Structure and History of Military-Political Power in South Africa*

Cape Town ECO Military Research Group, 18th May 1986.

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■ ..tcr .;ii: "egraaf, near Paul Rouxin the Free State. -• " t-t whichtime it was named the Gt ' ' .r. hadsplit away from the coaliii;,i v. . in ±943 Botha waselected MP for George— the same year that Vorster was— and two years later received his first responsible job in the Party, that of organising the elections in South-West Africa to strengthen the small Nat majority. SWA returned six Nationalist MPs.

Botha had built his reputation by taking part in the disruption of U.P. meetings; hard-working, he sc:n became known as competent and was made Deputy Minister for Internal Affairs and Coloured Affairs on the 23rd of Octobcr 1958. He seems to have had c jealous and dictatorial attitude towards his newly-acquired power, but accounts agree on his reputation for efficiency. On the 2nd of August 1961 he was made a full Minister (a ai: on the same day as Vorster), and was also gi-vcn the portfolio of Cctrrcunity development which supervised forced removals. B^tha ,ir.s the man responsible for administering the destruction of District 6, an action reputedly recommended by the Directorate of Military Intelligence for political purposes.

On the 5th of April 1966, Botha was given the portfolio of Defence, one which had been growing in significance throughout the 1960s after humble beginnings; it was an important step up for him. (Incidentally, at that time the young Colonel Magnus Maian was commanding South—West Africa Command.) The Chief of the South African Defence Force was General Hiemstra, who delivered an evaluation on defence preparedness in September of that month. The general thrust of the evaluation was that terrorism was on the increase and was dangerous and that, thus, greater defence preparedness was needed.It was hardly a new or clever analysis.

lor the first tine, though, the Defence pc-+fo?io in thi* of a capable of carrying out such demands* int Jiijiji' had grown enormously over the previous five years, without any corresponding administrative reform. Outside the SADP; important groups were forming; in 1963 the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research had formed

o, Ka.'tiontil Rocket Insti‘tut6# In 19b4 the -.unitions Production Board had been set up and automatic rifles were being made in South Africa. Nov; Botha coordinated the foundation of Armscor, with an initial investment of some 35 million rands. In March 1967 Botha visited Portugal, inspecting armaments factories and meeting the dictator Salazar; the two dccided that the n tions ought to cooperate more

• i : • -ti-:of the military completely under luilit-ry control by turning the civilian Secretariat of Defence into the military Logistics Staff Division. The trend of Botha's administrative reforms seemed to lead towards a completely autonomous SADF, supported, but not necessarily controlled, by those civilian leaders not closely in contact with it. Almost certainly he was guided in his reforms by his friends in the military.

Troubles for South Africa were mushrooming all over the subcontinent Since I960 in Angola, and since 1964 in Mozambique, the Portuguese colonialists had been fighting a losing war against resistance movements. South Africa herself was faced with guerrilla war in Namibia, beginning officially on the 26th of August 1966. The SAP could handle this at first (though the SADF gradually replaced them, taking overall control in 1973), and were also sent to Rhodesia (their presence being announced by Vorster on the 8th of August 1967). More drastic measures were needed, though; in February 1969 South Africa was asked for aid by the Portuguese Minister of Defence General Rebelo, and responded generously with troops, equipment, commanders and money, partly in defence of the Cahora Bassa project. This put much pressure on the South African military machine; through the 1960s time in the SADP was gradually extended, from 3 months to 9, while the ballot system,by which only some of those eligible actually served, was abolished. In 1972 service time was made a full year, with19 days' training per year over five years.

Administrative reform proceeded alongside these dramatic increases in the strength and scope of the SADP. In 1972 the SADP was given a potentially important role when the State Security Council was formed with military officers on it, though the SSC was fundamentally a creature of the Bureau for State Security. (The Bureau for State Security, the successor to Republican Intelligence, had been founded by Vorster and was led by a crony of his who had been with him in Koffiefontein internment camp, General Van Den Bergh, former head of the Security Branch.) The Supreme Command was rationalised as the Defence Command Council. Next year the South African Defence College was founded as a training school and think-tank.

It is interesting that, consciously or not, Vorster and Botha had led similar lives with high points at similar times. If Vorster, the former Minister of Police, had his confidant in General Van Den Bergh, Botha had his in the dynamic young Chief of the Army (since 1973),Lieutenant-General Llagnus Kal&n. I:alan t-.no Botha made a strong combination and were cloi - friend; . R* J.&ly, V( ster and Van Den •

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::o •..vtr, hi: supreme efficand as leader of the C&r^^gion of the National I arty .ensured iris survival. Now more than ever South Africa faced trouble; in 1972 a deputation of generals visited Angola and found the situation there dangerous for South Africa* In June 1973 South Africa stopped aid for Portugal. Portugal protested, and learned that the conditions for continued aid were simple; she must build some corvettes for the South African Navy, although this would give her trouble in NATO. Portugal agreed, but Salazar died and the dictatorship began falling to pieccc. When South Africa made further threats, the Portuguese dithered, and South Africa decided to turn to coastal defence forces, and to face the fact that Portugal would be defeated.

Defeat came from an unexpected quarter; on the 24th of April 1974 the comparatively left-wing General Spinola seized power from the moribund fascists, holding free elections a year later which returned the Communist Party to a short spoil of power. Mozambique became independent on the 26th of June 1975, and South Africa recognised the Frelimo government, but Angola was a much hotter potato. The Army feared that SWAPO would have a free hand if the radical MPLA took power, as seemed likely. (The Bureau of State Security was more optimistic about SWAPO*s potential power.) In July 1975 Vorster and Van Den Bergh met secretly to discuss answers to the questions.

The answer seemed to be to back Unita, a rebel movement with which South Africa had cooperated because of Unita's hatred for SWAPO. Vein Den Bergh immediately left the country to canvass sunport for Unita. Only three days later was Botha told of the plans} he almost certainly would have x)ref erred something more ambitious.

After all, South Africa had a tailor-made excuse for intervening in Angola; there were 430 Cuban advisers with the KPLA. On the 8th of August 1975, South African troops entered Angola (clashing with Unita, which hadn't been told of the project) and took control of the town of Caluesue, ostensibly to safeguard the Ruacana water project. Actually

they began training Unita troops for the coming civil w§.r; the operation was under the overall command of Major-General Viljoon, later chief of the SADP. On the 3rd of October Unita completed its training and moved north, with South African technical and transportassistance. 7/hen they first encountered the KPLA, two days later, itwas d ear *thsi f> - ***LA v.r r * v r - t t h e y ; all the South

the wishes of .. -irvene directly.

•.? * to beginoperations on the 14th of October, On that day (task Force Zulu, a motly group of Unita and South African infantry with a little artillery and armour began pushing up the Angolan coast. On the 25th, the MPLA began to realise what was going on, denouncing the foreigners who were involving themselves, but it was too late for rhetoric; on the 29th another force, Foxbat, pressed into the Angolan interior with strong armour and artillery support. On the 4th of November, Malan flew in to Angola to supervise the operations there. Joint MPLA/Cuban forces had set up a strong defence line outside Ltisnda, and the South Africans realised that they couldn't break it without heavy casualties. On the 7th, 141mm artillery was flown in with the purpose of bombarding Luanda, but they lacked the range. Even bombers were used once, without success.

At the end of a perilously long supply line, the South Africans outside Luanda were now very vulnerable. The original plan had called for a halt by the 11th of November if success wasn't gained, but Savimbi flew to Pretoria on the 10th and persuaded Vorster to continue. By the 2nd of December, though, even Botha realised that the 3 000 South African troops involved should withdraw. The decision was finally made on the 14th of January 1976, and by the 27th of March the last South African soldiers crossed the Cunene into South African- controlled territory. Botha was present at the withdrawal ceremony, along with Malan, Lt-General Rogers (later Chief of the Air Force), Major-General Viljoen and Major-General Webster, later Chief of Staff Personnel. This assemblj’- of Botha's power-base couldn't hide the fact that he had suffered a catastrophe. Kis successful exploitation of Vorster's temporary weakness had only shown that the stupid policemen had been more correct than the clever generals. Ix mignt have been the beginning of Botha's eclipse.

Instead, through a chain of lucky events, it was the beginning of his rise to supreme power. In June 1976 the school boycott in Soweto

turned into revolt. The SAP responded with availing violence, and it was apparent that South Africa's survival in its conventional form still depended on the military po'.ver which only Botha could be relied on to organise. The Minister of Police, the reactionary nincom;oooT> Jimmy Kruger, lacked the intelligence or character to inspire the public with confidence. Botha was the government's ctr

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"r'z bccame a sxz.ll though vital p*rt 01 t. brjuL political, economic and psychological conflict.

This laid the foundations for the policy which Botha was to follow, but there was no certainty that he would gain power. Though Vorster was growing old, his heir apparent was the young and erratically brilliant Minister for Information, Connie Mulder, who had worked closely with Van Den Bergh in a complex, multimillion rand attempt to improve South Africa’s image at home and abroad. Unfortunately for the National Party, much of this cluster of operations was kept secret, and much of it affected the South African public directly, such as the clandestine funding of the newspaper The Citizen and the magazine Pace.

Botha claims to have known nothing of the Information Scandal before it broke, but some have suggested that the details given to journalists which uncovered the scandal were supplied by military men. Certainly the Scandal »s effect was catastrophic; Vorster actually grew ill under the strain of constantly lying to Parliament and in the Press. It seems that this was what made it possible, in May 1978, for Botha to cement his popularity with the South African public by launching Operation Reindeer, the first anti-SWAPO invasion of Angola. Significantly this happened directly after the Western Contact Group had offered a Namibian settlement to South Africa. Perhaps Botha merely wanted to torpedo the settlement; perhaps he only wished to make more trouble for Vorster; in addition, the Army had been calling for an invasion since the previous year.

On the 20th of September 1978 Vorster resigned, knowing that in a few months the details of the Scandal would come out. Kis chief ally, Van Den 3ergh, was implicated in the Scandal and had been called before an investigatory commission. Vorster's last hope lay with Mulder, also implicated but possessing a strong powerbase in the Transvaal and unscrupulous enough to suppress evidence of the scandal. Fortunately

for -■ .¥/. Botha’s fortunes, Pik Botha drev; the fire of the more liberal potential Mulder supporters by standing for Prime Minister himself, and P.m. Botha scuesked hone with a handful of votes# He became Prime Minister on the 28th. It took him come time to destroy Mulder, who was finally expelled from the National Party on the 6th of April 1979.Two months later Vorster re'signed as St Pr« it. Botlia's victor •

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greater importance in the state security network.One of Botha's tasks was to streamline the chaotic administration of

the Vorster government, to ensure the unity which total strategy demanded. He cut the standing cabinet committees from 20 to 4, chief among these the State Security Council. The number of governmental departments was slashed from 40 to 22. On the 22nd of November 1979 the entire cabinct participated ih a large gathering of business leaders at the Carlton Centre, where Botha announced his 'constellation of states' concept and appealed for business to help with the reform process.

Of course, not everything in the garden was rosy. A total arms boycott hrd been in force since the 4tli of November 1977 (right after Steve Biko's death) and though Armscor was growing steadily it couldn't always fully support the SADP's heeds. The Southern African Development Coordination Council was founded less than two months after the Carlton Conference. Despite the efforts of Botha and Muzorewa (and the near­intervention of the 3ADF to save the latter from defeat), Mugabe had gained power in Zimbabwe. Still, the lean, efficient Botha government faced the future with a firm determination to destabilize and massacre its way to peace.

Considerations and Structure of the Botha Government.

One of the most interesting places where Botha's regional strategy has operated has been Namibia. There, the Democratic Turnhally Alliance was formed as an alternative to SWAPO. Both this and its successor the Multi-Party Conference badly needed to win legitimacy so that it could overcome SWAPO at the polls. Unfortunately this hone was doomed from the start; legitimacy could only be gained by ending apartheid and encouraging true democracy, and even then the Rhodesian experience pointed out the risks for the Botha government. The right-

wing whites in Namibia, though, with their party Aletur and their wide connections in South Africa used the Administrator-General to prevent this from coining about. However the Namibians wriggled, they remained mere pupnets of 'retoria.

Botha, here ce elsewhere, turned'the military against the political questions to achicve complete confasion. The events of 3 978 haver *| •%»,-. r A Va/j. rr - 4 < 4_ v >, • • *i .

jq± 3 t r tv cjt c Dv% *' o7"i r*> 4 '■> y* * "its heaviest raid into Angola. In Au ivevisited the UN Military Command in New York t.o.discuss peacekeeping forces prior to Namibian independence; that month yet another enormous invasion was undertaken. In June of that year, the South African Government had announced support for Cuban 'linkage'; the idea that the Cubans should leave Angola before South Africa left Namibia. While South Africa occupied Angola, the Angolans couldn't afford to ditch the Cubans, so the fulfilling of South African demands for peace rested on South Africa's own actions. This was the culmination of a long-standing policy which fits perfectly with the psychological aspects of total strategy.

This is the theory, of course. Botha must also appear strong +•. his Afrikan public. As he has disseminated reformist rhetoric he musv -Iso show that he retains kragdadigheid. He must also give the SAD? scne crumbs of glory in its long and difficult Namibian war. Hence the occupation of Namibia also serves Botha from simple political ends. This is why the regime wasn't troubled when Botha's visit to Europe failed to legitimise the MFC, and why so much South African propaganda, like Magnus Malan's recent warnings about possible invasions from Angola, seem like mere mindless ranting. It's what the public wants!

The military are dominant in the Botha government, but not wholly. (Pig. I.) Botha, unquestionably, is the man in cha.rge. Under him is hi; old friend and protege, General Magnus Malan, veteran of Mozambique, Angola, Algeria, Namibia, Rhodesia and now South Africa, one of the most experienced anti-guerrilla fighters in the world. There are perhaps three other men in the Cabinet of comparable importance—Chris Heunis, F W de Klerk, and Botha's probable crown prince, Dr Gerrit Viljoen, Minister of Education and Development. A little below this level are aspirants like Adriaan Vlok and has-beens like Pik Botha. Well below are Louis le Grange and the rest of the Cabinet, below them the National Party in the House of Assembly, below them

the majority parties in the House of Delegatee and House of Representatives, and below then (a long way below) the voters and the rest of the people, theoretically distinct but actually almost identical in power.

There are less visible powers. One of the more interesting systems for by-passing conventional chr.nr.elp i the Defence Advisor. Council;i t *' ?V?lud e

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it seems to oe a convenient means of liason between government and big business.

Decidcdly stronger than this i3 the State Security Council, the only Cabinet Committee chaired by the State President. Ministers not invited onto the Committee may not sit on it, nor need its decisions be circulated even within the Cabinet— both unique provisos. The SSC’s role is "...to advise the Government concerning the formulation of national policy and strategy in connection with the security of the Republic...". The word ‘advise’ is used, but the SSC includes the State President, Minister of Justice, Minister for Law and Order, Minister of Defence, Chief of the SADF, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Commissioner- General of the SAP, the head of the Rational Intelligence Service, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, the Secretary of Justice and any other persons who may be invited by the State President. Effectively it is a political powerhouse weighted towards the military.

Under the SSC are the Joint Management Councils, mostly led by military men, which liase between smaller regions and the SSC and are empowered to carry out SSC decisions. The Department of the State President manages SSC work, under which is an SSC Work Committee, a Secretariat, 15 interdepartmental committees and the National Joint Planning Centre which coordinates the JMCs. (These JMCs may have points of contact with the Regional Service Councils as well as with the headquarters of military Commands— and the RSCs are also appointed bodies.) The Secretary of the SSC is General Van Der Westhuizen, formerly Chief of Staff (Intelligence). His predecessor was General van Deventer, formerly Chief of Staff (Finance). With these strong liasons with the military and already-organised channels of control down to regional level, the SSC has the capacity to become the supreme power in the land, if it hasn’t already done so, and this power is likely to be expressed, fundamentally, through the military.

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National Joint Planning Centre

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Voters and People

The Total Onslaught, the Total Strategy and the SADF.

What is the Total Onslaught?

This concept entered the political arena in the early 3 9 70c,

^ouuhtrn rica ib being violently transformed into a Marxist state and South Africa is the last foothold of Christian, democratic, civilised values in Southern Africa. Essentially elementary fears are exploited by stressing virulent anti-communism.

The Total Onslaught is manifested in armed violence from across South Africa's borders and internal revolution (terrorism.and agitation). It is supposedly channelled through proxy forces like the SAC? and the ANC.

What is the Total Strategy?

The Total Onslaught is seen as fact, thus a total strategy becomes a rational necessity. The Total Strategy is a security policy implemented to cope with the danger. Coordination of government action in all areas in the internal and external defense of South Africa is the object. All available means must be utilised in the mobilisation of the nation's resources for war.

All levels and functions of South African society are affected. The scope covers anything deemed a matter of "national security"— thus the boundary between civil and military issues blurs. There is a role for senior military personnel in the civil government because they are experts in the matter of the onslaught.

The Background of the Total Strategy.

Total Strategy relies on South African studies of the conflicts in Vietnam, Malaya and Algeria. The theories of the French General Andre Beaufre, current in the 1960s, are very important— they contain manyof the ideas on which Totsl Strategy is based. Beaufre is taught at

10.I

the Joint Defence College (& training centre and SADF think tank).Beaufre reduces strategy to a dialectic of wills: it's the will to

fight that is all-important. This will to fight should be manifested on all levels of socicty. The ultimate aim of the enemy is undermining the will— creating moral disintegration. (Kcncc the cmnhasis on the values threatened by the Total Qnrlau'-rht.) There is thus r. need f or a

see:, as aix-cmc.racing— touching ill the different aspects of society. Socicty is interdependent. It is necessary to align all national policies and to identify actions that aid military purposes across the board.

Why is Total Strategy Important?

Externally, South Africa is viewed as an important piece in the East-West conflict. This offers an excuse for South African interference in the affaire of other Southern African states via expansionism, destabilisation and assorted acts of terrorism. Total Strategy legitimises the raids that take place in the same way that the raids legitimise the need for a Total Strategy. Southern Africa can be seen as a whole— all states are drawn into the South African orbit— the "Constellation of States".

Internally, security of the state becomes the supreme goal. Sacrifices of rights and freedoms in the interests of protection and long-term interests can be called for.

The Total Strategy offers a way of dealing with the current situation— by placing the blame elsewhere. South Africa’s problems become more respectable. (The situation is not of our making.)

National character is defined in terms of the State's interests— if one opposes the State, one is viewed as un-South African, becoming an alien, an agitator/terrorist, the tool and dupe of external enemy forccs. Political protest is viewed as selfish overemphasis on questionable rights, anti-South African in its aversion to the status quo and in its disregard of one's obligations to one's country. (Thus an important part of Total Strategy is a program of psuedo-reform to emphasise that grievances aren't legitimate.)

The SADP is a political tool, although in terms of the way in which national interests are defined, it can be described as remaining

‘aloof from sectionalism and political affiliations.

Total Strategy and the image of the SADF.

As we’ve seen, national character ic- defined in term- of the way national interests are served. The imc^e of th* :'.D? expresses this.

. - ■ ' ctoi nc living symbol o_' the st at < an the representative of all who ewe loyalty to it. The SAD? is presented as a "peoples' defence force”— protecting the interests of the South African people and drawing from different national groups— white conscripts, blacks, coloureds and Indians.

In the context of the 2-way relationship seen to exist between the nation and the army, the ’’unifying role" of the SADF becomes very important. The SADF is seen as a valuable, constructive part of national life— achieved through, for example, culture, sport, Civic Action and so forth. (Civic Action includes teachers, doctors and agricultural specialists playing a "constructive role" while spreading propaganda. They work mostly in rural areas, especially burder areas.) This accommodates people to the military, welding the army and the state closer together and legitimising the Total Strategy.

The SADF is also seen as a means of inspiring the nation. (One can consider the image ascribed to the SADF— the glorification of its structures and role, and the way in which it’s seen to represent the ultimate ideal of service to country.)

In terms of the Total Strategy, the SADF’s ability to inspire and unify becomes almost as important as its military capacity. There is a close relationship between the state and the army; peoples' attitudes are reflected in the SADF and vice versa. Thus there is an emphasis on loyalty and morale: in pride in way of life, traditions and the values of society which are of paramount importance.

This can be related to Beaufre's emphasis on the crucial importance of the attitude of one's side: the will to fight, which the enemy seeks to undermine and the importance of stressing the values one has to protect in the face of the enemy onslaught.

Thus, something like an anti-conscription movement is perceived as a threat, because it conveys the notion that the SADF is not an army that everyone would choose to fight in, which clashes with the ideology constructed around the SADF. It's seen as an attempt to weaken the all-important morale and present possibilities to South Africa's

%enemies.

She Shifting Hole of the SAD?.

It is traditionally external. The SADF offers "orotection from the foreign threat and maintains territorial integrity.

This contrasts to the SAP, which is internal, protecting thestructure of society, preventing crime and maintaining law and order,

' :that media fosters this image— T/, V.illem Steenkamp, etc.) There hasn't been the same effort made to construct an image for -the SAP and anyway, their image has been increasingly eroded. Most pro-SAP propaganda involves making excuses for them.

Keanwhile there is an escalating civil war with an increased internalisation of the army's function as it takes up the traditional SAP role of preserving law and order as friend of the people and guardian of their day-to-day interests. Thus, gradually, a new type of idealisation is being woven around the SADF.

The Results of Total Strategy.

There is grassroots and community-level resistance to the new constitution that grew’ out of the Total Strategy. Thus, in the way it embodied the new constitution, Total Strategy contained the making of its own downfall.

There is also a challenge of social structures: a refusal to acknowledge the government as leaders and to accept the set-up they've imposed on South Africa. Attempts are made to make South Africa ungovernable. So, essentially w’hat we have is a dual patriotism; two conflicting views about what bein^ a true South African is all about. (This establishing of a vision of a true South Africa is something that’s onljr reached full fruition under Total Strategy.

It's thus increasingly hard for the State to respond effectively to this sort of reaction® It can only clamp down on specific manifestations of protest, but not on the now-established ideal. Also as time goes on this crisis of legitimacy will intensify and it will become increasingly difficult for the State to define the Total Onslaught satisfactorily in terms of this grassroots resistance.

The Structure of the Defencc Family.■ ■■ I— . — M— i . , ■■ - i .1 . . . . .............. — .......................... . —

The South African Defence Force.

The Chief of the v'-.U?, Scr.er* 1 Gclfienhuys. ir r.t the top. 3c:

ifclj:;;; .j'c: 0 i •, ■- a u K ■ ; vi- i 1 Svli-U Xii6 Cnief CiStaff (Operations) who is in charge of the Defence Force Staff Operations.

Inferior to this body is the Defence Staff Council (DSC) with the Chief of the SADF, all Chiefs of Staff, the Chaplain-General and the Director-General of Resources who oversees logistics. The DSC manages the internal running of the armed forces.

The Defence Planning Committee (DPC), formed in 1976, includes the chiefs of the armed services, the Chiefs of Staff for Operations, Logistics and Finance and the Chairman and Senior General Manager of Armscor. The DPC oversees procurement, budgeting and economic planning (via a series of five-year plans) for the SADF, under the overall control of the DCC.

The Defence Advisory Council (DAC) assembles the Minister of Defence, the President of the Armaments Board (part of Armscor) and the Chief of the Defence Force together with various civilian businessmen. Set up in 1973» it commuiiicates between military, government, business and the state security apparatus.

Under these bodies, and under the Chief of the Defence Force, are five Staff Divisions— those of Personnel, Intelligence, Operations, Logistics and Finance— which carry out short-term plannihg and management.

Since 1974 the Logistics Staff Division has handled all material matters like the procurement and maintenance of equipment and the movement and quartering of personnel; its head is the Quartermaster- General. The Finance Staff Section under the Comptroller has nine Directorates— perhaps more now that there are more Commands— with wide managerial and computorial powers, and controls all purse-strings in the SaDF. The Personnel Staff Division handles personnel uud recruitment for the SADF. It also cooperates with civilian groupings like the Southern Cross Fund and the cadet corps, thus controlling

military socialisation. The Operations Staff Division manages the actual operations, civilian and military, of the SADF, obviously managing such things as raids and invasions.

Perhaps the most important Staff Division from the SCO's point of vie', is the Intelligence Staff Division, which was set ur* as the Directorate of lit&ry Inte3 :• 61. Its formation was

comprised Dkl, Dril (Military Counterintelligence Directorate) and ASH (Military Information Service) which handles military propaganda, archives (including those of Armscor) and other information services. Attached to this Staff Division is the Foreign Relations Directorate, which runs South African military diplomatic attaches, cooperates with foreign attaches and organises intelligence strategy and civil defence. The whole Staff Division collects, interprets and evaluates intelligence of a military nature.

Below these bodies fall the Services. The Chief of the Army commands, trains and administers the army under the SCO’s supervision. Since 197'C the SAA has comprised two divisions of seven brigades— this beir its conventional-warfare component. A brigade amounts to about 4 CjO troopi, but one should remember that in 1971 there were 132 PF an<" 226 CF (Permanent Force and Citizen Force) units and that most of these would have been committed to these two divisions, so that their actual numbers may be larger. There were also 218 Commando units, for counter-insurgency warfare; this force has recently been revamped under the banner of ’area defence* and now tends to operate inside South Africa. The conventional arms of service include the armour, infantry, artillery, anti-aircraft artillery and engineering, each of which arms are further subdivided according to the functions of the troops making up the arms.

There used to be 9 military districts. Recently Northern Transvaal Command has split into Eastern and Western, while Northern Cape Command has been created and Southern Cane merged with Western Cape. These changes probably reflect, like the new support given to the Commandoes, the SADF's new concern with South Africa's border defence. The officers commanding Commands are usually brigadiers, and all units in those Commands fall under them as far as training, housing, administration, discipline and counter-insurgency operations go, all ultimately under the control of Army HQ in Pretoria. The plum job in

the 3AA, though, is not & Command, but the control of the occupation forces in northern Kamibia. South-'-Yest Africa. Command was headquartered at Windhoek (it may now fall under the SWA Territory Force) whereas the Operational Area, entirely dominated by South Africa, is a separate region ruled from Oshakati. This poet tends to be unwardly mobile—the. -es; V ',-.1 leaded fro th +

Durban (the Strike Craft Flotilla); the SAK*s large vessels, all now scrapped or decommissioned, were formerly also based at Simonstown.The Navy also patrols harbours and the coast with various small craft and minesweepers. The 9 Protection Units of the Marines protect 42 National Key Points (many of these harbours) and also send units to the Operational Area. In 1984 an average of 15 Marines a day aided the SAP and SARP, while 300 each day were guarding key points. The Navy may be seen as the junior servicc; significantly, it is English-dominated.

The Air Force is not broken into commands by area except in the field of administration. It has functional commands including Strike Command (which operates combat aircraft), Transport Command (which operates all transport aircraft), Light Aircraft Command (small aircraft and helicopters, cooperating with the Army) and Maritime Command (coastal patrol aircraft and helicopters cooperating rr’ith the Navy and sometimes operating from SAN vessels). Support units include Training Command, Tactical Support Command (possibly airfield defence) and Logistics Command. There is also a radar chain currently being upgraded, based at Devon near Johannesburg, which is intended to control all South African airspace.

Though technically part of the Army, the Reconnaissance Commando (Special Forces) falls directly under the Chief of the SADF and is almost autonomous.

The Medical Service (separated from the rest in 1979) handles the 3Military Hospitals and the specialised medical training of medical/personnel, who are then seconded to units throughout the SADF.

There are mans'- training centres, of which the most important is probably the Military Academy at Saldanha. This trains all senior officers of all services, offering a B. Mil for ranks of Major (Lieutenant-Commander in the Navy) and up. The South African Defence College (established 1973) is the think-tank of the armed forces,•>along with the Joint Defence College which formulates policy and offers

courses to non-military personnel. Both are in Pretoria.The South African Army College at Voortrekkerhoogte trains senior

Army officers, while the Army Battle School at Lohatla trains large conventional forces (including air-to-ground warfare training for the SAA?). The Danie Thcron Combat School rt Kimberley trains commandoes.

The Air Force College trains p e r n t orcr. officcr; for the SA'JP,

l in in c is scattered .... the c ies.As to the training of National Servicemen, there are eight infantry

battalions, an artillery battalion, an anti-aircraft battalion, a parachute battalion and various other smaller units for specialist functions. Many of these latter units fall under the enormous Services Corps which handles supply and high-level maintenance. All these units feed their troops into the Citizen Force after their two years is complete.

The politicisation of troops during their two years is important. Their psychological conditioning is controlled by the Military Psychological Institute which 'ensures cultural enrichment'. The College of Educational Technology (Colet) together with 15 instructional media centres at other training schools distribute media, often crude political propaganda, to the troops. Other internal media like Paratus and Uniform help in t his field.

This politicisation must be aided in the civilian field, and the SADF cooperates closely with newsmen, especially the radio and TV.Other civilian areas where the SADF is concerned are the Southern Cross Fund supporting the SADF with over 250 branches nationwide, and the Cadets, where the SADF cooperates with the Department of National Education. In 1979 there were 626 cadet corps with 154 000 pupils and this expands yearly. Teachers are trained at the Danie Theron Combat School. This education is supplemented by the paramilitary Voortrekkcrs and the 'veldskoole' organised in some regions.

Civil Defence is a less overt but perhaps more important field of politicisation. There are 633 National Key Points, many of which (factories, etc.) provide their own military -units. In 1970 the Army took over Civil Defence and by 1977 657 local authorities had civil defence units. All reservists are liable for duty on these, and SADF troops may be seconded to them in emergency. There is also the Military Radio Network (MARKET) in the rural areas, linking farms under threat.

In 1982, after the system had been tested in Namibia, the Northern, Par-Northern and Eastern Transvaal were given operational MARNET systems. In 1984 the N or th-Y/e stern Transvaal and Eastern Province gained them, and the Free State should have one by 198 6. (It is easy to see that EARNET is aimed as much against internal strife as against external rttack.) There are nov 83 st.-tior vith 2 655 users.

Citizen Force heeerve after one's 14 years are done, with 12 days* training in at least five years uhtilohe is 55. At 55 Commandoes and members of the ACFR pass to the National Reserve until 65. Thus one is training for war from puberty to senility!

In spite of this, there is a personpower shortage in the SADF.The expansion of the Women's College at George may have helped to reduce this, but women make up only a small fraction of the SADF, and the armed forces are reluctant to send them into combat.

Originally this problem was solved by opening the SADF to blacks. Some 40 000 Coloureds joined the Cape Corps for the Second World War, but this force was disbanded in 1949 because it was a centre of anti- Nationalist activism. The Corps was re-established in 1963, and after a slow start it grew to have much prestige in the community; 2 737 tried to join in 1982 and nearly 4 000 in 1985. By 1972 the SACC was giving its troops combat training. In 1974 an Indian Naval Corps was set up.

Keanwhile, also in 1974, 21 (Black) Battalion was established at Lenz. The next year blacks were allowed to join the Permanent Force. Unfortunately, the Military Disciplinary Code had said that whites didn't have to salute senior officers who weren't white, and in 1975 this was altered. The SADF did, though, soften the blow for racists who might dislike saluting blacks— they placed the ceiling on black promotion at staff-sergeant!

In 1977 Cape Corps troops began joining the Citizen Force, while Indians and Coloureds became eligible for naval officers' courses. In that year, too, the SACC went to the Operational Area, and next year coloured raratrocps began training. 1978 was the year that the Government tried to introduce coloured cadets, perhaps to soften the path for coloured conscription, but resistance was strong and this wasnever .accomplished.

By 1981 the SACC and the Indian volunteers had salary levels equal

to those of white personnel in most areas, although they differed in perquisites. Black salary levels were lower.

Ethnic black battalions v;ere also set up (21 Bn was not tribal). These include 121 (Zulu) battalion at Dukuduku, 111 (Swazi) battalion at Amsterdam, 112 (Venda) battalion at Kadimbo (now the Venda Defence Force), 113 (Shangaan) battalion at l .tabr Rsnch, 116 (Korth Sotho)

troops).It was envis gea that by 1992 18 black battalions would exist, but

not many Joined those that were set up, and organisations like Inkatha tended to have a stronger attraction for potential volunteers. Black battalions have failed to come up to expectations. However, one should not forget that the mere cxistcnce of such battalions is an important propaganda point for the South African Government in its struggle to confusc real issues of political conflict.

Coloured battalions have expanded. In 1983 about 6?c of the ?? was coloured. The SAN was 16,8$ coloured and 7,6£ Indian. In 1986 the size of the SACC was doubled while coloureds were permitted to attend Infantry School at Oudtschoorn. The 1986 Defence Y'hite Paper revealed the extent of black participation in the Commandoes (the existence of a coloured commando at Queenstown was revealed in 1985). of the Commandoes are coloured, 3# Indian, and 2$ black.

Armscor.

Armscor was established about 1967. The Armaments Development and Production Act of 1980 ensures that information about this company will be as scarce as possible, and thus little hard data is available, but the details of investment speak for themselves:year million. R — year million R year million R1967 23 1975 296 1981 12351969 52 1977 689 1982 14501971 68 1979 921 1983 15911973 102 1980 1178 1984 1571

Armscor is an important communications link between business andgovernment; the Chairman and Chief Executive sit on the DAC, while the Board includes the Director-General of Finance and the Chief of the

SADF. It is an autenomous state corporation accountable to the ministry of Defence through the Llinistcr and the Defence Planning Committee. It doesn't allow trade unions, hut there is full and eoual medical aid for all through Krygmed, and there are non-racial pensions and housing loans. There is much contracted foreign labour— up to 10?- of Atlas Aircraft, for instance. About 105 000 workers, half of then sck, work in- 5 600 subsidiary. [oi h 190 ai regular sul

■i-lopxro for electro-optical equipment (lasers, night vision and TV), Naschem for large calibre ammunition, Bosko-p for bombs and grenades, Some hem and Krantzko-p for rockets, explosives and propellants, ' Swartklip for pyrotechnics, Musgrave for ammunition and rifles and Sandock-Austral for vehicles and shipping. SA30L and Iscor are linked to Armscor. About 70$t of Armscor’s operations in 1982, though, were sub-contracted. It is the 3rd biggest corporation in South Africa, and the largest arms producer in the hemisphere.

However, it isn't wholly -South African. In 1930 B500 million, or 25^ of the defence budget, went abroad. In 1981 210 million, or 15$, and Armscor oversees this spending. Foreigh corporations also helped set up the industries; Th3rssen-Henschel (Germany) helped with the Sandock-Austral armoured vehicle plants, and AECI helped with explosives. Other companies involved are Erikson-Ford, Daimler-Benz and Toyota (vehicles), Fuchs, AEG-Telefunken and Messerschmidt (radar and communications), Barlow Rand (armour), Siemens (electronics), IBM (computers), Sperry-Rand (aBrospace and communications), General Motors, Leyland, Mitsubishi and others. In 1978 the PE General Motors plant was declared a national key point. Clearly the nation isn't wholly self-sufficient.

Nevertheless there is an extensive research and development programme proceeding at enormous cost to close the gaps. Research groups arc operating at the CSIR, Paardefontein, the Institute for Marine Technology and Verwoerdburg, with test ranges at Bordjesrif,St Lucia, the Overberg a.nd De Hoop. Regions of requirement include long-range aircraft, combat pi nes, heavy tanks, advanced electronics an8 submarine s.

In 1965 SAFARI If a nuclear reactor bought from America, became operational, and the USA give South Africa 230kg of fuel. In 1968, reputedly, another reactor, SAFARI II, went critical. Between 1973and September 1975 the German governmental company STEAG cooperated

mm ■

with:the Atonic Energy Board to help build the jet-nozzle uranium enrichment plant at Valindaba. Framatome, a French company, supplied South Africa with two nuclear reactors for the Koeberg power station. This should be seen in the context of South Africa’s two nuclearweapons scares— a threatened test in 1977, and a claimed test in 3 980. (South Africor; adviser.: \ erf. vrt scr.t st a IQS?/ nuel ec.r w£?;-oon

T

Strength of the Defence Force.

This may be an over-estimate, because accurate figures aren't released, but these figures show a significant growth. They refer to the standing operational force (PF, NSK, mobilised GF and commandoes.) I960 1967 1974 1977 197911 500 42 000 47 000 105 000 180 000

The Institute for Strategio Studies says that our inflation rate is about 215 , so that increases in the defence budget are partially compensated for by this; it is now over 5 ,2 billion (i960 about 21 million).

Army— 76 000, 290 000 reserve plus 130 000 Commandoes.Equipment— 250 Centurion/01ifant tanks, 1 600 armoured cars,

1 500+ Ratel infantry combat vehicles, 1 500+ Buffel etc. armoured personnel carriers. 30 25-pounder, 75 141mm, 40 G-5, 10 G-6 guns.127 multiple rocket launchers, 120 120mm mortars. 120 ENTAC anti-tank guided missiles, an unknown number of Milan missiles of similar type (but more modem). 55 twin 35mm AA guns. 20 Cactus and 54 Ti^ercat surface-to-air missiles. Possibly 150 90mm anti-tank guns.

Navy— 9 030 (900 marines?)Equipment— 3 Daphne class submarines, 10 Minister of Defence

(Israeli Reshef) missile-carrying patrol boats, 9 other patrol boats, 30 harbour patrol craft (Namacurra class), 6 minesweepers, 1 replenish -ment ship carrying helicopters (one more recently launched). 3 smrll missile-carrying patrol boats (Dvora class) may be on order.

Air Force— 13 000.Equipment— 5 Canberra, 6 Buccaneer bombers. 38 (possibly 60)

Kirage FI supersonic combat aircraft, 45 (possibly 73) Mirage III,239 (338?) Im-oala jet trainers and bombers, 12 (15?) Super Prelon heavy helicopters, 50 Puma medium helicopters, 80 (110?) Alouette III light helicopters, 7 (plus 12?) C-130 Hcrcules medium transport aircraft, 9 C-160 Transall mecium transports, 20 (30?) C-47 Dakota light transports (8 for marine duties), 15 (40?) AM3C, 25 (40?) C4M,20 Cessna 185: (all light aircraft), 12(18) P-16.6 Albatros maritime reconnaissance aircraft,

South-West Africa Territory Force.Formed in 1979»with 31(Bushman), 201 (Bushman), 33 (Caprivi), 34 (Kavango), 35 (Owambo), 41 (Baster) battaliotis. (Note 32 battalion absent— comprises Angolans.) In 1981 201 battalion included 850 Bushmen and 200 whites. There has been universal conscription since 1981 (for whites since 1978). About 21 000 troops.

Reports of strength are unreliable. Furthermore, strength may be misleading because it includes all servicemen. In the SADF 3,48 r-upport troops are needed to help one combat soldier. Therefore, if in 1979 total SADF manpower was 494 000, no more than 110 000 could be mobilised for combat, with 380 000 in support.

Chief of the SAD? , (Geldenhuys)-------V

Collection Number: AG1977

END CONSCRIPTION CAMPAIGN (ECC)

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