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Written by KPMG and Bocconi University February 2018

Study on State asset management in the EU

Final study report for Pillar 3 – EU28 Summuary Report

Contract: ECFIN/187/2016/740792

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EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs Directorate Fiscal policy and policy mix and Directorate Investment, growth and structural reforms

European Commission B-1049 Brussels

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EU28 Summary Report

This EU28 Summary Report aims at providing a broad overview of the EU-wide mix of

investment strategies and governance models adopted by the public sector across the

EU28 Member States to manage their asset portfolios. It sketches and summarises

data and insights included in the 28 Country Fiches making up Pillar 3 of this Study.

The information presented here, far from being exhaustive, has been collected from

publicly-available sources only, and should be considered as a starting point for

carrying out more in-depth analysis.

1. OVERVIEW OF GOVERNANCE MODELS BY CLUSTER OF ASSETS ACROSS THE

EU28

Across the EU28 countries, there is no specific, unique government entity responsible

for managing the government’s asset portfolio as a whole. The only exceptions are

Croatia, Estonia, Hungary and Greece, which have established a unique government

entity responsible for state asset management across all clusters of assets. More in

detail:

the Ministry of State Properties in Croatia has responsibility for overseeing the

management of state-owned assets;

the State Assets Department in Estonia designs state asset policy, prepares

draft acts, advises and coordinates the activities related to public assets in the

area of state asset management and ownership reform;

the Minister of National Development in Hungary is responsible for overseeing

the overall state asset management;

the Hellenic Corporation of Assets and Participations (HCAP) SA1 is a Public

Sector Holding (PSH) responsible for overseeing state asset management in the

country, and it aims at enhancing the value and improving the performance of

the government’s asset portfolio, by assessing and promoting the best

available management strategies, in compliance with the Law No. 4389/2016

(Art. 201)2.

1.1. Governance models

With regard to all other cases, governance models have to be analysed by looking at

three “responsibility-dimensions”, as follows:

ownership of the asset;

strategic and investment decisions;

1 For more information about the Hellenic Corporation of Assets and Participations S.A., please see

http://www.hcap.gr/?q=en/annual [Accessed 18th December 2017].

2 HCAP SA operates through three subsidiaries. The first subsidiary is the Hellenic Financial Stability Fund (HFSF), which aims at contributing towards the stability of the Greek banking system for the sake of public interest. The second one is the Hellenic Republic Asset Development Fund (HRADF), established by Law No. 3986/2011, and has the main responsibility to manage the implementation of the privatisation program in the country, as set in the Asset Development Plan (ADP). Finally, the third subsidiary is the Public Properties Company (ETAD), managing and exploiting a large portion of the state-owned real estate portfolio.

http://www.hcap.gr/?q=en/annual

Study on State asset management in the EU – Pillar 3

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operational decisions.

On the basis of Pillar 1 and Pillar 2 of this Study, two categories of assets were taken

into account:

Financial assets (i.e. Public Sector Holding (PSH) with public shares in

companies, at any level), and

Non-financial assets (i.e. Dwellings, Buildings other than dwellings, Airports,

Maritime ports, Roads, Railways, Mineral and Energy reserves, and Other

natural resources).

1.1.1. Financial assets

Within each country, the portfolios of financial assets are owned alternatively by either

central or local entities3 (in a sort of “mixed model”), as Figure 1 - top left panel

shows. The only exceptions are Cyprus and Malta, where almost all financial assets are

owned by the central government.

Then, the Ministries for the Economy/Finance are responsible for designing the

overarching policy framework providing guidance for all decisions to be made on

domestic PSHs across the EU28 (top right panel).

Moreover, since public bodies (at all levels, from central to local government, to arms’

length bodies) owning a majority stake in PSHs are also responsible for operational

decisions, the “centralised-decentralised mixed” model observed for ownership is also

observed for responsibility for operational decisions.

Figure 1 Governance regimes: Financial assets, EU28

3 With “entities” throughout this Pillar, we mean, alternatively, governments, public bodies, PSHs. In other words, it is used in its general, encompassing definition.

Ownership Responsibility for the strategic and investment decisions


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Source: KPMG elaborations.

The governance regimes in the figure above highlight the main bodies involved for each role across the (a)responsibility chain (e.g. the bodies owning the assets, the bodies responsible for operational decisions), for each cluster in the government’s portfolio. These models may not apply to all the individual assets within the cluster.

In some countries (e.g. Germany), there are three most important levels of government, i.e. the federal (b)government, the state government, and the local government. In order to better compare models across EU28, these three levels are divided into the two clusters used throughout Pillar 3 analyses: the central government is overlapped to the federal government, and the local governments include the state and the local governments.

With regard to the management of the central government’s Financial assets, 19

countries have established an ad-hoc, “centralised” public body4 (organised either as a

PSH or as public entity) for managing part of the PSHs portfolio and/or implementing

the privatisation strategy set by the government5. More in detail, 11 countries have

set up a PSH in charge of managing central government-owned PSHs (i.e. Austria,

Belgium, Finland, Hungary, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, and

Spain). By contrast, France, Croatia, Romania have designated a central public body

for managing PSHs in their portfolio.

Among the six countries that have set up a specific public entity for managing the

privatisation process (i.e. Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Latvia, Malta, and the UK), only

4 For more information about the “centralised” bodies responsible for Financial assets, please see Table I in

Appendix EU28. 5 Please note that, although national promotional banks have stakes in many PSHs, these were not included in the analysis therein. Their main goal is to provide medium- and long-term capital for capital investments, in order to boost the domestic economy (e.g. Cassa Depositi e Prestiti S.p.A – Cdp S.p.A in Italy, Caisse de Depot et Consignations – CDC in France). Nonetheless, in the majority of the cases, these bodies were not established with the specific purpose of enhancing and exploiting the central government’s portfolio, and are thereofer out of our scope for this analysis.

Responsibility for the operationaldecisions

National public data sources

Legend

Private bodies (PM)

Both central and local are represented (in one or more of the respectiveclusters of governance regimes)

Central government (C1)

Local governments (D1)

Central public bodies (C2)

Local public bodies (D2)

Central company-type structure (C3)

Local company-type structures (D3)

Asset not present in this country

Information is not available from National public data sources


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the UK and Latvia have established a PSH for the disposal of central government-

owned PSHs.

It is worth highlighting that Malta is the only EU28 country to have established a

specific public body for the implementation of the privatisation programme, and two

specific PSHs acting as shareholders for the Malta central government.

Figure 2 “Centralised” bodies with responsibility for public financial assets, EU28,

2018


For more details on these bodies, please see Table 1. (a) In many EU28 countries, PSHs are owned by the Promotional Banks and other public bodies whose main (b)goal is to provide medium- and long-term capital for capital investment, in order to boost the domestic economy. However, these bodies were not established with the specific purpose of enhancing and exploiting the central government’s portfolio. Therefore, they are not considered in this Study, and not represented in this table. For the list of promotional banks that have been mapped in this study (Pillar 1) but have been excluded from this analysis, pleas see Table I in Appendix.

As Table 1 shows, the share of financial assets owned by the public bodies or PSHs

listed therein (as compared to the public financial assets within each country) varies

greatly. For instance, at one end, Agencja Rozwoju Przemysłu SA (ARP SA) owns 0.3%

of public financial assets in Poland; whereas, at the other end we find the Federal

Holding and Investment Company (SFPI-FFIM) owning 72% of public financial assets

in Belgium.

Public body responsible for managing PSHs

Public body responsible for the implementation of privatisation programmes

Not present

Legend

ARP SAUKGI

APE

SEPI

SOLIDIUM OY

AAAS

LPA

SGPS SA

MH Manažment

TURTO BANKAS

HNAM

HRADF

PRIVATISATION UNIT

CERP

PPCA

ÖBIB

SFPI - FPIM

MIMCOL & MGI, PRIVATISATION UNIT

SDH

PSH responsible for managing PSHs

PSH responsible for the implementation of privatisation programmes


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Table 1 Overview of “centralised” bodies responsible for Financial Assets by EU28

country

Source: KPMG elaborations. In many EU28 countries, PSHs are owned by the Promotional Banks and other public bodies whose main (a)goal is providing medium- and long-term capital for capital investment, in order to boost the domestic economy. However, these bodies were not established with the specific purpose of enhancing and exploiting the central government’s portfolio. Therefore, they are not considered in this Study, and not represented in this table

The portfolio size is calculated as the total weighted assets owned by the PSHs lodged within this bodies (b)

over the total weighted assets owned by the domestic PSHs.

Country Name Form Role Portfolio size

AustriaÖsterreichische Bundes- und

Industriebeteiligungen GmbH – ÖBIB

PSH fully owned by

the central Management of PSHs 10.4%

BelgiumFederal Holding and Investment Company -

SFPI-FPIM

PSH fully owned by


BulgariaPrivatisation and Post-Privatisation Control

Agency - PPCAPublic body

Implement the

privatisation processn.a.

Croatia Hrvatski Fond Za Privatizaciju - CERP Public body Management of PSHs n.a.

Cyprus Privatisation Unit Public bodyImplement the


Czech Republic

Denmark

Estonia Not present

Finland Solidium OyPSH fully owned by


France APE Public body Management of PSHs 51.4%

Germany

GreeceHellenic Republic Asset Development Fund -

HRADFPublic body

Implement the

privatisation process30.2%

HungaryHungarian National Asset Managment Inc. -

HNAM Inc.

PSH fully owned by

the central Management of PSHs n.a.

Ireland

Italy

Latvia Latvian Privatisation Agency - LPA Public bodyImplement the


Lithuania Turto Bankas

PSH fully owned by

the central

government

Management of PSHs

& Implement the

privatisation process

n.a.

Luxembourg

- Malta Investment Management Co Ltd -

MIMCOL & Malta Government Investments

PSH fully owned by


- Privatisation Unit Public bodyImplement the


The Netherlands

Poland Agencja Rozwoju Przemysłu SA -ARP SAPSH fully owned by


PortugalParpublica - Participacoes Publicas SA -

SGPS SA

PSH fully owned by


RomaniaAutoritatea pentru Administrarea Activelor

Statului - AAASPublic authority Management of PSHs n.a.

Slovakia MH Manažmen PSH fully owned by


Slovenia Slovenski Držacni Holding, d.d. - SDHPSH fully owned by


SpainSociedad Estatal de Participaciones

Industriales - SEPI

PSH fully owned by


Sweden

United Kingdom UK Government Investments - UKGIPSH fully owned by

the central

Implement the


Not present

Not present

Malta

Not present

Not present

Not present

Not present

Not present

Not present


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1.1.2. Non-financial assets

Airports

The general government traditionally owns airports. For this same reason, airport

management is traditionally undertaken by the central government, either directly

(i.e. the relevant ministry) or through a bespoke public sector civil aviation

administration (e.g. ENAC in Italy). By contrast, since the 1980s, an increasing

tendency towards the corporatisation of airport management and towards private

investors’ involvement has been registered.

Looking at Figure 3 below, in Spain, Germany, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Sweden,

the ownership of the greatest part of the airport network was transferred to one or

more PSHs. These companies are also responsible for operational decisions.

Furthermore, as shown in Figure 5, in Spain, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Sweden, a

unique PSH is responsible for the largest portion of the airport network (in terms of

passengers and freight traffic).

However, the nature and the extent to which private investors involvement vary

across the EU28 Member States. In the UK, the property of the majority of airport

infrastructures was transferred to private investors, which are also responsible for

operational decisions. In Cyprus, Hungary, and Portugal, airport infrastructures are

public and their management is entrusted only to private investors.

In the remaining countries, airports are kept within the public sector (i.e. owned by

the central government and/or the relevant local governments) and entrusted to

different airport infrastructure managers, which can be either private companies or

PSHs.

As far as the responsibility for strategic and investment decisions is concerned, the

majority of EU28 central governments are responsible for strategic and investment

decisions on their national airport networks6.

Figure 3 Governance regimes: Airports, EU28

6 In Figure 3, Belgium and Germany only appear to have local governments responsible for strategic and investment decisions. However, this is mainly due to the reclassification, which had to be imposed to make governmental layers for federal governments consistent to all others, hence allowing us to make comparisons among countries.

Ownership Responsibility for strategic and investment decisions


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In some countries (e.g. Germany), there are three most important levels of government, i.e. the federal (b)government, the state government, and the local government. In order to better compare models across EU28, these three levels are divided into the two clusters used throughout Pillar 3 analyses: the central government is overlapped to the federal government, and the local governments include the

state and the local governments.

Responsibility for operationaldecisions


Legend

Private bodies (PM)











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Figure 4 “Centralised” bodies with responsibility for the airport network, EU28, 2018


Ports

The landlord port model is the prevalent model for organising port authorities across

the EU28. In this model, the port infrastructure is owned by the port authority, which

is also in charge of its management. It follows that port infrastructures across the

EU28 are mainly owned by public port authorities, with the only exception being the

UK, where the property of the majority of port infrastructures was transferred to

private investors (Figure 5 – top left panel).

An increasing number of port authorities are organised as PSHs and operate in a

commercially-oriented manner (e.g. Cyprus, Belgium, Estonia, Finland, Ireland, and

the Netherlands). In other countries, port authorities are still standalone public bodies

with their own legal personality and different degrees of functional and financial

dependency on the central/local government.

As far as the responsibility for strategic and investment decisions is concerned, the

central government (through the Ministry of Transport and/or Infrastructures) is

responsible for setting the general strategic and investment framework in almost all

EU28 Member States, in which port authorities (organised either as PSHs or public

authorities) are responsible for operational decisions.

PSH responsible for airports within the country

No public entity responsible for airports within the country

Legend

AENA

FINAVIA

SWEDAVIA

RIX

TALLINN AIRPORT


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The only exceptions are Malta and Spain, where the central government has

established a central public body or arms’ length body for coordinating and controlling

the activity of the domestic public port authorities (i.e. Transport Malta in Malta, and

the Public Authority for Public Ports - EPPE7 in Spain), as shown in Figure 6.

Figure 5 Governance regimes: Ports, EU28



7 Ente Público Puertos del Estado (EPPE).




Legend

Private bodies (PM)











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Figure 6 “Centralised” bodies with responsibility for the port network, EU28, 2018


Roads

In all EU28 countries, the road network is almost fully government-owned. More in

detail, motorways and main roads are owned by the central government, while other

roads are owned by the relevant local governments.

From a simple cross-country comparison of governance models across the EU28

(Figure 7), it can be seen that the central government is responsible for outlining the

overall strategic and investment framework in the majority of EU28 countries.

As far as the responsibility for operational decisions is concerned, a variety of actors

are involved at different levels. The majority of EU28 central governments have

entrusted the responsibility for operational decisions with regard to the main roads

network to a central government-owned PSH (e.g. ASFINAG AG in Austria) or a public

authority (e.g. the Swedish Transport Administration).

Public body responsible for the majority of portswithin the country

Asset not present in the country

Legend

EPPE

Transport Malta

No public entity responsible for majority of portswithin the country


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A significant portion of motorways across the EU28 are tolled and operate under

private concessions.

In all EU28 countries, the local governments are responsible for the operational

decisions concerning the roads under their ownership.

Figure 7 Governance regimes: Roads, EU28







Legend

Private bodies (PM)











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In Belgium, motorways and main roads are owned by the relevant state governments. According to the (c)classification adopted in this Pillar, the local governments include the state and the local governments. Therefore, the Belgium network as a whole is owned by the local governments.

Figure 8 “Centralised” bodies with responsibility for the road network, EU28, 2018


Railways

Since the end of the 20th century, a number of European Directives have been adopted

to trigger a structural reorganization of the governance of the railways infrastructure.

Taking into consideration experiences across the EU28, two main models can be

singled out, as follows:

the infrastructure is owned by the central government but managed by a PSH

fully owned by the central government (i.e. Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary,

Lithuania, Latvia, Luxembourg, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia). Within

this model, the only exceptions are Finland and Sweden, where public

authorities act as infrastructure managers;

the railways infrastructure is both owned and managed by a PSH fully owned

by the central government (i.e. Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Denmark, Estonia,

France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, the

United Kingdom). These PSHs are shown in Figure 10 below.

No public entity responsible for the road network within the country

Legend


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Across all EU28 Member States, the central government is responsible for strategic

and investment decisions on the railway network, through the relevant Ministry of

Transports/Infrastructures (Figure 9 – top right panel).

Figure 9 Governance regimes: Railways, EU28




Please note that Cyprus and Malta have no railways. (c)




Legend

Private bodies (PM)











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Figure 10 “Centralised” bodies with responsibility for the railway network, EU28,

2018


Please note that Cyprus and Malta have no railways. (a)

Mineral and Energy reserves

Mineral and Energy reserves across the EU28 are government-owned. The state can

give permission for exploitation to different operators, which can be either private

companies (e.g. in Germany, all the concessionaires are private companies) or PSHs.

These companies are mainly responsible for operational decisions.

With regard to investment strategies, as the top right panel of Figure 11 shows, the

relevant Ministry (e.g. the Ministry for the Economy, Economic Development, Energy,

or Environment) is responsible for setting the strategic framework, often jointly with

the relevant local governments (i.e. in Belgium, Estonia, Romania, Spain, and the UK).

Germany is a special case, since the relevant local government (i.e. the 16 federal

states) are directly responsible for mining policy.

PSH responsible for the country's railway network


Legend

ADIF

DB NETZ

RFI

SNCF Reseau

PKP SANetwork Rail

Irishrail

Rail Net Denmark

OSE

HŽ

Infrastruktura

d.o.o.

Infrabel

RailinfratrustB.V

AS Eesti Raudtee & Edelaraudtee

Infrastruktuuri AS


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Figure 11 Governance regimes: Mineral and Energy reserves, EU28







Legend

Private bodies (PM)











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Figure 12 “Centralised” bodies with responsibility for Mineral and Energy reserves,

EU28, 2018


Other natural resources

In all EU28 countries, Other natural resources8 are owned by the general government.

State participation in the management of natural resources ranges between a more to

less centralised governance regime, and involves a variety of stakeholders through

different public participation processes. While no single governance model can fit all

EU28 Member States, a few, “stylised facts” can be gathered from cross-country

comparisons:

natural resources are often owned either by the central government or the

relevant local government where they are located;

in recent decades, in many countries, the responsibility for strategic,

investment and operational decisions have been spread across jurisdictions,

8 Please note that the “Other natural Resources” broader category includes the following types of assets: Land, Non-cultivated biological resources; Water Resources.

Public body responsible for the country's Mineral and Energy reserves

No public entity responsible for the country's Mineral and Energy reserves

Legend

Latvian Envir., Geol., and Met. Agency

Oil and Gas Aut.

Mining Inspectorate

Office for Mining and GeologyLabour

and Mines Insp.

MRA


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meaning that the sub-national levels of government are involved together with

the central government in the definition of strategic and investment decisions.

As Figure 14 shows, there are no centralised public entity mandated to supervise

assets within the Other natural resources cluster as a whole.

Figure 13 Governance regimes: Other natural resources, EU28







Legend

Private bodies (PM)











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Figure 14 “Centralised” bodies with responsibility for Other natural resources, EU28,

2018


Dwellings, Buildings other than dwellings

Assets falling into this cluster are owned either by central or local governments. With

regard to investment strategies, two models can be identified, as follows:

the Ministry of Finance is responsible for strategic and investment decisions

related to state-owned buildings;

the central government is responsible for strategic decisions on central

government’s buildings, while the relevant local public bodies/governments are

responsible for strategic decisions on their buildings.

It is worth highlighting that many EU28 governments have established a public

authority or a central government-owned PSH (e.g. Senate Properties in Finland) with

the aim of centralising property management. In the majority of cases, these bodies

own the properties they manage.

No public entity responsible for Other natural resources within the country

Legend


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Figure 15 Governance regimes: Dwellings, Buildings other than dwellings, EU28




Ownership Responsibility for the strategic and investment decisions



Legend

Private bodies (PM)











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Figure 16 “Centralised” bodies with responsibility for Buildings, EU28, 2018


For more details on these bodies, please see Table I in Appendix. (a)

1.2. National Public Data Sources

In the majority of EU28 countries, no unique, comprehensive and consolidated

national public data source covering all assets in the government’s portfolio can be

found. In those EU countries in which this was the case, such a National public data

source of public assets can be structured into two ways, as follows:

a proper inventory covering detailed information on technical features of assets

(e.g. the general inventory of State assets in Portugal);

a government balance sheet mapping the value of all assets in the government

portfolio if, of course, compiled adopting accrual accounting (e.g. the Whole of

Government Accounts in the UK).

Public body responsible for public Buildings within the country

No public entity responsible for public Buildings within the country

Legend

BlmA

DIE

SENATE PROPERTIES

AAAS

LPA

TURTO BANKAS

HNAM

HACP

PRIVATISATION UNIT

State Real

Estate

BIG

Real Estate Agency

Lands Authority

Public PropertyAgency

PSH responsible for public Buildings within the country

Admin. Of Reg. and

Dem.

Buildings Agency


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However, if a national public data source is found, in most cases it still does not cover

and/or consolidate assets owned by local governments9.

Figure 17 “Centralised” national public data source covering all assets in the

government portfolio, EU28, 2018


As Figure 17 above shows, only five countries (i.e. Croatia, Estonia, Poland, Sweden,

and the UK) have established a “central” national public data source covering all the

assets within the government’s portfolio.

In any case, even if a proper national public data source of assets is not available,

data about certain clusters of assets - in particular, for Financial assets, Dwellings and

Buildings other than dwellings - are annually collected by the National Statistics

9 Throughout this Pillar, the general government sector is divided into two subsectors: the central government and the local governments. However, in some countries (i.e. Austria, Germany, Belgium), the general government has three subsectors: the federal government, the state governments (e.g. Länder in Germany), and the local governments. For sake of comparability, we re-cluster these three government levels into two categories, i.e. the “central government”, which includes the federal government, and the “local governments”, which include both the state governments and the local governments.

Year-end Financial

Statements

State Property Register

State Real Estate Register

WGA State Asset Register

Registry

Not present

Legend

Government balance sheet compiled adopting accrual accounting


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Offices in each country, in compliance with the ESA2010 Transmission Programme of

Data.

2. OVERVIEW OF THE INVESTMENT STRATEGIES BY CLUSTER OF ASSETS ACROSS

EU28

To our knowledge10, most EU28 countries do not have a unique document outlining

the investment strategy for all assets, despite the fact that, in recent years, the

majority of governments have launched and approved many initiatives across all

assets in their portfolio, with regard, in particular, to those “strategic” sectors of the

economy or “strategic” assets.

The rationale for public ownership is not universal to all countries and to all assets,

because of the different markets and country-specific economic scenarios; therefore, a

service or an asset considered as “strategic” in one country might not be as such in

another. This is the reason why the definition of “strategic” sector of the economy or

“strategic” asset is set by the national legislation.

Still, in many cases, the label “strategic” is linked with the definition of “services of

general interest” (SGEI), “which are economic activities that general governments

identify as being of particular importance to citizens and that would be supplied (or

would be supplied under different condition) if there were no public intervention”11.

These services may be provided either by the state or by the private sector12.

Examples of services of general interest include the public transport, postal services,

and healthcare.

2.1. Financial assets

In the last three decades, a general trend towards privatisation and liberalisation has

prevailed in the majority of the economic sectors (Figures 18, 19 and 20). More in

detail, “Manufacturing”, “Utilities” and “Finance & Real Estate” have been the most

important sectors both in terms of total value and by number of deals.

The number of privatisations in the EU28 reached its peak in the mid-1990s, before a

long (but mostly steady) decline through 2012, followed by a sharp bounce back in

2013 and 2014. The peak on proceeds from privatisations was registered during the

so-called “Bubble Era” over the 1998–2000 period (with 206 Bn Eur raised).

As a result of the 2008 economic and financial crisis, revenues from privatisations

decreased between 2008 and 2012. During this period, governments’ policies were

mainly driven by the economic conjuncture. In fact, many governments took

10 For more details, please see the “Limitations” section of the Methodological Note to Pillar 3. 11 European Commission (2013). Guide to the application of the European Union rules on state aid, public procurement and the internal market to services of general economic interest, and in particular to social services of general interest. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/overview/new_guide_eu_rules_procurement_en.pdf [Accessed 15th February 2017]. 12 There are three categories of SGEI, as follows:

1. services of general economic interest, which are basic services that are carried out in return for a payment (e.g. postal services). These are subject to EU internal market and competition rules. However, derogations to these rules might be in place, in those cases in which it is necessary to protect citizens’ access to basic services;

2. non-economic services (e.g. police, justice and statutory social security schemes), which are not subject to specific EU legislation or to internal market and competition rules;

3. social services of general interest, which are those that respond to the needs of vulnerable citizens,

and are based on the principles of solidarity and equal access (e.g. social security schemes, employment services, and social housing).

http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/overview/new_guide_eu_rules_procurement_en.pdf


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emergency action to rescue banks and other financial institutions, often with a full or

partial nationalisation of these companies.

Figure 18 Privatisations across markets by value and by number, 1980–2014,

EU25 (excl. BG, HR, RO)

Sources: KPMG elaborations on data from the Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) database, 1980-2014.

The value of privatisations refers to the sum of the values of the transactions agreed between a public (a)body (seller) and a private entity (bidder) for that period.

The number of privatisations refers to the total number of transactions for that period. (b) Sectors that are below the 5% threshold in terms of both total value of the transactions and number of (c)deals have been included in the aggregate cluster “Other”.

Please note that the values reported in Figure 18 do not include Bulgaria, Croatia, and Romania, as they (d)are not mapped by the FEEM database.

20.3%

10.3%

1.5%

7.1%

2.3%

11.2%

24.5%22.8%

Telecommunications

Manufacturing

Petroleum Industry

Utilities

Other

Finance & Real Estate Industry

Services Industry

Transportation Industry

8.1%

31.1%

18.1%

13.5%

9.0%

3.5%

10.6%

6.2%

By value By number

1,053.2Eur Bn

2,614Deals

26

Figure 19 Privatisations across markets over time by value, 1980–2014, EU25 (excl. BG, HR, RO)


The value of privatisations refers to the sum of the values of the transactions agreed between a public body (seller) and a private entity (bidder) for that period. (a) In the Eastern European Countries, no privatisations occurred during the 1980s. Indeed, privatisations kicked off 1990s when these, previously planned economies, were (b)transformed into market economies.

Please note that the values reported in Figure 19 do not include Bulgaria, Croatia, and Romania, as they are not mapped in the FEEM database. (c)

200,000

80,000

280,000

220,000

160,000

300,000

260,000

180,000

140,000

120,000

100,000

240,000

320,000

20,000

40,000

0

60,000

30.9%

0.0%

8.9%

13.3%

2.1%

9.3%0.2%

0.2%0.0%0.0%

2001 - 2005

14.1%

25.8%

0.5%

20.1%

0.7% 0.3%

7.7%

23.5%

0.1%

15.6%

1996 - 2000

20.4%

1.0%

8.9%

0.3%0.8% 0.1%

0.1%

2.8%

22.0%

8.7%

8.6%

2.0%

23.7%

1.1%

37.5%

1991 - 1995

0.5%

2.1%

0.1%

19.1%

8.3%

2.9%

0.1%

6.1%

14.9%

0.2%2.1%6.0%

4.2%

0.0%

1986 - 19901980 - 1985

0.1%

21.1%16.8%

37.9%

11.5%

0.1%

3.8%

21.2%

1.2%

59.4%

12.9%

0.3%

1.2%

2.1%

6.7%

2.3%

0.0%

2.7%

1.3%

0.0%

0.1%

2006 - 2010

16.5%

2011 - 2014

10.0%6.3%

33.3% 53.4%

Eur Mn

Construction

Agriculture Industry

Manufacturing

Utilities



Petroleum Industry

Services Industry

Natural Resources

Public Administration

Telecommunications

Trade Industry

27

Figure 20 Privatisations across markets over time by number, 1980–2014, EU25 (excl. BG, HR, RO)


The value of privatisations refers to the sum of the values of the transactions agreed between a public body (seller) and a private entity (bidder) for that period. (a) In the Eastern European Countries, no privatisations occurred during the 1980s. Indeed, privatisations kicked off 1990s when these, previously planned economies, were (b)

transformed into market economies. Please note that the values reported in Figure 20 do not include Bulgaria, Croatia, and Romania, as they are not mapped in the FEEM database. (c)

10

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

500

550

600

650

700

750

13.3%

1.3%

0.3%1.8%

3.2%

3.9%

1991 - 1995

1.1%

3.7%8.1%

17.6%

1.4%

9.4%

0.7%

19.8%

2.5%

14.8%

4.9%

15.0%

6.6% 1.8%

14.4%

19.8%

3.5%

0.4%3.6%

3.3%1.4%

2.9%

13.2%

0.9%0.3%

2001 - 2005

18.0% 29.6%

10.6%

2006 - 2010

12.6%

3.3%

15.8%

2011 - 2014

20.0%

0.7%0.7%

21.2%

13.9%

3.8%7.0% 1.2%

2.2%

9.9%

0.7%

1980 - 1985

22.2%

16.7%

3.7%3.7%

1.5%

0.6%

2.3%1.3%

6.6%

12.8%

5.6%

27.7%

2.2%

1.7%

1.4%

9.1%

8.8%

1986 - 1990 1996 - 2000

22.2%

31.9%

9.4%

52.7%

4.4%

3.7%

33.3%

22.2%

20.7%

Eur Mn


Trade Industry

Manufacturing

Petroleum Industry

Public Administration

Construction


Agriculture Industry

Utilities

Telecommunications

Natural Resources

Services Industry


EU28 Summary Report

28

With regard to the current investment strategies, the majority of EU28 governments

(i.e. 18 EU28 countries) are committed to reduce their portfolio of Financial assets, as

way to boost the liberalisation process and to reduce public debt.

By contrast, the Hungarian and Polish central governments are planning to expand

their equity portfolio by (re-)nationalising companies operating in industries

considered as “strategic” by the central government.

Figure 21 Formulated investment strategies: Financial assets, EU28

Source: KPMG elaborations based on recent observed strategies.

The investment strategy pattern is classified as ”not identified” when, given the information gathered, it (a)is not possible to clusterise the current investment strategy in one of the investment models identified.

The colour of each country reflects the general investment strategy adopted by the government. The (b)general investment strategy might not apply to every single asset within the cluster (e.g. the colour of the country indicates that the government currently plans to invest/divest, and this does not imply that this applies to all assets within the cluster in the country).

2.2. Non-financial assets

The majority of EU28 countries do not appear to have a unique document outlining

investment strategies for all Non-financial assets. However, specific strategy

documents for some clusters of non-financial assets can generally be found. For

example, concerning transport infrastructures, almost all countries have approved

specific plans and programmes for future enhancement and development of transport

infrastructures.

In the following sub-sections more details on the investment strategies relating to

single clusters of Non-financial assets are provided.

Airports

European airports have undergone a major business transformation over the last three

decades. As reported by ACI Europe, “around 80% of the EU airport management

(Re-)Entry in capital

No change in the composition of the financial asset portfolio

Privatisation

Investment strategy pattern not identified

Legend



EU28 Summary Report

29

companies are corporatised businesses with an increasing ever-growing involvement

of the private sector, particularly at the major airports”13.

This framework has led to a rise in both “private-public partnerships” and full or partial

privatisations of airport management companies. Prominent examples of EU airport

management companies which opened up to private shareholders in recent years

include the Spanish (i.e. AENA SA) and the Portoguese (i.e. ANA SA) national airport

network operators, as well as SEA (i.e. the company that operates Milan airports),

Zagreb, Ljubljana and Toulouse airports.

It follows that, in the majority of the EU28 countries, private investors are involved in

the investment in airport infrastructures.

Figure 22 Formulated investment strategies: Airports, EU28




13 Airport Council International – ACI Europe (2016). The ownership of Europe’s Airports. Available at:

http://newairportinsider.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/ACIEUROPEReportTheOwnershipofEuropesAirports2016.pdf [Accessed 06th

February 2018].

Investment

Investment with private investors involvement

Divestment/Fully private investment


Legend


http://newairportinsider.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/ACIEUROPEReportTheOwnershipofEuropesAirports2016.pdf

http://newairportinsider.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/ACIEUROPEReportTheOwnershipofEuropesAirports2016.pdf


EU28 Summary Report

30

Maritime Ports

The “landlord model” has become the prevalent governance model for seaports across

the EU28. According to this model, the port authorities are responsible for the

investment in port infrastructures, and also for attracting private capital.

Within this framework, the majority of investments in port infrastructures are made by

the public sector, although with an increasing involvement of private investors.

In addition, 12 governments across EU28 have launched/adopted an ad hoc document

outlining the investment strategy for the public port network in the medium- and long-

term (i.e. Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia,

the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom).

Figure 23 Formulated investment strategies: Ports, EU28



The colour of each country reflects the general investment strategy adopted by the government. The (b)general investment strategy might not apply to every single asset within the cluster (e.g. the colour of the country indicates that the government currently plans to invest/divest, and this does not imply that

this applies to all assets within the cluster in the country).

Investment




Legend



EU28 Summary Report

31

Roads

In almost all EU28 countries, the relevant Ministries of Transport have launched a

development plan for the future enhancement and expansion of the national road

network in the short- and medium-term. In some cases, planned investment on

motorways and main roads are identified through a multi-year investment plan jointly

signed by the central government (represented by the Ministry of Transport) and the

public entity in charge of managing main roads and motorways (e.g. in Italy by the

so-called Program Contract, jointly signed by the Ministry of Transport and ANAS

S.p.A, which is the PSH fully owned by the central government). In other cases, the

relevant Ministry of Transport defines the strategic financing of important road

planning projects in the multi-year investment plans jointly signed with the relevant

local governments (e.g. in France).

As emerged from these plans, investments in road infrastructures are going to be

financed mainly through state budget allocations.

However, it is worth highlighting that governments have been gradually looking at the

private sector to raise capital for infrastructure investments, mainly through the

procurement “partly-private and partly-public” (e.g. in Spain, France, Portugal, and

Poland).

Figure 24 Formulated investment strategies: Roads, EU28




Investment




Legend



EU28 Summary Report

32

Railways

In almost all EU28 countries, the relevant Ministries of Transport have launched a plan

for the future development of the national railway network. In many cases, planned

investments on railways are identified through a multi-year investment plan jointly

signed by the central government (represented by the Ministry of Transport) and the

railway manager.

According to these plans, the government’s budgets of the EU28 Member States are

the main sources for funding for railway projects. The governments integrate their

funding resources by rail track charging, EU co-funding, concession finance or PPPs.

Figure 25 Formulated investment strategies: Railways, EU28




Please note that Cyprus and Malta have no railways. (c)

Investment




Legend



EU28 Summary Report

33


As far as the investment strategy for Dwelling and Buildings other than dwellings is

concerned, there is no uniform investment strategy across the EU28.

In fact, 9 countries (i.e. the UK, Belgium, Spain, Finland, Latvia, Austria, Croatia,

Greece, and Cyprus) are currently committed to reduce the general government’s real

estate assets (e.g. the UK government in 2010 established a specific policy unit, the

Government Property Unit, in order to achieve a more efficient management of public

properties and to drive savings across the government estate). By contrast, 2

countries (i.e. Ireland, and Poland) plan to enhance and expand their portfolio of

buildings.

Figure 26 Formulated investment strategies: Dwellings, Buildings other than

dwellings, EU28




Investment




Legend



EU28 Summary Report

34


Across the EU28, the exploitation of the Mineral and Energy reserves is given,

predominantly, in concession to private companies, which are responsible for

operational decisions and investments. In this context, it is often difficult to identify a

clear investment strategy pattern.

Figure 27 Formulated investment strategies: Mineral and Energy reserves, EU28




Investment




Legend



EU28 Summary Report

35


Other natural resources cluster consists of many single items, each with its own

strategy and with numerous central and local entities in charge of defining a medium-

and long-term strategy for the portion of natural resources within their jurisdiction.

Therefore, the identification of a clear and unique investment strategy for the cluster

of Other natural resources as a whole is inherently complex.

However, in a few cases, this exercise is possible. In particular, the Slovenian and

Cypriot general government have adopted their investment strategies, which aim at

developing the natural resources within the government’s portfolio.

Figure 28 Formulated investment strategies: Other natural resources, EU28




Investment




Legend



EU28 Summary Report

36

3. OVERVIEW OF THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE GOVERNANCE REGIMES AGAINST

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE INVESTMENT STRATEGIES

The main objective of this section is to cross-match the governance regimes and the

investment strategies across the EU28. As shown in Figure 20, this analysis allows us

to identify the prevalent model (if any) of governance regimes and investment

strategies for each asset cluster, across the EU28.

In more detail, Figure 29 is built on three dimensions. For each cluster of assets, we

look at:

the degree of centralisation/fragmentation of the governance models across

countries for that particular cluster of assets (y-axis);

the general investment strategy adopted by governments for that particular

cluster of asset (x-axis);

the extent of uniformity across EU28 countries in terms of governance regimes

and investment strategies (i.e. the size of the bubbles shows the share of

countries with similar governance regime and investment strategy).

As a matter of example, looking at railways, the governance regimes and investment

strategies appear to be relatively uniform across the EU28. In fact, in all EU28

countries, the governance regime is centralised and investments are made through

public sector fundings (i.e. a unique bubble in the first quadrant on the left of Figure

20). By contrast, governance regimes and investment strategies for Dwellings and

Buildings other than dwellings appear to be the most fragmented ones across the

EU28.

As Figure 29 shows:

the governance regimes for network infrastructures (i.e. roads and railways)

are mostly centralised, and the public sector is the main source of funding for

infrastructure investments;

the governance regimes for nodal infrastructures (i.e. ports and airports) are

mostly decentralised, and the private sector is significantly involved in

financing investments in these infrastructures;

the central governments and the local governments are involved in the

management of financial assets and the majority of EU28 countries appear to

be considering to reduce their portfolio of assets.

37

Figure 29 Matrix of Governance regimes vs Investment strategy, broad features, EU28

Source: KPMG elaborations, based on governance regimes and current, observed strategies. The size of the bubbles shows the percentage share of EU countries which have a similar governance regimes and investment strategy strategies;and therefore could be (a)represented in the same position in the graph (e.g. for the railways cluster the unique only bubble represented shows that all EU countries have a similar governance regimes and investment strategies).

Please note that in Austria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Luxembourg and Slovakia there are no maritime ports. (b)

Decentralised

(Re-)Entry in capital

No change in the composition of the

financial assetportfolio

Privatisation

Governanceregime

Investmentstrategy

Centralised

Not clearinvestment

strategy pattern

Financial assets

AT

BEBG

HR

CY

CZDK

EE

FI

DE

ELIEHU

IT

LV

LU

MT

PL

PTRO

FR SK SI

LT

ES

NL UK

SE

Decentralised

InvestmentInvestment with private investors

involvement

Divestment/Fullyprivate investment

Governanceregime

Investmentstrategy

Centralised

Not clearinvestment

strategy pattern

Airports

AT

BE

BGHR

CY

CZ DK

EEFI

DE

EL

IEHU

IT

LV

LU

MT

PLPT

RO

FR

SK

SI

LT

ES

NL

UK

SE

Decentralised


involvement


Governanceregime

Investmentstrategy

Centralised

Not clearinvestment

strategy pattern

Ports

BE

BGHR

CY

DK

EE FI

DE

EL

IEIT

LV

MT

PL

PT

RO

FR

SI

LT

ESNL

UKSE

Decentralised


involvement


Governanceregime

Investmentstrategy

Centralised

Not clearinvestment

strategy pattern

Roads

AT

BE

BG

HR CY

CZ

DKEE

FIDE

EL

IE

HU

IT

LV

LU

MT PL

PT

RO

FRSK

SI

LTES

NL

UK

SE

Continue

38

Source: KPMG elaborations, based on governance regimes and recent current, observed strategies. The size of the bubbles shows the percentage share of EU countries which have a similar governance regimes and investment strategy strategies;and therefore could be (a)represented in the same position in the graph (e.g. for the railways cluster the unique only bubble represented shows that all EU countries have a similar governance regimes and investment strategies).

Please note that in Cyprus and Malta there are no railways. (b)

Decentralised


involvement


Governanceregime

Investmentstrategy

Centralised

Not clearinvestment

strategy pattern

Railways

26 Countries

Decentralised


involvement


Governanceregime

Investmentstrategy

Centralised

Not clearinvestment

strategy pattern


AT

BE

BG

HRCY

CZDK

EE

FI

DEEL

IE

HU

IT

LV

LU

MT

PL

PT

RO

FR

SK

SI

LT

ES

NL

UK

SE

Decentralised


involvement


Governanceregime

Investmentstrategy

Centralised

Not clearinvestment

strategy pattern


AT

BEBG

HR

CY

CZ

DKEE

FI

DE

EL

IE

HU

IT

LV

LUMT

PL

PT

ROFR

SKSI

LT

ES

NL

UK

SE

Decentralised


involvement


Governanceregime

Investmentstrategy

Centralised

Not clearinvestment

strategy pattern


AT

BE

BG

CY

CZ

DKEE

FI

DE

EL

IEIT

LV

LU

MT

PL

PTROFR

SK

SILT

ES

NLUK

SE

HR

HU


EU28 Summary Report

39

4. SUMMARY

This EU28 Summary Report provides an overview of the EU-wide mix of investment

strategies and governance models adopted by the government across the EU28 to

manage their asset portfolio.

In the majority of EU28 countries, an ad-hoc, unique government entity with specific,

institutional set up with the aim of overseeing state asset management cannot be

found. In fact, in most cases, central governments have progressively increased their

responsibility for strategic decisions, which can either be in the hands of the relevant

ministries, PSHs or authorities.

By the same token, most EU28 governments have not adopted a unique document or

law outlining the government’s general investment strategy for the assets portfolio as

a whole. By contrast, many specific strategies covering significant portions of the

government’s asset portfolio have been implemented. In this regard, the case of

transportation infrastructures is a good example, for which almost all EU28

governments have approved strategy and future investments.

The analysis also shows that, with regard to Financial assets, in the last few decades,

the presence of the government has been decreasing, in favour of liberalisations of

many industries in light of free competition and according to the principle of

subsidiarity. In particular, across Europe, the sectors which were affected the most by

the privatisation process over this period were the financial, telecommunications, and

utilities sectors.

Moreover, it is also worth highlighting that many EU28 countries have established ad-

hoc “centralised” public bodies (organised either as PSH or public authority) for

managing some clusters of assets within the PSHs portfolio or for implementing the

privatisation strategies set by the government.

For example, looking at the Buildings sector, there is no uniform investment strategy

and governance model across the EU28. However, some EU28 governments have

established a public authority or a central government-owned PSH with the aim of

centralising property management. In most cases, these bodies own the properties

they manage and were established with the aim of making the most efficient and cost-

effective use of the central governments’ buildings.

Finally, in the majority of EU28 countries there is no unique, comprehensive and

consolidated National public data source covering all assets in the general

government’s portfolio.


EU28 Summary Report

40

Appendix I EU28

Table A Overview of governance regimes, Financial assets, EU28


The codes in the table above highlight the main bodies involved for each role within the responsibility (a)chain (e.g. bodies owning the assets, bodies responsible for operational decisions), for each asset cluster in the government’s asset portfolio. These models may not apply to all the individual assets within the relevant cluster.

For some cluster of assets, the responsibility for some aspects of the governance regime is spread (b)between more bodies at different levels of centralisation. Therefore, we represent these cases using more than one code.

This country does not have a specific National Public Data Sources for this type of asset. (1)

Country Ownership

Responsibility for

strategic and

investment decisions

Responsibility for

operational decisions

National Public Data

Sources

Austria Mixed (C3 + D1) C1 Mixed (C3 + D1) C1

Belgium Mixed (C3 + D1) C3 Mixed (C3 + D1) Mixed (C2 + C3)

Bulgaria Mixed (C1 + D1) C1 Mixed (C2 + D1) C1

Croatia Mixed (C2 + D1) Mixed (C1 + D1) Mixed (C2 + D1) C1

Cyprus C1 C1 C2 n.a.(1)

Czech Republic Mixed (C1 + D1) C1 Mixed (C1 + D1) C1

Denmark Mixed (C1 + D1) C1 Mixed (C1 + D1) C2

Estonia Mixed (C1 + D1) Mixed (C1 + D1) Mixed (C1 + D1) C1

Finland Mixed (C3 + D1) C1 Mixed (C3 + D1) C1

France Mixed (C2 + D1) C1 Mixed (C2 + D1) C1

Germany Mixed (C1 + D1) Mixed (C1 + D1) Mixed (C1 + D1) C2

Greece Mixed (C3 + D1) C1 Mixed (C3 + D1) Mixed (C1 + C3)

Hungary Mixed (C3 + D1) C1 Mixed (C3 + D1) n.a.(1)

Ireland Mixed (C1 + D1) Mixed (C1 + D1) Mixed (C2 + D1) C2

Italy Mixed (C1 + D1) C1 Mixed (C1 + D1) C1

Latvia Mixed (C1 + D1) C1 C3 C2

Lithuania Mixed (C1 + D1) C1 Mixed (C3 + D1) C2

Luxembourg Mixed (C3 + D1) C1 Mixed (C3 + D1) Mixed (C1 + C2)

Malta C3 C1 C3 C2

Poland Mixed (C1 + D1) C1 Mixed (C1 + D1) C2

Portugal Mixed (C3 + D1) C1 Mixed (C3 + D1) Mixed (C1 + C2)

Romania Mixed (C1 + D1) Mixed (C1 + D1) Mixed (C2 + D1) C2

Slovakia Mixed (C3 + D1) C1 Mixed (C3 + D1) C1

Slovenia Mixed (C1 + D1) C1 Mixed (C3 + D1) C2

Spain Mixed (C3 + D1) C1 Mixed (C3 + D1) C2

Sweden Mixed (C1 + D1) C1 Mixed (C1 + D1) C2

The Netherlands Mixed (C1 + D1) C1 Mixed (C1 + D1) C1

United Kingdom Mixed (C1 + D1) Mixed (C1 + D1) Mixed (C1 + D1) Mixed (C1 + C2)

Legend

C3C1 C2= Central government

= Central public body

= Central company-typestructure

D1 = Local governments

D2 = Local public body

D3 = Local company-typestructure

= Private bodyPM


EU28 Summary Report

41

Table B Overview of governance regimes, Airports, EU28




Country Ownership

Responsibility for

strategic and


Responsibility for



Sources

Austria C1 C1 Mixed (C3 + D3) C2

Belgium Mixed (C1 + D1) Mixed (C1 + D1) Mixed (C3 + D3) C1


Croatia C1 C1 Mixed (C3 + D3) C2

Cyprus C1 C1 PB C2

Czech Republic Mixed (C1 + D1) C1 Mixed (C3 + D3) Mixed (C1 + C2)


Estonia C3 C1 C3 C3

Finland C3 C1 C3 Mixed (C3 + C2)


Germany D3 Mixed (C1 + D1) D3 C2

Greece C1 Mixed (C1 + C3) Mixed (C3 + C2) C2

Hungary C1 C2 PB C2

Ireland Mixed (C1 + D1) C1 Mixed (C3 + D3) C2

Italy Mixed (C1 + D1) C1 D3 C2

Latvia C3 C1 C3 C3

Lithuania C1 C1 C3 C2

Luxembourg C1 C1 C3 Mixed (C3 + C2)

Malta C1 C2 C3 C2

Poland C1 C1 C3 C2

Portugal C1 C1 PB C2

Romania C1 C1 Mixed (C3 + D3) C2

Slovakia C1 C1 C3 Mixed (C3 + C2)

Slovenia C1 C1 C3 C2

Spain C3 C1 C3 C3


The Netherlands Mixed (C1 + D1) Mixed (C1 + D1) Mixed (C3 + D3) C2

United Kingdom PB C1 PB Mixed (C1 + C2)

Legend







= Private bodyPM


EU28 Summary Report

42

Table C Overview of governance regimes, Maritime Ports, EU28




This country does not have this particular type of asset. (1)

Country Ownership

Responsibility for

strategic and


Responsibility for



Sources

Austria Not present(1)

Not present(1)

Not present(1)

Not present(1)

Belgium D3 Mixed (C1 + D1) D3 C2


Croatia C1 C1 D2 Mixed (C1 + C2)

Cyprus C1 C1 C3 C2

Czech Republic Not present(1)

Not present(1)

Not present(1)

Not present(1)

Denmark D1 C1 D2 C2

Estonia D3 C1 D3 C1

Finland D3 C1 D3 C2


Germany D1 Mixed (C1 + D1) D3 C2

Greece Mixed (C1 + D1) Mixed (C1 + C3) C3 C2

Hungary Not present(1)

Not present(1)

Not present(1)

Not present(1)


Italy C1 C1 D2 C2

Latvia C1 C1 D2 C2

Lithuania C1 C1 D2 C2

Luxembourg Not present(1)

Not present(1)

Not present(1)

Not present(1)

Malta C1 C2 C2 C2

Poland C1 C1 D2 C2

Portugal C1 C1 D2 C2


Slovakia Not present(1)

Not present(1)

Not present(1)

Not present(1)


Spain C1 C2 D2 C2

Sweden C1 C1 D2 C2


United Kingdom PB C1 PB C1

Legend







= Private bodyPM


EU28 Summary Report

43

Table D Overview of governance regimes, Roads, EU28




Country Ownership

Responsibility for

strategic and


Responsibility for



Sources

Austria Mixed (C1 + D1) C1 Mixed (C3 + D2) Mixed (C1 + C2)

Belgium D1 D1 D2 C2

Bulgaria Mixed (C1 + D1) C1 Mixed (C2 + D3) Mixed (C1 + C2)

Croatia Mixed (C1 + D1) C1 Mixed (C3 + D2) Mixed (C1 + C2)

Cyprus Mixed (C1 + D1) C1 Mixed (C2 + D2) C2

Czech Republic Mixed (C1 + D1) C1 Mixed (C2 + D2) C2

Denmark Mixed (C1 + D1) C1 Mixed (C2 + D2) Mixed (C1 + C2)

Estonia Mixed (C1 + D1) C1 Mixed (C2 + D2) Mixed (C1 + C2)

Finland Mixed (C1 + D1) C1 Mixed (C2 + D2) C2

France Mixed (C1 + D1) C1 Mixed (C2 + D2) Mixed (C1 + C2)


Greece Mixed (C1 + D1) Mixed (C1 + C3) Mixed (C1 + D1) C2

Hungary Mixed (C1 + D1) C2 Mixed (C3 + D2) C2


Italy Mixed (C1 + D1) C1 Mixed (C3 + D2) Mixed (C3 + D2)

Latvia Mixed (C1 + D1) C1 Mixed (C3 + D2) Mixed (C3 + C2)


Luxembourg Mixed (C1 + D1) C1 C2 C2

Malta Mixed (C1 + D1) C1 Mixed (C2 + D2) C2


Portugal Mixed (C1 + D1) C1 Mixed (C3 + D1) C2

Romania Mixed (C1 + D1) C1 Mixed (C3 + D1) Mixed (C3 + C2)

Slovakia Mixed (C1 + D1) C1 Mixed (C3 + D2) Mixed (C3 + C2)



Sweden Mixed (C1 + D1) Mixed (C1 + D1) Mixed (C2 + D2) C2



Legend







= Private bodyPM


EU28 Summary Report

44

Table E Overview of governance regimes, Railways, EU28




This country does not have this particular type of asset. (1)

Country Ownership

Responsibility for

strategic and


Responsibility for



Sources

Austria C3 C1 C3 Mixed (C3 + C2)

Belgium C3 C1 C3 C3

Bulgaria C1 C1 C3 Mixed (C1 + C2)

Croatia C3 C1 C3 C3

Cyprus Not present(1)

Not present(1)

Not present(1)

Not present(1)

Czech Republic C1 C1 C3 Mixed (C3 + C2)

Denmark C3 C1 C3 C3

Estonia C3 C1 C3 Mixed (C3 + C2)

Finland C1 C1 C2 C2

France C3 C1 C3 Mixed (C3 + C2)

Germany C3 C1 C3 C3

Greece C3 Mixed (C1 + C3) C3 C3

Hungary C1 C2 C3 C2

Ireland C3 C1 C3 C2

Italy C3 C1 C3 C3

Latvia C1 C1 C3 Mixed (C3 + C2)

Lithuania C1 C1 C3 C3

Luxembourg C1 C1 C3 C2

Malta Not present(1)

Not present(1)

Not present(1)

Not present(1)

Poland C3 C1 C3 C3

Portugal C1 C2 C3 Mixed (C3 + C2)

Romania C1 C1 C3 C2

Slovakia C1 C1 C3 Mixed (C3 + C2)


Spain C3 C1 C3 C3

Sweden C1 C1 C2 C2

The Netherlands C3 C1 C3 Mixed (C3 + C2)

United Kingdom C3 C1 C3 Mixed (C1 + C3)

Legend







= Private bodyPM


EU28 Summary Report

45

Table F Overview of governance regimes, Mineral and Energy reserves, EU28




This country does not have a specific National Public Data Sources for this type of asset. (1)

Country Ownership

Responsibility for

strategic and


Responsibility for



Sources

Austria C1 C1 Mixed (C3 + D3) n.a.(1)

Belgium C1 D1 Mixed (C3 + D3) n.a.(1)

Bulgaria C1 C1 Mixed (C3 + D3) C2

Croatia C1 C1 Mixed (C3 + D3) C1

Cyprus C1 C1 C3 n.a.(1)

Czech Republic C1 C1 Mixed (C3 + D3) C2

Denmark C1 C1 Mixed (C3 + D3) C2

Estonia C1 C1 Mixed (C3 + D3) C1

Finland C1 C1 Mixed (C3 + D3) C2

France C1 C1 Mixed (C3 + D3) C2

Germany Mixed (C1 + D1) D2 PB C1

Greece C1 C1 Mixed (C3 + D3) n.a.(1)

Hungary C1 C2 Mixed (C3 + D3) C2

Ireland C1 C1 Mixed (C3 + D3) C2

Italy Mixed (C1 + D1) C1 Mixed (C3 + D3) C1

Latvia C1 C2 Mixed (C3 + D3) n.a.(1)

Lithuania C1 C1 Mixed (C3 + D3) n.a.(1)

Luxembourg C1 C2 Mixed (C3 + D3) n.a.(1)

Malta C1 C2 Mixed (C3 + D3) n.a.(1)

Poland C1 C1 Mixed (C3 + D3) C1

Portugal C1 C1 Mixed (C3 + D3) n.a.(1)

Romania C1 Mixed (C2 + D1) C3 C2

Slovakia C1 C1 Mixed (C3 + D3) C1

Slovenia C1 C1 Mixed (C3 + D3) n.a.(1)

Spain C1 Mixed (C1 + D1) Mixed (C3 + D3) C1

Sweden C1 C2 Mixed (C3 + D3) n.a.(1)

The Netherlands C1 C1 Mixed (C3 + D3) C2

United Kingdom C1 Mixed (C1 + C2) Mixed (C3 + D3) C2

Legend







= Private bodyPM


EU28 Summary Report

46

Table G Overview of governance regimes, Other natural resources, EU28




This country does not have a specific National Public Data Sources for this type of asset (1)

Country Ownership

Responsibility for

strategic and


Responsibility for



Sources

Austria Mixed (C1 + D1) C1 Mixed (C2 + D2) Mixed (C1 + C2)

Belgium Mixed (C1 + D1) Mixed (C1 + D1) Mixed (C2 + D2) C2


Croatia Mixed (C1 + D1) C1 C2 C2

Cyprus Mixed (C1 + D1) C1 C1 C2

Czech Republic C1 C1 C2 C2


Estonia Mixed (C1 + D1) C1 Mixed (C2 + D2) C2

Finland Mixed (C1 + D1) Mixed (C1 + D1) Mixed (C2 + D2) C2



Greece Mixed (C1 + D1) C1 C2 C2

Hungary C1 C1 C1 C2

Ireland Mixed (C1 + D1) C1 C2 C2

Italy Mixed (C1 + D1) Mixed (C1 + D1) Mixed (C2 + D2) C2

Latvia Mixed (C1 + D1) C1 C2 C2

Lithuania Mixed (C1 + D1) C1 C2 C2



Poland Mixed (C1 + D1) C1 C2 C2

Portugal Mixed (C1 + D1) C1 C2 n.a.(1)


Slovakia Mixed (C1 + D1) C1 C2 C1


Spain Mixed (C1 + D1) Mixed (C1 + D1) Mixed (C2 + D2) C2



United Kingdom C1 C1 C2 Mixed (C1 + C2)

Legend







= Private bodyPM


EU28 Summary Report

47

Table H Overview of governance regimes, Dwellings and Buildings other Dwellings,

EU28




Country Ownership

Responsibility for the

strategic and


Responsibility for the



Sources

Austria Mixed (C3 + D1) C1 Mixed (C3 + D1) C2

Belgium Mixed (C1 + D1) Mixed (C1 + D1) Mixed (C2 + D1) Mixed (C1 + C2)


Croatia Mixed (C1 + D1) C1 C3 C1

Cyprus Mixed (C1 + D1) C1 Mixed (C2 + D1) C2

Czech Republic Mixed (C1 + D1) Mixed (C1 + D1) Mixed (C1 + D1) C2


Estonia Mixed (C1 + D1) C1 Mixed (C3 + D1) C2

Finland Mixed (C1 + D1) Mixed (C1 + D1) Mixed (C3 + D1) C2

France Mixed (C1 + D1) Mixed (C1 + D1) Mixed (C2 + D1) C2


Greece Mixed (C1 + D1) Mixed (C1 + C3) Mixed (C3 + D1) Mixed (C3 + C2)

Hungary Mixed (C1 + D1) C1 Mixed (C3 + D1) C2

Ireland Mixed (C1 + D1) Mixed (C1 + D1) Mixed (C2 + D1) C2

Italy Mixed (C2 + D1) Mixed (C1 + D1) Mixed (C2 + D1) C2

Latvia Mixed (C2 + D1) Mixed (C1 + D1) Mixed (C2 + D1) C2





Portugal Mixed (C1 + D1) Mixed (C1 + D1) Mixed (C1 + D1) C1

Romania Mixed (C1 + D1) Mixed (C1 + D1) Mixed (C1 + D1) C2

Slovakia Mixed (C1 + D1) C1 Mixed (C1 + D1) C2

Slovenia Mixed (C1 + D1) Mixed (C1 + D1) Mixed (C2 + D1) C2





Legend


= Central public authority



D2 = Local public authorities


= Private body

PM


EU28 Summary Report

48

Table I Overview of the promotional banks by EU28 country


In many EU28 countries, PSHs are owned by the Promotional Banks and other public bodies whose main (a)goal is providing medium- and long-term capital for capital investment, in order to boost the domestic economy. However, these bodies were not established with the specific purpose of enhancing and exploiting the central government’s portfolio. Therefore, they are not considered in this Study, and not represented in this table.

Country Name

Austria Austria Wirtschaftsservice (AWS)

Belgium Participatiemaatscha ppij Vlaanderen (PMV)

BelgiumSociété Wallonne de Financement et de Garantie

des Petites et Moyennes Entreprises (SOWALFIN)

Bulgaria Bulgarian Development Bank

Croatia Hrvatska banka za obnovu i razvitak (HBOR)

Cyprus Cyprus Development Bank (CDB)

Czech RepublicCzech-Moravian Guarantee and Development Bank

(CMZRB)

Denmark Vækstfonden

Estonia KredEx

Finland Finnvera

Finland Municipality Finance plc

France Agence France Locale

France BPIFRANCE

France Caisse des dépôts et consignations

France Société de Financement Local

Germany Bayerische Landesbank

Germany Bremer Aufbaubank

Germany Förderbank Investitionsbank Berlin

Germany Hamburgische Investitions-und Förderbank

Germany Investitionsbank des Landes Brandenburg

Germany Investitionsbank Sachsen-Anhalt

Germany Investitionsbank Schleswig-Holstein

Germany Investitions-und Strukturbank Rheinland-Pfalz

Germany KfW Bankengruppe

Germany Landesförderinstitut Mecklenburg-Vorpommern

Germany Landeskreditbank Baden-Württemberg

Germany LFA Bayern

Germany National Rentenbank

Germany NRW BANK

Germany Saarländische Investitionskreditbank AG

GermanyState Development Bank of the Free State of

Saxony (SAB)

Germany Thüringer Aufbaubank

Germany Wirtschafts-Infrastrukturbank Hessen (WiBank)

Greece Institute for Growth

Hungary Hungarian EXIMBANK

HungaryMFB Hungarian Development Bank Private Limited

Company

Continue


EU28 Summary Report

49


In many EU28 countries, PSHs are owned by the Promotional Banks and other public bodies whose main (a)goal is providing medium- and long-term capital for capital investment, in order to boost the domestic economy. However, these bodies were not established with the specific purpose of enhancing and exploiting the central government’s portfolio. Therefore, they are not considered in this Study, and not represented in this table.

Country Name

Ireland Strategic Banking Corporation of Ireland

ItalyBanca del Mezzogiorno - MedioCredito Centrale

S.p.A.

Italy Cassa Depositi e Prestiti

Italy Finpiemonte

Italy Friulia

Latvia Latvian Single Development Institution

Lithuania Invega

Luxembourg Société Nationale de Crédit et d’Investissement

Malta Malta Development Bank

The

NetherlandsBank Nederlandse Gemeenten

The

NetherlandsNederlandse Waterschaps Bank

Poland BANK GOSPODARSTWA KRAJOWEGO

PortugalPortuguese Development Financial Institution -

Instituição Financeira de Desenvolvimento

Romania Exim Bank

Slovakia Slovenská Záruèná a Rozvojová Banka

Slovenia SID Bank

Spain IDEA Agency

Spain Instituto Catalan de Financas (ICF)

Spain Instituto de Credito Oficial

Spain Instituto Valenciano de Finanzas

Sweden Almi Företagspartner

SwedenKommuninvest of Sweden Local Government Debt

Office

United

KingdomBritish Business Bank

United

KingdomGreen Investment Bank

United

Kingdom

Scottish Investment Bank (investment arm of

Scottish Enterprise)

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