strengthening the oversight function of the parliament of uganda: an assessment of accountability...

8/9/2019 Strengthening the oversight function of the Parliament of Uganda: An assessment of accountability committees

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Tis study is made possible by the support of the United States Agency for InternationalDevelopment (USAID) and the UK Department for International Development (DFID) through theGovernance, Accountability, Participation and Performance (GAPP) Program contract. Te contentsof this study are the sole responsibility of Centre for Policy Analysis and do not necessarily reflect the

views of USAID, DFID and or the Government of Uganda.


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CONTENTSLIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

FOREWORD

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

METHODOLOGY

FINDINGS

Challenges Faced By Accountability Committees Challenges At The Beginning Of Consideration Of Ag Reports

Obstacles To The Efcient Consideration Of Reports In Committees

Delays In Consideration Of Completed Reports By The Plenary

Delays In The Issuing and Addressing Of Treasury Memoranda

RECOMMENDATIONS AND POLICY OPTIONS

CONCLUSION

ANNEXES

Annex 1: Political Incentives and Disincentives in the Consideration of AG’s

reports by Accountability Committees:

Annex 2: Key bureaucratic incentives and disincentives in the consideration

of AG reports by accountability committee

Annex 3: Key nancial incentives and disincentives in the consideration of AG

reports by accountability committees

Annex 4: Obstacles to consideration of AG’s reports at each stage of the

accountability cycle

Annex 5: Outstanding Value for Money Audit Reports

Annex 6: List of Respondents

REFERENCES

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List Of Abbreviations

AG - Auditor General

CEPA - Centre for Policy Analysis

COSASE - Committee on Statutory Authorities and States Enterprises

DPAC - District Public Accounts Committees

FINMAP - Financial Management & Accountability Programme

FY - Financial Year

GAPP - Governance Accountability, Participation, Performance ProgramLGAC - Local Government Accounts Committee

MPs - Members of Parliament

OAG - Ofce of the Auditor General

OPM - Ofce of the Primary Minister

PAC - Public Accounts Committee

TM - Treasury Memoranda

VFM - Value for Money


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FOREWORDThe Centre for Policy Analysis (CPA), through its Parliament Watch Uganda program and the Governance, Accountability,Participation and Performance (GAPP) share a common goal; increasing participation, accountability, and localgovernance for effective service delivery in Uganda.

One of the institutions that is key to combating corruption and responsible for advocating for accountability and servicedelivery in Uganda, is the Ofce of the Auditor General (OAG) through its reports and recommendations.

This report is the outcome of a year-long participatory research process on Parliament undertaken by a team ofresearchers. At the centre of our research was the need to identify the obstacles, which undermine the effectiveconsideration and redress of corruption cases in Uganda. Specically, the aim of the research was to identify and analysethe major obstacles to the effective consideration of the Auditor General’s reports by Parliament as part of its oversightrole as well as the delays by Parliament to adopt the recommendations contained in OAG reports.

The report’s ndings reveal a number of obstacles including but not limited to: heavy backlog in the three (3)Accountability committees of Parliament; Public Accounts Committee (PAC), Local Government Accounts Committee(LGAC), and Committee On Statutory Authority and State Enterprises (COSASE); internal challenges within the 3committees that range from the slow consideration of AG’s reports and production of reports by accountabilitycommittees, to the time the reports take to be debated and adopted, as well as other administrative and politicalchallenges.

Based on the research ndings and analysis of both the substance and processes of accountability, we make severalrecommendations on how to efciently and effectively use the OAG report to improve government accountability.

It is important to note that Parliament is currently in the process of implementing a number of the recommendationscontained in this report. Among them, the move to focus on outstanding issues rather than considering every query forCOSASE and PAC and enforcing rules that discourage consideration of issues outside the AG’s report, which will pavethe way for greater efciency in deliberating corruption cases in Parliament.

Another important change relates to PAC dividing audit reports into different categories and prioritizing investigations

on those reports based on the opinions given by the OAG. This change has so far laid on table the report by the PublicAccounts Committee on the report of the Auditor General FY ended 30th June 2013 on the “Disclaimer” queries andthe committee is scheduled to soon lay those of qualied and unqualied opinions.

The research process culminating in this report could not have been possible without the support of differentstakeholders who in various ways facilitated our inquiries and provided many useful insights. In this regard, we areindebted to; The Speaker and Deputy Speaker of Parliament, Leader of Opposition, The Clerk to Parliament,Parliamentary Commissioners, The Government Chief Whip, the former and current Chairpersons of AccountabilityCommittees, Parliament’s administrative and technical staff, representatives of the Ofce of the Auditor General, theAccountant General and FINMAP. All the above tirelessly engaged with the research team and participated in theinterviews which form an important part of this report.

We, in a special way, thank the Corporate Planning and Strategy department of Parliament and the entire administrationof Parliament for all the support accorded to the team.Our struggle to ensure that accountability is imbedded into every public sector to improve service delivery in Uganda,especially at the local government level continues..

Nansozi K. Muwanga

Board Chair

Centre for Policy Analysis


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E c h w a l u P h o t o g r a p h y

It is our hope that this report can make a

modest contribution to the valuable work

carried out by Parliament and its

accountability committees.“


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EXECUTIVE S U M M A R YThe accountability committees of the

Parliament of Uganda consider the reports ofthe Auditor General and make

recommendations to improve the Government’s

management of public nances. Through their

oversight role, they provide an important check

on corruption in government and improve the

government’s management of public resources

to promote development more effectively.

In the Parliament of Uganda, the accountability

committees have made important contributionsto holding government accountable on a

number of high prole cases, including nancial

mismanagement of Commonwealth Heads Of

Government Meeting and Ofce of the Prime

Minister. The committees have also highlighted

other important concerns of nancial

mismanagement unearthed by the Auditor

General’s reports.

While there are other institutions involved in

the audit process, this report specically focuses

on Parliament’s role in the accountability

cycle. Despite their high level of activity,

generous support from Parliament and donors,

and experienced and committed

Parliamentarians on the committees, however,

the accountability committees continue to face

challenges in considering reports, getting their

reports tabled and adopted, and receiving a

response from Government in a timely fashion.

The lack of completion of the cycle ofaccountability work means that their high level

of activity does not bear the fruit it should in

terms of tasking government to account fully for

its management of public expenditure. This

report details the ndings of

research conducted on accountability

committees’ consideration of Auditor General’s

reports from 2006 -2013 FYs and makes

recommendations based on these ndings as

follows:

Core recommendations

Challenge 1: Excessive backlog of

outstanding Auditor General’s reports

in PAC, LGAC, and COSASE

Explanation of the challenge: The large volume

of outstanding reports to be considered means

that committees are considering reports many

years after the Fiscal Year for which they apply. If

any action is taken on the reports, it is taken well

after the period under investigation.

Recommendations:

Policy Option 1: Declare a date before which

backlog will not be considered, allowing

committees to focus on considering recent

reports that are still relevant. Any outstanding

audit reports should automatically be

considered as received and the

Government should issue a Treasury

Memorandum to Parliament on them.

Policy Option 2: Develop consensus on

considering current reports rst, then

considering previous years’ reports through an

omnibus report (not year by year) to clear all

backlog without sacricing the prompt

consideration of current reports.

Policy Option 3: Scaling back the extent to which

LGAC hears AG reports on LGs from scratch.Instead LGAC should hear only a small sample

of AG’s reports, including ones that

contain outstanding issues after the DPACs have

nished their consideration. In practice DPACs

are not functioning well; this is an area where

GAPP and FINMAP are supporting programs to

improve the performance of DPACs. Either

developing a separate committee to address

Value for Money Audit (VfM) reports, or scaling

down the work of PAC in another way, would

help reduce the workload of PAC and ensure

that VfM Audit reports are considered

expeditiously.


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Challenge 2: Slow consideration of AG’s

reports and production of reports by

accountability committees

Explanation of the challenge: The slow

consideration of the AG reports by accountability

committees leads to signicant delays in theproduction of committee reports and

weaknesses the reports produced. One former

vice chairperson of PAC indicated that ideally a

one-year report can be completed within three

months. Public Accounts Committees operating

in other Parliaments such as Australia, New

Zealand, and Canada hold many far few hearings

than the Parliament of Uganda does, and write

their reports in a much shorter period of time,

allowing them to complete reports in a timelyfashion. For example, the hearings on the OPM

mismanagement involved 30 meetings with 90

witnesses, consuming a signicant amount of PAC

time, when a much more limited set of

witnesses would probably have sufced. This

would allow for the conclusion of annual

reports within the constitutionally mandated time

frame, and also allow other months to be used for

special investigations, VfM reports or other

outstanding business.

Recommendations:

Policy Option 1: Develop a set of guidelines or

a manual for how accountability committees

should work, including:

• Focusing on outstanding issues rather than

considering every query • Establishing and enforcing rules that dis

courage consideration of issues outside the

AG’s report

• Dividing the committee into

sub-committees to increase the volume of

work considered

• Limiting the number of witnesses heard to

a small sample of potential witnesses

• Promoting the input of technical staff in

ways thatcan simplify the committee’sconsideration of complicated nancial

management issues, such as:

- The preparation of briefs

- Summarization of AG’s reports

- Production of timed agendas for

meetings.

- Regular technical input into the hearing

and report writing process.

• A recent GAPP report also suggests

dividing audit reports into different

categories and prioritizing investigations on

those reports that were either categorized

as “qualied” or for reports where the AG

has issued a “disclaimer.”

For unqualied reports letters of

appreciation could be sent to the

institutions expressing satisfaction at their

performance. For reports with minor

issues, institutions should be asked to

respond in writing within a specied time

frame.

Policy Option 2: Provide training and guidance

to technical staff and committee members to

increase their expertise on nancial

management issues, to ease their speedy

consideration of reports.

Policy Option 3: Establish a xed time frame

in the rules of Parliament that designates how

long it should take for accountabilitycommittees to conclude their annual reports.

This would help committees to set up a

“This report details the ndings of researchconducted on accountability committees’consideration of Auditor General’s reportsfrom 2006 -2013 FYs and makesrecommendations based on these ndings.


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schedule for consideration and make sure to

reach their deadline, promoting a more efcient

method of work. Although such a time frame is

already

established in the Constitution, including it in the

Rules of Procedure would help build ownership

and motivation to observe the legally mandatedtime frame among Parliamentarians.

Challenge 3: Difculty in getting

committee reports tabled, debated

and adopted by the plenary

Explanation of challenge: Once completed,

reports face signicant delays in being tabled in

plenary; or are tabled but never debated or

debated long after their tabling; or are neverdebated and adopted.

Policy Option 1: Develop an ofcial

parliamentary calendar, as is done for other parts

of the budget process, which provides for a xed

window of time in which accountability

committee reports will be tabled, debated and

adopted. This calendar should reect the

six-month time frame established by the

Constitution, and also should reect changes in

the budget process mandated by the proposed

Public Finance Bill, if it is passed.

Policy Option 2: Hold quarterly meetings of the

Business Committee to ensure that

accountability committee reports receive their

due consideration in the plenary. Also ensure

that any outstanding accountability committee

reports, which have been tabled but not

debated, are saved as Parliamentary business to

be considered.

Policy Option 3: Reorganize the conduct of

plenary sessions to allow more time for debate

of reports, including accountability committee

reports.

Recommendations

In addition to the above core recommendations

to streamline and support oversight work done

by the accountability committees in Parliament,

a number of other recommendations could help

the work done by the accountability committeesachieve its maximum impact.

1) General Institutional Environment

of Parliament

Business tracking software and websites/portals

would help Parliament ensure that business like

the oversight process that has to go through

multiple stages does not get lost at some point

in the process. For the example of the work ofthe accountability committees, the reports

presented by the Chairperson of PAC at the end

of the 8th Parliament have never been taken up

again by the 9th Parliament. Having a tracker

would help the Speaker’s Ofce, the

Committee Chairpersons, and other interested

parties to make sure that reports from

accountability committees do not get lost be-

tween parliamentary sessions and between

different stages of the process.

As reports have to go through many stages over

an often extended period of time, a tracker is an

essential tool in following accountability

processes through to their conclusion.

Ideally such a business tracker would include

both internal versions for Parliament to follow

and a public version, so that the public can easily

access information on the status of

Reports presented by the Chairperson

of PAC at the end of the 8th Parliamenthave never been taken up again by the

9th Parliament.“


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accountability committee reports and other

parliamentary business. Public access to the

progress of parliamentary business can also

support the public to demand action on

outstanding accountability reports in cases where

they are overdue.

2) Political Will and Support for

Accountability Processes

Generating political consensus on the

importance of oversight processes among both

Government and opposition leaders in

Parliament would help highlight the importance

of accountability proceedings to ensure that they

are followed through to their

conclusion. Informants for this study emphasizedtwo themes:

• That the ruling party and government

leadership were often reluctant to give

prominence tooversight processes for fear that

they would make the government or its leaders

look bad.

• That the opposition was happy to use

accountability issues for political capital through

the “theatre” of PAC and the plenary, but not

particularly concerned to follow through on

whether Government responded adequately to

the concerns raised in the AG’s and the Commit-

tee’s reports. Building political consensus within

and across both sides that each will benet from

being seen as on the front lines of the war against

corruption can help make sure that

accountability processes are backed up by

political will to reach their necessary resolution.

3) Improving the Record-keeping and

Institutional Memory of theCommittees

To support a consistent method of work and

smooth transitions in the committee process,

establishing a system of record keeping and data

management for each committee in the ofce of

the clerk will support a more efcient and insti-

tutionalized framework for accountability

committees. At present lack of an electronic and

well-organized system for keeping minutes andrecords of committee processesmakes

report-writing difcult, especially when report

writing carries over to new committee

leadership. It also should make it easier for

committees to take a consistent approach to

investigations through providing documentation

of how issues were investigated by a previous

committee.

Establishing a full-edged secretariat includingxed ofce space for each accountability

committee should also provide for a greater

level of continuity in the work of the

committees.

4) Adjusting Parliamentary Staff

Structure to Meet Committee

Demands

As committees seek to discharge their duties inas efcient a way as possible, a number of

options are possible to adjust Parliamentary

staff structure to meet committee demands.

On one level, reducing the workload on

overworked clerks to committees may help

improve efciency in report writing and

preparing MPs on the accountability

committees for issues to be discussed. One

area that was frequently named as a gap for

either lack of time or lack of capacity was

report writing by clerks. On another level,

considering creative stafng structures for

committee staff could help minimize the

disruption caused by unavailability of technical

staff to committees that travel extensively like

LGAC. Generating material to help MPs

focus may require both recruiting and equipping

technical staff with very focused skill sets and to

consider supporting professional staff for

individual MPs or small groups of MPs. Although

the MPs may have incentives not to takeadvantage of the guidance provided by the

technical staff, considering a exible and tailored

plan for stafng the accountability committees

and the MPs that operate in them could help

professionalize their methods of work, reduce

wastage of time, and produce higher quality

reports. Having at least three clerks for each

accountability committee would be optimal,

according to the Vice Chairperson of PAC.


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INTRODUCTION

Public Accounts Committeesare a common feature ofWestminster-style Parliamentarydemocracies worldwide. At theirbest, they are supposed to providea check on government’s nancialmanagement, limiting corruptionand the use of public funds forpurposes other than which theyare intended. As Pelizzo writes,“legislative oversight is theprocess through whichgovernments are kept accountableand therefore strengthening oflegislatures and their oversight

capacity is a condition for thereduction of corruption and thepromoteofdevelopment.” (Pelizzoand Kinyondo 2014 p. 80).

In practice, as noted by Pelizzo andothers, in a number of countriessignicant weaknesses such as lackof political will to pursueaccountability issues, lack ofquality technical stafng to supportthe committees, and limited powers

of committees can undermine theeffectiveness of their work. Otherfactors which can have an impacton the effectiveness of committeework include the size ofcommittees, the leadership andpresence of opposition on thecommittees, and the level of accessthat the committees have towitnesses and the Auditor General.

For the case of Uganda,Parliament has three active

accountability committeesproviding oversight on the issuesraised in the Auditor General’sreports. Yet despite their highlevel of activity, relatively generoussupport from Parliament anddonors, and presence ofexperienced and committedParliamentarians on thecommittees, the accountabilitycommittees continue to facechallenges in considering reports,

getting their reports tabled andadopted, and receiving a responsefrom Government in a timelyfashion. The lack of completion of

the cycle of accountability workmeans that their high level ofactivity does not bear the fruit itshould in terms of taskinggovernment to account fully forits management of publicexpenditure. In this report wewill look at the reasons why theaccountability committeescontinue to face challenges asthey seek to use the reports ofthe Auditor General to holdgovernment accountable.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK OFTHE BUDGET AND AUDIT

PROCESS

The Constitution of theRepublic of Uganda places uponthe President the duty to causethe budgetary estimates for eachnancial year to be prepared andlaid before Parliament not laterthan 15 days before the nancialyear begins which starts on 1st July. The Ministry of FinancePlanning and Economic

Development (MFPED) is thenmandated to coordinate anddrive the budget process. TheMFPED preparesmacroeconomic projections andproduces sector ceilings on thebasis of which ministries agenciesand departments produce budgetframework papers (BFPs).

The budgetary estimates are laidbefore Parliament. Anappropriate Parliamentary

committee (sectoral committee /sessional committee)discusses the estimates and makesrelevant recommendations to theentire Parliament in plenary. TheHouse in plenary passes vote onaccount to ensure continuity ofgovernment programs during thebudget process. Parliamentapproves the budget, monitors,and evaluates the performance ofthe budget through its

various committees. TheParliamentary budget committeecarries out day-to-day monitoringof the budget while

accountability committees likePublic Accounts (PAC) andLocal Government PublicAccounts (LGAC) evaluate theperformance of the budget byreviewing the Auditor General’sreports (discussed in more detailin the next section). The sessionalcommittees also occasionallycarry out eld monitoring andevaluation visits and research onthe performance of governmentprograms and projects.

After end of each nancial year,the accountant-general prepares

and submits to theauditor-general and the ministerdocuments of the cash ow forall public funds and other entitieswholly funded throughconsolidated funds showing therevenues, expenditures andnancing for the year within fourmonths or any longer periodParliament may by resolutionappoints.

Each accounting ofcer preparesand submits to the minister andthe auditor-general, with a copy tothe accountant-general, inrespect of the nancial year and inrespect of the votes, revenues,resources and moneys for whichthe accounting ofcer isresponsible.

Once these are submitted, theAuditor General mandated by theNational Audit Act, 2008, audits

and reports on the public accountsof Uganda and all of public ofcesincluding the courts, the centraland local governmentadministrations, universities andpublic institutions of a similarnature, and any public institutionsof a similar nature, and anypublic corporation or otherbodies or organizationsestablished by an Act ofParliament. The Public Finance and

Accountability Act require that theaudit process be completed withinnine months.


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Article 163 (4)

Article 163 (5)

Article 13 (f)

Of the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, the auditorgeneral shall submit to Parliament annually a report of theaccounts audited by him or her for the nancial yearimmediately proceeding.

Of the Constitution then provides that Parliament shall,within six months after the submission of the report referredto in clause (4) of this article, debate and consider the report

and take appropriate action

Once Parliament has tabled, debated and adopted the reportssubmitted by the accountability committees, the ministerresponsible is supposed to provide a report in form oftreasury memoranda to Parliament detailing government’saction in response to the report.

Of the National Audit Act then requires the Auditor Generalto audit the treasury memoranda as the nal stage tocomplete the budget and audit cycle.


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4 Months

No time limit indicated No time limit indicated

6 Months 9 Months

ACCOUNTANT GENERAL

Submit cash ow of all public

revenue expenditure and

nancing to the Auditor General

within 4months of the end of the

nancial year.

PARLIAMENT

Required to review AGreports submitted. This

includes the consideration

by the accountability

committees, laying on table,

debate and adoption

processes

MINISTER RESPONSIBLE

For each a treasurymemorandum must be

submitted to Parliament

detailing government’s

actions on the report

AUDITOR GENERAL

Audit treasurymemoranda submitted

AUDITOR GENERALAudit all public accounts,

write a report detailing the audit

and submit the

ndings to Parliament

Audit Cycle Showing The

Allocated Time For Each Stage

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III

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II


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Accountability Committees In

The Parliament Of Uganda

The Public Accounts Committee in Parliament as currently constituted draws its legal standing from

the Constitution, and the Rules of Procedure of Parliament, and has been active in this form since

1995. According to the Constitution, the Auditor General is required to audit and submit

annual reports on public expenditure to Parliament. Parliament is mandated to consider, debate and

adopt these reports within six months after they are received from the AG.

The Public Accounts Committee is established under the Parliamentary Rules of Procedure as a

Standing Committee with tenure of two and a half years, chaired and deputized by Members of the

Ofcial Opposition Party. The Committee has 30 members, based on the proportional partymembership in the House. Its mandate is to review and report on the Auditor General’s report

relating to Central Government.

The Public Accounts Committee

The Local Governments AccountsCommittee

The Committee on Commissions, Statutory Authorities and State

Enterprises

Established in 2001 to relieve the workload of the Public Accounts Committee, and with a similar

setup, is charged with reviewing and reporting on the AG’s report on Local Authorities.

The Committee on Commissions, Statutory Authorities and State Enterprises fulls a similar

mandate for the Statutory Corporations, the institutions under its jurisdiction.


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The main function of the accountability committees is to consider the Annual Reports of theAuditor General on Central Government; Local Authorities; Statutory Corporations; and Value forMoney Audits. For the rst three reports they each are referred to the committee with therelevant mandate. The Value for Money Audit Reports are referred to PAC, LGAC, or COSASEdepending on the subject of the report.

For all of the committees, the process of consideration of the AG’s reports involves a number ofstages:

1) Tabling of the report in Parliament by the

Auditor General on March 31 of each year

(ie the 2011/12 FY report would be tabled in

Parliament on March, 31, 2013)

2) Committee begins consideration of report

3) Committee hears witnesses for each

reports

4) Committee drafts a report based onthe contents of the AG’s report and on

hearings conducted

5) Committee submits a nal report to

the Clerk’s and Speaker’s ofce to be led

as business to follow

6) Report tabled by Committee chairperson

7) Plenary debate on the report follows

8) Parliament adopts fully, partially adopts or

refuses to adopt recommendations of

Committee report9) If adopted or partially adopted, Parliament

forwards the recommendations to the

Treasury for action

10) Treasury issues memorandum in response

to the issues raised, detailing what action

Government has taken to respond to

recommendations made

11) Auditor General and Accountability

Committee review memorandum

submitted

12) Accountability Committee submits report

on the memorandum to the House

It is worth noting that this process is lengthy and complicated. The process may provide useful tools

for oversight that can help promote government accountability in expenditure. The time required to

complete an accountability cycle, however, may limit the political incentives to promote the

completion of such a cycle, because the recommendations made may be obsolete by the time the

Executive has nished their response.

Parliamentary Accountability Committees face a number of challenges in the consideration of

reports from the AG, and in ensuring that they full their responsibility to ensure that government isaccountable in its expenditure and nancial management. In the next section we will look at these

challenges, considering them stage by stage.


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METHODOLOGYThis report was conducted by the Centre for Policy Analysis (CEPA) for its Parliament Watch

Uganda initiative, and with the support of the GAPP program, employed the following methodology.

In depth interviews with the Speaker of Parliament, selected

committee members, technical staff, other Parliamentary staff, and

OAG representatives.

CEPA conducted a series of in depth interviews with individuals representing committee members,

technical staff, other Parliamentary staff, and OAG representatives to establish the primary reasons

behind limited consideration of AG’s reports and production of accountability committee reports

that are tabled in the plenary. During the interviews CEPA guided the respondents to consider the

technical, resource, and political constraints that shape the process by which the AG’s ndings are

reviewed, analyzed, and committee reports produced.

Review of secondary literature

CEPA also conducted a review of secondary literature that analyzed the proceedings of Uganda’s

Parliament, particularly focusing on the work done through the African Legislative Project. This liter-

ature was used to contextualize accountability committee proceedings in the 9th Parliament across

time and relative to other Parliaments in the region.

Analysis of committee proceedings and reports produced.

CEPA complemented the analysis gleaned from the interviews with an analysis of the extent to which

committees consider the AG’s ndings and pass reports, and whether these reports are debated and

adopted in the plenary. CEPA evaluated the speed and substantial consideration with which the AG’s

reports are dealt with, and the extent to which the current committee processes compare with

committee processes in previous Parliaments and in other Parliaments in the region, to the extent

that these other processes are available. Some documentation exists on previous Parliaments due

to the work of the African Legislative Project. An analysis of the proceedings will help explain to

what extent the obstacles to consideration of the AG’s reports are due to human resource capacity,

technical constraints, political considerations, bureaucratic obstacles, or other limitations. Where

materials are available, CEPA also analyzed minutes and draft committee reports to evaluate the way

in which committee proceedings work and the impact on the efcient and substantial considerationof the AG’s reports.


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This chapter presents thendings, interpretations of data

collected and comparison of thendings with other ndings from

different but related studies. The

data was analyzed and ndings

presented on the basis of the study

objectives and research questions.

Further, the ndings are discussed

in light of the practical experiences

of the primary respondents as well

as related literature.

Challenges Faced By

Accountability

Committees

To analyse the challenges that

Parliamentary Accountability

Committees face in considering the

AG’s reports efciently and

effectively, we will analyse four

stages:

1) the commencement of the

consideration of AG’s reports by

the committees;

2) the consideration of reports in

the committee, including hearing

witnesses and writing reports;

3) the process by which reports are

tabled, debated and adopted in the

plenary;

FINDINGS

The ndings are discussed in

light of the practical

experiences of the primaryrespondents as well as

related literature.“

4) the process by which the

Government provides Treasury

Memoranda on all adopted

reports and reports back toParliament. Each stage of the

process faces unique challenges,

and each of these unique

challenges has an impact on the

use of the AG’s reports.

Challenges At The

Beginning Of

Consideration Of AG

Reports

(a) Backlog of outstanding reports

One of the major challenges in

the efcient consideration of

AG’s reports by PAC, LGAC, and

COSASE is the delay to consider

reports as they are presented by

the Auditor General. There are a

number of reasons for the delay in

consideration but the most

important one is a huge backlog of

outstanding reports. The huge

backlog of outstanding reports is

brought about by a number of

factors, most of which will be

considered in subsequent sections

of this report.

To illustrate the backlog of reports

existing, Parliament has yet todebate and adopt any annual

report on Central Government

or Local Governments since the

reports from the 2004/5 Fiscal

Year; they have adopted Special

Investigation Reports and two

LGAC reports: 2008/9 that

covers 36 districts and 2009/10

that covers 41 districts.

This means that no TreasuryMemoranda have been issued on

annual reports since the ones re-

sponding to the 2004/5 Fiscal

Year reports. At the level of

producing reports, PAC has not

produced a nal report on anyAuditor General’s annual report

since the 2008/9 Auditor

General’s Report. LGAC has

not produced a nal report on

any year since their partial

report on the 2008/9 and

2009/10 FYs.

The LGAC under Chairperson

Hon. Ekanya presented onereport (for 2000-2001) and

left four draft reports (for the

years 2001/2, 2002/3, 2003/4,

and 2004/5). The LGAC under

Chairperson Hon. Katuntu

presented Ekanya’s draft

reports and also left ve

reports in draft form, including

the years 2005/6-2007/8, the

Special Audit Report on Lands

(KCC), and the Special Audit on

Markets for Kawempe Division.

The LGAC under Chairperson

Hon. Jack Sabiiti did not table

Chairperson Hon. Abdu

Katuntu’s draft reports, but

presented the reports for 36

and 41 districts for the years

2008/9 and 2009/10.


19/5012

AG’s Annual Reports on Central Government

(under consideration by PAC)

Public Accounts Committee (PAC) Back Log On the AG’s AnnualReports on the Central Government

Fiscal Year

19951996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

7.00

5.25

3.25

1.75

0

Days Taken to Debate andAdopt Report

12

N/A

327

40

N/A

1

373

9

N/A

2

Total years between endof the FY and adoption

3.53.5

N/A

5.5

7

N/A

5.5

7

6.5

N/A

N/A

1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

Maximum Time Allowed Under The Law To Adopt AG’s Annual Report (6 Months)

Time Taken To Consider and Adopt AG’s Annual Repot (In Years)

Source: Adapted from Kasr and Twebaze 2013


20/5013

Reports on Central Government (under consideration by PAC)

Fiscal Year

Date Tabled in Parliament by the AG

Date When Consideration by PAC began (and days between tabling and

the beginning of consideration)

Date when Final Report was presented to Clerk

Date when Tabled in Parliament (years taken to table report

from presentation of AG’s report)

Date when Debated and Adopted (days taken to debate and

adopt report)

Date when Tabled in Parliament (years taken to table report

from presentation of AG’s report)

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

20122013

No data Info notavailable

Info notavailable

17/06/2008 Info notavailable

Info notavailable


Info notavailable


Info notavailable

12/04/2011 12/03/2013 DRAF

19/04/2012 02/10/2013 DRAF

23/07/2013 02/10/2013 DRAF

02/04/2014 05/08/2014 NYC

NANA10/05/2011Over 4 years

NANA10/05/2011

NAN/A10/05/2011Over 2 years

NAN/A10/05/2011Over 1 years

NADRAFDRAF

NADRAFDRAF

NADRAFDRAF

NANYCNYC

*Info not available: No Data in Parliamentary records

*NA: not applicable—In this case because the reports have never been debated.

*NYC: Not Yet Considered

Source: Parliamentary Hansards, Committee Reports


21/5014

AG’s Reports on Local Governments under Consideration by

Parliament

Local Government Accountability Committe (LGAC)

Backlog On the Annual Reports on Local Government

8

6

4

2

02001 2002 2003 2004 2005

Maximum Time Allowed Under The Law To Adopt AG’s Annual Report (6 Months)

Time Taken To Consider and Adopt AG’s Annual Repot (In Years)

Fiscal Year

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

Days Taken to Debate andAdopt Report

4

1

245

364

364

Total years between endof the FY and adoption

7.5

7.5

6.5

5.5

4.5

Source: Adapted from Kasr and Twebaze 2013


22/5015

Table 5. Reports on Local Authorities (under consideration by

LGAC)

Fisical

Year

Date Tabled

in Parliamentby the AG

Date When

Consideration

by LGAC began

(and days betweentabling and the

beginning of

consideration)

Date when Final

Report was presented

to Clerk

(days taken toconsider report and

write a report)

Date when

Tabled in

Parliament(days taken to

table report)

Date when

Debated and

Adopted (days

taken to debateand adopt

report)

Date when

Treasury

Memorandum

Issued (anddays taken to

issue treasury

memorandum)

2006Information

not available

Information not

availableReports in draft

Information

not available

Information not

available NA

2007 18/06/2008Information not

availableReports in draft

Information

not available

Information not

available NA

2008

Information not

available Reports in draft

Information

not available

Information not

available NA

2009* 08/04/2010 23/09/2011Information not

available27/08/13

Report on

36 Districts

Presented but

Not Debated

NA

2010** 12/04/2011 23/09/2011Information not

available25/09/13

Report on

41 districts

presented and

debated but not

adopted

NA

2011 19/04/2012 03/10/2013 UC UC UC NONE

2012 23/07/2013 03/10/2013 UC UC UC NONE

2013 02/04/2014 Not yet considered NONE NONE NONE NONE

*36 districts considered for the 2008/9 FY Report. This report was tabled on 27 August 2013 but

was not presented because the Minister was not around and the report did not appear on the OrderPaper again, possibly due to a clerical error.

**41 districts considered for the 2009/10 FY Report. This report was presented and debated on 25September 2013 but the question for adoption to the House was not put, although the Minister wastold that Parliament expected a Treasury Memorandum in response to issues raised.

UC=Under Consideration

NA=In this case not available because the Treasury Memorandum has never been issued.

NONE = In this case no information available because reports have not been considered.



23/5016

Table 6. Reports on Statutory Corporations (under

consideration by COSASE)

ReportDate consideration

begun

Date of

adoption

Date when Treasury

Memorandum

Issued

Report on the auditor general’s reporton the nancial performance of Uganda

development Bank for the period 2002

to 2010

12/10/2011 07/11/2013 NA

Report on the auditor general’s report

on the nancial performance of Uganda

revenue authority for the period 2001 –

2010

Consideration

started in the 8th

Parliament

19/11/2013

Recommitted NA

Report on the auditor general’s report

on the nancial performance of Ugandainvestment authority for the period

2002 to 2011

06/03/2012 12/02/2013 NA

N/A = In this case not available because the Treasury Memorandum has never been issued.


COSASE has over 100 statutory corporations to consider and in the 9th Parliament the committee

tabled 5 reports. Of the 5 reports, 3 reports were from the AG reports and 2 were petitions from

the Uganda Railways tenants association on the transfer of 57.93 acres of land at Nsambya from

Uganda Railways Corporation to Uganda land commission and on the eviction of tenants from plots85 to 95 Port Bell Road Luzira which were adopted by the House.

In addition to the backlog of annual reports, there are also Value for Money audit reports that are

outstanding — about 61 such reports have yet to be adopted (only one of these 61 was tabled). For

LGAC, the situation is particularly critical since they also have lower Local Government accounts

reports to consider, many of which have been outstanding for a number of years. COSASE also has a

backlog of reports, some of them dating back over 10 years. With such a huge backlog, committees

often prioritize clearing backlog rather than considering current AG reports in an expeditious fashion.

For example, in the 8th Parliament, the PAC spent a considerable amount of time considering backlog

reports from the 7th Parliament before it even began reports tabled in the 8th Parliament. LGAC

in the 9th Parliament did not consider the 2006-2008 FY AG’s reports, but has to date completed

partial reports on 2008/9 and 2009/10 FYs, a report for municipalities for the 2008/9 FYs (which

was debated and adopted on 06/03/2014), and other selected reports as detailed above.

COSASE has a backlog of reports,

some of them dating back over 10

years.“


24/5017

Table 7. Special Audit Reports and Reports on Compensation

Tabled In the 9th Parliament

FY ended

June 30thPAC Report

Date

consideration

began

Date of

tabling and

presentation

Date of

debate

Date of

adoption

2009/10

On Government compensation to

Haba Group of Companies Limited

and Rhino Investments Limited

22/08/2011 09/02/2012 15/02/2012 21/02/12

2009/10 On compensation payment to Dura

Cement Ltd07/11/2011 07/02/2013 12/02/2013 13/02/2013

2009/10

On government compensation

payment to Beachside Development

Services

30/09/2011 05/11/2013 14/11/2013 14/11/2013

2010/11

On the Special Audit Report on

Financial Impropriety in the Ofce

of the Prime Minister

08/11/12 19/02/2014 25/02/2014 27/02/2014

2009/10

On Government Compensation

Payment to Basil Bouygues for

Rehabilitation of Jinja – Bugiri

Road

22/08/2011 07/02/2013 13/02/2013

Referred

back to the

committee

Table 8. Average time committee took to complete special

investigation reports

Special Investigation and Related ReportsDays from Tabling of Auditor General’s

Report until Adoption—if adopted

On Government compensation to HABA Group of Companies

Limited and Rhino Investments Limited 2009/10 FY353

On compensation payment to Dura Cement Ltd 2009/10 FY 666

On government compensation payment to Beachside

Development Services 2009/10 FY982

On the special Audit report on nancial impropriety in the

Ofce of the Prime Minister 2010/11 FY777

On government compensation payment to Basil Bouygues for

rehabilitation of Jinja – Bugiri road 2009/10Returned to Committee


25/5018

(b) Funding for committee

work

The level of funding foraccountability committees hasan impact on their ability toreview and report on the ag’sreports. For the pac, consider-able funding support has comefrom the finmap project sincethe 8th parliament, which hasallowed them to sit extra daysand extra hours, and provideallowances for the membersof the committee. Given also

that pac rarely travels, fundinglevels for pac would seem tobe less of a concern, with thecaveat that depending so heav-ily on donor funding for thecommittee makes its fundingsituation more precarious thannecessary.

Also, the generous support

for pac creates a level ofexpectations among mps that

they will receive generousallowances for pac work,threatening the integrity of the

committee if such allowancesfail to continue in the future.Lgac has more limited donor

interest, and considerablyhigher costs due to the

demands of extensive travel.

The committees prepare workplans, and these work plansare relayed to finmap by the

director of corporate planning

and strategy, and then finmapprocesses the request forfunds.

While this funding systemusually works relatively well,there can be gaps as in the

case of the 2012/13 fiscalyear, when donor supportwas suspended. Therefore,

excessive dependence onfinmap support for certain

activities can also underminethe efficiency of lgac work,as lgac waits for finmap toprocess funds.This is, however, a relativelyrare occurrence and has not

made a significant impact

on their ability to address

their workload and clear anyoutstanding backlog.

(C) logistics for lgac

There are a number of

other issues that can delay

consideration of reports by

the accountability committees.One is the question of logistics,particularly important for

the lgac, which carries outits hearings in districts. Lgac

frequently faces challengesin arranging travel, becauseits members normally attend

parliament during the three

days of plenary session, andthen are supposed to travel todistricts for hearings. Officialsmay often not be available onthe days when the committeeis scheduled to travel to thedistricts. The procedure ofconducting hearings at the

district level has also impliedthat lgac needs to cover at

least 111 districts during theconsideration of each report,if they are to cover everydistrict. Given that eachdistrict hearing is likely to take

at least a day, each ag reportwill require at least 111 days ofhearings, not even consideringtravel days required to reacheach district.

Given the number of

workdays available for lgac ina year, ever increasing backlogseems inevitable, if the currentmethod of work continues.Theworkload of lgac also includesthe consideration of reports

on lower local governments,which adds a huge number ofadministrative units to theiralready considerable workloadof 111 districts.

(D) availability andcommitment of mps

Another obstacle is the

availability of committeemembers, given their othercommitments in parliament,including the sectoral

committees on which they sit,their responsibilities in their

constituencies, and their othercommitments, such as partyactivities.

The average time between the tabling of the AG’s reports

in Parliament and the debate and adoption of these

reports by Parliament exceeded the constitutionally

mandated limit of six months in all cases where the full

process was completed “


26/50

The large number of members

on each committee (30 eachfor pac and lgac) means thatachieving the required quorumof 15 mps can be difficult attimes, although committees

have frequently carried outhearings without realizing thefull quorum of their members.

Obstacles to the

efcient consideration

of reports in

Committees

Efcient consideration ofthe AG’s annual reports and

other reports by PAC andLGAC remains a challenge.The average time between thetabling of the AG’s reports inParliament and the debateand adoption of these reportsby Parliament exceeded theconstitutionally mandatedlimit of six months in all caseswhere the full process wascompleted. For example, for

the case of the PAC reports,the number of years from theend of the Fiscal Year untiladoption of PAC reportsranged from three and a halfyears for the 1995 and 1996FYs to seven years for the1999 and 2002 FYs, for theyears on which data wereavailable. Since 2006 no PACreport on the AG’s annualreport has been adopted; the2006-9 FY reports were laidon the table at the end of the8th Parliament but have neverbeen debated or adopted.

Similar patterns aredemonstrated by the LGAC’sreports considering the AG’sreports. For the 2001-2005FYs, the number of yearsfrom the end of the Fiscal

Year ranged from a low offour and a half years in 2005to a high of seven and a halfyears for the 2001 and 2002

Fiscal Years. Only two yearsof the AG’s annual reports ofLocal Governments have beenconsidered by the LGAC andtabled, debated and adopted,and even submission coveredonly 36 and 41 of Parliament’s111 districts.

According to one former PACChairperson, “Parliament takestoo much time to considerwork and does not meet itsdeadlines.” Another informantalso indicated that PAC andLGAC spend excessive timeon hearings and report writing,leading to unnecessarily slow

consideration of the AG’sreports.

(a) Methods of work

Respondents identied anumber of challenges tothe efcient considerationof reports by Committees.One of the crucial factorsidentied in terms of delays

in consideration of AG’sreports was the method ofwork of the committees. Inthe case of PAC, a number ofrespondents pointed out thatPAC spent excessive time ondiscussing each query raisedin the AG’s report, even onesthat had already been resolvedby the AG. Respondents alsoindicated that MPs tended toraise policy issues such as levelsof funding, incomplete stafng,and similar issues that wereoutside the scope of misuse ormisappropriation of resources.To generate more focus onrelevant concerns raised inthe AG’s reports, respondentssuggested a focus onoutstanding queries or querieswhere signicant amounts offunds were lost, in order not

to unnecessarily repeat workdone by the AG without addingvalue. Another respondent

19

suggested that committeesshould only talk to a selectedrange of accounting ofcers tocover all the major issues andmake recommendations thatapply across all the ministriesor districts.

In the 9th Parliament,PAC hassat for extended hours, withthe Committee often sittingbetween 6-10 hours per day,ve days per week. But thespeed of consideration ofreports clearly presents oneof the central problems. Asenior technical staff memberindicated that the workload

for the committees wasextremely high and thatthey needed to prioritizeoutstanding issues in the AG’sreports to ensure that theydid not fall behind. Accordingto one ofcial in the Ministryof Finance, Parliament shouldnot re-do the work of the AG.Instead, PAC should ask theaccounting ofcers what steps

they have taken to address therecommendations of the AG,make recommendations, andcharge government to takecertain actions.

(b) Policies and procedures for

hearings and report writing

Another senior technical staffmember suggested a number ofgaps in the way accountabilitymeetings are organized.He noted that agenda andstructure for meetings areinadequate, meaning thattiming and organizing meetingsis difcult. The technical staffmember also noted thatthere are no briefs prepared;such briefs could be helpfulin determining a short listof outstanding items to be

discussed and how they wouldbe discussed. Finally, there isno established procedure for


27/5020

report writing, meaning that inmany cases the accountabilitycommittee reports just mirrorthe AG’s reports, ratherthan summarizing the reportand focusing on outstandingquestions. Establishing aprocedure for generatingmore focused reports wouldhelp limit the length of reports,make them more user-friendly,and set a clear and manageableagenda for debate in theplenary.

(c )Media visibility leads to in-

creased politicization and de-

railment of committee work

Respondents identied anumber of other concernsregarding the speed ofconsideration of reports forthe case of PAC. First, the factthat the Committee is opento the media and frequentlyreceives extensive mediacoverage means that MPsoften use the Committee

to make political points onissues not relevant to the AG’sreports. As one informantnoted, “Parliament’s businessis mainly politics,” arguing thatMPs in LGAC addressed issuesrelated to the Market Vendors’Initiative because of itspolitical capital and abandonedthe regular work of thecommittee in the meantime.

Given the potential large sizeof the committee, with upto 30 members present, plusother members allowed toattend, this can signicantlyderail the proceedings ofcommittees. The potentialgenerate political capital in themedia and then leave beforethe response.

At times the political theatre

has been useful, and has helpeddraw public attention tomismanagement, as in the case

of OPM or CHOGM, but onerespondent indicated that “Wehave succeeded in making thecommittees visible but not inclearing the backlog.”

(d) Limited preparation of

committees on how toapproach work

Second, a number ofrespondents indicated thatMPs are frequently unpreparedfor committee meetings, andthe committee often proceedswithout a clear strategyfor how to address issuesraised in the AG’s report.

The committee chairpersonsand the MPs seldom usethe technocrats from theCommittee, from the clerk’sofce, and from the AG’s teamto prepare and organize theCommittee’s approach to theAG’s reports. This limitedpreparation and focus canlead to slow considerationof the AG’s report, with the

committee members lackingconsensus on how to considerthe reports. Lack of consensusmay also have a signicantimpact on the report writingprocess, delaying it as MPswrestle with each other overconicting opinions.

(e) LGAC holding districts

presents logistical challenges

In the case of LGAC, thecommittee’s practice oftravelling to hold hearings inthe districts reected in theAG’s report means that thelogistics of arranging suchtrips becomes complicatedand delays consideration, asdiscussed above. While themedia element of the LGACmay not be as important asthat of PAC, the LGAC mayalso have difculties mobilizingmembers for trips due to

their wide range of othercommitments and the limitedrewards of travelling for LGACwork. LGAC work also takestime away from MPs as theyseek to meet their obligationsin Kampala and in theirconstituencies, making it lesslikely for MPs to participate incommittee work.

(f) Written procedures to

guide operation of committees

As a number of informantsnoted, the written proceduresto guide the committeeson exactly how they should

operate do not exist. Giventhe unfamiliarity of most MPswith auditing and accountingissues, the fairly short terms ofcommittee members, and thecomplicated technical natureof many of the contentiousissues brought before PACand LGAC, such lack ofwritten procedure is criticalin undermining the efcient

and smooth functioning of theaccountability committees.

(g) Availability and competence

of support staff to provide

relevant technical support

A number of respondentsmentioned the availability ofsupport staff to provide timelyand relevant support to the

committees as a challenge.Although PAC is fairly wellresourced in terms of dedicatedstaff, respondents indicatedthat clerks are frequently tornbetween administrative dutiesand report writing. Given thelength of time for which PACsits each day, and the frequencywith which it sits, clerks canface challenges in completingreports, although this maybe alleviated by the recentassignment of an additionalclerk to PAC. The tendency for


28/50

clerks to be overwhelmed withwork means that even if thatclerk is only assigned to onecommittee, they can still fail todeliver on their responsibilitiesin a timely fashion. Accordingto some respondents, clerksto accountability committeesshould have an accountingbackground in order to beable to manage the issuesaddressed in the committeemore competently. While theyhave the support of researchofcers and other technicalstaff with relevant technicalcapabilities, some committeemembers felt that because

of the key role of the clerks,their particular technical skillsshould match the needs of thecommittees.

Although technical staff are alsoattached to committees, staffwith legal or other technicalexperience frequently work onseveral committees. This canmean that committees with

very intense workloads that sitfor long periods on a regularbasis lack the staff to addressissues raised in the committeeadequately. For example, oneformer chairperson of LGACraised the issue that legaltechnical staff were unable totravel with the LGAC teamdue to the fact that they wereshared, leaving the committeewith a lack of legal supportduring their hearings on theroad.

(h) Lack of denition ofroles and responsibilities oftechnical staff

In addition to availability,technical staff may lackdenition of roles and

responsibilities in terms ofthe committee work forwhich they are accountable.Support also comes from

other technical bodies likethe Parliamentary Liaisonofce of the Auditor General,yet despite their mandateto prepare briefs to guidethe oversight committeesand provide de-brieng ofthese committees, manyrespondents indicate that MPsare frequently unprepared orunaware of key issues. Thelack of qualied technical staffassigned to individual MPs alsolimits initiatives to help MPsdebate and discuss from amore informed perspective.

(i) Capacity of committee

members to handleaccountability issues

Respondents also questionedthe capacity of MPs toaddress accountability issues,citing chairpersons or vicechairpersons who wereallocated to committees bypolitical parties based onloyalty, regional balance orother criteria, but who wereoften lacking the education,skills or experience to addressthe level of technical issuesrequired of them duringhearings. One respondentand former chairperson ofPAC argued that committeechairpersons should beelected based on theircompetence to handle issues

raised. According to thisinformant, the committeesshould be headed by peoplewith professional experiencein accountancy.

(j) Morale in committee on the

impact of their reports

Another concern raised waslow morale, with respondents

arguing that MPs lost theincentive to do committeework because the government

took no action on the reportsproduced by the accountabilitycommittees. It is difcult toevaluate how much impact ofthe limited follow up by thegovernment on the issuesraised discourages MPs on thecommittees from doing theirwork.

(k) The Importance of good

leadership

Good leadership can makea difference in terms of theprogress of the committee. Agood leader, supported by aneffective clerk, can motivate

his team, keep them focused,and generate support fromthe donor community foradditional work. Withoutclear direction, however,inuential members of thecommittee can hold thecommittee hostage by raisingirrelevant issues, engaging inconicts with other membersof the committee, and failing to

ensure that work is deliveredon a reasonable schedule.

(l) Political and nancial pres-

sure on committee members

and staff

Political and nancial pressurefrom those under investigationby the committees also cancause delays and loss of

integrity of the committees,especially in the case ofsensitive reports like CHOGMor OPM. According to onerespondent, this can comein several forms. Sincemembership of the committeeis proportional to the strengthof the party in Parliament,the ruling party can use itsnumerical advantage to placepressure on the committeeto backtrack on issues thatput the party or its seniorleadership in a negative light.

21


29/5022

inclusion of their reports inthe business to follow andthe order paper. While theBusiness Committee meets atthe beginning of each sessionto set the agenda for the year,more frequent meetings mightbe helpful to adjust the agendato accommodate completedaccountability committeereports and other relevantbusiness. In cases where theBusiness Committee seldommeets, the leadership of thecommittee chairpersons isparticularly important toadvocate for reports to appearwhen the agenda of business is

crowded.

(b) No xed schedule for

considering accountability

committee reports

The lack of a guaranteedscheduled time to consideraccountability committeereports on the Parliamentarycalendar also contributes

to low priority for theaccountability committeereports, especially comparedto other parts of the budgetingprocess. Time being dedicatedto Matters of NationalImportance and Ask the PrimeMinister in the plenary, asdemonstrated by the researchof Kasr and Twebaze (2013),also reduces the time availablefor discussion of accountability

committee reports.

(c) Reports not carried over

from one Parliament to

another

Another reason for thelapsing of some concludedreports in the plenary is thatsome business is not carriedover from one Parliament to

another. In the 8th Parliament,several annual reports weretabled by the Chairpersonof PAC on the last day of

ability of the bureaucracyto compel MPs to delivercompleted reports is verylimited.

Delays in consideration

of completed reports by

the plenary

In many cases, there aresignicant delays in thetabling, debate and adoptionof completed reports bythe plenary. In previousparliaments, the time betweentabling and adoption rangefrom one day for the PACreports on the 1995 and

2001 Fiscal Years to 373 daysfor the PAC reports on the2002 Fiscal Years. In extremecases, therefore, the slowprocess of consideration ofPAC reports in the Housecan delay a report for overa year. Similar data on theLGAC reports show that daysbetween tabling and adoptionrange from a low of one day

for the 2002 FY reports to364 days for the 2004 and2005 FY reports. There arealso considerable delays in thetabling of completed reports,but data on this are moredifcult to come by due tolimited recordkeeping of thedate when concluded reportsare handed over to the Clerkand Speaker.

(a) Infrequent Business Com-

mittee Meetings

One of the reasons identiedby respondents for delays inthe tabling of accountabilitycommittee reports is theinfrequent meetings of theBusiness Committee. Severalrespondents indicated thatthe Business Committee onlymeets infrequently, leaving littleopportunity for committeechairpersons to lobby for the

In other instances, accordingto this informant, money andintimidation can be used bypowerful individuals seekingto change the outcomes ofcommittee work. While theuse of bribery and intimidationis extremely difcult to prove,it can delay and undermine thework of the committee and putthe integrity of its reports intoquestion. Corruption can alsomake chairpersons reluctantto include controversialrecommendations for fearthat they will not be passedbecause MPs will have beencompromised to oppose them,

as in the case of the LGACdelaying its consideration ofthe Report on KCC marketsdue to allegations of bribery.

(m) Financial incentives not to

complete reports efciently?

A nal concern in thenancial motivations for theaccountability committees

is the problem of “moralhazard.” By paying MPs to sitadditional times to addressbacklog, the incentive to clearreports expeditiously maybe undermined by the desireto drag reports out as longas possible in order to getpaid more money for extrasittings of the committee toaddress backlog. According

to one informant, they havebeen paying MPs for the pastsix years to clear backlog inPAC, LGAC and COSASE.After these six years thebacklog is no closer to beingcleared. One approach toeliminating the potential moralhazard problem might betoincentivize the completion ofreports by MPs, paying themfor completing work ratherthan for number of days theysit. This is a politically unlikelysolution, however, and the


30/5023

Parliament. There was noresolution of Parliament tocarry these reports over intothe 9th Parliament, and to dateParliament has not consideredthese tabled reports, meaningthat reports from the 2006-

2009 Fiscal Year reports ofPAC have not been debated oradopted by Parliament. Partof the explanation for businessnot carrying over is limitedrecord keeping on reportsin progress, leading to lack ofinstitutional memory on whichaccountability reports need tobe concluded.

In other cases the handoverprocess from one committeechairperson to another leavesreports that are either in draftor have been tabled in limbo,as the new chairpersons mayeither lack information onthe work completed or bemore interested in producingtheir own work, rather thanfollowing up on a previouschairperson’s work. The new

chairpersons may have fewpolitical incentives to followup on outstanding reportssince they are more likely tomake their reputation for thework they begin and completethemselves.

(d) Political Sensitivity of

reports

In the 9th

Parliament, somereports have also suffered dueto their political sensitivity.The OPM report was readyfor presentation by May 2013but was not actually presentedto the plenary until February2014. Although the politicalsensitivity of OPM, CHOGMand Temangalo reports maybe the exception rather thanthe rule, political dynamicsmay play a signicant role indelaying reports, especiallySpecial Investigation Reports

on politically sensitive topics.

At a broader level theaccountability committeereports may also beunappealing to Government,for several reasons. First,

they are products of theopposition, as the oppositionchairs all the accountabilitycommittees. This makes itless likely that governmentwill want to give prominenceto the efforts of their politicalopponents. Second, thecontents of the reportsmay cast the governmentin an unfavourable light to

the extent that they exposenancial mismanagement orcorruption. Third, the Leaderof Government Business in theHouse may not consider thema priority since Governmentdoes not consider them asGovernment business in thesame way as it considersthe budget, government-sponsored bills and othergovernment business beforethe House. According to someinformants, the low priorityplaced on accountabilitycommittee reports byGovernment for politicalreasons also therefore delaystheir tabling and considerationin the plenary.

Delays In The Issuing

and Addressing Of

Treasury Memoranda

Another potential sourceof delays in the nalizationof accountability committeereports is in the issuingof Treasury Memorandaon the AccountabilityCommittee reports as wellas re-consideration of thememoranda when returned

to Parliament. According todata from Kasr and Twebazeon the LGAC, the months

between the adoption ofreports and the issuing oftreasury memoranda rangefrom a low of 11 months in the2004 and 2005 FY to a high of23 months in the 2001 FY.Datafrom our research show thatthe delay can in some cases beas great as ve years, althoughis usually considerably less.On the other hand, datashows that the nal stages ofthe accountability cycle areunclear.

(a) Infrequent reports coming

from Parliament

Ofcials from the Treasury in-dicate that their major

challenge is the lack of reports

coming from Parliament,

indicating that the last set of

completed recommendations

for an annual report of the AG

was for the 2004/5Fiscal Year.

According to Treasury ofcials,

memoranda should be ready in

not more than three months,even if they sometimes fail to

complete their memoranda

within this time frame. The

Treasury ofcials interviewed

indicated that they do not

place pressure on Parliament

to issue recommendations,

since their work is

independent of each other.There can also, however, besignicant delays in the issuingof Treasury Memoranda, as thetables below show.


31/5024

Table 9: Public Accounts Committee Reports on the Annual

Reports of the AG on Central Government: Time between

Adoption of Report and Issuing of Treasury Memorandum

FinancialYear

Report adopted(Date)

Treasury

Memorandum

issued (Date)

Treasury

Memorandum laid on

Table (Date)

30th June 2001 13/12/2006 March 2007 01/04/2008

30th June 2002 N/A Feb 2011 N/A

30th June 2003 20/10/2009 Feb 2011 N/A

30th June 2004 N/A N/A N/A

30th June 2005 05/11/2009 Feb 2011 N/A

Sources: Hansard 2nd session – Third Meeting issue No. 16, i-18 April, 2008. Pg 4714

Table 10: Local Government Accounts Committee Reports on the

Annual Reports of the AG on Central Government: Time between

Adoption of Report and Issuing of Treasury Memorandum

Financial

Year

Report

adopted (Date)

Treasury

Memorandum Issued

(Date)

Treasury

Memorandum laid on

Table (Date)

30th June 2001 22/08/2008 Feb 2011 01/04/2008

30th June 2002 04/11/2009 Feb 2011 N/A

30th June 2003 04/11/2009 Feb 2011 N/A

30th June 2004 03/03/2010 Feb 2011 N/A

30th June 2005 03/03/2010 Feb 2011 N/A

We see from the tables thatwhile the Treasury has in somecases issued Memoranda asquickly as 11 months after thereceipt of the adopted reports,in other cases (the 2001LGAC report, for example)there has been a delay of 2-3years from when the reportswere adopted to the receiptof the Treasury Memoranda bythe House. This is a signicantdelay in the oversight processand limits the effectiveness

of the reports and publicinterest in what happens toaccountability proceedings.

b) Unclear procedure when

Treasury Memoranda are re-

turned to the house

At the very nal stage of theaccountability process, when

the Treasury Memoranda arereturned to the House, therehas been only two TreasuryMemoranda presented

in the House (TreasuryMemorandum for the yearended 30th June 2000 andTreasury Memorandum forthe year ended 30th June2001 for PAC) on 1st April2008, and were referred tothe committee to study andhelp the House debate. Therehas yet to be an instance,according to our data, of whenthe returned Memoranda aredebated by the House, as isgenerally agreed should be the


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case. This means that the Government’s response to the recommendations is never evaluated anddebated, thus allowing the Government to ignore potentially unpleasant recommendations.

The major obstacle is the adoption of reports of PAC and LGAC, but the nal stages of the accountabilityprocess—whether the Treasury memoranda are issued, whether the Treasury memoranda are auditedby the AG, whether PAC follows up on this audit of the Treasury memoranda, and whether the plenarynds time to consider what the AG and PAC/LGAC have discovered regarding the response—still

seems to be missing. This is particularly important because whether the recommendations are actedupon determines whether the work of the committees on the AG’s report is bearing fruit in termsof improving the nancial management of public expenditure, reducing corruption and improvingaccountability.


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RECOMMENDATIONS AND POLICY

OPTIONSGiven the problems identied through the research, the suggestions made by respondents, andthe outstanding challenges that block effective and efcient oversight processes, a number of

recommendations emerge from the research ndings. The ndings are divided into two sections:core recommendations, and additional recommendations.

Core recommendationsChallenge 1: Excessive backlog of

outstanding Auditor General’s reports

in PAC, LGAC, and COSASE

Explanation of the challenge: The large volume

of outstanding reports to be considered meansthat committees are considering reports manyyears after the Fiscal Year for which they apply. Ifany action is taken on the reports, it is taken wellafter the period under investigation.

Recommendations:

• Policy Option 1: Declare a date beforewhich backlog will not be considered, allowingcommittees to focus on considering recent

reports that are still relevant. Any outstandingaudit reports should automatically be consideredas received and the Government should issue aTreasury Memorandum to Parliament on them.

• Policy Option 2: Develop consensus onconsidering current reports rst, then consideringprevious years’ reports through an omnibusreport (not year by year) to clear all backlogwithout sacricing the prompt consideration ofcurrent reports.

• Policy Option 3: Scaling back the extent to whichLGAC hears AG reports on LGs from scratch.Instead LGAC should hear only a small sampleof AG’s reports, including ones that containoutstanding issues after the DPACs have nishedtheir consideration. In practice DPACs are notfunctioning well; this is an area where GAPP andFINMAP are supporting programs to improvethe performance of DPACs. Either developing aseparate committee to address Value for MoneyAudit reports, or scaling down the work of PAC

in another way, would help reduce the workloadof PAC and ensure that VfM Audit reports areconsidered expeditiously.

Challenge 2: Slow

consideration of AG’s reports and

production of reports by

accountability

committees

Explanation of the challenge: Inefcientconsideration of the AG reports by accountabilitycommittees leads to signicant delays inthe production of committee reports andweaknesses the reports produced. One formervice chairperson of PAC indicated that ideally aone-year report can be completed within threemonths. Public Accounts Committees operatingin other Parliaments such as Australia, NewZealand, and Canada hold many fewer hearingsthan the Parliament of Uganda does, and writetheir reports in a much shorter period of time,allowing them to complete reports in a timelyfashion. For example, the hearings on the OPMmismanagement involved 30 meetings with 90witnesses, consuming a signicant amount of PACtime, when a much more limited set of witnesseswould probably have sufced. This would allowfor the conclusion of annual reports withinthe constitutionally mandated time frame, andalso allow other months to be used for specialinvestigations, VfM reports or other outstandingbusiness.

Recommendations:

Policy Option 1: Develop a set of guidelines or

a manual for how accountability committees

should work,

including:

• Focusing on outstanding issues rather than

considering every query

• Enforcing rules that discourage considerationof issues outside the AG’s report

• Dividing the committee into sub-committees

to increase the volume of work considered


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• limiting the number of witnesses heard to a small

sample of potential witnesses;

• Promoting the input of technical staff in ways

that can simplify the committee’s consideration

of complicated nancial management issues,

such as:

• The preparation of briefs• Sof AG’s reports

• Production of timed agendas for meetings, and

• Regular technical input into the hearing and

report writing process.

• A recent GAPP report also suggests dividing

audit reports into different categories and

prioritizing investigations on those reports that

were either categorized as “qualied” or for

reports where the AG has issued a “disclaimer.”

For unqualied reports letters of appreciationcould be sent to the institutions expressing

satisfaction at their performance. For reports

with minor issues, institutions should be asked to

respond in writing within a specied time frame.

Policy Option 2: Provide training and guidance to

technical staff and committee members to

increase their expertise on nancial management

issues, to ease their speedy consideration of

reports

Policy Option 3: Establish a xed time frame in

the rules of Parliament that designates how long

it should take for accountability committees to

conclude their annual reports. This would help

committees to set up a schedule for consideration

and make sure to reach their deadline, promoting

a more efcient method of work. Although such a

time frame is already established in the

Constitution, including it in the Rules of

Procedure would help build ownership andmotivation to observe the legally mandated time

frame among Parliamentarians.

Challenge 3: Difculty in getting

committee reports tabled, debated and

adopted by the plenary

Explanation of challenge: Once completed, reportsface signicant delays in being tabled in plenary, orare tabled but never debated or debated long aftertheir tabling, or are never debated and adopted.

Policy Option 1: Develop an ofcialparliamentary calendar, as is done for other

parts of the budget process, which provides for

a xed window of time in which

accountability committee reports will be tabled,

debated and adopted. This calendar should

reect the six-month time frame established bythe Constitution, and also should reect

changes in the budget process mandated by the

proposed Public Finance Bill, if it is passed.

Policy Option 2: Hold quarterly meetings of the

Business Committee to ensure that

accountability committee reports receive their

due consideration in the plenary. Also ensure

that any outstanding accountability committee

reports, which have been tabled but not

debated, are saved as Parliamentary business tobe considered.

Policy Option 3: Reorganize the conduct of

plenary sessions to allow more time for debate

of reports, including accountability committee

reports.

Recommendations

In addition to the above core recommendations

to streamline and support oversight work doneby the accountability committees in Parliament,a number of other recommendations could helpthe work done by the accountability committeesachieve its maximum impact.

4) General Institutional

Environment of Parliament

Business tracking software and websites/portals would help Parliament ensure that business like

the oversight process that has to go throughmultiple stages does not get lost at some pointin the process. For the example of the workof the accountability committees, the reportspresented by the Chairperson of PAC at theend of the 8th Parliament have never been takenup again by the 9th Parliament.

Having a tracker would help the Speaker’sOfce, the Committee Chairpersons, and otherinterested parties to make sure that reports

from accountability committees do not get lostbetween parliamentary sessions and betweendifferent stages of the process.

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