steinberg - prospects for democratization in myanmar and impact to india

7/30/2019 Steinberg - Prospects for Democratization in Myanmar and Impact to India

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Prospects for Democratization in Myanmar: Impact on India

By David I Steinberg Issue Vol 24.4 Oct-Dec 2009 | Date : 27 Nov , 2010

According to the military junta that rules Myanmar,1 the State Peace and

Development Council (SPDC) is on the cusp of the completion in 2010 of its self-

ordained roadmap to a form of democracy in the country an election, the

inauguration of a bicameral representative national legislature, local legislatures, and

the operational stage of the new constitution that was approved by a questionable

referendum in May 2008. These series of events will introduce a new discipline-

flourishing democracy, as the Senior General (and Head of State) Than Shwe has so

proclaimed.

On Discipline-Flourishing Democracy

How democratic will this new discipline-flourishing democracy be, and what

are its prospects for changing the orientation of Myanmars domestic and foreign policy

in both the near term and into the future? In spite of protestations to the contrary by the

Burmese expatriate community, human rights advocates, and the United States

(among other nations), Myanmar is at present a strong state both in its exclusive

monopoly on coercive power, and in its capacity to limit any significant element of

political pluralism that could alter state control or even effect, in any major sense, a

reorientation of foreign policy.

policy level officials have maintained that they can withstand the isolation imposed by

sanctions, which are, in any case, incomplete because of the wealth of

Burma/Myanmars natural resources

Over its score of years in command, its power, capacity, and resources havegrown. The foreign and domestic policies of Myanmar are solely in the hands of the

SPDC, and the new constitution will ensure the autonomy of the tatmadaw (Burmese

armed forces) not only in its internal operations but also in its international activities. Its

multiple roles will not be compromised by the new multi-party elected legislature at

least over the next half-decade. As the Senior General, quoting a Burmese proverb,

indicated in an Armed Forces Day speech on March 27, 2009, democracy is like a

newly dug well it does not yield clear water for some time. The military will filter that

water for the foreseeable future.


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It is ironic that the strengths of the regime are also its vulnerabilities. Concepts

of finite power and authority lead to its personalization, and thus entourage politics that

are complicated by factionalism, and is further supported by a hierarchical society

strengthened by a military command system that brooks no dissent. Loyalty is valued

over competence, and orthodoxy is required not only among the tatmadaw, but in other

institutions, such as opposition political parties. These reinforcements of the strong

state are also its weaknesses. Hierarchy leads to a Potemkin-village-like shielding of

some of the top leadership from the realities of current multiple crises, and thus timely

responses. Rigidity discourages innovative solutions to problems.

Entourage systems virtually require corruption to grease social and economic

skids. Strident responses to perceived foreign insults or threats prevent arbitration and

discourage compromise. Dirigiste policies inhibit economic growth. Stifling of manageddissent forces it into the streets. Yet in the near term the strong state will prevail.

Although discipline-flourishing democracy may be internationally challenged, the

prospects for successful internal challenges seem remote.

Although the human rights abuses of the military regimes in all of their

incarnations under the Burma Socialist Programme Party (1962-88), under the State

Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC-1988-97), and now under the present

SPDC (1997 onwards), are all internationally well known and deplored, and an

embarrassment to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the United

Nations, and other groups, this international lack of legitimacy penetrates only partly

into that semi-obscured state, in which legitimacy is defined by the regime in

alternative, indigenous terms.

Myanmar, however, is not insensitive to Chinese penetration. It regards the

control or even the extensive Chinese presence, or that of any other state, in the

Burmese economy as subversive of its interests

These terms, stridently repeated and the basis of a military ideology that is

required to be printed in all locally published volumes, which are subject to censorship,

and are taught in all schools, form the core, both of its internal concept of power and its

international relations. These evolve around the ideology of national sovereignty and

the unity of the state, both of which the tatmadaw believes can only be maintained by

the military in its predominant role. The military has moved from legitimation previously

defined (1962-88) in now defunct socialist terms (although the administration is still

highly dirigiste) to one related to Buddhism but more focused on the historic, inevitable,

and paramount role of the military in Burma/Myanmars past, present, and future, to


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which end history has been rewritten. The military explicitly will guide the state, as the

new constitution expressly stipulates.

The policy implications of these attitudes, which predate military rule, are that

Burma/ Myanmar has and will continue to be guided by a strong sense of nationalismthat is too little appreciated abroad. Attempts at external pressure, calls for regime

change, characterization as an outpost of tyranny or a rogue or pariah state,

introduction and strengthening of various forms of sanctions (four US tranches from

1988 to 2008), all are denigrated as efforts by imperialists or neo-imperialists and their

lackeys and minions as demeaning to national sovereignty.2

Under the Burmese concept of the discipline-flourishing democracy, the

tatmadaw will retain effective power through two forces: legislatures at both the

national and at all local levels that will have 25 percent active-duty military personnel

appointed by the Minister of Defense, plus an unknown but likely to be significant

number of pro-military civilian or retired military who will win elections under the

auspices of either the military-mandated Union Solidarity and Development Association

(some 24.6 million members) or one or more of the parties it will foster.

The Burmese authorities will maintain that a representative, multi-party political

system is in force, as it promised years ago, and thus that government should be

considered both as legitimate by the Burmese peoples, but also by the international

community. They are likely to cite the lack of opposition parties in internationally

accepted regimes such as China, Vietnam, Laos, and Brunei, and claim unfair

discrimination by the industrialized world.

On The Foreign Equation

As the military fear for the unity and vitality of the country under civilian control,

they also fear foreign interventions. Although history may not repeat itself, past patterns

affect present attitudes, often profoundly if inaccurately. Various Burmese regimes in

past years have been justified in fearing their neighbors and the major powers. Yet the

present junta is caught in a time warp; they do not recognize that relations have

changed in half a century, and no state wants the balkanization of Burma/Myanmar.

Both India and China will continue to view Myanmar as an important, although

not pivotal, factor in eachs strategic equation.

All of Burma/Myanmars neighbors have directly or indirectly supported

rebellions or insurrections and have called for either the overthrow of the national


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government or autonomy for peripheral regions. Some, such as India and Thailand,

have shielded dissidents and refugees of various ethnicities. If the Peoples Republic of

China supported the Burma Communist Party (Deng Xiao Ping claiming that relations

among states were different from relations among political parties) as well as some

northern minorities and trained rebels, the United States supported the Kuomintang

(Chinese Nationalist) troops that fled into Burma following the establishment of the

Communist state, and has supplied assistance to dissident groups on the Thai side of

the border.

The unarticulated Thai policy until 1988 was to create buffer zones by

supporting rebellious groups along the border between the conservative regime in

Bangkok and what was viewed as radical governments in Rangoon. Bangladesh (and

before it, East Pakistan) harboured Muslim rebels. The multi-ethnic tribal societies thatstraddle the Burma/Myanmar-Indian border in Indias Northeast and Manipur have

protected rebels and refugees from Myanmar. They have moved back and forth and

created sanctuaries in the uncontrolled areas on both sides of the border. Burman

isolation was further exacerbated by minority Christian and Muslim external contacts

with co-religionist organizations.

However misguided and incongruous, there is a real fear of a US invasion,

dramatically illustrated in the response to Cyclone Nargis in May 2008 by preventing

the US Navy from delivering supplies directly to the stricken area. These fears are ever

present. All these factors have reinforced the garrison state concept the tatmadaw

claiming that only it can protect the state from its predatory neighbors and the

imperialist powers.

This sense of nationalism is reinforced by the isolation of the socialist period

(1962-1988), and policy level officials have maintained that they can withstand the

isolation imposed by sanctions, which are, in any case, incomplete because of the

wealth of Burma/Myanmars natural resources, which are coveted by many states and

not only those within the region.

Nationalism is not only the driving force of Burmese international relations, it is

the basis of internal policy and even administrative structure the two are wedded with

the primacy of internal control taking precedence over external relations. The

Tatmadaw may justify its expanded size (approximately 186,000 in 1988 to perhaps

400,000 in 2009) and power because of foreign threats, noting regime claims of

occasional Thai incursions and provocations and the palpable but misguided fear of a


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US invasion, but its real requirement is because of its need for internal control of

potential strife, and its ideology and image of its central role in the society.

But external relations have been important, and so the move towards China.

There has been a mutuality of interests. Chinese access to the Bay of Bengal has beenone motivation, but there are others. Myanmars natural resources (especially gas and

hydro-electric power), a potential market of over 50 million people especially for

businesses in southwest China that cannot compete with east coast Chinese firms in

Western markets. It is a means to ensure a strategic advantage over India (and part of

the China-India border in the Northeast remains unresolved), and mitigating Chinese

dependence on transporting energy through the Straits of Malacca. All these

contributed to Chinese penetration of Myanmar, beginning in 1988, but which older

PRC, Nationalist, and even imperial maps regarded as either Chinese territory or withinChinas hegemonic influence.

China has supplied some US$3 billion in arms and equipment, has or is building

30 hydro-electric dams, has provided major economic assistance, and is the site of

much of Myanmars overseas training.3 Yet Myanmar is not a Chinese client state, as

witness its opening to India, and Indias supply of naval vessels, aircraft, military

hardware, and economic aid, and indeed to Russia as well (MIG-29 sales, extensive

training, and an experimental, small nuclear reactor).

Myanmar, however, is not insensitive to Chinese penetration. It regards the

control or even the extensive Chinese presence, or that of any other state, in the

Burmese economy as subversive of its interests internationally and its internal control

over the economy. It was, after all, this foreign economic exploitation that prompted the

Burmese to introduce the socialist system. Anti-Chinese riots took place in 1967

reflecting this antagonism and the export of the Chinese cultural revolution to Rangoon;

many were killed and Chinese shops looted.

On Indian Relations

Indias response to the Burmese coup of 1988 was virulently negative. India

was probably the most vociferous critic of the SLORC until the early 1990s. India even

employed U Nus daughter as the head of all India Radios Burma service. This

changed in the early 1990s when the Indians recognized the strategic role that China

was beginning to play in Myanmar, and Indias policy was reversed to attempt to

compete with Chinas growing influence that extends to even illegal immigration, now

informally said to approximate two million people.4


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The insurgencies that have plagued India in its remote Northeast Region,

together with the Burmese rebellions on its side of the border, and the movement of all

groups back and forth to effective sanctuaries has also prompted agreements for the

development of those regions.

Although there were rumors that India was providing support to Kachin and

Karen insurgents after 1988, this was never confirmed. India has, however, provided a

refuge for Burmese dissidents and refugees, supposedly some 50,000, not including

Rohingyas.5 Dissident Burmese organizations still operate from Indian territory.

Burmese domestic policy and its ideology of not being dependent on any one

foreign influence also prompted the Burmese to encourage Indian assistance and

support. There has been an array of higher level military delegations in both directions.

The first visit by a Burmese head of state since independence in 1948 occurred in

October 2004. Transportation road links between India and Myanmar have been

upgraded and supported by an Indian aid program, and increased trade has been on

both states agendas, although the target of US$ one billion in two-way trade has yet to

be realized. India has bid for access to the off-shore gas reserves in western Myanmar

off the Rakhine coast near the Bangladesh border, but China has succeeded in

obtaining the rights to much of that area and will construct a gas pipeline across

Myanmar to Yunnan Province, as well as a separate pipeline to bring in crude oil from

the Middle East, thus easing its strategic dependence on the Straits of Malacca.

The insurgencies that have plagued India in its remote Northeast Region,

together with the Burmese rebellions on its side of the border, and the movement of all

groups back and forth to effective sanctuaries has also prompted agreements for the

development of those regions. Both India and Myanmar are using each other for their

own national interests. India has developed a Kaladan River Multi-Modal Transit

Transport Project that would begin at the port of Sittwe (Akyab-modernized with Indian

support) through the Chin State of Myanmar, and allow more intensive economic

development of the Northeast, and help mitigate ethnic revolts there. Myanmar wants

to control Naga and Chin unrest in the region as well.

At present, there is considerable smuggling taking place between India and

Myanmar. Chemicals used in the preparation of heroin and metamphetamines are said

to be imported from India, and heroin exported to India, some of which has been

confiscated by the Indian government. Intravenous drug use has produced 70 percent

HIV rate among users in the region. All the borders of Myanmar are smugglers

havens, for local officials also benefit. Under the military government, and even with


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borders porous to smuggling, Myanmar is able militarily to manage its border areas. It

has increased the size of its military forces in these regions.

Administrative changes in Myanmar are planned. Under the disciplined system

of the new constitution that is to come into effect following the elections of 2010, aspecial self-governing Naga area will be created out of the present Sagaing Division (to

be known as a Region under the new constitution) on the Indian border that will give a

modest degree of local government to those peoples.

The newly elected legislature in 2010 will have a five-year term, and it is

possible that during that period some space may develop between the state and its

citizens that would allow greater freedom and a relaxation of the stringent rules

The Chin (Mizo) people just to the south of the Naga area now have, and will

have, a special State. All these will have local legislatures. Because active duty

Burmese military will occupy 25 percent of the Naga local legislature and the local Chin

legislature, these administrative changes should not greatly affect the capacity of the

tatmadaw to control its borders. Antagonisms among the Chin against the Burmans run

high because about 90 percent of the Chin are Christians, and many feel discriminated

against by the Buddhist Burman military.

The newly elected legislature in 2010 will have a five-year term, and it is

possible that during that period some space may develop between the state and its

citizens that would allow greater freedom and a relaxation of the stringent rules of

enforcement and censorship that are an aspect of life in contemporary Myanmar. Over

the medium term, it may be possible to see a more balanced approach to foreign policy

as the internal tensions between the military and civilian Burmese are assuaged, and

perhaps even the constitution amended. This might allow more civilian influence on

foreign policy. This is a slight and somewhat distant ray of hope for positive change.

One must note, however, that amending the constitution requires a 75 percent

approval of the legislature, which means that the military would have to agree to any

limitations of its powers, which seems unlikely during the first term, and slightly less

unlikely later.6 ASEAN, the UN, and the Japanese are likely to maintain that progress

has been apparent after the 2010 elections, but more needs to be done to implement to

human rights provisions of the new constitution. India will accept the new government,

and will continue to work with it to counter Chinese influence. The US and the EU are

unlikely to accept unambiguously the results of the elections even though they may


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begin the process of dealing with the new government with a certain degree of

skepticism, and in part motivated and justified by humanitarian concerns.

A possible but highly unlikely alternative result before the elections of 2010,

could be a revolution in the streets that could bring the National League for Democracy(NLD), an emasculated but existing opposition group whose most famous figure is

Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, to some sort of power-sharing with elements of the

military. Such a scenario is as unlikely as it would be unstable, for the NLD is held

together by its essential criterion of getting the military out of power, rather than by an

accepted set of shared premises beyond that goal. Coalitions are exceedingly fragile

because of the personalization of power.

the NLD is held together by its essential criterion of getting the military out of power,

rather than by an accepted set of shared premises beyond that goal. Coalitions are

exceedingly fragile because of the personalization of power.

Aung San Suu Kyi, who was partly brought up in India when her mother was

Burmese ambassador there, would in all likelihood have a more favorable attitude

towards India, but this may not result in any profound shift of policy. The NLD is

effectively a Burman party, and claims it would deal with minority issues after achieving

political control. It has called for some sort of federalism for the state.

Should, however, real representative government take place under a

democratic system, and the military retire to the barracks (although one must stress

this scenario is highly unlikely), there could be significant developments that could

affect Indian security in its Northeast. No such democratic Burmese government would

be able to exist without some form of federal system, a system that has been

anathema to the military since at least 1962. But in the unlikely event of it happening, it

is instructive to examine what the Chin have wanted in a draft constitution they

prepared illegally outside of Myanmar. It is the most autonomous and radical of suchdrafts that various minorities have formulated.7 Among other provisions, Union troops

could not be stationed on Chin territory without the expressed approval of a Chin

legislature, which would have extensive powers.

Although the central government would make foreign policy, the Chin would

have jurisdiction over the stationing of foreign troops on its soil, and all powers not

expressly designated to the center would be the province of the periphery. Under such

an extreme version of federalism, one could easily imagine Myanmar Chin and Naga

support for their co-ethnic brethren on the India side of the border (and the reverse as


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well), and even for the possibility of a pan-Mizo (Chin) and pan-Naga homeland that

could create extensive instability in the area. The 2010 Burmese constitution expressly

prohibits any and all secessions from the Union of Myanmar. However, the lessons of

previous irredentist movements and the past possibility of a Pashtunistan model

(Afghan-Pakistan Pashtun tribal homeland) should not be completely dismissed. This

might have repercussions for other parts of India as well.

Domestic factors would also affect how any democratization in Myanmar would

alter policies towards India. It should not be assumed that a democratic or civilian

Burma/Myanmar would be any the less nationalistic (although perhaps less strident)

than the military, for a review of the civilian period (1948-58, 1960-62) would indicate

the opposite.

First, are the residual attitudes toward Indians (all those from the subcontinent)

in Myanmar. Having been ruled until 1937 in the colonial era as a province of India,

Burma was subject to massive Indian migration. Indian control of credit, and following

the great depression of 1929-32, the foreclosure of land to the Indian Chettyar money-

lending caste produced strong antipathies towards Indians that is still part of the

residual memory of the Burmese. Rangoon was an Indian city before World War II, and

the movement of the capital to Naypyidaw is in part an attempt to eliminate this

shameful heritage. Some 200,000 people from the subcontinent were expelled from the

country following the coup of 1962.

Under the Citizenship Act of 1982, which was directed against the Indians and

Chinese, all those not a member of one of Burma/Myanmars indigenous races

(ethno-linguistic groups), and who cannot prove that their ancestors resided in Burma

before 1823 (the first Anglo-Burmese War was 1824-26) are associate citizens and

have significantly truncated rights.8 These negative attitudes, possibly reinforced by an

increasingly politicized sangha, could become more manifest if there were political

space for debate in Myanmar. Now, they are held in check by authoritarian rule.

Conclusion

The prospects for a functioning and deepened democracy through attrition

rather than through revolution, by any internationally acceptable standard in Myanmar

over the near term, are remote. Even should that happen, changes in Burmese policy

toward the Indian Northeast, access to gas reserves, or improved transportation links

are unlikely to alter significantly should that eventuality come about.


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The international globalized economic system will play little role in influencing

Myanmars internal politics. Although the states natural resources are attractive to

multinational corporations

Although there have been cries among expatriate Burmese for blacklisting ofthose firms that have collaborated with the military junta, economic and foreign policy

issues are likely to prevail. Both India and China will continue to view Myanmar as an

important, although not pivotal, factor in eachs strategic equation. Under these

circumstances, democracy by any definition is likely to play a minor role.

India, on the one hand, might wish to see a democratic Burma/Myanmar as

Aung San Suu Kyi might be closer emotionally to India, having grown up there, written

on India, and been strongly influenced by Gandhis philosophy; thus, she might be less

influenced by China. On the other hand, such a desire could easily backfire. It is

difficult to envision a democratic Burma/Myanmar by any international standard without

some form of greater ethnic autonomy or federalism.

Under the 2008 constitution, the Chin and Naga have areas with a degree of

local governance. Under a democratic system, local governance (such as it is) would

be most unlikely to recede from that high water mark. Probably greater autonomy

would occur, and this would put local pressures on these groups to deal with their

ethnic cousins across the border in India, and could prompt reactions from these India-

based groups for greater autonomy from centralized Indian control.

In summary, the international globalized economic system will play little role in

influencing Myanmars internal politics. Although the states natural resources are

attractive to multinational corporations, Myanmars decentralized economy would allow

the state to continue even if these resources were to erode. Myanmars orientation is

not a product of its participation in the international economy, but rather is a product of

its history its colonial past and the perceived dangers and insults of that period, thepast predatory roles of its neighbors, ethnic strife, and the glorification of the Burmese

military tradition to which the present tatmadaw lays claim. The regime is able to force

compliance while titularly espousing a particularistic brand of democracy (akin to

Suhartos Indonesia) in which multiple political parties affect only the periphery of

power and policy, but under strong, iron bands formed by the Burmese military.

Notes

1. Although the United Nations and most of the world has accepted the Burmese

militarys change of name from Burma to Myanmar, an old written form, in July


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1989 , the opposition in that country has not done so because they consider

that government illegitimate. The United States has followed the opposition,

thus making the use of either a political statement. In this essay, Burma is used

for the period before 1989. Myanmar thereafter, and both to indicate continuity.

No political connotations should be attached to the use of either term.

2. As the designated Prime Minister, General Khin Nyunt, said to the author, while

shaking in his hand a picture of President Bush signing the sanctions bill of

2003, We will stand up to you Americans.

3. Although there were early reports of Chinese bases in Myanmar, these have

been discredited. The new Burmese constitution prohibits foreign troops

quartered on Burmese territory. Two-thirds of the officers sent overseas for

training in the 1990-99 period went to China. David I. Steinberg,

Burma/Myanmar: What Everyone Needs to Know. New York: Oxford University

Press, 2009 (forthcoming).

4. In the early 1990s, India approached the U.S. Embassy in Delhi to discuss

Burma/Myanmar policies, but was rebuffed.

5. Personal communication, Andrew Selth, 5-2009.

6. National League for Democracy calls for reconsideration of the constitution

before the elections of 2010, a factor in whether it might participate in those

elections, will be ignored by the junta. Whether the NLD would be allowed to

participate, and if allowed whether it would, is still unclear in May 2009.

Personal interview, NLD Executive Committee members, Yangon, March 2009.

The most careful review of the constitution of 2008 is the International Crisis

Group Report, Myanmar: Towards the Election. Forthcoming 2009.

7. See David I. Steinberg, Turmoil in Burma: Contested Legitimacies in Myanmar

(Norwalk: EastBridge, 2006, pp. 229-231. Questioning the proposed

constitution or preparing alternative versions was declared illegal in Myanmar.

8. An inquiry in May 2009 to the Ministry of Information in Naypyidaw as to

whether associate citizens could run for office or even vote in the 2010

elections was unanswered, as even higher level officials were unclear in the

lack of the election law.

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