state with in a state n ation al secu r ty : an an lysis...

GORKHALAND: DEMANDS FOR ASTATE WITHIN A STATE

CHALLENGES TO KENYAN NATIONALSECURITY: AN ANALYSIS CHALLENGES TO KENYA'S

NATIONAL SECURITY : AN ANALYSIS

CHALLENGES TO KENYA'S NATIONAL SECURITY: AN ANALYSIS

TABLE OF CONTENTSExecutive Summary

Challenges

Introduction

Forecast

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2

4

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Violence in the Great Rift Valley region

Multiple arrests linked to militancy in coastal counties

Cross border attacks by Somalia-based Al-Shabaab

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARYThe available literature about Kenya’s political structure and scenarios is sparse, as is the case with most

countries of sub-Saharan Africa. While the conflict in Africa has found relevance in research, the political

aspect of it has remained largely undiscussed. However, with Kenya driving in a significant amount of

investments, especially in the infrastructure sector, it becomes essential to understand the bearing that

domestic politics has on providing an environment for business to thrive.

In the World Bank Group’s report from 2016 indicating the ease of doing business index for countries

across the world, Kenya ranks 92 while other countries of sub-Saharan Africa that are ahead in the list are

Mauritius at 49, Rwanda at 56, Botswana at 71 and South Africa at 74. The most promising sectors of

investment have been identified as technology, agriculture, infrastructure, tourism, and manufacturing.

In this context, it becomes imperative to understand the challenges that the state faces in the coming years

as a new government form, following the August 8 presidential elections. In a bid to understand those

dynamics, the following research focuses on the three main challenges to the security scenario in Kenya -

the devolution of the drought crisis into violent outbursts, the potent threat of militancy from the coastal

counties and repeated attacks perpetrated by al-Shabaab along the Kenya-Somalia border.

With the election being a little over a month away, candidates will make attempts to win favor in the

counties that have no clear political inclination like Mandera and Garissa counties which are often

vulnerable to militant attacks. In that case, promising sincere efforts in monitoring the border with Somalia

might prove to be a tactic that candidates resort to. Hence the lead-up in the following month is likely to

intensify in the counties marked as swing states.

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INTRODUCTION

Kenya is slated to hold its presidential elections on August 8 this year with the two main candidates being

Uhuru Kenyatta of the Jubilee Party, who is also the incumbent president and Raila Odinga of the National

Super Alliance (Nasa), a coalition of opposition parties. The lead-up to the elections have seen some

significant developments in 2017 alone, setting aside the exception of the formation of Jubilee Party itself

in September of 2016.

Two issues that have been consistent throughout the campaigns are the frequent defections from one party

to another and the use of violent means both by the supporters of the candidates as well as the candidates

themselves. Defections have been frequent with candidate switching parties hours before the primaries

were slated to be held citing the potential for massive rigging as the cause for the decision. The second issue

regarding the use of violent means has been observed on several occasions. For instance, the supporters of

the then-gubernatorial aspirants Peter Kenneth and Mike Sonko clashed in Nairobi on February 26 while

rival members of parliament (MPs) physically assaulted one another following a discussion on reintroducing

manual voting as a backup to electronic voting machines. However, there are three main challenges that the

government is facing in the August elections.

One of the most important issues that emerged in the first quarter of this year is the sudden upsurge in

violence between multiple ethnic groups in the counties of the Great Rift Valley region. The violence

resulted from the persistence of extreme drought and famine conditions gripping the whole of the Horn of

Africa, drastically impacting the security scenario in Laikipia, Baringo, West Pokot, Turkana and Elgeyo

Marakwet counties of Kenya.

Another issue that gained prominence was the multiple arrests on suspicions of working with militant

groups like the Islamic State (IS) and the Somalia-based al-Shabaab and groups enabling human trafficking

like the Magafe network of Libya. The most noteworthy of these arrests was the geographical location as all

of those arrested operated in the coastal counties namely Kilifi, Mombasa, and Kwale counties.

Finally, the matter of the spillover of Somali militancy into Kenya carried out primarily by al-Shabaab

remains significant as following a lull in attacks in the first quarter of 2017, al-Shabaab resumed attacks in

the month of May targeting both civilians and military personnel. Given the ongoing series of attacks, it is

likely that they will continue in the months leading up to the election as repeated attacks are expected to

make the people question the capabilities of the government in providing security to its own population

while paving way for militant groups to operate more fully.

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3


CHALLENGES

It was evident from the poor rainfall during the 2016 monsoons that the Horn is likely to face drought and

subsequent famine conditions the following year. However, the manifestation of its impact was not only felt

in the availability of commodities in the market but also in the lawlessness that seemed to have abruptly

gripped the region. With respect to Kenya, the uptick in violence was specifically felt in the Great Rift Valley

region namely Laikipia, Baringo, West Pokot, Turkana and Elgeyo Marakwet counties. Easy access to arms

and ammunitions further enabled the violence to continue. The security scenario rapidly deteriorated

which resulted in the UK’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) to issue a warning against visits to the

Great Rift Valley region owing to the “armed incursions”.

The first wave of violence was observed in Laikipia which is a county housing a number of ranches both

owned privately and by the government. There was a trend of occupying private ranches by pastoralists

who led their livestock to graze on these ranches due to the drought conditions that had impacted their

traditional grazing grounds . This quickly escalated to targeted attacks at the owners of these ranches to

avoid, or at least delay, alarming the authorities about their illegal encroachment. Two of the most

prominent incidents were the deaths of a British national who owned Sosian farm and an Italian

conservationist who was shot by invaders in Laikipia county. Violent incidents were subsequently observed

in the Baringo and Turkana counties but the nature of it was different. The said two counties are

traditionally home to the Baringo and Turkana people who practice agropastoralism. These tribes along

with the Pokot people are often in conflict with each other over resources like water and land. In this

scenario, given the unavailability of crops, the reliance on livestock increased leading to a scramble amongst

the already warring tribes. However, the Pokot people who also significantly contribute to the population of

these two counties were said to, largely, be the perpetrators of the violence.

Initially, the purpose of violent incursions into Baringo and Turkana villages was to steal livestock. However,

by the later half of March there were reports of Pokot incursions which involved shooting people

indiscriminately while making no attempts of stealing livestock. This surge in general lawlessness brought

business in the counties, which helps generate a significant part of the revenue through ecotourism, to a

halt, especially following the burning down of multiple tourist lodges.

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VIOLENCE IN THE GREAT RIFT VALLEY REGION


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A Kenyan tribesman with an assault rifle

In March, the government decided to deploy the Kenyan Defence Forces (KDF) to Laikipia, Baringo, Pokot

and Elgeyo Marakwet counties to restore peace and security. Communities were asked to surrender their

weapons as a means of precaution against violence. Given that the events took place simultaneously to the

lead-up to the forthcoming elections, several instances led to the aspirants making promises which resulted

in having a derogatory impact on implementation. For instance, Deputy President William Ruto during a

campaign in Laikipia in March stated that security forces are encouraged to use force to apprehend raiders.

This was followed by reports of Pokot tribesmen being physically assaulted by security forces on grounds of

raiding villages and attacking unwitting villagers. While it is true that a majority of the attacks reported

were perpetrated by Pokot raiders, following Ruto’s visit security forces attempted to apprehend the Pokot

community rather than the individuals of that community involved in conducting the raids. Furthermore,

the surrender of weapons left the communities defenseless. This turn of events enraged Pokot raiders

leading to targeted attacks at police stations and other security personnel.

Given the deployment of additional security forces, peace and security have been restored in the counties

to a certain extent. The onset of rains in May further pacified communities that heavily depended on

agriculture. However, seeing that the raiding emerged as a pattern of lawlessness, isolated incidents are still

being reported, although at a much-reduced frequency.


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Location of areas where significant militant arrests have occurred

In the first quarter of 2017, there have been multiple arrests on grounds of suspected links with the Somali

militant group al-Shabaab and Islamic State (IS) and networks enabling human trafficking like the Magafe

network of Libya from Kwale, Kilifi and Mombasa counties which are located along the coast. Most of the

arrests made were on suspicion of being part of a team that is involved in the recruitment process and

procure the required documents to ensure their safe passage from Kenya to their respective destinations.

A majority of the population in these three counties belong to the Islamic faith. While it cannot be

construed as a reason for extremism to flourish, it provides the premise for militant groups to function

there, given that the first criterion for the interested candidates to qualify for the militant group’s

consideration is the Islamic faith. Cases of radicalisation have been reported along with cases of human

trafficking which proves that the three counties serve as a breeding ground for recruitment for militant

groups. Kilifi and Kwale also have two of the highest unemployment rates in the country which pave way for

militant groups to recruit as the opportunity is taken to be a means to earn a livelihood rather than that of

radicalisation. According to a police spokesperson, unemployed youths are more inclined to sympathise

with militant groups as both their and the militant group’s discontent is targeted at the government.

MULTIPLE ARRESTS LINKED TO MILITANCY IN COASTAL COUNTIES


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Kenyan Special Forces in action

Several of those arrested were on suspicion of financing militant activities as well. One of the most prominent

arrests among these was the arrest of Ali Hussein Ali who allegedly was involved in financing militant

activities as well as organizing safe passage for new recruits and illegal immigrants. Ali was suspected to have

traveled to Libya and received formal training from the IS which proves the significance of these counties for

the militant groups.

Another advantage of recruiting Kenyan nationals is their ability to blend into the masses after having carried

out an attack successfully, evading an immediate arrest. It is estimated that a quarter of al-Shabaab’s recruits

that are in the range of 7000 to 9000 are Kenyan nationals, making them a significant part of the militant

organization.


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Attacks by al-Shabaab are often encountered by the counties bordering with Somalia namely Mandera,

Wajir, Garissa, Lamu and occasionally in Tana River, counties. While attacks were regularly conducted in

2016, averaging at 4 attacks in a month, a lull was observed in the first quarter of 2017. This was attributed

to effective policing which included a dusk-to-dawn curfew in Mandera county which has arguably

encountered the most number of attacks, although on a smaller scale. There was, however, an upsurge in

attacks since May that have managed to secure casualties in almost all the attacks. The latest in these series

of attacks was the one in El Wak on June 23 that killed three including one police personnel.

As is evidenced by the frequency of attacks along the border, the porosity of the border greatly contributes

to the insecurity in the counties. This is further enabled by ineffective policing as well as an inadequate

presence of security infrastructure. There are also other factors that contribute to the prevailing insecurity.

For instance, the town of El Wak is divided into two, one-half of it belonging to Kenya and the other to

Somalia. In order to allow free movement in the town the measures to cross over borders are not as

stringent as is applicable for the rest of the border. Keeping this in mind, given that El Wak has encountered

a number of attacks, it leads to the plausibility that free movement has also enabled militant elements to

gain access to the Kenyan territory.

The targets of these attacks have primarily been civilians, particularly non-Muslim civilians. Attackers are

known to force a target group to split into a Muslim group and a non-Muslim one and shoot them dead in

case they belong to the latter group. Given that the two most prevalent religions in Kenya are Islam and

Christianity, the targets of their attacks have mostly been Christians. Furthermore, the militants target

lodges and hotels that are known to be frequented by foreigners.

CROSS BORDER ATTACKS BY SOMALIA-BASED AL-SHABAAB

Islamic State-inspired militants with anti-Kenya placards


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Militants are also known to target telecommunication masts which have not incurred any casualties but

have effectively delayed a response from security forces. These bordering areas that already lacked proper

security infrastructure were now incapable of requesting security forces in time to counter an attack by

militants. Moreover, given the proximity of these counties to the neighboring Somalia, the perpetrators

often fled back to Somalia after carrying out a successful attack in Kenya.

While the proximity to the Somali territory and the significant Muslim population are what led al-Shabaab

to target Kenya, it has since been the presence of the KDF in Somalia that has led the militant group to

target security personnel on both Kenyan and Somali territories. One of the large-scale attacks

orchestrated by al-Shabaab in recent times is the attack in Kulbiyow located in Lower Juba region January

27 this year when al-Shabaab claimed to have killed at least 57 KDF soldiers in an ambush on a KDF base

and subsequently capturing the town of Kulbiyow. Since then KDF counterinsurgency operations have

intensified claiming to have killed 31 militants in Bardera, Gedo region in an operation and 57 militants in

Afmadow, Lower Juba region in another conducted in the month of March. However, the number of

casualties claimed ought to be treated with caution as it is in the interest of each party to exaggerate the

numbers.

Image of Kenyan policemen using assault rifles against demonstrators in the Mathare slums of Nairobi


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Kenya is divided into 47 counties. In the month of February, it was estimated that the Jubilee Party has a

stronghold in 17 counties while 17 other counties were Nasa strongholds. The remaining 13 were

estimated to be swing states. The coastal counties are mostly Nasa strongholds that became evident in the

2013 elections, which include Kwale, Kilifi, and Mombasa among others.

The swing states include Mandera, which is a hotspot for militancy. During a recent visit to Mandera, in a bid

to garner more popular support Deputy President Ruto on May 21 stated that the dusk-to-dawn curfew will

be withdrawn during the month of Ramadan. This was implemented in another week’s time by the

authorities despite an attack in Mandera that killed five police officers on May 24. The lifting of the curfew

despite the attack indicates the populist nature of their efforts aimed at gaining more votes in their favor in

Mandera.

According to a poll survey conducted in January 2017 by a Kenya-based research institute called Ipsos,

Kenyatta is expected to win 40 percent of the votes cast while Odinga was expected to win 29 per cent

only. In a more recent survey conducted in May, while Kenyatta is expected to win 47 percent of the votes

cast, 42 percent is expected to be bagged by Odinga. Therefore, the poll surveys so far have shown that the

opposition has a fair chance of securing a victory in the August 8 elections.

While it is too close to call, in the case of a Jubilee victory there is a high likelihood that the results might be

rejected by the opposition leading to clashes. Although post-election violence was not witnessed in 2013,

the violence following the 2007 elections was a clear indication of the polarized nature of politics in Kenya

and the extent of its manifestation. A repetition of such events will potentially have an impact beyond its

polity.

FORECASTS


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