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Strong Implementation of Social Choice Functions in Dominant Strategies Clemens Thielen Sven O. Krumke 3rd International Workshop on Computational Social Choice 15 September 2010 [email protected]

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Page 1: Strong Implementation of Social Choice Functions in Dominant Strategies Clemens ThielenSven O. Krumke 3rd International Workshop on Computational Social

Strong Implementation of Social Choice Functions in Dominant Strategies

Clemens Thielen Sven O. Krumke

3rd International Workshop on Computational Social Choice

15 September 2010

[email protected]

Page 2: Strong Implementation of Social Choice Functions in Dominant Strategies Clemens ThielenSven O. Krumke 3rd International Workshop on Computational Social

Problem Definition

Social choice setting with private information:

n jobs j 1; : : : ; j n with processing requirements p1; : : :;pn ¸ 0n jobs j 1; : : : ; j n

Strong Implementability

Page 3: Strong Implementation of Social Choice Functions in Dominant Strategies Clemens ThielenSven O. Krumke 3rd International Workshop on Computational Social

Mechanisms

Types

Bids

Social Choices

.

.

.

Mechanism:

.

.

.

strategy α1

strategy αn

g

Strong Implementability

Agent 1

Agent n

Page 4: Strong Implementation of Social Choice Functions in Dominant Strategies Clemens ThielenSven O. Krumke 3rd International Workshop on Computational Social

Utilities and Equilibria

Definition:

Strong Implementability

• •

valuation of the output

payment obtained

Page 5: Strong Implementation of Social Choice Functions in Dominant Strategies Clemens ThielenSven O. Krumke 3rd International Workshop on Computational Social

Utilities and Equilibria

Strong Implementability

• •

Definition:

Definition:

Page 6: Strong Implementation of Social Choice Functions in Dominant Strategies Clemens ThielenSven O. Krumke 3rd International Workshop on Computational Social

Strong Implementation

Definition:

Strong Implementability

Page 7: Strong Implementation of Social Choice Functions in Dominant Strategies Clemens ThielenSven O. Krumke 3rd International Workshop on Computational Social

Strong Implementability Problem

The Strong Implementability Problem:

Strong Implementability

Encoding length:

Page 8: Strong Implementation of Social Choice Functions in Dominant Strategies Clemens ThielenSven O. Krumke 3rd International Workshop on Computational Social

Augmented Revelation Mechanisms

Strong Implementability

Definition:

Augmented Revelation Principle:[Mookherjee, Reichelstein 1990]

„incentive compatibility“

Page 9: Strong Implementation of Social Choice Functions in Dominant Strategies Clemens ThielenSven O. Krumke 3rd International Workshop on Computational Social

Previous Results

Strong Implementability

Page 10: Strong Implementation of Social Choice Functions in Dominant Strategies Clemens ThielenSven O. Krumke 3rd International Workshop on Computational Social

Previous Results (2)

Strong Implementability

Page 11: Strong Implementation of Social Choice Functions in Dominant Strategies Clemens ThielenSven O. Krumke 3rd International Workshop on Computational Social

Our Results

Strong Implementability

Page 12: Strong Implementation of Social Choice Functions in Dominant Strategies Clemens ThielenSven O. Krumke 3rd International Workshop on Computational Social

Augmented Revelation Principle

Strong Implementability

Augmented Revelation Principle:[Mookherjee, Reichelstein 1990]

Augmented Revelation Principle for Dominant Strategies:[this paper]

Page 13: Strong Implementation of Social Choice Functions in Dominant Strategies Clemens ThielenSven O. Krumke 3rd International Workshop on Computational Social

General Idea (I)

Strong Implementability

To obtain an augmented revelation mechanism:•

Definition:

see definition to follow soon

Page 14: Strong Implementation of Social Choice Functions in Dominant Strategies Clemens ThielenSven O. Krumke 3rd International Workshop on Computational Social

Selective Elimination

Strong Implementability

agent i

SN

¹s1

¹s2

Page 15: Strong Implementation of Social Choice Functions in Dominant Strategies Clemens ThielenSven O. Krumke 3rd International Workshop on Computational Social

Selective Elimination

Strong Implementability

Page 16: Strong Implementation of Social Choice Functions in Dominant Strategies Clemens ThielenSven O. Krumke 3rd International Workshop on Computational Social

Bad Pairs and Elimination Definition:

Definition:

Definition:

Strong Implementability

Page 17: Strong Implementation of Social Choice Functions in Dominant Strategies Clemens ThielenSven O. Krumke 3rd International Workshop on Computational Social

Two Important Steps

Theorem 2 (selective elimination is necessary):

Theorem 3 (selective elimination is sufficient):

Strong Implementability

Page 18: Strong Implementation of Social Choice Functions in Dominant Strategies Clemens ThielenSven O. Krumke 3rd International Workshop on Computational Social

Structure of the Algorithm

guess

guess

verify

Theorem 3 + close look at the proof

Definition of selective elimination

Strong Implementability

Page 19: Strong Implementation of Social Choice Functions in Dominant Strategies Clemens ThielenSven O. Krumke 3rd International Workshop on Computational Social

The Verification

Strong Implementability

General Approach:

Main Observation:

Page 20: Strong Implementation of Social Choice Functions in Dominant Strategies Clemens ThielenSven O. Krumke 3rd International Workshop on Computational Social

The Payment Polyhedron

Strong Implementability

Page 21: Strong Implementation of Social Choice Functions in Dominant Strategies Clemens ThielenSven O. Krumke 3rd International Workshop on Computational Social

The Payment Polyhedron (I)

Strong Implementability

Inequalities encode which bids are dominant bids.

Incentive compatibili

ty&

dominant bids

Page 22: Strong Implementation of Social Choice Functions in Dominant Strategies Clemens ThielenSven O. Krumke 3rd International Workshop on Computational Social

The Payment Polyhedron (II)

Strong Implementability

Inequalities encode conditions of selective elimination

Page 23: Strong Implementation of Social Choice Functions in Dominant Strategies Clemens ThielenSven O. Krumke 3rd International Workshop on Computational Social

The Payment Polyhedron (II)

Strong Implementability

Inequalities encode conditions of selective elimination

Page 24: Strong Implementation of Social Choice Functions in Dominant Strategies Clemens ThielenSven O. Krumke 3rd International Workshop on Computational Social

Verification Issues

Strong Implementability

Here I am!

Page 25: Strong Implementation of Social Choice Functions in Dominant Strategies Clemens ThielenSven O. Krumke 3rd International Workshop on Computational Social

Verification Issues

We have to handle strict inequalities.To do so, we must find a point in the

relative interior of the polyhedron.This can be done by means of the

Ellipsoid Method (directly) or by solving a sequence of LPs.

Byproduct: Payments are of polynomial encoding length.

Strong Implementability

Page 26: Strong Implementation of Social Choice Functions in Dominant Strategies Clemens ThielenSven O. Krumke 3rd International Workshop on Computational Social

Conclusion

Strong Implementability in dominant strategiesÎNP

Characterization result generalizes to infinite type spaces

Open: Is the problem in P?

Useful(?) results:◦ Augmented Revelation Principle◦ Selective elimination procedure with polynomially many

steps◦ Payments of polynomial encoding size

Strong Implementability

NP-complete

!

Page 27: Strong Implementation of Social Choice Functions in Dominant Strategies Clemens ThielenSven O. Krumke 3rd International Workshop on Computational Social

Thank you!

Strong Implementability