su phd thesis - 10 chapter 3

8/14/2019 Su PhD thesis - 10 Chapter 3

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CHAPTER THREE

THE INTERNAL STRUCTURE OF THE GUANGXI CLIQUE

After his defeat in the struggle for the central power of the GMD, Li Zongren with

the Guangxi Clique were forced to return to the province in April 1929. Jiang Jieshi could

not, however, tolerate the idea of Li and the Clique holding a province in opposition to him.

Jiang employed a policy of replacing one Clique with another (yi-Gui zhi-Gui), sending

the main force of the 7th Army of NRA, which had defected from the Clique in Hubei and

was currently under the command of Generals Yu Zuobai and Li Mingrui, back to their

home province in order to use Guangxi natives to fight each other. Meanwhile, Jiang used

silver bullets to try to bribe Li Zongrens subordinates who had remained in the province

during the Northern Expedition and encouraged them to defect from the Clique.1

Under

Jiangs pressure, Li and other Guangxi leaders were finally forced into exile and left their

home province for Hong Kong and Vietnam two months later. However, Jiang

underestimated his rivals. In fact, they still had potential influence in Guangxi. Seizing the

opportunity in the complicated situation of the anti-Jiang wars initiated by the

Reorganization Faction under Wang Jingwei and Chen Gongbo, particularly that of the

1For details of the defection of Guangxi native generals headed by both Yu Zuobai and Li

Mingrui from the Clique in 1929, see Zhang Renmin, Jiang-Li zuida lieheng zhizhaozhe -

Yu Zuobai, CQ, No. 112 (01/03/1962), and the same author, Yin Liang Chaoji zhisi,

xianhua Guangxi neimu, ibid, No. 308 (16/05/1970); Lai Gang, Jiang Jieshi liyong Yu-Li

dao-Gui wowen, GDWSZLXJ, No. 10, pp. 123-9; Lin Tinghua, Jiang-Wang mimou dao-

Gui de qianyin houguo, GDWSZLXJ, No. 8, pp. 43-9; Zhang Wenhong, Li Mingrui dao-

Gui tou-Jiang he dao-Jiang shibai jingguo, GXWSZL, No. 13, pp. 142-54; Zhongguo

qingnian junrenshe, Fan-Jiang yundong shi, Guangzhou: Zhongguo qingnian junrenshe,

1934; and Chen Gongbo, Ku xiao lu, Hong Kong: The University of Hong Kong, 1979,

Chapter 6.


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anti-Jiang mutiny launched by General Zhang Fakui in September 1929,2

Li, Huang and

Bai returned to Guangxi in the fall of the year. They joined forces with the 4th Army of the

NRA, the famous Ironside under the command of Zhang, which entered Guangxi at the

end of 1929, and restored the Cliques force. Through the anti-Jiang wars in 1929-1931,Lis group revived,

3becoming a powerful rival to Jiang in the struggles for both power and

policies in the 1930s, the latter mainly over the issue of how to deal with resistance against

Japanese aggression. How could the Clique have revived and developed political ideals

and formidable military strength within the GMD in the 1930s before the Sino-Japanese

War? There are indications that, aside from the reasons that Li successfully carried out

mass mobilization in Guangxi and strove for regional cooperation with other provinces, a

possible answer is that he also relied on political and military support from his group.Unfortunately, previous studies of contemporary Guangxi history did not deal with this

issue. For this reason, before we deal with the political ideas and policies of Li and the

Clique in response to imperialist aggression, it is necessary to analyze and account for its

internal structure, and the impact of this on the political development of the Guangxi group

in the 1930s.

The Graduates of Baoding Military Academy (BMA) Group

The officers of the Clique were mainly military school graduates, as mentioned

earlier, but the nucleus actually came from the Baoding Military Academy (BMA). The

phenomenon of the BMA group in domination over the Clique can be attributed to the

historical background of its formation.

2For details of the civil wars in 1929-30 - also called Hudang jiuguo zhanzheng (the

War of the Party Protection and National Salvation) - and the anti-Jiang war in Guangxiduring 1929-1931, see Zhongguo qingnian junrenshe, Fan-Jiang yundong shi, pp. 75-95;

Disijun jishi bianzuan weiyuanhui (ed.),Disijun jishi, Guangzhou: Huaiyuan wenhua shiye

fuwushe, 1949; and Chen Gongbo, Ku xiao lu, Chapter 6.

3For details of the survival and revival of Li Zongren and his Clique in Guangxi and

Zhang Fakuis anti-Jiang mutiny organized by the Reorganization Faction, see Chen

Gongbo, Ku xiao lu, chapter 6; and memoirs of Li Zongren, Li Pinxian, Wei Yongcheng,

Cheng Siyuan, Huang Shaohong, Huang Xuchu, Bai Chongxi, Zhang Renmin, Xu Qiming,

Yu Shixi, and Chen Xiong in the Bibliography of this thesis. Also see Archives of the

War History Compiled Committee, the Nationalist Government, The Second Historical

Archives of China, Nanjing.


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The Clique was initially composed of two major parts: Lis own troops from Yulin,

and the Guangxi Model Battalion (GMB) where most Guangxi native BMA graduates

started their military careers. For example, when the GMB was established in 1917, its

main officers were BMA graduates, such as Huang Shaohong, Bai Chongxi, Xia Wei, XuQiming, Chen Xiong and so on; while Li built his own force in Yulin, BMA graduates,

such as Yin Chenggang, Yu Zuobai and others, who acted as senior commanders of Lis

troops at that time, also played an important role.4

When it was reorganized in 1926, most

middle and high ranking officers of the 7th Army of the NRA were BMA graduates.5

In

fact, this phenomenon also occurred in other armies of the NRA, such as the 1st, 4th, and

8th armies at that time.6

Even the revival of Li's force in Guangxi after 1929 was

dependent on this group, because elements of the group actually controlled the remnanttroops of the Clique when Li was forced into exile in Hong Kong and Vietnam.

7Before the

War of Resistance, HMA (Huangpu Military Academy) graduates had already become the

leading officers at all levels of Jiangs zhongyang jun (the Central Army). On the

contrary, the BMA Group in the Clique still occupied the most important positions in the

provincial government, the army, and the militia organizations as well.8

Another reason for the BMA Groups domination in the Clique was that there were

no Guangxi native graduates from the Japanese Military School before the Expedition,except Ma Xiaojun, founder of the GMB. However, Ma left the GMB for the Guangzhou

government one year after the war between Guangdong and Guangxi broke out in 1921.9

As a result, Huang Shaohong and Bai Chongxi replaced Ma as leaders of the GMB, which

had been expanded to a regiment during the war, and then joined Li in 1922. We know

4See Appendix 1.1.

5See Appendix 1.2.

6For a discussion of the role played by the BMA graduates in the 1910s and 1920s, see

Lin Dezheng, Baoding junguan xuexiao zhi yanjiu (1912-1924), M. A. thesis, National

Political University, Taipei, 1980.

7See Zhang Renmin, Yin Liang Chaoji zhisi, xianhua Guangxi neimu, CQ, No. 308-9

(1-16/05/1970).

8See Appendix 1.3 and 1.4.

9See Ma Xiaojun, Guangxi gemingjun fayuan zhilue, GXWX, No. 63 (1994), pp. 8-10.


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that, at the end of the late Qing Dynasty and in the early Republic, there were four

categories of the military school in ascending order: 1) the elementary military school; 2)

the army preparatory school; 3) the middle military school; and 4) the BMA. That is to say,

among them the BMA was on the top level with its current modern military educationsystem.

10In general, BMA graduates had longer and more systemized military training

(about six to seven years from the beginning until the highest level) than those from other

levels. Thus, not surprisingly, these BMA graduates from Guangxi provided the source of

officers for the new Guangxi armies after Lu Rongting was defeated by the Guangdong

armies in 1921, and became the main commanders of the Guangxi armies.11

Among them

were Huang and Bai. After the occupation of Wuzhou in 1923, Huang and Bai became

provincial militarists. They attracted numerous Guangxi BMA graduates to their troops tostrengthen the force. Their attitude towards BMA graduates also won the support of some

of these from other provinces who came to join them.12

For example, Wang Yinyu, a

BMA graduate of the 1st term (qi) and a native of Guangdong, became Chief of Staff of the

7th Army during the Northern Expedition; Hu Zongduo, a BMA graduate of the 4th term

and a native of Hubei province, with his fellow provincial, formed a sub-faction in the

Clique, which we will discuss later; and Zhang Dingfan, a native of Jiangxi province and a

BMA graduate of the 3rd term, was Mayor of Shanghai in 1927-28 and one of Bais trustedsubordinates. Through the efforts of both Huang and Bai, the BMA group dominated the

most important positions amongst middle and senior commanders in the new Guangxi

army under the command of Li. No doubt, this large number of BMA graduates helped to

ensure the Cliques control over the province.

10

For details of curriculums in the Baoding Military Academy, see Lin Dezheng,Baoding junguan xuexiao zhi yanjiu (1912-1924).

11The old Guangxi armies under Lu Rongting belittled these younger well-trained

officers and limited their promotions in the army. This was the main reason for them

coming under the command of Li Zongren soon after the defeat of Lu Rongting by the

Guangdong army. See Yin Chenggang, Li Zongren qijia jingguo, GXWSZLXJ, No. 7;

and Li Pinxian,Li Pinxian huiyi lu, Taipei: Zhongwai tushu chuban gongsi, 1975, pp. 25-

30.

12Lu Weiqian, Hu Zongduo Tao Jun zai Guixi zhong de qiluo, WSZLXJ, No. 52

(1964), p. 64.


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As for HMA graduates, they joined the Clique too late to occupy important

positions in both the Guangxi government and the army. When the HMA was set up in

1924, the BMA group was already entrenched in the principal positions in the Clique.

Even when some HMA graduates joined the Clique after 1925, their ranks and positionswere so minor that they could not play important roles before the Sino-Japanese War.

More importantly, after the reunification of Guangxi, the Clique set up its own military

school in Nanning as a branch of the HMA, with BMA graduates as instructors or teachers.

With this background, the graduates of this branch regarded themselves as coming from

the Guangxi Military School rather than from the HMA.13

The Guangxi army under the Clique had shown high combat effectiveness in wars

of the reunification of Guangxi and the Northern Expedition. Even in the War ofResistance, the Guangxi troops, according to a Western observer, are the best of the

provincial forces. These troops were organized and trained by Generals Li Tsung-jen and

Pai Chung-hsi, two of the best soldiers in China. The men receive excellent care, their

morale is high, and they have given a good account of themselves in battle.14

Therefore,

they have won high praise for their gallantry.15

As John S. Service, an American

diplomat, pointed out early in 1945, the Guangxi army had proved in earlier days that they

were good fighters - against the Northern warlords, against Chiang and against theCommunists. So they were given the honour of an important place in the front lines - but

north of the Yangtze and far from their home province. they fought well - and lost heavily -

at Taierchuang and Hsuchow.16

The reason for its excellent performance is that, it to a

great extent, depended on the domination of the BMA group in the Guangxi troops. With

excellent military knowledge and fighting skills as well as experience of the BMA group

13Liang Xueqian, Guijun ganbu de yaolan - Nanning junxiao, GXWX, No. 57 (1992),pp. 13-8; and Liu Qianyi, Guilin Lijiacun junxiao huiyi, GXWX, No. 11 (1981), pp. 48-

50.

14Evans Fordyce Carlson, The Chinese Army: Its Organization and Military Efficiency,

New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940, p. 31.

15Li Po-Sheng, How Kwangsi Trains Its Troops, Peoples Tribune, Vol. XXV, No. 3

(May 1938), p. 141.

16Joseph W. Esherick (ed.), Lost Chance in China: The World War II Despatches of

John Service, New York: Random House, 1974, p. 43.


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and other commanders who originated from other military schools, the Guangxi army

defeated the enemy in one battle after another. This army was in addition well-trained and

it always was conscious of its reputation as it carried forward the militant tradition of the

Guangxi people, the source from which its soldiers were recruited. There is no doubt thatthe defeat of the Clique after the Expedition was the result of divisions in the BMA group

caused by Jiang, as mentioned in Chapter Two. However, the fighting skills of this group

and the militant tradition of the Guangxi people were once more to become a vital factor in

the revival of Lis force in Guangxi from 1929 to 1931 and in building its reputation as a

courageous army in the Sino-Japanese War.

The most important element in the political cohesion between the BMA group and

the Clique was the shared aim of regional self-government (difang zizhi), which drove themto acknowledge Li Zongren as their leader. First, they came mainly from rural families and

had the same educational background. Secondly, they were pushed into oblivion because

they failed to obtain the chance to be promoted to higher positions in the central

government and the army, though they had on their record significant military

achievements in the Expedition. Even those natives of Guangxi who served other

provinces or armies were not trusted by Jiang and other factions. As a result, those men,

such as Li Pinxian, Ye Qi, and Liao Lei, former senior commanders of Tang Shengzhistroops, were forced to return to their native province - Guangxi. In this situation, the

ambitions of Li and the Clique to transform and reconstruct the province in the earlier stage

of the Cliques rise were to be realized by these officers. Moreover, after the Expedition,

the GMD proclaimed that China had begun the political tutelage (xunzheng) period. How

could the policy be carried out? Different factions and groups had different ideas. For

example, in 1928 Feng Yuxiang proposed to settle problems of the livelihood of the people

as the first agenda of the Nationalist Government, but he failed to have the proposal passedin both the party and the government.

17The fact that Li and the Clique were excluded from

Nanjing led them to the belief that Jiang aimed at building his own dictatorship over the

country, and would not implement democratic practice in politics. Here democracy was an

ideal which they believed demanded national power-sharing by all factions of the GMD

and the people including, of course, the Clique itself. More importantly, Guangxi had

17For details see Cao Hongxin, Feng zai Nanjing, Shanghai: Zhengzhi yanjiushe, 1932.


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experienced two years of the chaos of war because Jiang had commanded the Nanjing and

non-Nanjing troops to attack the province in order to eliminate the Clique from 1929 to

1931. Li and the Clique attributed this to Jiangs attempt to establish his dictatorship and

they were forced to arouse political regionalism to defend their homeland.

18

Theyadvocated regional self-government in order to consolidate their base and to emphasize

how their ideal differed from that of Jiang's policy which aimed to consolidate his rule first.

Furthermore, they insisted on regional self-government, which they considered an effective

weapon against the influence of the Communists on the rural society of Guangxi, even the

whole country.19

This mixture of political regionalism and regional self-government

provided a favourable foundation on which to build the BMA group's support for Li to

carry out the policies of the Clique in Guangxi.That is not to say, however, that the BMA graduates were an absolutely

consolidated group and always made a great contribution to the Clique expanding its

influence in Chinese politics at all times. Actually, the defeat of the Clique in central China

by Jiang after the Expedition in 1929 was to a great extent caused by divisions within the

BMA group itself.

The first one who split from the Clique was Yu Zuobai. A native of Beiliu county

and a BMA graduate of the 3rd term, Yu had been one of the senior commanders of theClique since its rise in Yulin under the aegis of Li Zongren. With his brilliant military

achievements during the reunification of Guangxi, Yu became one of the secondary leaders

of the Clique. However, he was not satisfied with his position. He attempted to replace Li,

Huang and Bai as leader of this group. For this purpose he joined both Jiang Jieshi and

Wang Jingwei. In March 1929 Yu used the enmity between both Guangxi and Hubei

natives in the Clique and bought over the main force of the 7th Army, which was under the

direct command of General Li Mingrui, his former subordinate as well as his cousin - thisfamily relationship is important in understanding how this could happen. Yus action

directly led the Cliques forces quickly to collapse in Hubei. However, he was unable to

control the Guangxi troops effectively because of his obstinate and unruly reputation and

18For details of propaganda of Li Zongren and the other Guangxi leaders for defending

the province and opposing Jiangs dictatorship over the country, seeHudang jiuguo ji, n.p.,

1931.

19SeeDSZK, Nanning, No. 3 (1931), p. 13.


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soured relations with other Guangxi native BMA graduates. The troops in the province,

who were mostly under the control of the elements of the BMA group, came back to Li

Zongren when he and other Guangxi leaders returned to the province in the fall of 1929.20

As a result, Yu followed in the previous footsteps of Li, Huang and Bai, and left Guangxifor Hong Kong where he remained in exile until 1957, during which his former colleagues

refused to allow him to return to his home province. He died in Guangzhou in 1958 after

his return to the mainland.21

Following Yu was Lu Huanyan, a native of Rong county as well as a BMA graduate

of the 3rd term. Lu joined the Clique in 1923 when Huang Shaohong was expanding his

strength in Wuzhou. Lus defection from the Clique occurred in early 1930, when Guangxi

was under Jiangs siege from the three provinces of Guangdong, Hunan and Yunnan and Liwas struggling to revive his shaky force. As a Divisional Commander in the Guangxi

armies at that time, Lu had low prestige in the Clique. Most elements of the BMA group

who were at present under his command soon abandoned him and went back to their

former leaders - Li, Huang, and Bai when they returned to the province. His split did not

cause serious trouble for the Clique but strengthened the impression that the defection

could not destroy this group which was of strong cohesion and regional identity. Lu was

assassinated by his bodyguard several months later.

22

Another man who disengaged from the Guangxi group was Huang Shaohong, the

number two leader of the Clique. The departure of Huang was a mystery, but his departure

from the province for Nanjing occurred after discussion with both Li and Bai. In other

words, he separated from the Clique peacefully, which I will discuss later. Apart from Yu,

Lu and Huang, the most important blow to the cohesion of the Clique was that of a sub-

faction in this group - the so-called Hubei Faction (Hubei pai, orHubei bang) under the

20For details of the BMA group of the Clique, and their welcome of the return of their

former leaders Li, Huang and Bai to continue leading them and their abandonment of Yu

and Li Mingrui, see Huang Xuchu, Guangxi yu zhongyang nian yunian lai beihuan lihe

yishu, CQ, No. 119, p. 12. Also see Zhang Renmin,Huiyi Lu, Hong Kong, 1987, pp. 95-

100.

21For details of Yu Zuobais defection from the Guangxi Clique and his last years, see

Zhang Renmin, Jiang-Li zuida lieheng zhizhaozhe - Yu Zuobai, CQ, No. 112 (1/3/1962).

22See Zhang Renmin, Yin Liang Chaoji zhisi, xianhua Guangxi neimu, CQ, Nos. 308-

9 (1, 16/05/1970).


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leadership of Hu Zongduo. The rise and fall of this faction in the Clique provided the

Guangxi leaders with an experience which eventually strengthened internal unity and the

regional identity of the group.

The Hubei Faction

As the term suggests, it was composed of natives of Hubei province. This faction

once played an important role in the rapidly expanding influence of the Guangxi Clique

during the Northern Expedition. Hu Zongduo, leader of the faction, joined the Clique

around 1923 when Huang Shaohong occupied Wuzhou and was appointed Chief Adviser

(zong canyi) for Huangs troops. Hu was rapidly promoted to secondary leadership of the

Clique, as a Brigadier of the 7th Army on the eve of the Expedition. During theExpedition, Hu, who was promoted later to Commander of the 19th Army, had been one of

Lis two senior subordinate commanders (the other was Xia Wei) commanding the

Guangxi troops advancing from the south to the Yangzi River Valley. Surprisingly, as a

native from a province outside Guangxi, his rise in the Clique was quicker than those of

Guangxi native BMA graduates. A reason was that Hu was favoured by both Huang and

Bai because they were all graduates of the BMA and were at that time advocating the

greater unity of BMA graduates within and outside the province. Hu served the oldGuangxi army under Lu Rongting for years before the formation of the Clique under Li.

His career in the Guangxi armies gave him a higher prestige than his fellow provincials,

particularly those who were Hubei native BMA graduates. By using Hus prestige, Huang

and Bai were able to attract numerous other Hubei native BMA graduates into the Clique,

strengthening its force.23

Hus achievements in the reunification of Guangxi were

considerable and the leaders of the Clique intended to let him play more important roles

when the Expedition was launched. Because one of the destinations of the Expedition wasthe middle Yangzi River valley, in Hubei, Hus home province, he was more familiar with

this region, its personnel and geography, than anyone of the Clique.24

23Lu Weiqian, Hu Zongduo Tao Jun tongzhi Hubei de qingkuang, HBWSZL, No. 18

(1987), p. 2.

24Huang Shaohong, Xin Guixi de jueqi yu liangguang tongyi ji dageming beifa,

GXWSZLXJ, No. 6, p. 95.


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As BMA graduates of the 4th term were nearly all natives of Hubei, Hu brought

many of his classmates and fellow provincials into the Clique as middle and lower ranking

officers, among these Tao Jun and Li Yixuan, who served in the reunification of Guangxi.

As his rank was higher than any of his fellow provincials, Hu promoted and appointed themin his own unit in order to enhance his own position.

25In this way, he was naturally

accepted as leader of the Hubei natives in the Clique.

A good opportunity for Hu to form his own faction within the Clique came in

March 1927 when Li Zongren was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the 3rd Route Army

of the NRA marching to the east of China. The Wuhan Nationalist regime moved one

division and one brigade from the 15th Army, a Hubei body of troops which defected from

Wu Peifus armies and claimed loyalty to the NRA recently, to join Lis action. To usethese troops more conveniently, Li put them under Hus command as the latter was a native

of Hubei. Seizing the opportunity, Hu put his friends among the Hubei natives, particularly

BMA graduates, into commands in these formations and a division of the 7th Army, which

was under his direct command. Both units later formed the 19th Army with Hu as

Commander, a subsidiary unit of the Clique.26

This was the starting point of direct control

of his own forces. At the end of 1927 Hu led the 19th Army, following with other Lis

troops, i.e. the 7th Army, back to Hubei after the victory of the punitive expedition againstTang Shengzhi, a militarist who was a mainstay of the Wuhan regime and opposed

Nanjing. Early in 1928, Li disarmed the old Hubei zapai jun (armies of inferior brands),

which was reorganized as a new army, i.e. the 18th Army, a subsidiary force of the Clique.

By taking advantage of Lis advocacy of the policy Hubei for the Hubei people, Hu,

under the support of Bai Chongxi, persuaded Li to appoint Tao Jun, his classmate at the

BMA and an acting Divisional Commander of the 7th Army, as Commander of the 18th

Army. Thus, by creating both the 19th and 18th armies with Hubei natives, or to be moreexact, Hubei native BMA graduates in commands from low to high ranks, Hu actually

made himself leader of the Hubei Faction (Hubei pai) within the BMA group of the Clique

25Li Chunchu, Hu Zongduo Tao Jun zai Hubei de tongzhi yu bengkui, WHWSZL, No.

11 (1983), p. 17.

26Yan Jing, Di shiba shijiu liangjun zujian ji qingxiang jingguo,HBWSZL, No. 18, p.

44-7.


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in 1927-1929. Not surprisingly, Hubei native BMA graduates were the nucleus of the

Faction.27

There were two aspects of this development. First, the Hubei Faction expanded

considerably the influence of the Clique into Hubei, secondly, it also planted the seeds of asplit within the Clique - an internal enmity between both Guangxi and Hubei natives, which

was cleverly exploited by Jiang to defeat Li in 1929. As Hu was eager to build up his own

influence by putting all his fellow provincials into influential positions at each level of

government and party organizations as well as controlling the army in Hubei, he and his

followers rapidly became masters of the province.28

In so doing, they hurt the interests and

power of other factions in the province. On the other hand, as one of the secondary leaders

of the Clique, and, in the view of the outsiders, any of Hus actions was regarded as part ofthe Cliques. Hus actions made the Clique an objective to be attacked by other groups and

factions. These actions also hurt internal interests of the Clique, for Hu and his followers

discriminated against the other Guangxi troops in Hubei which they once served,

particularly in personnel, distribution of financial resources and promotions in the army.29

Although there is no evidence that Hu had already taken a firm decision to immediately fly

his own colours and to form his own independent influence,30

disunity did arise within the

Clique. Hu and his followers had come back to their home province with many distinctionsin war. They had earned the right to take a hand in any domestic issue of the province that

they desired, but began to exclude outsiders, including Guangxi natives who were their

27See Lu Weiqian, Hu Zongduo Tao Jun tongzhi Hubei de qingkuang, HBWSZL, No.

18, p. 18; and Appendix 2.

28For details of the Hubei Factions policies in handling provincial affairs, seeHBWSZL,

No. 18, pp. 1-43; and WHWSZL, No. 11, pp. 2-38.

29See Yan Jing, Di shiba shijiu liangjun zujian ji qingxiang jingguo,HBWSZL, No. 18,

pp. 4-7; Lan Tengjiao, Cong Gui-Tang zhanzheng dao Jiang-Gui zhanzheng, HBWSZL,

No. 18, pp. 29-43; Zhang Renmin, Yin Liang Chaoji zhisi, xianhua Guangxi neimu, CQ,

Nos. 308-9; and Tu Yuntan, Hu Zongduo Tao Jun bachi Wuhan zhengju yu xin Guixi

neibu maodun, WHWSZL, No. 11, pp. 28-38; Peng Boxun, Zhang Zhiben shi zenyang

dangshang Hubei sheng zhuxi de,HBWSZL, No. 18, pp. 52-4.

30According to Tu Yuntan, one of Hus trusted followers, soon after the defeat of the

Clique in Hubei, Hu told Tu that he had a mind to fly his own colours in the future, but not

at the present. See Tu Yuntan, Hu Zongduo Tao Jun bachi Wuhan zhengju yu xin Guixi

neibu maodun, WHWSZL, No. 11, p. 36.


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colleagues in the Clique, from the political and military operation of the province. The

practice began to assume a strong regionalist colour. The officers and soldiers of the 7th

Army not only distrusted Hu but bitterly resented the actions of the Hubei natives in

dropping their benefactor as soon as their help was no longer required. Many commanderswere jealous of the strength of Hu and his followers, their swift expansion of influence, and

of the unfair speedy promotions through the army ranks. A wave of discontent and enmity

spread between them. This resentment was deepened by the scramble for possession of

opium taxes.31

The income from opium taxes was an important financial resource of the

army at the time, particularly where it lacked normal financial support from the Central

government at Nanjing, for example in the 7th Army.32

The defeat of Lis troops in Hubei was, to a great extent, due to the resentment ofGuangxi officers, headed by Li Mingrui, a Divisional Commander who became

Commander-in-Chief of the Communist Red Army in Guangxi later, against Hu Zongduo

and the Hubei Faction. At least all members of the Clique thought so.33

In their memoirs,

even some of Hus followers emphasized that the defeat of the Clique had resulted from

damage caused by the Hubei Faction which severely hurt Guangxi natives interests.34

Hu,

himself also recognized and acknowledged, several years later, after the defeat of Lis

troops in Hubei, that his actions in the province, to some extent, had been disastrous to the

31See Lan Tengjiao, Cong Gui-Tang zhanzheng dao Jiang-Gui zhanzheng, HBWSZL,

No. 18, pp. 29-43.

32During the Expedition, financial support of the 7th Army, except that from the Central

government for a short time in the first half of 1928, came mainly from the Guangxi

government, totalling 17,000,000 Yuan (Chinese dollars). See Zhang Renmin, Yin Liang

Chaoji zhisi, xianhua Guangxi neimu, CQ, Nos. 307-9 and Guanyu Guangxi de jingbu,

CYGL, Vol. 2, No. 6 (20/03/1937), p. 3; Lu Weiqian, Hu Zongduo Tao Jun tongzhi Hubeide qingkuang, HBWSZL, No. 18, p. 10; Yan Jing, Di shiba shijiu liangjun zujian ji

qingxiang jingguo,HBWSZL, No. 18, p. 46; Li Chunchu, Hu Zongduo Tao Jun zai Hubei

de tongzhi yu bengkui, WHWSZL, No. 11, p. 11.

33See the memoirs of middle and high ranking officers of the Guangxi Clique, such as

Zhang Renmin, Zhang Wenhong, Yin Chenggang, even of the senior leaders of the Clique -

Li Zongren, Huang Shaohong, Huang Xuchu, and Bai Chongxi in the Bibliography of this

thesis.

34For details see memoirs and collections of Yan Jing, Lan Tengjiao, Tu Yuntan, Lu

Weiqian, Lu Zhibing, Liu Minggao, and Huang Sufu in the Bibliography of this thesis.


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Clique, in which he once rapidly rose as a provincial militarist.35

This resentment seems to

explain why Li Mingrui joined Jiang Jieshi when the Jiang-Gui War broke out in March

1929. For its negative impact on the Clique, this Hubei Faction was not again revived after

Li Zongren and Bai Chongxi were driven back to their home province by Jiang in that samemonth.

In general, the BMA group was not an organized faction in Guangxi. They were

gathered together for the military purposes of reunifying Guangxi and making a career of

serving in the war of national unification; also, they enthusiastically shared Lis idea of

regional self-government and other policies. They provided the main source of senior

officers for Li and the Clique and formed the secondary and lower-level leadership of thisgroup. Although some of its members left to follow Jiang, the elements of this group still

were the military mainstay of this body because they had already realized that their careers

were firmly linked with the fate of the Clique and nowhere else. The criticism and attacks

from other factions as well as outside temptation had not broken down the group, but

strengthened their regional identity. Furthermore, although the action of some elements of

the group such as the Hubei Faction caused the defeat of the Clique in central China, it

provided the Guangxi group with a lesson to prevent further internal division. To that end,the Guangxi leaders strengthened the unity of the group and the formation of its political

aim, which were closely related to the structure of the Cliques leadership and the discipline

of a secret political organization.

Leadership

Revival of the Clique after 1929 also depended on its leadership. Unlike other

factions of the GMD which all had only one leader, the Clique had a governing body of

three people. In other words, it was like a triumvirate, a unique characteristic of the Clique.

This might explain to some extent why the Clique retained the capacity for survival after

35Tu Yuntan, Hu Zongduo Tao Jun bachi Wuhan zhengju yu xin Guixi neibu maodun,

WHWSZL, No. 11, pp. 36-7; and Lan Tengjiao, Cong Gui-Tang zhanzheng dao Jiang-Gui

zhanzheng,HBWSZL, No. 18, pp. 42-3.


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each defeat by Jiang, and why it was always regarded as a powerful political and military

rival by the latter.

In this triumvirate, also known as the Li (Zongren) - Huang (Shaohong) - Bai

(Chongxi) leadership, Li was always acknowledged to be the number one leader of theClique. This arrangement of the leadership can be traced back to the Cliques initial

formation, as described in Chapter Two. As Huang and Bai were leaders of the Guangxi

Model Battalion (GMB), one of the two main component parts of the Clique, they of course

became its number two and number three leaders. Huang seized an opportunity to leave

Yulin for Wuzhou to expand his own strength independently in 1923, but he had

maintained a good relationship with Yulin and obtained support from Li.36

As the

expansion of his own strength at that time was made possible by support from Li, Huang, inappearance at least, regarded the former as his superior. When the troops of both Li and

Huang, respectively from Yulin and Wuzhou, joined forces to form the Guangxi

Pacification and Bandit Suppression Joint Army (dinggui taozei lianjun) in Nanning in

1924 in order to reunify Guangxi, logically, Li became Commander-in-Chief, and Huang

Deputy Commander-in-Chief. By this arrangement, Huang voluntarily placed himself as

the second leader of the new rising Guangxi group.37

Apart from the fact that he was founder of the Clique in Yulin, the main reason forLi to proclaim himself as the number one leader was his good personal moral character,

according to memoirs and recollections of most senior members of the Clique who trusted

him throughout his career, as well as some outside observers, both Chinese and foreign.38

A British intelligence report in 1934 stated that Li:

Gives an impression of great mental and physical vigour, and of being possessed of

moral and physical courage to an unusual degree. Wide views on the exterior and

36Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, Colorado: Westview

Press, 1979, p. 99; and Huang Shaohong, Xin Guixi de jueqi, WSZLXJ, No. 52, p. 16.

37Huang Shaohong, Wushi Huiyi, Hangzhou: Fengyun chubanshe, 1945, pp. 84-5.

38Yin Chenggang, Li Zongren qijia jingguo, GXWSZLXJ, No. 7, pp. 104-45; also see

Yuan Qingping, Li Zongren, in Yuan Qingping (ed.),Dangdai dangguo mingren zhuan,

Nanjing: Junshi xinwenshe, 1936.


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interior problems of China. Very ambitious and visualizes himself as capable of

replacing Chiang Kai-shek at the helm of state. A fighter.39

Huang Shaohongs memoirs several decades later also confirmed the importance of Lis

character in the recognition of his right to the top leadership of the Clique.40

In addition,

the Clique had already realized that the Taiping Rebellions failure in the 1860s had

originated in its internal split. As the Clique considered itself to be the successor of the

Taiping, it always emphasized the importance of avoiding internal dissension of the

Taiping, the mistake that led to its final failure. It became an axiom to make secure the

leadership of Li and other persons in this Guangxi group.41

With the support from all his

followers and through political propaganda, Lis leadership in the Clique was further

strengthened and undisputed.

As for Bai Chongxi, he had two favourable advantages which made him an ideal

candidate for the position of the number three leader in the Clique. First, he shared the

leadership of the GMB with Huang Shaohong. Secondly, he was a fellow townsman of Li

Zongren; both were natives of Lingui county. Culturally, they all belonged to the Guilin

guanhua dialect system (i.e. Guilin dialect, a dialect of xinan guanhua or Southwest

Mandarin, which includes Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou provinces and north Guangxi), one

of the two main dialect systems in Guangxi (the other being the baihua, i.e. Cantonese).

More importantly, they shared and pursued the same ideals in both the province and the

nation. This made their relations closer than with any others.42

When the troops from

Yulin and Wuzhou were combined in one force, Bais previous position in the GMB and

his close relationship with Li ensured that he would play a very important role in promoting

consolidation of this new and rising military group. For this reason, Bai was, after the

39Great Britain, Foreign Office 371 (General Correspondence) /18153 /1783, Report onKwangsi Province, by Captain A. T. Wilson-Brand, Intelligence Section, General Staff,

June 1, 1934, p. 147 (quoted in Eugene W. Levich, The Kwangsi Way in Kuomintang

China, 1931-1939, Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1993, p. 7).

40Huang Shaohong, Wushi huiyi, p. 109.

41See Guangxi yu zhongguo geming, compiled and published by General Political

Training Department of Headquarters of the 4th Group Army of the NRA, Nanning, 1935.

Also see Song Houreng, Wang Gongdu yu xin Guixi, GXWSZLXJ, No. 12, pp. 115-36.

42Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, p. 100.


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formation of the Clique, usually authorized to command its troops. This position advanced

him naturally into the triumvirate.

This triumvirate contributed to the expansion of the Cliques influence outside

Guangxi and its capacity to revive its forces in the province during and after the Expedition,even during a series of civil wars between the GMD factions. During the Expedition, Li

and Bai were in the battlefield commanding the Guangxi troops in all battles against

Beiyang militarists in the northern sector. At the same time Huang firmly controlled

Guangxi. Relying on this base of the Clique, Huang was able to provide Guangxi troops

with manpower and armament expenditure when they fought in both central and south

China. This was necessary because the Nationalist Government virtually did not provide

any financial assistance to the 7th Army at the beginning stages of the Expedition.

43

Theactions of Huang during these struggles for power of both the Nationalist government and

the GMD always coincided with those of Li and Bai in political and military matters. For

example, in the autumn of 1927 Huang supported the Nanjing Special Committee and the

Western Expedition against Tang Shengzhi, in which both Li and Bai played very

important roles.44

Even after Li and Bai were defeated in both Hubei and Hebei provinces

respectively and driven back to Guangxi, Huang still gave great support to both of his

colleagues. The three powerful men of Guangxi used the forces that Huang had kept in theprovince to struggle for the fortunes of the Clique. In other words, this triumvirate

provided them with a foundation on which to base any struggle for expansion or revival of

the forces of the Clique.

Behind their cooperation was their common desire to expand the Cliques influence

outside the province and to reconstruct Guangxi. They regarded Guangxi as an area for

experiment and testing of their policies in mass mobilization and regional self-government,

43Except that he appropriated for the 7th Army a sum of money totalling 200,000 Yuan

for its reinforcement to Tang Shengzhi which was the prelude to the Expedition in May

1926 (See Mao Sicheng, Minguo shiwu nian zhiqian de Jiang Jieshi xiansheng, reprinted

Hong Kong, 1962, Vol. 15, p. 76), Jiang and the Guangzhou Nationalist Government did

not give any financial support to the 7th Army before early in 1927. See Huang Shaohong,

Wushi huiyi, p. 127; and Zhang Renmin, Yin Liang Chaoji zhisi, xianhua Guangxi

neimu, CQ, No. 307.

44For details of Huangs activities in response to that of Li and Bai during the NSC

period, see Guangzhou Pingshe (ed.), Guangzhou shibian yu Shanghai huiyi, Guangzhou:

Pingshe, 1929; and Huang Shaohong, 1928 nian Yue-Gui zhanzheng, WSZLXJ, No. 3.


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and for the achievement of their goal to modernize Guangxi.45

The achievements of

Guangxi during the Expedition demonstrated the correctness of the Cliques aspirations in

provincial reconstruction and mass education.46

After being excluded from Nanjing, they

were anxious to regain control of Guangxi, to prepare for revenge, and to resume theimplementation of their own policies in the province. However, at a critical point, when

they were striving to revive their force in Guangxi, Huang Shaohong suddenly left his

colleagues and the Clique for Nanjing at the end of 1930, where he joined the Political

Studies Faction ( zhengxue xi), an influential and potentially powerful group in the

Nationalists and a powerful support of Jiang. Huang soon became Minister of Interior of

the Nanjing Government and later Chairman of Zhejiang, Jiangs home province; he also

continued to enjoy his high position in the government. Thus, the triumvirate seemed tohave disintegrated. The Clique was in crisis.

The real reason for the departure of Huang is still unknown. Perhaps Huang felt

himself responsible for the military reverses of the Clique within and outside Guangxi as

the forces under his command made serious mistakes in several decisive campaigns against

Jiang. For these reverses, his reputation among members of Guangxi fell to a point he

could no longer tolerate.47

Perhaps he had realized that his chances for a future career in a

strong military atmosphere were irreparably ruined. Also, in a typically Chinese way, theexistence of a tougher political and military group in opposition to Jiang, in which he once

was a leader, was a weapon that Huang could use to bargain with the former to obtain a

high position in the central government under the leadership of Jiang.48

It has even been

suggested that his departure was a tactic of the Clique to ease Jiangs siege of Guangxi.49

It

45SeeDSZK, No. 3, pp. 12-13.

46For details of Guangxi's achievements under Huang Shaohong, see serial articles of

Zhu (Chu) Hongyuan and Huang Zongyan in the Bibliography of this thesis.

47Cheng Siyuan, Zhenghai mixin, Hong Kong: Nanyue chubanshe, 1987, pp. 25-47;

Chen Liangzuo, Xin Guixi cong qingchao ru-Xiang dao huishi quzhu dianjun chujing,

GXWSZLXJ, No. 3, pp. 45-50; Zhang Dihai, Zhang-Guijun fan-Jiang zhong de Beiliu ji

Hengyang zhanyi, GDWSZLXJ, No. 19, pp. 157-62; Huang Mengnian, Xin Guixi

qingchao ru-Xiang ceying Feng-Yan fan-Jiang zhanzheng, GXWSZLXJ, No. 3, pp. 35-44;

Disijun jishi; and Huang Shaohong, Wushi huiyi, pp. 197-212.

48Huang Shaohong, Wo yu Jiang Jieshi he Guixi de guanxi, WSZLXJ, No. 7, p. 75.

49Huang Shaohong, Wushi huiyi, p. 214.


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also was, according to Huang himself, due to the fact that he gave up the anti-Jiang attitude

held by Li and Bai, who would continue opposing Jiang.50

Whatever the reason, Huangs

departure did not irreparably harm the Clique. In short, he left peacefully on his own,

without taking any force of the Clique with him. It is safe to say that he left not because ofpressure from his colleagues but for a multiplicity of reasons, perhaps even some which

were purely personal.

Although Huang did not take any forces with him at the time of his departure, the

action effected the armys morale; in particular, those officers of the Clique in military and

civic administration of the province, who had remained at Guangxi with Huang while Li

and Bai were expanding the Cliques influence outside the province, were shocked. To

strengthen and reconstruct the leadership, Li successfully developed a secret organization toestablish and monitor the common political goal of the Clique, which was to consolidate

the Guangxi group internally. Also, early in 1931, after Bai moved up to take the previous

position of Huang Shaohong, Li promoted Huang Xuchu into the triumvirate, as number

three leader of the Clique. The new Li-Bai-Huang (Xuchu) leadership replaced that of Li-

Huang (Shaohong)-Bai. The formation of the new leadership retained the power balance of

the Clique and sought to carry on as usual.

A classmate of Li at the GMITS and a graduate of Military Staff College (MSC) inBeijing, Huang Xuchu was once Ma Xiaojuns aide in the Guangxi Model Battalion and

later Lis Chief of Staff in Yulin. During the formation of the Guangxi Clique, he had

already seemed to be the most important aide to Li in Yulin.51

As assistant to Huang

Shaohong during the Expedition, the position of Huang Xuchu in the province was only

slightly less important than that of the former. An important reason was that both men

were fellow townsmen of Rong county, an area within the baihua dialect system of the

province. In this circumstance, the officers from the baihua system held a nearly completesway on all fronts of the province at this time. At the crucial moment that Huang Shaohong

left Guangxi, Huang Xuchu demonstrated his continuing loyalty to Li and Bai even though

50Huang Shaohong, Wushi huiyi, pp. 212-3, and the same author, Wo yu Jiang Jieshi he

Guixi de guanxi, WSZLXJ, No. 7, pp. 75-6.

51Huang Xuchu, Ba-Gui yiwang lu, CQ, Nos. 168-70. Also see Te-kong Tong and Li

Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, pp. 92-3.


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he still maintained a good relationship with the former.52

This was very important because

his remaining in the Clique helped to reassure and retain the loyalty of the officers from the

baihua system. More importantly, as a practitioner of policies and a good civic

administrator rather than a policy-maker, he had a strong capability for handling provincialadministration. By promoting Huang Xuchu, Li and Bai were able to restore the

confidence of the province in the Cliques revival, after it had been shaken by Huang

Shaohongs departure, and to strengthen control over the province in both the military and

civil administrations. On the other hand, the promotion of Huang Xuchu enabled the

Clique to retain the status of the triumvirate. The three men worked well together after that

and the Clique finally took control of the province again, because, as Joseph Stilwell

pointed out, the friendship that exists between these men, and their common antipathytowards Nanking augurs well for the success of their plans.

53Guangxi enjoyed a

reputation as the model province under their leadership for its achievements in

reconstruction and mass mobilization.

Once the new triumvirate was re-formed in 1931, it was never again broken.

Certainly the senior leaders of the Clique themselves did not want to alter the current

structure of leadership, because they needed each other. During the period of 1931-1936,

except when he shared the work with Bai in determining policies for Guangxi, Li paid greatattention to cooperation with other factions of the GMD, particularly those of Guangxis

neighbourhood, such as Guangdong, Guizhou, Yunnan, and Sichuan. Bai concentrated on

provincial mobilization with the dual purpose of defending Guangxi and preparing for

resistance against Japan, a process in which the masses' political consciousness in the

regional and national identity was aroused to join the mainstream consciousness of

nationalism. At the same time, Huang devoted himself to the reconstruction of Guangxi.

Perhaps, as has been suggested, they did not attempt to overthrow Li or others, because theyfeared senior subordinates of the Clique who might follow. In so doing, they would be the

victims of a domino effect.54

On the other hand, some senior officers, such as Yu

Zuobai, Li Mingrui and Lu Huanyan, defected from the Clique and attempted to replace Li,

52Song Houreng, Wang Gongdu yu xin Guixi, GXWSZLXJ, No. 12, p. 118.

53U. S. Military Intelligence Reports - China, 1911-1941, No. 9348 (May 5, 1936).

54Su Mingde, Bai Jiangong wannian yishi, GXWX, No. 60 (1993), p. 53.


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Huang and Bai and to make themselves leaders of this group, but they all failed to shake the

triumvirate for they were utterly isolated by their colleagues of the Clique and distrusted by

this Guangxi groups rivals - Jiang Jieshi and Wang Jingwei, or even executed by the CCP

though they joined this party, such as Li Mingrui.

55

The fate of these defectors of coursewas a warning to other senior officers of the Clique.

This Li-Bai-Huang leadership coincided with the needs of the Clique of the 1930s

in domestic reconstruction and mobilization of the province and in external relations with

other factions, including the Jiang group. As Leng Guan (Hu Lin), editor ofDagong Bao

(Ta Kung Pao, or Ta Kung Daily) in Tianjin, pointed out in 1935, Li had won the position

of top leader and was able to control the whole Clique because of his superior moral

characteristics and his charismatic ability; Bai had distinguished himself in military strategyand tactics; and Huang was the best possible civil administrator to implement the Cliques

policies which were made by both of the former. In other words, to draw a parallel with

ranks in the army, Li was Commander-in-Chief, Bai Frontline Commander-in-Chief and

Chief of Staff, and Huang served as Commander of the rear base.56

In a sense, this

triumvirate was seen as a whole, particularly within the Clique. Li and Bai were, in the

view of those observing from the outside, even treated as one person, named Li-Bai. Li

also recognized this without reservation in his memoirs.

57

The adjustment to the leadership

55Li Mingrui later joined the CCP and became Commander of the 7th Army of the Red

Army. But he was executed by the CCP in October 1931 after the remnants of the 7th Red

Army from Guangxi under his command joined forces with the Central Red Army under

the leadership of Zhu De and Mao Zedong in Jiangxi. See Gong Chu, Wo yu hongjun,

Hong Kong: Nanfang chubanshe, 1954; Zhonggong Guangxi quwei dangshi ziliao zhengji

weiyuanhui (ed.),Zuo-You jiang geming gengjudi, Nanning: GXRMCBS, 1989, pp. 492-7;

Lu Qunhe and Li Yingfen, Li Mingrui, Nanning: GXRMCBS, 1992; and articles and

memoirs of Wu Xi, Huang Songjian, Lu Xiuxuan, Lin Qing in the Bibliography of this

thesis. Also see Zhang Renmin, Jiang-Li zuida lieheng zhizhaozhe - Yu Zuobai, CQ, No.112 (1 March 1962), and Yin Liang Chaoji zhisi, xianhua Guangxi neimu, CQ, Nos. 308-

9 (1-16 May 1970); Diana Lary, Communism and Ethnic Revolt: Notes on the Chuang

Peasant Movement in Kwangsi, 1921-31, China Quarterly, No. 49 (1972); and Graham

Hutchings, The Troubled Life and After-life of a Guangxi Communist: Some Notes on Li

Mingrui and the Communists in Guangxi Province Before 1949, China Quarterly, No.

104 (December 1985), pp. 700-708.

56Leng Guan, Yue-Gui xieying, in Leng Guan et al, Guangxi jianshe jiping, Nanning,

1935, p. 7. Also see Lu Yi, Guangxi san jutou yinxiang ji, Nanning minguo ribao, 23

February 1936.

57Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, p. 100.


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plus the common political goal designed by the secret organization, along with changes in

the political situation, made the Clique more secure than all others, and lasted until the fall

of the GMD on the mainland in 1949.

The Secret Political Organization

Of course, the stabilization of the Li-Bai-Huang leadership after 1931 was also

benefited by the work of an efficient secret political organization within the Guangxi

Clique.

As stated above, military school graduates were able to achieve spectacular

successes for the Clique militarily. But the Clique had clearly been out-manoeuvredpolitically by Jiang. The reverses of Guangxi troops in Hubei and departure of Huang

Shaohong indicated the necessity for strengthening political unity within the Clique. A

possible measure to meet the necessity was that after 1930 the Clique set up a secret

organization as a politically cohesive force by setting a political goal which they would all

strive for. This was a common political consciousness which emerged in the senior ranks

of the Clique, first, after their failure in the struggle with Jiang to achieve power sharing

and for freedom in carrying out different domestic and external policies, and second, afterthe shock of the departure of several senior members from this Guangxi group. The Clique

believed that the departure of these members was the result of failing to provide them with

a clear and firm political goal. Of course, the fact of a secret organization in a faction

working to tie their internal relations to the leaders and to unite policies and define goal was

also a common phenomenon in the GMD.58

It worked to deflect the different political

demands and discordant policies within the Nationalists, and also, to some extent

reconciled the different consciousness of the factions within the GMD to achieve politicalunity of the party and nation. The GMD under Jiangs control had successfully subverted

the forces of the Clique in subduing Guangxi, but the Clique leaders learned fast and

formed their own organization in their revival.

58For example, Jiang Jieshi had a secret organization - the Blue Shirts. See Lloyd E.

Eastman, Abortive Revolution: China under Nationalist Rule 1927-1937, Cambridge,

Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974, pp. 31-84. For details of Jiang Jieshi's secret

organization in the GMD, see Chai Fu (ed.), C. C. neimu, Beijing: ZGWSCBS, 1988.


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The secret organization of the Clique, named Zhongguo Guomindang hudang

jiuguo qingnian juntuan (the Party Protection and National Salvation Young Army Corp

of the Chinese Nationalist Party),59

was formed in September 1930. Because of its internal

division, to which Jiang partly contributed, this was a critical time for Li Zongren and theGuangxi Clique. At the same time, Jiang also ordered the neighbouring provincial troops

of Guangxi to invade the Cliques base in an attempt to destroy its strength completely in

the province. These all brought crisis to the Clique. These events also provided two urgent

reasons for Li to set up the secret organization. First, to survive in the province and to

prevent further internal wavering, Li had realized the necessity for building up a political

organization to transform the Clique from a single military group into one with a dual

nature, both military and political. A firm political standpoint and a united political groupwould bring strength to Li in his continuing struggle with Jiang, to back up a tough army

which he had always had. Another reason for a secret political body was that Li wanted to

maintain the Zhang Fakui group (i.e. the Ironside) in Guangxi for continuing anti-Jiang

activity, because the latter and the Clique had fought together against Jiang after it followed

the Reorganization Faction in opposing Nanjing and entered Guangxi to join forces with

the Guangxi group at the end of 1929.60

Thus, the aim of the Young Army Corp was to

oppose Jiang and eventually to overthrow his dictatorship in the cause of national salvation.This central aim was based on the assumption that China was coming under Jiangs

dictatorship, and the perceived need for democratic politics throughout the country, by

59For details of this organization, see Cheng Siyuan, Tantan Guixi mimi zhengzhi

zuzhi, GXWSZLXJ, No. 7, pp. 136-50. But, according to the memoirs of Yu Shixi, a

member of the secret body and a senior commander of the 7th Army at that time, the name

of this secret body was Zhongguo Guomindang geming qingnian juntuan (The

Revolutionary Young Army Corp of the Chinese Nationalist Party). See Yu Shixi, Xin

Guixi yu gaizupai de mimi zuzhi - Zhongguo Guomindang geming qingnian juntuan,GXWSZLXJ, No. 1, pp. 47-58. It should be noted here, after the outbreak of the Sino-Japan

War in 1937 when Li and Bai left Guangxi leading the Guangxi troops to the battlefront in

east and central China, they dismissed this secret body and destroyed all confidential

documents relating to the body obeying the orders of Li and Bai in order to demonstrate

their sincere intention of cooperation with Jiang and upholding internal unity of the GMD

(see Feng Huang, Gengzheng, GXWSZLXJ, No. 6, p. 202). For this reason, this secret

body in the Clique was not known by the public. Of course, details on this body rely only

on the memoirs of the relevant persons who were once its members as its original

documents are all not available at this time.

60Cheng Siyuan,Zhenghai mixin, p. 70.


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which it meant power sharing of the nation and regional self-government, according to the

political program of this body.61

To achieve these ends, it claimed Sun Yatsens the Three

Principles of the People as its guiding ideology even though this was never more concrete

than a mere outline of ideas. This is understandable because all of the factions within theGMD claimed to be faithful followers of the Three Principles of the People in the

Nationalist era. Li and his colleagues were no exception. Of course, this body had to be a

secret one because Li and other Guangxi leaders still waved the GMD flag and attempted to

avoid both attack from the Nationalists and adverse public opinion. Through a secret

organization, they also expected to promote and strengthen the prestige of the triumvirate.62

For this reason, the body was well-organized in its organizational structure, with Li, Bai,

and Zhang Fakui as the top leaders. They then established branches in both the Guangxiarmies and the Ironside under the command of Zhang which joined forces with the

Clique and fought in Guangxi against Jiang, with middle and high ranking officers (i.e.

military school graduates) as members.63

Through a two year struggle, Li revived his forces in Guangxi, to which this secret

body made a considerable contribution. There was additional assistance also from the

Guangdong Faction, which had once supported Jiang Jieshi in his attempts to eliminate the

Clique. This faction abandoned its hostilities and resumed the cooperation between the twoparties after the Hu Hanmin Incident which occurred in March 1931.

64With two years

experience, Li had already realized important results from his secret organization because it

played an extremely important role in helping the Clique to overcome its crisis. During that

time, it had consolidated internal unity, formed the ideal of the anti-Jiang and regional self-

government that the Clique would pursue, and strengthened the union with the Ironside.

61See Cheng Siyuan, Tantan Guixi mimi zhengzhi zuzhi, GXWSZLXJ, No. 7, pp. 139-

41, and the same author,Zhenghai mixin, pp. 42-3; and Yi Shixi, Xin Guixi yu gaizupai demimi zuzhi, GXWSZLXJ, No. 1, pp. 48-51.

62Song Houren, Wang Gongdu yu xin Guixi, GXWSZLXJ, No. 12, pp. 115-36; and Yu

Shixi, Xin Guixi yu gaizupai de mimi zuzhi, GXWSZLXJ, No. 1, pp. 47-58.

63Yu Shixi, Xin Guixi yu gaizupai de mimi zuzhi, GXWSZLXJ, No. 1, pp. 49-50.

64For details of the Hu Hanmin Incident, see Lau-cheung Yee, Hu Han-min: A

Scholar-Revolutionary in Contemporary China, unpublished PhD dissertation, University

of California, Santa Barbara, 1986. Also see Hu Hanmin, Hu Hanmin zizhuan,JDSZL,

No. 2, 1981, and No. 2, 1983.


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Furthermore, a semi-independent organization from Nanjing was set up in Guangzhou,

with Guangdong and Guangxi provinces as its mainstay, after the Hu Hanmin Incident.

With this new political situation appearing in the GMD, and with Guangxi freed from the

military pressure of encirclement by the neighbouring provincial troops, particularly that ofGuangdong, the whole situation was clearly changed. The Ironside then left Guangxi in

early 1932 for Nanjing because Wang Jingwei, its spiritual leader, joined Jiang and formed

a cooperative government between the two groups under their leadership. The Young

Army Corp, which was formed with the Ironside, was to be reorganized as part of the

latter. Meanwhile, after the September 18 Incident in 1931, along with the further

Japanese invasion of China, resistance to imperialism, or to be more exact, resistance

against Japan, which was the mission of the Nationalist Revolution, became an urgentpolitical demand throughout the country. To strengthen control of the province and to

synchronize the activities of the Clique with the needs of this new political development in

internal and external situations, Li now reorganized this secret body and renamed it

sanmin zhuyi geming tongzhihui (the Revolutionary Association of Comrades of the

Three Principles of the People) early in 1932 instead of the Young Army Corp in order to

make it really become a nucleus body of the Clique to strengthen its internal unity in the

province.

65

The political program of the Revolutionary Association of Comrades after its

reorganization was as follows: 1) It affirmed sanmin zhuyi as the leading ideology of the

Chinese revolution and would fight with others to reach this goal. 2) It stated that the

nature of the Chinese revolution at the present was an anti-imperialist, anti-feudal

Nationalist Revolution, while the central mission of the revolution was to struggle for

national liberation. The national struggle for independence was the prerequisite for

carrying out measures for developing people's rights and enriching people's livelihood. 3) Itstated Jiang Jieshi as the primary enemy of the Chinese revolution, while all patriotic

parties and groups were in alliance with this organization. 4) It would unite all forces

65See Cheng Siyuan, Tantan Guixi mimi zhengzhi zuzhi, GXWSZLXJ, No. 7, pp. 144-

5. The name of this body, according to Wei Yongcheng, was Kangri geming tongzhihui

(The Revolutionary Comrade Association of Resistance against Japan). See Wei

Yongcheng, Tan wangshi,ZJWX, Vol. 32, No. 1, p. 116.


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which could be united (to achieve its goal) and avoid making enemies as much as possible

while pointing others towards the real enemy.66

This political program indicated the political attitude of the Clique in the first half

of the 1930s. The main theme of the program was its anti-Jiang sentiment and anti-Japanese attitude. It is true that the anti-Jiang bias was based on the resentment of the

Clique against Jiang himself. However, the anti-Jiang policy of the Clique had a dual

purpose: revenge for Jiangs attempts to eliminate other factions with which he had

differences; and opposition to Jiangs dictatorship throughout the country resulting from his

policy of rangwai bixian annei (domestic pacification before an external war). After

1931, although the Clique had escaped the fate of total destruction by Jiang, it was still

excluded from the central power structure. In other words, the gap between Li and Jianghad not been eliminated but actually enlarged, because the latter still wanted to wipe out all

his rivals, among whom the Clique was the principal one, before starting a war of national

resistance against Japanese aggression. Li and his group remained opposed to Jiang,

waiting for a chance to restore their previous force, and to consolidate their base - Guangxi.

They also wanted to reestablish their reputation because Li and the Clique had been

regarded by Jiang and his followers as the representative of feudal regionalism since

1929.

67

Such resentment against Jiang also had a wider social basis within the GMD.Sharp internal factional struggles had divided that body after the launching of the Northern

Expedition and this provided fertile soil for the Clique to continue holding up its anti-Jiang

banner, as it could derive a lot of allies and sympathy as a result. This is because all of

those factions of the GMD, which were either defeated or were being threatened by Jiang,

were seeking to restore their own forces and to overthrow his rule.68

66Chen Siyuan,Zhenghai mixin, p. 71.

67See Taofa Guixi junfa wengao, 1929,Nationalist Government Archives, The Second

Historical Archives of China, Nanjing. Also see Pan Gongzhan, Shinian lai de Zhongguo

tongyi yundong, in Zhongguo jianshe xiehui (ed.), Kangzhan qian shinian zhi Zhongguo,

first printed in 1937; reprinted Hong Kong, 1965, pp. 1-20.

68For example, Hu Hanmin had contacts on all sides, with influential and potential

figures in the Nationalists such as Cheng Qian, Zhang Xueliang, Song Zheyuan, Feng

Yuxiang, Han Fuju and militarists in the Southwest in order to form a wide united front

designed to overthrow Jiang Jieshi and carry out their policy towards the Japanese invasion.

See Yang Tianshi, Hu Hanmin de junshi dao-Jiang mimou yu Hu-Jiang hejie, KRZZYJ,

First Issue (September 1991), pp. 101-40.


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There also was a political basis. The two political organizations of the Southwest

existed as a semi-independent organization from Nanjing, the Clique being one of the two

mainstays in these organizations. Both the organizations and the Clique aimed to share

power in the Nanjing government and the party. Their aim was, according to Hu Hanmin, aGMD veteran and spiritual leader of the organizations, to reach the minquan tongzhi (the

rule by civic rights) instead of Jiangs junquan tongzhi (the rule by military force).69

To

some extent, this minquan tongzhi was the idea of regional self-government held by the

Clique. It emphasized power sharing by all factions and groups, of course, mainly

including the Clique and others, as against Jiangs dictatorship. Both social and political

bases were linked by the above political program of the secret body under the Clique.

The Revolutionary Association of Comrades was further renamed ZhongguoGuomindang geming tongzhihui (The Revolutionary Association of Comrades of the

Chinese Nationalist Party) in 1934.70

The further reorganization of this body was

correlated with the current situation. To draw more people into the Clique and strengthen

it, a firm political group with discipline and the capacity for the pursuit of political aims

was necessary. Moreover, Hu Hanmin was secretly reorganizing a political party, i.e. the

new Guomindang, in an attempt to replace that of Nanjing. Hu attempted to use both

Guangdong and Guangxi provinces as the base of this new Guomindang. However, ChenJitang, ruler of Guangdong, refused to cooperate with Hu in his plan. Hu then turned to

Guangxi. He sent Huang Jilu, one of his trusted followers and a GMD veteran, into the

province in 1934, with many details of his organizations plans for a new Guomindang. Li

had not fully adopted this plan, but used the idea in reorganizing his secret political body

and renamed it with the above title.71

This perhaps was the first step taken by Li and Bai in

their attempt to form their own political party instead of supporting the GMD under Jiangs

control. According to Song Houreng, a member of the secret body, during that period, Liand the Clique still nursed the humiliation of their earlier defeat and planned for another

69Ibid, p. 133.

70Cheng Siyuan, Tantan Guixi mimi zhengzhi zuzhi, GXWSZLXJ, No. 7, pp. 146-9;

Song Houreng, Wang Gongdu yu xin Guixi, GXWSZLXJ, No. 12, pp. 115-36; and He

Zuobai, Zhongguo Guomindang geming tongzhihui neimu, GXWSZLXJ, No. 1, pp. 35-

46.

71Cheng Siyuan, Tantan Guixi mimi zhengzhi zuzhi, GXWSZLXJ, No. 7, p. 147.


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day. But this was only part of their motivation. They firmly believed it was necessary to

form a new political party to replace Jiang for both political and military reasons in order to

lead the nation to resist Japan and save the country, because they were convinced that

Jiangs policy of rangwai bixian annei would not lead to national salvation but woulddestroy China. At least their aim was to restore the GMD, a good reason which denied any

suggestion of self-aggrandizement.72

If so, they naturally claimed themselves to be national

leaders.

During this period, Li and Bai had always held that Jiang betrayed the Revolution,

and had used the GMD as a tool for advancing his own interests, breaking all of Sun

Yatsen's promises to the peasants and common people. Jiang and his followers had done

their best to represent the Clique as the chief criminal element, destroying the reunificationof the nation, and forming an obstacle to prosecution of the external war at this time in

order to make easier Japan's absorption of China.73

In order to rebut this claim and to

preserve its existence and expansion, the secret body of the Clique linked its purposes

firmly with those of Chinese nationalism. The leaders of the Clique used the resentment

against Jiang which existed among the Guangxi people as they suffered in straitened

circumstances in 1929-1931. They attributed the chaos of 1929-1931 to the invasion of

Guangxi by the neighbouring provincial troops in order to impose Jiang's dictatorship. Liand the Clique gained willing support when they encouraged the Guangxi people to fight

together with them against the invasion. At the same time, the existence and expansion of

the Clique were largely enhanced by the national political situation, in which the most

important event was the September 18 Incident in 1931 engineered by the Japanese in an

offensive designed to conquer the whole of China. In response to this event, Jiang merely

continued to concentrate his troops for the purpose of eliminating domestic adversaries,

both the CCP and rivals within the GMD, including the Guangxi Clique, instead ofimmediately resisting the latest burst of Japanese aggression. Seizing this opportunity, the

political program of the secret body put forward anti-Japanism, national independence,

72Song Houreng, Wang Gongdu yu xin Guixi, GXWSZLXJ, No. 12, pp. 138-31.

73See, for example, Taofa Guixi junfa wengao, 1929, Archives of the Editorial

Committee for War History, the Nationalist Government, The Second Historical Archives

of China, Nanjing; Anonymous, Dui Liangguang yidong zhi renshi, n.p., 1936; and

Anonymous,Liangguang panluan neimu, n.p., 1936.


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together with the anti-Jiang movement. In China, it was customary to emphasize shichu

youming (dispatch troops with just cause) when a campaign or a movement was initiated.

So anti-Jiang and anti-Japan slogan became the foundation for the existence and

expansion of the Clique within and outside Guangxi. The secret body served thosepurposes well. In other words, Li and the Clique used propaganda against Jiang's weak

policy towards the Japanese invasion of China to serve their own ends. However, there

could be no question of the genuineness of the anti-Japanese spirit of both the leaders and

the people of Guangxi. As Hallett Abend pointed out in the 1930s, Guangxi was sincere in

their anti-Japanism and in their belief that if Jiang continued to be in power, China would

be given away to Japan, bit by bit, while Jiang husbanded his military and cash reserves

to sustain his own domestic position against domestic adversaries. Guangxi sincerelywanted to reorganize the central government, and then to arouse the national patriotism of

all the Chinese people in order to make an effort to regain North China and Manchuria,

which were occupied and threatened by the Japanese army.74

Why did the secret body claim itself to belong to the GMD and operate publicly

under the GMD banner? First, the Clique opposed Jiang and his group, but not the GMD

itself. Secondly, the current ideology of the GMD provided the most useful tool for the

secret body. All people within the GMD had claimed themselves to be the followers ofSuns sanmin zhuyi, regardless of whether or not ordinary people could be said to be clear

about the implications of those principles. Li and his followers were of course no

exception. Once the secret body of the Clique affirmed sanmin zhuyi as the guiding

ideology, it could clear the doubt from the minds of its members on the one hand, and could

easily obtain the political belief of its members on the other, as well as inviting people

opposed to Jiang to join. Furthermore, with the banner of the GMD, it had a justifiable

excuse to defend itself from any attack under a flag well known to the Chinese people andthe rest of the country, and could also easily avoid public criticisms.

All policies and activities of the Clique had always centred on a theme - linking its

own existence and expansion to the tide of the time - by insisting on resistance against

Japan during the 1930s. The secret body of the Clique embodied the theme of carrying out

mass mobilization and reconstruction in the province. This was well-organized with

74Hallett Abend,My Years in China, 1926-1941, New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1943, p.

223.


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rigorous discipline and clear anti-Jiang and anti-Japanese political goals, and played a very

important role in the reconstruction and mobilization of Guangxi. The internal unity of

Guangxi during the June 1 Movement in 1936, when Jiang encircled the province from

three provinces with superior forces, showed the success of the secret body in politicalorganization and discipline. Because none of the Cliques members defected from the

Guangxi group, except several pilots who were natives of Guangdong and who left

Guangxi for their native province, Jiang failed to buy over Guangxi members as he

successfully did in Guangdong. Lis secret body continued its work until the outbreak of

the Sino-Japanese War in July 1937 when Jiang officially called for national resistance. To

show the determination of political unity within the GMD and to offer resistance to the

Japanese in full force, Li and the Clique officially disbanded the RevolutionaryAssociation of Comrades and destroyed all relevant documents in September 1937.

75

After that, Bai left Guangxi for Nanjing to become Jiangs Deputy Chief of Staff, and Li

went to the Fifth War Zone as Commander-in-Chief and led several hundred thousand

Guangxi soldiers to resist Japan in central and east China.

Brains Trust

75According to Huang Qihan, Bais confidential secretary in the late 1930s, after the

outbreak of nationwide resistance against Japan occurred in August 1937, the Clique and

Jiang reached an agreement to dismiss all secret political organizations. The Clique did so.

But Jiang had, in fact, not kept his word. Both Li and Bai privately swore to Jiangs

betrayal. For the organization of the so-called Guangxi jianshe yanjiuhui (Guangxi

Reconstruction Studies Association) which was openly established by Li in Guilin in

October 1937, someone might claim that it was the reproduction or continuation of the Zhongguo Guomindang geming tongzhihui (see Chen Shaoxian, Guangxi jianshe

yanjiuhui de chengli he jieshu, GXWSZLXJ, No. 4, pp. 73-846). In fact, the association

was not a secret political organization but was a liaison unit of the Clique with the aim of

maintaining and enlarging its contact with all forces the Clique could influence. Of course,

this association also had a dual mission to provide the Clique with the political organization

and officers once Jiang could not continue to resist Japan. But such a proposal never had a

chance to be put into practice. For details of the association, see recollections of Li Wei,

Chen Shaoxian, Li Renren, Wan Zhongwen and Cheng Siyuan in the Bibliography. In the

Autumn of 1947, Bai, then Minister of Defence in Nanjing, once proposed restoring the

previous secret political body. The exact result of this proposal is unknown. See Huang

Qihan, Guixi jiqi fandong de zhengzhi zuzhi, WSZLXJ, No. 7, pp. 128-129.


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The formation and development of a secret political body in the Clique depended

on its Brains Trust, a group of political advisers. This group was composed of two parts:

figures from other provinces and factions who had opposed Jiang, and the Guangxi students

returned from Russia. The willingness of the former to join Guangxi showed that theCliques anti-Jiang policy had a certain support and sympathy. These people included Pan

Yizhi, Qiu Changwei, Zhu Foding, Liu Shiheng, the former elements of the Reorganization

Faction and the Third Party under Deng Yanda as well as elements who gave up the

Communist memberships, and so on, a mixture of politicians and political scholars.

However, the important contribution came from the latter, who made great contributions to

the consolidation of the Revolutionary Association of Comrades and provided a

theoretical basis for its political program. These returned students from Russia became animportant force in the Clique during the 1930s.

Wang Gongdu was head of the returned students. A native of Yongfu county (in

the guanhua dialect system), Wang was sent by Li to Russia in 1926 to study at Sun Yatsen

University, Moscow, an institution set up for the benefit of both Chinese Nationalists and

Communists.76

According to Wei Yongcheng, a senior officer of the Clique and Wangs

classmate in Russia, this background provided Wang with an opportunity to learn the

Russian leader Stalins methods of organization in the party. Wang had realized theenormous possibilities of political organization, particularly a secret one, and viewed this as

a prerequisite to defeat domestic adversaries in internal struggles in the party. The fact that

Stalin successfully defeated Trotsky, another leader of Russian Communists, was one good

example. This perception of Russian political organization had strongly influenced Wangs

subsequent actions in Guangxi.77

He came back to China in 1928 to serve as secretary to Li

in Wuhan.

Lis defeat in the following year provided Wang with an opportunity to play animportant role in the revival and consolidation of the Cliques internal unity. Owing to

military defeat, Li had already been conscious that it was not sufficient to rely solely on the

power of a single military group. What his rival Jiang possessed was not only a central

government but also a national party with a political ideal, even if the ideal was only given

76Wei Yongcheng, Tan wangshi,ZJWX, Vol. 31, No. 3, p. 97.

77Ibid, Vol. 32, No. 1, p. 116.


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in lip service and without real substance. Wang became Lis political adviser in this critical

circumstance. He suggested Li to form a secret political organization within the Clique in

accordance with that of Russia as a preparation for forming a political party. This would

make the Clique a main force in the Chinese Revolution. The Young Army Corp, andthen the Revolutionary Association of Comrades, were established in accordance with

what Wang suggested.78

Since 1931, Wang had been Chief of the propaganda and

organization field of the Clique. Meanwhile, Wang drew numerous returned students from

Russia into the Clique. They held all important positions of propaganda work in Guangxi,

and became an influential Brains Trust.

This group set all propaganda machines in motion serving the needs of the Clique,

particularly that of the secret organization. They loudly advocated the political program ofthe Revolutionary Association of Comrades, the theoretical foundation of the Clique

which will be discussed in the next chapter. Once the appropriate political policy (i.e. that

of anti-Jiang and anti-Japan, for the Clique) was determined, officers were a decisive factor

for a political organization. When the secret body was formed, Wang and his colleagues

devoted their major efforts to training political and military officers. On the one hand, they

imbued the officers with the ideas that the Clique was the leading force of the Chinese

Revolution and Li and Bai were its real leaders.

79

On the other hand, they set up manysmall-size secret clubs or societies in the army and schools as well as the provincial

government, which became peripheral organizations of the secret political body.80

Through

their efforts, the low and middle ranking officers of the Clique fostered belief in their group

and leaders. Although Wang was executed by Li and Bai in September 1937,81

his ideals

78See Song Houreng, Wang Gongdu yu xin Guixi, GXWSZLXJ, No. 12, pp. 115-36;

and Wei Yongcheng, Tan wangshi,ZJWX, Vol. 32, No. 1, pp. 115-6.

79Song Houreng, Wang Gongdu yu xin Guixi, GXWSZLXJ, No. 12, pp. 115-8; He

Zuobai, Wang Gongdu de mimi zuzhi huodong, GXWSZLXJ, No. 12, pp. 137-49;, and

the same author, Zhongguo Guomindang Guangxi dangzheng yanjiusuo, GXWSZLXJ,

No. 15, pp. 40-4.

80Song Houreng, Wang Gongdu yu xin Guixi, GXWSZLXJ, No. 12, pp. 115-36; and Ni

Zhongtao, Wang Gongdu zai junxiao de mimi zuzhi, GXWSZLXJ, No. 13, pp. 178-82;

and He Zuobai, Wang Gongdu de mimi zuzhi huodong, GXWSZLXJ, No. 12, pp. 137-49.

81The execution of Wang in September 1937 remains a mystery to this day. There are

several theories about Wangs death. One is that Wang was the victim of an internalstruggle of the Clique. As Wang had influence on the lower and middle ranking officers of


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still influenced the activities of these people. For example, during the Sino-Japanese War,

Jiangs trusted followers failed to draw these low and middle ranking officers of the Clique

over to Jiangs side, even though they tried in many ways.82

The success of the Brains Trust in propaganda work was correlated with theirperception of the nature of Chinese society. Their perception was based on their similar

political backgrounds. Members of the Brains Trust, including those students returned

from Russia and other politicians and scholars who had joined the CCP before such as Zhu

Foding,83

were mostly influenced by Marxism-Leninism. They realized that the nature of

Chinese society was semi-feudal and semi-colonial, and as stated above, influenced by

borrowing from the theory of imperialism. Against the CCPs theory that the working class

was the leading force of the Chinese revolution, they emphasized that the productivemasses were the basis and main force of the Chinese revolution linked with reconstruction

and mobilization.84

Their perception contributed to the formation of a firm political goal

by the Clique on the one hand, and coincided with the needs of awakening the masses to

the political consciousness of the current situation that China faced on the other. With their

perception of the nature of Chinese society, the Clique created a theory of the Pearl River

the Clique, those veterans and senior officers of Guangxi were jealous of the promotion of

his power so quickly. They concocted a false charge against him. As a result, Li and Bai

had to put Wang to death in accordance with the excuse that he attempted to overthrow the

rule of the Clique in Guangxi

su phd thesis - 10 chapter 3

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