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All rights reserved. Printed in the United States o America. No part o this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in

any orm or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any inormation storage and retrieval

system, without permission in writing rom the publisher.

2010 Washington Institute or Near East Policy

Published in 2008 in the United States o America by the Washington Institute or Near East Policy,

1828 L Street NW, Suite 1050, Washington, DC 20036.

Design by Daniel Kohan, Sensical Design and Communication

Front cover: U.S. ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker, Iranian ambassador Hassan Kazemi Qomi, and Iraqi prime minister

Nouri al-Malik i, at a meeting, May 28, 2007, where Iran and the United States resumed public diplomacy or the rst time

in more than a quarter century. (AP Photo/Hadi Mizban)


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Contents

Acknowledgments / v

Preface / vii

Introduction / 1

Iranian Perspective on Engagement / 2

International Perspective on Engagement / 5

Iranian Regional Activities / 9

Prudent Preparations / 11

Conclusions / 15


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The WashingtonInstituteforNearEast Policy v

T H E W A S H I N G T O N I N S T I T U T E G R A T E F U L LY acknowledges the generous assistance o United StatesCentral Command and the U.S. Army Directed Studies Oce in organizing the January 12, 2010, symposium.

PATRICK CLAWSON

Deputy Director for Research

Acknowledgments


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The WashingtonInstituteforNearEast Policy vii

Preface

common position has consumed so much energy thataction has oen been slow and insuciently vigorous.Meanwhile, regional players such as the Gul states andIsrael are eeling increasing pressure as a result o Iransenrichment activities, justiying various preparationsin the event that tensions escalate. Te challenge is toachieve balance o continued engagement with Iranalongside prudent preparations by the United States,including military steps, to reassure allies o its com-mitment to a regional security architecture. Any suchsteps, participants emphasized, should avoid provok-

ing Iran or prompting diminished support rom otherinternational powers.

Perhaps the most interesting conclusion reached atthe symposium involved the continued openness othe most basic questions about engaging Iran:

When?

We cannot exactly tell whether time is on Irans side ornot. Te Islamic Republic is proceeding with its nuclearactivities despite orders to suspend them by the UNSecurity Council, but the regime worries that domes-

tic discontent may undermine its eorts. In addition,Iran is becoming more isolated internationally, withWashingtons oer to engage making Iran look like thesource o the problem, not the United States.

Who?

Despite its perennial complaints about the lack obilateral engagement with the United States, Iran hasproven uninterested in such engagement with an obvi-ously eager Obama administration. At the same time,the United Nations seems unable to agree on what

steps to take next, and the P5+1 (the ve permanentSecurity Council members plus Germany) has madelittle progress. As noted, regional states such as Israeland the Gul monarchies are concerned about Iransadvances, but they would ar preer that someone otherthan themselves solve the problem.

F O R H E P A S W E N Y - F I V E Y E A R S , h eWashington Institute has worked closely with policy-makers to crat a vision or U.S. involvement in theMiddle East. Leaders in the policy arena have par-ticipated in events ranging rom our annual symposiato policy orums to o-the-record roundtables. TeInstitute has cultivated equally close relationshipswith members o the U.S. military, with tens o mili-tary gures having served as ellows, oen or stints omore than a year.

On January 12, 2010, he Washington Insti-

tute marked a new orm o collaboration: a daylongconerence on Iran, held in the Institute oces andcosponsored with U.S. Central Command and theU.S. Army Directed Studies Oice, that eaturedtalks by a dozen leading international experts on Iran.Attendees included some sixty Iran watchers, most owhom hold positions in the U.S. government, and theensuing discussion was one o the best inormed andenlightening o its kind. In the pages that ollow, weare pleased to present a summary o the events pro-ceedings, and we thank our cosponsors or their gen-

erous assistance.he current impasse between the international

community and Iran, especially as regards the nuclearissue, is likely to persista message that was rein-orced by several speakers. Likewise, any early hopesthat U.S. engagement with Iran would yield transor-mative results have been tempered. On the Iranianside, preoccupation has centered not on the prospecto international engagement but on deep divisionsamong the elite that threaten to make Iranian politicsever more chaotic and dysunctional. Forces on the

ascendant, such as the Islamic Revolutionary GuardCorps (IRGC), worry that engagement could meanseduction by the Americans, a ate they regard as moredangerous than a U.S. attack. For the internationalcommunity, engagement is complicated by the di-ering interests o the many actors. Coordination o a


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The PeRFeCT hAnDShAKe WITh IRAn

viii Washington Institute.org

H I S RE P OR RE P RE S E N S the considerations oits author, in response to the January 12 event. It doesnot necessarily relect the views o he WashingtonInstitute, its Board o rustees, or its Board o Advi-

sors, nor does this report necessarily refect the viewso the U.S. Central Command, the U.S. Army DirectedStudies Oce, or the other symposium participants.

WhAT?

It is unclear what actions the United States or theinternational community can take that will aect Iranscalculus. ehran seems cool to the proered induce-

ments and unconcerned about the potential penalties,be they political isolation, sanctions, or a preemptiveshow o orce.


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The WashingtonInstituteforNearEast Policy 1

Introduction

Iras ria actiitis. What is the relationshipbetween international negotiations on Irans nuclearprogram and Iranian activity in Iraq, Aghanistan,Lebanon, and the Palestinian territories?

Prdt prparatis. What military steps shouldthe United States take to reassure allies o its com-mitment to a regional security architecture withoutbeing provocative or antagonistic, or diminishingdiplomatic support rom other internationalpowers? What shape will the military strategies

o regional states take as nuclear talks proceed?

he discussion was conducted under the ChathamHouse rule, which states that participants are reeto use the inormation received, but neither the iden-tity nor the ailiation o the speaker(s), nor that oany other participant, may be revealed. Te sectionsthat ollow are this rapporteurs conclusions romthe colloquium.

ON JANUARY 12, 2010, U.S. Central Command,the U.S. Army Directed Studies Oce, and Te Wash-ington Institute cosponsored a colloquium to discussthe latest security and diplomatic developments sur-rounding Iran. Te assembled panel o experts ocusedon several key questions:

Iraia prspcti at. How havethe roles o the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps andthe Supreme Leader evolved since the June elections?o what extent do domestic actors infuence Iranian

calculations regarding engagement?

Itratia cit prspcti a-

t. How can international sanctions be shaped inorder to have maximum impact on Iranian decision-making with regard to their nuclear program? Howcan diplomacy and pressure best be combined? Howshould the various international actors coordinatetheir actions?


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2 Washington Institute.org

Iranian Perspective on Engagement

tent in their response to the demonstrations and wantpolitical compromise, while hardliners are concernedthat such a move would make the government appearvulnerable to urther pressure. Tereore, any compro-mise would have to include a strategy or containingthe radicals. Furthermore, given Irans loosely struc-tured politics and lack o organized parties, there isno process by which a ormal compromise agreementcould be negotiatedin other words, any bargainwould have to unold over time.

he more likely outcome is that Iranian politics

will become even more chaotic and dysunctional.Tat does not mean the Islamic Republic will collapse.Instead, one can expect continued political paralysis,especially i little eort is made to contain the radicalspushing or harsher measures against the opposition.Such paralysis would seriously complicate any eort toengage the outside world.

nuCleAR negoTIATIonS STAlleD

Tere is no broad international consensus about Iransnuclear objectivesexperts are unsure whether the

regime wants a breakout capability or intends todevelop missile-mounted nuclear weapons. Despitethis uncertainty, Irans approach to nuclear negotia-tions with the West has been clear.

From 2002 to 2005, Iran sought to prevent UNSecurity Council action on the issue, believing that res-olutions or similar measures would serve as a steppingstone to regime change through military orceeh-rans reading o what happened to Iraq under SaddamHussein. he elite have since lost that ear, however.Tey now believe that a military attack is unlikely with

the United States bogged down in Iraq and Aghani-stan. Successive international deadlines without ur-ther action have conirmed that the regime aces noreal military threat and quite possibly not much o asanctions or diplomatic threat either. As ar as hard-liners are concerned, these acts reduce the urgency odoing anything substantive on the nuclear issue.

H E I RAN I AN E L I E D O N O S H ARE a commonview on engagement with the international communityor the United States. Indeed, one o the Islamic Repub-lics abiding eatures has been disagreement about thecountrys direction and political ground rules. hatsaid, until the June 2009 election, the Oice o theSupreme Leader had handled these divisions relativelywell, oen by manipulating the electoral system or cre-ating new political structures. But the circles aroundAyatollah Ali Khamenei have gradually been depopu-lated as he pushes away those he does not completely

trust. Consequently, radicals have illed his shrink-ing inner circle, exacerbating his isolation and urthereroding his legitimacy.

Khameneis badly miscalculated handling o theelection and subsequent protests brought home theimpact o this growing isolation. Te decisions to rigthe vote so blatantly and then stare down the protest-ers have divided and even paralyzed the regime. Teopposition Green Movement persists despite violentcrackdowns that have included iring into crowds,making widespread arrests, torturing prisoners, and,

most recently, using regime-sponsored crowds to over-whelm and intimidate protestors. During the Decem-ber 27, 2009, Ashura protests, demonstrators took theconlict to a new level: they began to ight back. Bycontrast, on the February 11 Islamic Revolution Day,the protestors were out-organized by the government,leaving them dispirited

Te regimes ability to manage confict within thepolitical elite has also eroded since the election. Inter-nal divisions are deep, including on the issue o how toresolve the political crisis. Te opposition itsel encom-

passes a wide range o views, rom those looking ordemocratic change to regime pragmatists such as ailed presidential candidates Mir Hossein Mousavi andMehdi Karrubi, both o whom are deeply committedto the Islamic Republic. Meanwhile, relatively moder-ate elites believe that President Mahmoud Ahmadi-nezhad and the Supreme Leader have been incompe-


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PrudENT M Il ITary STraTEgyaNd PragMaTIc ENgagEMENT PolIcy


gRoWIng Role FoR The IRgC

he Revolutionary Guards role in government hasbeen expanding and evolving or some time. AyatollahRuhollah Khomeini ounded the orce to protect the

regime rom within and without. oday, it is steadilybecoming an instrument o state repression and shapero the Iranian political scene.

Upon its emergence soon aer the 1979 revolution,the IRGC was a rudimentary orce intended to preventa military coup. During the 19801988 Iran-Iraq War,its members became battle-hardened veterans and wonloyalty and praise or their humility and sel-sacrice.Te war also led Khomeini to ound the Basij militia,which he considered the backbone o the resistanceagainst Iraq. Its members held a romanticized concept

o war and were perceived to be even more idealisticthan the IRGC. hey were a diuse orce, however,not a tightly structured organization.

Following the war, the IRGC morphed into anorganized entrepreneurial group. President AkbarHashemi Rasanjani turned to it as a means o recon-structing Iran, placing it at the oreront o a Recon-struction Jihad. As part o its new mandate, the IRGCchanged the traditional, prerevolution army, liberallydistributing promotions and replacing many armyleaders with IRGC oicers (many o whom becamegenerals overnight). It also took over the Basij andgained infuence in the law enorcement agencies. Inaddition, it awarded university degrees to newly pro-

moted personnel and their civilian colleagues, llingkey positions and denying them to other individualsand actions. As part o this process, the IRGC createdits own higher educational system. Overall, this periodbrought wealth, control, and condence to the Guards,though not without isolating them and making themless representative o the population.

Given this lack o urgency and the deeply contestednature o the current political environment, ew in Iranwill advocate bold steps to address the issue. Khame-nei and Ahmadinezhad cannot, or instance, pursue

rapprochement with the international community,and the Greens are unlikely to express support orsanctions. he recent ehran Research Reactor dealis a case in point. Te Iranian negotiator who initiallyaccepted the deal clearly had Khameneis approval todo so, but the agreement still ell through at home.Mousavi declared that the government did not havethe authority to bargain away Irans national right tonuclear energy, while other opponents o the deal didnot trust the Europeans to live up to the deal. hisorced Khamenei to withdraw his original support.

Tese sorts o deadlocks seem to grow worse as out-side pressure increases. None o the elites want to beaccused o bowing to such pressure or acting as agents

o oreign powers. So the greater the pressure, the moredicult it is or them to discuss the issues at hand orpropose fexible policies. In short, a nuclear deal withthe international community is unlikely under the cur-rent government.

Should the Greens came to power, Mousavi wouldpersonally be loathe to give up what he has long seen asIrans nuclear rights. But institutions would be stron-ger than any personality in such an environment, so hispreerences would not necessarily dictate the new gov-ernments policy. Mousavi would probably seek a way

to allay the Wests concerns by visibly changing Iransoreign policy orientation rather than making con-cessions on the nuclear ront. In any case, the Greenswould certainly insist on having easy access to nuclearenergy and advanced technology. For the time being,the movement has expressed rustration at Washing-tons preoccupation with the nuclear issue.

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he current crisis continues to strengthen theIRGC, while the parliament, Expediency Council,Assembly o Experts, judiciary, and executive branchbecome even more ragile. Te Basij have been trans-

ormed into a brutal orce o repression against theopposition, inltrating the legislature, the universities,and numerous other institutions.

An ascendant IRGC committed to deending itsview o the revolution could lead to some pretty darkscenarios, including the assassination or imprison-ment o a broad range o Green Movement leadersand activists, accompanied by bloody crackdowns ondemonstrators. In this eventuality, the Islamic Repub-lics character would change substantially, becom-ing more solidly totalitarian. It is unclear precisely

how the Supreme Leader, the IRGC, and the regulararmy would share power under such conditions, butthe Guards would most likely hold the bulk o it, atKhameneis expense.

During the past decade, the IRGC entered the polit-ical arena, initially as a bulwark against the reormistmovement headed by President Muhammad Khatami.Te rst instance o such intervention arose in 1999,

when student protests prompted the IRGC to send aletter to Khatami reminding him that the reormistsneeded to respect the Islamic nature o the regime. Notlong thereater, the Supreme Leader began to insistthat IRGC veterans be appointed to cabinet positions.Meanwhile, the Guards themselves began to view manyo those who were originally part o the revolution asoutsiders. Teir sense o us vs. them deepened, withus becoming progressively exclusive and themexpanding to the point where it now includes manypolitical conservatives. In response to what they per-

ceive as an internal threat rom this broad action, theGuards have urther increased their political involve-ment, despite Khomeinis original prohibition againstmilitary intererence in politics.


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International Perspective on Engagement

accept that Iran cannot be allowed to dominate itsneighbors despite its regional importance. In otherwords, true engagement implies the end o the revo-lution and a dramatically dierent regime, even ithat result is achieved peaceully and the current eliteretains power. Few o Irans leaders are interested inthis kind o engagement. Some are willing to explorecertain aspects o it (especially scientic and economicengagement) while limiting or rejecting others. Evenmore discouraging, a signiicant number o leadersworry that compromise is a slippery slope, where the

irst concession would lead to an avalanche o addi-tional pressurein other words, compromising onany ront would mean compromising the revolution.Tese leaders have not been willing to look at engage-ment seriously except when Iran has been under directthreat, as it perceived itsel to be in 2003.

In short, Iranian and Western dierences regard-ing the goals o engagement are the central impedi-ment to engagement. I Irans leaders truly wanted toengage, they would have pursued opportunities withthe numerous partners and institutions that have

expressed interest in working with them over theyears. Instead, much o their diplomatic interactionhas centered on dividing the West and defecting sanc-tions and other pressure. One tactic in this strategy isto periodically endorse Western overtures in order tobuy time, during which the regime continues to carryout objectionable activities. ehran also seeks to cre-ate dierences within the international communityin order to isolate the United States and the Westor example, by suggest-ing that it could work withmore reasonable partners such as Russia, China, and

developing nations. In reality, only under the greatestduress would the hardline government make a strate-gic decision to change its nuclear stance or cease chal-lenging the regional status quo.

he Iranian leaderships greatest ear is Americanseduction, not American attack. he hardliners earU.S. riendship much more than they ear U.S. enmity.

HE PROSPECS ARE NO GOOD or persuadingthe current Iranian government to abandon its danger-ous nuclear ambitions. Tis act raises questions aboutthe goals o engagement. At the same time, just becausethe prospects or success are poor does not mean theinternational community should stop trying. Review-ing the experience with diplomacy to date may yieldsome useul lessons or uture eorts. And there are ahost o questions about how best to proceed with eco-nomic sanctions.

goAlS oF engAgemenTAny engagement eort should be established ontwo oundations. First, a hardline-run Iran is highlyunlikely to abandon the wide range o activities towhich the West objects, be it nuclear eorts, statesponsorship o terrorism, subversion against othergovernments, or human rights abuses at home. Sec-ond, the vast majority o Iranians, especially youths,do not support the regimes policies, and a hardlinegovernment would probably be incapable o prevailinginto the next generation. Based on these observations,

engagement should aim to buy time until the regimechanges rom within. Such an approach would requirecritical engagement on Western terms, without anyimplicit endorsement o ehrans human rights recordor adverse regional activities.

Unortunately, much o the engagement to datehas instead ocused on how to reeze Irans nuclearprogram. Tat ocus has been problematic, especiallygiven the lack o international consensus on a viablelong-term technical solution. Without such a solu-tion, the international community has sought to buy

time in the expectation that the regime would evolverom within.

Yet many Iranian elites view engagement as nor-malization, which in their view would require eh-ran to permit open cultural, educational, and inor-mational interaction with the global community; toacknowledge that Iran is a state, not a cause; and to


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and/or Israel will handle Irans nuclear program i itbecomes a threat, so why should Moscow make ehranangry by supporting sanctions? Some Russian leadersalso believe they have an interest in making the EU and

United States appear ineective, while others seem tohave personal business ties that allow them to proitsignicantly rom dealing with Iran.

In retrospect, it may have been a mistake to movethe Iranian nuclear issue to the UN without an agreedplan or serious sanctions. Te long delays beore Secu-rity Council action and the light penalties placed onehran thus ar have persuaded the regime that its pastconcerns about being brought beore the UN wereunounded. Resorting to the UN did not carry muchpolitical weight with Iran either. Te current regime

views the Security Council as an illegitimate institu-

tion and its resolutions as scraps o paper with noth-ing behind themneither moral nor practical orce.

By contrast, ehran is sensitive to regional criticismand isolation rom developing countries. Accordingly,strategies involving regional pressure and unity shouldnot be overlooked.

Te threat o orce or other tangible consequenceshas been central to the limited diplomatic successeswitnessed to date, such as when Iran temporarilyagreed to suspend some activities and provide moreinormation and access to the International AtomicEnergy Agency (IAEA). It is diicult to bring thisthreat to bear at present, however. Irans hardliners are

rmly convinced that the United States is tied down,politically i not militarily, by the ongoing wars in Iraqand Aghanistan. Tey also believe that Israel wouldnot take military action without American approval.

Tis lack o concern about consequences is rootedin ehrans reading o the past ew years. Te interna-tional community has drawn an ever-shiting series

Americans tend to believe that the best means o entic-ing a diicult government is to begin with modestcondence-building measures and incentives, such asstudent scholarships, cultural exchanges, sports interac-

tion, easier visa processes, and ambassadorial exchanges.But the hardliners would rather ace a military strikethan such riendly measuressome might even regardthe ormer as a blessing in disguise i they could directthe subsequent nationalist reaction into revolutionaryervor. In short, some hardliners ear American carrotsmore than American sticks.

InTeRnATIonAl DIPlomACy

Speaking to Iran and other powers at the same timeis structurally dicult or the United States; what is

needed to move one audience may complicate eorts

to move the other. Aecting the target audience in e-hranthe hardline leadershiprequires constant cali-

bration between perceived concessions and coerciveelements such as sanctions. But such a delicate processis dicult to reconcile with the consuming attentionrequired to orge and maintain cohesion among theEuropean Unions diverse members.

At the international level, the UN Security Coun-cil is currently marginalized because China and Russiawould sabotage any new proposed sanctions againstIran, as they have done in the past. Tis same problemundercuts the utility o negotiating through the P-5 +1 (i.e., the ve permanent Security Council members

plus Germany). Neither Moscow nor Beijing sees theIranian nuclear program as an urgent matter. Chinahas never regarded nuclear prolieration as a seriousthreat to its interests, and Irans activities are no excep-tion to this rule; Beijing has aced little i any pressurerom Arab oil suppliers to support sanctions. Mean-while, Russia seems to think that the United States

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smuggling rom the emerging market economies,which did not regard Iran sanctions as a priority andlikely lacked the resources to detect Iranian rontorganizations themselves.

In light o these problems, new players are neededin the sanctions game. A smaller coalition o like-minded countries would be bestideally the UnitedStates and the EU. Although unilateral U.S. sanctionshave had an impact, Europe must do more. Te mosteective strategy would be a joint EU-U.S. sanctionsoice based in Brussels and managed by trade andprolieration proessionals rather than diplomats.ogether, Europe and America could deprive Irano much o the high technology it both needs andwants, even i China, Russia, and other countries do

not cooperate. And i riendly states such as Canada,Japan, and South Korea participate, Iran could acereal problems obtaining the oreign expertise andequipment necessary or its ambitious inrastructureconstruction program. At the same time, a joint EU-U.S. eort could include an oer to suspend someo the most bitterly protested American sanctions(e.g., on spare parts or civilian airliners) i progressis made on the nuclear le, such as implementation othe ehran Research Reactor deal.

Washington and its partners should also build on

the U.S. reasury Departments innovative eortsby instituting severe sanctions against the IRGCsexpanding business empire. reasurys targeted nan-cial measures have already attracted serious attentionrom Irans senior leadership, and such steps could begreatly expanded. As the key institution supportingthe hardliners, the Guards act as the main orce behindIrans nuclear program, terror sponsorship, and humanrights abuses. hey also reportedly control nearly athird o the countrys economy and wield inluenceover millions o jobs, whether directly (as employers)

or indirectly (as key customers or competitors). heblunt steps the IRGC has taken to block governmentactions that would cut into its incomesuch as itsheavy-handed 2004 takeover o Imam Khomeini Inter-national Airportsuggest that it cares deeply about itsnancial prospects. Accordingly, some analysts see theGuards economic power as a major limitation on the

o red lines that, i crossed, would supposedly resultin serious repercussions. he irst line was crossedwith the introduction o yellow cake into the Isahanconversion acility and its conversion into uranium

hexaluoride (UF6). hen came the introduction oUF6 into the centriuges at Natanz. hen came thecontinued spinning o the centriuges, then the pro-duction o additional centriuges, and so on. WheneverIran crossed a red line, the international communitycontinued to engage without enorcing negative conse-quences. Even Israels drastic warnings that time is run-ning out and that a moment o decision is near havelost their punch; aer all, similar statements in the pastwere not ollowed by Israeli action. In act, the interna-tional community typically made a better oer when-

ever ehran crossed a line, telling the regime it couldkeep whatever it had just created as long as it producedno more. Te Iranians policy o playing or time anddividing the international community has worked orthem: their program has continued to move or ward,and the limited price they have had to pay is one theyare willing to accept.

SAnCTIonS

Sanctions have had some success in delaying Iransnuclear program. Unortunately, they are unlikely to

change the regimes mind about important strategicmatters such as whether to develop a nuclear capabilityor nuclear weapons.

In general, the world has ailed to make use o the(admittedly limited) punitive instruments availableto it. For example, ollowing ehrans reusal to per-mit IAEA inspectors to visit certain sites, the agencyhad the authority under its Saeguards Agreementwith Iran to request a special inspection, but it neverdid so. Although the regime may well have reusedsuch a move, it would have been an opportunity to

mobilize concern about Irans stance on the part othe many developing countries on the IAEA Boardo Governors, isolating Iran rom the sorts o nationsthat it sees as its natural constituency. Similarly, littlewas done to make the UN sanctions eective. At theoperational level, the international community didnot establish active cooperation to prevent Iranian


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it would make the considerable eort required to enactand implement such a measure.

SuPPoRT FoR The oPPoSITIon?

Explicit, large-scale international support or the Iranianopposition would be dicult to conduct and o unclearutility. More modest measures are called or, such as

expanding broadcast eorts to Iran and upgrading thequality o overall programming to the BBC Persian ser-vices impressive standards. Not only are these steps ethi-cally appropriate, they also oer a means o underminingthe sel-condence that leads ehran to believe it neednot compromise domestically or internationally.

opposition, which may nd it dicult to challenge theregime in the ace o IRGC nancial and labor threats.

I the Iranian economy were to receive a truly crip-pling blow in the orm o expanded sanctions, it is

unclear how the country would respond. Such a devel-opment might generate a nationalist backlash, althoughthat has not been the reaction so ar to the existing set o

lower-grade, gradual sanctions. Perhaps a crippling blowwould be such a shock to the system that it would under-cut the hardliners resolve, though their sel-condenceand limited concern about the peoples well-being mayrender them impervious to such a shock. In any case,the international community has shown no signs that

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Iranian Regional Activities

I RAN S FORE I G N P OL I C Y G OAL S have remainedairly consistent or decades: to limit U.S. infuence inthe region, to be the dominant regional power, andto export the revolution. Despite some successes ingaining infuence, ehran has also had setbacks. Bothin Iraq and among the Shiite populations o the GulCooperation Council (GCC) states, Irans inluenceis not what it once was. None o these parties are par-ticularly interested in supporting ehran during thecurrent nuclear impasse. Although they would be sym-pathetic to Iran in the event o a U.S. military action,

they would probably not do much other than mountpeaceul protests.

It is unclear how much Irans protest movementshave aected Iraqi and GCC Shiite public opinion.I demonstrations become more widespread and theauthorities use more violent repression, the Gul per-ception that ehran enjoys widespread domestic sup-port could change.

InFluenCe In IRAq

ehran has been cultivating infuence in Iraq since the

1979 Islamic Revolution. Indeed, when Iraq invaded in1980, Baghdad blamed Khomeinis requent calls orSaddam Husseins ouster and the Iranian-encouragedassassination o a cabinet minister, among other ac-tors. Years later, Iranian eorts paid o ollowing the2003 U.S. invasion o Iraq, when ehran exploited itsmany assets already in place to urther its agenda. As aresult o this long-term strategy, Iran now has consid-erable sway in its neighbors economic, political, andmilitary sectors.

On the economic ront, Iran is one o Iraqs major

trading partners, exchanging $45 billion annually. Italso appears to have been subsidizing products beingsent into Iraq, thereby undermining Iraqi private sectordevelopment.

On the political ront, Irans gains have derived inpart rom its relationship with the Sadrist movement,which began as a nationalist Iraqi group but evolved

under Iranian inluence. ehran began its eorts tocontrol the organization through the so-called specialgroups and then branched out. Eventually, the groupsleader, Muqtada al-Sadr, moved to Qom, Iran, undergovernment sponsorship.

On the military ront, Iran is closely aliated withmany key Iraqi igures. For example, several o thethree-star generals in the Iraqi Ministry o Deense pre-viously lived in Iran or decades. Te ministrys inspec-tor-general, a very powerul gure, also has strong tiesto Iran. Even the main parliamentarian overseeing

Iraqs deense orces is close to the Iranians. Tese tiestake on added importance when one considers that itis diicult or senior Iraqi military igures to remainunaligned politically. Given the prevailing culture opolitics and patronage, Iraqi military leaders may welldecide to aliate themselves with a political party orprotectiona move that could also give their Iranianassociates even greater sway in Iraqi aairs.

Although Iran is clearly a major orce in Iraq, itsinluence has diminished somewhat over the pastcouple years. For example, in 2006 and early 2007,

the IRGC transerred large numbers o sophisticatedweapons to a range o groups inside Iraq. By summer2007, however, Baghdad had had enough and issuedstern warnings to the Iranians to back oa threatthe IRGC heeded. Meanwhile, Iraqs Shiite politi-cal parties are becoming more independent, secular,and nationalistic, and openly touting ties to ehranis no longer a winning strategy. he 2009 provincialelections were evidence o this shi, with pro-Iraniancandidates aring poorly. Even Prime Minister Nourial-Maliki began to gain popularity when he portrayed

himsel as an Iraqi nationalist rather than ocusing onhis Shiite or Iranian ties. In addition, Iraqi Sunnis aremore willing to participate in the political process nowas opposed to 2005, when they boycotted the elections.As a result, Shiite politicians eel compelled to appealsomewhat to the Sunni base, making them less likely topublicly highlight connections to ehran.


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he Islamic Supreme Council o Iraq (ISCI) is agood example o how much the situation has evolved.A party with longstanding, high-proile ties to Iran,ISCI now sells itsel as an Iraqi nationalist organiza-

tion. Middle Easterners tend to have long memories,however, and it remains to be seen how eective thisattempted rebranding will be.

InFluenCe on gulF AnDlevAnT ShIITeS

Among Shiite communities in the GCC, Iranianinfuence is on the decline compared to the 1980s and1990s. Te 1979 revolution gave ehran real credibilityamong Gul Shiites or overthrowing a widely despisedregime. Tese communities have evolved over the past

thirty years, however, and an anti-Iranian Shiite politi-cal movement has emerged. For example, one o theleading Saudi Shiites who strongly supported Iran

during the 1980s has now begun to speak out againstehrans oreign policy. He also recently supported theSaudi governments mil itary intervention in Yemen,despite the act that Iran reportedly sponsored the Shi-ite Houthis there.

Gul Shiites are also increasingly ocused onlocal issues, such that Iran is no longer a top prior-ity or concern or them. Even the Kuwaiti Hizballahrecently turned on ehran, reaching a rapprochement with the emirates government and publicly stating

that Khamenei is not the only legitimate Shiite reli-gious leader. One reason or this development is thatthe GCC countries have adopted ar smarter policiestoward their minority Shiite communities. Instead o

resorting to repression as they did in the past, they arenow ocused on co-opting and integrating these com-munities. By and large, this strategy has worked (withthe exception o Bahrain, where Shiites are the major-ity and are pushing or true democracy so that they cantake over).

Given this new environment, a U.S. or Israeli attackon Iran would probably not spark a major Shiite upris-ing in the Gul. Some protests might break out, butopposition would likely be limited to that.

A more diicult question is what the Lebanese

Hizballah would do under such circumstances. heIran-Hizballah relationship has evolved over time,and ehran now has somewhat less control over the

organization than in years past. oday, Hizballahhopes to maintain the appearance o being a crediblepolitical actor in Lebanon, which might constrain theactions it would be willing to take. Tat said, Hizbal-lah will remain an important Iranian proxy regardlesso whether the current regime survives. Even a GreenMovement government would want to maintainclose ties to the group. In act, Hizballah will remainan important strategic asset or ehran as long as theIsraeli-Palestinian confict persists.

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Prudent Preparations

R E G I O N A L S A E S N E E D O A K E appropri-ate diplomatic and military measures to counter Iransnuclear ambitions. Although discussion o diplomaticpressure tends to center on the P-5 + 1 countries,Israeli and Gul Arab diplomacy must be considered aswell. And although preventive military action is usu-ally thought o in terms o U.S.-Israeli planning, GulArab states must be prepared to counter any Iranianretaliatory action ollowing a strike on the regimesnuclear acilities.

One complicating actor in determining what is

prudent is the lack o consensus about Irans prog-ress toward nuclear weapons capability. Israel and theGCC are rmly convinced that ehran seeks a nuclearweapon, while the U.S. government continues to debatewhether Iran will acquire such capability but eschewthe nal step o assembling weapons. Tere is also widedivergence regarding the amount o time remainingbeore that point arrives, and about what constitutesa nuclear red line. Israel believes that the timerame is20092013, implying that Iran might already be ableto make nuclear weapons. Te United States, however,

believes that Iran will not reach that point until some-time aer 2013.

gCC PRePARATIonS

Whether the outcome is a Western military strike oran Iranian nuclear breakout, the GCC states believethat their undamental interests are at stake. Tey arereluctant to take a diplomatic lead, however, lackingcondence in their own stability and strength. Indeed,many Gul citizens are proud that Iran can challengeperceived U.S. and Israeli dominance in the region.

And Gul governments question the value o gettinginvolved in anti-Iranian eorts that they believe aredoomed to ail. In particular, they are not sure they canrely on the United States to ollow through on toughpolicies toward the Iranian nuclear program. ManyGCC elites saw the 2007 U.S. National IntelligenceEstimate as a sign that Washington planned to do little

to stop Irans nuclear progress and would thereore bean undependable ally i they were to conront ehranthemselves. More recently, international eorts on thenuclear ront have led them to conclude that Iran isoutsmarting the West.

At the same time, based on their reading o whereIran is headed, the Gul states believe that a militaryconrontation is approaching, whether deliberate oraccidental in origin. Since the June 2009 Iranian presi-dential elections, GCC governments have concludedthat the nations hardliners are consolidating power.

Accordingly, they see a conrontation looming betweenIran and either the United States or Israel. It couldcome in the orm o a direct strike or an unplannedincident in Gul waters. In short, GCC threat percep-tions toward Iran are very similar to Israels, thoughGul leaders will not say so publicly.

he GCC states realize that they become a rontline in any confict with Iran. Te regimes most likelyresponse to U.S.-Israeli military action can be ascer-tained rom the nature o recent Iranian military exer-cises and the pronouncements o IRGC command-

ers, particularly with regard to asymmetric strategies.Examining such actors, one can see that oil transitchokepoints such as the Strait o Hormuz, the SuezCanal, and the Bab al-Mandab Strait may be at risk.ehran could also sponsor eorts to create instabilityacross the Arab world (e.g., Somalia, Yemen, the Pal-estinian territories), in the southern Sahara, and in theAghanistan/Pakistan region.

GCC countries also tend to ocus on their vulner-ability to Irans diverse and developing missile arse-nal. Missile deenses have been boosted across the

region, however, with several countries deployingPatriot PAC-3 batteries and the United Arab Emir-ates (UAE) acquiring a heater High-Altitude AreaDeense (HAAD) system. In addition, Gul aircrasuch as the Mirage-2000, F-15, and F-16 are all capableo threatening Iranian targets, and the UAE air orce isdeemed quite capable o holding its own against Iran.


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Te act that greater regional military cooperation isoccurring is a strong indicator o just how seriously theGCC states regard the Iranian threat. raditionally,the Arab Gul states have been limited by their histori-

cal reticence to collaborate militarily. Instead o org-ing deep multilateral relationships among themselvesand integrating their command and control structures,they have preerred bilateral relationships with theUnited States. Tese limitations have now lessened toa certain degree.

In act, the GCC states no longer wish to rely exclu-sively on the United States or military and diplomaticprotection. Tey want to diversiy their oreign rela-tions, bringing in countries such as France and Italyto broaden their range o allies. In other words, they

want to internationalize Gul security. Washington isnot certain what to make o this approach, and Iranis strongly opposed given its longstanding belie thatonly Gul states should be involved in Gul security.

Despite these bold initiatives, persuading the GCCstates to be more active diplomatically on the nuclearissue will not be easy. Because they still see Iran as amajor power in the region, their instinct is to avoidantagonizing ehran whenever possible. GCC elitesalso worry about several previously mentioned actors,such as Irans ability to stir up Shiite unrest and Wash-

ingtons uncertain reliability when it comes to stayingthe course. Numerous other complicating issues arein play as well; or example, U.S. relations with SaudiArabia are currently unsettled by dierences regard-ing Israeli-Palestinian aairs, Aghanistan, Pakistan,Yemen, Iraq, energy, and climate change.

Ironically, the GCCs greatest ear may be a grandbargain between the United States and Iran. Te Gulstates are intensely aware that Iran would be a greatstrategic asset or Washington. I the two countrieswere to become strategic allies, their riendship would

undermine the importance o Washingtons rela-tionship with the GCC. Under such circumstances,Gul elites ear that the United States would in eectendorse Irans ambitions to dominate the region. Tisconcern has not led the elites to become nervous aboutIrans democratic opposition, however. Given theirintense dislike o the Islamic Republic, they have been

pleased about the popular unrest, despite its potentialto result in U.S.-Iranian rapprochement.

ISRAelI PRePARATIonS

A major emerging diplomatic problem or the UnitedStates is that Israel is no longer sure it can trust Wash-ington when it comes to Iran. Israel believes that theUnited States is in denial regarding the Iranian threat;some Israelis are even concerned that the Obamaadministration does not have a deep commitment totheir country.

From Israels perspective, i Iran cannot be con-tained without nuclear weapons, then there is littlechance it can be contained once it has nuclear weapons.Attempting to do so would be a risky policy, with Israel

bearing most o the risk. In particular, i the hardlineleaders o a nuclear Iran nd themselves about to losepower, Israel believes they may say to themselves, I wehave lost anyway, why not press the button rst?

Although President Obama has said that Iran isnot a problem or Israel alone, Israel is not condentthat the United States has thought through the con-sequences o an Iranian nuclear arsenal. For example,any U.S. port could be accessible to an Iranian nuclearweapon hidden in a storage container. Accordingly,many Israeli elites are convinced that the United States

will have to take military action itsel at some point. Intheir view, the question is whether Israel can wait orthat to happen beore taking action o its own.

Most Israelis also seem to believe that i Iran acquiresnuclear weapons, Arab countries will seek their ownnuclear arsenals. his recognition has signiicantlyinfuenced Israeli views on securityspecically, theybelieve that any regional security architecture requiresa oundation, and that prevention is the only solidoundation or the Middle East. Similarly, militarypreparations do not undermine engagement with Iran;

to the contrary, without military pressure, engagementstands no chance o ensuring prevention.

In light o these core belies, Israel avors a twinstrategy o throwing Iran o balance, while also mak-ing it clear that such an action is only the beginning oa more comprehensive approach. A nuclear weaponwould become the number-one asset on Irans balance


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sheet. Nothing the international community couldoer would be equal in value to that asset. Tereore,the only way to persuade ehran to desist would be tomake nuclear weapons the regimes number-one liabil-

ity. Israel is convinced that the only way o musteringenough pressure to achieve this transormation is toinclude potential military measures as part o the pres-sure package. Pressure o any sort entails costs, and thequestion is whether the United States is prepared topay the necessary price.

I Israel concludes that neither Washington nor theinternational community are planning to prevent Iranrom going nuclear, then it will be orced to conduct avery serious cost-benet analysis on its own. As notedrepeatedly throughout the ongoing crisis, a nuclear-

armed Iran could be seen as an existential threat toIsrael. In act, the mere threat o nuclear-tipped Ira-

nian missiles could destabilize the Israeli population,

prompting the departure o untold numbers to a lessdangerous part o the world. Any Israeli prime ministerwould also be conscious o the cost o doing nothing,thereby risking horrendous casualties in the event o anuclear strike. Jewish history would weigh heavily insuch calculations, o course. Israelis are intensely aware,or example, that many Jews were killed at Auschwitzeven ater advancing American orces came withinrange o the camps rail lines, all because U.S. ocialsrejected the appeals o Jewish organizations calling ortimely action.

I Israel were to take unilateral military action,it would be ocused and short-lived, conducted vialong-range bombing runs or missile strikes. Te mostlikely targets would be the plutonium-producing heavywater reactor under construction in Arak, the centri-uge enrichment acility at Natanz, and the uraniumconversion plant in Isahan. Israeli aircra would likely

ly along the Syrian-urkish border or similar lines,conusing the issue o which countries were being over-fown (though it is possible that Israel would ask ortacit permission to fy through Saudi airspace).

u.S. PRePARATIonS

he United States views the Iranian nuclear issuepartly through the lens o the Islamic Republics revo-lutionary activities, but more through the lens o pro-lieration. Although the risk o nuclear war may notget much popular attention, it is o deep concern totop American decisionmakers, particularly PresidentObama. Te casualties rom any use o nuclear weap-ons could be enormous. In late 2001, when an Islamicmilitant attack on the Indian parliament sparked a

major India-Pakistan conrontation, Pentagon ana-lysts calculated that a nuclear exchange would result

in a death toll o somewhere between 10 million and

300 million. Even the lower bound o that wide rangewould be horric. Tereore, Washington could serveU.S. interests by highlighting its concerns aboutnuclear war as an element in the current impasse overIrans program, osetting the regional and interna-tional tendency to ocus exclusively on Americas con-fict with the Iranian regime.

In the unlikely event that the United States doestake military action against the Iranian nuclear pro-gram, all indications point to a campaign that wouldinvolve overwhelming orce. he United States has

not suiciently explained why such a ar-reachingcampaign would be appropriate, however. Te attackwould presumably involve multiple strikes over a num-ber o days, destroying Irans ballistic missile capabili-ties, antiaircra networks, and command structuresin addition to nuclear targets. Many in Iran, across theregion, and around the world may believe that the aim

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o such a campaign is regime change, with the nuclearissue only an excuse to take action. Perceptions othat sort would not be in U.S. interests, so Washing-ton should explain more careully what preemptive

strikes would entail. Te reasons or doing so, while primarily political, are also military. For instance,base access and overlight rights will be more dii-cult to acquire i countries believed the U.S. objectivewas regime change. Alternatively, the United Statescould sidestep some o these third-country problemsby conducting as much o the campaign as possiblevia carrier-based strike orces and long-range bombersoperating rom the United States.

Currently, the U.S. military has good working rela-tions with Gul militaries. Tese military-to-militaryrelationships may be quite dierent rom government-to-government relations, however. For example, Gul

governments may not be pleased i their militaries areperceived as adopting the U.S. stance on issues such asmilitary preparations against potential Iranian action.Similarly, the United States has sometimes had troubleexplaining to Gul elites exactly what military stepswould constitute prudent preparation. Considerableprogress has been made in securing cooperation onmissile and air deense as well as critical inrastructureprotection, but more remains to be done.


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Conclusions

H E M O S B A S I C Q U E S I O N S about engage-ment remain open:

When?

It is unclear whose side time is on. A good argumentcan be made that the Iranian hardliners have succeededin advancing the nuclear program while using stalltactics to divide the international community. But astrong case can also be made that ehran is increasinglyregarded as the source o the problem (certainly muchmore so than two years ago), while the United States is

seen as making a good aith eort. Additionally, Iransongoing domestic instability may orce the regime toresolve the nuclear impasse rather than ight a two-ront war at home and abroad.

Who?

For years Iran insisted that the outstanding disputescould be resolved i only the United States wouldagree to direct bilateral engagement without precon-ditions. Ten, when the Obama administration madea ull-court press or such engagement, ehran was

utterly uninterested. Te regime also insisted or yearsthat the nuclear issue belonged at the IAEA ratherthan the Security Council. But in 2009, when anoverwhelming majority o the IAEA Board o Gover-nors took the initiative and condemned Irans stance,the regime was dismissive. In light o these contradic-tions, European powers have shown greater willing-ness to consider sanctions by a group o like-mindedstates, including the EU, the United States, Canada,Japan, and others. Tis change has been reinorced bygrowing anger over Iranian human rights abuses and

the inability to overcome Chinese infexibility in theSecurity Council (which had been the Europeanspreerred venue or such action).

Meanwhile, the role o Arab states will likely remainlimited by the complex GCC security agenda, includ-ing ears that Gul states would be vulnerable to Iranian

retaliation. And although the Israeli role has been sub- ject to much speculation, the reality is that Israel islikely operating under the same basic rule that appliesto most states acing extremely diicult decisions: itwill wait until the last possible moment beore decid-ing what to do.

WhAT?

It is unclear what incentives the United States canproductively oer to a government that is deeply sus-picious o U.S. riendship. It is also unclear what the

United States can do to credibly demonstrate thatmilitary options are still on the table; aer all, manyobservers share ehrans conviction that the Obamaadministration will not use military orce on this issue.Te consensus among U.S. analysts is that the threat ostronger sanctions would make ehrans choices starkerand reinorce the search or a diplomatic solutionbut key actors such as China rmly disagree with thisapproach. Finally, despite their sympathy or Iransdemocratic movement and their unwillingness to hurtit by appearing to endorse an autocratic regime, West-

ern governments are hoping to reach an agreementwith the existing government, and they see little theycan do to help the opposition.

Te uture direction o U.S. policy in the region isuncertain. Te Obama administrations internal debateregarding Aghanistan can be read in one o two ways:either Washington will ocus on that conlict andplace Iran on a side burner, or its decision to proceedwith vigorous action in Aghanistan signals that it willapproach other international issues with the same com-mitment and resolve.

Equally unclear is extent to which the oppositionwill take center stage in U.S. strategic thinking aboutthe Islamic Republic. I there is any realistic pros-pect that the hardliners will be shoved aside, then theUnited States would have less reason to concentrate onthe nuclear impasse.


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Next Generation Leadership CouncilJill AbramsonAnthony Beyer, cochairDavid EigenJonathan S. GilbertAdam HerzJames KestonZachary Schreiber, cochairWhitney SkibellJonathan orop

BoARD oF ADvISoRS Warren ChristopherLawrence S. EagleburgerMax M. KampelmanHenry A. KissingerSamuel W. LewisEdward LuttwakMichael MandelbaumRobert C. McFarlaneMartin Peretz

Richard PerleJames G. RocheGeorge P. ShultzR. James WoolseyMortimer Zuckerman

BoARD oF DIReCToRS

President

Martin J. Gross

Chairman

Howard P. Berkowitz

Chairmen Emeriti

Fred S. LaerMichael Stein

Founding President and Chairman Emerita

Barbi WeinbergSenior Vice Presidents

Bernard LeventhalPeter LowyJames Schreiber

Vice Presidents

Charles AdlerBenjamin BreslauerWalter P. Stern

Secretary

Richard S. Abramson

Treasurer

Dimitri Sogolo

Board Members

Anthony BeyerRichard BorowMaurice Deane, emeritusRobert FromerMichael GelmanRoger Hertog, emeritus

Shelly KassenMichael KestonDaniel MintzZachary SchreiberFred SchwartzMerryl ischGary Wexler

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy


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The current impasse between the internationalcommunity and Iran, especially as regards

the nuclear issue, is likely to persist.

z

strategic report 03

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