succ cases

8/2/2019 Succ Cases

1/36

1. Promise to deliver future property

BLAS vs. SANTOS, Administratrix of the Estate of MAXIMA SANTOS VDA. DE BLASG.R. No. L-14070 March 29, 1961

FACTS:Simeon Blas contracted a first marriage with Marta Cruz sometime before 1898.

They had three children, one of whom is Eulalio who has children and grandchildren who are

the plaintiffs. Marta Cruz died in 1898, and the following year, Simeon Blas contracted a

second marriage with Maxima Santos. At the time of this second marriage, no liquidation of

the properties required by Simeon Blas and Marta Cruz was made.

On December 26, 1936, a week before his death on January 9, 1937, Simeon Blas

executed a last will and testament stating One-half of our properties, after the payment ofmy and our indebtedness, all these properties having been acquired during marriage (conjugal

properties), constitutes the share of my wife Maxima Santos de Blas. Maxima Santos deBlas also executed a private document presented as Exhibit A where she promised that in

making her will, she will give one-half () to the heirs and legatees or the beneficiariesnamed in the will of her husband.

Exhibit A was presented as evidence by the plaintiffs arguing that the dispositions

made were valid. The defendants contends that Exhibit "A" is a worthless piece of paper

because it is not a will nor a donation mortis causa nor a contract. It is also contended that itdeals with future inheritance.

The trial court and appellate court rendered judgement in favour of the defendant sothe case was elevated to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Exhibit A constitute a contract of future inheritance which isprohibited to be the subject matter of a contract under Article 1271 of the Civil Code.

DECISION:Exhibit "A" is not a contract on future inheritance. It is an obligation or promise made

by the maker to transmit one-half of her share in the conjugal properties acquired with her

husband, which properties are stated or declared to be conjugal properties in the will of the

husband. The conjugal properties were in existence at the time of the execution of Exhibit

"A" on December 26, 1936. As a matter of fact, Maxima Santos included these properties in

her inventory of her husband's estate of June 2, 1937. The promise does not refer to any

properties that the maker would inherit upon the death of her husband, because it is her share

in the conjugal assets. That the kind of agreement or promise contained in Exhibit "A" is notvoid under Article 1271 of the old Civil Code

Future inheritance is any property or right not in existence or capable of

determination at the time of the contract, that a person may in the future acquire by

succession. Certainly his wife's (Maxima Santos) share in the conjugal properties may not be

considered as future inheritance because they were actually in existence at the time Exhibit

"A" was executed.

As this private document (Exhibit A) contains the express promise made by Maxima

Santos to convey in her testament, upon her death, one-half of the conjugal properties she

would receive as her share in the conjugal properties, the action to enforce the said promisedid not arise until and after her death when it was found that she did not comply with her

above-mentioned promise. (Art. 1969, old Civil Code.)

The lower courts decisions were reversed and the defendant-appellee,

administratrix of the estate of Maxima Santos, is ordered to convey and deliver one-half

of the properties adjudicated to Maxima Santos as her share in the conjugal properties

8/2/2019 Succ Cases

2/36

2. Deed of Donation which is to take effect after death of decedent

SICAD VS. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No. 125888 August 13, 1998

FACTS:Aurora Vitro DA. De Motinola of the City of Iloilo executed a deed entitled DEED

OF DONATION INTER VIVOS naming her grandchildren as the donees. The propertyinvolved is a parcel of land located at Brgy. Pawa, Panay, Capiz, covered by TCT No.T-

16105 in the name of Montinola. Montinola's Secretary, Gloria Salvilla, afterwards presented

the deed for recording in the Property Registry, and the Register of Deeds cancelled TCT No.

T-16105 (the donor's title) and, in its place, issued TCT No. T-16622 in the names of the

donees. Montinola however retained the owner's duplicate copy of the new title (No. T-

16622), as well as the property itself, until she transferred the same ten (10) years later, on

July 10, 1990, to the spouses, Ernesto and Evelyn Sicad.

Aurora Montinola drew up a deed of revocation of the donation, and caused it to be

annotated as an adverse claim on TCT No. T-16622. Then, on August 24, 1990, she filed apetition with the Regional Trial Court in Roxas City for the cancellation of said TCT No. T-

16622 and the reinstatement of TCT No. T- 16105. Her petition was founded on the theory

that the donation to her three (3) grandchildren was one mortis causa which thus had to

comply with the formalities of a will; and since it had not, the donation was void and could

not effectively serve as basis for the cancellation of TCT No. T-16105 and the issuance in its

place of TCT No. T-16622.

The Trial Court then rendered judgment on March 27, 1991, holding that the donation

was indeed one inter vivos, and dismissing Aurora Montinola's petition for lack of merit. The

matter of its revocation was not passed upon. Montinola elevated the case to the Court of

Appeals. She however died on March 10, 1993, while the appeal was pending. Spouses

Sicad together with the legal heirs of Montinola were substituted as appellants. The appellatecourt affirmed the decision of the trial court .

ISSUE:Whether or not the donation was indeed one inter vivos or mortis causa.

DECISION:The court considers first the intention of AuroraAurora Montinola in executing the

document entitled "Deed of Donation Inter Vivos," The evidence establishes when thedeed of donation prepared by Montinola's lawyer (Atty. Treas) was read and explained

by the latter to the parties, Montinola expressed her wish that the donation take effect

only after ten (10) years from her death, and that the deed include a prohibition on the

sale of the property for such period.

A donation which purports to be one inter vivos but withholds from the donee theright to dispose of the donated property during the donor's lifetime is in truth one mortis

causa. In a donation mortis causa "the right of disposition is not transferred to the donee

while the donor is still alive."

In the instant case, nothing of any consequence was transferred by the deed of

donation in question to Montinola's grandchildren. They did not get possession of theproperty donated. They did not acquire the right to the fruits thereof, or any other right of

dominion over the property. More importantly, they did not acquire the right to dispose of

the property. They were therefore simply "paper owners" of the donated property. Allthese circumstances, including, to repeat, the explicit provisions of the deed of donation

ineluctably lead to the conclusion that the donation in question was a donation mortiscausa, contemplating a transfer of ownership to the donees only after the donor's demise.

The decision of the Court of appeals is set aside and the Deed of Donation Inter

Vivos executed by Montinola in favor of her grandchildren is declared null and void.

8/2/2019 Succ Cases

3/36

3. Nenita de Vera SUROZA,

complainant,

vs.

Judge Reynaldo P. HONRADO and Evangeline YUIPCO

, respondents.

A.M. No. 2026-CFI, December 19, 1981

FACTS:

Mauro Suroza, a corporal in the 45 Infantry of the US Army (PhilippineScouts) married Marcelina Salvador but they

were childless. However, theyreared a boy named Agapito who used the surname Suroza and who considredthem as

parents as shown in his marriage contract with Nenita de Vera. WhenMauro died, Marcelina, as a veterans widow, became

a pensioner of the FederalGovernment. Agapito and Nenita begot a child named Lilia and afterwards, Agapito also became a

soldier. However, he was disabled and his wife wasappointed as his guardian when he was declared an incompetent. In

connectionto this, a woman named Arsenia de la Cruz (apparently a girlfriend of Agapito)wanted also to be his guardian

however the court confirmed Nenitasappointment as guardian of Agapito.The spouses Antonio Sy and Hermogena Talan

begot a child named MarilynSy, who was delivered to Marcelina Salvador Suroza who brought her up as asupposed

daughter of Agapito and as her granddaughter. Marilyn used thesurname Suroza and stayed with Marcelina but was not

legally adopted by Agapito.Marcelina, being a veterans widow accumulated some cash in two banks.She executed anotarial will which is in English and was thumbmarked by her for she was illiterate. In that will, Marcelina bequeathed all her

estate to Marilyn. After her death, Marina Paje (alleged to be a laundrywoman of Marcelina and theexecutrix in her will) filed

a petition for probate of Marcelinas alleged will. Asthere was no opposition, Judge Honrado appointed Marina as

administratix andsubsequently, issued two orders directing the two banks to allow Marina towithdraw from the savings of

Marcelina and Marilyn Suroza and requiring thecustodian of the passbooks to deliver them to Marina. Upon motion of

Marina,Judge Honrado issued another order instructing the sheriff to eject the occupantsof the testatrix house among

whom was Nenita and to place Marina inpossession thereof. Nenita was then alerted to the existence of the

testamentaryproceeding hence, she and other occupants filed a motion to set aside the order ejecting them, alleging that the

decedents son Agapito was the sole heir of thedeceased; that he has a daughter named Lilia; that Nenita was

Agapitosguardian; and that Marilyn was not Agapitos daughter nor the decedentsgranddaughter. Later, they

questioned the probate courts jurisdiction to issue theejectment order. In spite of such fact, Judge Honrado issued on orderprobatingMarcelinas supposed will wherein Marilyn was the instituted heiress. Nenita filedin the testate case an omnibus

petition to set aside proceedings, admitopposition with counter petition for administration and preliminary

injunction reiterating that Marilyn was a stranger to Marcelina; that the will was not dulyexecuted and attested; and that the

thumbmarks of the testatrix were procuredby fraud or trick. Further, that the institution of Marilyn as heir is

void because of the preterition of Agapito and that Marina was not qualified to act as executrix.Not contented with her

motions, Nenita filed an opposition to the probate of thewill and a counter-petition which was however, dismissed. Instead

of appealing,Nenita filed a case to annul the probate proceedings which was also dismissed.Hence, this complaint.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a disciplinary action should be taken against respondent judgefor having admitted a will, which on

its face is void.

RULING:

Disciplinary action should be taken against respondent judge for his improper disposition of the testate case which

might have resulted in a miscarriage of justice because the decedents legal heirs and not the instituted heiress in thevoid

will should have inherited the decedents estate. Inefficiency impliesnegligence, incompetence, ignorance and carelessness.

A judge would beinexcusably negligent if he failed in the performance of his duties that diligence,prudence and

circumspection which the law requires in the rendition of any publicservice.In this case, respondent judge, on perusing the

will and noting that it waswritten in English and was thumbmarked by an obviously illiterate testatrix, couldhave readily

perceived that the will is void.

4. Testacy of Sixto Lopez, Jose S. LOPEZ,

Petitioner-appellee,

Vs.

Agustin LIBORO,

Oppositor-appellant.

8/2/2019 Succ Cases

4/36

FACTS:

The will of Don Sixto Lopez was submitted for probate by Jose Lopez and Clemencia Lopez, the Dons sister. The

probate was opposed by Agustin Liboro who contended that the will is not valid due to the following grounds:(1) That the

deceased never executed the alleged will; 2) that his signature appearing in said will was a forgery; (3) that at the time of the

execution of the will, he was wanting in testamentary as well as mental capacity due to advanced age; (4) that, if he did ever

execute said will, it was not executed and attested as required by law, and one of the alleged instrumental witnesses was

incapacitated to act as such; and it was procured by duress, influence of fear and threats and undue and improper pressure

and influence on the part of the beneficiaries instituted therein, principally the testator's sister, Clemencia Lopez, and the

herein proponent, Jose S. Lopez; and (5) that the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick. Liboro

pointed out that the first page of the will, which was contained in two pages in all, was not numbered in letters or

Arabic numbers as what should have been required by law. It was also argued that the testator should have signed the will

with his signature and not only with his thumb print if he indeed had the capacity to execute the will. Furthermore, the will

did not expressly state that the language used is a language which the Don understood; in this case, it was in Spanish.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was substantial compliance to qualify the will for probate.

RULING:Yes, it was executed in all particulars as required by law. The purpose of the law in prescribing the paging of wills is

guard against fraud, and to afford means of preventing the substitution or of defecting the loss of any of its pages. In the

present case, the omission to put a page number on the first sheet, if that be necessary, is supplied by other forms of

identification more trustworthy than the conventional numerical words or characters. The unnumbered page is clearly

identified as the first page by the internal sense of its contents considered in relation to the contents of the second

page. By their meaning and coherence, the first and second lines on the second page are undeniably a continuation of the

last sentence of the testament, before the attestation clause, which starts at the bottom of the preceding page. Furthermore,

the unnumbered page contains the caption "TESTAMENTO," the invocation of the Almighty, and a recital that the testator

was in full use of his testamentary faculty, all of which, in the logical order of sequence, precede the direction for the

disposition of the marker's property. Again, as page two contains only the two lines above mentioned, the attestation clause,

the mark of the testator and the signatures of the witnesses, the other sheet cannot by any possibility betaken for other than page one.

The testator affixed his thumbmark to the instrument instead of signing hisname. The reason for this was that the testator

was suffering from "partialparalysis." While another in testator's place might have directed someone else

tosign for him, as appellant contends should have been done, there is nothingcurious or suspicious in the fact that the

testator chose the use of mark as themeans of authenticating his will. It was a matter of taste or preference. Both waysare

good. A statute requiring a will to be "signed" is satisfied if the signature ismade by the testator's mark. As for

the question on the language of the will, there is no statutoryrequirement that such knowledge be expressly stated

in the will itself. It is amatter that may be established by proof aliunde.

The will may therefore be submitted for probate.

Topic: 5. DEFECT IN ATTESTATION CLAUSE

Rosario GARCIA vs Juliana LACUESTA, et al.

G.R. No. L-4067, November 29, 1951

FACTS:

A will was executed by Antero Mercado wherein it appears that it was signed by Atty. FlorentinoJaviwe who wrote the name of Antero. The testator was alleged to have written a cross immediately

after his name. The Court of First Instance found that the will was valid but the Court of Appeals

reversed the lower courts decision holding that the attestation clause failed: 1) to certify that the will

was signed on all the left margins of the three pages and at the end of the will by Atty. Javier at the

express request of the testator in the presence of the testator and each and every one of the witnesses;

2) to certify that after the signing of the name of the testator by Atty. Javier at the formers request said

testator has written a cross at the end of his name and on the left margin of the three pages of which

8/2/2019 Succ Cases

5/36

the will consists and at the end thereof 3) to certify that the witnesses signed the will in all the pages

thereon in the presence of the testator and of each other. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the attestation clause is valid.

RULING:

The attestation clause is fatally defective for failing to state that Antero Mercado caused Atty. Javier

to write the testators name under his express direction, as required by section 168 of the Code of Civil

Procedure. It is not here pretended that the cross appearing on the will is the usual signature of Antero

Mercado or even one of the ways by which he signed his name. After mature reflection, the SC is not

prepared to liken the mere sign of the cross to a thumbmark and the reason is obvious. The cross cannot

and does not have the trustworthiness of a thumbmark.

Topic: WHEN THE TESTATOR REQUIRES ANOTHER TO WRITE HIS NAME ON HIS BEHALF

6. Lucio BALONAN vs. Eusebia ABELLANA, et al.

G.R. No. L-15153, August 31, 1960

FACTS:

The last Will and Testament sought to be probated consists in two (2) typewritten pages. The first

page is signed by Juan Bello and on the left margin appears the signatures of the three (3) instrumental

witnesses. On the second page appears the signature of said witnesses, at the bottom of which appears

the signature of the notary public and below said signature is his designation as notary public. On the

left margin of the second page (last page of the will) appears the signature of Juan Bello under whose

name appears handwritten the phrase, Por la Testadore Anacleta Abellana (For the Testate of

Anacleta Abellana). The will is duly acknowledged before the notary public.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the signature of Juan Bello above the typewritten statement, Por la Testadora

Anacleta Abellana comply with the requirements of law prescribing the manner in which a will shall be

executed.

RULING:

Article 805 of the Civil Code provides:

Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the

end there of by the testator himself or by the testators name written

by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction and

attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the

presence of the testator and of one another.

The law requires that the testator himself sign the will, or if he cannot do so, the testators name

must be written by some other person in his presence and by his express direction. In this case, the

name of the testatrix, Anacleta Abellana does not appear written under the will by said Abellana herself,

or by Dr. Juan Bello. There is therefore, a failure to comply with the express requirement in the law thatthe testator must himself sign the will, or that his name be affixed thereto by some other person in his

presence and by his express direction. Hence, the will of the deceased Anacleta Abellana must not be

admitted to probate.

7. G.R. No. L-5971 February 27, 1911

8/2/2019 Succ Cases

6/36

BEATRIZ NERA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. NARCISA RIMANDO,

defendant-appellant.

Facts:

The only question raised by the evidence in this case as to the due execution of theinstrument propounded as a will in the court below, is whether one of the subscribing

witnesses was present in the small room where it was executed at the time when the

testator and the other subscribing witnesses attached their signatures; or whether at

that time he was outside, some eight or ten feet away, in a large room connecting with

the smaller room by a doorway, across which was hung a curtain which made it

impossible for one in the outside room to see the testator and the other subscribing

witnesses in the act of attaching their signatures to the instrument.

Ruling:

The true test of presence of the testator and the witnesses in the execution of a will is

not whether they actually saw each other sign, but whether they might have been seen

each other sign, had they chosen to do so, considering their mental and physical

condition and position with relation to each other at the moment of inscription of each

signature.

But it is especially to be noted that the position of the parties with relation to each

other at the moment of the subscription of each signature, must be such that they may

see each other sign if they choose to do so. This, of course, does not mean that the

testator and the subscribing witnesses may be held to have executed the instrument inthe presence of each other if it appears that they would not have been able to see each

other sign at that moment, without changing their relative positions or existing

conditions. The evidence in the case relied upon by the trial judge discloses that "at

the moment when the witness Javellana signed the document he was actually and

physically present and in such position with relation to Jaboneta that he could see

everything that took place by merely casting his eyes in the proper direction and

without any physical obstruction to prevent his doing so." And the decision merely

laid down the doctrine that the question whether the testator and the subscribing

witnesses to an alleged will sign the instrument in the presence of each other does not

depend upon proof of the fact that their eyes were actually cast upon the paper at themoment of its subscription by each of them, but that at that moment existing

conditions and their position with relation to each other were such that by merely

casting the eyes in the proper direction they could have seen each other sign. To

extend the doctrine further would open the door to the possibility of all manner of

fraud, substitution, and the like, and would defeat the purpose for which this particular

condition is prescribed in the code as one of the requisites in the execution of a will.

8. G.R. No. L-36033 November 5, 1982 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR

THE PROBATE OF THE WILL OF DOROTEA PEREZ, (deceased): APOLONIO

TABOADA, petitioner, vs. HON. AVELINO S. ROSAL, as Judge of Court of First

Instance of Southern Leyte, (Branch III, Maasin),respondent.

Facts:

8/2/2019 Succ Cases

7/36

In the petition for probate filed with the respondent court, the petitioner attached the

alleged last will and testament of the late Dorotea Perez. Written in the Cebuano-

Visayan dialect, the will consists of two pages. The first page contains the entire

testamentary dispositions and is signed at the end or bottom of the page by the

testatrix alone and at the left hand margin by the three (3) instrumental witnesses. The

second page which contains the attestation clause and the acknowledgment is signedat the end of the attestation clause by the three (3) attesting witnesses and at the left

hand margin by the testatrix.

Ruling:

Ruling as to how the law should be construed:

The law is to be liberally construed, "the underlying and fundamental objective

permeating the provisions on the law on wills in this project consists in the

liberalization of the manner of their execution with the end in view of giving thetestator more freedom in expressing his last wishes but with sufficient safeguards and

restrictions to prevent the commission of fraud and the exercise of undue and

improper pressure and influence upon the testator. This objective is in accord with the

modern tendency in respect to the formalities in the execution of a will" (Report of the

Code commission, p. 103).

Parenthetically, Judge Ramon C. Pamatian stated in his questioned order that were not

for the defect in the place of signatures of the witnesses, he would have found the

testimony sufficient to establish the validity of the will.

The objects of attestation and of subscription were fully met and satisfied in the

present case when the instrumental witnesses signed at the left margin of the sole page

which contains all the testamentary dispositions, especially so when the will was

properly Identified by subscribing witness Vicente Timkang to be the same will

executed by the testatrix. There was no question of fraud or substitution behind the

questioned order.

In Singson v. Florentino, et al. (92 Phil. 161, 164), this Court made the following

observations with respect to the purpose of the requirement that the attestation clause

must state the number of pages used:

The law referred to is article 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act

No. 2645, which requires that the attestation clause shall state the number of pages or

sheets upon which the win is written, which requirement has been held to be

mandatory as an effective safeguard against the possibility of interpolation or

omission of some of the pages of the will to the prejudice of the heirs to whom the

property is intended to be bequeathed (In re will of Andrada, 42 Phil., 180; Uy Coque

vs. Navas L. Sioca, 43 Phil. 405; Gumban vs. Gorecho, 50 Phil. 30; Quinto vs.

Morata, 54 Phil. 481; Echevarria vs. Sarmiento, 66 Phil. 611). The ratio decidendi of

these cases seems to be that the attestation clause must contain a statement of thenumber of sheets or pages composing the will and that if this is missing or is omitted,

it will have the effect of invalidating the will if the deficiency cannot be supplied, not

by evidence aliunde, but by a consideration or examination of the will itself. But here

the situation is different. While the attestation clause does not state the number of

sheets or pages upon which the will is written, however, the last part of the body of

8/2/2019 Succ Cases

8/36

the will contains a statement that it is composed of eight pages, which circumstance in

our opinion takes this case out of the rigid rule of construction and places it within the

realm of similar cases where a broad and more liberal view has been adopted to

prevent the will of the testator from being defeated by purely technical considerations.

9. WHEN WITNESSES DID NOT SEE THE ACTUAL SIGNING OF THE WILL BYTHE TESTATOR

Vda. De Ramos vs. CA, GR No. L-40804, Jan. 31, 1978

Facts:

Petitioners and intervenors, as instituted heirs or devisees, prayed for the probate and/or

allowance of the will and codicil purportedly executed by Testatrix Eugenia Danila because they

too have rights and interests to protect. Respondents opposed the petition because the Testatrixswill and testament had already been probated and not revoked or annulled during her lifetime

and was duly signed by her and the three (3) witnesses and acknowledged before a Notary Public

in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law even if two (2) of the attesting witnesses didnot see the Testatrix sign the will when they affixed their signatures therein. The lower courtgave more weight and merit to the straight-forward and candid testimony of the lawyer notary

public affirming that the Testatrix and the three (3) witnesses signed the will in the presence of

each other.

CA reversed the decision of the lower court on the ground that the evidence failed to establish

that Testatrix Eugenia Danila signed her will in the presence of the instrumental witnesses inaccordance with Art. 805 of the New Civil Code.

Issue:

WON the last testament and its accompanying codicil were executed in accordance with the

formalities of the law after two (2) of the attesting witnesses testified that they did not see the

Testatrix sign the will.

Held:

The will and codicil were executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. Each

and every page of the will and codicil carry the authentic signatures of the testatrix and 3

attesting witnesses. Similarly, the attestation clauses were properly signed by the attestingwitnesses. Both instruments were duly acknowledged before a notary public who was all the

time present during the execution. The documents were prepared by a lawyer and the executionof the same was evidently supervised by another lawyer before whom the deeds wereacknowledged.

Once signed by the attesting witnesses, the attestation clause affirms that compliance with theindispensable legal formalities had been observed. In the attestation clause, the witnesses do not

merely attest to the signature of the testatrix but also to the proper execution of the will, and their

signatures following that of the testatrix show that they have in fact attested not only to the

genuineness of the testatrix signature but also to the due execution of the will as embodied in theattestation clause.

8/2/2019 Succ Cases

9/36

10. THE ACKNOWLEDGING OFFICER MANY NOT BE THE THIRDINSTRUMENTAL WITNESS TO A WLL

Cruz vs. Villasor, GR No. L-32213, Nov. 26, 1973

Facts:

Petitioner Agapita Cruz, th surviving spouse of the decedent, Valente Z. Cruz opposed the

allowance of the will because it was alleged to have been executed not in accordance with lawparticularly Articles 805 and 806, NCC which requires the following:

a. At least 3 credible witnesses to attest and subscribe to the will;b. The Testator and the witnesses to acknowledge the will before a notary public.

One of the three (3) instrumental witnesses was a notary public before whom the will wassupposed to have been acknowledged. Petitioner therefore argued that only two (2) witnesses

appeared before the notary public to acknowledge the will.

Private respondent Manuel Lugay, the executor of the will maintains there was substantialcompliance with the legal requirement of having at least three (3) attesting witnesses even if the

notary public acted as one of them.

Issue:

WON an acknowledging officer can serve as a witness at the same time of a Last Will andTestament.

Held:

The notary public before whom the will was acknowledged cannot be considered as the third

instrumental witness since he cannot acknowledge before himself his having signed the will.

Consequently, if the third witness was the notary public himself, he would have to avow, assent

or admit his having signed the will infront of himself.

This cannot be done because he cannot split his personality into two, so that, one will appear

before the other to acknowledge his participation in the making of the will. Such will be in

contravention of the provisions of Arts. 805 and 806 of the NCC.

15. GAN, vs. YAPG.R. No. L-12190; August 30, 1858

Topic: Lost holographic will may not be probated.

FACTS:

After the death of Felicidad Esguerra Alto-Yap, Fausto Gan filed a petition for the probate of a holographicwill allegedly executed by the former. Opposing the petition, her surviving husband Ildefonso Yapasserted that the deceased had not left any will, nor executed any testament during her lifetime.

The will itself was not presented. Gan tried to establish its contents and due execution by the statementsof allegedly four (4) witnesses to the execution of the alleged will.

ISSUE: WON a lost holographic will may be probated upon the testimony of witnesses who haveallegedly seen it and who declare that it was in the handwriting of the testator.

HELD: No. If testimonial evidence of holographic wills be permitted, one more objectionable feature feasibility of forgery would be added to the several objections to this kind of wills.

8/2/2019 Succ Cases

10/36

Unlike holographic wills, ordinary wills may be proved by testimonial evidence when lost or destroyed. In the first, the onlyguarantee of authenticity is the handwriting itself; in the second, the testimony of the subscribing or instrumental witnesses(and of the notary, now). The loss of the holographic will entails the loss of the only medium of proof; if the ordinary will islost, the subscribing witnesses are available to authenticate.

In the case of a lost will, the three subscribing witnesses would be testifying to a factwhich they saw, namely the act of thetestator of subscribing the will; whereas in the case of a lost holographic will, the witnesses would testify as to their

opinionof the handwriting which they allegedly saw, an opinion which cannot be tested in court, nor directly contradicted bythe oppositors, because the handwriting itself is not at hand.

16. ROXAS de Jesusvs. Andres R. de JESUS, Jr.G.R. No. L-38338, January 28, 1985

Topic: When the date in the holographic will appears as FEB./61

FACTS:

After the death of spouses Andres and Bibiana de Jesus, a special proceeding was instituted by

Simeon, brother of Bibiana. Simeon was then appointed administrator of the estate and consequently, hedelivered to the lower court a document purporting to be the holographic will of Bibiana which was thenset for a hearing. Luz Henson, one of the compulsory heirs filed an opposition to probate assailing thepurported holographic Will of Bibiana was not executed in accordance with law. However, the lower courtissued an order allowing the probate which was found to have been duly executed in accordance withlaw. A motion for reconsideration was then filed by Luz assailing that the alleged holographic will was notdated as required by Article 810 of the Civil Code and contending that the law requires that the Willshould contain the day, month and year of its execution and that this should be strictly complied with. Thecourt then reconsidered its earlier order and disallowed the probate of the holographic will on the groundthat the word dated has generally been held to include the month, day, and year.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the date (FEB/61) appearing on the holographic will of the deceased Bibian Roxas deJesus is a valid compliance with the Article 810 of the Civil Code.

RULING:

ART. 810. A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated,and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may bemade in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.

As a general rule, the date in a holographic will should include the day, month and year of itsexecution. However, when as in the case at bar, there is no appearance of fraud, bad faith, undueinfluence and pressure and the authenticity of the Will is established and the only issue is whether or notthe date FEB/61 appearing on the holographic will is a valid compliance with Article 810 of the CivilCode, probate of the holographic Will should be allowed under the principle of substantial compliance.



FACTS:


The will itself was not presented. Gan tried to establish its contents and due execution by the statements

of allegedly four (4) witnesses to the execution of the alleged will.



8/2/2019 Succ Cases

11/36






FACTS:



ISSUE:


RULING:





FACTS:






8/2/2019 Succ Cases

12/36






FACTS:



ISSUE:


RULING:





FACTS:






8/2/2019 Succ Cases

13/36






FACTS:



ISSUE:


RULING:





FACTS:

After the death of Felicidad Esguerra Alto-Yap, Fausto Gan filed a petition for the probate of a holographicwill allegedly executed by the former. Opposing the petition, her surviving husband Ildefonso Yap

asserted that the deceased had not left any will, nor executed any testament during her lifetime.

The will itself was not presented. Gan tried to establish its contents and due execution by the statementsof allegedly four (4) witnesses to the execution of the alleged will.


8/2/2019 Succ Cases

14/36



In the case of a lost will, the three subscribing witnesses would be testifying to a factwhich they saw, namely the act of thetestator of subscribing the will; whereas in the case of a lost holographic will, the witnesses would testify as to theiropinionof the handwriting which they allegedly saw, an opinion which cannot be tested in court, nor directly contradicted bythe oppositors, because the handwriting itself is not at hand.



FACTS:

After the death of spouses Andres and Bibiana de Jesus, a special proceeding was instituted bySimeon, brother of Bibiana. Simeon was then appointed administrator of the estate and consequently, hedelivered to the lower court a document purporting to be the holographic will of Bibiana which was thenset for a hearing. Luz Henson, one of the compulsory heirs filed an opposition to probate assailing thepurported holographic Will of Bibiana was not executed in accordance with law. However, the lower courtissued an order allowing the probate which was found to have been duly executed in accordance withlaw. A motion for reconsideration was then filed by Luz assailing that the alleged holographic will was notdated as required by Article 810 of the Civil Code and contending that the law requires that the Willshould contain the day, month and year of its execution and that this should be strictly complied with. Thecourt then reconsidered its earlier order and disallowed the probate of the holographic will on the groundthat the word dated has generally been held to include the month, day, and year.

ISSUE:


RULING:


As a general rule, the date in a holographic will should include the day, month and year of itsexecution. However, when as in the case at bar, there is no appearance of fraud, bad faith, undue

influence and pressure and the authenticity of the Will is established and the only issue is whether or notthe date FEB/61 appearing on the holographic will is a valid compliance with Article 810 of the CivilCode, probate of the holographic Will should be allowed under the principle of substantial compliance.

19. GONZALESvs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.G.R. No. L-37453, May 25, 1979

Topic: Credibility of Instrumental Witnesses

FACTS: Lutgarda Santiago and Rizalina Gonzales are nieces of the late Isabel Andres Gabriel. Lutgardafiled a petition for the probate of a will alleged to have been executed by the deceased and designatedLutgarda as the principal beneficiary and executrix. There is no dispute that Isabel died as a widow andwithout issue. The will submitted consists of five (5) pages and includes the pages whereon theattestation clause and the acknowledgment of the notary public were written. The signatures of thedeceased Isabel Gabriel appear at the end of the will on page four and at the left margin of all the pages.

At the bottom thereof, under the heading "Pangalan", are written the signatures of Matilde D.Orobia, Celso D. Gimpaya and Maria R. Gimpaya, and opposite the same, under the heading"Tirahan", are their respective places of residence. The petition was opposed by Rizalina assailingthat the will is not genuine and was not executed and attested as required by law. The lower court

8/2/2019 Succ Cases

15/36

disallowed the probate of said will and as a consequence, Lutgarda appealed to Court of Appealsreversed the lower courts decision and allowed the probate of the will. Rizalina filed a motion forreconsideration but the same was denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not the will was executed and attested as required by law.

RULING: No. Instrumental witnesses in order to be competent must be shown to have thequalifications under Article 820 of the Civil Code and none of the disqualifications under Article821 and for their testimony to be credible, that is worthy of belief and entitled to credence, it isnot mandatory that evidence be first established on record that the witnesses have a goodstanding in the community or that they are honest and upright or reputed to be trustworthy andreliable, for a person is presumed to be such unless the contrary is established otherwise. Inother words, the instrumental witnesses must be competent and their testimonies must becredible before the court allows the probate of the will they have attested.

In the case at bar, the finding that each and everyone of the three instrumental witnesses arecompetent and credible is satisfactorily supported by the evidence as found by the respondent Court ofAppeals, which findings of fact this Tribunal is bound to accept and rely upon. Moreover, petitioner hasnot pointed to any disqualification of any of the said witnesses.

20. GAGOvs. MAMUYAC, et al.G.R. No. L-26317, January 29, 1927

Topic: Probate of a cancelled will cannot be allowed.

FACTS: Miguel Mamuyac executed a last will and testament on July 1918 and almost 4 years later,Francisco Gago presented a petition in the CFI for the probation of such will which was opposed byCornelia Mamuyac et al. The petition was denied upon the ground that Mamuyac had executed a new willon April 1919. An action was filed to secure the probation of the said new will. The opponents alleged (a)that the said will is a copy of the second will executed by Miguel; (b) that the same had been cancelledand revoked during the lifetime of the testator; and (c) that the said will was not the last will and testamentof Miguel Mamuyac. The petition was then again denied upon the ground that the will of 1919 had beenthe cancelled and revoked based on the evidence adduced by the trial court that the 1918 will is a merecarbon of its original which remained in the possession of the deceased, who revoked it before a witness,who typed the 1919 will of the testator, and before another person who witnessed the actual cancellationby the testator in 1920. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: WON a cancelled will can be probated.

RULING: No. The law does not require any evidence of the revocation or cancellation of a will to bepreserved. Where a will which cannot be found is shown to have been in the possession of the testator,when last seen, the presumption is, in the absence of other competent evidence, that the same wascancelled or destroyed. The same presumption arises where it is shown that the testator had readyaccess to the will and it cannot be found after his death. It will not be presumed that such will has beendestroyed by any other person without the knowledge or authority of the testator. In view of the fact that

the original will of 1919 could not be found after the death of the testator and in view of the positive proofthat the same had been cancelled, the conclusions of the lower court are in accordance with the weight ofevidence.

After a careful examination of the entire record, we are fully persuaded that the will presented forprobate had been cancelled by the testator in 1920.

21. CASIANOet al.vs. COURT OF APPEALS et al.G.R. No. 76464, February 29, 1988

Topic: Revocation of a will

FACTS:

Adriana Maloto died leaving as heirs Aldina, Constantcio, Panfilo and Felino who are her niece andnephews. Believing that the deceased did not leave behind a last will and testament, the 4 heirscommenced an intestate proceeding for the settlement of their aunts estate. However, while the casewas still in progress, the heirs executed an agreement of extrajudicial settlement of Adrianas estate

8/2/2019 Succ Cases

16/36

which provides for the division of the estate into four equal parts among themselves. When presentedbefore the court, said agreement was approved.

However, three years later, Atty. Sulpicio Palma, a former associate of Adrianas counsel, discovereda document entitled KATAPUSAN NGA PAGBUBULAT-AN (Testamento) and purporting to be the lastwill and testament of Adriana. Panfilo and Felino are still named as heirs in the said will, Aldina and

Constancio are bequeathed much bigger and more valuable shares in the estate than what they havereceived by virtue of the agreement of extrajudicial settlement. The will likewise gives devises andlegacies to other parties, among them being the petitioners. Thus, Aldino and Constancio joined by otherdevisees and legatees filed a motion for reconsideration and annulment of the proceedings therein andfor the allowance of the will. Upon denial of the trial court, the petitioners came before the Supreme Courtby way or petition for certiorari and mandamus which were dismissed because they were not the properremedies. The appellate court found out that the will was burned by the househelper of Adriana and wasat the possession of the lawyer in because Adriana was seeking the services of the lawyer in order tohave a new will drawn up.

ISSUE: WON the will of Adriana Maloto had been efficiently revoked.

RULING: No.It is clear that the physical act of destruction of a will, like burning in this

case, does not per se constitute an effective revocation, unless the destruction iscoupled with animus revocandion the part of the testator. It is not imperative that thephysical destruction be done by the testator himself. It may be performed by anotherperson but under the express directionand in the presenceof the testator. Of course, itgoes without saying that the document destroyed must be the will itself.

In this case, while animus revocandior the intention to revoke, may be conceded, forthat is a state of mind, yet that requisite alone would not suffice. "Animus revocandiisonly one of the necessary elements for the effective revocation of a last will andtestament. The intention to revoke must be accompanied by the overt physical act ofburning, tearing, obliterating, or cancelling the will carried out by the testator or by

another person in his presence and under his express direction. There is paucity ofevidence to show compliance with these requirements. For one, the document orpapers burned by Adriana's maid, Guadalupe, was not satisfactorily established to be awill at all, much less the will of Adriana Maloto. For another, the burning was not provento have been done under the express direction of Adriana. And then, the burning wasnot in her presence. Both witnesses, Guadalupe and Eladio, were one in stating thatthey were the only ones present at the place where the stove was located in which thepapers proffered as a will were burned.

22. AUSTRIA vs. REYES

G.R. No. L-23079, February 27, 1970

Topic: Adopted children as testate heirs

FACTS:

Basilia Austria filed with the CFI of Rizal a petition for probate ante mortem of her last will andtestament which was opposed by Ruben Austria and others who are nephews and nieces of Basilia.However, such opposition was dismissed and the probate was allowed after due hearing.

The bulk of the estate was destined under the will to pass on the Perfecto Cruz and others whom hadbeen assumed and declared by Basilia as her own legally adopted children. Subsequently, upon Basiliasdeath, Perfecto was appointed executor in accordance with the provisions of the for mers will. Ruben andthe others filed in the same proceedings a petition in intervention for partition alleging that they are thenearest kin and Perfecto and others had not in fact been adopted by the testator in accordance with law,hence they should be rendered mere strangers and without any right to succeed as heirs.

ISSUE: WON institution of adopted children as testate heirs is valid.

RULING: Yes. Even if the adoption in question were spurious, Perfecto Cruz, et al., willnevertheless succeed not as compulsory heirs but as testamentary heirs instituted in

8/2/2019 Succ Cases

17/36

Basilia's will. This ruling apparently finds support in article, 842 of the Civil Code whichreads:

One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose of by will all his estate or any part of it infavor of any person having capacity to succeed.

One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he does notcontravene the provisions of this Code with regard to the legitime of said heirs.

The lower court must have assumed that since the petitioners nephews and niece arenot compulsory heirs, they do not possess that interest which can be prejudiced by afree-wheeling testamentary disposition. The petitioners' interest is confined toproperties, if any, that have not been disposed of in the will, for to that extent intestatesuccession can take place and the question of the veracity of the adoption acquiresrelevance.

23. Topic: a will cannot be made subject of annulment

GALLANOSA et al. vs. ARCANGEL et al.G.R. No. L-29300 June 21, 1978

FACTS:Florentino Hitosis executed a will in the Bicol dialect on June 19, 1938 when he was

eighty years old. He died on May 26, 1939 and survived by his brother, Leon Hitosis. A petition

for the probate of his will was filed in the CFI of Sorsogon. In that will, Florentino bequeathedhis one-half share in the conjugal estate to his second wife, Tecla Dollentas, and, should Tecla

predeceased him, his one-half share would be assigned to the spouses Pedro Gallanosa and

Corazon Grecia, the reason being that Pedro, Tecla's son by her first marriage, grew up under thecare of Florentino; he had treated Pedro as his foster child, and Pedro has rendered services to

Florentino and Tecla. Florentino likewise bequeathed his separate properties consisting of threeparcels of abaca land and parcel of riceland to his protege, Adolfo Fortajada, a minor.

Opposition to the probate of the will was filed by Leon, his surviving brother. After a

hearing,the oppositors did not present any evidence in support of their opposition, Judge Pablo S.

Rivera, in his decision of October 27, 1939, admitted the will to probate and appointed Gallanosa

as executor. The Gallanosa spouses submitted a project of partition covering sixty-one parcels ofland and several pieces of personal property were distributed in accordance with Florentino's

will. The project of partition was approved by Judge Doroteo Amador in his order of March 13,

1943, thus confirming the heirs' possession of their respective shares.

ISSUE: Whether or not a will is subject of annulment.

RESOLUTION:No.Our procedural law does not sanction an action for the "annulment" of a will. In order

that a will may take effect, it has to be probated, legalized or allowed in the proper testamentary

proceeding. The probate of the will is mandatory. The 1939 decree of probate is conclusive as tothe due execution or formal validity of the will that means that the testator was of sound trial

disposing mind at the time when he executed the will and was not acting under duress, menace,

fraud, or undue influence; that the will was signed by him in the presence of the required numberof witnesses, and that the will is genuine trial and not a forgery. Accordingly, these facts cannot

again be questioned in a subsequent proceeding, not even in a criminal action for the forgery of

the will. After the finality of the allowance of a will, the issue as to the voluntariness of its

execution cannot be raised anymore.

In Austria vs. Ventenilla, 21 Phil. 180, a "petition for annulment of a will" was notentertained after the decree of probate had become final. After the time allowed for an appeal has

expired, when no appeal is taken from an order probating a will, the heirs cannot, in subsequentlitigation in the same proceedings, raise questions relating to its due execution. The probate of a

will is conclusive as to its due execution trial as to the testamentary capacity of the testator

8/2/2019 Succ Cases

18/36

24. Topic: when an issue of ownership is intertwined maybe passed upon on a probateproceeding.

Pastor et al. vs. CA et al.GR. No. L-56340, June 24, 1983

Facts:

Pastor, Sr. died in 1966, survived by his wife Sofia Bossio, two legitimate childrenPastor, Jr. and Sofia de Midgely, and an illegitimate child Lewellyn Barlito Quemada. He left a

holographic will which contained only one testamentary disposition: a legacy in favor of

Quemada consisting of 30% of Pastor, Sr.s 42% share in the operation by Atlas ConsolidatedMining and Development Corporation (ATLAS) of some mining claims. Quemada was

appointed as special administrator of the entire estate of Pastor, Sr., whether or not covered or

affected by the holographic will. Pastor, Jr. and his sister Sofia opposed the petition for probateand the order appointing Quemada as special administrator.Quemada instituted against Pastor, Jr. and his wife an action for reconveyance of alleged

properties of the estate, which included the properties subject of the legacy and which were inthe names of the spouses Pastor, Jr. and his wife, Maria Elena Achaval de Pastor, who claimed tobe the owners thereof in their own rights, and not by inheritance. The action is docketed as Civil

Case No. 274-R.The probate court issued an order allowing the will to probate which was affirmed by the CA. Onappeal SC dismissed the petition and remanded the same to the probate court. Quemada kept asking for payment of his legacy and seizure of the properties subject of said

legacy which was opposed by Pastor, Jr. and Sofia on the ground of pendency of thereconveyance suit with another branch of the CFI. All pleadings remained unacted upon by the

probate court.The probate court ordered ATLAS to submit a sworn statement of royalties paid to the PastorGroup from the death of Pastor, Sr. died to February 1980. It revealed that 60% of the mining

claims being operated pertained to Pastor Group. Of the 60%, 42% belonged to Pastor, Sr. and

only 33% belonged to Pastor, Jr.

While the reconveyance suit was still being litigated, the probate court issued an Order of

Execution and Garnishment, resolving the question of ownership of the royalties payable by

ATLAS and ruling in effect that the legacy to Quemada was not inofficious. Thus, it directedATLAS to remit directly to Quemada the 42% royalties due decedent's estate, of which Quemada

was authorized to retain 75% for himself as legatee and to deposit 25% with a reputable banking

institution for payment of the estate taxes and other obligations of the estate. The 33% share ofPastor, Sr.and/or his assignees was ordered garnished to answer for the accumulated legacy of

Quemada from the time of Pastor, Jr.'s death, which amounted to over two million pesos.

Another orderdeclared that the questions of intrinsic validity of the will and of ownership over

the mining claims (not the royalties alone) had been finally adjudicated thereby rendering moot

and academic the pending suit for reconveyance.

Issue: Whether or not the probate court can resolve questions of ownership over the mining

claims and was able to determine the intrinsic validity of the will.

Resolution: No.

On the Question of Ownership

The question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot resolvewith finality. The said court may only provisionally pass upon titles of properties to be included

in the inventory of the estate properties, subject to final decision in a separate action to resolvethe question on ownership. The issue in the probate of a will is restricted to that kind of validity

of the will which for example determines whether or not the testator was possessed of a sound

8/2/2019 Succ Cases

19/36

mind, whether or not he freely executed the will, and whether or not the will had been executed

in accordance with legal formalities.

Before the provisions of the holographic will can be implemented, the questions of ownership of

the mining properties and the intrinsic validity of the holographic will must first be resolved with

finality. In this case, the Probate Order did not resolve the two said issues. Therefore, the Probate

Order could not have resolved and actually did not decide Quemada's entitlement to the legacy.This being so, the Orders for the payment of the legacy are unwarranted for lack of basis.

On the Intrinsic Validity of the Will

If the deceased was survived by his wife and his children, there is a need, aside fromliquidating the conjugal partnership, to set apart the share of the surviving spouse in the conjugal

property, preparatory to the administration and liquidation of the estate of the deceased.

In the case at bar, there was no liquidation of the conjugal partnership, there was no priordefinitive determination of the assets and debts of the estate of Pastor, Sr. nor his estate tax been

paid. The net assets of the estate not having been determined, the legitime of the forced heirs in

concrete figures could not be ascertained. It was therefore not possible to determine whether thelegacy of Quemada would produce an impairment of the legitime of the compulsory heirs. This case was then remanded to the appropriate RTC for proper proceedings, subject to the

judgment to be rendered in Civil Case No. 274-R.

25. TOMAS JIMENEZ, VISITACION JIMENEZ, DIGNO JIMENEZ, ANTONIOJIMENEZ, AMADEO JIMENEZ, MODESTO JIMENEZ and VIRGINIA JIMENEZ,

petitioners,

vs.

HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. AMANDA VALERA-CABIGAO, in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch XXXVII,

Lingayen, Pangasinan, LEONARDO JIMENEZ, JR. and CORAZON JIMENEZ,respondents.

G.R. No. 75773 April 17, 1990

Facts: Leonardo (Lino) Jimenez on his first marriage with Consolacion Ungson had fourchildren, namely: Alberto, Leonardo, Sr., Alejandra and Angeles. During the existence of the

marriage, Lino acquired five parcels of land. After Consolacion died, he married Genoveva

Caolboy with whom he begot the seven petitioners herein. Lino and Genoveva died.

Virginia Jimenez filed a petition before the Court of First Instance praying to be appointed as

administratrix of the properties of the deceased spouses Lino and Genoveva. Leonardo Jimenez,

Jr., filed a motion for the exclusion of his father's name and those of Alberto, Alejandra, andAngeles from the petition, inasmuch as they are children of the union of Lino Jimenez and

Consolacion Ungson and not of Lino Jimenez and Genoveva Caolboy and because they have

already received their inheritance consisting of five parcels of lands.

Virginia, the appointed administrator, included the five parcels of land in the inventory of theestate of the spouses. Leonardo Jimenez, Jr. moved for the exclusion of these properties from

the inventory on the ground that these had already been adjudicated to the children on Lino on

his first marriage. The probate court ordered the exclusion of the five parcels of land from the

inventory. A motion for reconsideration of said order was denied so Virginia went to the Courtof Appeals on a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking the annulment of the order

excluding the five parcels of land from the inventory and the denial of her motion forreconsideration. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition.

Petitioners filed an amended complaint after two years to recover possession/ownership of the

subject five parcels of land as part of the estate of Lino and Genoveva and to order private

respondents to render an accounting of the produce therefrom. Private respondents moved for thedismissal of the complaint on the grounds that the action was barred by prior judgment in a

8/2/2019 Succ Cases

20/36

former decision and by prescription and laches. The trial court resolved to dismiss the complaint

on the ground ofres judicata.

Issue: Whether or not in a settlement proceeding (testate or intestate) the probate court hasjurisdiction to settle questions of ownership.

Held: No.

It has also been held that in a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the question of

ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot resolve with finality. Since

the probate court's findings are not conclusive being prima facie, a separate proceeding isnecessary to establish the ownership of the five parcels of land.

The patent reason is the probate court's limited jurisdiction and the principle that questions of

title or ownership, which result in inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the property, can

only be settled in a separate action.

All that the said court could do as regards said properties is determine whether they should orshould not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the

administrator. If there is a dispute as to the ownership, then the opposing parties and theadministrator have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting

claims of title because the probate court cannot do so.

26. Testate Estate ofCARLOS PALANCA TANGUINLAY. ROMAN OZAETA, petitionerand appellant, PHILIPPINE TRUST COMPANY (Special Administrator), movant and apellee,

MARCIANA PALANCA, ANGEL PALANCA, and SEBASTIAN PALANCA, co-movantsand appellants, MARIA CUARTERO VDA. DE PALANCA, ET AL., co-movants andappellants, vs. ROSA GONZALES VDA. DE PALANCA, ET AL., oppositors and appellants.

GRN L-5585 September 16, 1954

Facts: Roman Ozaeta initiated a special proceeding for the probate of the will left by CarlosPalanca Tanguinlay. The will confirmed to all requirements needed, so the trial court approvedits probate. A motion was filed with the probate court by the Philippine Trust Company,

appointed as special administrator of the estate, asking that a Buick sedan car presumably a part

of the estate of Palanca, and being kept by Rosa Gonzales, be delivered to said specialadministrator for purposes of administration. Rosa declined to give the car up saying that having

been married to Palanca in 1945, as his widow, she had a right to keep the sedan. Maria Cuarteroentered the scene and claimed that Rosa could not have validly been married to Palanca in 1945for the reason that she had married him in 1929, and therefore, any marriage entered into by

Rosa with Palanca thereafter must be bigamous and void. Therefore, she was the true widow and

as such had a better claim to the car.

Issue: Who is entitled to a portion of Palancas estate as the formers legal widow?

Held: Rosa Gonzales is the legal widow of Palanca and is therefore entitled to a portion of hisestate.

Maria Cuartero and Rosa Gonzales both claimed that they were married to Carlos PalancaTaguinlay in 1929 and 1945, respectively. The marriage of Rosa to Carlos had been dulyestablished by testimonial and documentary evidence. One of the pieces of evidence presented

was the will executed by Carlos Palanca wherein he declared that he married Rosa Gonzales in

which marriage they had eight children.

8/2/2019 Succ Cases

21/36

Palanca executed his will and he made the solemn declaration in said document that since 1923and for some years thereafter he maintained amorous relations with Maria Cuartero and had by

her six natural children whom, according to him, he had liberally fed and supported. He said

nothing about having married Maria; on the contrary, he declared that for grave reasons he

regarded her unworthy of being the guardian of the persons and property of his children by her

and so appointed Felisa Joson de Fernandez and the Philippine National Bank as guardians oftheir persons, and property respectively. On the other hand, in the same will he spoke of his

marriage to Rosa Gonzales and the eight children he had by her, which children according to him

were legitimated by reason of their subsequent marriage.

We are convinced and so find and hold that Palanca and Maria Cuartero were never married, andthat there was not even a simulated marriage; that on April 12, 1945, Palanca was a widower and

so was in a position to marry as in fact he validly married Rosa Gonzales.

28. Remedios NUGUID vs.

Felix NUGUID and Paz Salonga NUGUID.G.R. No. L-23445, June 23, 1966

FACTS:

Rosario Nuguid, testator in the holographic will, died single and without descendants, legitimate orillegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate parents, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, and sixbrothers and sisters, namely: Alfredo, Federico, Remedios, Conrado, Lourdes and Alberto, all surnamedNuguid.

On May 18, 1963, Remedios Nuguid, sister of Rosario, filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal aholographic will allegedly executed by Rosario Nuguid on November 17, 1951, some 11 years before herdeath. The will stated as follows:

Nov. 17, 1951

I, ROSARIO NUGUID, being of sound and disposing mind and memory, having amasseda certain amount of property, do hereby give, devise, and bequeath all of the property which Imay have when I die to my beloved sister Remedios Nuguid, age 34, residing with me at 38-BIriga, Q.C. In witness whereof, I have signed my name this seventh day of November, nineteenhundred and fifty-one.

(Sgd.) Illegible

T/ ROSARIO NUGUID

Remedios prayed that said will be admitted to probate and that letters of administration with thewill annexed be issued to her. This was opposed by the parents of Rosario, Felix and Paz.

The parents opposed on the ground of preterition. The CFI of Rizal decided in favor of theparents and declared that there was indeed preterition of compulsory heirs.

Petitioner insists that the compulsory heirs were simply ineffectively disinherited and that they areentitled to receive their legitimes, but that the institution of heir "is not invalidated," although theinheritance of the heir so instituted is reduced to the extent of said legitimes.

ISSUE:

May a part of the will, when preterition has been declared, be considered to still be valid with respect

to the free portion of the will?

RULING:

No, preterition has an effect of completely nullifying the will. Article 854 of the Civil Code states that(T)he preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether livingat the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution ofheir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.

8/2/2019 Succ Cases

22/36

The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. But she left forced heirs in the

direct ascending line her parents. The will completely omits both of them. They thus received nothing by the

testament; tacitly, they were deprived of their legitime; neither were they expressly disinherited. This is a clear case

of preterition.

It cannot be gleaned in the will that any specific legacies or bequests are therein provided for. It is in this

posture that the Supreme Court held that the nullity is complete. Perforce, Rosario Nuguid died intestate.

Remedios claim that the will should only be nullified as to the part of the legitime and that she should thus be

considered a devisee or legatee is without merit. The law requires that the institution of devisees and legatees must

be expressly stated in the will. Such was not present.

Also, the omission of the parents in the will cannot be interpreted as a form of disinheritance as the law also

requires that, for disinheritance to be proper, the disinheritance should be clearly and expressly stated in the will.

Absent that, no inference of disinheritance may be had.

27. Pascual COSO, vs.

Fermina Fernandez DEZA, et al.,

G.R. No.L- 16763,December 22, 1921

FACTS:

The testator, a married man, became acquainted with Rosario Lopez and had illicit relations with her

for many years. They begot an illegitimate son. The testators will gives the tercio de libre disposicion to

the illegitimate son and also provides for the payment of nineteen hundred Spanish duros to Rosario

Lopez by way of reimbursement for expenses incurred by her in talking care of the testator when he is

alleged to have suffered from severe illness. The will was set aside on the ground of undue influence

alleged to have been exerted over the mind of the testator by Rosario Lopez. There is no doubt that

Rosario exercised some influence over the testator.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the influence exercised was of such a character to vitiate the will.

RULING:

Mere general or reasonable influence over a testator is not sufficient to invalidate a will; to have that

effect, the influence must be undue. The rule as to what constitutes undue influence has been variously

stated, but the substance of the different statements is that, to be sufficient to avoid a will, the influence

exerted must be of a kind that so overpowers and subjugates the mind of the testator as to destroy his

free agency and make him express the will of another rather than his own.

Such influence must be actually exerted on the mind of the testator in regard to the execution of thewill in question, either at the time of the execution of the will, or so near thereto as to be still operative,

with the object of procuring a will in favor of particular parties, and it must result in the making of

testamentary dispositions which the testator would not otherwise have made.

And while the same amount of influence may become undue when exercise by one occupying an

improper and adulterous relation to testator, the mere fact that some influence is exercised by a person

sustaining that relation does not invalidate a will, unless it is further shown that the influence destroys the

testators free agency.

The burden is upon the parties challenging the will to show that undue influence existed at the time of

its execution. While it is shown that the testator entertained strong affections for Rosario Lopez, it does

not appear that her influence so overpowered and subjugated his mind as to destroy his free agency andmake him express the will of another rather than his own. Mere affection, even if illegitimate, is not undue

influence and does not invalidate a will.

Influence gained by kindness and affection will not be regarded as undue, if no imposition or fraud be

practiced, even though it induces the testator to make an unequal and unjust disposition of his property in

favor of those who have contributed to his comfort and ministered to his wants, if such disposition is

voluntarily made.

8/2/2019 Succ Cases

23/36

30.Acain vs. IACFACTS:Constantitno filed for probate of the will of his decased brother Nemesio. The spouse and

adopted child of the decedent opposed the probate of will because of preterition. RTCdismissed the petition of the wife. CA reversed and the probate thus was dismissedISSUE:

Whether or not there was preterition of compulsory heirs in the direct line thus their

omission shall not annul the institution of heirs.RULING:

Preterition consists in the omission of the forced heirs because they are not mentioned

there in, or trough mentioned they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expresslydisinherited. As for the widow there is no preterit ion because she is not in the direct line.

However, the same cannot be said for the adopted child whose legal adoption has not

been questioned by the petitioner. Adoption gives to the adopted person the same rights

and duties as if he where a legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted person alegal heir hence, this is a clear case of preterition.

The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to the entireinheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification ofsuch institution of universal heirs without any other testamentary disposition in the will

amounts to a declaration that nothing was written. No legacies and devisees having been

provided in the will, the whole property of the deceased has been left by universal title to

petitioner and his brothers and sisters.

An adopted child, if totally omitted in the inheritance, is preterited and can invoke its

protection and consequences. Since an adopted child is given by law the same rights as alegitimate child, the adopted child can, in proper cases, invoke Article 854 in the same

manner a legitimate child can.

29. Aznar vs. Duncan

FACTS:

Edward E. Christensen, a citizen of California with domicile in the Philippines, died

leaving a will executed on March 5, 1951. The will was admitted to probate by theCourt of First Instance of Davao in its decision of February 28, 1954. In that same

decision the court declared that Maria Helen Christensen Garcia (hereinafter referred

to as Helen Garcia) was a natural child of the deceased. The declaration was appealedto this Court, and was affirmed in its decision of February 14, 1958

On October 29, 1964, the Court of First Instance of Davao issued an order approvingthe project of partition submitted by the executor, dated June 30, 1964, wherein the

properties of the estate were divided equally between Maria Lucy Christensen

Duncan (named in the will as Maria Lucy Christensen Daney, and hereinafter referred

to as merely Lucy Duncan), whom the testator had expressly recognized in his will ashis daughter (natural) and Helen Garcia, who had been judicially declared as such

after his death. The said order was based on the proposition that

succ cases

Documents