Running Head Structural Change

Maya Shatzmiller

The University of Western Ontario, Canada

STRUCTURAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE ISLAMIC

MIDDLE EAST 700-1500: POPULATION LEVELS AND PROPERTY RIGHTS

Abstract

In recent years, blamed Islamic institutions, Islamic law and culture, for the current

underdevelopment of the Middle East. According to European economic historians Islamic

institutions were, and are, ‘growth retarding’, ‘averse to change’, ‘path dependent’, ‘lacking

creative destruction’, ‘extractive’ rather than ‘inclusive’. This paper challenges this view by

pointing to its unhistorical methodology and nonfactual assessment of Islamic institutions. Two

changes in economic structures are investigated empirically and methodologically. The first, a

demographic transition, a shift from high to low population level, the second, a change in

property rights regime from common to individual. The paper argues that Islamic institutions,

legal, cultural and economic, enabled these structural changes to exercise their potential as

growth stimulators.

I. Introduction: Concept and Methodology in the Investigation of structural change and

economic development of the Middle East

Economists know what blocks economic development in the contemporary Middle East:

lack of support of intellectual freedoms, lack of the rule of law, lack of citizenship rights, lack of

entrepreneurship and markets, as well as lack of attention to the multitude of national

experiences are obstacles to economic development. Yet, the science of economics has still to

deliver a remedy to what ails the Middle East, while economic history has not been very helpful

either by supplementing the past for the present. Although the literature has certainly grown in

recent years from a trickle to a torrent, somehow all historical studies end with the same

conclusion: Islamic economic institutions were, and are, inefficient and growth retarding, averse

to change, path dependent, lacking ‘creative destruction’, ‘extractive’ rather than ‘inclusive’.

Whether it is done through the lenses of the New Institutional Economics, (NIE), or economics

of religion, or the economics of culture, or yet the economics of minorities and ethnicity, all that

economic historians could do is continue to embrace the belittling spirit of the 19th century

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philosophers: poverty, underdevelopment, decline and lack of progress is “Islamic” in nature. 1

European economic historians concluded that the failure of the contemporary Middle East have

its roots in the failure of past Islamic economic institutions.

All the while, investigation of Middle East economic history is using a skewed

methodology. Economic historians writing on the Middle East use a basic second-hand general

narrative of the Middle East, and apply to it the most sophisticated theoretical and quantitative

approaches in their arsenal. In all fairness, some European historians are aware of the faulty

methodology, “Many explanations for Europe’s rise and the Islamic world’s stagnation have

been posited in the largely narrative, theoretical economic history literature… “attempts to

empirically back up these hypotheses are few.” 2 Surely, the lack of empirical evidence in these

accounts, coupled with disregard and careless misinterpretation of data to suite a preconceived

idea, will not be tolerated in other circumstances. Surely, economic history journals will never

publish articles employing such flawed methodology in the investigation of Europe’s economic

history! Both the concept and the methodology of this approach are ill conceived. It is scholarly

dishonest and frankly harmful to blame medieval institutions for causing contemporary

economic backwardness by being incompatible with economic growth. Worst, it is factually

incorrect. As this paper will demonstrate, nothing is further from what the evidence suggests.

Islamic economic institutions were formed during a period of economic resurgence, they did not

inhibit a dynamic growth process and instead, contributed, facilitated and enhanced growth. An

empirically based investigation of changes in economic structures concurrent with the

Islamization and Arab settlement of the Middle East demonstrate the point. These were changes

in population levels and a transition to low fertility rate, and a structural change to property

rights, from common to individual property rights.

Before presenting the evidence, a few general comments are warranted. The backdrop to

this paper is a Middle East economic resurgence attested to through economic indicators of

change, to which I drew attention in previous publications. These indicators include changes to

labour and technology,3 and to urbanization and the monetary system.4 There were geo-political

1 There is no point nor room here to revisit this material. I reviewed the literature and the

arguments in previous occasions. Shatzmiller, 2011 and Shatzmiller, 2018a.

2 Bosker, Buringh and Van Zanden, 2013, p. 1419:

3 Shatzmiller, 1994

4 Shatzmiller, 2017a.

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economic advantages that benefited the economy that came with the new Islamic rule and

delayed resurgence in ninth-thirteenth century Europe. 5 Thanks to series of standardizations, the

benefit of the structural changes that took place in the centre, in the Middle East, travelled

quickly to the rest of the Arab Empire. There, in Iberia, North Africa and the lands to the North

East, economic institutions and tools facilitated resurgence in the provinces. Interaction between

the center and the peripheries was enhanced and enhancing, something that their European

contemporaries, the Carolingians, could not achieve.6 Local pools of knowledge also survived

better in the Middle East than in Europe, enhancing technological innovations. The.

standardizations in religious expressions, language, script, literacy tools, weights and measures

and law, made transaction technology more efficient and growth accommodating. Early change

that occurred in the regions known for higher agricultural productivity, Iraq and Egypt, generated

higher incomes, more demand for consumer goods and new preferences in food and clothing and

benefitted manufacturing and trade. 7 These were instrumental in the Smithian growth that was

visible in the eleventh century.

Technology and rational economic decisions are one aspect painfully missing from the

debate about the Islamic institutions. Like Europe, the regions conquered by the Arabs were not

unfamiliar with technological achievements of previous generations. Some regions of the Middle

East were previously incorporated into the Roman empire while other benefitted from

technological developments under the Sasanians, such as development in irrigation techniques,

for example. The regions to the North-East that fell to Islam, were linked through the silk trade

routes to technological innovations from China and plants from India. Traders brought their

financial instruments and knowledge of calculation with them. The translation movement of

Greek sciences to Arabic in the ninth century confirmed the existence not only of a society,

culturally rich and technology savvy but also the availability of investigative tools. Christians,

Jews and pagans transmitted pool of theoretical knowledge that encouraged technological

innovation, and with no church dogma to interfere with knowledge acquisition Muslims from all

regions engaged in scientific investigation. Indeed, technological innovation picked up early and

everywhere. As early as the end of the 8th for example, technology of houseware production

5 Persson and Sharp, 2015.

6 For the Carolingians and Islam, Sénac, 2006.

7 On technological innovations in agriculture, Watson, 1983.

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changed with a switch from the use of mineral alkali to plant ashes in glass and soap making.

Plants readily available at the desert margin, the Arabic ushnān, replaced the alkali needed as

flux in the glass production and were cheaper than the minerals and lowered the melting

temperature thus cutting production costs. 8 The discovery of Arabic paper, making paper from

cheaply available linen rags, made paper cheaper, available for use in writing and accounting. 9

As will be argued below, much of the technological innovation was a response to chronic labour

shortages in the Middle East, although the same conditions in medieval Europe did not yet delays

in Europe were blamed on the failure to retrieve and advance technological legacy.10

Making rational economic decisions is an integral part of economic growth, and

capitalism did not leave the Mediterranean with the end of the Roman Empire. The Umayyad

administration’s intervened to ensure that the mints in the conquered regions did not shut down

and continued to function, contributing to the maintenance of monetary circulation and increase

money supply.11 The Samanid administration’s decision to develop the rich silver mines under

their control in tenth century Uzbekistan and North-Eastern Iran, was instrumental in forcing

trade to pass through their territories. Using their geographic advantages to develop an economic

edge over Baghdad through their superior coinage, they forced traders to exchange their goods

through their cities.12 The shift in trade routes benefitted the mining industry and favoured

commercialization. Urbanization picked up steam drawing labour from the countryside and a

new class of artisans emerged. Rise in agricultural productivity fuelled by technological

innovation, efficient labour markets and manufacturing, growth in human capital made the

service industry grow accordingly.13 Not all changes were beneficial to economic development.

Land ownership, for instance, remained with the central government and did not become free

private in spite of individual property rights. Peasants and farmers in Egypt, for instance, did not

8 The alchemist Jābir ibn Hayyān d. probably 815 who was identified by Sarton as the introducer

of manganese dioxide as colourant. Heidemann, 2006, p. 35.

9 Shatzmiller, 2018b.

10 Comparative discussion of growth in Findaly & Lundahl. The revival of the Roman heavy

plough, Andersen et al. 2016.

11 Walmsley, 2010. “…the remarkable feature of coin production in the 7th-8th centuries was the

multiplication of towns that minted coins when compared to late Roman practices,” p. 23.

12 See al-Muqaddasi, 1994, p. 285 for analysis of the goods coming from the North-East into

Baghdad. We are comparatively well informed on mining technology and production. See

Morony, 2019; Power, 2012; Rosenberger, 1970.

13 Shatzmiller, 1994, 2013.

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own their land, a pattern that endured until the 19th century, “Since land could normally not be

bought and sold, nor leased or pledged, there was no market price of land and no market rental of

land services.” 14 Peasants property rights were limited to cultivate a particular piece of land in

their village. Disruptive factors were political and included Bedouin invasions, ambitious

renegade military officers, local urban factions.

Throughout the discussion of structural changes in the early medieval Middle East

economic theory is present by its use in the analysis of the empirical evidence of economic

development in comparative studies. For example, it is central to the first structural change in the

demographics to conceptualize it as Malthusianism. Bruce Campbell offered a useful

comparative context to the question of why population level provides only a temporary relief

from Malthusian equilibrium and post-Malthusian recovery, so that discussing the Middle East

using its methodological approach and investigative framework is beneficial. 15 We use the

literature to argue that post-Malthusian population growth and growth theory clarify the

uniqueness of the Middle East in this respect. Most societies with post-Malthusian economic

growth episodes failed in exiting Malthusian regime, so it is essential to show how the Middle

East differed. Our quantitative data is insufficient to follow or be inserted into the European data

but we do employ quantitative methodologies in a different environment, relying instead on more

qualitative evidence. In the end, much depends on our ability to properly understand and

interpret the significance of the demographic transition.

II. Population Level and Demographic Transition

Middle East population estimates vary considerably, whether we talk about the total of

the Arab Empire, or of an individual region. 16 For example, estimates for Egypt, the region with

the best available data, present a blurred picture:

POPULATION ESTIMATES FOR EGYPT 800-1000

14 That was going to remain a pattern in Egypt. Hansen, 1983, p. 475.

15 Malthus, 1976; On the classic Malthusian regime, and Neo-Malthusian theories, Abramitzky

and Braggion, 2004. On Malthusian trap in growth episodes, North, 1981, pp. 69-186; Livi-

Bacci, 2012, pp. 82-105. In the Neolithic and Industrial revolutions, Cipolla, 1962, pp.17-32;

Allen, 2001. In growth theory, Galor and Weil, 2000. On Medieval Europe’s long period of

population decline, Persson and Sharp, 2015, p. 33.

16 Findlay and Lundahl, 2006, provide a useful summary.

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We rely on estimates from three studies devoted to the demographics: the canonical articles by

Russell, 17 the Atlas of world population by McEvedy and Jones,18 and an article by Issawi.19

These were used and discussed by Findlay and Lundahl authors of a seminal paper on the impact

of the plague on economic development.20 As can be seen from the chart it is impossible to

derive a conclusive demographic trend for Egypt, or the Middle East for that matter based on

these estimates. Our analysis of the demographic trajectory of the medieval Middle East will take

the estimates into consideration but in conjunction with an independent empirical body of

qualitative and qualitative evidence as well as theory. I present the evidence in four sections, the

first establishes a pre-Islamic Malthusian phase in the Middle East with a sixth century peak in

cultivation and settlement expansion. The second section explores the stages of population

decline, beginning with the first visitation of the bubonic plague in 541, followed by plague

recurrences. The third, deals with the early labour shortages and the administration attempts to

alleviate them. Settlement priorities, calling for immigration and slave imports, were the policies

used. The fourth section deals with the adoption of voluntary birth control by Muslims and

suggests that it was already in reaction to the resulting economic benefits, such as raised incomes

and rising expectations. It will be argued here that our evidence suggests a trend of from high to

low with the ninth century recovery that due to various reproductive strategies kept population in

check. As a result, post-Malthusian gains were maintained.

17 Russell, 1958, 1966, 1972,

18 McEvedy and Jones, 1978

19 Issawi, 1981

20 Fidlay and Lundahl, 2006.

0

1,000,000

2,000,000

3,000,000

4,000,000

5,000,000

6,000,000

Russell M&J Issawi

800 A.D 1000 A.D

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Egypt’s population estimates were used here because Egypt played a significant role in

the economic recovery of the Middle East after the plague, but also because Egypt as well as Iraq

have settlement patterns that easily show expansion and retraction. The picture derived from

archeological studies we can see that both Egypt and Iraq experienced a Malthusian a peak in the

sixth century. 21 Both regions experienced a remarkable expansion in the cultivated area, in

settlement, cities and villages, with every land surface suitable cultivated and an urban economy

to boot. Wars, famines, diseases, earthquakes and climate change, the usual of positive checks,

were manifested as well.22 While a Malthusian phase is easier to demonstrate through archeology

in the two-river irrigated agricultural economies, it is more complicated in the case of Syria-

Palestine. There agriculture is typically Mediterranean, based on rain fed grains and hills planted

with olive trees and wines and population that is more sparsely located.23 Yet, even in Arabia,

which is even less susceptible to archeology, demographers believe that a Malthusian crisis

occurred there as well before the Islamic conquest of the Middle East.24

Despite the doubts expressed by historians of Late Antiquity about the severity of the

Justinian plague, the literary evidence pointing to a major population decline is undeniable after

the first visitation of 541.25 With the scientific confirmation of the strain found in the Middle

East as a Bubonic plague, the absence of mass graves is non-consequential.26 The population

continued to decline with plague recurrences visiting the now Islamic Middle East, labour

shortages became a major preoccupation of the administration. It is estimated that between the

seventh and the ninth centuries the Middle East lost about 50% of its population.27 The numbers

below illustrate the severity of the impact.

Table 1

Number of Plague Victims sixth-ninth century

21 Adams, 1965 for Iraq; Alston, 2001 for Egypt.

22 Morony, 2004, p. 172-175.

23 Fuks and al. 2017 with extensive bibliography.

24 Pellat, 1971. McEvedy and Jones, 1978, pp. 144-148.

25 On the Justinian Plague and recurrences in the Middle East see Conrad, 1981a and 1981b.

McCormick, 2019. Compare Jongman, 2011 for Rome; Jordan, 1996 for pre-plague France.

Findaly and Lundhal, 2006; Pamuk and Shatzmiller, 2014.

26 Wagner et al. 2014. http://www.thelancet.com/journals/laninf/article/PIIS1473-

3099(13)70323-2/abstract?_eventId=login#back-cor1

http://www.theguardian.com/science/2014/jan/28/plague-victims-shed-light-disease-origins

27 On the Justinian Plague and recurrences in the Middle East see Conrad, 1981a and 1981b.

McCormick, 2019.

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Date (C.E.) Estimated No. of Deaths Location

541-543 5,000-16,000/day Constantinople

541-543 majority of population Egypt

541-543

Entire villages and towns

depopulated Palestine

557-558 35,000 in three months Amida

Mid 6th-Mid 8th c

Population repeatedly

decimated Levant

743-744 600,000 in one month Bostra and Hawran

743-744 100,000 Mesopotamia

773-774 1,000/day

Lower Mesopotamia

(Mawsil)

841-843 500/day Ramla

841-843 Many villages deserted

Mesopotamia to Syria and the

coast

841-843 1/3 of population Palestine

Source: Morony, 2007.

Given Malthusian pressure in Arabia and population decline in the Middle East it is

understandable that settlement began even before the conquest was completed. Soldiers were

told to settle in Iraq as early as 636 and other immigrants from Arabia were directed to settle in

cities, first in the garrison cities of Kūfa and Basra, and in 640 ordered all the way up to

Mawsil.28 In Egypt, where the Muslim administration prohibited the settlement of soldiers, the

need for manpower was unrelenting. Between 641 and 776 the government tried to redress the

shortage of labour by returning fugitives to their villages and forcing land tenure on them.

Bedouin tribes’ who migrated first to Syria, were sent to Egypt in 673. 29 Similar evidence of

government’s involvement in settlement comes from the Northern frontier, where the Umayyad

administration continued the policy of settling Arab soldiers in garrison cities, ribāts, along the

28 Morony, 1981; Lapidus, 1981.

29 Sijpesteijn, 2013, p. 7.

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Byzantine frontier, the thughūr.30 In 717 the Umayyad Caliph cUmar II issued a call for

immigration to the Arabian tribes:

“The Prophet has said, the gate of emigration, (al-higra), should be opened to all the

people of al-Islam… we open it up to whosoever may emigrate of the Bedouin, and who sells his

cattle and removes from his Bedouin abode to the abode of emigration…”31

The invitation extended by the new Islamic state to immigrants to come to the Middle

East is similar to what we would expect on basis of migration theory, naming the State as

‘labour-recruiter’, and using the ‘push-pull’ theory. 32The ‘push’ factors, the demographic

pressure at home, the lack of resources in the desert already lacking resources, the low income

and low living standards, the lack of economic opportunities, were all typical of societies that

engage in migration. The Middle East displays the ‘pull’ factors as well, demand for labour,

availability of land, good economic opportunities, all offered by the new location.

The government did not stop there. With natural growth flattened by plague recurrences,

and demand for manpower in both rural and urban areas constant, import of slaves may have

presented a potential solution to labour shortages. Provenance was a logistic hurdle, though.

Slaves in sufficient numbers could only come from regions unaffected by the plague, namely

Black Africa, Central Asia, and North-Eastern Europe. 33 Indeed, the Arabic sources are very

clear as to provenance of the slaves, those referred to as saqāliba, reflect a Slavonic origin,

different from generic slaves, ‘abd, or Black slaves, Zanj, or Turkic slaves, Atrāk.34 Estimates of

the number of slaves arriving in the Middle East between 650-1500 are for 6 million from Africa

and several millions from central Asia.35 However, their impact on labour markets remained

limited. Only two episodes in the Arabic sources refer to slaves in agricultural labour for the

entire medieval period. The first involved Black slaves in Iraq, the Zanj, the other, slaves in

30 Ager, 2008; von Sivers, 1982. The pattern of the Ribāt settlement is also known from Islamic

Central Asia. de la Vaissière, 2008.

31 Gibb, 1955.

32 Castles and Miller, 1998, pp. 19-47 for survey of the literature.

33 On these and related aspects of medieval slavery, Fynn-Paul, 2009. On slave imports in the

Middle East, Amitai and Cluse, eds. 2017.

34 McCormick, 2001, p. 737, n. 44 and pp. 738-740. The Slav/slave etymology, which

McCormick traced to the ninth century, surfaced in Arabic at the same time

35 Clarence-Smith, 2006. pp. 11-16.

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North Africa.36 European historians overstated the impact and role of an assumed slaves’ imports

from Western Europe to the Middle East crediting Muslims with the abolishment of slavery in

Europe and the end of gold coinage. None of this is substantiated by the Arabic sources.37

Military slavery in Islam is better represented in the sources and better investigated and

understood. 38 Recruiting soldiers as slaves which began by the Abbasid state as early as the

eighth century remained the only kind of slave recruitment undertaken by the State, the rest was

left in private hands. Turning military slaves to rulers in Egypt and Syria, thirteenth-sixteenth

century was a transformation in political structures.

As far as labour markets were concerned, slaves prices were determined by supply and

demand. Our data shows that slaves prices were high in the early centuries of Islamic rule but

declined afterwards signaling rising availability of local labour with population recovery. The

graph below demonstrates the trend.

Slaves Prices Seventh to Thirteenth Century in Gold Dinars

Source: Ashtor, 1969; Ragheb, 2002

We derive confirmation of the demographic trajectory we paint also from evidence of the trend

in wheat prices in Egypt. Egypt was the major wheat producer of the Mediterranean during

36 Popovic, 1976, Talbi, 1981.

37 Duby, 1974; McCormick, 2002 on the role of Islamic slave traders but see the paucity of

evidence for trade relations beyween Carolingian Europe and the Middle East in Sénac, 2006.

38 On early military slavery, Crone, 1980; Pipes, 1981, Gordon, 2001.

0

50

100

150

200

7th 8th 9th 10th 11th 12th 13th

Pri

ce

Century

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Roman and Byzantine periods, so that the low prices during the first two centuries of Islamic rule

is indicative of low demand due to low population levels. With population recovery in the ninth

century, wheat prices began to rise, reaching a peak between the tenth-twelfth century.39

Wheat prices in Egypt 7th-13th century in Gold Dinars

Slaves do not appear on records as employed in manufacturing either and instead most

were involved in domestic service. As slavery in Islam became a one generation institution,

slaves did not reproduce in sufficient numbers to maintain the slave population. Their impact on

population levels occurred mainly through a lenient manumission mechanism. Islamic law

prohibited the enslavement of Muslims and encouraged their conversion and manumission once

in the abode of Islam. Manumission of one’s slaves was recommended as a charitable act, and

manumission documents commonly surface in the archives. 40 A slave ‘mother’, umm walad,

who bore a child to her master, would become free with her child, which meant that many

females were manumitted while young and in child bearing years. The practice stands in contrast

to the practice in Rome, where female slaves were not manumitted before they reached

menopause.41 Military slaves, as in the case of the Mamluk slaves of Egypt, whose numbers are

estimated in the tens of thousands, transitioned automatically as a group into Islam and freedom

and were subsequently incorporated into society.42

39 More on wheat prices in Egypt in Shatzmiller, 2018 and in Iraq in Shatzmiller, 2017a.

40 On manumission of slaves when held in partnership, Udovitch, 1970, pp. 113-115.

41 Scheidel, 1997.

42 Ayalon, 1985.

0

0.01

0.02

0.03

0.04

0.05

7th 8th 9th 10th 11th 12th 13th

Pri

ce

Century

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The most significant factor that played a role in maintaining low population levels in the

long-run, was the practice of voluntary birth control. The practice was thoroughly documented

by Basim Musallam in his book on the subject published in 1983. 43 His evidence is qualitative

but thorough and comprehensive, covering law, medicine, chronicles, and Arabic prose. 44 It

shows that ‘coitus interruptus’ or cazl, appeared early, that it was legally sanctioned and

authorized by the jurists of all schools, and that couples practiced it because they wanted to

avoid hardship to themselves and have children with better opportunities. 45 Musallam

convincingly argued that cazl, placed the responsibility for birth control on males, but noted that

the agreement of the wife was required to protect the rights of women to children. 46 He also

believes that the practice was associated with the Black Death being the epitome of ‘bad times’,

‘by which civilized people reacted to the political upheavals, insecurities in the cities and the

countryside’. Thus, in spite of its early mentions in hadiths, Musallam concluded that the

practice was a later occurrence, an outcome of the horrors of the Black Death and was specific to

Egypt and Syria.47 However, Musallam’s suggestion is challenged by the evidence itself. The

practice is discussed in the earliest traditions, the hadiths, in details in the early legal sources,

and appears in a final codified version in Islamic law, sharīca, complete by the 9th-10th centuries.

It is therefore most likely that the ‘bad times’ Muslims referred to were those caused by the

Justinian plague recurrences, not the Black Death and that when the Black Death appeared, the

practice was already well established. 48

It is nonetheless correct that the evidence we have of small families dates from the

fourteenth century, and that because of the proximity to the Black Death, needs to be treated with

caution. Probate inventories dating from 1390-1393 Mamluk Jerusalem revealed that the city had

a high rate of unmarried single women, divorced and widowed individuals and that statistically

58% of males and females had no children. 49 Huda Lutfi concluded that “Small families seem to

have been more common than larger ones. David Powers also found small families in fourteenth

43 Musallam, 1983.

44 Musallam, p. 109 and pp. 115-121.

45 Compare Blanc, 2019 for Europe.

46 Musallam, 1981, pp. 28-38 on the rights of women.

47 Musallam, 1983, pp.105-121.

48 Musallam, 1983.

49 Lutfi, 1985.

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century North Africa, “No family had more than three children and the average number of

children per family was 1,6.”50 Archival documents from 15th century Granada, dealing with

estate division also show small families, with one or two siblings inheriting. 51 Middle East

demographers noted the presence of small families in the medieval Middle East and drew the

following conclusions. Russell suggested that the average family in Egypt was about 3.5

persons,52 a number endorsed by Michael Dols as the average size of medieval household of 3,5

after the plague. 53 Lutfi concluded that “it was more common for families who had children to

have 1 or 2 rather than 3 or 4 so the average household is 2,7 which is lower than the 3,5 average

that Russell estimated for a medieval family.” 54 Two surviving children per urban household

may seem low to the modern observer but in view of what we know about voluntary birth

control, in addition to the levels of infant mortality in the urban areas of the medieval Middle

East, two children per couple, appears to be a reasonable number. There is no way to know how

effective was the practice. It might have been as ineffective as the array of herbs and potions

suggested by the medical literature to prevent conception, or the “taboos, infanticide, and various

other means”, suggested by North.55 This is not to distract from the weight of the evidence

collected by Musallam nor from the conclusion that may be drawn. We can now add new

evidence of rising standards of living and rising household income as additional plausible

reasons for the practice.

Both growth theory and comparative studies, postulate that the presence of higher

incomes, higher living standards, human capital and growing expectations, need to be considered

reasons for the practice of voluntary birth control. Becker and Galor suggest that in households

with higher incomes and standards of living, parents would opt to have fewer children in favor of

‘better ones’ that could benefit from higher education and better remuneration. 56 The rise in

living standards in the medieval Middle East, as well as the rise and spread of education and

literacy, is evidence that cannot be disregarded as support to the practise. We are able now to

50 Powers, 1990, p. 241.

51 Shatzmiller, 2007, pp. 1-6. Kedar’s and estimate of household of 8 is untenable

52 Russell, 1965, p. 72.

53 Dols, 1981, p. 402; Musallam, 1983, pp. 106-107

54 Lutfi, 1985, p. 256

55 North, 1981, p.85.

56 Becker, 1960; Galor, 2011; Livi-Bacci, 2012, pp. 34-41.

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quantitatively substantiate an assumed rise in incomes and in living standards in the early e

Middle East in the aftermath of the Plague and recurrences. 57 Wages paid to unskilled labour in

Iraq and Egypt were two or three times the subsistence level during the eighth-tenth centuries,

but when compared to wages paid to skilled labour, they appear minimal. they show clearly that

employers paid a skill premium to the like of teachers, astronomers, physicians. The Table

below, while somewhat dramatic and likely based on exaggerated reports by the chroniclers,

demonstrate the range of the skill premium in eighth-tenth centuries Iraq, where a community of

scholars flourished. Concentration of scholars explains the intellectual achievements, like the

translation of Greek sciences and codification of Islamic law. The Chart below demonstrates.

Average wage of skilled and unskilled labour in Iraq Eighth-Tenth Century (Dinars/Day)

Source: Ashtor, 1969; Pamuk and Shatzmiller, 2014. 58

The skill premium paid to the ‘intellectuals’ corresponded to the rise in educational

institutions, libraries, academies, madrasas, mosques, in itself a response to the demands of the

growing needs of courts and administration for literate personnel. 59 The migration pattern of the

57 Pamuk and Shatzmiller, 2014.

58 The skilled wages presented a challenge. Five entries produced data standard deviations of

14.52 and 222.61 for the 9th and 10th century respectively (none of the five entries came from the

8th century). Excluding the five entries produced standard deviations of 0.77 and 0.91 for the 9th

and 10th century respectively, closer to the standard deviation of 0.37 for the 8th century.

59 Shatzmiller, 2018.

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

1.2

1.4

8th 9th 10th

Skilled Unskilled

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Arab tribes, namely their preference to settle in the cities, facilitated the standardization of the

Arabic language and its elevation to the status of the language of culture and that of state

institutions. Typically, as standards of living rose so did the expectations of parents and their will

to invest in their children’s education and to limit their number. More support for a long-term

low population level and the maintenance of the post-Malthusian gains comes from the second

structural change, a transition to individual property rights. advances

III. Property Rights and Women’s Empowerment

The transition to individual property rights may have begun in Mecca with the profits

from trade accumulating there and Meccan elites trying to exclude others from sharing in them,

as some have suggested. 60 Once in the Middle East, where land and real estate were held

individually, the transition was completed with the newly codified Islamic law showing well

defined individual property rights. 61 Although the process was not complete and land ownership

in Egypt remained in the hands of the government, private land existed in the other regions such

as Muslim Spain and North Africa. The benefits of property rights to the economy are well

established and include protection of investment, limiting “free riders”, minimizing transaction

costs, and the Islamic Middle East would be no exception. More significant however, was the

change individual property rights brought to women’s legal status and economic involvement. In

the space available here only slim mention of the rich empirical evidence on the changes

available, can be made. It includes evidence on Muslim women’ property rights,62 and on

women’s labour,63 which will allow us to provide a summary.

North argued that a group living in common property rights regime has no interest in

limiting births, unlike a group living in exclusive property rights regime. The group, which

achieved equilibrium between return on fixed resources, will strive to curtail birth through

“taboos, infanticide, and various other means,” 64 The theoretical and the comparative body of

literature on the issue has increased considerably since North, to focus on the role of women’s

60 Ibrahim, 1990.

61 On the formation of Islamic law see papers collected in Hallaq, ed., 2004.

62 Shatzmiller, 2007.

63 Full empirical analysis in Shatzmiller, 1994.

64 North, 1981, 65, 72- 89, quote on p. 85; On North’s interpretation of the economics of

property rights, Galiani and Sened, 2014.

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16

economic empowerment as the motivation behind low fertility rate.65 The literature suggests

three major themes in the debate over women and economic development: females’ role as a

cultural factor, 66 their role in the demographic transition,67 and females’ role in economic

growth. 68 Women earning wages contributed to the two wage earners’ household, whose income

and living standards were higher.69 A household with two wage earners would be more likely to

have fewer children and therefore engage in voluntary birth control. The studies that focus on

post-Malthusian demography have paid increased attention to the changes in women’s income

and their economic empowerment, and female labour played a significant role in the transition. 70

The European model, the EMP, not quite a voluntary birth control, rather an involuntary one,

rationalised lower fertility rate because of women being absent from the hearth for long periods

of time due to their pasture activities. 71 Based on the literature Campbell suggested that it was

indeed the measure that ensured that not all economic gains were eliminated with population

recovery.72

Indeed, women’s property rights in the Islamic law provide a wider social and economic

context for the practice of birth control. Muslim society priorities, expressed through Islamic law

viewed reproductive behaviour as one of the individual’s property rights and women have

identical property rights to those of men. They inherit from all family members and bequeath,

have the right to exclusive ownership and enjoyment of property and income generated through

wage earning. Table 2 presents women’s property rights in the Islamic law in a diagram.

Table 2

Females’ Property Rights in Islamic Law

Right Acquisition Requirement Legal Status

65 Cinnirela, Kemp and Weisdorf, 2017.

66 Alesina, 2013.

67 Voighlander and Voth, 2013.

68Manifested in the debate over women’s wages in England’s Industrial Revolution, Allen, 2011;

rebuttal Humphries and Schneider, 2019.

69 De Moore and Van Zanden, 2010; Voigtländer and Voth, 2013; Livi-Bacci, 38-39

70 Voightländer and Voth, 2009 and 2012; Klemp and Framroze Møller, 2016; De Moore and

Van Zanden, 2010; Van Zanden, 2011. Dennison and Ogilvie, 2014; for dissenting opinions

Greenwood, 2018.

71 EMP and economic growth in De Moore and Van Zanden, 2010; Voigländer and Voth, 2013;

rebuttal Dennison and Ogilvie, 2014.

72 Campbell, 2013.

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17

Receive mandatory gift

(bride price)

Marriage Marriage No forgiveness or

trading is allowed

Receive mandatory

maintenance

Marriage, divorce,

widowhood

Marriage May be traded for

husband’s rights

Inheritance

(mandatory)

Any time Any time No forgiveness or

trading in allowed

Receive gifts Any time Any time Forgiveness option

Earn wages Any time Occasionally husband’s

agreement is required

No forgiveness or

trading-in

Invest (sales, loans) Majority Majority and release

from interdiction

No forgiveness or

trading- in

Gifting Majority Majority and release

from interdiction

At will

Agree to

consummation of

marriage

Marriage Delivery of bride price Taking possession of

the bride price

Agree to birth control Marriage Compensation required Only to free women

Receive payment for

wet nursing

Marriage Husband’s agreement At will

Source: Shatzmiller, 2007.

The significance of the above-mentioned rights means not only that females had the right

to acquire, own and dispose freely of property transferred and acquired through various means,

gift, inheritance, wages, but also, that there was no conjugal property at marriage and no

interference from fathers or husbands. There is plenty of empirical evidence in the literacy

sources to fill in the legal framework with content. 73 A spectrum of women’s trades and

economic activities includes occupations in the manufacturing sectors, especially in textile

production with female monopoly on spinning, and in the service sector, in addition to tasks

performed in the rural sector, harvesting and dairy production. Together with empirical evidence

on women’s labour and female’s attachment to labour markets in the Middle East law and labour

evidence suggest that Muslim household was a two earners household. The challenge remains

providing quantitative evidence to support the claim that women’s property rights in the law

corresponded to ‘real’ economic gains, and secondly that it had a positive impact on economic

development.

To provide reliable quantitative evidence on partial women’s property, we turned to

marriage contracts where the value of payment and property transferred to brides are registered.

73 For details, Shatzmiller, 1988, 1994, pp. 347–353, 1995, 1997, 2007, 2012, 2013.

Structural Change

18

A collection of 650 marriage contracts with data on bride price and family gift dating from

eleventh-thirteenth century Egypt was analysed with the following results. 74

Table 3

Combined Bride Price and Family Gift Egypt 11th-13th Centuries in Gold Dinars

Source: http://www.medievalislamiceconomy.uwo.ca/equity_equality/appendices/index.html

In the absence of data on women’s wages and only sporadic quantitative data on

women’s inheritance, a complete picture of medieval women’s worth eludes us. Although

partial, it is possible to make an argument in favour of a trend based on the results. Property and

wages owned by women most likely played a role in household decision to limit the number of

children produced. If we are to follow the argument presented here the conclusion needs to be

that the transition to individual property rights in the medieval Middle East responded to changes

in economic structures. Women’s and household’s incomes increased and together played a role

in lowering fertility rate, which in turn permitted the economic gains achieved earlier to remain.

Recent publications by the IMF on the ‘Year of Women’s events’, show that women’s

progress to equality with men, in the work force, income and empowerment is still slow,75 and

that women in Muslim countries are stuck at the bottom of the international scale.76 Although

women’s status is only a part of the puzzle of what ails the contemporary Middle East, this paper

argued that Islamic law is not the cause. It concludes that methodologically and empirically, the

evidence from the Middle East displays vibrant growth promoting Islamic economic institutions.

74 Datasets and Appendices on

http://www.medievalislamiceconomy.uwo.ca/equity_equality/index.html

75 https://wiw-report.s3.amazonaws.com/Women_in_the_Workplace_2019.pdf

76 ADHR 2005.

Bride

Price

Observations Mean Median Interquartile

Range

Mode Standard

Deviation

Variation Min Max

Early 116 15 8 16 5 25 625 1 200

Delayed 132 31 20 30 20 37 1393 1 300

Combined 114 50 30 50 25 75 5575 4 502

Family

Gift

65 143 61 152 50 189 35500 2 795

Structural Change

19

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