structures, values, and interaction in field-level partnerships: the case of unhcr and ngos

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Structures, values, and interaction infield-level partnerships: the case ofUNHCR and NGOsChristian Mommers a & Margit van Wessel ba International Organisation for Migration, PO Box 10796, TheHague, 2501 HT, The Netherlands E-mail:b Wageningen University, PO Box 8130, 6700 EW, Wageningen, TheNetherlands E-mail:Published online: 20 Feb 2009.

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Structures, values, and interactionin field-level partnerships: the caseof UNHCR and NGOs

Christian Mommers and Margit van Wessel

This article discusses the process of transforming partnership from a conceptual framework

into a practical, operational framework for field-level interaction among humanitarian organ-

isations. The authors approach this transformation from the perspective of the core values of the

partnership concept and the ability of field workers to behave in ways that are consistent with

these core values, illustrated by an empirical study of the relationships between the United

Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and NGOs in a refugee-assistance pro-

gramme in northern Uganda. The authors connect inter-organisational structures with the

role of people charged with making partnership work, concluding that the structures and

context in which individuals operate make it impossible for them to ‘act out’ the core values

of partnership. By identifying the major challenges to creating field-level, operational partner-

ships, the authors offer lessons for current and future partnership-building initiatives, such as

the Global Humanitarian Platform.

KEY WORDS: Aid; Civil society; Methods; Sub-Saharan Africa

Introduction

‘Partnership’ is now a key term in discussions about inter-organisational co-operation in the

field of humanitarian action and is generally seen as a reference point for what co-operation

among development or humanitarian agencies should be like. The term ‘partnership’ reflects

a set of values, typically encompassing equality, transparency, shared responsibility, joint

decision making, trust, and mutual understanding. Taken together, these values are thought

to lead to improved co-ordination and performance.1 However, despite its prominence in the

humanitarian field, academics and practitioners alike have struggled to find ways of transform-

ing the concept of partnership into a practical framework for co-ordination. The latest in a series

of initiatives to achieve this transformation is the Global Humanitarian Platform (GHP), which

held its first global meeting in July 2007 in Geneva. The GHP focuses on co-operative relation-

ships between United Nations humanitarian agencies and civil society. It explicitly aims to

160 ISSN 0961-4524 Print/ISSN 1364-9213 Online 020160-13 # 2009 Oxfam GB

DOI: 10.1080/09614520802689428 Routledge Publishing

Development in Practice, Volume 19, Number 2, April 2009

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‘improve humanitarian response by strengthening partnership at the global and field levels’

(GHP 2007: 1).

Despite academic concern about the viability of transforming partnership into an operational

reality at the field level, policy makers continue to regard partnership as the ‘holy grail’ for

improving inter-agency co-operation and effectiveness. In general, the academic literature on

partnership and its practical possibilities is dominated by institutional approaches in which

administrative processes, agreements among the parties, financial ties, and other structural com-

ponents are central. Repeatedly, authors conclude that structural constraints of, most impor-

tantly, the funder–donor relationship and its associated conditionalities make partnership

difficult, if not impossible (Ahmad 2006; Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff 2004; Fowler 2000;

Lister 2000). However, there has been little empirical study of co-operation that illustrates

how these constraints actually operate and how relations between actors are negotiated

within them (Fowler 2000; Mawdsley et al. 2005). To understand the problems of putting part-

nership values into practice, we need to connect inter-organisational structures with the beha-

viour of people who are charged with making partnership work (Lister 2000).

Our discussion of this issue is based on a field-level empirical study of a refugee-assistance

programme in northern Uganda which is implemented jointly by the United Nations High Com-

missioner for Refugees (UNHCR), national government agencies, and NGOs. Perhaps more so

than any other UN agency, UNHCR has concentrated its energy on developing a specific part-

nership concept and a strategy to translate it into an operational reality. Moreover, the UNHCR

process shows remarkable similarities to that envisaged by the GHP. Our central argument,

illustrated in the case study, is that the structure of the field-level relationships between

UNHCR and NGOs may provide a context in which it becomes impossible for NGO workers

to behave in a way that is consistent with the central values of partnership. This, as we shall

discuss later, provides important lessons and warnings to the GHP and similar initiatives

focused on building and strengthening partnership.

The origins of the UNHCR–NGO partnership concept

Since the early 1990s, co-operative relationships between UNHCR and other UN specialised

agencies and NGOs have expanded rapidly. The increased importance of the input of NGOs,

as well as their sheer numbers, however, also brought to light a number of problems with the

way in which this UN–NGO relationship was managed. Andrew Natsios explains:

Under [the] traditional paradigm, UN agencies viewed NGOs as subcontractors in a

clearly subordinate position – paid for services performed – not as equal partners with

unique capacities [. . .] This has caused the resentment by UN agencies of nongovern-

mental organizations when they do not act in the way expected and by NGOs when they

are treated as subcontractors rather than equals. (Natsios 1996: 74)

Thus, a growing demand arose among NGOs to be treated as equals in the planning and

implementation stages of UN-co-ordinated programmes. This coincided with donors’ concerns

about the accountability of UN agencies – such as UNHCR – and their ability to relate to the

grassroots. This need for more effective co-operation provided the impetus for the development

of the partnership concept and its adoption as a guiding notion in the external-relations policies

of UNHCR and those NGOs with which it co-operated.

Consultations between UNHCR and NGOs on this matter reached a significant milestone in

1994, when the Partnership in Action (PARinAC) Conference was held in Oslo, culminating

in the presentation of a Declaration and a Plan of Action. The Declaration set out the general

principles for improved UNHCR–NGO co-operation, while the Plan of Action contained

Development in Practice, Volume 19, Number 2, April 2009 161

Structures, values, and interaction in field-level partnerships

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recommendations for putting these principles into practice. These documents have provided the

agenda for transforming UNHCR–NGO relationships from the ‘traditional paradigm’ into a

new and improved relationship. From this moment onward, the term ‘partnership’ started to

appear increasingly often in policy documents, until it became an integral part of the general

discourse on UNHCR–NGO co-operation.

The main challenge for UNHCR and its partners was to transform the conceptual framework

of partnership, devised through global conferences, into a viable and concrete framework for

UNHCR–NGO relations at the field level, where, after all, the efforts to assist refugees take

their ultimate shape. An important event in this process was the development of the Programme

Management Handbook for UNHCR’s Partners, first published in 1997 and revised in 2003. It

is a ‘carrier’ of the values of partnership, which it translates to operational situations. For

example, it provides 13 ‘best practice principles’ for UNHCR–NGO co-operation. According

to these principles, UNHCR and NGOs ‘should (1) strive to understand each other’s point of

view; (2) seek opportunities to learn from each other; (3) commit to excellence and improve-

ment; (4) commit to transparency and information sharing; (5) look for synergy; (6) think

win–win in their interactions with each other; (7) endeavour to communicate in all directions;

(8) plan and solve operational problems together; (9) establish co-ordinating mechanisms

and processes that facilitate continuous prioritisation; (10) respect each other’s expertise;

(11) define roles, limits and standards, and agree to respect them; (12) identify policy gaps,

set policy, and share that policy with all concerned during all stages of implementation;

(13) commit to training at the earliest stage of the operation’ (UNHCR 2003: 33–34).

Although the partnership concept developed by UNHCR and its partners resembles other for-

mulations, it is important to focus on this concept more thoroughly, because it provides the

specific context in which to interpret UNHCR–NGO field-level relationships. While they set

out no single standard-setting definition of partnership, documents such as the PARinAC

papers and the Programme Management Handbook provide us with some of the best clues to

how the UNHCR–NGO partnership concept needs to be understood. There are several recur-

ring themes, from which three main values for UNHCR–NGO interaction can be distilled.

These ‘promises’ for better co-operation, which are discussed in detail below, are our points

of reference for exploring the interaction between UNHCR and its NGO partners in the

refugee-assistance programme in northern Uganda.

Three promises of the UNHCR–NGO partnership

The first promise of the partnership concept deriving from the Oslo Declaration and Plan of

Action is the creation of a framework in which resources can be exchanged effectively

among interdependent actors. This is related to the mutual dependence of UNHCR and

NGOs and the exchange of resources between them. One of the underlying assumptions of

the partnership concept is that co-operation between UNHCR and NGOs is not only beneficial

to both parties, but necessary. It suggests that both parties rely on each other to achieve their

ultimate goals of providing adequate assistance to refugees. Both UNHCR and NGOs

possess a number of resources crucial to achieving this goal. The term ‘resource’ in this

context should be understood in its broadest possible sense; resources can be material or

financial, but also intellectual. The focus on interdependence and exchange is clearly reflected

in the Oslo Declaration and Plan of Action, in which some of the main stated goals are ‘to

maximize the effective use of resources’ and to ‘benefit fully from comparative advantages

and expertise’ of the respective partners (UNHCR 1994, Part V, A).

A second promise emphasised in the partnership documents is connected with the idea

that UNHCR–NGO relationships should be built on equality. The Plan of Action states that

162 Development in Practice, Volume 19, Number 2, April 2009


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‘partnership between NGOs and UNHCR should be based upon equality of respect, with both

parties recognising each other’s experience and mandate’ (Recommendation 110). The Plan of

Action also addresses NGOs’ perception that they were not seen as serious partners in the

planning and decision-making processes: ‘UNHCR should also make efforts [. . .] to include

NGOs in the early planning stages and assessment missions of emergencies’ (Recommendation

124), and that ‘UNHCR should, when appropriate, devise and prepare funding proposals jointly

with NGOs’ (Recommendation 131). Perhaps most importantly, the partnership documents

draw attention to the ‘spirit of co-operation’, referring to the fact that the relationship should

not be seen as politicised and competitive.

The third promise of partnership relates to the wish for more predictability in co-operation.

The PARinAC process, according to the Oslo Declaration, is a direct result of changing circum-

stances in the global geo-political environment, and the uncertainties associated with it. The

introduction to the Declaration states that UNHCR and NGOs are ‘moving into the uncharted

waters of a new international era’. Transparency and accountability are promoted as ‘the

underlying principles of the NGO–UNHCR partnership’. They are closely connected to

providing more predictability in dealing with one another in those ‘uncharted waters’

(UNHCR 1994, Part V, B).

The Plan of Action also promotes stable operational frameworks, which should replace ad

hoc co-operation. For instance, it states that partnership ‘should not depend on the goodwill

of individual representatives’ (Recommendation 115), but should create ‘improved mechan-

isms’ (Part V, A), including ‘contractual arrangements’, to ‘realise meaningful, workable and

long-lasting actions’ (Part V, B). A major goal of the partnership process, therefore, has been

the mitigation of uncertainties over responsibilities and competencies, as well as the promotion

of more open communication between UNHCR and NGOs in order to create more stability and

predictability in UNHCR–NGO relationships.

UNHCR–NGO co-operation in northern Uganda

While ‘partnership’ often refers to the global interactions between UNHCR and its partners, it

also aims to provide an operational framework at the field level. The ‘field level’, however, is

not a homogeneous entity; it consists of hundreds of bigger and smaller programmes for

refugees around the world. Therefore, we now turn to the specific context of our grassroots

empirical study, the UNHCR–NGO assistance programme in Adjumani district in northern

Uganda, in order to provide the appropriate background for understanding the results. This pro-

gramme proved to be well suited to an explorative study of UNHCR–NGO field relationships.

First, the refugee programme in Adjumani district is well established, as it has been running

since the early 1990s, thus excluding the distortion of the results due to possible start-up pro-

blems between the organisations. Furthermore, the stability associated with a long-running

programme provides opportunities to discuss long-term issues and is likely to make respondents

more amenable to co-operating. Second, from an organisational perspective, at the time of

the fieldwork the programme had a large number of NGOs with very different backgrounds

co-operating with UNHCR. This reduced the chances of results being affected by an extreme

case, such as where an NGO co-operates exceptionally well or exceptionally badly with

UNHCR. It also allowed for very different views about the situation on the ground, providing

a more complete picture. Finally, Uganda is presented as a country with a solid refugee-

assistance policy. A UNHCR spokesperson was even quoted as describing it as ‘one of the

best in Africa’ (Sheikh 2005). This, in theory, should minimise the possibility of a flawed

national refugee regime exerting a negative impact on UNHCR–NGO relationships.



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UNHCR is the main provider of assistance to refugee populations in Uganda, and the Adjumani

district in the north hosts the largest refugee population, mainly consisting of Sudanese. In this

district UNHCR co-ordinates a programme comprising a very broad range of services,2 although

most are not provided directly by UNHCR. While it acts as a co-ordinating body – and often as a

funder of projects – project implementation is undertaken by NGOs, or by national or local gov-

ernmental agencies.3 UNHCR divides the NGOs with which it works into two broad categories.

The first is the ‘operational partners’ (OPs), which are very broadly defined as any organisation

‘that work[s] in partnership with UNHCR to protect and assist refugees, leading to achievement of

durable solutions’ (UNHCR 2003: 30). These OPs rely on their ‘own’ financial resources (from

other donors) and do not receive funding from UNHCR. An ‘implementing partner’ (IP) is defined

as an ‘operational partner that signs an implementing agreement and receives funding from

UNHCR’ (UNHCR 2003: 30). The relationships between UNHCR and its implementing partners,

therefore, are much more formalised than those with operational partners. This form of co-

operation or partnership, in which the transfer of funds also plays an important role, provides

the main focus for this study. When the term ‘partnership’ is used, this will refer to implementing

partnerships, unless stated otherwise.

At the time of the research – between April and August 2003 – in Adjumani district, nine

major NGOs were implementing activities for the benefit of refugees. Of these, five were

UNHCR implementing partners, receiving UNHCR funding that ranged from approximately

half to their full operational budgets. The remaining four NGOs were operational partners.

All of the major NGOs in Adjumani were branches of international organisations, although

in a few cases these in turn subcontracted small, local NGOs.

The analysis presented here is primarily concerned with the perspectives of the NGO imple-

menting partners on the co-operation, rather than the perspective of UNHCR personnel. The

partnership concept as we are describing it is a product of consultations between UNHCR

and NGOs. In fact, two of the NGOs that are included in this case study have a long-standing

relationship with UNHCR, both at the global and at the field levels, and they were involved in

the PARinAC process. However, the partnership concept is also applied by UNHCR to NGOs

that were not necessarily part of its development. UNHCR has been the epicentre of the

development of this form of partnership throughout the process, and is now its main advocate

for its adoption at the field level by its own staff and also by NGOs. NGOs, from this perspec-

tive, can be seen as one of the main ‘targets’ of UNHCR’s efforts to implement partnership

at the field level. NGO perceptions of the outcomes in practice therefore offer the best view

of the successes and failures of partnership as a field-level co-operative framework.

For this reason, interviews with field staff in the IPs provide the bulk of the data for this

research. The interviews were conducted with field directors and department heads, but also

with staff without managerial duties, collectively categorised as field workers for the purposes

of this study. These respondents also represented a mix of Ugandans, Sudanese (former)

refugees, and expatriates, although the latter were found only in managerial positions. In

addition to the respondents from implementing partner NGOs, interviews were held with

three representatives of NGO operational partners, and a number of UNHCR officials stationed

either in Adjumani or at the head office in Kampala. The results of these interviews, related to

the three ‘promises’ of UNHCR–NGO partnership, are presented below, starting with the issue

of exchange and interdependence.

Exchange and interdependence in the field

The interdependent nature of the UNHCR–NGO relationship is emphasised throughout the

partnership discourse. UNHCR does not have the manpower or expertise to provide all the



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different forms of assistance to refugees; it co-operates with a host of local and international

NGOs that can implement a very diverse range of assistance activities. This relation between

UNHCR and NGOs was described fittingly in UNHCR’s Refugees Magazine: ‘[NGOs] are

UNHCR’s right arm, often working behind the scenes in remote and dangerous places with

little or no fanfare. Without them, UNHCR would be totally impotent’ (Berthiaume 1994).

Unsurprisingly, when the topic of UNHCR’s dependence on NGOs was discussed by

UNHCR staff in Adjumani, the role of the NGOs as implementers – providing their workforce

and expertise – figured most prominently. NGO staff, on the other hand, identified the funding

provided by UNHCR to their organisations as the most crucial resource exchanged.

At first glance, then, the relationship between UNHCR and the NGO community in Adjumani

seemed to be based on mutual dependence. However, focusing on the exchange and interdepen-

dence between the UN refugee agency and this NGO community would be a misrepresentation

of the field-level reality in Adjumani. The reason for this lies in the manner in which the

relationship is structured.

The practical basis for the exchange of resources between UNHCR and its NGO implement-

ing partners is formed by the partnership agreement (also known as the subproject agreement),

which sets out the respective responsibilities of UNHCR and NGOs. It is a tripartite agreement

between UNHCR, the government of Uganda, and individual NGOs. Since an agreement is

signed with each NGO, what might be perceived as a relationship between UNHCR and the

NGO community is in fact a series of separate arrangements with individual NGOs. It is

UNHCR’s role to co-ordinate these into a coherent programme. Given this structure, it

makes sense to approach the question of interdependence by focusing on relationships

between UNHCR and each single NGO, rather than that of UNHCR with the NGO community

at large. A good illustration of the consequences of this approach to the issue of dependence is

the (hypothetical) scenario of either UNHCR or an NGO withdrawing from the relationship.

When discussing this scenario with respondents, it became clear that the need for UNHCR to

co-operate with any single NGO is far less pressing than the other way around. As described

by many of the NGO staff interviewed, an NGO’s withdrawal from the refugee programme –

taking with it its workforce and expertise – would not severely damage UNHCR’s ability to

provide an effective and comprehensive range of services. According to them, there would

always be other NGOs willing to fill the gap left by a departing NGO, drawn by the lure of sig-

nificant UNHCR funding. In fact, the Adjumani programme – in the years leading up to the

fieldwork for this research – had experienced several permutations of NGOs without dramatic

consequences for the programme.

By contrast, the perception of NGO respondents of the need to work with UNHCR is very

different. Of the three NGO implementing partners included in the research, two received

approximately 50 per cent of their operational budgets from UNHCR, with the other half

coming from other donors. In the case of the third NGO, almost the entire budget was covered

by UNHCR funds. Unsurprisingly, the reduction or withdrawal of UNHCR funding was unequi-

vocally seen as a severe threat to the operational capabilities of those NGOs. However, the effect

of UNHCR’s financial resources was not seen as limited to operational capabilities. According to

one NGO field director, UNHCR was seen throughout Adjumani district as ‘a big daddy. Without

UN[HCR], Adjumani wouldn’t be what it is. It would still be a backwater place.’

We should note here that the overwhelming majority of NGO staff were locally hired local

inhabitants, with only a few (higher-level) staff members originating from elsewhere in Uganda

or expatriates. For most of these staff, salaries were paid from UNHCR funding, and several

respondents noted the reliance on this money to feed their families and pay school fees. As

such, NGOs rely on UNHCR funding not only for their operational capacity, but in some

cases also for the well-being and livelihoods of NGO employees and their dependants.



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In addition, NGO respondents suggested that the relationship with UNHCR was crucial for

NGOs not only in terms of being able to do their jobs, but also in terms of being allowed to do

them. In a roundabout way, they argued, the NGOs’ legitimacy in Adjumani derived from

UNHCR. As mentioned above, co-operation in the Adjumani programme involved not only

UNHCR and the NGOs, but also the government of Uganda. Permission for any NGO – and

indeed UNHCR – to operate on Ugandan soil is given by the government. However, NGO

staff stated that UNHCR, as co-ordinator of the refugee assistance provided by the NGOs,

would also have to ‘green-light’ the presence of NGOs.4 This aspect of the UNHCR–NGO

relationship was identified by staff of the implementing NGOs and the operational partner

NGOs alike.

In short, UNHCR’s role as co-ordinator and funder of NGOs, its centrality in a web of bilat-

eral relationships, and the perception that it is able to legitimise the presence of others make

dependence among the partners unbalanced.

Equality and power in the field

As for the second promise of partnership, the partnership documents emphasise consultations

between the partners, as well as joint planning and decision making, on a basis of equality.

Most of the NGO staff in our study, however, argued that UNHCR was unwilling to consult

with NGOs on important planning and operational issues. One NGO field worker explained

the attitude that he typically encountered:

‘Do this, do this, do this, do this. Anything I have to present from my side is nothing to you

[UNHCR]. You have your policies, they are set, finished. I shouldn’t follow mine. So then I

cease to be a partner.’

A first, and obvious, reason for the UN refugee agency’s perceived control over this process is

its role in funding the NGOs. One NGO field worker expressed this situation as follows:

‘Probably people look at UNHCR as the boss because they know that money is the power;

because they are funders. [It is] a mother organisation, because it funds the majority of

the NGOs.’

We have already noted that the NGOs were dependent on UNHCR. This in itself, however, is

not sufficient for UNHCR to exert power over them. In his seminal work on power in organis-

ations, Jeffery Pfeffer sets out the other precondition for doing so:

[T]he social actor who has an advantage in the net power from the relationship must

have the discretion to control the allocation and use of the resources that the other

party depends upon in order to translate the potential power resulting from the dependence

into effective influence. (Pfeffer 1981: 100, emphasis added)

However, although it disburses money to the NGOs, UNHCR is not in the strict sense a real

donor; it is more like an intermediary between the international community and implementers,

collecting donations at the global level and disbursing them at lower levels. In line with Pfeffer,

we can see that it is not exactly a matter of possessing resources, but more precisely one of con-

trolling their allocation and use, and being able to measure and observe the other’s compliance

with the demands made (Pfeffer 1981: 100).5 As the co-ordinator of the Adjumani programme,

UNHCR carried the ultimate responsibility for the outcomes of the different projects under its

co-ordination. It therefore set out strict demands concerning project implementation by NGOs.

The receipt of funds was made dependent on meeting these demands. Through an extensive

reporting structure, the NGOs were held accountable to UNHCR for the extent to which projects



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had been implemented according to the pre-agreed standards. The partnership agreement played

a central role in this continuous cycle of funding, implementing, and reporting. Therefore a

closer look at this agreement is crucial to understanding the power relations between

UNHCR and its NGO partners in Adjumani.

According to the standard partnership agreement, funding takes the form of an ‘initial

obligation’, which UNHCR guarantees to provide to the NGO for a particular project.

Further remittances are subject to satisfactory reporting to UNHCR. The agreement states

that the first remittance – i.e. this ‘initial obligation’ – takes place ‘within ten working days

following the signing of this Agreement’ (UNHCR 2003, annex C1, para 5.04.1). However,

the commentary on the Agreement in the Programme Management Handbook states that ‘ten

working days is the norm’ rather than an enforceable deadline (UNHCR 2003, annex C2).

So although UNHCR ‘will take all necessary steps to make payment within the ten days’, a

delay does not signify a breach of the UN refugee agency’s obligations towards the NGO

partner (ibid.). Further remittances are all ‘subject to availability of funds’ (UNHCR 2003:

annex C1, 5.04.2). The Agreement therefore speaks of ‘estimated amounts’ and ‘anticipated

dates required’. From an operational point of view this is understandable, as UNHCR’s

funding is always unsure, and flexibility is necessary in an uncertain environment. However,

it also means that an NGO can draw no firm guarantees from the Agreement in terms of

amounts and dates for the transfer of funds. Thus, the Agreement does not provide NGOs

with any sanctions against UNHCR to enforce the transfer of resources.

The Agreement explicitly states that amicable settlement of disputes is always the

preferred option. In the case of the NGOs included in our research, this was also the only

option. As one NGO field director lamented: ‘We can go and cry and beg and say “what’s

happening to the money?”, or “why aren’t you paying us?”. We can’t really force them

[UNHCR] to do anything.’ The NGOs, on the other hand, would face immediate repercussions

if they had not met their obligations. As stated above, every remittance authorised by UNHCR is

conditional upon a satisfactory report by the NGO. If reporting is either unsatisfactory or late,

remittances are withheld until the NGO meets the requirements.

These characteristics of UNHCR correspond to Pfeffer’s description of a powerful actor.

Although UNHCR exercised control over NGOs’ actions, it seldom needed to resort to sanc-

tions or even threaten to do so. Its power over NGOs had become such an enduring, if implicit,

part of the relationship that UNHCR did not need to invoke sanctions. Although some respon-

dents reported cases in which UNHCR had openly threatened to end a partnership, this was a

rare occurrence. One respondent remarked that UNHCR’s role as funder and its power to

cancel agreements were constantly ‘in the back of your mind’, thus playing a role in how

their interaction was regulated. As one UNHCR department head put it: ‘Most of the partners

know [what they need to do], and they know the consequences if they don’t. So they do it, they

do it.’ As one NGO staff member explained it: ‘You find that the funder tends to go for someone

who is a little mild’, meaning that an uncritical, even docile, stance on the part of NGOs was

necessary in order to stay in favour with UNHCR.

This is reflected by the fact that despite differences of opinion on operational issues, respon-

dents reported that conflict was rare. However, this superficial harmony is not an indication of

non-competitive co-operation, but rather the result of power at work. NGO staff members indi-

cated that they had internalised as a fact of life that UNHCR should not be criticised. This led to

a situation of normalisation, which organisational theorists Jackson and Carter, drawing on the

work of French sociologist Michel Foucault, explain as follows:

Normalisation is the tendency of people to accept as normal the expectations of those

who govern them and to comply with them, even though they may not agree with them



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or see them as useful. It is a process whereby these requirements are acted upon without

prompting in the usual course of events. (Jackson and Carter 1999: 86)

This in turn leads to self-policing, which Jackson and Carter (1999: 87) describe as ‘controlling

one’s own behaviour, without prompting, so that one always behaves in the way desired by those

in control, those with the power of sanction’. All this took place in an environment where the

terms ‘partner’ and ‘partnership’ were omnipresent, albeit not necessarily borne out in reality.

While UNHCR staff spoke of ‘our partners’, NGO staff talked of UNHCR as ‘the donor’ or even

a ‘father’ or ‘mother’ organisation. Where UNHCR staff spoke of monitoring or ‘facilitating’

NGOs, their NGO counterparts used terms like ‘controlling’ or even ‘bullying’.

Predictability and transparency in the field

The partnership discourse promotes open communication, the efficient exchange of resources,

and clearly defined responsibilities among the different organisations involved. These should

help participants to expect more or less stable patterns of behaviour and relatively certain out-

comes. We have, however, already shown that with regard to the first two promises of the part-

nership concept, there is a significant gap between theory and practice. We will return to our

case study to discuss how this affects this third and final promise of UNHCR–NGO partnership.

Within the context of UNHCR–NGO partnerships in the field, there are a number of formal

instruments which are designed to identify predictability among the parties concerned. Again,

the clearest and most formalised example of this is the Partnership Agreement, defining stan-

dards for implementation and conduct, providing NGOs with the (relative) certainty that

UNHCR would commit funds to their activities, and encompassing the main instruments for

ensuring accountability for the funds received by NGOs on which the success of the project

is judged.

Connected to the safeguards emanating from the Partnership Agreement is another instru-

ment to ensure stability and predictability within the refugee programme: UNHCR’s position

as ‘lead agency’ and co-ordinator. The agency’s self-proclaimed responsibility, based on its

mandate, is to ensure ‘the effective planning and design of UNHCR-funded projects, and

their overall supervision, monitoring, control and evaluation’ (UNHCR 2003: 28). By subject-

ing all implementing partners to the same procedures, monitoring systems, and evaluation stan-

dards, UNHCR seeks programme-wide consistency, which would be far less likely to be

achieved without a central monitoring body. This consistency, as identified by UNHCR and

NGO respondents, was mainly manifest in ensuring that all essential aspects of service delivery

were covered, and avoiding duplication.

In Adjumani, the various structural arrangements in place created a degree of predictability;

however, they were not rooted in a ‘spirit of partnership’ and therefore did not create the form of

co-operation embedded in the partnership discourse. What the absence of the ‘spirit of partner-

ship’ in co-operation meant for creation of predictability becomes clear when we take a closer

look at the field situation. Despite the Partnership Agreement setting out the funder–implemen-

ter relationship, the situation that we found in northern Uganda was fraught with uncertainty.

Funding delays and budget cuts accounted for many of the problems of unpredictability in

the UNHCR–NGO relationship. Delays in funding, however infrequent, caused a rupture in

the NGOs’ normal operations and agreed schedules, and therefore created a lot of uncertainty.

This was aggravated by the fact that it was seldom clear when exactly funds would become

available; this could be a matter of weeks, sometimes months.

While the bureaucratic procedures may have facilitated the monitoring of a large number of

financial exchanges, the lack of flexibility had serious consequences in terms of operational



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uncertainties. Few respondents related the tensions that had developed between NGOs and

UNHCR to the budget cuts per se, but rather to the way in which UNHCR communicated

them, which was often described as ‘briefing’ rather than ‘consulting’. This is illustrated by

one NGO department head describing his experience of presenting a project-implementation

budget: ‘They cut the thing halfway, no consultation, nothing’. He went on to air his dissatis-

faction with UNHCR’s way of dealing with his input:

‘. . . if I’ve said “twenty thousand” [Ugandan shillings, for the activity], and you cut it to

ten, then maybe you have an idea about what you’re doing, but without consulting me is

unfair. Because I worked it out, I generate my rates fairly, although I feel at the same time

that I’m being pushed by the donor [UNHCR] that I work within a certain limit. So I

squeeze the local person, or the refugee [sub-contracted to undertake the activity],

giving that person far far below even the government’s standards, you get me? And

then at the end of the day you come and again cut it halfway. To me it doesn’t make

sense, it is like somebody just does it and says: “cut, cut”.’

The partners’ obligation to consult with each other on important operational matters, which

must include budgets, is not only emphasised in the Partnership Agreement (UNHCR 2003:

annex C2) but also forms a vital part of the ‘spirit of partnership’. The fact that UNHCR was

perceived not to take such consultation seriously created a lot of frustration among NGO

staff members, as an NGO field director explained:

‘There has been a general feeling probably that we [the NGOs] are just working for them

[UNHCR]. And probably that comes out of not putting that [part of the Partnership

Agreement] properly in.’

According to NGO staff, more open communication and transparency, although not resolving

the problems of funding delays and budget cuts, would have gone a long way to easing the

mutual tensions – partly because these problems could then be dealt with earlier and contin-

gency plans could be made, and partly because it would show willingness on the part of

UNHCR to regard the NGOs as equals. This lack of transparency also appeared to affect

other operational areas. One national-level NGO manager gave an example of such lack of

transparency between his organisation and UNHCR:

‘Of late I feel that that transparency is not there at all. We seldom meet to discuss issues,

you know. We come to know through third parties what is happening. . . . you are seeing

things are not going well, but we do not discuss that. There is no transparency. You will see

a problem, but you have not told us that you have a problem, so therefore our planning

becomes difficult’.

This does not mean that there was no co-ordination among the organisations involved, the

main forum for which were the inter-agency meetings (IAMs), in which UNHCR, NGO imple-

menting partners, NGO operational partners, and government representatives would come

together to calibrate their activities. UNHCR hosted and took the lead in these meetings.

NGO staff raised a number of issues concerning the significance of these meetings for partner-

ship. One concern was that the monthly IAMs were too infrequent. The problem of consultation

also cropped up again. Implementing and operational partner staff frequently referred to the

meetings as ‘briefings’, in which UNHCR was ‘dictating terms’. For the NGO respondents,

the IAMs failed to act as a forum for mutual adjustment and rather became another illustration

of the unbalanced power relations among the partners.



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Discussion

The empirical study presented in this article illustrates the problems of translating partnership

from an abstract notion into an operational framework for inter-agency co-operation at the

field level. We have shown that despite widespread use of the terminology of partnership,

in the case described here there was a significant gap between the values of partnership and

their reflection in the day-to-day behaviour of NGO staff and their UNHCR counterparts.

Changing individual behaviour is crucial to successful partnership at the field level. This is

emphasised by the Global Humanitarian Platform partnership initiative, which makes a dis-

tinction between attitudes and behaviour, stating: ‘attitudes may be difficult to change, but

it is possible to change the behaviour of individuals, by being clear about what is expected’

(GHP 2007: 2). In other words, communicating clearly what partnership entails (its central

values or principles) is seen as an important way to transform it into an operational framework

for co-operation.

Both behavioural theory and the findings of our empirical study, however, cast doubt on that

assumption. First, attitudes cannot be separated from action. Behavioural scientists Klander-

mans and Seydel explain that attitude is one of the determinants of the intention to behave in

a certain way. As such, an individual’s internalisation of the values of partnership is a precondi-

tion for the values to be ‘acted out’. A successful partnership-building strategy, then, needs to

focus on gaining support for the core values of partnership from individuals working for the

organisations involved at all levels. Given the different backgrounds and interests of those

involved, this may prove to be a daunting task.

Second, although internalised values and personal attitudes may lead to certain behavioural

intentions, these intentions are not necessarily translated into actual behaviour. Barriers may

prohibit people from acting according to their intentions (Klandermans and Seydel 1996:

44). One important barrier relates to the structure in which these actions take place – the

rules, regulations, procedures, roles, and systems that prescribe and regulate interactions

(Jackson and Carter 1999: 36). Structures carry within them identifiable assumptions about

the legitimacy of certain practices and relationships and define the locus of authority, respon-

sibility, and bases of power (Lane et al. 2000: 200). Structures thus make it difficult to

behave in a way that is not consistent with the patterns of communication and interaction

that it legitimises. This is the aspect on which this article has focused.

The gap that we found between the values of the UNHCR–NGO partnership concept and the

outcomes on the ground can be related to a mis-match between these values and the structural

conditions of the Adjumani programme. These include the conditionalities that are familiar

in the partnership literature, such as the problems of donor–recipient relationships. They

also include contextual specificities and instruments that govern the interactions between

UNHCR and the NGOs, such as the number of organisations involved, the contractual arrange-

ments, and the legitimacy that NGOs derive from their relation with UNHCR. These structural

conditions reinforced a culture that was characterised by lopsided dependence relationships,

power inequalities, and a lack of transparency. For NGO staff, they formed a barrier to the

development of true partnership at the field level. A re-evaluation of the role of the instruments

that governed their field-level co-operation, not least of which was the Partnership Agreement,

would have been necessary to make partnership a viable framework for co-operation.6 While

some of the conditions that we have described were specific to the situation in Adjumani at

the time of the research, we believe that many of them are integral parts of any field-level

UNHCR–NGO partnership; although this is a view not necessarily shared by UNHCR.7 Our

case study suggests that a successful partnership-building strategy needs to pay particular atten-

tion to re-shaping or developing the inter-organisational structures and the context in which



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co-operation takes place, in order to support and facilitate behaviour of individuals according to

the core values of partnership.

A final concern is the difficulty of addressing the mis-match between partnership values and

the situation on the ground. Although the values of partnership were not working at the field

level, the terminology surrounding partnership was omnipresent. Effectively, partnership as

practised at the field level may bear very little resemblance to the one originally intended

(see also Lister 2000). Such ‘false advertising’ makes open discussion by the partnering organ-

isations even less likely. As such, a successful partnership-building strategy needs to take into

account that the use of partnership terminology without focusing on making partnership-like

behaviour possible is not only empty rhetoric but can actually make it impossible for (less

dominant) partners to criticise the status quo constructively.

This article has identified a number of challenges to field-level aid workers to exhibit beha-

viour that is consistent with the core values of partnership. The GHP has emphasised that part-

nership, and its translation into an operational framework for co-ordination, is ‘essential in

today’s world’ (GHP 2007: 2). If this is indeed the case, then the challenges that we have ident-

ified need to be addressed as part of present and future strategies that aim to build or strengthen

partnerships in the humanitarian field.

Notes

1. We focus exclusively on the implications of partnership for inter-agency co-operation and co-

ordination. An exploration of how partnership influences the performance of these organisations, in

terms of effective service delivery, is beyond the scope of this article.

2. These services include the construction and maintenance of roads, school buildings, health centres, and

other infrastructure; the provision of primary and secondary school education; the provision of health

care through a network of health centres and ambulance services; the delivery of food to designated

groups, such as extremely vulnerable individuals (EVIs); the development of agricultural projects,

including training and the provision of seeds and of livestock; and the construction of water and

sanitation facilities, such as boreholes and latrines.

3. We focus on the relationship between UNHCR and its NGO partners. The role of the government of

Uganda is therefore beyond the scope of this article.

4. Commenting on this article, UNHCR asserts that no such requirement exists. Whether or not this is the

case, the perception of NGO staff that their legitimacy is dependent on UNHCR’s approval affects how

they experience co-operation with the agency.

5. One NGO manager’s comment on this issue was: ‘I know it used to bug [my predecessor] like crazy to

be driving around in a vehicle saying “donated by UNHCR” when it wasn’t. You know, he had this

argument it’s not donated by UNHCR, it’s actually donated by the donors of UNHCR.’

6. Ironically, although the partnership agreement is intended to facilitate the implementation of partner-

ship, it actually widens the gap between the intended and the actual outcomes of the relationship.

7. Commenting on this article, a UNHCR spokesperson stated that ‘[a]fter 2004, the relationships between

UNHCR and NGOs in Adjumani have been extremely co-operative and constructive, from the point of

view of UNHCR and the NGO partners. If, as your paper suggests, there was room for improvement in

2003, I am happy to say that enormous improvements have been made.’ UNHCR also stressed that the

specific conditions of the Adjumani case, as described in this article, may not be illustrative of UNHCR

co-operation with NGOs elsewhere.

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The authors

Christian Mommers is a researcher at the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), where he leads

a programme on issues faced by migrants living with HIV. Contact details: International Organisation for

Migration, PO Box 10796, 2501 HT The Hague, The Netherlands. ,[email protected].

Margit van Wessel is an assistant professor in the Communication Science Sub-department at

Wageningen University. Contact details: Wageningen University, PO Box 8130, 6700 EW Wageningen,

The Netherlands. ,[email protected].



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structures, values, and interaction in field-level partnerships: the case of unhcr and ngos

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