step hydrocarbon release toolkit

Human Factors

Hydrocarbon Release Database

Bolted Joints Guidelines

Flexible Hose Guidelines

Small Bore Tubing Guidelines

Vibration Guidelines

Corrosion Management Guidelines

Awareness and Communication

Audit

Hydrocarbon Release ReductionTOOLKIT

CONTENTS02 Introduction

04 Tool 1 Human Factors in Hydrocarbon Releases

06 Tool 2 Hydrocarbon Release Database

08 Tool 3 Good Practice Guidance

08 a Bolted Joints Guidelines

09 b Flexible Hose Guidelines

11 c Small Bore Tubing Guidelines

12 d Vibration Guidelines

13 e Corrosion Management Guidelines

15 Tool 4 Awareness and Communication

17 Tool 5 Audit

20 Tool 6 References and Contacts

Hydrocarbon Release Reduction TOOLKIT

01

Installation asset integrity is one of the main areas offocus by the offshore oil and gas industry in its effortsto prevent the occurrence of a major accident event,to ensure long term security of oil and gas suppliesand to continue its significant contribution to the UKeconomy.

Hydrocarbon releases are one of the key performanceindicators of an installations asset integrityperformance. Although major inroads have beenmade in reducing major and significant releases inrecent years, the improving trend slowed in 2006/07and 2007/08 suggesting the need for renewedawareness and efforts.

At the time of publication the latest data, as seen inthe graph below, shows there were 61 major andsignificant releases in the reporting year 2008/09. Thisis a significant improvement over the previous twoyears, but the imperative for sustained efforts tosecure lasting leak reduction remains.

For more details on severity classifications see the HSEHyd roca rbon Re l ea se s Da ta web s i t ewww.hse.gov.uk/hcr3/

02

INTRODUCTIONHYDROCARBON RELEASE REDUCTION TOOLKIT

0

50

100

150

200

No.

of

Rele

ases

93 94 95 96 97 98

Year

99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09

major significant minor

Hydrocarbon Releases (source: HSE Hydrocarbon Release Database)

The current level of major and significant releasesrepresents an over 50% improvement in the last 10years. However, the HSE has agreed a new targetwith the industry of 62 major and significant releasesto be reached by 2010/11. This represents a 45%improvement based on 113 major and significantreleases in 2001/02.

Improving asset integrity performance by preventingall hydrocarbon releases should be a primary goal forall installation operators. This can only be achievedwith an effective management system that targetsthe causes of releases and implements, in a sustainablemanner, proactive measures such as the good practicesidentified in this Toolkit.

The Step Change in Safety Leadership Team commendsthis revised Hydrocarbon Release Reduction Toolkitto all those responsible for the management andoperation of hydrocarbon process systems. A fullcommitment to the good practices identified withinwill make a significant contribution to HSE and Industrytargets and to the UK Offshore Oil & Gas Industrysvision of being the safest offshore oil and gas regionin the world.

Although the Toolkit is focused primarily on equipmentfailures, hydrocarbon release data indicates that ahigh percentage of releases is due entirely or in partto human intervention. Typically these failures are inpermits to work & isolation procedures, task riskassessments, training & competency, planning &communication. The tools for addressing these areasare already well established in offshore operations.However for all tools to be effective they must beregularly inspected and well maintained.

Further information on permit to work systems andisolation procedures can be found on the HSEswebsite. Further information or guidance on TaskRisk Assessment can be found on the Step Changein Safety website.

INTRODUCTIONHYDROCARBON RELEASE REDUCTION TOOLKIT

03

Industry and the Health and Safety Executive in theNorth Sea estimate that 50-70% of hydrocarbonreleases have causes linked in part or in whole toHuman Factors. In simple terms this suggests that alarge proportion of releases are not due tospontaneous failures of equipment, but to thingspeople do (or dont do) when designing, maintainingand operating. How might you start understandingand managing these issues?

The approach typically used in understanding leakcauses is to identify the plant items that are mostcommonly associated with leaks. This in itself helpsto identify some HF contributions. For instance, smallbore tubing is a regular source of leaks. It requirestrained and competent personnel who understandthe stresses and vibration issues that can be createdby incorrect fitting. However, other types of failuremay not be identified by this plant-focused perspective.Asking What were people doing that led to theleak? gives a different picture of systemic causes.For instance, this may point to design, isolation, ormaintenance of plant. This approach allows you tofocus in on the particular operational tasks that mayneed improving through redesign or goodmanagement. You may find that there are a numberof deeper rooted problems with existing operationalpractices that simply manifest themselves as a leak.

When it comes to understanding the humancontribution to an accident we often dont delve deepenough into the causes. Human error and Notfollowing procedures are often cited as root causesof a leak, but these events often have deeper rootedexplanations which must be systematically addressed.Peoples behaviour can be broadly divided intointentional and unintentional. If intentional, thechallenge is to understand what the motivation ofthe individual was. This may include the prospect ofreward, saving time or approval of peers or managers,or irrational belief that they are in control or knowbetter. If unintentional, the action was probably anerror of some type. Good management of thosethings that make errors more likely (complexity, timepressure, fatigue) can reduce the probability of error.

Several investigation systems now offer the ability todrill down to establish the circumstances in which aparticular behaviour occurred. However, even in theabsence of these, a good investigator can make adifference by not being content with the answerhuman error or not following procedure.Continue to ask why did this error occur and whywasnt the procedure followed until you reach thereal root causes. Keep asking why, what or whenquestions until there are no more questions to ask.In many cases, having identified the root problem,the solutions will be well within the scope of normalgood design and operating practice such asengineering, supervision, checking and permit towork.

TOOL # 1HUMAN FACTORS IN HYDROCARBON RELEASES

04

INDIVIDUALcompetence

skillspersonalityattitudes

riskperception ORGANISATION

communicationswork patterns

leadershipresourcesculture

JOBtask

workloadenvironment

display & controlsprocedures

Human Factors - The Theory

05

There is also a positive side to human involvement -particularly in the detection of leaks. HSE researchsuggests automatic systems detect only a proportionof all leaks. Although this may be partly due to theunreliability of detection systems the fact remainsthat people detect one-third of Major leaks (by HSEOIR/12 definitions) and two-thirds of Significantreleases. Data is not available for Minor releases butextrapolation would suggest that the best detectionfor these leaks is human.

Moving from a position where a company is notmanaging its leaks to one where it is mindful of theconsequences and actively eliminating causes mayrequire a culture change. This may mean a wholesalerealignment of the values, priorities and knowledgebase of the company, or simply a refocusing ofattention onto this important issue. One possibleapproach to cultural change is to ensure that yourplans include:

Management commitment: Leadership needsto visibly demonstrate that the reduction of leaksis an important goal for them.

Communication: It is necessary to communicatethis leadership commitment, the currentperformance and the risk associated with leaks.Its also important to tell people about the measuresthat need to be taken.

Participation: The intervention needs to includeall teams that have an influence on leak preventionand detection.

Competence: People need to have the rightknowledge and skills through training and practice.

The consequences for an HF leaks strategy are:

Ensure you look at incident statistics through thelens of what did people do as well as whatplant is involved.

Ensure investigations go beyond human errorand not following procedures to understandroot cause of these conditions.

RESOURCES:

Reducing Error and influencing behaviour,HSG48, HSE Books 1999

Offshore information sheet 2/2009 HydrocarbonReleases (HCRs) Offshore

Guidance On Investigating and Analysing Humanand Organisational Factors Aspects Of Incidentsand Accidents, Energy institute 2008, available atwww.energyinst.org.uk/index.cfm?PageID=1268

Guidance on specific human factor issues: EnergyInstitute Human Factor briefing notes, atwww.energyinst.org.uk/index.cfm?PageID=703

Guidance on Major Accident Hazard relevant HFissues: Managing Human Performance atwww.hse.gov.uk/humanfactors/majorhazard

HSE Human Factors Briefing Note No. 7:SafetyCulture athttp://www.hse.gov.uk/humanfactors/comah/07culture.pdf

Distinguish between intentional and unintentionalacts.

Having understood the root causes, use gooddesign and operating practices before looking formore complex solutions.

Have a systematic policy of searching for leaks andconsider area-ownership schemes.

Regularly check recently broken or disturbed jointsand reinstated equipment when recommissioning.

You may have to change the culture of thecompany to make it mindful of the importance ofhydrocarbon leak reduction.

TOOL # 1HUMAN FACTORS IN HYDROCARBON RELEASES

The Hydrocarbon Release (HCR) System containsdetailed voluntary information on offshorehydrocarbon release incidents. The web-basedversion of the HCR System allows duty holders tohave password-protected access to the system tosubmit incident reports direct to HSE via onlineinteractive forms. Statistical information is alsomade available to duty holders and otherauthorised users in the form of a data downloadfacility, standard reports, generated graphs and/ortables online as required.

Interrogation of the database allows companiesto gain valuable trending information for theirown facilities as well as being able to assess theirperformance compared to the rest of the industry.This can be invaluable for setting up inspectionprogrammes as part of the integrity managementsystem and also establishing an audit programme.

Some examples of the kinds of trending you canextract from the database are: system failuresresulting in HCRs; equipment failures resulting inHCRs; types of failure and leak frequencies foreach system.

How do I access the HCR System?

The HCR System HOME page at https://www.hse.gov.uk/hcr3/ contains general details of the site,including a table and graph, which illustrate currentreporting trends, plus a HELP file describing thevarious features of the HCR System. After loggingon, this HELP file expands to include full guidanceon how to report releases and how to operatethe HCR System.

If your company has not yet registered to use theHCR System and, after viewing the HCR HOMEpage information, you feel that you could benefitfrom further information on offshore hydrocarbonreleases, then please use the contact details givenon the HOME page and in HELP to advise the HCRAdministration team of your requirements.

TOOL # 2 HYDROCARBON RELEASE SYSTEM DATABASE

06

Choose Offshoreoil and gasindustry

www.hse.gov.uk

ChooseHydrocarbonsrelease systembutton

click here

1

2

3

4

For all reportable releases Form OIR/9B mustbe completed and submtted within 10 days.This should be followed by Form OIR/12Supplementary Information submitted within28 days. HSE Operations Notice 30, availableon the HSE website, contains details on correctsubmission of Forms OIR/9B and OIR/12.

(Note: Form OIR/12 cannot be processed bythe HSE without Form OIR/9B having beensubmitted. If an HCR is subsequently deemedto be non-reportable under RIDDOR 95, thenthe Form OIR/9B should be withdrawn.)

IMPORTANTINFORMATION

Links to other free online HydrocarbonReleases documentation are as follows:

Offshore Hydrocarbon Release Statistics:www.hse.gov.uk/offshore/statistics/hsr2002/index.htm

(Note that this is the last such report to havebeen produced by the HSE. After this time,the data download facility available via theHCR System allows users to produce their ownHCR statistics.)

HSE formal guidance for Reporting of OffshoreHydrocarbon Releases:www.hse.gov.uk/research/otohtm/1996/index.htm#100+ [Scroll to report number 96:956, clickand wait for .pdf file to load]

Oil & Gas UK supplementary guidance forReporting Hydrocarbon Releases:www.oilandgas.org.uk/issues/health/hydrocarbonreleases. cfm

LINKS

07

TOOL # 2 HYDROCARBON RELEASE SYSTEM DATABASE

08

TOOL # 3GOOD PRACTICE GUIDANCE

Introduction

This is a collection of good practice guidelinesdeveloped by the oil and gas industry to address themain leak areas identified from the HydrocarbonRelease Database.

Tool 3 Good Practice Guidance

a Bolted Joints Guidelines

b Flexible Hose Guidelines

c Small Bore Tubing Guidelines

d Vibration Guidelines

e Corrosion Management Guidelines

a Bolted Joints Guidelines

A bolted joint is one of many safety critical componentsof a pressurised system. Dependent upon the contentsand pressure of the system, leakage or failure of abolted joint can have potentially catastrophicconsequences. To meet this challenge, every operatorof pressurised systems should have in place a systemto positively and actively manage the integrity ofbolted joints. It is expected that such a system willbe built around the principle of continuousimprovement (see Figure 1.1).

The Oil & Gas UK/Energy Institute Guidelines forthe Management of Integrity of Bolted PipeJoints for Pressurised Systems 2nd Edition (June2007) describes the principles and good practice forthe establishment of a management system for boltedjoints in pressurised systems. The individual sectionsprovide details of what is considered good practicein the key areas of ensuring joint integrity. Togetherthey provide the framework for a management system.

The publication is not intended as a design guide forbolted joints, but as a guide on how to manage jointsduring construction and commissioning phases andthrough their operational life. It provides a frameworkto achieve this based on working with a correctlydesigned joint.

ANALYSIS,LEARNING ANDIMPROVEMENT

OWNERSHIP

TECHNOLOGYAND PRACTICE

CRITICALASSESSMENT

TRAINING ANDCOMPETENCE

RECORDS,DATA

MANAGEMENTAND TAGGING

IN-SERVICEINSPECTION

MANAGEMENTOF LEAKS

Essential Elements of a Management System

09

b Flexible Hose Guidelines

Flexible Hose Assemblies (FHAs) are complexcomponents used extensively for delivery of productsor hydraulic power on a wide range of process, drillingand service/utility systems. Failures in their integritycan create hazards such as leakage of flammable ortoxic substances. Failures or defects can compromisethe operation of safety and control systems, impacton the safety of personnel or cause environmentalproblems.

FHAs are often an integral part of pressurised systemscarrying hydrocarbons (liquids and gases), high-pressure water, chemicals, fuels and high-pressurepower fluids. They are also used in many drilling/wellengineering applications and extensively used duringbulk loading and unloading operations.

Effective management, in particular the assurance ofpersonnel competency and hazard awareness, is keyto ensuring the quality of the whole lifecyclemanagement of FHAs. To ensure the integrity offlexible hose products, it is necessary to establishperformance-based maintenance and inspectionstrategies in accordance with approved guidelinesand inspection practices.

The UKOOA/IP Flexible Hose ManagementGuidelines address many of the good practice issuesconcerning design, installation, maintenance,inspection and testing of hoses in all possibleapplications. They also cover required skill levels,training and overall competency of personnel.


Flexible Hose Assembly

Safety Management Lifecycle Objectives and Activities table, Issue No.1 Jan 2003This table has been extracted from the UKOOA/IP guidelines:

10


Lifecycle Phase Objectives/Deliverables Activities Documents

Conceptual Design To ensure that the use of a flexiblehose assembly can be justified asthe optimum technically safesolution, and that all lifecycleaspects are considered.

Safety assessment Technical evaluation Lifecycle cost analysis Identification of

alternative methods

These GuidelinesISO 8331

Risk Analysis To identify and evaluate any riskposed by the use of FHAs in anyspecific application, classify theFHAs by risk category, and to ensurethat risk reduction measures havebeen fully considered.

Risk assessment Identification of

Opportunities for riskreduction

These Guidelines

Detailed Design Detailed design, materialsspecification, operating conditions,procurement and storage.

Hose performance Compatibility Operating parameters Procurement criteria Certification


Construction/Installation/Commissioning

To ensure that FHAs aretransported, sorted, installed todesign, and that commissioningis satisfactorily completed.

Installation and testing Storage and

transportation Hose routing Commissioning


Operations, Maintenance,Inspection and Testing

Development of a Maintenanceand Inspection Strategy for FHAs.The strategy should ensure thatinspection frequencies align withthe FHAs Criticality and RiskAssessment.

Tagging and documentation

Inspection strategy Pressure testing Rejection criteria

These Guidelines

Modification To ensure that the integrity ofFHAs is retained, both during andafter modification or charge ofservice conditions.

Risk analysis Detailed design Change management

These GuidelinesAll of the above

Decommissioning The integrity of the FHAs isretained during decommissioning.

Risk analysis Decommissioning

/Removal Change management Documentation and

closeout

These Guidelines


11

c Small Bore Tubing Guidelines

Small bore tubing systems are a significant contributorto the incidence of process containment failure inhazardous plants. When incorrectly designed, selected,modified, installed or maintained, small bore tubingsystems will inevitably degrade and can rupturecatastrophically leading potentially to largehydrocarbon releases.

The purpose of the Guidelines For TheManagement, Design, Installation andMaintenance of Small Bore Tubing Systems is toprovide operators of offshore installations and onshoreplant with a reference framework of managementand technical controls and procedures necessary toensure the continuing integrity of small bore tubingsystems.

The guidelines apply to small bore tubing used forinstrumentation and control purposes. They providean outline approach to the specification, design,operation and maintenance of small bore tubinginstallations and set out issues to be considered andrecommended principles to be followed:

Principles of hazard management should be integralto the design, maintenance and operation of smallbore tubing. Root cause analysis of failures isessential and any lessons learned should be fedback into the management of these systems.

A management system should be established toensure competency of personnel and identify therequirement for a register of Authorised Personnel.An e-learning course, Compression Fittings andSmall Bore Tubing Awareness, has been developedas a result of a Joint Industry Project to deliver theawareness training requirements of theseguidelines.

Performance standards and their typical contentshould be considered, if a hazardous situationcould arise as a result of fittings failures.

Requirements for setting up a standardisationpolicy to specify the permitted combinations offittings and related devices for use when consideringa new installation or altering an existing installationsite.

The principles of making up various fittings.

Maintenance and operations, including the needto ensure that any changes to the systems do notadversely affect the small bore tubing.

Field installation covers the installation aspects ofsome of the most commonly encounteredcomponents.

The control and standardisation of fittings, tube typesand brands on individual installations and plants areessential to reduce the incidence of defective work.A policy for the technical management andminimisation of the valve, fitting and tubing typesshould be developed, documented and implementedfor each new or existing installation or plant.

The policy should be made visible to, and understoodby, all personnel involved in the design, installation,commissioning, maintenance, operation andpurchasing of small bore tubing systems andequipment.

d Vibration Guidelines

Fatigue failure from vibration in pipework is a commonsource of leaks. Vibration causes dynamic stresseswhich, if above a critical level, could initiate fatiguecracks. Fatigue cracking can lead to through-thicknessfracture and subsequent rupture. Fatigue life of thecomponent can be relatively short (minutes or days)or long (years) if the vibration is intermittent.

Three of the vibration related problem areas addressedby the offshore industry are: continuous vibrationfrom steady-state plant operation (the commonest);transient vibration (shock/impact loading from rapidvalve closure etc.); and vibration in flexible risers fromsubsea lines.

1 Continuous Vibration

Guidelines for the Avoidance of Vibration InducedFatigue in Process Pipework, were produced bythe Marine Technology Directorate (MTD). Theyaddress:

a Different vibration mechanisms and their effecton pipework and small bore connections (SBCs)

b Assessment methodology for the likelihood offailure of piping systems and SBCs for the variousexcitation mechanisms

c Possible design solutions/best practices for pipingsystems or SBCs susceptible to vibration

d Survey methods for vibration measurement andassessment of pipework fatigue in operating plant

Key Areas:

IdentificationGood awareness programmes enable the workforceto identify and record potential threats from vibration.Anomaly reports detail which system has been affectedand under what conditions this problem was observed.

AssessmentRisk assessment should be applied to all main linesand SBCs, ensuring all types of excitation areconsidered. The risk associated with the whole plantunder different operating conditions should also beassessed.

Remedial ActionWhenever possible and practicable reduce vibrationat source (reduce the level of excitation) by installingappropriate supports/dampening etc. For newconstruction the use of one piece short-bodied forgingsrather than weldolet and nipple is preferred.

2 Transient Vibration

Transient Vibration Guidelines for Fast ActingValves Screening Assessment, produced for HSE(OTO 2002/028).

They cover theory and screening methods to assesspiping local to various types of valves. The outputfrom the assessment, in conjunction with the SBCsscreening assessment in item 1, provides a risk ratingwhich can be mitigated against by applying therecommendations from these same guidelines.

3 Vibration in Flexible Risers

A Joint Industry Project (JIP) was established by BP,ExxonMobil, Statoil, the HSE and Bureau Veritas.

In the last few years several assets that utilise flexiblerisers for gas export have experienced high levels ofpiping noise and vibration resulting in piping failuresand significant reductions in gas exports rate. Thevortex shedding phenomenon within the flexible risersis the suspected cause.

The JIP deliverables include: Guidance to operators Increased awareness and understanding of the

problem Screening methods to identify if a problem might

be experienced Short-term integrity solutions Longer-term design guidance to avoid the problem

12



13

e Corrosion Management Guidelines

The loss of hydrocarbon containment on offshoreprocessing facilities due to corrosion can result insevere consequences upon safety, the environmentand asset value.

The Energy Institute/Oil & Gas UK document,Guidance for corrosion management in oil andgas production and processing, provides generalprinciples, engineering guidance and requirementsfor improving corrosion management practices in oiland gas production and processing. It has beenproduced by an oil and gas industry workgroup withthe objective of:

reducing the number of corrosion relatedhydrocarbon releases and other safety related andenvironmentally damaging outcomes;

identifying good practices for setting up an optimalcorrosion management scheme, and

providing an overview of the top corrosion threatsto production and processing facilities downstreamof the wells.

Corrosion management has been defined as the partof the overall management system that develops,implements, reviews and maintains the corrosionmanagement policy and strategy and includes a clearset of corrosion management system requirementsthat can, and should, be considered normative.

a Clear policiesand objectives

Healthand safety,

integrity andcorrosion

issues

b

c

d

e

fMeeting

the controlcriteria?

g

Reviewsused to provide

correction

Reportsused to achieveimprovements

Getting itright

Independentaudit

Reviewsystem

performance

Monitoring andmeasuring

performance

Implementatonand analysis

Corrosion riskassessment

and planning

Organisationalstructure andresponibilities

Yes No

To supplement this previous publication The EnergyInstitute, in association with Oil & Gas UK and TheHealth & Safety Executive, has produced the Corrosionthreats handbook for upstream oil and gasproduction plant.

The handbook has been commissioned as a concisereference tool to provide practical information toillustrate the corrosion degradation mechanisms likelyto affect upstream oil and gas production systems,structures and components. The guide outlines thecauses of the corrosion threats, shows typical locationsfor their occurrence and gives examples of how thethreats may be managed.

The guide is intended for use by plant engineers andpersonnel with direct and indirect responsibility forthe long term integrity of production facilities. Itshould assist system housekeeping and more formalintegrity audits, and should also be of value topractitioners of Integrity Management, especially thoseless familiar with corrosion issues specific to oil andgas production plant.

The information should allow the user to:

Understand the key corrosion threats (both internaland external corrosion)

Understand the typical appearance of the mainthreats

Understand where the threats may occur

Identify the conditions which may give rise tothreats

Consider actions to mitigate the threats

The majority of the corrosion threats apply to carbonsteel, the most commonly used material for upstreamoil and gas production systems, structures andcomponents. Threats to other material are identified.

The information in this guide should NOT be used tothe exclusion of established and applicable codes,standards and criteria; nor should the threats andtheir manifestation described in this guide be seen asexhaustive. Please notify and consult with the relevanttechnical engineering authority/discipline specialistsfor investigation of potential threats or actualdegradation that may be observed.

The corrosion threats in this guide are presented eitheras specific corrosion mechanisms, e.g. microbialcorrosion, erosion corrosion; or by location, e.g.external corrosion under insulation. In addition tothe threats which are strictly corrosion, three otherdegradation processes are included in this handbook.They are: erosion, fatigue and fretting. In practice,corrosion may be driven by two or more mechanisms.Typically, the resultant corrosion rate is faster thanwould be anticipated from a single mechanism.

14


TOOL # 4AWARENESS AND COMMUNICATION

15

Involvement

Why workforce involvement is important:

The workforce are the eyes and ears around theinstallation

They need to understand the role they play inreducing hydrocarbon releases

They need to be onboard for the tools to work

There are many ways to communicate to theworkforce:

Toolbox talks before any job remindall personnel about the importance oflooking for telltale signs of leaks or potentialhot spots and reporting them. Emphasisethe need to double check all connectionsand valve status at the end of each taskand work to procedures.

Safety meetings discuss any recent leaks,their root causes and any lessons fromthese. Show awareness videos. Discuss anybest practice guidelines.

Inductions ensure all new starts areaware of the no leak culture and the needfor vigilance at all times for potential leaksand how to report them.

Poster campaigns, notice boards andleaflets all help to raise awareness andspread the word.

Useful tips for successful communication:

The delivery of information is often through anindividual supervisor, safety advisor or safetyrepresentative. It is important to ensure theseindividuals have the skills and the support materialnecessary to communicate effectively.

Communication mechanisms need to be as diverseas possible to ensure the message reaches everyoneand doesnt get stale.

Generally you will find that where people havebeen involved in establishing a particular process(and recognise that involvement) then they will bemore receptive to further information relating tothe ongoing operation or development of theprocess.

Gather the views of the workforce, particularly onthe shortcomings of your existing communicationsand processes. Seek further input from supervisorsand safety reps as to the scope of futurecommunications.

The HSE publication PlayYour Part was revised in2008 and contains manyexamples of good practicefor workforce involvement.

This guidance, which wasoriginally produced inresponse to Lord Cullensr e c o m m e n d a t i o n , i sintended to help operators,contractors, trades unions,safety representatives andindividual employees to co-operate to improve healthand safety offshore through the active participationof the workforce.

The booklet has been prepared by the WorkforceInvolvement Group of the Offshore Industry AdvisoryCommittee which is made up of industryrepresentatives employers, employees, trades unionsetc and draws on examples of good practice andsuccess stories from the industry, involving theworkforce in improving health and safety.

Lord Cullen said the whole workforce must becommitted to safe working practices.

He picked out the safety representatives andcommittee system as the most visible way ofinvolving the workforce. Other ways includegiving information, improving communicationat all levels, good induction and training, andmaking sure that people feel truly involved inthe decisions affecting them.

Guidance on Effective Workforce Involvementin Health and Safety published by The EnergyInstitute, 2008

This guide has been developed for everyone whowants to find out more about WFI and improving itseffectiveness. It details the issues surrounding WFIand describes a three step approach to itsimplementation, and is supported by case studies andassessment exercises.

16

TOOL # 4AWARENESS AND COMMUNICATION

Health and Safety Executive websites:www.hse.gov.uk/hcrfor the information database andwww.hse.gov.uk/forms/offshore/index.htm toreport a leak

LINKS

Where are we now?

Assess current WFI in healthand safety management

Assess the factors thatinfluence WFI

Ways to improve?

Plan WFI improvements

Get started

Select methods to improve WFIin Health and Safety

Management

Address factors thatinfluence WFI

Sustaining WFI

Maintaining momentum

Set new targets

Monitor and review

Examples and case studies are provided in this guide for each of these stages

The information contained within the guide couldhelp improve safety management systems. Theguidance focuses on health and safety but theinformation and techniques can also be used to helpinvolve workers in other areas of work, e.g. design,making decisions about environmental protection orconsidering ways to improve quality.

Three step approach for improving WFI

TOOL # 5AUDIT

The vital part of the system

The most important part of any process is theaudit/review/feedback loop. Lots of time, effort andmoney is put into engineering solutions as well asnew inspection and maintenance criteria. Howeverunless we complete the loop to ensure that thesechanges have been effective this is pointless.

Audits are the way to maintain continuousimprovement in a process. Findings from the auditshould be discussed, lessons learned should be shared

and processes amended and communicated to relevantparties accordingly. This is where this toolkit could beused to best advantage. Ensure your audit scheduleincludes the topics covered in this toolkit to preventleaks.

For an audit schedule to be effective it should include:independent audits; management-level audits; systemaudits; procedure audits and task-based checks toensure the full range of activities has been addressed.A checklist with useful questions about what requiresto be audited is overleaf.

audit

review

feedback

17

Are you doing all this?

Questionnaire/Check List on release reduction activities: YES NO

1 Have any high-level company goals or targets been set for release reduction in yourannual or longer-term Business Plans?

2 Have any specific leak targets been set for individual assets/platforms to achieve areduction in releases?

3 Have any targets been set for monitoring and tracking specific releaseactivities/actions/problem areas?

4 Is release performance monitored and reported on?

5 Does your company keep its own hydrocarbon release statistics/database?

6 Is past performance on releases analysed for trends and learning?

7 Have you identified your problem areas?

8 Is there a hydrocarbon release reduction person/focal point or team in your company?

9 Is there any structured release reduction programme?

10 Is your company aware of the HSE website for hydrocarbon release information andreporting releases?

11 Is your company registered to use the HCR system?

12 Do you have an onshore focal point for co-ordinating and submitting OIR/12 formsto the HSE via the website?

13 Do you carry out an onshore process review of all data submitted on Form OIR/12,including a check/calculation of the mass of any release prior to submission to the HSE?

14 Have you compared your company leak performance with industry performance?

15 Is your company aware of the Guidelines on The Management of Bolted Pipe Joints?

16 Has your company committed to implementing these Guidelines?

17 Is your company training personnel on flange make up?

18 Does your company plan to make flange make up training a required competency?

19 Does your company have, or plan to have, a flange tagging system?

20 Is your company aware of the Flexible Hose Management Guidelines?


22 Does your installation have a register of Flexible Hose Assemblies (FHAs)?

23 Does your installation have an inspection strategy for Flexible Hose Assemblies?

TOOL # 5AUDIT

18

TOOL # 5AUDIT

Continued YES NO

24 Do you ensure the correct FHAs are being used for the application?

25 Is your company aware of the Guidelines on the Management of Small BoreTubing Fittings?


27 Has your company applied the recommendations/guidance from the Guidelinesmentioned above?

28 Have all personnel making up compression fittings on your companys installationsbeen trained to do so and deemed competent?

29 Is your company aware of the Guidelines for the Avoidance of Vibration InducedFatigue in Process Pipework?


31 Has your company applied the recommendations from the Guidelines mentioned above?

32 Do you take due account of piping vibration as an integrity threat inHAZOP/HAZID forums?

33 Are operations and process engineering personnel aware of the threat of vibrationinduced fatigue and its contributory factors?

34 Has a structured risk assessment methodology been followed to identify potentialvibration problem areas?

35 Have remedial actions been identified following a structured assessment ofvibration issues?

36 Have these actions to prevent vibration been correctly implemented?

37 Is your company aware of the report on The Review of Corrosion Management forOffshore Oil & Gas Processing (OTO 2001/044)?

38 Has your company applied the recommendations and good practiceguidance on corrosion management?

39 Have any release reduction awareness programmes been undertaken?

40 Have presentations/visits been made offshore to raise awareness on release reduction?

41 Has the Step Change in Safety DVD video on hydrocarbon release reduction been shown to all relevant staff on and offshore?

42 Are there any regular reports, bulletins, newsletters etc. on release reductionissues/learning?

43 Do you have an appropriate programme of refresher training in all relevantcompetency areas?

19

TOOL # 6REFERENCES AND CONTACTS

20

References

1 Supplementary Guidance on Reporting Hydrocarbon ReleasesAn Oil & Gas UK document produced in co-operation with the HSE; available via the Oil & Gas UK websitewww.oilandgasuk.co.uk.

2 Guidelines for the management of the integrity of bolted joints for pressurised systems2nd edition June 2007 published by the Energy Institute (EI); available via the Energy Institute websitewww.energyinstitute.org.uk & the Oil & Gas UK website www.oilandgasuk.co.uk.

3 Flexible Hose Management GuidelinesIssue No. 1 January 2003; an HSE/UKOOA/IP document published by UKOOA (now Oil & Gas UK); availablevia the Oil & Gas UK website www.oilandgas.co.uk.

4 Guidelines for the management, design, installation and maintenance of small bore tubing systemsPublished by IP (now the Energy Institute) in June 2000; available from Portland Press Ltd ColchesterTel: 01206 796351 or e-mail [email protected].

5 Compression Fittings and Small Bore Tubing AwarenessFor more information about this CD-ROM please contact the EIs publications department onTel: 020 7467 7100 or e-mail [email protected].

6 Guidelines for the Avoidance of Vibration Induced Fatigue in Process PipeworkOriginally published by MTD, available from the Energy Institute. For more information or to place an order,please contact the EIs publications department on Tel: 020 7467 7100 or e-mail [email protected].

7 Transient Vibration Guidelines for Fast Acting Valves Screening AssessmentAvailable from the HSE (OTO Report 2002/028) or via their website atwww.hse.gov.uk/research/otopdf/2002/oto02028.pdf

8 Guidance for Corrosion Management in Oil & Gas Production ProcessingPublished by the Energy Institute in May 2008; available from the EIs publications department onTel: 020 7467 7100 or e-mail [email protected] & the Oil & Gas UK website www.oilandgasuk.co.uk.

9 Corrosion threats handbookPublished by the Energy Institute in 2008 & available the EIs publications department on Tel: 020 74677100 or e-mail [email protected] & the Oil & Gas UK website www.oilandgasuk.co.uk.

TOOL # 6REFERENCES AND CONTACTS

21

Contacts & Websites

1 Step Change in Safetywww.stepchangeinsafety.net

2 The Health and Safety Executivewww.hse.gov.uk

3 Oil & Gas UKwww.oilandgasuk.co.uk

4 International Association of Oil & Gas Producers (OGP)www.ogp.org.uk

5 International Association of Drilling Contractors (IADC)www.iadc.org

6 HCR Databasewww.hse.gov.uk/hcr3/

7 Energy Institutewww.energyinst.org.uk/index.cfm

8 Vibration in Flexible Riserswww.flexible-risers.org

address 3rd FloorThe Exchange 262 Market StreetAberdeenAB11 5PJ

telephone 01224 577268fax 01224 577252

email [email protected] www.stepchangeinsafety.net

Hydrocarbon Release ReductionTOOLKIT

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