7/27/2019 strmedv

1/18

Lecture to be delivered on May 16, 1944 at the FourthInstitute of Biblical an d Post-Biblical Studies.

How To Study Medieval PhilosophyLeo Strauss

"How To Study Medieval Philosophy" w as available to the editors in ProfessorStrauss's original typescript, with addit ions, corrections an d a l te ra t io n s a d d edin pencil in his ow n hand. We ar e grateful to Heinrich an d Wiebke Meier fortheir most generous help in deciphering Professor Strauss's handwriting and toHillel Fradkin for help with regard to Hebrew an d Arabic words. A few minorchanges by the editors in spelling an d punctuation have no t been noted.

We raise th e question of how to study medieval philosophy. We cannot discussthat question without saying something about how to study earlier philosophy ingeneral and indeed about how to study intellectual1 history2 in general.

In a sense, the answer to our question is self-evident. Everyone admits that,if we have to study medieval philosophy at all, we have to study it as exactlyand as intelligently as possible. As exactly as possible: we are no t permitted toconsider any detail however trifling, unworthy of our m os t c ar ef ul o bs er va ti on .As intelligently as possible: in our exact study of all details, we m ust never losesight of the whole ; we must never , for a moment , overlook the wood fo r thetrees. But these are trivialities, although we have to ad d that they are trivialitiesonly if stated in general terms, and that they cease to be trivialities if one paysattention to them while engaged in actual work: th e temp ta tion s to lose oneselfin cu rio us and unexplored details on the one hand, and to be generous as reg ar ds minu tiae on the other, are always with us.

We touch upon a more controversial issue when we say that ou r understanding of medieval philosophy must be historical understanding. Frequently peop le r ej ec t an account of th e past, not simply as unexact or unintelligent, but asunhistorical. What do2 they mean by it? What ought they to mean by it?3

According to a saying of Kant, it is possible to understand a philosopherbetter than he understood himself. Now, such understanding may have thegreatest merits; but it is clearly no t historical understanding. If it goes so far asto claim to be the true understanding, it is positively unhistorical. [The mostoutstanding example of s uc h u nh is to ri ca l interpretation which we have in thefield of the study of Jewish medieval philosophy, is Hermann Cohen's essay onMaimonides' ethics. Cohen constantly refers statements of Maimonides, not to

1994 by The University of Chicago. Al l r ig h ts r e se r ve d .interpretation, Spring 1996, Vol. 23, No. 3

7/27/2019 strmedv

2/18

322 InterpretationMaimonides'2 center of reference, but to his own2 center of reference; he understands them, no t within Maimonides'2 horizon, but within his own2 horizon.Cohen had a technical term for his procedure: he called it "idealizing" interpretation.4 It m ay justly be described as the modern form of allegoric interpretation. At any rate, it is professedly an attempt to understand the old authorbetter than he understood himself.]6 Historical understanding7 means to understand an earlier philosopher8 exactly as he understood himself . Everyone whoever tried his hands on that9 task, will bear me o ut w hen I say th at th is task isan already sufficiently tough assignment in itself.

In th e normal10 and most interesting case, the philosopher studied by thehistorian of philosophy is a m an by fa r superior to his historian in intelligence,imagination,11 subtlety. This historian does well to remind himself of th e experience which Gulliver made w hen he came in contact, through necromancy,with the illustrious dead: "I had a Whisper from a Ghost, w ho shall be nameless, that the Commentators of Aristotle and other great philosophers alwayskept in the most distant quarters from their Principals, through a Consciousnessof Shame and Guilt, because they had so horribly misrepresented the meaningof those authors to Posterity." The most sustained effort of th e most giftedhistorian, hardly suffices to carry him for a short moment to the height which isthe native and perpetual haunt12 of the philosopher: how can the historian evendream of reaching a point from which he can look down on a philosopher?13

For1 the attempt to understand a philosopher of the past better than he understood himself, presupposes that the interpreter considers his insight superior tothe insight of the old author. Kant made this quite clear when suggesting thatone can u nd er st an d a philosopher better than he understood himself . The average historian is much too m odest a fellow to raise such an enorm ous claim w ithso many words. B ut he is in danger of doing so without noticing it. He will notclaim that his personal2 insight is superior to that of Maimonides e.g. But onlywith difficulty can he14 avoid claiming that th e collective2 insight available today is superior to the collective insight available in the 12th century. There ismore than one historian wh o in interpreting, say, Maimonides, tries to assessthe contribution of Maimonides. Hi s1 5 contribution to what? To th e treasure ofknowledge and insight which has been accumulated throughout the ages. Thattreasure appears to be greater today than it was , say, in the year of Maimonides' death. This means that when speaking of Maimonides' contribution, th ehistorian has in mind th e contribution of Maimonides to the treasure of knowledge or insight as it is available today.2 Hence, he interprets Maimonides'thought in terms of the thought of the present day. His tacit assumption is thatthe history of thought is, generally speaking, a progress, and that therefore thephilosophic thought of the 20th century is superior to , or nearer the truth thanthe philosophic thought of the 12th century. I contend that this assumption isirreconcilable with true historical understanding. It necessarily leads to the atte m pt to understand th e thought of th e past better2 than it understood itself, and

7/27/2019 strmedv

3/18

How To Study Medieval Philosophy 323not as2 it understood itself. For: it is evident that ou r understanding of the pastwill tend to be th e more adequate, th e more we are interested in th e past; butwe cannot be seriously interested, i.e. passionately interested in th e past, if weknow beforehand that the present is, in th e most important respect, superior tothe past. It is no t a matter of chance that, generally speaking, th e historicalunderstanding of th e continental romantics, of the historical school , was superior to the historical understanding of 18th century rationalism; it is a necessaryconsequence of th e fact that the representatives of the historical school did no tbelieve in th e superiority of their tim e to the past, whereas th e 18th centuryrationalist believed in the superiority of the Age of Reason to all former ages.Historians wh o start from th e belief in th e superiority of present-day thought toth e th ou gh t of the past , feel no necessity

to understand th e past by itself: theyunderstand it as a p re pa ra ti on of th e p re se nt o nl y. When studying a doctrine ofth e past, they do not ask primarily: w hat was th e co nscio us an d deliberateintention of its originator? They prefer to ask: what is th e contribution of thedoctrine to ou r beliefs? what is th e meaning , unknown to its originator, of thedoctrine from th e point of view of the present? what is its meaning in th e lightof later developments? Against this approach th e historical consciousness rightlyprotested in the name of historical truth, of historical exactness. The task of thehistorian of thought is to understand the thinkers of th e past exactly2 as theyunderstood themselves, or to revitalize their thought according to their own2interpretation of it . To sum up this point: the belief in th e superiority of one'sow n approach, or of th e approach of one's time, to the approach of th e past isfatal to historical understanding.

We may express the same thought somewhat differently as follows. The taskof th e historian of thought is to understand the thought of th e past exactly as itunderstood itself; for to abandon th at ta sk is tan tamount to abandoning the onlypracticable criterion of objectivity in the history of thought . It is well-knownth at the same historical phenomenon is interpreted in most different ways bydifferent per iods , different generations, different types of men. The same historical phenomenon appears in different lights at different t imes. New humanexperiences shed ne w light on old texts. No one can foresee e.g. how th e Biblewill be read 100 years hence. Observations such as these have led some peopleto adopt the view that the claim of any one interpretation to be the2 true interpretation is untenable. Yet the observations in question do not justify such aview. For the infinite variety of ways in which a given text can be understood,does no t do away with th e fact that th e author of the text, when writing it,understood it in one way only provided he wa s not muddle-headed.16 The lightin which the history of Samuel and Saul appears on the basis of the Puritanrevolution e.g., is not the light in which th e author of th e Biblical historyunderstood that h isto ry . And the true interpretation of th e Biblical history inquestion is th e on e which restates, and makes intelligible, th e Biblical historyas understood by the Biblical author. Ultimately, the infinite variety of inter-

7/27/2019 strmedv

4/18

324 In te rp re ta tio npretations of an author is due to conscious or unconscious attempts to understand the author better than he understood himself; but there is only one way ofunderstanding him as2 he understood himself.17

To return to the point where I left off: The belief in th e superiority of one'sown approach, or of th e approach of one's time, to the approach of the past, isfatal to historical understanding. This dangerous assumption which is characteristic of what one may call progressivism, was avoided by what is frequentlycalled historicism. Whereas the progressivist believes that th e present is superior to the past , the historicist believes that all periods are equally "immediateto God". The historicist does not want to judge of the past, by assessing thecontribution of each period e.g., but to understand and to relate how thingshave actually been, wie es eigentlich gewesen ist, and in particular how thethought2 of the past has been. The historicist has at least the intention2 to understand th e th ou gh t of th e past exactly as it understood itself. But: he is constitutionally unable to live up to his intention. For: he knows, or rather he assumes,that, generally speaking and other things being equal , th e thought of all epochsis equally true, because every philosophy is essentially the expression of th espirit of its t ime. Maimonides e.g. expressed th e spirit of his t ime as perfectlyas, say, Hermann Cohen expressed th e spirit of his t ime. Now, all philosophersof the past claimed to have found th e truth, and not merely the truth fo r theirtime.2 The historicist however asserts that they were mistaken in believing so.And he makes this assertion the basis of his interpretation. He knows a priorithat the claim of Maimonides e.g. that he teaches the truth, th e truth valid fo rall times, is unfounded. In this most important respect, th e historicist, just ashis hostile brother th e progressivist, believes that his approach is superior to theapproach of th e thinkers of old. The historicist is therefore compelled, by hisprinciple, if against2 his intention, to try to understand th e past better than itunderstood itself. He merely repeats, if sometimes in a more sophisticatedform, th e sin fo r which he is used to blame th e progressivist so severely. For,to repeat, to understand a serious teaching, one must be seriously interested init, one must take it seriously. But one cannot take it seriously, if one knowsbeforehand that it is "dated". To take a serious teaching seriously, one must bewilling to consider the possibility that it is simply true. Therefore, if we areinterested in an adequate understanding of medieval philosophy, we must bewilling to consider th e possibility that medieval philosophy is simply true, or,to speak less paradoxically,18 that it is superior, in the most important respect,to all that19 we can learn from any of the contemporary philosophers. We canunderstand medieval philosophy only20 if we are prepared to learn something,not merely about the medieval philosophers, but from them.

It remains then true that if one wants to understand a philosophy of the past,one must approach it in a philosophic spirit, with philosophic2 quest ions: one'sconcern must be primarily, not with what other people have thought about thephilosophic truth, but with th e philosophic truth itself. But: if one approaches

7/27/2019 strmedv

5/18

How To Study Medieval Philosophy 325an earlier thinker with a question which is not his central question, one isbound to misinterpret, to distort, his thought . Therefore, the philosophic question with which one approaches the thought of th e past, must be so broad, socomprehensive, that it permits of being narrowed down to the specific, preciseformulation of the question which th e author concerned adopted. It can be noquestion other than the question of the2 truth about th e whole.

The historian of philosophy must then undergo a t ransformat ion into a philosopher or a conversion to philosophy, if he wants to do his jo b properly, if hewants to be a competent historian of philosophy. He must acquire a freedom ofmind which is not too frequently met with among the professional philosophers:he must have as perfect a freedom of mind as is humanly possible. No prejudice in favor of contemporary thought, even of modern philosophy, of moderncivilization, of modern science itself, must deter him from giving the thinkersof old th e full1 benefit of th e doubt. When engaging in th e study of the philosophy of th e past, he must cease to take his bearings by th e modern signposts towhich he has grown familiar since his earliest childhood; he must try to take hisbearings by the signposts which guided the thinkers of old. Those old signpostsare not immediately visible: they are concealed by heaps of dust and rubble.The most obnoxious part of th e rubble consists of th e superficial interpretationsby modern writers, of th e cheap cliches which are offered in th e te xtb ook s andwhich seem to unlock by one formula th e mystery of th e past. The signpostswhich guided th e thinkers of th e past, must be recovered2 before they can beused. Before the historian has succeeded in recovering them, he cannot helpbeing in a condition of utter bewilderment, of universal doubt: he finds himselfin a darkness which is illumined exclusively by his knowledge that he knowsnothing. When engaging in the study of the philosophy of the past, he mustknow that he embarks on a journey whose end is completely h idden from him:he is not likely to return to th e shore of his t ime as th e same man who left it.II . True historical understanding of medieval philosophy presupposes th at thestudent is willing to take seriously th e claim of th e medieval philosophers thatthey teach the truth. Now,21 it may justifiably be objected, is this demand notmost unreasonable? Medieval philosophy is based, generally speaking, on thenatural science of Aristotle: has that science not been refuted once and fo r allby Galileo, Descartes and Newton? Medieval philosophy is based on practically'complete unawareness of the principles of religious toleration, of the representative system, of the rights of man , of democracy as we understand it. It ischaracterized by an indifference touching on contempt , toward poetry and history. It seems to be based on a firm belief in th e verbal inspiration of the Bibleand in th e Mosaic origin of the oral Law. It stands and falls with the use of amethod of Biblical interpretation as unsound as th e allegoric interpretation. Inbrief, medieval philosophy arouses against itself all convictions fostered by theleast indubitable results of modern science and modern scholarship.

7/27/2019 strmedv

6/18

326 InterpretationNor is this all. Medieval philosophy may have been refuted by modern

thought, and yet it could have been an admirable and highly beneficial achievement for its time. But even this may be questioned. A strong case can be madefo r the

view22that the influence of philosophy on medieval Judaism was fa rfrom being salutary. Most of you will have read the remarkable book by Dr.

Scholem on Major T rends in Jewish Mysticism. Dr. Scholem contends thatfrom the point of view of Judaism, i.e. of Rabbinical Judaism, th e Kabbalah isby fa r superior to Jewish medieval philosophy. He starts from th e observationthat "both th e mystics and th e philosophers completely t ransform the structureof ancient Judaism". But "the philosopher can only proceed with his propertask after having successfully converted th e concrete realities of Judaism intoa bundle of abstractions ... By contrast, the mystic refrains from destroyingthe living structure of religious narrative by allegorizing it . . ["The difference becomes clear if we consider th e attitude of philosophy and Kabbalahrespectively to the tw o outstanding creative manifestations of Rabbinic Jewry:Halachah and Aggadah, Law and Legend. It is a remarkable fact that the philosophers failed to establish a satisfactory and intimate relation to either . . .The whole world of religious law remained outside th e orbit of philosophicinquiries which means of course to o that it was not subjected to philosophiccriticism . For a purely historical understanding of religion, Maimonides'analysis of th e origin of th e religious commandments is of great importance,but he would be a bold man who would maintain that his ideology of theMitzvot was likely to increase th e enthusiasm of th e faithful fo r their actualpractice ... To th e philosopher , the Halachah either had no significance at all,or one that was calculated to diminish rather th an to enhance its prestige in hiseyes.""The Aggadah . . . represents a method of giving original and concreteexpression to the deepest motive powers of th e religious Jew, a quality whichhelps to make it an excellent and genuine approach to the essentials of ourreligion. However, it was just this quality which never ceased to baffle th ephilosophers of Judaism . . . Only too frequently their allegorizations are simply . . . veiled criticism" .]23 Scholem does not leave it at suggesting that ourmedieval philosophers were, qua philosophers, blind to the deepest forces ofthe Jewish soul; he suggests also that they were blind to the deepest forces ofthe soul of man as man. Philosophy, he says, turned "its back upon th e primitive side of life, that all-important region where mortals are afraid of life and infear of death, and derive scant wisdom from rational philosophy". The Kabbalists on th e other hand "have a strong sense of th e reality of evil and th e darkhorror that is about everything living. They do not,2 like th e philosophers, seekto evade its existence with the aid of a convenient formula".

We ought to be grateful to Dr. Scholem for his sweeping and forceful condemnation of our medieval philosophy. It does not permit us any longer to restsatisfied with that mixture of historical reverence and philosophic indifferencewhich is characteristic of th e prevailing mood. For Scholem's criticism, while

7/27/2019 strmedv

7/18

How To Study Medieval Philosophy 327unusually ruthless, cannot be said to be paradoxical. In fact, to a certain extent,Scholem merely says quite explicitly what is implied in th e more generallyaccepted opinion on the subject. The central thesis underlying the standardwork on the history of Jewish philosophy, Julius Guttmann's Philosophy ofJudaism is that our medieval philosophers abandoned, to a considerable extent,th e Biblical ideas of God, world and man in favor of the Greek ideas, and thatthe modern Jewish philosophers succeed much better than their medieval predecessors in safeguarding th e original purport of the central religious beliefs ofJudaism. In this connection we might also mention th e fact that Franz Rosen-zweig considered Hermann Cohen's posthumous work (Religion der Vernunft)definitely superior to Maimonides' Guide fo r th e Perplexed.

Criticisms such as these cannot be dismissed lightly. Nothing would be moreimpertinent than to leave things at24 a merely dialectical or disputative answer.The only convincing answer would be a real interpretation2 of our great medieval philosophers. For it would be a grave mistake to believe that we disposealready of such an interpretation. After all, th e historical study of Jewish medieval philosophy is of fairly recent origin. Everyone working in this field isdeeply indebted to the great achievements of Salomon Munk, David Kaufmannand Harry A. Wolfson in particular. But I am sure th at th es e great scholarswould be th e first to admit that modem scholarship has not yet crossed thethreshold of such works as Halevi 's Kuzari and Maimonides' Guide: BENZOMA 'ADAYIN BACHUTZ.25 We are still in a truly preliminary stage.

But quite apart from this perhaps decisive considerat ion, the critical remarksquoted can be answered to a certain extent26 without raising the gravest issue.Dr. Scholem takes it fo r granted that our medieval philosophers intended toexpress, or to interpret, in their philosophic works , th e living reality of historical Judaism, or th e religious sentiments or experiences of the pious Jew. Theirreal intention was much more modest , or much more radical. The whole edificeof th e Jewish tradition was virtually or even actually under attack from the sideof the adherents of Greek philosophy. With all due caution necessitated by1 ourinsufficient information about what had happened in th e Hellenistic period ofJewish history, one may say that the Midd les Ages witnessed th e first, andcertainly the first adequate,2 discussion between these tw o most importantforces of the Western world: the religion of th e Bible and th e science or philosophy of the Greeks. It was a discussion, not between ethical monotheism andpaganism, i.e. between tw o re l igions, but between religion as such and scienceor philosophy as such: between the way of life based on faith and obedienceand a way of life based on free insight, on human wisdom alone.2 What was atstake in that discussion, were not so much th e religious sentiments or experiences themselves,2 as the elementary and inconspicuous presuppositions2 on thebasis of which those sentiments or experiences could be more than beautifuldreams, pious wishes , awe-inspiring delusions or emotional exaggerations. Itwas very well for the Kabbalist Moses of Burgos to say that the philosophers

7/27/2019 strmedv

8/18

328 Interpretationend where the Kabbalists begin. But does this not amount to a confession thatth e Kabbalist as such is not concerned with the foundations2 of belief, i.e. withthe only question of interest to the philosopher as philosopher? To deny thatthis question is of paramount importance is to assert that a conflict betweenfaith and knowledge, between religion and science is not even thinkable, or thatintellectual honesty is nothing to be cared for. And to believe th at th e specificexperiences of the mystic are sufficient to quell the doubts raised by science orphilosophy is to forget the fact that1 such experiences guarantee the absolutetruth of the Torah in no other way than that27 in which they guarantee theabsolute truth of the Christian dogma or of the tenets of Islam; it means tominimize the importance of th e doctrinal conflicts between th e three greatmonotheist religions. In fact, it was th e insoluble character of those doctrinalconflicts which engendered , or at any rate strengthened, the impulse towardphilosophic studies. [I t is perhaps not altogether insignificant that Jewish philosophy has proved to be much more impervious to the influence of the Christian dogma than the Kabbalah.]28One may say of course and this is the implication of the view taken by

Guttmann and Rosenzweig in particular that modern Jewish philosophy hasdiscussed the question of faith and knowledge, of religion and science, in amuch more advanced, in a much more mature way than medieval Jewish1 philosophy. At the root of all our internal difficulties is after all th e conflict between th e tradit ional Jewish beliefs, not with Aristotelian metaphysics, but withmodern natural science and with modem historical criticism. And this conflictis being discussed of course, not by medieval2 Jewish philosophy, but by modern2 Jewish philosophy. Yet there is another side to this picture. Modern Jewishphilosophy from Moses Mendelssohn to Franz Rosenzweig stands and fallswith the basic premises of modern philosophy in general. Now, th e superiorityof modern philosophy to medieval philosophy is no longer so evident as itseemed to be one or tw o generations ago. Modern philosophy led to a distinction, alien to medieval philosophy, between philosophy and science. This dist inction is fraught with the danger that it paves the way fo r the admission of anunphilosophic science and of an unscientific philosophy: of a science which is amere tool, and hence apt to become the tool of any powers, of any interests thatbe, and of a philosophy in which wishes and prejudices have usurped the placebelonging to reason. We have seen modern philosophy resigning the claim todemonstrable truth and degenerating into some form of intellectual autobiography, or else evaporating into methodology by becoming th e handmaid of modern science. And we are observing every day that people go so fa r in debasingth e name of philosophy as to speak of th e phi losophies of vulgar impostorssuch as Hitler. This regrettable usage is not accidental: it is the necessary outcome of th e distinction between philosophy and29 science, of a distinction whichis bound to lead eventually to the separation2 of philosophy from scienceWhatever we might have to think of Neo-Thomism, its considerable success

7/27/2019 strmedv

9/18

How To Study Medieval Philosophy 329among non-Catholics is due to th e increasing awareness that something is basically wrong with modern philosophy. The old question, discussed in th e 17thcentury, of th e superiority of th e moderns to the ancients, or vice versa, hasagain become a topical question. It has again become a question: only a foolwould presume that it has already found a sufficient answer. We are barelybeginning to realize its enormous implications.

But th e mere fact that it has again become a question, suffices for makingth e study of medieval philosophy a philosophic, and not merely a historical,necessity. [ I would like to s tre ss o ne point which is of particular significancefor the right approach to our medieval philosophy. The development of modemphilosophy has led to a point where the meaningfulness of philosophy or science as such has become problematic. To mention only one of its most obviousmanifestations: there was a t ime when it was generally held that philosophy orscience are, or can, or ought to be th e best guide for s oc ia l a ct io n. The verycommon present-day talk of th e importance and necessity of political myths2alone suffices to show that at any rate th e sociap significance of philosophy orscience has become doubtful. We are a ga in confronted with th e question "Whyphilosophy? why science?"This question wa s in th e center of discussion in thebeginnings of philosophy. One may say that the Platonic dialogues serve nomore o b vi ou s p u rp o se than precisely this one: to answer th e question why philosophy, why science? by justifying philosophy or science before the tr ibunalof th e city, th e political community. In fundamentally th e same way, our medieval philosophers are compelled to raise the question why philosophy, whyscience? by justifying philosophy or science before th e trib una l of th e law, ofthe Torah. This most fundamental question of philosophy, the question of itsown legitimacy and necessity, is no longer a question fo r m o d er n p h il os o ph y .Modern philosophy wa s from its beginning th e attempt to replace th e allegedlywrong philosophy or science of th e Middle Ages by the allegedly true philosophy o r science: it did no t raise any longer th e question of the necessity ofphilosophy or science itself:2 it took that necessity fo r granted. This fact alonecan assure us from the outset that medieval philosophy is distinguished by aphilosophic radicalism which is absent from modern philosophy, or that it is, inthis most important respect, superior to modern philosophy.]30 It is then notaltogether absurd that we should turn from the modern philosophers to themedieval philosophers with th e expectation that we m ight have to learn something from them, and not merely about them.III. The student of medieval philosophy is a modern man. Whether he knows itor not , he is under the influence of m o de rn p hi lo so ph y. It is precisely thisinfluence w hic h m ak es it so difficult, and to begin w ith e ven impossible, reallyto understand medieval philosophy. It is this influence of modern philosophyon th e student of medieval philosophy which makes an unhistorical2 interpretation of medieval philosophy to begin with inevitable. The understanding of

7/27/2019 strmedv

10/18

330 * Interpretationmedieval philosophy requires then a certain emancipation2from the influenceof modern philosophy. And this emancipation is not possible without serious,constant and relentless reflection2 on the specific character of modern philosophy. For knowledge alone can make men free. W e modern men understandmedieval philosophy only to the extent to which we understand modern2 philosophy in its specific character.

This cannot possibly mean that the student of medieval philosophy mustpossess a complete knowledge of all important medieval and modern philosophies. The accumulation of such a vast amount of knowledge, of factual information, if at all possible, would reduce any2 man to a condition of mentaldecrepitude. On the other hand, it is impossible fo r any genuine scholar to relyon those "fables convenues"about the difference between medieval and modernthought which have acquired a sort of immortality by migrating from one textbook to another. For even if those cliches were true, th e young scholar couldnot know that this is th e case: he would have to accept them on trust. There isonly one way of combining the duty of exactness with the equally compell ingduty of comprehensiveness: one must start with detailed observations at strategic points. There are cases e.g. in which a medieval work has served as amodel fo r a modern work: by a close comparison of the imitation with itsmodel , we may arrive at a clear and lively first-hand impression of th e characteristic difference between the medieval approach and th e modem approach. Asan example one could mention Ibn Tufayl' s Hayy ibn Yaqzan and Defoe'sRobinson Crusoe. Defoe's work is based on th e Latin translation made in the17th century, of th e work of the Arabic philosopher. Both works deal with thequestion of what a solitary human being can achieve with his natural powers ,without the help of society or civilization. The medieval man succeeds in becoming a perfect philosopher; the modem man lays the foundation of a technical civilization. Another type of strategic points is represented by moderncommentaries on medieval texts. A comparison of Mendelssohn's commentaryon Maimonides' Treatise on Logic with the Maimonidean text itself could wellperform the function of an entering wedge into our subject. The third typewould be detailed modern polemics against medieval teachings. Take Spinoza'scritique of Maimonides' teaching and method in the Theologico-Political Treatise. By observing what theses of Maimonides' are misunderstood or insufficiently understood by Spinoza, one is enabled to grasp some of the specificallymodem prejudices which to begin with prevent us at least as much as they didSpinoza from understanding Maimonides. Yet, all examples of th e th ree ty pesmentioned are open to the objection that they may mislead th e unwary studentinto taking the difference between these specific modern and medieval philosophies for th e difference between modem philosophy as such and medieval philosophy as such. To grasp that general difference, there is, I think, no betterway than a precise comparison of th e most typical divisions of philosophy orscience in both th e Middle Ages and the modem period. It is easy to compile a

7/27/2019 strmedv

11/18

How To Study Medieval Philosophy 33 1list of th e philosophic disciplines which are recognized today, from th e curricula of present-day universities, or from th e title-pages of systems of philosophycomposed in the 19th and 20th centuries. Compare that list w ith , say, Alfarabi's or Avicenna' s division of philosophy. The differences are so big, theyare so appallingly obvious2 that they cannot be overlooked even by the mostshortsighted person; they are so obtrusive that they compel even th e most lazystudent to think about them.31 One sees at once e.g. that there do n ot e xis t in theMiddle Ages such philosophic disciplines as esthetics or philosophy of history,and one a cq ui re s a t once an invincible and perfectly justified distrust against themany modem scholars32 who write a rtic le s or even books on medieval estheticsor on medieval philosophy of history. One becomes interested in the questionwhen th e very terms esthetics and philosophy of history appeared fo r the firsttime; one leams that they make their first appearance in th e 18th century; onestarts reflecting on the assumptions underlying their appearance and one isalready well on one's way. Or take th e absence of a discipline called philosophy of religion from m e di ev al p hi lo so ph y. How many books and pamphletshave been written on Jewish philosophy of religion in th e Middle Ages, onsomething, that is, which strictly speaking, does no t e xis t. Something must bebasically wrong with all these books and pamphlets. In th e place of o ur m od emphilosophy of religion, we find in m e di ev a l p hi lo so p hy : theology as a philosophic discipline, natural theology as it was formerly called. There is a worldof difference between natural theology,33 th e philosophic1 doctrine of God, andphilosophy of religion, the analysis of th e human2 attitude2 toward God. Whatis th e meaning of that difference? What does it mean that th e greatest work ofmedieval Christianity is entitled Summa Theologica whereas the g re at es t w or kof the Reformation is entitled Institutio Christianae Religionisl And what doesit mean that Maimonides excludes th e discussion of r e li g io u s s u bj ec ts from hisGuide? This is exactly the type of questions w ith w hich one has to start inorder to arrive eventually at a tme, exact, historical understanding of medievalphilosophy.

[Many scholars consider the type of q ue st io ns w hi ch I have mentioned, aspedantic, no t to say bureaucratic. They w ou ld a rg ue as follows: why should weno t describe a medieval philosopher's remarks on poetry e.g. as his contribution to esthetics? The medieval philosopher would have considered those remarks as belonging to poetics, or to ethics, or p er ha ps e ve n to political science.He conceived of poetry as an essentially purposeful activity, as an activitydestined to please by instructing or to instruct by pleasing. He conceived ofpoetics as a technical art destined to teach how to make good poem s etc. Heconsidered poetry essentially subservient to ulterior purposes such as moralimprovement. In short , he had a terribly narrow view of poetry. Thanks to ourm o d e m philosophers, we know better: we know that poetry is something existing in its ow n right, an d that esthetics fa r from teaching a poet how to makepoems, is the analysis of poetic productivity and of e sthe tic e n jo y men t or ap-

7/27/2019 strmedv

12/18

332 Interpretationpreciation or understanding. The modem view being so manifestly superior tothe medieval v iew, why should we hesitate for a moment to refer the medievalphilosopher's remarks on poetry to our center of reference, and hence to describe them as belonging to esthetics? Well, this is precisely th e mental habit34which makes impossible historical understanding of medieval philosophy. If weknow from the outset that th e medieval view of the matter is wrong or poor , weshould not waste our t ime in studying it, or if someone does not mind wastinghis time, he simply will not command the intellectual energy required fo r trulyunderstanding a view for which he cannot have any real sympathy. Since Imentioned this example of esthetics vs. poet ry , I may be permitted to add thatthe medieval view of poetry ultimately goes back to Plato's Republic, i.e. tothe work of a man who cannot be accused of having had a monkish lack ofsense of

beauty.]35

The implication of th e point I have been trying to make , is that terminology2is of paramount importance. Every term designating an important subject implies a whole philosophy. And since to begin with, one cannot be certain whichterms are important and which t e rms are not , one is under an obligation to paythe utmost attention to any term which one reads, or which one uses in one'spresentation. This naturally brings us to the question of translations.2 There isno higher praise fo r a translation of philosophic books than that it is of utmostliteralness, that it is in ultimitate literalitatis, to avail myself of th e Latinity ofthose wonderful medieval translators whose translations from th e Arabic in toHebrew or from either language in to Latin infinitely surpass most36 modemtranslations I know:37 although their Latin in particular is frequently in ultimitate turpitudinis. It is difficult to understand why many1 modem translatorshave such a superstitious fear of translating literally. It leads to th e consequencethat a man who has to re ly entire ly on modem translations of philosophicworks, is unable to reach a precise understanding of the thought of the author.Accordingly, even the poorest linguists (such as the present speaker) are compelled to read the originals. This was not so in the Middle Ages. Medievalstudents of Aristotle, who did not know a word of Greek, are by fa r superior asinterpreters of Aristotle, to modem scholars who possess a simply overwhelming knowledge of Greek antiquities. This superiority is decisively due to thefact that the medieval commentators disposed of most literal translations of theAristotelian text and that they stuck to the te xt and the terminology of the text.IV . The foregoing remarks apply to the study of medieval philosophy in general. Now le t us turn to Jewish medieval philosophy in particular. MedievalJewish philosophy consists broadly of tw o types, an earlier type which flourished in an Islamic environment, and a more recent type which emerged in aChristian environment. I shall limit myself to th e older type which is moreinteresting from th e point of view of our methodological question, to say nothing of other considerations. There are specific difficulties obstructing our un-

7/27/2019 strmedv

13/18

How To Study Medieval Philosophy '333derstanding of Arabic-Jewish as well as of th e Islamic philosophy o n w hich it isdependent. History of philosophy, as distinguished from doxography, is an ou tgrowth of the modem world. Its program wa s stated for th e first t ime by FrancisBacon. Originally it was considered as something outside of philosophy proper,as a pursuit for antiquarians rather than fo r philosophers: it became an integralpart of philosophy in the 19th century only, owing to Hegel in particular. History of philosophy, being an outgrowth of Christian Europe, has a congenitalinclination to take its bearings as regards th e study of medieval philosophy, bythe standards of Christian or Latin scholasticism. The student of m ed ie va l p hilosophy, as a modem man , is prevented by the influence of modem philosophyon his thought, from understanding medieval philosophy, if he does n ot c oh erently re fl ec t o n th e difference between modem a nd m ed ie va l philosophy. Similarly, th e student of Islamic and Jewish philosophy, wh o as a historian ofphilosophy participates in a tradit ion of Western2 origin, is prevented by thattradit ion from understanding Islamic and Jewish philosophy, if he does notcoherently reflect on the difference between Christian s ch ol as ti ci sm a nd Islamic-Jewish philosophy.

One has to start from th e difference between Judaism and Islam on the onehand, and Christianity on th e other. For th e Jew and th e Muslim, religion isprimarily not, as it is for th e Christian, a faith2 formulated in dogmas, but alaw,2

acode2

of divine origin. Accordingly, the religious science, th e sacradoctrina is, not dogmatic theology, theologia revelata, but th e science of thelaw, Halachah or F ikh. The science o f the law thus understood has much less incommon with philosophy than has dogmatic theology. Hence, the status ofphilosophy is, as a matter of principle,38 m uch m ore precarious in the Islamic-Jewish world than it is in th e Christian world. No one could become a competent Christian theologian without having studied at least a s ub st an tia l part ofphilosophy; philosophy was an integral part of th e officially authorized andeven required training. On the other hand, one could become an absolutelycompetent Halachist or Fakih without having th e slightest knowledge of philosophy. This fundamental difference doubtless explains th e possibility of the latercomplete collapse of philosophic studies in the Islamic world, a collapse whichhas no parallel in the West in spite of Luther. It explains why, as late as 1765,th e Ashkenazic Jew Mendelssohn felt compelled to offer a real apology fo rrecommending the study of logic, and to show why the prohibition against thereading of extraneous o r p ro fa ne books does no t apply to the study of works onlogic. It explains at least partly why Maimonides' Guide in p ar ti cu la r n ev eracquired the authority enjoyed by Thomas Aquinas' Summa Theologica. Nothing is more revealing than the difference between the beginnings o f these tw omost representative works. The first article of Thomas' great' Summa dealswith the question as to whether theology is necessary apart from, and in addition to , the philosophic disciplines: Thomas39 defends theology before the tr ibunal of philosophy.

Maimonides' Guide on th e other hand is explicitly40 devoted

7/27/2019 strmedv

14/18

334 Interpretationto the science of the law, if to the true2 science of the law; it opens in the formof1 a somewhat diffuse commentary42 on a Biblical verse;43 it opens as a defense of philosophy before the tribunal of traditional Jewish science rather thanas a defense of traditional Jewish science before the tribunal of philosophy. Canone even imagine Maimonides opening the Guide with a discussion of the question as to whether the Halachah is necessary in addition to the philosophicdisciplines? Maimonides' procedure is illustrated by a treatise of his contemporary Averroes the explicit purpose of which is the legal justification of philosophy: it discusses in legaP terms, in terms of th e Islamic law, th e question as towhether the study of philosophy is permitted2 or forbidden2 or commanded.2Philosophy was clearly on the defensive, not so much perhaps in fact, butcertainly as fa r as the legal situation was concerned. There is more than oneparallel to Averroes' argument in Jewish literature.

The problematic status of philosophy in th e Jewish Middle Ages finds itsmost telling expression in the use of the terms "philosophy" and "philosopher".W e take it for granted that men such as Maimonides and Halevi were philosophers , and we call their respective books without hesitation philosophic books.But do we act in agreement with their view of the matter by doing so? In theirusage, philosopher designates normally a man whose beliefs are fundamentallydifferent from those of the adherents of any of the three monotheist religions,whether he belongs nominally to one of these religions or not. The philosophersas such are supposed to form a group, a sect,2 fundamentally distinguishedfrom the group of th e Jews, that of the Muslims and that of the Christians. Bycalling thinkers such as Halevi and Maimonides "philosophers", we implicitlydeny that there is a problem2 in the very idea2 of a Jewish philosopher or ofJewish philosophy. But of nothing were these men more deeply convinced thanof this that Jewish philosophy is, as such, something problematic, somethingprecarious.

Now le t us consider the other side of th e picture. The official recognition ofphilosophy in the Christian world had doubtle ss its drawbacks. That recognitionwas bought at the price of strict ecclesiastical supervision. The precarious position of philosophy in the Islamic-Jewish world , on th e other hand, guaranteed,or necessi ta ted, its private2 character and therewith a higher degree of innerfreedom .2 The situation of philosophy in th e Islamic -Jewish world resembles inthis respect its situation in classical Greece. It has often been said that th eGreek city was a totalitarian social order: it comprised, and regulated, not onlypolitical and legal matters proper, but morality, religion, tragedy and comedyas well. There was however one activity which was, in fact and in theory,essentially and radically private,2 trans-poli t ical and trans-social: philosophy.The philosophic schools were founded, not by authorities civil or ecclesiastical,but by men without2 authority, by private men. In this respect, I said, thesituation of philosophy in the Islamic world resembles th e Greek2 situation

7/27/2019 strmedv

15/18

How To Study Medieval Philosophy 335rather than the situation in Christian Europe. This fact was recognized by th eIslamic-Jewish philosophers themselves: elaborating on a remark of Aristotle,they speak of th e philosophic life as a radically private2 life: they compare it tothe life of a hermit.

Religion is conceived of by Muslims and Jews primarily as a law. Accordingly, religion enters the horizon of the philosophers primarily as a politicalfact. Therefore, th e philosophic discipline dealing with religion is, n ot p hi lo sophy of religion, but political philosophy or political science. The political science in question is a specific one: Platonic political science, th e teaching ofPlato's Republic and of his Laws. No difference between Islamic-Jewish philosophy on th e one hand and Christian scholasticism on th e other is more palpable than this: whereas th e classic of political science in the Western world wasAristotle's Politics, th e classics of political science in th e Islamic-Jewish worldwere the Republic and th e Laws. In fact, Aristotle's Politics w er e u nk no wn tothe Islamic -Jewish w orld and the Republic and the Laws made their appearancein Christian Europe no t before th e 15th century. The Islamic law as well asthe Jewish law is of course considered a divine law, a law given by God to me nby th e intermediary of a prophet. The prophet is interpreted by Alfarabi, Avicenna and Maimonides in t e rms of the Platonic philosopher-king: as the founder of th e p er fe ct p ol it ic al c om m un it y. The doc trine of prophecy as such isconsidered by these philosophers a part of political science. Avicenna describesPlato's Laws as th e standard work on prophecy. This view of the essentiallypolitical character of prophecy influences the very plan of Maimonides' SeferHamitzvot and of his Sefer Hamadda. Its implications appear from Maimonides' remark that the neglect of the arts of war and of conquest in favor ofastrology led to the destruction of th e Jewish state.

The difference between Islamic-Jewish philosophy and Christian scholasticism shows itself most clearly in th e field of practical philosophy. As regardstheoretical philosophy, both Islamic-Jewish philosophy and Christian scholasticism build on substantially the same tradit ion. But in p ol it ic al a nd moralphilosophy, the difference is fundamental. I have mentioned the absence ofAristotle's Politics from th e Islamic-Jewish world. Equally significant is th eabsence from it of the Roman literature, of Cicero and the Roman Law inparticular. This leads to the consequence th at th e doctrine of natural law, so characteristic of Christian scholasticism, and indeed of Western thought up to the endof th e 18th century, is completely lacking in Islamic-Jewish philosophy: it appearsin some later Jewish writers only under the influence of Christian thought. It istrue, the Islamic theologians, th e Mutakallimun, had asserted the existence ofrational laws which were practically identical with what w er e c alle d n atur al laws inth e Occident; but th e Islamic-Jewish philosophers reject this view altogether. Therules of conduct which are called by the Christian scholastics natural laws and bythe Mutakall imun rational laws, are called by th e Islamic-Jewish philosophers:

7/27/2019 strmedv

16/18

336 InterpretationGenerally accepted opinions. This view appears in th e Christian Middle Ages onlyat their fringes as it were, in th e teaching of Marsilius of Padua, the most energeticmedieval opponent of clerical claims.This leads me to th e last point which I would like to make in order to

indicate the extent and bearing of the difference separating Islamic-Jewish philosophy from Christian scholasticism, and in order to justify my contention thata genuine understanding of Islamic-Jewish philosophy must be based on constant awareness of that difference. That44 school of Christian scholasticismwhich was most deeply influenced by Islamic philosophy, wa s Latin Averro-ism. Latin Averroism is famous for its doctrine of the double truth, fo r itsassertion that a thesis may be tme in philosophy but false in theology and viceversa. The doctrine of the double truth does no t occur in Averroes himself or inhis predecessors. Instead, we find in Islamic philosophy a relatively ample useof th e distinction between exoteric teachings, based on rhetorical arguments,and the esoteric teaching based on demonstrative or scientific arguments. Up tonow, students of Islamic philosophy have not paid s u ff ic i en t a tt en t io n to thisdistinction which is evidently of absolutely decisive importance. For if th e true,scientific teaching is an esoteric, a secret2 teaching, we have no right to be as45certain as we are accustomed to be , that the public teaching of the Islamicphilosophers is their real teaching. We would have to acquire a special technique of reading no t necessary fo r th e understanding of books which set forthth e views of their authors directly, without any concealment o r c ir cu m lo c ut io n .It would be wrong to tra ce th e esotericism in question to certain s pu ri ou s p henomena of dying antiquity: its origin has to be sought in Plato himself, in thedoctrine of th e Phaedrus concerning th e superiority of oral teaching to teachingby writ ings, in the doctrine of th e Republic and the Laws concerning th e necessity of noble lies, and, above all, in th e literary technique used by Plato himselfin all his works. One may safely say that before this46 Platonism2 of th e Islamicphilosophers has been duly studied, ou r understanding of Islamic philosophyrests on extremely shaky foundations. Similar considerations apply to the Jewish philosophy which is dependent on Islamic philosophy. Everyone w ho hasread th e Guide, knows how emphatically Maimonides insists on th e secret character of his ow n teaching: he warns his reader from the outset that he has setforth only th e chapter headings of th e secret teaching, and not the chaptersthemselves. In th e Kuzari, we a re c on fr on te d with a similar situation: th e finalconversion of th e Kuzari to Judaism is th e consequence of47 his listening to ahighly secret interpretation of th e secret teaching of the Sefer Yetz irah. It waswith a view to phenomena such as these that I ventured to say that48 ou r understanding of medieval philosophy is1 still in a truly preliminary stage. In makingthis remark I do no t minimize the debt which we ow e to Wolfson and IsaacHeinemann in particular, who have spoken on the peculiar literary technique ofour medieval49 philosophers on v a ri ou s o c ca s io n s. What is required beyond thegeneral observations, is a coherent a nd m e th od ic application of those observa-

7/27/2019 strmedv

17/18

How To Study Medieval Philosophy 337t ions to the actual interpretation of th e texts. Only after this interpretation hasbeen completed, shall we be in a position to judge of the value,2 of the truth2 ofour medieval philosophy. For th e t ime being, it is good policy to suspend ourjudgment and to learn2 from our great teachers.50 For there are many important'lessons which modem man can learn only from pre-modem, from un-modemthinkers.

NOTES

1 . Word added in pencil.2. Underlining added in pencil.3. Sentence added in pencil.4. "interpretation'' added in pencil to replace "procedure" which has been crossed out.5. "of supplied by th e editors: a word has been lost where a corner of a page has been torn

off.6. The brackets in which this passage is enclosed were added in pencil. There was apparently

also a word or note of explanation supplied in th e margin , all but an unintelligible portion of whichwas on th e page-comer which has been lost (see note 5).

7. The words "on th e other hand" following "understanding" have been crossed out.8. "an earlierphilosopher"dded in pencil to replace "Maimonides e.g."which has been

crossed out.9. Brackets have been placed in pencil around "that"; th e alternative "such a" has been written

above th e line in pencil.10. "typical" has been added, or perhaps substituted, above th e line.11 . The words "judgment, taste, and"after "imagination" have been crossed out.12. "haunt" replaces "abode" which replaced "domicile"; both "abode" and "domicile" have

been crossed out.13. This entire paragraph was added (on a separate sheet) in pencil for insertion after th e end of

th e preceding paragraph, either as a part of that paragraph or, as we have it, as a separate paragraph. It was not included in the previously published version of th e lecture.

14. "only with difficulty can he" added in pencil to replace "h e can hardly" which has beencrossed out.

15. "His" added in pencil to replace "The" which has been crossed out.16. "provided he was not muddle-headed"added in pencil.17. A note has been attached to th is sentence or paragraph and added in pencil at th e bottom of

th e page , as follows: "Application to sociological interpretation: it is an attempt to understand th epast better than it understood itself it has its merits but it is not historical understanding in th eprecise sense of th e term."

18. "to speak less paradoxically"added in pencil.19. "that" added by the editors to replace "what" in th e te x t.20. A comma after only h as b een deleted by th e editors.21. "Now" added in pencil to replace "But" which has been crossed out.22. "view" added in pencil to replace "assertion" which has been crossed out.23. The brackets in which this passage is enclosed were added in pencil and an arrow has been

drawn from th e last word preceding th e brackets to th e first word following t h em.24. "to leave things at" added in pencil.25. Dr. Fradkin, to whom we owe th e transliteration of th e Hebrew in th e text, informs us that

th e meaning is "Ben Zoma is stilloutside,"phrase from th e Babylonian Talmud (Hagigah 15a)

that is quoted by Maimonides in the Guide (III51).26. "to a certain extent"dded in pencil.27. "than that" added by th e editors.

7/27/2019 strmedv

18/18

338 Interpretation28 . The brackets in which this sentence is enclosed were added in pencil.29. "and" added by th e editors to replace "or" in th e text.30 . The brackets in which this passage is enclosed were added in pencil.31. The sentence, "Such a study is even more exciting than the reading in a first class historicaldictionary" following "them" has been crossed out.32. The words , "(nomina sunt odiosa)"following "scholars" have been crossed out.33. The word "between" following "theology" has been crossed out.34. The word in th e text was originally "habitude"; "ude" has been crossed out.35. The brackets in which this paragraph is enclosed were added in pencil.36 . "most" added in pencil to replace "all" which has been crossed out.37. The words " w ith th e exception of Schleiermacher and Salomon Munk" following "know"

have been crossed out.38 . "a s a matter ofprinciple'dded in pencil to replace " to begin with"which has been crossed

out.39. "Thomas" added in pencil to replace "he" which has been crossed out.40. "is

explicitly"added in pencil to replace "claims to

be"which has been crossed out.41. Above th e line containing th e words "i t opens in th e form of which have not been crossed

out, an alternative has been written in pencil: "Its first chapters look like".42 . At this point an alternative is added in pencil above th e line: "(a midrash)"43. At this point th e following is added in pencil above th e line: "which verse'44 . "That" added in pencil to replace "The" which has been crossed out.45. Above "as" which has not been crossed out, an alternative has been written in pencil: "so"46 . The word "the" has been replaced by "this" by crossing out "e" and adding "is" in pencil

above th e line.47. "of added in pencil to replace "to" which has been crossed out.48. The words "w e are in" following "that" have been crossed out.49 . Bracke ts have been placed in pencil around "our medieval"; th e alternative "earlier" has

been written above th e line in pencil.50 . "our great teachers" added in pencil to replace "them" which has been crossed out.