state violence and lgbt rights in the balkans

8/6/2019 State Violence and LGBT Rights in the Balkans

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Fall - Winter2010

State violence and the accep-

tance of LGBT individuals and

rights in the Western Balkans.

Throughout the 20th century, democracy and its liberal sense gained widespread acceptance in

what has been called The West. Without wanting to enter in debates about the appropriateness

of the geopolitical and social construct theorized by Samuel Huntington (Huntington 1996), there

seems to be an agreement about the fact that around one-third of the world countries are consid-

ered performing democracies (Encyclopdia_Britannica 2010).

One of the reasons that have been considered to be at work for the advent of this brand of de-mocracy in Europe was the traumatic experience of the World Wars. The gruesome violence un-

leashed by the belligerent States lead to long-term human and material costs. Thus, it is not sur-

prising that only five years after the end of the inter-State conflict occurs the creation of an Euro-

pean cooperation project aimed at limiting the power of by-gone enemies to ensure the raising of

the living standards and to promoting peaceful achievements (Schuman Declaration, 1950).

To do so, the Union has determined as its foundational values ideas such as human dignity, free-

dom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of per-

sons belonging to minorities (Article 2 of the Treaty of the European Union, 2009). These valuesconstitute limits to the States violent potential and encourage horizontally structured civil socie-

ties and civil economies based upon the rule of law (Bideleux and Jeffries 2007).

This apparent virtuosity of the Unions core ideals seems to be at odds with certain generalized

perceptions about a currently neighboring region: the Balkans. If generally rejected by the inhabi-

tants of the region itself, the term Balkanization have been equaled to:

endemic propensities towards highly debilitating (and often self-perpetuating) political,

cultural and socio-economic fragmentation, deeply destructive and often fratricidalinter-communal conflict, political destabilization, intemperate or intolerant attitudes and

mentalities, pervasive clientelism and corruption, a preponderance of relatively oppres-

sive vertical power relations and power structures, weak development of the rule of law,

stunted development of impersonal horizontally structured civil, legal, and associational

ties and relationships, the exercise of unstable and strongly personalized power and

influence, a prevalence of polities with strong coercive but weak infrastructural capabili-

ties and widespread feelings of victimization, vindictiveness and fatalism (ibid).

We must concede that there is a high degree of caricature in such visions as they constitute sim-plistic generalizations regarding the populations and States of a territory thats hardly ever defined

Written by: Juan Fernandez Ochoa

Friday, December 17, 2010

Master in European Affairs - SciencesPo - Paris 1


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without sound contestation. Plus, the accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the European Union

in 2007 is an evidence of the diverging dynamics within the region itself.

However, to different degrees, some of the aspects compiled by Bideleux and Jeffries persist to

the detriment of the quality of life of a great deal of the population of these countries.This situation

is particularly worrying in light of the EU enlargement policy vis--vis the Western Balkans. In

2003, during the Thessaloniki Summit, the European Union formalized a commitment with the

countries of the Western Balkans in matters of accession prospects. The wishful approach that led

to declare that the future of the Balkans is within the European Union in 2003 seems to material-

ize as accession negotiations with Croatia are progressing (European_Commission 2008) but

many questions remain unanswered, specially as there are three unfinished states in the Western

Balkans: Bosnia, Kosovo and Serbia (Rupnik 2009).

Our study will address one of the unresolved dilemmas persisting in the heterogeneous Western

Balkans: the social acceptance of LGBT individuals. Borrowing notions from structuralist and his-

torical institutionalist approaches in sociology we will posit that State violence acts as an inde-

pendent variable conditioning the level of acceptance of LGBT rights in the Western Balkans. Our

study will be nourished by extensive literature on the issue of State violence; recent, but limited,

research on the field and general statistics on LGBT matters in the countries at stake: Albania,

Bosnia Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. We will structure our

presentation in four steps: the first will be to define which violence our study needs to focus on,

we will see how restricted visions are incomplete to understand complex long-term social phe-

nomenon like the one were addressing; the second step will analyze who constitute the sexual

otherness that is marginalized in the region; a third part will try to build bridges between what we

consider to be intricate processes (State violence and Societys rejection) to; finally, present our

hypothesis and submit it to statistical test.

Theoretical framework on State violence.I. Concrete / Physical violence.

Writing in 1919, Weber affirms that the relation between the State and violence is an

intimate one (Weber 1959). This link is, in his theory, so intimate that physical violence

becomes a constitutive trait of the modern State; defined in turn as the entity possess-

ing the monopoly of legitimate physical violence. Building his theory on the Hobbian

Leviathan, Weber posits that the absence of the State would lead to anarchy, a chaotic

state of nature that would irrepressibly lead to conflict, the violence of all against all

(Braud 2004). In this sense, the monopoly of physical violence appears, quite paradoxi-

cally, as a means for peace.

This uniqueness of the State in this paramount to understand the action of its adminis-

trative apparatus as its institutions crystallize the prerogative defined by Weber as ar-

ticulating the State. The action of the police forces, the army, the legislative instances

and the judicial order flesh out the States monopoly of legitimate physical violence by

borrowing legitimacy from it.



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However, even if we agree on the basic premises identified by Weber as defining the

modern State and its relation to violence, for the purposes of our study his theory is

insufficient to evaluate the realities of the States action. In order to fill this gap, we will

adopt a broader approach to the States physical violence that allows us to classify

concrete realizations of it. Through this lens, proposed by Mark Ungar, we recognize

three forms of State physical violence: judicial, semi-judicial and extra-judicial.

The judicial variant refers to all acts of violence committed under the aegis of the legal

order. This kind of violence is the most evident in the Member States of the European

Union as it is directly related with the prerogatives of the State we described before.

One of the clearest illustrations of this type of violence can be found in Article 3.3.2 of

the Code of Practice on Police Use of Firearms and Less Lethal Weapons of the UK;

which allows the use of firearms with fatal risks if the protection of life so requires it

(Home_Office 2003). But State-allowed killings are an extreme example of a kind of vio-

lence that can express with more subtlety through discriminatory and violent practices

against individuals by the courts, the prisons and other government institutions (Un-

gar 2000).

Semi judicial violence is related with practices that are just partially backed up by the

legal order. Excessive edicts, military laws and extraordinary operations (ibid) with

high levels of opacity in the exercise of State competences can give room to unac-

countable violence.

Finally, theres an extra-judicial violence related to killings, torture and harassment

that, while out of the legality, develops either because of the inaction of the security

apparatus of the State or its complacence. For instance, during the post-transition gov-

ernments of Felipe Gonzalez in Spain (1982-1996), a counter-terrorist group known as

the GAL (Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberacin) executed several members of the sepa-

ratist terrorist group ETA over a period of time going from 1983 to 1987; it was revealed

afterwards that the Ministry of Interior financed the campaign as an attempt to end with

the separatist threat.

As we have seen, concrete and/or physical violence where the State acts as the subject

can take different forms. By adopting Ungars model of State violence we will be able,

further on, to empirically identify expressions of State violence against LGBT groups in

the Western Balkans.

II. Symbolic violence and the power of the discourse.Notwithstanding the clarity of this classification, we consider State violence exists be-

yond the possibility of identifying without doubts the existence of a perpetrator and a

victim. By doing so, we take position against moralist definitions of violence that rely on

the supposed existence of universal norms, of juridical or ethical order, that are or, ac-



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tually, should be unanimously admitted (Braud 2004). But also the limited positivist

approach that considers violence an objective matter that can be quantified.

We believe both positions miss important aspects of State violence: the former, by rely-

ing on the normative and the contingent; and the latter, by requiring a victim to feel as

such in order for violence to exist, thus excluding less conspicuous forms of violence

that are deeply linked to domination and have verifiable even if probably more diffuse

effects. For our work, being a victim does not require for physical harm to take place as

being a victim of violence, is also being affected at the soul (ibid).

By borrowing ideas from structuralist approaches on violence, we will be able to con-

sider those case where State violence does not generate self-recognized direct victims.

This perspective is fundamental for our work, as our hypothesis is to assert that State

violence affects the society as a whole; while some sectors bear higher costs (espe-

cially, in our case, LGBT individuals and groups).

Precisely, structuralist views on violence do not link individual responsibility and the

phenomenon of violence. On the contrary, symbolic violence as theorized by Pierre

Bourdieu is a soft violence, invisible, unknown as such, chosen as well as suffered

(Bourdieu 1980). This view is particularly useful to the extent that in terms of under-

standing the long-term causes of violence, specially the way that certain social groups

(...) tend to be abused by other social groups (...) the emphasis on the intention of the

individual may be less than expedient (Bradby 1996). We put forward the argument that

this idea can be extended to the violence exerted by elements of the State on society

as a whole.

If symbolic violence might ulteriorly lead to physical and/or concrete violence, it is im-

portant not to confuse these two ideas we consider complementary. Indeed, symbolic

violence refers to the capacity to create significations legitimately without the arbitrary

of the production of these representations being perceivable. In other words, the power

to institute mental structures and schemes of perception and thought in such a way

that their construction becomes invisible and, this way, perceived as natural (Bourdieu

1994). Making use of its symbolic power, the State imposes representations of the

world through its complex apparatus. In particular, the school system, which acts as a

privileged instrument because of its capacity to diffuse massively long-lasting visions of

reality.

The theories evoked lead us to adopt a broader vision of the relation of the State and

violence. Transforming Max Webers theory, Bourdieu agrees: the State is a X (to be

determined) capable of claiming successfully the monopoly of the legitimate use of

physical and symbolic violence on a determined territory and on the population that

corresponds to it (ibid). We claim that the interplay between physical/concrete and



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symbolic violence will produce patent and long-lasting effects in society, influencing

significantly the generalized perception of LGBT individuals.

The LGBT movement in the Western Balkans.I. Historicity and minority status.The literature on LGBT individuals, groups and movements is particularly limited in the

Western Balkans. However, as Helms reports, there is a growing but still incomplete

[that] has offered important insights into gender regimes in the former Yugoslav space

(Helms 2006). Though our study focuses on a relatively different geographical area1, we

share the appreciation about the absence of information (which is almost total with re-

gards to heterosexual men and LGBT individuals), the recent emergence of key studies

and the need for more profound work on the issue and the zone.

The absence of information is telling for a number of reasons. Being aware of the exis-

tence of a visible LGBT movement in Croatia (The Zagreb Pride parade is progressively

prominent) and Serbia (Gay Pride in 2001 and 2010), the silence around the subject is at

the least atypical. While it is true that the LGBT movements are recent, the mutism

about the context surrounding the violences against LGBT individuals during the Bel-

grade Gay Pride 2010 parade points is worrying. Some political analysts, however, have

not missed the sign and question the capability of accession of the Western Balkans

countries to the EU on the basis that theyre unable to protect a visibly endangered mi-

nority (Lowen 2010).

In any case, the question regarding the LGBT population remains far from being solved

in the Western Balkans. We believe it is fundamental to understand the minority and

fragile situation that define this group in order to be able to understand its standing

amongst the societies of the countries of the Western Balkans. To this extent, we reject

to some extent an approach that limits the question to a non-discrimination issue with-

out identifying it with the problems damaging the quality of life of minorities.

The idea of minorities sparks off heated debate when it comes to definition. Conven-

tional wisdom tends to associate this status with numerically disadvantaged social

groups. Nonetheless, this restrictive definition forgets the multiple connotations given to

the word: quantitative, pejorative, political, ethnical, cultural, ideological, etc. (Brzea

1996); all of the which are regarded as being proper basis for minority status. Though

we agree with the work of Birzea preventing from essentialist views of minorities, we will

distance ourselves from a perspective that privileges complex cultural dynamics over

relations of domination (ibid). On the contrary, we will consider a traditional socio-

logical approach that defines a minority group as any group of persons that, because

of its physical or cultural characteristics, is submitted to a discrimination vis--vis the

Master in European Affairs - SciencesPo - Paris 51 The Western Balkans (territorially) equals the Yugoslav space minus Slovenia plus Albania.


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other members of the society in the which he lives (Wirth 1945); only to expand it by

adding sexual orientation or sexual identity to the characteristics invoked.

The LGBT movements start developing in the 20th century and enter the public sphere

after the 1969 Stonewall riots in New York. This founding act saw an expansion

throughout the West, then by organizations in Latin America in the late 1970s, in Africa

and Asia in the 1980s, and Eastern Europe in the 1990s (Ungar 2000). Though no lit-

erature seems to account for the evolution of the gay movement in the Western Bal-

kans, we could mention as examples (though they do not abound): Lesbian and Gay

Men Action (LIGMA) founded in Croatia in the early 1990s and Arkadija, founded in

1990 in Serbia. These slow advances, a consequence of social and State violence and

repression, set the pace and basis for a more prosperous LGBT community that has

begun to flourish, though at different speeds according to the country, since the 2000s.

Nowadays, the LGBT movement has diversified and several NGOs, associations and

online communities appear as nuclei for activism and socialization.

II. The European parrainage.The European Union has played a double role in the evolution of LGBT rights in the

Western Balkans. On the one hand, it exercises indirect pressure because of its geopo-

litical standing and its progressive approach regarding LGBT matters. On the other

hand, it has a direct influence via accession negotiations with Western Balkan States.

Both modes respond to the image that the European Union wants to project via its ex-

ternal relations; the image of a civil ethical or benevolent power (Smith 2003).

Regarding its own legal order, the European Union has two major instruments with the

objective of avoiding discrimination over grounds of sexual orientation: while primary

legislation sets out a general purpose according to the which the Union shall aim to

combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability,

age or sexual orientation. (Art. 10 Treaty of Lisbon; 13 TEC), secondary legislation

(through Directive 2000/78/EC) establishes, a general framework for equal treatment in

employment and occupation [that] requires explicit and specific legislation to outlaw

sexual orientation discrimination (Waaldjk 2006).

By definition, both legal instruments penetrate the domestic legal order, urging Member

States to comply with the objective of non-discrimination. Moreover, Directives need to

be transposed and internal legislation adapted in order to ensure implementation. How-

ever, as implementation is in charge of the Member states and harmonization is rather

heterogenous amongst them, the application has allowed for gray areas to emerge in

matters of indirect discrimination, sanctions, scope of the prohibition of discrimination,

etc. In spite of the shortcomings, these changes at the heart of the European Union

have an influence to the extent they become a part of the political model exported by

the EU and integrate the acquis communautaire, the dynamic body of the European



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Union law that States who demand accession need to comply with in order to be

granted membership.

It is in terms of the acquis communautaire that the influence of the European Union

against discrimination towards what we consider sexual minorities becomes most visi-

ble. The countries in the Western Balkans can be grouped in three different stages to-

wards accession: the first stage concerns those countries which have not still officially

applied to the EU but have been recognized as potential candidates through the 2003

Summit Declaration we mentioned beforehand; in this situation are Kosovo and Bosnia

Herzegovina. Then, a second stage has to do with those countries that have submitted

an application but are not considered candidates yet; the case of Serbia, Montenegro

and Albania. And, finally, a last stage regards the countries that are considered official

candidates and go through official negotiations to ulteriorly be given clearance to enter

the Union; the case of Croatia.

If, because of this perspective, it is true that all countries of the Western Balkan sare

submitted to these normative pressures, we believe the case of Croatia is the most evi-

dent as its accession to the European Union is imminent and has been estimated to

materialize in 2012. During the first part of the negotiations, the Candidate is submitted

to screening meetings by agents of the Commission that will found the basis for solid

reports about the situation of the acquis for each chapter of negotiation. Chapter 19

(Social policy and employment) and 23 (Judiciary and fundamental rights) evaluate the

countrys strategies for non-discrimination comparing them to the EUs. As specific

binding rules have (...) been developed with respect to non-discrimination on grounds of

racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation (Europe-

an_Commission 2006) by the European Union, the State is expected to provide LGBT

individuals with equivalent safeguards. In the case of Croatia, a certain number of provi-

sions within the domestic legal order, such as the Family Act, the Inheritance Act, the

Act on Same-Sex Unions, the Criminal Procedure Act and the Act on the Security and

Intelligence System of the Republic of Croatia (...) the Gender Equality Act (Europe-

an_Commission 2007) and also anti-discrimination institutions embodied by three om-

budspersons in Croatia: Ombudsman (general issues), Ombudsman for gender equality

and Ombudsman for children were highlighted as positive advances.

We do not intend to say that the European Union has a monopoly on the foreign influ-

ence in the region. As a consequence of a recent democratization in the area, numerous

foreign-funded NGOs have taken over (socialist) state functions that have disap-

peared as such (Helms 2006). But due to the UE accession protocol, its influence is

almost tangible in most of the countries were analyzing.



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Connecting the dots: State violence and acceptance of

LGBT rights in the Western Balkans.

I. Assessing State violence in the Western Balkans.Regardless of the evolving situation of the countries nowadays, the Western Balkans

have a historical burden of State violence. In the next lines, we will recur to numerous

resources to estimate the factors that articulate State violence in the region.

For a long time, until the recent democratization of the region, States incurred in dis-

criminatory and/or violent practices against LGBT individuals. As Ungar affirms for re-

cently democratized countries: The most deeply rooted kind of state violence occurs

within the states own institutions (Ungar 2000). Submitted to the power of authoritar-

ian leaders during the 1990s and, for some, even until the 2000s, LGBT individuals

faced a double threat: on one side, the rejection of society and; on the other side, the

States repressive apparatus. Based on the model on physical/concrete violence ex-

plained beforehand, we will try to identify common traits of State violence to validate its

part in our hypothesis, that State violence has conditioned the level of acceptance of

LGBT individuals and rights in the Western Balkans.

The criminalization of homosexual acts would be one of the first clues to look for State

violence against LGBT individuals. Abolished in most of Western Europe countries dur-

ing the first half of the 20th century (and in some, like France or Belgium, during the

18th century), the penalization of homosexual acts have persisted in most Western

Balkans countries as an evidence of judicial violence. Croatia and Montenegro seem to

be exceptions (1977) in a region were the legislative apparatus reacted late against this

virulent discrimination: Serbia in 1994 (Greenberg 2006), Albania in 1995, Macedonia in

1996.

If the criminalization of homosexuality seems to be the most aggressive judicial State

violence, many other forms persist. In matters of same-sex cohabitation, only Croatia

has allowed for some form to exist (in 2003) (European_Commission 2007), the rest of

the countries forbidding same-sex unions of all kinds and even imposing a constitu-

tional ban by defining marriage as between a man and a woman. Other kinds of anti-

gay laws have to do with the possibility for homosexual individuals to serve openly in

the military (forbidden in Serbia) or to occupy certain professional posts (professors or

lawyers, as in Macedonia since 1995 - (Ungar 2000)).

Forms of semi-judicial violence are harder to explore in the Western Balkans. Most of

the times, these relate to common day-to-day practices that remain after a democratic

transition in the ambiguity of the legal/illegal continuum. In Bosnia, for example, Article

2 of the Law on Gender Equality, approved by the Parliament in 2003, specifies that

Discrimination on the grounds of gender and sexual orientation is prohibited; but biol-



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ogy books for children include comparisons of deviant behavioral traits such as the

tendency to crime or suicide, use alcohol or drugs, homosexuality, and many other be-

haviors (GayEcho 2010).

Other practices, specially those related to security, are often recalled. When political

and societal uncertainty is high, when structures and rules are new, when crime is ris-

ing, and when officers expect antagonism from citizens all conditions common in new

democraciesgovernments tend to give security forces even wider leeway and allow

many of the violent practices fine-tuned during the pre-democratic era to continue

(ibid). Amongst these, police harassment tends to be evoked as such a practice. How-

ever, we have not been able to find empirical and concrete historical data about semi-

judicial State violence in the Western Balkans as the literature is considerably limited.

We believe, nonetheless, that the matter requires following as the President of the Gay-

Straight Alliance recently declared that "Although the police in Serbia made progress in

respect of professional standards in dealing with LGBT individuals, yet the majority of

police unprepared to work with this population" (GayEcho 2010).

Be it the consequence of its current non-existence (which we doubt) or the lack of insti-

tutions reporting it (Amnesty international doesnt have delegations in most Balkan

countries), police harassment does not seem to be as problematic as elsewhere. How-

ever, some have criticized that the State does not work preventively to discourage all

those who want to exercise violence (GayEcho 2010), letting extra-judicial violence

remain in impunity. Such visions are slowly changing as governments persevere in their

will to enter the European Union and try to give an image distancing from complacence

towards these attacks.

Nonetheless, as we have already explained, concrete and/or physical violence by the

State is far from explaining the complex and harsh treatment given to LGBT individuals

by Western Balkan societies. In order to understand why State violence has had such a

transcendental effect in influencing negative perceptions of this minority we are to take

into account the symbolic violence exerted by the State.

The greatest trait of such violence in the Balkans has to do with a certain brand of na-

tionalism that seems endemic to the region. Indeed, even today, a fear of the resur-

gence of a nationalism of the kind that motivated the genocide and war crimes com-

mitted between 1991 and 1999 under the support of Slobodan Milosevic in Croatia,

Bosnia and Kosovo (Pocar 2006) persists. Indeed, some agree that the great boogie-

man of Serbian and Balkan politics was the threat of the extreme nationalists, the radi-

cals, coming to power in Belgrade (Judah 2010).

If a lot has been told about the ethnic component of the State-sponsored nationalism

that led to armed conflicts in the 1990s, very little is understood about the Gender im-



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plications2. As a matter of fact, the context preceding the war favored the emergence of

such a nationalism. Towards the 1980s, critical economic change occurred in detriment

of middle-class men who, already conditioned to violence according to some authors

(Frantz 2009), felt allured by the nationalist discourse. This type of nationalism aligning

masculinity, homophobia, violence and dignity captivated men who felt deprived of their

core identity as economic instability and multiculturalism progressed; thus, militarism

as a way of winning back both individual manliness and national dignity (Greenberg

2006). On these grounds, the eruption of a war based on essentialist views on national

identity and the development of a certain imaginaire collectif (Anderson 1991) around

this identity prone to bellicosity became likely. The patriarchate and manly virtues have

been exalted during the conflict (Derens 2006) and the identity of men became hybrid-

ized with the stereotype of a warrior: A male is a man with a gun (Moss 2002).

This violent nationalism that the State hosted and encouraged in different intensities

during the last decades in the Western Balkans has persisted even if moderated. Tim

Judah, qualifies the threat of an aggressive nationalism la Milosevic to be over (Judah

2010). If by threat, the author meant the possibility of it hijacking the State, then we

would agree. But, as Rupnik concedes, the question, in the short or mid-term, is less

of a decline -unlikely- of nationalism parties, and more about the ways to contain them,

see them evolve and make them eurocompatible as it happens in Croatia (Rupnik

2004). This situation is generalizable to different extents to other countries of the region,

even if we can question the level of eurocompatibility of a party whose leader claims

that gay sex, sex with animals and sex with things [are] of the non-normal kind as

Tomislav Nikolic from the Serbian Progressive Party expresses according to a local

news outlet (Markovic 2009).

These parties continue to exist for the same reason that in many Eastern European

countries we have seen appear communist successor parties during the late 1990s;

although they do not want to turn back the wheel of history, they promise less severe

economic and social policies. They pledge to reduce the high costs of modernizing and

when in power some actually do so (Flam 2001). Extrapolating on the Western Balkan

case, we would posit that these parties persist as they protect old identities and a cer-

tain statu quo that feels threatened by change. In the Western Balkans, modernization is

coming with high costs for a segment of the population that less than a decade ago

defined itself according to the violent nationalist credo preached by leaders as Mi-

losevic. Mental structures can be changed, but they are not as malleable as we would

expect.


2 Gender is herein understood as a domination relation between sexes as defined by Delphy, C. (2001). L'en-

nemi principal. Vol. 2: Penser le Genre. Paris, Syllepse. We do not define it as the study of the role of women in

society as many works imply by concentrating on the roles of women in the region; ignoring a definition.


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II. The resiliency of a discriminatory imaginaire collectif.During the last decades, to different extent, the State recurred to its monopole of legiti-

mate physical and symbolic violence to produce a national identity fixed around a cer-

tain vision of masculinity in the Western Balkans. Nowadays, considerable change

seems to be at work. Clear illustrations of such changes are the imminent accession of

Croatia to the EU or the Serbian Minister of Human Rights participation at the Belgrade

Pride Parade of 2010. But even as physical and symbolic State violence have shifted, a

certain collective imagery persists based on the old system of representations. This

representation of reality is modifiable through long-term processes and cannot be ex-

pected to suddenly change. Violence is an important part of the peoples imagery

(Braud 2004), in the Western Balkans this violence is, amongst others, oriented against

LGBT individuals.

This is where historical institutionalism might help us understand the evolution of social

behavior. We believe the causality relation we are trying to identify is explained by path

dependency. A process understood as occurring when a contingent historical event

triggers a subsequent sequence that follows a relatively deterministic pattern (Ma-

honey 2000). In our case, the contingent historical event was the violence exerted by

the States of different Western Balkan countries, which conditioned, proportionally, the

domestic acceptance of LGBT rights by society. However, this model explains why a

change in the States violence (less oriented against the LGBT population) doesnt lead

to an automatic change in the perception of society as it is conditioned by the contin-

gent event we mentioned before.

An empirical prove of our work could be concluded by similar work made in Poland.

According to Kliszczynski, the traditional lack of positive information was one impor-

tant reason for the creation of the grotesque stereotype of a homosexual, however,

even if the media has moderated its position and the authorities have accepted the the

existence of homosexual groups as part of a rich public life, the attitude of the Polish

society differs very much from the official position on this question (Kliszczynski 2001).

But the same author nuances his statement as he indicated that the acceptance of ho-

mosexual relations have increased from 17% in 1992 to 40% in 1994, mimicking the

shift in the Polish States discourse.

HypothesisIn countries where politics are just recently shifting, we will be able to measure more

clearly the influence of a (bygone) State violence on the acceptation of gay rights by

society. Throughout the previous section of our study, we have effectively identified pre-

cise means through the which the State exerts its monopoly of legitimate physical and

symbolic violence. Consequently, we have posited that this violence will nourish a rejec-

tion towards the LGBT population by society to that will vary in proportion of the vio-

lences intensity and orientation.



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What we call orientation is particularly important as we are convinced that all States put

into use, in different fashion, their legitimate monopoly of physical and symbolic vio-

lence. However, in the Western Balkans, this violence has been historically tinged with

ideologies that foment rejection of the LGBT populations. Through its influence, these

ideas are diffused amongst the population and become a part of their collective im-

agery; even of their national imagery, as weve explored.

When evaluating such complex variables, jumping to conclusions might seem hasty

beyond our general assumption that State violence and LGBT acceptance will be

linked. However, we do expect to see a difference for the case of Croatia.

Several factors condition the exercise of State violence in Croatia. Firstly, together with

Montenegro it was the first country to decriminalize sex acts amongst homosexuals;

which reveals a certain openness of the States discourse. Then, together with Macedo-

nia, it was the first country to sign an association agreement with the EU, the first to

start negotiations and the first to be granted candidate status; this process of europe-

anization required a previous internal change in terms of State violence as the EU re-

gards itself as a normative power. Finally, even if concrete physical violence has taken

place in Croatia (the ethnic cleansing of a Serb minority carried out between 1991 and

1995 having severe demographic consequences (Bideleux and Jeffries 2007)), the ho-

mophobic connotation of State-sponsored violence never gained the force it had in

countries like Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, etc.

Statistical analysisMeasuring State violence is highly imprecise. To date, we ignore the existence of in-

dexes condensing the different components we have considered during our research.

For our statistical analysis well rely on the Freedom in the World index published by

FreedomHouse as a proxy for state violence. We concede that the usage of a political

rights/civil liberties index is highly imprecise and takes into account but a small part of

what our work has considered State violence to be. Nonetheless, we expect to see a

certain correlation when we confront the historical data we have obtained from cross-

national reports made by this organization with a valuable indicator of LGBT acceptance

in the Western Balkans: the World Values Survey and its indicator regarding the justifi-

cation of homosexuality.

Thee considerations are necessary before the statistical analysis. For the Freedom of

the World index, we have decided to use an average of the decade preceding the

measurement of LGBT acceptance. The reason is coherent with our argument that State

changes in the orientation of violence will only be mirrored in the populations opinions

in term. The second precision regards the measurement of the WVS regarding the justi-

fication of homosexuality as the data available is from 1995. The limitations of such a

late measure have to do with the fact that changes in State violence in most of the



13/16

countries of the Western Balkans, as we have explained before, are patent after the

1990s. These two nuances will help to clear doubts on the precision of a statistical ex-

ercise that we deem imprecise but can provide us with hints to take our study further.

Last, we would like to remark that, because of the recent foundation of Serbia, Monte-

negro and Kosovo and the international occupation of Bosnia, data for these countries

are either inexistent (Kosovo and Bosnia) or fused (Serbia and Montenegro).

On the x-axis, countries are classified according to the FreedomHouse index Freedom

of the World. This index based on civil liberties and political rights classifies countries

from 0 (Free) to 7 (Not Free). To make it easier to understand we have adapted it to a

scale of 100 following the work by Pippa Norris3. The y-axis is based on the WVS ques-

tion Is homosexuality justifiable?; we have taken the mean for each country and con-

centrated on what we considered to be easier to grasp: the percentage of the popula-

tion that considers that homosexuality is always justifiable.

The resulting graph (Fig. 1) has a considerable amount of dispersion from the which we

infer the existence of two groups of countries in the Western Balkans: on the one hand,

the countries were homophobia has been strongly associated with citizenship and na-

tional identity and where the population manifests a generalized rejection vis--vis of

homosexuality and; on the other hand, Croatia, which would be an outlier for the rea-

sons weve mentioned beforehand: a State violence for the which homophobia is not a

constitutive trait. But the dispersion obtained when including Croatia in our analysis

might also be a consequence of the divergences between our broad definition of vio-

lence (closer to structural definitions) and the Freedom in the World index thats based

essentially on judicial and political considerations .

30

35

40

45

50

0 7.5 15 22.5 30

State Violence and LGBT Social acceptation (Figure 1)

Master in European Affairs - SciencesPo - Paris 133 Databases accessible on: http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/pnorris/Data/Data.htm

Croatia

Serbia and

Montenegro

Albania

Macedonia

FreedomH

ouseindex(198

5,

90,

95)

Justifiability of homosexuality (1995)
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/pnorris/Data/Data.htmhttp://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/pnorris/Data/Data.htm


14/16

If we do without Croatia considering it an outlier obeying to different dynamics in mat-

ters of State violence, the graph (Fig. 2) reveals a higher degree of correlation between

the two variables invoked. But considering the absence of numerous indicators measur-

ing different aspects of a complex social phenomenon like violence and the lack of solid

scientific data, our findings can only expect the research of the Academy on the field

will be directed towards filling the persistent gap on the causes of LGBT social accep-

tance in the Western Balkans.

Serbia and

Montenegro

Albania

Macedonia

30

33.75

37.5

41.25

45

1.5 2.625 3.75 4.875 6

R = 0.7757

State Violence and LGBT Acceptation (Figure 2)

FreedomH

ouseindex(1985,

90,

95)

Justifiability of homosexuality (1995)

ConclusionOur study set to sound out the origins of a social phenomenon that has been accounted

for in numerous assessments about the Western Balkans: generalized homophobia.

Facing this evidence, we proposed a potential explanation based on the links existing

between that generalized perception and the historical State violence that has menaced

the stability of the region during the last few decades. To do so, we have recurred to a

vast literature that allowed us to determine a theoretical framework on State violence in

the region.

Considering our dependent variable, we regarded as necessary to adopt a broad ap-

proach to state violence that does not limit itself to the identification of victims and per-

petrators. To this extent, the structural definition of State violence theorized by eminent

sociologists like Pierre Bourdieu have allowed us to complete the panorama of State

violence that we took the task to study in relation to social acceptance of LGBT indi-

viduals and rights.

Studies about this concrete issue are almost inexistent in a region where countries have

not necessarily been able to erect the sufficient administrative apparatus and reunite the

conditions to be considered performing States; much instability persists and the situa-

tion proves to be a handicap as well as encouragement for the researcher. However, the



15/16

existent work allowed us to confirm our hypothesis about a relation between State vio-

lence and social acceptance of LGBT individuals and rights. The main vector being a

brand of State-sponsored nationalism that constructed identities around the idea of an

aggressive masculinity.

In transposing our theoretical study to the domain of statistics, we expected to find em-

pirical proof of our hypothesis. Given the many limitations when measuring phenomena

involving social perceptions and inconspicuous processes, our statistical results have

proven only relatively successful. To date, it would be impossible to carry out a solid

statistical analysis on the situation because of the inadequacy of indicators that most of

the work on the region rely on and the lack of reliable quantitative data from countries

as troubled as Bosnia and Kosovo.

Nonetheless, even if the issue requires field work that has not taken place, we sustain,

as our study has demonstrated, that State violence plays a significant role influencing

society and conditioning its acceptance of LGBT groups. Other variables could refine

our study considering their fundamental character for many of the countries explored:

religion, education and other values could be the object of further research.

Lastly, we would like to add our study has pointed out to a phenomenon we did not

foresee and could also be included in further analysis: the circularity of homophobic

attitudes. We believe together with top-down dynamics of influence (from the State to

the society), there is also, through electoral means, a feedback that obeys to bottom-up

logics.



16/16

Fall - Winter2010

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Comparative Politics [ S. Persico ]Written by: Juan Fernandez Ochoa

Friday, December 17, 2010


state violence and lgbt rights in the balkans

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