear answer: it is power. But as the earlier classical theorists knew: in

politics, first comes power, then the need to control it. “In framing a government . . . the

great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed;

and in the next place oblige it to control itself.” Beginning with the ancient philosophers,

political thinkers have worried about how to keep power under control, how to

domesticate it, how to prevent its abuse, how to subject it to certain procedures and rules

of conduct. (Schedler, 1999, p. 13)

The present paper explores many of these questions, primarily through the process of refuting

two of Skogstad’s (2010, p. 109) statements, which roughly split the paper into two parts. Along

the way, where relevant, special attention is paid to democratic systems, in general, and

Canadian political system, in particular.

Skogstad (2010, p. 109) begins her article, “Who governs? Who should govern?”, with a

somewhat absurd statement: “Why do we obey the rules and decisions to which those in

authority collectively bind us? The answer is clear. We obey, first, because we believe that

those who make legally enforceable decisions have a right to do so; and second, because we

believe the decisions themselves – the public policies – are socially desirable.” The reality,

however, is considerably different:

The authority of the state rests on two important foundations. First, the state holds the

exclusive right to use force and physical coercion. Any act of violence not expressly

permitted by the state is illegal and, consequently, punishable by the state. Thus, state

governments make written laws, administer them through various levels of the

bureaucracy, and enforce them through mechanisms such as police forces, armies, and

national guards. The state needs to be continuously vigilant against threats both from

within and from without to usurp its power through rebellions and revolutions. Second,

the state maintains its authority by means of ideology. For the state to maintain its power

over the long run, there must be a philosophical understanding among the citizenry that

the state has the legitimate right to govern. In the absence of such an ideology, it is often

difficult for the state to maintain its authority by means of coercion alone. (Ferraro, 2006,

p. 295-296)

An interesting link between the state’s ability for physical coercion and its ideology is

that “State leaders attempt to create an aura of invincibility about the state. The more the state

seems all-powerful, the more likely are subjects to accept it in their ordinary lives and, in the

process, reduce the burden of enforcing all its dictates” (Migdal, 1994, p. 14). In this respect

We should also note the strong tradition which goes back at least as far as Karl Marx of

viewing the apparent coherence of the state as either an illusion or, in some versions, a

kind of confidence trick played on the public by those in charge who wish either to

increase their own power or to disguise the fact that this apparently mighty entity is much

less cohesive, much more the tool of competing factions and sectional interests, and, in

general, much more chaotic than they want outsiders to believe. (Owen, 2004, p. 2)

Thus, Skogstad’s above-quoted statement refers to a few narrow aspects of the second

(or secondary) foundation of state’s authority: ideology. And completely ignores the fact that

we obey the rules and decisions of the government, first and foremost, because we fear that

the government will use force against us, should we fail to obey.

This observation inevitably leads to a question: How do governments come to hold

monopoly on the use of force? The attempts to answer this question are numerous. But most

of them boil down to the idea that each government is formed by the strongest party in society,

i.e. that party which has overwhelming force on its side in the first place; using which it can

coerce everyone else to do what it wishes. A relatively recent expression of this idea can be

found in the work of John Stuart Mill:

The government of a country, it is affirmed, is, in all substantial respects, fixed and

determined beforehand by the state of the country in regard to the distribution of the

elements of social power. Whatever is the strongest power in society will obtain the

governing authority; and a change in the political constitution cannot be durable unless

preceded or accompanied by an altered distribution of power in society itself. A nation,

therefore, cannot choose its form of government. The mere details, and practical

organization, it may choose; but the essence of the whole, the seat of the supreme power,

is determined for it by social circumstances. (Mill, 1865, p.5)

A related question, specific to democratic forms of government, is why the minority

usually obeys the will of the majority. Classical thinkers offer a few insightful answers.

According to Herodotus, “If all men are equally strong and equally armed … then the reading of

votes tells everyone what would happen if things came to blows. A group of men gathered on

top of the hill shouts approval of particular candidates (or policies) and everyone can hear

which group is larger and therefore stronger” (Przeworski, 2004). More recently, Condorcet,

observed in a similar manner that

When the practice of submitting all individuals to the will of the greatest number

introduced itself into societies, and when people accepted to regard the decision of the

plurality as the will of all, they did not adopt this method as means to avoid errors and to

conduct themselves on the basis of decisions based on truth, but they found that, for the

good of peace and general welfare, it was necessary to place authority where the force

was. (Przeworski, 2004)

Skogstad’s (2010, p. 109) above-mentioned article continues with another, related, and

no less absurd statement: “In representative democracies, those who exercise authority do so

with public consent, having been freely chosen in elections and subject to mechanisms of

accountability that ensure that they roughly reflect the public’s will and preferences. This much

about the exercise of political authority in Canada is obvious.”

The problems inherent in representative democracies, and the consequent absurdity of

anything resembling Skogstad’s above statement, have been noted early, for example, by John

Stuart Mill:

When the time for that government has arrived, sufficient power for all needful purposes

is sure to reside in the sovereign assembly; and if enough of it is not entrusted to the

executive, this can only arise from a jealous feeling on the part of the assembly towards

the administration, never likely to exist but where the constitutional power of the

assembly to turn them out of office has not yet sufficiently established itself. Wherever

that constitutional right is admitted in principle, and fully operative in practice, there is no

fear that the assembly will not be willing to trust its own ministers with any amount of

power really desirable; the danger is, on the contrary, lest they should grant it too

ungrudgingly, and too indefinite in extent, since the power of the minister is the power of

the body who make and who keep him so. (Mill, 1865, p. 44)

And when it comes to the present day and the representative system of government

used in Canada, various experts mentioned by Mallory (2011) state that the British

parliamentary and cabinet system (the Westminster model) can be used to run the country

undemocratically, and is positively inferior to US political system when it comes to maintaining

rulership according to democratic principles. After all

The Westminster model is a product of nineteenth-century England, and as such it is not a

democratic constitution, but an oligarchic one. The centre of authority in the system was

not to be people, but the legislature, and the government which was able to control the

legislature could govern without serious interference between elections. … Furthermore,

in Canada the power of the executive has become excessive because of the weakness of

parliament and the failure of the public to understand how the system should work. … the

public sees politics only as a contest between leaders (that is, as presidential politics) and

is generally impatient with what seems to be parliamentary obstruction because the role

of the opposition is not understood. Furthermore we have the worst of both worlds by

having presidential politics without a presidential system – the written constitution, the

separation of powers, and other restraints which exist in the United States. … So effective

is the control which a majority government has over the operations of the House of

Commons that it can hardly be said to be a separate branch of the government at all in the

American sense. … Another cause of difficulty is the notion of ministerial responsibility.

In the theory of the constitution a minister whose department is in trouble may be

compelled to resign – for that is what political accountability means. But in fact no prime

minister will drop a minister in these circumstances, for that will be construed as a sign of

weakness. (Mallory, 2011, p. 22-23)

Similarly, Forsey and Eglinton (2011) state that in their view the Canadian political

system, while being superior (in pro-democratic qualities) to that of the United States in its

pure theoretical form, it is far more inferior in its “perverted,” currently practiced form. In fact,

“the Government of Canada must enjoy the confidence of the House of Commons, while the

President of the United States need not and often does not find his policies supported by one

or both Houses of the Congress” (Forsey & Eglinton, 2011, p. 34). In other words, in Canada, the

Government needs a majority support in the House of Commons (which the, all too common,

majority government always has) in order to stay in power and implement the policies of its

choice. While in the United States, the President cannot expect, and often does not receive

support for his policies from either of the Houses of the Congress. Forsey and Eglinton (2011)

go on to add that in the Canadian political system, as currently practiced,

… the Members [of the House of Commons] cannot even control the legislative policies

of their parties in their caucuses … the distinction between executive and legislative

powers has entirely disappeared, a reality reinforced in Canada by the vast delegated law-

making powers of the Executive, powers untrammeled by any general power of

disallowance in either House of Parliament. Both the legislative and executive functions

are exercised by the Leader of the majority party, the Prime Minister, and his closest

layer of supporters, his Ministers and his personal advisers and aides. Legislation agreed

to by this inner group almost invariably is passed by Parliament, (Forsey & Eglinton,

2011, p. 35)

When it comes to policy advice and analysis, “professional public service institutions

generally serve governing parties and their executives.” Consequently, and due to a strong

concentration of power in the hands of the same governing parties and their executives, in

Canada, prime ministers and premiers are usually unwilling “to grant autonomy and to fund

competing advice in legislations” (Howlett and Lindquist, 2007, p. 98). As a result, in Canada,

“for many years, governments and their public service institutions had analytic capabilities

rivalled only by the largest business firms and associations and, to a lesser extent, labour

organizations. This led to patterns of closed sectoral bargaining relationships between major

government, business and labour actors, not subject to great public scrutiny” (Howlett and

Lindquist, 2007, p. 98).

Moreover,

Ministerial and official intergovernmental committees are instruments of the executive

branches of each government, and usually work in camera without the direct scrutiny of

legislatures and the public. Citizens are typically only engaged if certain governments are

attempting to build public support for positions, usually at the agenda-setting stage of the

policy process, or if statements or decisions are communicated. (Howlett and Lindquist,

2007, p. 98-99)

Furthermore, “Within Canadian governments, the policy analysis capacity of

departments and ministries varies widely, and derives from the size of the government.” And

“since all ministers and deputy ministers are appointed directly by the prime minister and

premiers (in some provinces, they also appoint assistant deputy ministers), policy analysis in

Canadian governments, no matter how professional and non-partisan the public service in

question, tends to lack independence” (Howlett and Lindquist, 2007, p. 102).

The actual policy analysis performed by Canadian government agencies, also is often

either poor or superficial. And there are many reasons for this.

Lack of methodological sophistication is only one of them. In some cases political clients

foresee that they will dislike the recommendations of good analysis and deliberately

discourage it. Other politicians simply prefer more informal decision aids, including

discussion papers and (relatively) unstructured briefing papers. But at least some of the

deficiency in the supply of good analysis stems from lack of knowledge, or confusion,

about appropriate methods. (Vining & Boardman, 2007, p. 49)

Thus, we have seen that since ancient times, political thinkers have been trying to

answer a number of key questions about the sources of state’s authority and power, as well as

those dealing with why political power gets exercised the way it does, how it gets exercised,

and how it should be exercised. The modern consensus seems to be that the state maintains its

authority through physical coercion and ideology. While the state comes to hold monopoly on

the use of force because it is always formed by what happens to be the strongest power in

society. Similarly, in democracies, minority usually obeys the will of the majority because the

majority, in virtue of its greater numbers, is more powerful. Moreover, democratic systems of

government tend to have their own share of problems. And when it comes to the modern

Canadian political system, the executive controls the legislature (even though the reverse

should be the case), thus making the system undemocratic. Moreover, policy making and

analysis, in Canada, also lacks independence, input from the public, and tends to be of poor

quality.

References

Ferraro, G. (2006). Cultural Anthropology: An Applied Perspective. Belmont, CA: Thomson

Wadsworth.

Forsey, E. and Eglinton, G. C. (2011). The Question of Confidence in Responsible Government. In

C. Leuprecht and P. Russell (Eds.), Essential Readings in Canadian Constitutional Politics

(Pp. 33-42). North York, ON: University of Toronto Press.

Howlett, M. and Lindquist, E. (2007). Beyond Formal Policy Analysis: Governance Context,

Analytical Styles, and the Policy Analysis Movement in Canada. In L. Dobuzinskis, M.

Howlett, and D. Laycock (Eds.), Policy Analysis in Canada: The State of the Art (Pp. 86-

115). Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Mallory, J. (2011). Responsive and Responsible Government. In C. Leuprecht and P. Russell

(Eds.), Essential Readings in Canadian Constitutional Politics (Pp. 21-32). North York, ON:

University of Toronto Press.

Migdal, J. S. (1994). The state in society: an approach to struggles for domination. In J. S.

Migdal, A. Kohli, & V. Shue (Eds.), State Power and Social Forces: Domination and

Transformation in the Third World (Pp. 7-32). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mill, J. S. (1865). Considerations on Representative Government. London: Longmans, Green, and

Co. Available at

http://books.google.ca/books?id=nK4UAAAAQAAJ&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q

&f=false

Owen, R. (2004). State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East. 3rd ed.

London: Routledge.

Przeworski, A. (2004). Institutions Matter? Governance and Opposition 39(4), 527-540.

Schedler, A. (1999). Conceptualizing Accountability. In A. Schedler, L. Diamond, & M. F. Plattner

(Eds.), The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies (Pp. 13-

28). Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Skogstad, G. (2010). Who governs? Who should govern?: Political authority and legitimacy in

Canada in the twenty-first century. In P. H. Russell, F. Rocher, D. Thompson, and L. A.

White (Eds.), Essential Readings in Canadian Government and Politics (Pp. 109-112).

Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications.

Vining, A. R. and Boardman, A. E. (2007). The Choice of Formal Policy Analysis Methods in

Canada. In L. Dobuzinskis, M. Howlett, and D. Laycock (Eds.), Policy Analysis in Canada:

The State of the Art (Pp. 48-85). Toronto: University of Toronto Press.