Chapter Two

STRATEGIC DOCTRINES AND SPACE SYSTEM

Today satellite intelligence shapes military doctrines lnformat1on

gathered through this medium is authentic and precise. War planners

depend upon the geodatic data to ensure deep peneteration during advance

and to protect their military establishments as well.

Varied approaches have been taken by military analysts to integrate

nuclear weapons into war-fighting doctrines. One is to discount the human

scale of their destructiveness, to treat them as bigger ·conventional'

weapons. More civilians died in a non-nuclear fire bombing than the atomic

bombing of the two Japanese cities. Such a thinking may have been behind

Strategic Air Command's strategy in the 1950's, which was to deliver the

maximum available fire power in a short span of time. Secondly in a limited·

nuclear war the scale of destruction may be controlled by both sides

confining their nuclear strikes to a limited number or limited sets of target.

If we go by the second approach, it leads us to the concept of a protracted

nuclear war : Such a war is to be conducted not as a one day spasm of

retaliation, but as a more or less controlled military campaign extending

over weeks or months.

New weapons technology has made it possible to control destruction

Limited and protracted nuclear war theories have been given substance

29

by these technologies. Technicians invent new devices to bring the nuclear

genie under rational control : smaller nuclear warheads for more confined

circles of destruction, precision bombing of specifically military Installations

with the help of improved intelligence systems for the location of those

targets, and more pervasive command and control systems for the

measured and centralized direction of the application of nuclear force

Scenarios of limited or controlled nuclear war, concentrating on

damage limitation and targeting schemes were studied and analysed by

the McNamara, administration of the Pentagon. This approach led to the

encouragement of the demand from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to seek an

atmost unlimited number of new nuclear weapons to use against an almost

unlimited number of 'counterforce' military targets, "Whether nuclear war

fighting has been popular in current military doctrine or not, it has long

been a major component of the de facto target policy. The question has

never been whether or not the United States should have counter-force

weapons, but only how many. In fact McNamara's raised target guidance

of 1963, emphasizing assured destruction, called for only 18 per cent of

US strategic nuclear weapons to be alert by 1969 for the task of destroying

cities." 1

1. Friedman, Richard S. and othersAdvanced Technology

Warfare :A Detail Study of thelatest Weapons And

Techniques For Warfare Today And Into 21'st Century

(London, Salamander Co, 1983), p- 66.

30

SDI AND OTHER CONCEPTS

Back ground

No system could have stopped a ballistic missile attack agamst the

United States by the former Soviet Union. The reasons are varied, and

rooted in the late 1960s. Proliferation of nuclear-tipped strategic ballistic

missiles by both sides had begun earlier in that decade, and it made sense

to develop a system to defend against them. But investigations revealed

that technology could not produce a cost effective anti-ballistic missile

(ABM) system. ABM concepts then depended on nuclear-tipped

interceptors, and that also militated against serious development of an·

ABM system. (It was thought at that time the Soviets had reached the

same conclusions about developing such a system, though subsequent

events proved that was not the case). A principle of mutual vulnerability or

mutually assured destruction developed. In 1972 the two countries signed

the Antiballistic Misslie (ABM) treaty that placed limits on allowable

defenses. It was then thought that a balance in offensive strategic nuclear

forces would lead to negotiated reductions in the numbers and kinds of

strategic weapons, and that security and stability would surely result.

"To move away from the mutual destruction theorum, the stability would

result- Government is negotiating verifiable arms reductions w1th the Sov1et

Union while researching strategic defense technologies. such as SDS

The rationale is that an effective defense against ballistic m1ssiles could

31

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y,q SPAC.l -BAS(O RUAY MIRHOR SPAC( SAS£0 r~fiKt~ ln~r

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The four phase~ of the trajel'tory of an I en M. and ~II_I!P,CSll!d s [)I countermeasures

ultimately provide an incentive for negotiations to reduce the numbers of

those missiles. SDS could ensure stability during the transition penod as

both sides reduced their ballistic missiles. Once in place and upgraded 111

an evolutionary way, it would theoretically provide protection and allow

the United States to safely adjust the number of offensive strategic

weapons. The United States has no ABM defense, but the Soviets have

an operational ABM system for the defense of Moscow."2

It is often less than fully appreciated outside the US defence community

that, notwithstanding the overbones of technological adventure 1n the

President's 1983 speech inaugarating the strategic Diffence initiative. many

of the technologies on which SOl is based were at that time already in

place and funded. Arguably the US was already in the "Star Wars" bus1ness.

Certainly the US Army's Homing Overlay Experiment (HOE) was sufficiently.

far advanced to permit within a year the successful interception of a

"Minuteman warhead with an infrared guided kinetic energy weapon The

experiment placed minimal reliance on exotic technologies, us1ng radars

at the Kwajalein missile range to acquire the missile during its boost phase

~md to hand the target over to the interceptor for optical homing: but there

~as already a groundswell of technical and intelligence community opinion

urging more advanced developments in order to close a percen:ed gap

with Soviet programmes.

2. Paul. David .Space Warfare And Stratglc D_E;j_en~_gl ondo11 81son

Books. 1987). p- 133.

, ) .l-

Arguments for increased DOD funding for directed energy weapons

had been gaining momentum since the late 1970s. Russian developments

had probably focussed on the acquisition of anti-satellite capabilities, and

it was considered likely that in addition to having tested an ASAT system

in the operational context its 1982 strategic forces exercise, the former

USSR was far advanced with the development of laser-beam weapon

systems-which would be carried aloft by "next generation" manned space

stations as part of a space-based ABM system.

"The much:-discussed Soviet laser programme which began in the

mid 1960s and included a series of experiments at the Sary Shargan missile

test range had addressed the development of gas-dynamic, electric

discharge, and chemical lasers and had also probably progressed to the

point where its scientists had access to rocket-driven generators and other

power sources necessary to support further advances. The argument

offered in the US was that ground-based lasers would be operational in an

ASAT role by the late-1980s but Soviet technical advances did not stop

there; ever sine the 1970s its research establishments had also been

studying the feasibility of particle beam weapons which could be targetted

against satellites in the mid-1998s and of RF weapons capable of

destroying components of missiles or re-entry; vehicles"~'

3. Ibid; p- 140.

33

The Threat

The strategic ballistic missile arsenal of the former Sov1et Un1on

continued to grow and become more sophisticated. The inventory of former

Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submanne-launched

ballistic missiles (SLBMs) comprised about 2,308 missiles and up to 9,600

warheads plus decoys. The strategic rocket force operated about 1 ,380

ICBMs, some of which were mobile, and the force could deliver upto 6.000

nuclear warheads, depending on how weapon carriages were arranged.

Many of those ICBMs were obsolescent, having been developed and

deployed in the 1960s through the mid-1970's but they are still operational

The former Soviet navy operated 73 ballistic missile launching

submarines, with a total of 928 launch tubes available. As w1th Soviet

ICBMs, some Soviet SLBMs were of older design, but the total SLBM

force could deliver between 2,132 and 3,616 nuclear warheads on target.

Both land and sea missile forces underwent constant modernization. 4

Concept

The SDS concept calls for a multilayered defense in-depth, a systeril

complete with battle management capability that can engage ballistic

missiles at any time during flight. SDS sensors and weapons would be

deployed against each phase of flight.

4 John, Nicholson L.Soviet Military Strategy_j!l Spa~~ \London. Jane's.

1987), p- 48.

34

The boost phase would last from lift-off up to the point just before

warheads are dispensed. The most important element of SDS 1s boost-.

phase kill. During that phase, each missile destroyed could reduce the

attack force by a factor of one to ten, depending on the number of warheads

each missile carries. A successful use of defensive weapons at the

inception of missile attack can neutralize the enemy forces early on,

discourage the adversary and make the job easier for other layers of the

defense. Without effective boost-phase kill capability, subsequent defensive

measures would have to deal with the most difficult aspect of warheads

as opposed to decoys in the midcourse phase offlight. An effective boost­

phase kill capability might cause an adversary to select another method

of power projection. The post-boost phase occurs during the release of

the warhead platform. During this phase of flight, the primary target would

be the weapon package atop the missile. The ideal is to destroy it before

warheads and decoys are dispensed.

The mid-course phase would occur when the warheads and decoys

coast above the atmosphere towards their targets. Defensive measures

during this phase require location and identification, or discrimination of

individual warheads from decoys and platform/missile, residue. This is

the longest phase of flight, lasting upto 20 minutes in most ICBM attack

scenarios, and discrimination is one of the most demanding 1ssues fac1ng.

SDS plans

3S

The terminal phase is when the warheads re-enter the atmosphere.

Warheads that survive the previous layout defense would be attacked

while approaching to their target.

Program Elements and Goals

The five SDS program elements are planned to make a system that is

militarily effective and survivable, and would discourage an adversary

from attacking and one could operate in a nuclear- stressed env1ronment.

Research and development efforts are divided among four proelements:

1. Surveillance, acquisition, tracking and kill assessment sesors

developed under this program perform tracking, discrimination, target

designation and interest update, as well as damage assessment on

incoming by raids.

2. Kinetic energy weapons (KEW). Non-nuclear weapon developed

under this program are designed to physica intercept and collide

with ballistic missiles. They can be ground-or space-based. The

weapons developed under the KEW program represent the most

te~hnology present in the SDS.

3. Directed energy weapons (DEVIl) :The objective of this program 1s

to identify and validate weapon candi-that can make maximum use

of speed-of-light and deliver energy onto targets

4. · Survivability, lethality and key technologies. Rest 1n these programs

is to provide technology that would allow SDS to surv1ve defense

.If)

suppression meassures, and develop systems that can effect1vely

kill targets.

SYSTEM ANALYSIS AND BATTLE MANAGEMENT.

Some technologies are critical to success across all system

elements. Brig.Gen.Garry A.Schnelzer U.S. Air Force, SOlO deputy for

technology, said : "The most critical technology for SOl has been

microelectronics, since it facilitates signal and data processing In fact, if

you look at each of our elements, phase 1 or beyond, miniaturization of

electronics, making them smaller and lighter, has been one reason for our

successes. For example, the Maverick missile has a one hundred million

instruction per second processor for the infrared sensor that weighs 100

pounds. A similar processor developed for our space-based weapon

projectile weighs half a pound, Miniaturization made that possible, and we

have experienced cost and efficiency gains in all our programs because

of it. "5

He continued, "Signal processing is also important. We need to know

if our systems will work in a post-radiated condition at extreme

temperatures, and if we can achieve the required performance within the

power budget. We don't worry about that on the ground, because you

have almost unlimited power available, but on a spacecraft it IS in short

5 Paul, David SRa~e Warfare And St.r.9J.gj_g Oefe~ondon Bison

Books. 1987), p- 53.

37

supply and must last a long time. How you use it is a critical matter, and

much of the power required on our smarter spacecraft is allocated to Sl~~nal·

and data processing."('

BOOST SURVEILLANCE & TRACKING SYSTEM

Surveillance and Tracking System which as its name suggests

addressed the evaluation of device which could measure booster plume

signature but with the important provison that they would be limited to an

early warning capacity for purposes of the experiment. Its progress is

closely linked to that of the Space Surveillance and Tracking Expenment

which aims to demonstrate technology capable of upgrading ex1sting space

surveillance assets with a view to determining the technology which 1s·

likely to be the most suitable for future ABM applications. This experiment

is likely to be the crucial test of the capability to collect and identify signature

data from a wide range of space objects, but at this Strawman concept for

ballistic missile defense during the boost phase. It requires a global. full­

time Surveillance system. Space-based sensors detect and defme the

attack. Space-based interceptors protect the sensors and additionally

engage the missiles. The post-boost phase allows additional t1me for

engageing warheads and deception devices.

Stage it will do so only from a satellite with less than ABM capability ..

A further experiment, the Airborne Optical Adjunct. was des1gned to use

an aircraft as a platform for the validation of the technology for the

6. lb1d . p- 54.

application of airborne optics to missile defence, and in particular the linking

of Information gathered by airborne sensors to ground-based radars for

the purposes of tracking and discrimination.

The SOl experiments included three major Kinetic Energy Weapons

(KEW) projects of which the Kinetic Kill Vehicle was to demonstrate launch

and guidance techniques for the types of KEW which might be used to

defend satellites against ASAT interceptors- but obviously the end- product

of such experiments would be a weapon with ABM potential. Two Railgun

experiments were also envisaged, one based on the ground and one in

space, each of which would examine the feasibility of several types of

projectile.

The range of experimental work proposed at the outset of SDI included

several so-called category. Three experiments were conducted in the use.

of ground-based ABM system components (i.e. of a type not prohibited by

the treaty). Foremost amongst these were the High Endoatmospheric

Defence Interceptor (HEDI), which was to demonstrate a capability to take

out strategic missiles in the earth atmosphere within the terms of the ABM

Treaty, and ERIS, the Exoatmospheric Re-Entry Vehicle Interceptors

System, Agenerally similar programme was aimed to demonstrate a

capability to perform such interceptions out of the atmosphere The two

were to be integrated via a Terminal Imaging Radar programme and a

ground based Long Wavelength IR Probe.

39

40

BM I C:!

The Battle Management I Command, Control and Commun1cat1o~~

(BM/C 4 system would be used to monitor and control the activities of all

the elements of the SDS. Information from surveillance satellites. sensores j,

and radars would be relayed to battle managers. On confirmation of.·an '

·'" attack, the system would be used to assign targets to spaceborne and

ground-launched weapon systems. The system must be robust and.

survivable, capable of functioning into presence of radio frequency jamming

and nucler radiation. It must also be secure, testable, capable of

responding quickly to changes in the attack scenario and able to evolve

with the SDS of the future. Technologies that ar.e a key to success of the

system include management algorithms, command and control network

concepts, data processing, communications and software. SOlO planners

are convinced that battle management hardware and software can be

developed in the next several years.

The algorithms are t11e mathematical/logical processes and procedures

needed to perform resource allocation, manage and form the target file,

execute command and control actions, and in general, operate the enttte

system. Algorithms will be developed to initiate and maintain tarqet track~.

and to discriminate between warheads and decoys, assign weapons to

targets, assess system effectiveness and reconfigure it is necessary to

adjust to the changes in the battle. Statistical estimation techntque that

use reasoning and knowledge-based technologies have been developed

and tested for use in the SDS BM/C4

"The battle management system must operate in an electronically'

saturated stressed environment. The network for tying 1t together I '

incorporates distributed computers, and uses landlines and satellites

connectivity to link communications networks. In process 1s the

development of security systems, internetting techniques, routing protocols

and packet switching techniques applicable to high-speed ground and

space networks that include the use of fiber optics. "7

SDS require dependable, fault-tolerant, high-performance computer

systems. The system designs call for hardened microelectronics and high-

performance parallel processors, which provide the high processing rates

needed for real-time execution of battle management algorithms.

Development of advanced computer architectures has been accelerated

to take advantage of programs underway in the DARPA strategic computing

program and the NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory.

Radio Frequency (RF) systems in the 60=GHz range and laser

communications links will be used in space-to-space and space-to-ground links.

A solid-state RF amplifier has been designed for use with the system. and a risk-

reduction program has been undertaken in the laser communications portion of

the system to identify the technology drivers so engineers can concentrate on

them. SOlO has cooperated with DARPA and other service programs in designing

next-generation software for large-scale multiprocessor-based systems. In this

context, development of a distributed Ada program is being supported, and the

agencies are making extensive use of commercial products.

7. Airborne Electronic Warfare History, Techniques And TactinSJJ"ldon,

.James, 1988), p- 23.

41

42

An important installation for proving BM/C:' systems 1s the Nat1onal

Test Facility (NTF) in Colorado Springs. The NTF consists of hardware.

and software systems and will be electronically linked to other SOS test

and simulation facilities to form the National Test Bed (r\ITB). The NTB will

be the primary system integration and test and evaluation tool for BM/C""'

elements, and will consist of the NTF plus a network of geographically

distributed simulation and test facilities. NTB will be able to simulate all

SDS functions, and conduct phase I testing. The NTB directorate's mission

is to provide information for deciding whether to deploy SDS. "The project

is about 30 percent completed, and the building will be ready for occupancy

towards the end of this year or early next year. The important work being

done by the NTB team is the planning for integrated simulations of the·

functions of defense system. By conducting integarated experiments

(simulations) of sensor, battle management and weapons elements. we

will be able to understand how these systems interact and funct1ons."H

Other major successes in the programme include hardening of

electronic circuits, the development of large scale integrated circuits, and

the bringing to operational status of a distributed computer which network

several standard commercial computers into a virtual memory system to

provide test beds for battle management systems. For FY1987 the SOlO

plans to project its costly major experiments into the terminal defence tier.

8. Bussert, J .M. , Soviet Intelligence; Assessing the Soviet Abll1ty to Counter

SOl' Jane's Defence Weekly 7 (26) 4 July 1987, pp- 1440-45

of the potential Strawman concept for ballistic missile defense dunng the

terminal phase. This phase is the final line of defense. Threatening obJects

include warheads shot at but not destroyed, objects never detected, and

decoys neither discriminated nor destroyed. These objects must be dealt

with by terminal-phase interceptors. An airborne optical adjunct 1s show·

here. Reentry vehicles are detected in late exoatmospheric flight with

sensors on these long-endurance plateforme. The interceptors non-nuclear,

direct-impact projectile- are guided to the warheads that had survived the

engagements in the previous phases.

The concept for ballistic missile defense during the mid-course phase,

intercept outside the atmospher during the midcourse phase requires the

defense to cope with decoys designed to attract interceptors and exhaust

the defending force. Continuing discrimination of non-threatening obJects

and continuing attrition of reentry vehicles will reduce the pressure on the

terminal-phase system. Engagement times are longer here than 1n other

phases. The figure-shows space based sensors that discriminate among

the warheads, decoys and debris and the interceptors that the defense

has committed. The non-nuclear, direct-impact projectiles speed toward

warheads that the have been identified.

Space-Based Surveillance and Tracking System

The Space-based surveillance and tracking system ( SSTS) 1S a

midcourse sensor system Initially SSTS will consist of small. pass1ve

long-wave IR (LWIR) sensors placed in medium earth orbit to track post-

43

boost and reentry vehicles. Through stereo precessing, in conJunction w1th

other SSTS satellities, the system would track missiles as they move

through their trajectories, providing refined attack assessment to

subsequent tiers of the SDS. At that point in the attack scenano.the

information generated would include the number of reentry vehicles and

target locations. That information would be accurate enough to commit

weapon systems towards the destruction of incoming missiles.

Critical technologies for the SSTS program involve LWIR focal planes,

cryotechnology, background noise measurement and space mirrors.

Improvements in LWIR systems in recent years have reduced the cooling

power required for space borne arrays. To achieve the required sensitivity

those sensors must be maintained at a very low temperatures to achieve

the required sensitivity. Cryogenic coolers can be used to prov1de the

extremely cold temperatures, near absolute zero, needed to sustain the

sensitivity of infrared sensors. The cold improves their ability to discriminate

weak signals against a space background.

Cryotechnology at one time represented one of the risk technologies·

in the BSTS and SSTS programs. Frederick said, "Cryo-cooling 1s reqUireo

for t11e focal plane array and optics systems for the SSTS and like all

satellite components, the capability must last for a minimum of five years.

and as many as 10 if possible, while operating with goal This requ1res a

three-stage cooler which is being developed through a joint effor1 between

the Army Strategic Defense Command (Huntsville, Ala.) and the A1r Force

Space Technology Center (Albuquerque, N.M.) and materials and avronrcs·

laboratories at Wright-Patternson Air Force Base (Ohio)." 9

Life-limiting mechanisms such as bearings and seals have been

eliminated, and new innovations such as magnetie drives, gas beanngs

and miniature turbomachinery have been introduced. The synergy between

the reduced need for cooling and improvements in cooling technology

typify the breakthroughs that are improving the efficiency of SDS systems

and bringing down cost estimates.

An aircraft, the airborne optical adjunct (AOA} is an experimental test

bed used to resolve many of the passive sensor technical issues related.

to all midcourse sensor systems. It carriers the LWIR and other sensors in

the modified Boeing B-767 airframe operated by the U.S. Army. The FPA

in the aircraft will gather detection tracking and discrimination data on

mock missile attack during flights on missile test ranges. The AoA was

preceded in its IR testbed mission by a highly modified Boeing/U.S. Air

Force NC-135 aircraft.

SPACE ESTABLISHMENTS

The Russian military space installations are located in remote regions.

Armed force and fortifications between the Baltic and Barents seas protect.

Plesets-k, Neither Tyuratam nor Kapustin Yar is near an unfriendly frontier.

All three centers, reachable only by long-range delivery systerTIS,

9. Robinson Jr. C .A. ·Launch Vehicles Dominates Space Exploration

Scheme; Routine Cost Effectiveness Orbetal, Operatron Depend

on NASA finding boost upgrading space shutt1SIGNAL45 ( 1 0)

June 1991. pp- 45-48.

45

consequently are safe from external attacks, save those that risk general

nuclear war.

In contract the U.S. Military spececraft,recently launched from Cape_

Canaveral, Florida and Wallops Island, Viriginia on the Atlantic Coast

and from Vandenberg Air Force Base, California on the Pacific. Ail three

sites are well positioned to implement peacetime safety rules. Seaward

flanks are exposed to attacks, including limited objective operations during

low intensity conflicts, sub-marines that belong to hostile Third World

countries could have a field day with conventional standoff weapons. Skilled

saboteurs could infiltrate in these sites.

Distance shields the U.S. Consolidated Space Operations Center at

Peterson Air Force Base, near Colorado Springs, and additional

SPACECOM installations deep inside adjacent Cheyenne Mountain, which

is hardened against nuclear strikes. The U.S. military satellite control facility

and communications center at Sunnyvale, California sits on a seacoast.

So does the civilian mission control close to Houston, Texas, Sunnyvale

also straddles the San Andreas fault, a potential earthquake epicenter:'

Accordingly America's defe:1se decisionmakers might consider a better

blend of fixed and mobile military space installations that incorporates

increased redundancy and dispersion with greater degrees of hardness

for critical elements outside Cheyenne Mountain. Offshore launch pads

on modified oil-drilling rigs, which some free thinkers recommend. per~1aps·

would be administratively advantageous, but would hardly prove benef1cialy

from the point of view of physical security. ICBM-style silos at selected

launch sites ashore might serve better, as long as expandable space

delivery vehicles remain in vogue. Mobile launchers and associated support

probably are impractical, but land, sea, and/or air mobile C elements,

analogous to the National Emergency Command Post Afloat (NECPA), ·

are feasible. So are subterranean supplements like the Alternate National

Military Command Center at Fort Richie, Maryland, No such substitutes

duplicate all C capabilities available at primary headquarters, but they

would be useful backups during international crises and combat.

"No nation, unified command, or armed service on Earth relies

exclusively on centralized control for peacetime or wartime operations.

On-the-spot headquarters always assist. Those precedents indicate that

advance command posts almost certainly will displace into space sooner

or later. It is not too soon to commence preparations and pick proper

times."10

SPACE WEAPONS

The constant burning desire of man to increase the fighting efficiency

of the militaryforce on Earth has led to the development and application of

space technology for military purpose. For the purpose of reconnaissance,

communication, navigation, weather forecasting as well as for early

10. Kahamer, Larry, 'Artificial lnteliigence Hard Oriv1ng

Oetectives'OMNI_42 (11) Aug. 1988. pp- 25--31

47

warning, satellites are launched with frequency of one each in three days

Today almost all space power wants to protect their space system from

others,and for this purpose they are investigating a number of methods for

disabling or even destroying spacecraft from near and far earth orbit.s

Space system development has produced many countermeasures to

curb the eyes and ear of enemy devices .. If this trend continues, space

system will inevitably become the target in case of a future conflict.

Weapons and war for space have two aspects, weapons starts with overt ..

means antisatellites and covert relates to electronic jamming or spoofing.

War in space includes targets in space and on ground.To operate any

space system, a ground command, control and data acquisition Centre is

required space

SPACE DETECTION AND TRACKING SYSTEM

(SPADATS) does it for United States, which consists of a multitude of

radars. Baker-Num Cameras, interfirmeters and other sensors that are

located around the world.

"To hit a satellite with a 'killer satellite', a missile, a mine, or a laser,.

the attacker, has to find it first. Tile Air Force is looking for defensive counter

measures that would make U.S. military satellites 1·1arderto find. One such

counter measures is maneurer ability, If attack seems imminent, the target

out of the way. By the time the attacking weapon arrives at the point 1r1

space where it was aimed, the target will t11en be somewhere else

48

Continued random movements might keep away the attacker from zeroing

in on the target at all". 11

To put the satellite beyond the reach of the enemy's radar, technology

has made it possible to confuse the enemy with decoy. These techn1ques

similar to those that will go into the stealth strategic bomber. The idea 1s to

minimize the ·signature' by which the spacecraft might be spotted or

identified.

ASAT

Any device tl1at can be used to dismantle or destroy the operational

capability of satellites in Earth orbit is known as anti-satellite (ASAT) These

devices can involve three targeting methods (a) the direct ascent of a

missile carrying either a nuclear or non-nuclear warhead : (b) co-orbital

devices with explosive devices; or (c) direct energy weapons.

On Friday September 13,th 1985, a twin-tailed F15 Eagle. interceptor

took off from a secret air-field somewhere near the Western seaboard of

the United States Accelerating to a speed of 1,600 mile per hour at a

height of 40,000 ft, the Eagle unleashed its deadly payload against a· lure

' moving target satellite. According to the spokeman of the Department ot

Defense this interception went as planned. 12

The acquisition of a new flexible and sophisticated anti-satellite system

was the fulfilment of a secret report filed in the pentagon in the w1nter of

11. Yenne. Bill, The Encyclopedia of US Space Craf(lMiddlesex,

UK. The Hmlyn Pub. 1985). p- 158.

12. Paul, David. SP.ace Warfare And Stratgic Defen~ondon Bison

Books, 1987), p- 89.

49

ALTERNATIVE ORBITAL TRANSFERS r:rotn LEO to Htulwr Altitudes

-----------------.

l,HU<Jt odut

lfO. p<~r~rny

,,fiu1

Mtnimum l11uruy lum~lur

4'' ApOtJt•ll hutr•

fiV'

Per tqee tJUrll

D.v' occurs wllun the tr.w~lur ulltp~u muru"" wl!h 111gllur illlttudu orbtl.

LEO, parking

orbrt

Hiyh Enurgy Trdnslur

Tr.enuluf uthp:.~J 1

flv' Apog.:u

burn

Tr~PS1d

dlip:,t,: 1

4v2 occurs whun transfer ttllipse crosses high dllitudu orbit <tt steep angle.

1D.v ( Dultd Vt!o) is velocity chanytJ.

Nut ru sculu

Nut ro scdl<'

2 "Durn" is thrust to increasa velocity at D.vl dnd Chdnya vulocity 111 4v2. 3Thtl tr•on~tcr ellipse at perigee is the samu altitude as the Jlilrktng orbit; tts ilpogee th the new

orbtt dltttude.

Adapted from Spdce Hdndbook. pp 2-Jd. 2-39.

1982. The report entitled "Fiscal1984-1988. Defence Guidance", seemed

to be a highly informative 136- paged document and contains a bluepnnt

for America's armed forces tomake preparations for righting a prolonged

nuclear war and to wage war in space. The report reads. "The development

and deployment of a capability to defend space assets is required .... as 1s

the capability to deny the enemy the use of his space systems that are

harmful to our effort during conflicts."13

Only few months after the Sputnik had orbited· the Earth the USAF

was engaged on a research and development programme that was to

encounter many of the problems only recently rediscovered by scientists

working on star wars; the code named SAINT (Satellite Interceptor) was

arbited by an Atlas D-Agena Brocket, it manac itself into the path of a

target satellite by a combination of small propulation rockets, hemming

radar and television comeras. Due to the non availability of budget the·

SAINT project was shelved.

The SAINT project gave scientists a clue to solve the problem of

interception and targeting of the satellites. How to know a friend or foe

through technology? How to protect satellites from the adversorial ASATs?

How to detect a nuclear bomb fittted into a satellite? All questions have

had one answer that is advanced technology and more research is required

in this field .14

13. Nigel, Flynn,War in SRaceThe Bolt from out of the Blue, (W1ndwaral

UK 1987), p- 23-24.

50

Even if the SAINT could successfully identify and intercept an enemy

target, it had no means of 'killing' it other than by ramming at 1t w1th speed

A single .1.4 megaton nuclear bomb, was detonated 400 km above

the Johnston Island in the Pacific Ocean on July 8th1962. It emitted the

dose of electromagnetic pulse (EMP), it played havoc with the electronic

circuits of passing friendly satellites. It blacked out street camps, power

lines, burglar alarms and most of the telephone systems ot Hondulu.

According to Arthur clark such explosions above atmosphere would not

ony knock out all orbiting satellites, but will also have on the effect of

blacking out entire power, radio telephone system of a continent. the size

of Europe or Australia. 15

Under the ghoulish code name of Squanto Terror (also known as

Programme- 437) the USAF set about perfecting an-anti satellite system

that used nuclear warheads as the "kill mechanism". On February 15th.1964

a thormissile armed with dummy warhead rose from its launch pad, climbed

to an altitude of 540 nautical miles and at a distance of 820 km from the.

Johnston lsalnd successfully intercepted a target. After two more tests, on

JUne 1Oth, 1964 the system was declared officially operational and 1Oth,

Aerospace Defense Squadron USAF stationed on the Island, was put on

a 24 hour alert with two Thor missile and their nuciear warhead at the

ready position.

14. Ibid; p- 53.

15. Bovee, Jon L. 'The future of Influence of C3 Technologies' S.!_gNt-.1:: 42

(10) June 1988, pp 133-4.

In November 1967 US Secretary of Defense Robert S.McNamara,

unveiled to the world a new antisatellite system FOBS (Fractional Orbit

Bombardment System) of the Soviet Union. The great advantage of the

system from the Soviet point of view was that it enabled them to deliver

hydrogen bomb to USA by a backdoor route, thus avoiding the elaborate

American Ballistic Missile, Early Warning System (BMEWS).

In an interview Nikita Khrushchev stated that, the Soviet Union had a

missile that could hit even a fly in the outer space. Reacting on this

comment which was made on 16th July 1962, some western experts.

speculated that this was a reference to the use of a nuclear warhead

launched by a Galosh ABM missile, a system which is still deployed around

Moscow.

It has been reported that radar was used on the tests conducted through

the first part of 1977, after which optical sensors were introduced. Since

October 1968, the Soviet Union has conducted 20 tests of an interceptor

launched by the SS-1 missile. In this type of system, the interceptor

manoevers close to the largest and explodes, destroying the operational

capability of the satellite. The interceptor orbit can be cetiptical, so that it

intercepts the target either at apoges or periges; coplanar with the target,

or variable options available. 16

16 Ibid; pp 133-4.

S2

LASERS

The use of high energy, subatomic particle beams in anti-balliStic.

missile sale, is the most ambitious scheme of all the projects of defense.

The Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA) had a program

called 'Alpha', designed to produce 95 megawatt laser for a space platform

The number of ground based lasers for use against satellites in low or

high Earth orbits would be large, but since they would be housed 1n large

buildings, their exact nature probably could not be determined by national

technical means.

Physcist Tsipils, has calculated that a 600 mile range space laser

would have a or out put of 100 megawatt of energy to destroy an aluminium

coated missile in about one second. If we assume optimistically that the

lasers device could convert 30 per cent of its fuel's energy into laser energy,

then it would take about 4400 pounds of fuel to destroy one missile. In

modern war, each laser station has to target and destroy several hundred

missiles in a few minutes and for such a purpose it requires 100 million

pounds of fuel.

In research for the Navy, the Vought Corporation has already come up

with an ingenious technique that might protect missiles and aircraft from

laser damage. The Vought solution is to coat the aluminium with \;'\that is

called an ablative substance, a material that evaporates away under the

laser beam leaving the surface of metal still higt1ly reflective

53

Strong proponents of space based weapons deem the doctrine of

MAD as immoral. It takes our primary strategic objective the mass

destruction of people rather than the winning of war. Two Air Force advocate

of· initiating wide open military competition in space as a way of moving

beyond present deterrent strategies.'

Lieutenant Colonel Barry Watts and Major Lance Lord are unhappy

with the ·Corrosive effects of living with the balance of terror have

increasingly had on our national spirit."17

SPACE MINES

Use of inactive satellites and manned stations as space mines sound

similar to a piece of science fiction. But in reality it is possible now, due to

advanced technology used in space science. It is very hard to verify the

existence of space mines, that would be comuflaged as failed satellites

which had been launched for another purpose and which showed no signs·

of activity, until needed. The advantage and disadvantage of having such

objects out in space is corelated with the command and control from ground

station. The disadvantage would be that the satellite would slowly drift

a1.vay from its location and might not be in a good position tor attacking a

target satellite when the time for such action arrived. The advantage would

be that by having space mines in geosynchronous orbit, for example,

there would be less warning time that an attack was imminent s1nce the

17. Thomas Karas The New High Ground (Kent UK. 1986). p- 191.

S4

space mine could approach the target more quickly than if launched from

the ground.

The combination of ground based radars and satellites has resulted

in an early warning system. Missiles fired from one continent to another

take nearly 30 minutes to reach their target.

In a book entitled : War and peace In the Space Age, published in

1955, two years before the launch of the sputnik, General James Gavin.

correctly predicted that, "the first military application of satellites will

undoubtedly be as reconnaissance vehicle for the ICBM system Not only

will the satellite provide accurate, timely informations for an offens1ve ICBM

strike, but it will also provide early warning in defenses." 10

To enhance the capability of the systems below, the military space

system above is totally passive in nature. Satellites are not weapons

themsleves. Electronic signal and radio frequency detectors can pick up a

variety of electronic transmission used in military communications and

can determine the frequency of these transmissions to allow for jamming

and electronic counter measures (ECM). The radar sensor can be used to

detect and track large objects such as ships, and perhaps, aircrafts. These

systems have had a major effect on the strategic balance and international

relations. In the first place, as predicted by Gavin, they prov1de prec1se

information for the targeting of missiles silos and other military pos1t1ons

18. Feidman, Norman ·sentries in the SkfV]ilitary Technology?

(6) June 1984, pp 120-23.

.H