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merican cademy of Religion

Structuralism, Hermeneutics, and Contextual MeaningAuthor(s): Elizabeth Struthers MalbonSource: Journal of the American Academy of Religion, Vol. 51, No. 2 (Jun., 1983), pp. 207-230Published by: Oxford University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1463635Accessed: 07-08-2015 07:14 UTC

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2/25

Journal

of

the

American

Academy

of

Religion,

LI/2

Structuralism,Hermeneutics,

and

Contextual

Meaning

Elizabeth Struthers

Malbon

erhaps

one should

begin

by

defining

one's terms.

But,

were I to

attempt

to

define structuralism and

hermeneutics

carefully,

completely,

and in a

way

that would

satisfy

all-or even

most-

structuralists

or

hermeneuticists,

I fear

I

would never move

beyond

this

beginning.

Thus,

although

I

shall not

begin entirely

in mediis

rebus,

I

must assume some

experience

of

the

workings

of

structuralism and of

hermeneutics.

I

regard

structuralism and hermeneutics as

approaches

to

meaning,

as

ways

of

investigating

the

significance

of

things -from

individual texts to whole cultures-and the significance of significance.

My

present

task is

to

compare

and contrast these two

approaches

to

meaning-structuralism

and

hermeneutics-by

considering especially

their

goals,

or end

points,

and their

presuppositions,

or

beginning

points.

Although

my

references will be

chiefly

to

approaches

to

meaning

in

biblical

studies,

I

wish to understand

in

a more

general way

the contexts

in

which structuralism and

hermeneutics

seek

meaning

and seek to

make

meaning.

Relations between structuralism and hermeneutics are often implied

in

the characterization of either

structuralism

or

hermeneutics. For

example,

Robert

Culley,

in

characterizing

structuralism,

presents

a

model of the three focal

points

of

scholarly

approaches

to

biblical

texts:

author,

text,

reader./1/

According

to

this

model,

the author is the

shared

focal

point

of

source

criticism;

the

text

is the focus of

rhetorical

criticism

and structural

analysis;

the

reader is the

focus of biblical

hermeneutics

(167-69).

Thus

Culley's

model

indicates a

fundamental

difference

between structuralism

and hermeneutics. A

model

presented by

Robert

Polzin,

on the other

hand,

suggests

a

fundamental

similarity

between

structuralism and hermeneutics:

self-conscious awareness of the

role of

Elizabeth StruthersMalbon

(Ph.D.,

Florida

State

University)

s

AssistantProfes-

sor of

Religion

at

Virginia Polytechnic

Institute and

State

University.

She

is

the

author

of

articles

in

Semeia,

Catholic Biblical

Quarterly,

and

New

Testament

Studies. This

paper

was

first

presented

to the

American

Academy

of

Religion

at

its

annual

meeting

in

1981.


http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


3/25

208

Journal

of the American

Academy

of

Religion

the

subject,

the

analyst,

in

the

analysis./2/

Since

Polzin's

subject

is

related to

Culley's

reader,

Polzin's stress on this

aspect

of structuralism

that is shared with hermeneutics undercuts Culley's suggestion that

structuralism

is

distinguished by

its focus on the text from

hermeneutics

with

its

focus on the reader.

Perhaps

Culley's

model

overemphasizes

the

distinction between

structuralism

and

hermeneutics,

whereas

Polzin's

argument

overemphasizes

their

commonality.

What

is needed is a

way

both to

compare

and to contrast structural-

ism and hermeneutics as

approaches

to

meaning.

Toward that

end,

the

first

step

of

my investigation

involves

an examination and classification

of the

respective-and various-goals

of

structuralists and of hermeneu-

ticists. Goals are the

projected

end

points

of

investigators,

the

why

of

investigations.

Thus,

a

comparison

of

structuralist and hermeneutical

goals

should

help

us

establish

the

scope

of

each

of

these two

approaches

to

meaning.

After a brief look at the

basis

of

structuralism,

we

will turn

to

a

systematization

of several

important

goals

of

structuralists. Then we

will

repeat

this

procedure

with

regard

to

hermeneutics

and

the

goals

of

hermeneuticists.

Structuralism, Structuralists,

and

Goals

Historically,

structuralism,

particularly literary

structuralism,

is

rooted in

Saussurean

linguistics. Conceptually,

structuralism is

centered

in

concern for

relations,

or

networks of

relations,

rather

than isolated

elements.

Ferdinand de

Saussure,

Swiss

linguist

of

the late nineteenth

and

early

twentieth

century,

is acclaimed

the

grandfather

of

structur-

alism

(Bovon:8),

its

founding

father

(Lane:27);

and

Saussure's

Course

in General Linguistics, first published in 1915 on the basis of the lecture

notes

of

his

students,

is

proclaimed

the

magna

carta of

modern struc-

tural

linguistics

(Polzin:17).

The crux of

de

Saussure's

theory

... is

the

role of

relations

in

a

system

.

.

. ;

for

signs,

as

for

phonemes,

to be is to

be

related

(Wells:97).

A

linguistic

sign

itself is a

relation-between a

signifier,

or

sound-image,

and

a

signified,

or

concept.

Language

is a

system

of

signs.

Before

Saussure,

traditional

linguistics

focused on

dia-

chronic

analysis,

the

study

of

changes

in

language

over

time. Saussure's

insistence

on

the

priority

of

synchronic analysis,

the

investigation

of

the

structure of

language,

revolutionized

linguistics.

Also

seminal for the

history

and the

concepts

of

structuralism was

Vladimir

Propp,

Russian

folklorist,

whose

Morphology

of

the Folktale

has

quite

rightly

been

termed the

exemplar par

excellence of

syntag-

matic

structural

exegesis

(Dundes:xi).

In his

study

of

Russian

fairy

tales,

Propp

isolated

thirty-one

functions

(or

types

of

actions)

and seven

spheres

of

action

(or

character

types)

that

remain

constant

amid

the

varying

details of the

stories.

Although

Propp

did not

discover

every




4/25

Malbon: Structuralism

209

function manifest

in

every

tale,

he did

find the order

(syntagm)

of the

functions

in the narratives

to be invariable.

Propp's

important

contribu-

tion was, in the words of Susan Wittig, his typically Formalist proposal

that the

description

of

a

tale's

invariant

structural features is a

more

appropriate

mode of

analysis

than

the

description

of the variable

content

which

manifests the structure

(152).

Whereas

Propp

serves as a

representative

of

syntagmatic

structural

analysis,

the

champion

of

paradigmatic

structural

analysis

is

Claude

Levi-Strauss

(Dundes:xii).

It is

the

contemporary

French cultural

anthropologist

Claude Levi-Strauss

who is

generally

regarded

as

the

father of structuralism

(Bovon:8; Pettit:68),

the

archetypal high priest

of

structuralism

(Polzin:41).

To Levi-Strauss

goes

as

well

the dubious

honor of

being

perhaps

the best-known and least understood structural-

ist

(Polzin:17).

His

work is heralded as the most extended and

system-

atic

application

of structuralist methods and the structuralist vision to

human

phenomena

(Lane:12).

Levi-Strauss's

work

may

be

interpreted

as

both

an

extension

of

Saussure and a correction of

Propp.

Following

Saussure,

Levi-Strauss insists

upon

the

primacy

of relations

between

terms

(Culler:23).

These

relations are

underlying

or

implicit

relations

through

which

things

can function as

signs

or as

language

and which the

structuralist aims

to

make

explicit

(Culler:25).

Yet

the

language

to

which

Levi-Strauss

applies

this central

concept

is not

natural

language

(the

linguistic

phenomenon

of

langue)

but the

language

of

kinship

(Le vi-Strauss, 969)

or the

language

of

myth

(1969-81).

These cultural

languages,

like

langue

itself,

have two dimensions: the

syntagmatic

and

the

paradigmatic. Against

Propp,

Levi-Strauss

argues

for

(1)

the

greater

significance

of the

paradigmatic

dimension of narratives

(tales,

myths)

over their syntagmatic dimension and (2) the importance of the ethno-

graphic

context

of narratives to their overall

significance

and

clarity

(see

Wittig:153-58).

We

turn

now

from

this

briefest of looks

at structuralism's

foundation

on

the concern

for

relations,

or

networks of

relations,

to a

systematization

of

several

important

goals

of structuralism's

adherents or

practition-

ers. /3/

I

employ

the two terms

adherents

and

practitioners

advisedly,

for

structuralism in

its broadest sense

may

aim

toward

either

ideology

or

methodology. These two basic directions are not unique to structuralism,

but

common to intellectual

movements

generally;

they

represent

what

Michael Lane

(13)

refers

to,

although

with

somewhat different

labels,

as

the two

categories

of

the means

that men

employ

to

order

their

universe. /4/

By ideology-or

philosophy

if

its

connotations are less

abrasive/5/-is

meant

any

more or less

consistent

system

of beliefs and

values which

describes and accounts for

the relations of

men to one

another,

and

to

the

material,

and not

infrequently

the

immaterial,

uni-

verse

(13)./6/

Structuralism as an

ideology

or

philosophy

is,

in

the

words




5/25

210

Journal

of the American

Academy

of

Religion

of Robert

Scholes,

a

way

of

looking

for

reality

not in individual

things

but

in

relationships

among

them

(4).

By way

of an

example,

Levi-

Strauss's desire to understand the structure of the human mind from an

examination of

its cultural

products,

his

discovery

of vast

homologies

(Bovon:11),

represents

an

ideological

(or

philosophical)

goal

of

structuralism.

By methodology

is meant

any

set of rules or

regulations

which describes and

prescribes

the

operations

to

be

performed upon

any

matter

.

.

.

with

the

purpose

of

ordering

it and

understanding

its

working

(Lane:13).

Most

structuralists view structuralism as a

methodol-

ogy, although

they may

recognize

that

its

basic

presuppositions

are

philosophical (Lane:13,17;

Patte, 1976:14,19; Bovon:6-7; Ehrmann:ix;

Via:1;

Gardner:10).

I

offer this distinction between

ideology

and method-

ology

as a

descriptive

one,/7/

not as an evaluative

one,

although

ideol-

ogy,

or

its

equivalent,

generally

serves as the

negatively

valued

pole

among

commentators on

structuralism./8/

In

fact,

neither

ideology

nor

methodology

is manifest

concretely

in

total isolation-in structuralism or

in

any

intellectual

movement

(Lane:13).

But,

speaking

abstractly,

structuralism

as

a

methodology may

be said

to focus

upon

either

theory

or

analysis./9/

Structuralism as

theory may

be directed to various issues: a

theory

of Russian

fairy

tales

(Propp),

a

theory

of

kinship

or of

myth

(Levi-Strauss),

a

theory

of

narrativity

(Grei-

mas).

In

the field of

literature,

theoretical

structuralism

approaches

not

so much

the

meaning

of

individual works of

literature

as

the

meaning

of

meaning,

that

is,

the

presuppositions

that enable

literature

to

be

written

and to be

read;

theoretical structuralism seeks

not so much

to

tell

the

meaning

as to

recreate

the

process

of

meaning

(cf.

Spivey:185;

Culler:

30-85).

From

this

description,

the

reverberations between

theory

and

ideology should be loud and clear; in somewhat simplistic terms, ideol-

ogy may

be understood

as

theory

(or theories)

further

abstracted and

further

generalized.

In

the other

direction,

theory

is resonant with

analysis,

for

analysis

is

applied

theory.

In

the field of

literature,

structuralism as

analysis

focuses

upon

the

meaning

of individual

works,

although

this

meaning

must be

con-

sidered

(theoretically)

as a subset of the

meaning

of

meaning.

Structural-

ism as

analysis

is

concerned not

just

with the

what

of

individual

meaning,

but

with the how of individual

meaning.

Observers

have

noted that

struc-

turalism as

theory

appears

dominant

over structuralism as

analysis

(e.g.,

Lane:38; Culler:34;

Jacobson:157;

Detweiler:118);

some

commentators

have even

identified structuralism

as

theory

with structuralism

per

se./10/

Since theoretical

hypotheses

offer

starting

points

for

analysis,

theoretical

dcminance

may

be a mark of

structuralism's

youth;

if

so,

signs

of

matura-

tion

(or

aging, depending

upon

the

point

of

view)

may

be

discerned in

an

increasing

number of

analytical

studies.

However,

theory

and

analysis,

like

ideology

and

methodology,

are

separable

only

in

the

abstract./11/




6/25

Malbon:

Structuralism

211

Just

as structuralism

as

methodology

bifurcates into

theory

and

anal-

ysis,

so

structuralism

as

analysis

subdivides

into

structural

exegesis

and

narrative hermeneutics. In relation to philosophy (or ideology), both

theory

and

analysis

are forms

of

methodology./12/

In

relation

to

theory,

both

structural

exegesis

and

narrative hermeneutics

are

forms

of

analysis.

As

theory

is,

in

a

sense,

applied

philosophy,

so structural

exegesis

is the-

ory

applied

to an

object

(a

text)

and

narrative hermeneutics is

struc-

tural

exegesis

applied

to a

subject

(a reader). /13/

Edgar McKnight's

book on the

interrelationships

of hermeneutics

and

structuralism,

from

which I

have

borrowed the term narrative

hermeneutics,

well

repre-

sents this goal of structuralism. Structural exegesis as a goal

of

structural-

ism has been the aim of much of

my

research

(Malbon,

1979;

1980;

1982;

198?).

structuralist

goals

philosophy methodology

(or ideology)

theory analysis

structural

narrative

exegesis

hermeneutics

These

four-philosophy

(or

ideology), theory,

structural

exegesis,

narrative

hermeneutics-may

be considered terminal

goals

of

structural-

ism;/14/

a

structuralist

may

choose

any

one of them as

her

or his ulti-

mate

goal, though

she or he

may

reach it

via another

goal

(or

goals)

as

penultimate./15/

Thus,

in the

Mythologiques

(1969-81),

Levi-Strauss

moves from

an

analysis

of individual

myths

(structural

exegesis)

to a

theory

of

myth

to an

ideological

(or

philosophical)

understanding

of

what makes

humanity

human. In Structural

Exegesis:

From

Theory

to

Practice, Daniel Patte and Aline Patte move from a semiotic

theory

to a

structural

exegesis

of Mark

15 and

16

toward

a narrative

hermeneutic.

In

actuality,

both

Levi-Strauss

and Patte and Patte move

back and

forth

between

goals,

or

forms,

of

structuralism

in the

process

of

discovering

meaning.

However,

their

respective

directions and ultimate

goals

are clear:

Levi-Strauss

moves

toward

ideology,

Patte and

Patte toward

hermeneutics.

Yet

ideology

and

narrative hermeneutics are not

as

unrelated as

they

might

appear

from

the

diagram

above.

The

desire to

philosophize

on

the basis of




7/25

212

Journal

of the

American

Academy

of

Religion

ethnography

is not unlike

the desire to

theologize

on the basis

of

narratology. Ideology,

in

its

philosophical aspects,

and

narrative herme-

neutics, in its theological aspects, share a concern for the breadth of

humanity

and the

depth

of human

beings./16/

It is true that the

contin-

uum

might

be

represented

as a

line,

running

from

ideology

to narrative

hermeneutics. But

it

might

better be

represented

as a

circle,

in which

ideol-

ogy

and narrative hermeneutics would not

be

poles apart

but

only

ninety

degrees

apart.

Furthermore,

such a circle

might

better

depict

the

move-

ment

among goals

that often characterizes

interpreters.

Thus,

my

typology

of structuralist

goals

is not meant to

pigeonhole

scholars or to

portray

as

static the

dynamism

of

scholarship,

but to clar-

ify

the basic

thrust

of various

approaches.

We

turn now

from this consid-

eration

of structuralist

goals

to a

parallel

consideration of

hermeneutical

goals,

in

our

attempt

to interrelate these

two

fundamental

approaches

to

meaning.

Hermeneutics,

Hermeneuticists,

and

Goals

Richard

Palmer,

James

Robinson,

and others

open

their discussions of

hermeneutics with considerations of the various meanings of the Greek

verb hermeneuein and its noun

form hermaneia

(Palmer:12-32;

Robin-

son:1-7;

Achtemeier:13-14).

The words share a

linguistic

root with the

name of the

Greek

god

Hermes,

the

messenger

of

the

gods

and

the inventor

or

discoverer of

language

and

writing.

The three basic

meanings

of

hermp-

neuein are:

(1)

to

speak

(or

express

or

say),

(2)

to

explain

(or

interpret

or

comment

upon),

(3)

to translate. As

Palmer

notes,

all three

meanings

may

be

expressed

by

the

English

verb 'to

interpret,'

yet

each

constitutes

an

independent and significant meaning of interpretation (13-14). Since the

ancient

Greeks,

each of these

three

meanings

has

found its

applications

by

various

hermeneuticists.

Hermeneutics

as

speaking

has included not

only

the oral recitation of

Homer's

epics

but also

the

proclamation

demanded

by

the new

hermeneutic.

Hermeneutics as

commentary

has a

long

and

varied

history

in

biblical

exegesis,

from

third-century

Alexandrian

allegor-

ization to

nineteenth-century

historical-critical method.

Hermeneutics

as

translation

may

be seen

not

only

literally

in

traditional

philology

but also

metaphorically

in

Bultmannian

demythologizing.

Yet

one

may note,

with

Palmer,

that

in

all

three cases

the

foundational 'Hermes

process'

is

at

work: in

all

three

cases,

something foreign,

strange,

separated

in

time,

space,

or

experience

is

made

familiar,

present,

comprehensible;

something

requiring

representation,

explanation,

or

translation

is

somehow

'brought

to

understanding'-is

'interpreted'

(14).

It is

the new

hermeneutic,

claims

Robinson,

that has

regained

and

reexpressed

the

profound

implication

that

these three

functions

belong together

as

interrelated

aspects

of a

single

hermeneutic

(16).




8/25

Malbon:

Structuralism

213

From these

three definitions-and

implications-of

the ancient

Greek

hermaneuein,

Palmer

moves to six modern

definitions

of hermeneutics

(33-45). From the beginning, comments Palmer, the word has denoted

the science

of

interpretation, especially

the

principles

of

proper

textual

exegesis,

but,

Palmer

adds,

the field

of hermeneutics has been

inter-

preted

(in

roughly chronological

order)

as:

(1)

the

theory

of biblical

exege-

sis;

(2)

general

philological methodology;

(3)

the

science

of all

linguistic

understanding

[Schleiermacher]; (4)

the

methodological

foundation

of

Geisteswissenschaften

[or

human

studies ;

Dilthey];

(5)

phenomenology

of existence

and of existential

understanding

[Heidegger

and

Gadamer];

and

(6)

the

systems

of

interpretation,

both

recollective and

iconoclastic,

used

by

man to reach the

meaning

behind

myths

and

symbols

[Ricoeur]

(Palmer:33).

Furthermore,

Palmer draws the

important

conclusion that

each

of these definitions

is

more than an historical

stage;

each

points

to

an

important

'moment' or

approach

to the

problems

of

interpretation

(33).

Thus the six modern

definitions,

in

conjunction

with

the three ancient

ones,

seem to

suggest

various

goals

toward which

particular

hermeneuti-

cists

may

aim. The basic

shape

of the

typology

of structuralist

goals

appears

to serve also for

outlining

hermeneutical

goals,

thus

facilitating

our

comparison

of these two basic

approaches

to

meaning.

Hermeneutics

as

speaking

(or

proclamation)

moves

toward

philosophy

(or

theology).

Hermeneutics as

commentary

(or

explanation)

aims at

methodology,

either

in

a

general

sense as

theory,

or

in

a

specific,

analytical

(applied)

sense as

biblical

exegesis.

Hermeneutics as

translation-and

this

is

particularly

clear with

the

new

hermeneutic-sets its

sights

on

existential

understanding.

hermeneutical

goals

philosophy

methodology

(or

theology)

theory

analysis

biblical

existential

exegesis

understanding

In

relation to

philosophy,

both

theory

and

analysis

are

forms

of

methodology.

In

relation to

theory,

both

biblical

exegesis

and

existential

understanding

are forms

of

analysis.

As

theory

is,

in

a

sense,

applied




9/25

214

Journal

of

the American

Academy

of

Religion

philosophy,

so

biblical

exegesis

is

theory applied

to

a

so-called

object

(a text)

and existential

understanding

is

biblical

exegesis

applied

to a

so-

called subject (a reader). These four-philosophy (or theology), theory,

biblical

exegesis,

existential

understanding-may

be considered terminal

goals

of

hermeneutics;

a hermeneuticist

may

choose

any

one of them

as

her

or

his ultimate

goal, though

she or he

may

reach

it via

another

goal

(or

goals)

as

penultimate.

As a check

on

the

valididty

and usefulness of this

typology,

let

us

consider the

place

within it of several

important

hermeneuticists. It

would seem that

the

contrast

between the work of

Heidegger

and Gada-

mer on the one hand and of

Schleiermacher, Dilthey,

and Betti on

the

other

represents

a

contrast

between

philosophy

and

methodology

as her-

meneutical

goals.

Palmer

notes

a

clear

polarization

in

contemporary

hermeneutical

thinking:

There

is

the tradition of

Schleiermacher

and

Dilthey,

whose adherents

look to

hermeneutics

as

a

general

body

of

methodological

principles

which underlie

interpretation.

And there are

the followers of

Heidegger,

who

see hermeneutics as

a

philosophical

exploration

of the

character

and

requisite

conditions

for all

understand-

ing

(46,

my

emphasis).

As a

comparison

of the

thought

of

Hans-Georg

Gadamer and Emilio Betti makes

plain,

however,

having

or not

having

philosophy

as

a

goal

of

hermeneutics does not deliver a hermeneuticist

from

philosophical presuppositions;

the

conflict

of

Betti's realist

pre-

suppositions

and Gadamer's

phenomenological

ones

is

in addition to

the contrast of their

methodological

or

philosophical

goals

(see

Palmer:

46-65)./17/

The hermeneutical

goals

of

archetypical

new

hermeneuticists Ger-

hard

Ebeling

and Ernst Fuchs

might

be

expressed

as either

philosophy

or theology. The proponents of the new hermeneutic, as Achtemeier

notes,

in

some

instances,

are

quite prepared

to invade the

precincts

of

philosophy,

so broad

is

their

understanding

of

the

implications

of their

approach.

The

new

hermeneutic is

therefore not limited to

exegesis;

it is

a

way

of

doing theology,

and

it

will

be better

understood

if

that is

kept

in

mind

(86-87;

cf.

Robinson:6,63,67).

Both

Ebeling

and

Fuchs,

Palmer

observes,

have made the

word event the center of their

theolog-

ical

thinking,

which has been

labeled 'word-event

theology'

(53).

The

effect of the word

event emphasis in theology, Palmer continues, is to

bring

philosophy

of

language

to the

very

center of hermeneutics

(54).

Philosophy

(or

theology)

and

methodology

comprise

the first branches

of the

tree

of

hermeneutical

goals;

the second

branches are

theory

and

analysis

as forms

of

methodology.

The

theory/analysis

option

of

my

typology

of

hermeneutical

goals

appears

to

parallel

what

Palmer terms

the

double focus of hermeneutics.

According

to

Palmer,

the historical

development

of

hermeneutics as an

independent

field seems to hold within

itself two

separate

foci: one on the

theory

of

understanding

in a

general




10/25

Malbon:Structuralism

215

sense,

and the

other

on what

is

involved

in the

exegesis

of

linguistic

texts,

the

hermeneutical

problem.

These

two foci

need

not be either self-

canceling or absolutely independent, yet they are best held in sufficient

separateness

for

one

to

instruct

the other

(67).

By way

of

an

example,

we

noted above

that Schleiermacher

and

Dilthey

are to be associated

with

the

hermeneutical

goal

of

methodology

rather

than

philosophy;

methodology,

however,

is not a terminal

goal

within

the

typology;

and both Schleier-

macher and

Dilthey

are

to be associated with the

theory

option

of

methodology

rather than the

analysis

option.

In Palmer's

words,

herme-

neutics is true

to

its

great

past

in

Schleiermacher and

Dilthey

when

it takes

its

bearings

from a

general theory

of

linguistic understanding (68, my

emphasis).

Theory,

however,

as

a

goal

of

hermeneutics,

might

be

concentrated

on a

number

of

areas:

a

theory

of

language

(Schleiermacher

and

Dilthey),

a

theory

of

approaches

unique

to the human sciences

(Dilthey),

a

theory

of

literary

interpretation

(Palmer:220-53).

The direct alternative to

theory

as

a hermeneutical

goal

is

analysis.

Analysis,

however,

does not

represent

a

terminal

goal

in

my typology

of

hermeneutical

goals

but

suggests

in

turn the final

option

of biblical exe-

gesis

or

existential

understanding. Again my

distinction

is

paralleled-in

overall

significance

if not in

specific

terminology-by

a distinction

pointed

out

by

Palmer. The

distinction

I

see between

biblical

exegesis

and existential

understanding

is

comparable

to

the

distinction Palmer

observes

between the moment of

understanding

an

object

in

terms of

itself and

the moment of

seeing

the

existential

meaning

of the

object

for

one's own life

and future

(56).

While

the most

traditional definition

of

hermeneutics is

probably

the

theory

of

interpretation,

the most tradi-

tional

goal

of

hermeneuticists

in

the field of

religion

throughout

the

long

history of hermeneutics is probably biblical exegesis. By the opening of

the

nineteenth

century,

as Achtemeier

notes,

the terms

hermeneutics

and

exegesis

were

often

used

interchangeably

(Achtemeier:14).

How-

ever,

in

the twentieth

century-to

a certain

extent with

Bultmann and

more

fully

with the new

hermeneutic-the

goal

of

biblical

exegesis

has

been

overwhelmed

by

the

insistent

emphasis

on

existential

understand-

ing,

on

biblical

exegesis pro

nobis,

pro

me. As

John

Cobb notes:

In

the

new

hermeneutic

what is

interpreted

is

ultimately

and

decisively

the

existence of the hearer of the proclamation. The text, rather than being

the

object

of

interpretation,

as

with

Bultmann,

becomes

an

aid

in

the

interpretation

of

present

existence

(Cobb:229-80;

cf.

Robinson:52 and

McKnight:77-78).

Bultmann serves

as a

good

reminder,

however,

that

the

typology

of

hermeneutical

goals

is

not to be

viewed as static.

Certainly

Bultmann

shares much with

the

philosophical

hermeneutics

of

Heidegger

(see

Palmer:48-52;

Achtemeier:53-70;

Thiselton:

especially

227-84;

McKnight:

65-71)

and with

the

methodological

or theoretical

hermeneutics of

Dilthey




11/25

216

Journal

of

the

American

Academy

of

Religion

(see

Thiselton:234-40;

McKnight:65-71).

Clearly,

Bultmann the

preacher

and New Testament

scholar

is concerned with biblical

exegesis

(see

Palmer:50), but, equally clearly, Bultmann the demythologizer and New

Testament

theologian

aims at existential

understanding

of the biblical text

(see

Palmer:56).

Thus,

while

theology

(or

philosophy),

theory,

and biblical

exegesis

are for Bultmann

penultimate

goals

of

hermeneutics,

the ultimate

goal

is existential

understanding./18/

Yet,

as we observed

analogously

of

the

typology

of structuralist

goals,

the continuum from

theology

(or

philosophy)

to

theory

to biblical

exegesis

to existential

understanding

might

well

be

represented

as a

circle,

with existential

understanding

moving

toward

theology. Certainly

this movement is

descriptive

of

Bultmann's

exegesis

of

Paul and

John

for twentieth-century persons

as

part

of a

comprehensive

theology.

The

sketching

out of

parallel

typologies

of

structuralist and

hermeneu-

tical

goals

suggests

that,

in terms

of

their end

points,

certain

structuralists

may

have more

in

common

with

certain hermeneuticists than with

other

structuralists,

and vice versa. For

example,

those structuralists most

interested

in narrative

hermeneutics and those hermeneuticists most

con-

cerned

with

existential

understanding might

view

each other as

colleagues

in a common endeavor as

against

their more theoretical associates on

either

side.

Those

very

associates,

however,

whether structuralist

or

hermeneutical

theorists,

may

welcome closer association as

they

aim at

theoretical clarification rather than

simply

applied

analysis.

To

remind

us of what structural

theorists have

in

common with structural

exegetes,

and

hermeneuticists of one

emphasis

with

those of

another,

we

turn from a

consideration of end

points,

or

goals,

to a brief

consideration of

beginning

points,

or

presuppositions.

We will

concentrate on structuralist

and

hermeneutical presuppositions in two key areas:history and language.

The

Historical,

the

Historic,

and

Historicity

Norman

Perrin,

in an aside to his

discussion of the

New Testament

as

myth

and

history,

suggests

three

centers of

meaning

of the term his-

tory

(27-29): (1)

history

as

the

historical,

or

factual

history

of

the

type

that

would

satisfy

a court of

law ;

(2)

history

as the

historic,

or

the

sig-

nificance of

factual

history

in

the broader

context of the

totality

of

human

experience ;

and

(3)

history

as

the

historicity

of human

existence

in

the

world,

or

all those

things,

from

historical

circumstances

and events

to

ideas and

interpretations,

that can

change

one's life. To

borrow,

and

extend,

Perrin's

example:

all

the

authentic

speeches

of all

the U.S.

presi-

dents are

historical;

Lincoln's

Gettysburg

Address

is

historic;

and

the

Gettysburg

Address

has had an

impact

on

the

historicity

of

all Ameri-

cans,

changing

the lives of

both

northerners

and

southerners,

both

whites

and

blacks.




12/25

Malbon:

Structuralism

217

The

distinctions

among

the

historical,

the

historic,

and

historicity

may,

I

believe,

help

to

clarify

and

distinguish

the

presuppositions

of

structuralism and of hermeneutics regarding history. Traditional biblical

criticism,

based

on the historical-critical

method,

has focused on

history

as the historical.

This is

clearly

seen in form criticism's concern to

estab-

lish the Sitz im Leben

of

the

text

and in

redaction

criticism's

concern to

illuminate

the situation of

each

community by

examining

the

theology

of each

synoptic gospel.

Structuralism

has

not

infrequently

been criticized

by

biblical

schol-

ars

(and others)

as

being

ahistorical

if not

antihistorical.

But,

as Dan Via

more

realistically observes, any adoption and adaptation

of structuralism

by

biblical

studies

will

entail,

not a

rejection

of the

historical

method,

but

a

relegating

of it

to

a

more

marginal

position

than it

has been

enjoy-

ing

(2;

cf.

McKnight:239,242).

Structuralism reacts

against

concentra-

tion on the diachronic

by

focusing

on the

synchronic.

Structuralism

responds

primarily

not to

history

as

the

historical but to

history

as

the

historic. For

example,

Lincoln's

Gettysburg

Address

is

recognized

as

historic,

structuralists would

point

out,

not

primarily

because of its

place

in

the

chronological

syntagm

of

presidential

addresses

from

George

Washington

to Ronald

Reagan

but because of its

place

in the

paradigm

of all

presidential

addresses,

no

matter

when

they

were

given.

Likewise,

the

significance

of

a

text,

that

which

interests

structuralists,

is

to be

determined

by

its intertextual and intratextual

relationships,

not

merely

from its historical

context.

Oversimplifying

in

order to

clarify

our

schema,

we

might

say

that fact is to

significance

as the

historical

is to the

historic and as

historical criticism is to

structuralism.

Hermeneutics

focuses on

neither

the

historical

nor

the

historic but on

history as the historicity of human existence in the world. For herme-

neutic

itself,

states

Robinson,

is

rooted

in man's

historicness,

namely,

the

call

placed upon

him

to encounter the

history

of

the

past

in

such a

way

as not

to

deny

his

own

existential future

and

present

responsibility

(9).

In

fact,

Heidegger's

ontology,

on which much

of

recent hermeneuti-

cal

thinking

rests,

suggests

that the

historical

is

founded

upon historicity.

Paraphrasing Heidegger,

Achtemeier

states,

Time itself is

grounded

in

the

structure of

the

self,

so that

the

possibility

of

temporal

existence, i.e.,

history, is itself grounded in the structure of the self (39-40). Or, as

paraphrased

by

Thiselton

(184),

history

is

what it is

by

virtue

of

the

historicality

(Geschichtlichkeit)

of

Dasein,

rather than because of the

mere

pastness

of historical events

and

objects.

Hence

the focus of

history

lies not

in

the

past

but

in

the

present. /19/

Paul

Ricoeur,

in

speaking

for

hermeneutics as over

against

structuralism,

states

explicitly,

I

will

reserve the

term

'historicity'-historicity

of

tradition and

historicity

of

interpretation-for

any

understanding

which

implicitly

or

explicitly

knows itself

to be on

the road

of

the

philosophic

understanding

of self




13/25

218

Journal

of the American

Academy

of

Religion

and of

being

(55).

For this

reason,

biblical

exegesis

in the

Bultmannian

tradition

is

primarily

concerned not with

the historical

past

but with

the

present and future historicity of human existence; it is not historical

exegesis

but

exegesis

pro

nobis;

it

is,

in

the

words of

Ebeling,

a

process

from

text

to

sermon ;

it is

proclamation

(Ebeling:107;

cf. Fuchs:

141)./20/

At least as

applied

in

the field of biblical

studies,

both structuralism's

focus on

the

historic and

hermeneutics'

focus on

historicity

may

be

seen

as reactions

against

the

excesses

of

the nineteenth and twentieth

centu-

ries' concern for

the

historical./21/

Structuralism has

challenged

tradi-

tional historical

criticism to

respect

the

integrity

of

the

text

and

to

appreciate

the

presuppositions

that enable texts to be

written

and

to be

read

(e.g.,

Via).

Hermeneutics has

challenged

traditional

historical criti-

cism to

bridge

the

distance

between the two

horizons,

the horizon of

the

ancient text and

the horizon of

the

contemporary

reader

(e.g.,

Palmer).

Structuralism has

sometimes

accused

hermeneutics

of

ignoring

the

interrelations

and

the

constraints of

the text as a

linguistic

product

(e.g.,

Kovacs).

Hermeneutics has

sometimes

accused

structuralism

of

ana-

lyzing

the text

in

isolation

from

the

living

process

of

communication

(e.g.,

Ricoeur).

Evidently,

in

the

responses

of

structuralism

and

hermeneutics to

historical

criticism and

in

the

responses

of

structuralism

and hermeneu-

tics to each

other,

we are

sometimes

dealing

with

overreactions to over-

reactions.

In

order

to defuse

this

situation,

it is

helpful

to

remember

Perrin's

presentation

of the

historical,

the

historic,

and

historicity

as

three dimensions of

history,

three

interrelated-not

independent-ways

of

conceiving

of

history.

Analogously,

various

approaches

to textual

meaning are to be viewed as interrelated; the focus of traditional biblical

criticism

on

the

historical is

better

supplemented

than

supplanted

by

the

concern of

stucturalism for

the historic

and that

of hermeneutics for

historicity./22/

For

structuralism,

the

historic

is

determined

by

syntagmatic

and

especially

paradigmatic

inter-

and

intrarelationships

of

cultural

phenom-

ena,

and

syntagmatic

and

paradigmatic

are the

two

dimensions of lan-

guage.

For

hermeneutics,

the

bridge

between an

historical

text and the

historicity

of a

reader is

formed

by language. Yet structuralism and

hermeneutics

approach

language,

as

they

approach

history,

with differ-

ent

concerns and

different

presuppositions.

Langue,

Parole,

and

Sprachereignis

In

somewhat

oversimplified

terms,

we

may

say

that

structuralism

regards

language

as a

system

of

signs

and

hermeneutics

regards

language

as an

event

of

disclosure.

While

these

assumptions

are

not

necessarily




14/25

Malbon:

Structuralism

219

contradictory

or

exclusive,

they

do

represent opposing

points

of view on

the

appropriate

starting

point

of a discussion

of

language.

The foundations of structuralism's presuppositions about language

were set

by

Saussure.

As we

noted

above,

the

crux of de Saussure's

theory

.

. . is the role

of relations

in a

system

.

.

.

(Wells:97).

A

linguistic

sign

itself

(a word)

is

a

relation,

a

relation

between

a

signifier

and a

signi-

fied;

and

language

is a

system

of

signs.

In three

key

dichotomies,

Saussure

presented

his answers to three

questions

concerning

this

language

system:

(1)

what are the

components

of

languages?

(2)

how

should

language

be

studied?

(3)

what are the dimensions

of

language?

First,

language

in

the

broad

sense

(French langage)

is

comprised

of the

language-system

(langue)

and

language-behavior

or

speech

(parole)./23/

Langage

is a

social

phenomenon;

langue

is

its inherited or

institutional

element,

parole

its innovational element.

Langue, language,

is

communal and

passive;

parole, speech,

is individual and active.

Second,

according

to

Saussure,

it

is

the task

of

the

linguist

to

study

langue

and,

primarily,

to

study

it

synchronically

rather than

diachronically,

that

is,

as a

system

of relations

across a moment in

time,

rather than

through

time

(Lane:16-17).

Diachronic

analysis

of

language

is the

study

of

changes

in

language

over

time;

synchronic analysis

is the

investigation

of the structure of

language.

Third,

in

focusing

on

langue

synchronically,

Saussure

distinguished

two dimensions

of

langue,

two kinds

of

relationships

that exist between the

signs

of the

language-system:

syntagmatic

and

paradigmatic./24/

Rela-

tions of

contiguity

are

syntagmatic;

relations of

similarity

are

paradigma-

tic.

Principles

of

selection are

paradigmatic;

principles

of

combination

are

syntagmatic.

Consider,

for

example,

the sentence: She wrote

an

essay.

Here wrote

is

related

syntagmatically

to She

by

following

it

and to an

essay by preceding it, while, paradigmatically, She is related to He

and

essay

to

poem.

While the

syntagm

concerns the actual

sentence,

the

paradigm

concerns

the

potential

sentences over

against

which

the

meaning

of

the

actual sentence

is made clear.

Both the

paradigmatic

dimension,

the axis of

simultaneity,

and the

syntagmatic

dimension,

the

axis

of

succession,

are essential

if

language

is

to mean

(signify)

anything.

Language

as a

system

of

signs,

language

as the

interrelation

of

syn-

tagmatic and paradigmatic dimensions, is a basic presupposition of struc-

turalism.

Thus,

without reference to

Saussure,

Propp

focused

on the

syntagmatic

aspects

of the

Russian

fairy

tale.

In a

conscious

application

of

Saussure's

linguistic

model,/25/

Levi-Strauss focused on the

paradig-

matic

aspects

of the

language

of

kinship

and the

language

of

myth.

Levi-Strauss's work has

been heralded as the model

for

all

subsequent

attempts

at the

extension of

linguistic

theory beyond

the borders of its

own

discipline

(Robey:3),

and

with

this

extension has

come the exten-

sion of

the

syntagmatic/paradigmatic

distinction.




15/25

220

Journal

of

the American

Academy

of

Religion

Whereas

structuralism

focuses

upon

the

syntagmatic

and

paradig-

matic dimensions

of

language

(French

langue)

as

opposed

to

speech

(French parole), hermeneutics, and especially the new hermeneutic, con-

centrates

on

language

as

language-event

(German

Sprachereignis).

And

whereas

Saussurean

linguistics

is foundational for structuralism's view

of

language, Heideggerian

philosophy

is foundational for hermeneutic's

view of

language.

For

Heidegger, language

is

the

house

of

being ;

words

and

language

are not

wrappings

in which

things

are

packed

for

the commerce of those who write

and

speak.

It is

in

words and

language

that

things

first

come

into

being

and

are

(as

quoted by

Palmer:135).

Language, then,

is

insufficiently

accounted

for

as

a

system

of

arbitrary

signs. Language

originates

not with

human

beings

but

with

Being

itself.

Language

is,

in

Achtemeier's

paraphrase

of

Heidegger,

the

response

to

Being,

it

is

the act

of

being-open-to Being,

of

letting-be-manifest

in

response

to

the call of

Being

(Achtemeier:48;

cf.

Robinson:48-49).

Thus,

for the

new

hermeneuticist Ernst

Fuchs,

Language

is

not

necessarily

talk.

Language

is rather

primarily

a

showing

or

letting

be

seen,

an

indi-

cation in the active sense

(as

quoted by

Robinson:54).

Language

and

reality,

word and

event,

are

inseparable,

and it is

their

unity

that is indi-

cated

by

the term

language-event.

To

approach

language

as

language-

event is to

presuppose

that,

quoting

Achtemeier,

event and

word

are

born

together,

that

an

event needs

the

words,

the

language,

it

calls

forth in

order

to

be

itself,

and that the

language

thus

given

birth

illumines the

reality

that summoned it forth

(Achtemeier:90-91;

cf.

Robinson:46-48,57-58)./26/

Thus

language

as

language-event

is

a

living

process

of

communication-or

better,

of

illumination,

since the

saving

event

(Bultmann's

Heilsgeschehen

or

Heilsereignis)

is a

language

event (Ebeling's Wortgeschehen or Fuch's Sprachereignis) (Robinson:

57;

see also

61-62).

By

contrast,

language

as a

system

of

signs

is

a

human

product-though

more an

unconscious

than a conscious

one./27/

Structuralism's

insistence on

the

importance

of

synchronic study

of

language,

including

cultural

languages,

correlates

with its

concern

for

history

as the historic.

Hermeneutics'

understanding

of

language

as

language-event

correlates with its

concern for

history

as the

historicity

of

human

existence in

the

world.

For

the

new

hermeneutic,

language

is

the

bridge

between the

historical

and

historicity. Central to Fuchs's hermeneu-

tical

program

is the

task of

exhibiting

the

historicness of

existence

as

the

linguisticality

of

existence

(as

quoted

by

Robinson:55).

Language,

explains

Achtemeier

(91),

contains the

possibilities

of

self-understanding,

and

therefore of human

existence,

as

they

have found

expression

in

the

past.

Language,

summarizes Palmer

(207),

is

the

medium

in

which

the

tradition

conceals

itself

and

is

transmitted.

Experience

is

not so much

something

that

comes

prior

to

language,

but rather

experience

itself

occurs

in and

through language.

Linguisticality

is

something

that

permeates

the




16/25

Malbon: Structuralism

221

way

of

being-in-the-world

of

historical

man.

Thus,

and

not so

surprisingly,

presuppositions

concerning language

are intertwined with presuppositions concerning history for both herme-

neutics

and structuralism.

Furthermore,

these

presuppositions

influence

the

goals

generally

pursued by

structuralists

and

hermeneuticists.

Although

both structuralism and

hermeneutics,

as

we

suggested

above,

are

open

to four

analogous

goals,

structuralism's

approach

to

language

as

a

system

of

signs

predisposes

structuralism

to

aim

toward

exegesis,

while

hermeneutics'

approach

to

language

as

language-event

predisposes

her-

meneutics

to seek

existential

understanding

and to

develop

a

philosophy

and/or theology.

This would

seem

to

be

the reason

why

Ricoeur

(27-61;

see also

62-78),

for

example,

recommends

structuralism

as

a

method

(or

science )

of

exegesis

and hermeneutics as a

philosophy.

This

tendency

of

particular presuppositions

to

favor

particular

goals

seems

also to

be

behind

Culley's

observation that structuralism focuses

on

the text and

hermeneutics

on

the

reader,

for

structuralism's

approach

to

history

as the

historic

predisposes

structuralism

to

focus

on

the text

in

its

literary

or

linguistic

context,

whereas hermeneutics'

approach

to

history

as the

his-

toricity

of human

existence

in

the world

predisposes

hermeneutics to

focus on the reader in the context of his or her lived

experience./28/

For

both

structuralism and

hermeneutics as

approaches

to

meaning,

the

con-

text is crucial.

Structuralism,

Hermeneutics,

and

Contextual

Meaning

Structuralism,

as a

way

of

concentrating

on

the

text,

may

be

distin-

guished

from

hermeneutics,

as

a

way

of

concentrating

on

the

reader;

this is

the simple but powerful suggestion of Culley's model. Yet structuralism

shares with

hermeneutics an

awareness of the

relation of the

reader

to

the

text,

of

the

interpreter

to

the

interpreted;

this is

the recurrent

theme

of

Polzin's

argument.

Thus,

as we

noted at the

beginning,

Culley

emphasizes

a

fundamental

difference

between

structuralism and

hermeneutics,

whereas Polzin

emphasizes

a

fundamental

similarity

between them. It

has

been

my

aim

to

consider

both

differences and

similarities,

both distinctions

and

commonalities,

between

these

two

approaches

to

meaning.

I

have

suggested

that

structuralism and hermeneutics share a similar range of

goals:

that

four

terminal

goals

of

structuralism-ideology

(or

philosophy),

theory,

structural

exegesis,

and

narrative hermeneutics-are

analogous

to

four

terminal

goals

of

hermeneutics-theology

(or

philosophy), theory,

biblical

exegesis,

and

existential

understanding.

I

have

suggested

that

structuralism

and

hermeneutics

differ,

however,

in

their

presuppositions

concerning

history

and

language:

that

structuralism

approaches

history

as

the

historic

and

language

as a

system

of

signs,

and

hermeneutics

approaches

history

as

historicity

and

language

as

language-event.

Because




17/25

222

Journal

of the

American

Academy

of

Religion

of

these

presuppositions,

literary

or

biblical

structuralism focuses

on

intertextual

and intratextual

relationships

and

literary

or

biblical

hermeneutics focuses on the text-reader relationship.

But,

to

borrow the

terminology

of

Michael

Polanyi,

what is

of

focal

awareness

for

the

one is of

subsidiary

awareness

for

the

other.

Structural-

ists

know,

sometimes more

tacitly

than

explicitly,

that

to

remove

the text

from its

author-text-reader

context

is

an

abstraction;

they

insist, however,

that this

procedure

is

not

arbitrary

but

essential,

for

it enables

the reader

to listen

openly

and

fully

to

the text itself. Hermeneuticists

know,

some-

times more

tacitly

than

explicitly,

that,

if the reader

is to

hear

and

respond

to

the

text,

the text

itself-in detail

and as a

whole

and as

a

system

of

relationships

forming

of

details

a whole-this text must be

allowed to

speak

in

its

own

voice.

In

their

most

thoughtful

moments,

both structuralists and

hermeneuticists

realize,

with Robert

Funk,

that

the text cannot

speak

for itself if it is

not

painstakingly exegeted

in

its

own

context,

and it

cannot be

interpreted

if it

cannot

be

brought

into

intimate relation with

contemporary

modes

of

thought

and

experience

(Funk,

1964:181;

see also

Foust;

Scholes:9-10).

But one cannot focus

on

everything

at

once./29/

In

this the

scholar,

whether a traditional historical critic, a structuralist, or a hermeneuticist,

is no

better

off

than a child

at a

three-ring

circus-and

no

worse off

either.

We

do not

regard

the circus as

primarily

a

frustrating

experience

for

the

child,

nor

need

we

regard

the

scholarly

world as

primarily

such

for

ourselves.

Yet,

like the child

whose

head

spins

at the

circus,

we

would do

well to

shift

our

focus

occasionally,

to allow

our work

to

be

refreshed

by

tacit

knowledge coming

to

explicitness.

Structuralism

focuses

on

meaning

of,

on

meaning

in the

context

of

intertextual and intratextual relationships. Hermeneutics focuses on

meaning

for,

on

meaning

in

the context of the text-reader

relationship.

Because

both structuralism

and

hermeneutics

appreciate

the

importance

of context

to

meaning,

these two

approaches

to

meaning

should manifest

a

preunderstanding

of each

other, or,

to

change

the

figure,

should

perceive

a

common

structure

between

themselves,

and thus establish

a

creative

relationship.

Structuralism

might

guide

hermeneutics

away

from

a

premature

application

of

the

text to the reader. from

an

immature

abstraction

of the

text from

the

reader.

Both structuralism and herme-

neutics affirm

that all

textual

meaning

is

contextual

meaning.

Perhaps

both

structuralists

and

hermeneuticists need

to reaffirm that all

inquiry

is

interrelated.




18/25

Malbon:

Structuralism

223

NOTES

/1/ Compare (1) the model of a literary work (in the broadest sense of the

term)

as the interrelation

of

author, text,

reader,

world

presented

in

Malbon,

1980:321-22;

(2)

the

model of the coordinates of

art criticism

(work,

audience,

universe)

presented

by

Abrams

(especially

6);

and

(3)

the

maps

for

literary

critics

(central

point:

work;

cardinal

points:

author, reader,

information,

lan-

guage)

presented

by

Hernadi.

/2/

Polzin defines structuralism as an

approach

(1)

to

objects

as

whole,

self-

regulating

systems

of

transformations,

(2)

by

means of

hypothetical-deductive

models,

(3)

with

self-conscious awareness of the

personal, operational

structures

of the

subject

making

the

approach

(see

especially

1-2).

In

his

succeeding

evalu-

ations of what makes a

structural

analysis

structural, however,

Polzin focuses

primarily

on

the third

element,

the

relationship

of the

analyzing

subject

to the

analysis

(see

especially

38,33-34).

Polzin's

purpose

here-and

his model-is a

structural

analysis

of structural

analysis,

not

an evaluation

of

the

relationship

between

structuralism

and

hermeneutics.

/3/

An

earlier version of the

following typology

of structuralist

goals

was

presented

in

Malbon,

1980:318-21.

/4/

Lane

expresses

these

two

categories

not as

ideology

and

methodology

but

as theories and

methods ;

but note

Lane's use of

the

terms

philosophies

and

methods

(17)

and

ideology

(18).

/5/

I do

not mean

by

this to

ignore

the

possible

distinctions between

ideology

and

philosophy,

but

rather to

refer,

in

general

and with

neutrality,

to what

Robert Scholes identifies

and Robert

Polzin affirms

as structuralism

as

a

move-

ment of mind

(Scholes:1;

Polzin:iv,1).

/6/ Lane is here describing what he terms a theory as opposed to a

method.

See

note

4

above.

/7/

Cf. Scholes's

discussion of

structuralism

as

a

movement

of mind and

structuralism as a method

(1-12).

See also

Culley:169.

/8/

For

example,

Ehrmann:viii;

Lane:17-18;

Patte, 1976:19;

Spivey:144;

Wilder,

1974:11.

Among

the more

positive,

or at

least

neutral,

discussions

of

structuralism as an

ideology

are

Scholes:1-7;

Gardner:213-47;

McKnight:

295-312;

Detweiler:202-4,207.

/9/

This

distinction

between

theory

and

analysis

is

paralleled

by,

for

exam-

ple,

Patte and Patte's

distinction

between

theory

and

practice

or

fundamen-

tal research

and

applied

research

(1);

Patte's distinction

between

the search

for

universal structures and the

search for structures

which characterize

each

specific

narrative

(1980a:7);

Detweiler's distinction between

theory

and

application

(3-4,103,124);

Barthes's distinction

between

poetics

and

criti-

cism,

as discussed

by

Culler

(30-35).

/10/

This

appears

to be

the case

with

Spivey:135;

Robey:3;

Culler

(following




19/25

224

Journal

of

the American

Academy

of

Religion

Barthes):30-all

of whom are

commenting

in

the context

of

literary

structural-

ism.

Cf.

also

Calinescu:5,9,16,

on

poetics

(see

note

28

below).

/11/ See Polzin:34. Patte's discussion of five

types

of structuralist research

(1980a:7-9)

may

be

understood

as a

development

of the

various

relationships

between

theory

and

analysis: analysis

in

disregard

of

theory

(Patte's

type

1),

theory

in

isolation from

analysis

(type

2),

analysis

for the

sake

of

theory,

whe-

ther

inductive

or

deductive

(types

3

and

4),

and

analysis

in

the

light

of

theory

(type

5,

structural

exegesis ).

/12/

The term

methodology

is somewhat

problematic.

Whereas

methodol-

ogy

does seem an

appropriate

term

in

opposition

to

ideology,

that which sub-

divides into theory and analysis might more appropriately be labeled

methodology/method.

/13/

Cf.

Patte,

1976:3-6,

on

exegesis

and

hermeneutic. See also

Patte

and

Patte:vii,94;

and

Patte,

1980a:22.

/14/

My diagram

of

goals, although

developed

independently

of Pettit's tree

of

options

(54),

may

be

fruitfully compared

with it.

However,

Pettit's tree of

options

serves as an

evaluative tool

(54-64):

according

to

Pettit,

theory

fails-

generative theory

more

drastically

so than

descriptive

theory,

and

straight analy-

sis is uncontrolled, thus only systematic analysis is workable; there is only one

real

option

for

structuralism.

/15/

See

Glucksmann's five levels of

the

problematic,

or

conceptual

frame-

work,

of

structuralism-or of

any

theoretical

system,

listed

according

to

descending

levels

of abstraction

rather

than

a

hierarchy

of

determinacy

(10):

(1)

epistemology

[cf.

structuralism as an

approach

to

meaning],

(2)

philosophy

[cf.

philosophy

(or

ideology)],

(3)

theory

[cf.

theory],

(4)

methodology

[cf.

analy-

sis], (5)

description

[cf.

structural

exegesis].

Glucksmann stresses that

each

coher-

ent

thought system

includes

the five

mentioned

in

some form

(10).

/16/

See

structuralism, hermenuetics and contextual meaning

Documents