Strategy: We add value via active asset-selection usinga range of valuation models with the aim of deliveringsuperior risk-adjusted returns or alpha to traditionalhedge funds. The Fund invests primarily in senior andsubordinated debt securities, hybrids and derivativesissued by Australian entities domestically, although itcan also invest in these types of securities when theyare issued overseas, or by overseas entities (into theAustralian market or offshore). The Fund can useleverage and targets holding the majority of itsportfolio in investment-grade securities and hybrids.

Objective: An absolute return fixed-income strategyfocused on exploiting long and short mispricings incredit markets that targets returns above the ReserveBank of Australia (RBA) cash rate plus 4% to 6% p.a.over rolling 3 year periods with volatility of less than5% p.a. after Management Fees, Administration Feesand Performance Fees.

Fund: Smarter Money Long Short Credit Fund

Strategy: Alternatives/Hedge Funds/Unconstrained Fixed-Income

Target Return: RBA Cash + 4%-6% net pa

Target Return Volatility: Less than 5% pa

Atchison/Australia Ratings/Lonsec: Recommended/Very Strong/Investment Grade

PerformanceGross

ReturnNet Return

(Insto.)* Net Return

(Assist.)RBA Cash

Rate

Gross Excess Return

1 month -0.95% -1.01% -1.01% 0.13% -1.08%

3 months -0.21% -0.50% -0.59% 0.37% -0.57%

6 months 2.02% 1.16% 0.88% 0.75% 1.27%

1 year NA NA NA NA NA

Inception31 Aug. 2017

2.49% 1.49% 1.16% 0.87% 1.62%

Since Inception Annualised

4.32% 2.58% 2.01% 1.50% 2.82%

www.smitrust.com.auwww.coolabahcapital.com

Past performance does not assure future returns. Please read the

PDS to understand risks

* Based on discounted fees provided to institutional-sized commitments

Note: all portfolio statistics other than running yield reported on gross levered value

% Monthly Returns > RBA Cash Rate + 1.5% 71.4% Cash + RBA Repo-Eligible Assets 57.3%

Portfolio Weight Cash Securities 0.5% Portfolio Weight Hybrids 11.5%

Portfolio Weight Floating-Rate Securities 99.5% Portfolio Weight ABS/RMBS 0.6%

Av. Portfolio Credit Rating A Credit Spread Duration 4.1 Years

No. Floating-Rate Notes/Bonds/Hybrids 60 Annual Volatility (since incep.) 0.73% p.a.

Total Number of ADIs 11 Gross Sharpe Ratio (since incep.) 5.0 times

Av. Running Yield (Net Equity) Before Fees 5.73% Leverage Multiple 2.85x

Modified Interest Rate Duration 0.13 Years Ratings: Recommended (Atchison); Very Strong (Australia Ratings); Investment Grade (Lonsec)

March 2018Click Here to Apply Online

Portfolio Managers Christopher Joye, Darren Harvey, Ashley Kabel, Stephen Parker Coolabah Capital Investments

APIR Code (Assisted) SLT2562AU Fund Inception 31-Aug-17

ISIN AU60SLT25623 Distributions Quarterly

Morningstar Ticker 41597 Unit Pricing Daily (earnings accrue daily)

Asset-Class Alternatives/Hedge Funds Min. Investment $1,000

Target Return Net 4.0%-6.0% > RBA cash Withdrawals Daily Requests (funds normally in 3 days)

Investment Manager Smarter Money Investments Buy/Sell Spread 0.00%/0.10%

Sub-Manager Coolabah Capital Investments Mgt. Fee (Assisted) 1.25% p.a.

Responsible Entity OneVue RE Services Ltd Admin. Fee 0.25% p.a.

Custodian Mainstream Perf. Fee 20.5% of returns over RBA cash rate

Fund: Smarter Money Long Short Credit Fund

Target Return: RBA Cash + 4%-6% net pa (< 5% pa volatility)

The since inception gross (net insto) return is the total return earned by the fund since 31 August 2017, including interest incomeand movements in the price of the bond portfolio after all fund fees paid by institutional investors. Each investor’s return will varydepending on their fee regime, investment date, and any top-ups/withdrawals they make. The annualised volatility estimate of0.73% p.a. is based on the standard deviation of net daily returns since inception, which are then annualised.

Note simulations are indicative only—past performance does not

assure future returns

www.smitrust.com.auwww.coolabahcapital.com

Past performance does not assure future returns. Please read the

PDS to understand risks

Fund: Smarter Money Long Short Credit Fund

Target Return: RBA Cash + 4%-6% net pa (< 5% pa volatility)

Portfolio Commentary: In the March quarter the daily liquidity and near-zero interest rate duration Long Short Credit Fund (LSCF) strategy declared a net income distribution of approximately 0.8% (or 3.2% annualised). In the month of March total returns were more challenging with LSCF returning -1.0% net (-0.95% gross) of fees as the yield to maturity on the portfolio increased from 5.56% in January to 6.73% at the end of March and LSCF traded-off returns in March against the future interest rates it will capture on its cash, bonds and hybrids. In March the Australian bank-issued floating-rate, senior-rankingETF listed on the ASX lost -0.28%, the ASX Hybrids Index slumped -1.1% and Australian equities plus dividends suffered a -3.55% loss. Credit hedge funds such as the Neuberger Berman Long Short Credit fund lost -1.9% in March. In the first half of April, total returns have been much stronger with LSCF delivering 0.62% net (0.70% gross) between 1 April and 16 April compared to the RBA cash rate’s 0.07% as the interest rates on the SMHI’s bonds started normalising back to the portfolio managers’ fair value targets. Since inception on 31 August 2017, the LSCF has returned 1.16% to 1.49% net of fees depending on the fee regime (2.49% gross), comfortably outperforming the RBA cash rate (0.87%). Notwithstanding the data limitations associated with this being only the seventh month since inception, recorded return volatility has been very low at 0.73% on an annualised basis, which is significantly less than the LSCF’s sub-5% volatility target, with a correspondingly elevated 5.0 times Sharpe Ratio (gross of fees). On a gross, fully-leveraged basis, LSCF ended March with the following summary statistics: a weighted-average credit rating of “A”; modified interest rate duration of 0.13 years; and a portfolio weight to bonds/hybrids of 99.5% (inclusive of an 11.5% exposure to ASX hybrids and a 0.6% exposure to high-quality RMBS/ABS). The LSCF’s running yield as at 31 March was 5.73%. In February 2018 the LSCF was awarded a “Recommended” rating from the research group Atchison Consultants. The LSCF has also been awarded “Very Strong” and “Investment Grade” ratings from Australia Ratings and Lonsec in 2017.

Overall strategy commentary: March was an unusually challenging month with most of our active positions impacted byexternal shocks that detracted from performance. After revisiting all of our assumptions, analysis and valuations inrespect of our active exposures, we concluded that the shocks in question were exogeneous and likely to reverse-out, ashas been our experience in the past. On this basis, we increased our exposures to these assets as entry levels cheapenedduring the month. This is paying dividends now as the major banks' senior-ranking bonds and the ASX hybrid market havebounced bank firmly in April. We previously observed dislocations of this kind in the June 2013 "taper tantrum", the June2015 Grexit crisis, the September 2015 crash in Chinese equities, iron ore and oil, and the February 2016 blow-out in globalbank funding costs on the back of fears Deutsche Bank was about to collapse. During these corrections we have generallybought more of the assets we already owned as valuations have become more appealing and correspondingly reduced ourportfolio weights to cash (after confirming that there has been no change in our underlying analytical thesis).

Shock 1: While March was punctuated by a sequence of seemingly unrelated events that happed materialise in closeproximity to one another, it is instructive to dwell on them in turn. The first was the second worst blow-out in major banksenior spreads since the last GFC-style conflagration in 2011/12. The interest spreads above the bank bill swap rate (BBSW)paid by the major banks' AA- rated senior-ranking floating-rate notes (FRNs) jumped by an unusually large 26 basis points(bps), or 0.26%, from about 74 basis points above BBSW in January (on the bid) to as wide as 100bps in March. This was thesecond-biggest move in major bank senior spreads since the first Eurozone crisis in 2012 (the biggest being the secondEurozone crisis coupled with the February 2016 fears of Deutsche Bank collapsing). While a general global risk-off tone careof plunging equity values, a surge in bond supply, and the Trump trade war rhetoric probably accounted for about 5-10bps ofthis spread increase, another circa 15-20bps was unexplained. For example, major bank senior credit default swaps onlyincreased about ~8bps (roll-adjusted) and major bank Tier 2 subordinated bonds, which are much riskier and usually morevolatile than senior FRNs, experienced far smaller spread increases of roughly 5-10bps. The last time this happened in2015/16, the subordinated bond spread move was 2.0x to 2.25x larger than the senior spread change. While we could notexplain this price action we stayed out of the market. But we eventually determined that the culprits behind the poorperformance of otherwise attractive major bank senior FRNs were, in fact, the banks themselves. In short, we discoveredthat US companies had been transferring their Aussie cash deposits held with our banks back to the US following PresidentTrump changing tax laws on cash held by US corporates overseas. This left local banks somewhat short cash relative to theirregulatory targets. As 3 of the 4 major banks, and one regional bank, approached their half year financial balance dates on 31March they needed to improve their cash ratios. They did so by selling large amounts of their most liquid asset outside ofgovernment bonds—ie, major bank senior FRNs—to improve their cash, or “liquidity coverage ratios” (LCRs). The banks holdsenior bank-issued FRNs because they pay very attractive interest (spreads) on a risk-adjusted basis, and can be sold to theRBA for cash in emergencies via an arrangement called the Committed Liquidity Facility (CLF). Once we understood thisdynamic, we started aggressively buying major bank senior FRNs in the latter part of the month (spending north of $200macross all of our strategies). We have since seen the bid for 5 year major bank senior FRNs improve from 100bps over BBSWto 84.5bps over at the time of writing, thus recovering a fair share of the March widening.

Fund: Smarter Money Long Short Credit Fund

Target Return: RBA Cash + 4%-6% net pa (< 5% pa volatility)

Strategy Commentary Cont’d: Shock 2: A second series of random events hit the ASX hybrid sector. Over February andMarch Westpac and CBA slammed the market with >$3.1 billion of new hybrid supply with the CBA ~$1.4bn deal beingodd insofar as there was no "roll" of existing securities into it. This meant that it was all “new money” that would bedrawn from cash or selling existing hybrids. In February and March we observed an enormous increase in secondarymarket churn, or selling, of cheaper existing hybrid securities paying superior spreads to the new deals, which were pricedon a very unattractive basis (WBCPH was priced 23bps inside ASX market spreads and CBAPG was priced 10-15bps insidesecondary spreads) to buy the dearer new deals. This is clearly irrational behaviour and we were happy to fade the move, orbuy the weakness in strategies that are permitted to hold hybrids. Our plan was working well until the leader of theopposition, Bill Shorten, announced his intention to remove cash rebates from franking credits in the middle of the month.This triggered another round of selling even though the policy affects only a small minority of hybrid owners and has sincebeen wound-back to exclude 330,000 pensioners, including those with SMSFs. Excluding franking, the cash yields on manymajor bank hybrids are currently around 4.0% to 4.6% pa, which are significantly above TDs (2.8%), senior FRNs (3.0%),subordinated FRNs (3.25% to 3.50%) and the unfranked dividend yield paid on stocks in the ASX200 index (4.4%). Includingfranking, hybrid yields are north of 6.0% and superior to the franked dividend yield on the ASX200 index. Since 2012, the ASXHybrid Index's annual return volatility has been about 2%, roughly one-sixth the ASX200 Index's 12.2% volatility. Another wayto think about risk is through worst-case drawdowns. During the global financial crisis, the ASX hybrid index fell 27%, almosthalf the 48% loss suffered by the wider sharemarket. The bottom line is that there is no incentive to sell hybrids at theselevels for even the few taxpayers that cannot use any franking credits if and only if Labor comes to power (noting thatpensioners will now still be able to claim cash rebates under Shorten) given the absence of alternatives with comparable riskand liquidity. In April Morningstar published research declaring the sell-off "overdone" and a buying opportunity. Inclusive offranking, spreads on 5 year major bank hybrids have jumped from 3.0% over BBSW in January to around 3.81% at the end ofMarch (ie, +81bps), and are now about 140bps wider than their post-GFC "tights" hit in mid 2014 when, ironically, the majorbanks had much lower equity capital buffers protecting their Tier 1 capital hybrids. If we assume a worst-case scenario thatthe demand-side investor base will shrink by, say, 10%-15% (again noting that there are limited, if any, switchingopportunities on a cash yield basis with comparable risk), we believe that this will be more than offset by the trend for themajor banks to increasingly issue hybrids into OTC markets, with ANZ, Westpac and Macquarie all recently doing US dollarOTC deals and the possibility that CBA and NAB will follow. There is also a chance that we will see the majors do OTC deals inAUD in the future, as AMP, BoQ and ME Bank have done of late. We believe that shrinking ASX supply will more than negateany potential dilution in demand and maintain our fair value targets for 5 year major bank ASX hybrids at around ~250bpsabove BBSW, which is where the ANZ and Westpac US dollar deals were trading in January (in outright terms or at about275bps above BBSW swapped back into Aussie dollars). Importantly, the performance of the ASX hybrids market in Aprilhas vindicated the logic outlined above and our hypothesis that we should actively fade it: the ASX Hybrids Index has leapt0.88% in total return terms between 29 March and 11 April inclusive.

Fund: Smarter Money Long Short Credit Fund

Target Return: RBA Cash + 4%-6% net pa (< 5% pa volatility)

Strategy Commentary Cont’d: Shock 3: A third shock has been a jump in the short-term 3 month bank bill swap rate(BBSW), which has increased from 25bps to over 50bps above the RBA cash rate (or from 1.75% to 2.05%). This is beingdriven by several complex factors, including (1) a surge in short-term treasury bill issuance by the US government thattemporarily crowded-out bank funding markets (this is now dissipating), (2) reduced demand for bank bills (and in the USand UK, the equivalent LIBOR-related securities) because of the change in the interest rate setting process associated withthese products following the GFC (Libor is being replaced), and (3) in Australia and Europe the dynamic whereby UScorporates have been shifting cash out of these countries back to the US as a result of the introduction of new Trumptaxes on the cash kept by US companies in foreign jurisdictions. This has left Australian and European banks willing to paymuch higher interest rates to attract short-term money to fill this gap. What has made folks nervous about the jump in short-term bank funding costs is that every time this has happened since the GFC it has been driven by a crisis of confidence inrelation to the solvency of banks themselves. Yet this time around there are few if any analysts/strategists questioning thecreditworthiness of banks, which have delevered dramatically since the GFC. Consistent with our thesis, we have seen bankcredit spreads in Australia and overseas compress sharply since the penultimate week of March despite short-term ratesremaining elevated. Because we generally run zero interest rate duration strategies, all our bonds are floating-rate and pay aspread above (usually) 3 month BBSW. The increase in 3 month BBSW from 1.75% to 2.05% has meant that we are capturingan extra ~25bps pa in interest assuming these rates do not normalise or mean-revert, which we think they eventually will.

Disclaimer: This information has been prepared by Smarter Money Investments Pty Ltd. It is general information only and is not intended to provide you with financial advice. You should not rely on any information herein in making any investment decisions. To theextent permitted by law, no liability is accepted for any loss or damage as a result of any reliance on this information. The Product Disclosure Statement (PDS) for the fund should be considered before deciding whether to acquire or hold units in it. The PDS can beobtained by visiting www.smitrust.com.au. Neither Smarter Money Investments Pty Ltd, its shareholders, directors, agents nor associated businesses assume any liability to investors in connection with any investment in the fund, or guarantees the performance of anyobligations to investors, the performance of the fund or any particular rate of return. The repayment of capital is not guaranteed. Investments in the fund are not deposits or liabilities of any of the abovementioned parties, nor of any Authorised Deposit-takingInstitution. The fund is subject to investment risks, which could include delays in repayment and/or loss of income and capital invested. Past performance is not an indicator of nor assures any future returns or risks. Smarter Money Investments Pty Limited (ACN 153555 867) is authorised representative #000414337 of Coolabah Capital Institutional Investments Pty Ltd that holds Australian Financial Services Licence No. 482238 and authorised representative #414337 of Yellow Brick Road Investment Services Pty Limited that holdsAustralian Financial Services Licence No. 255016. Lonsec Disclaimer: The Lonsec Rating (assigned April 2017) presented in this document is published by Lonsec Research Pty Ltd ABN 11 151 658 561 AFSL 421 445. The Rating is limited to “General Advice” (as defined inthe Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)) and based solely on consideration of the investment merits of the financial product(s). Past performance information is for illustrative purposes only and is not indicative of future performance. It is not a recommendation to purchase,sell or hold Smarter Monday Investments product(s), and you should seek independent financial advice before investing in this product(s). The Rating is subject to change without notice and Lonsec assumes no obligation to update the relevant document(s) followingpublication. Lonsec receives a fee from the Fund Manager for researching the product(s) using comprehensive and objective criteria. For further information regarding Lonsec’s Ratings methodology, please refer to our website at:https://www.lonsecresearch.com.au/research-solutions/our-ratings. Morningstar Rating Definition: The Morningstar Rating is an assessment of a fund's past performance - based on both return and risk - which shows how similar investments compare with theircompetitors. A high rating alone is insufficient basis for an investment decision. Morningstar Disclaimer: Copyright 2017 Morningstar, Inc. All rights reserved. Neither Morningstar, its affiliates, nor the content providers guarantee the data or content contained herein tobe accurate, complete or timely nor will they have any liability for its use or distribution. Any general advice or 'class service' have been prepared by Morningstar Australasia Pty Ltd (ABN: 95 090 665 544, AFSL: 240892) and/or Morningstar Research Ltd, subsidiaries ofMorningstar, Inc, without reference to your objectives, financial situation or needs. Refer to our Financial Services Guide (FSG) for more information at . You should consider the advice in light of these matters and if applicable, the relevant Product Disclosure Statement(Australian products) or Investment Statement (New Zealand products) before making any decision to invest. Our publications, ratings and products should be viewed as an additional investment resource, not as your sole source of information. Past performance doesnot necessarily indicate a financial product's future performance. To obtain advice tailored to your situation, contact a professional financial adviser. Some material is copyright and published under licence from ASX Operations Pty Ltd ACN 004 523 782 ("ASXO").

Fund: Smarter Money Long Short Credit Fund

Target Return: RBA Cash + 4%-6% net pa (< 5% pa volatility)